

МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ ЗА ОДБРАНА, БЕЗБЕДНОСТ И МИР


СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

24

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МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА



24

ГОДИНА XIII
СКОПЈЕ
ЈУЛИ 2013

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА	Год.	Број	Стр.	Скопје
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE	13	24	1-150	2013
	Vol.	No	pp	Skopje



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

**СОВРЕМЕНА CONTEMPORARY
МАКЕДОНСКА MACEDONIAN
ОДБРАНА DEFENCE**

ISSN 1409-8199

Година 13, бр. 24, јули 2013 / Vol. 13, No. 24, July 2013

Skopje
July 2013

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

Издавач:

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

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„Орце Николов“ 116 1000 Скопје
Телефони: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527
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WEB на Министерството за одбрана:
<http://www.morm.gov.mk/sovremena-makedonska-odbrana/>
Списанието излегува два пати годишно.

ISSN 1409-8199

Скопје, јули 2013 година

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Според мислењето на Министерството за култура бр. 07-7144/2 од 27. 12. 1999 година, за списанието „СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА“ се плаќа повластена даночна стапка.

CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

Publisher:

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ministry of Defence

„CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE“

„Orce Nikolov“ 116 1000 Skopje

Tel.: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

Internet adress:

WEB of the Ministry of Defence:

www.morm.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defence/

The magazine published twice a year

ISSN 1409-8199

Skopje, July, 2013

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Печат: „ЕВРОПА 92“ – Кочани

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INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC DEFENCE, SECURITY AND PEACE JOURNAL OF
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CONTENT:

Anton GRIZOLD, Erik KOPAČ SLOVENE NATIONAL SECURITY: BETWEEN NATIONAL SUVEREIGNTY AND EURO-ATLANTIC REALITY	7
Anthony WANIS-ST. JOHN FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: A SHIFT IN PARADIGM	23
Mirko BILANDZIĆ CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON TERRORISM: IS THERE A STATE TERRORISM	39
Mitko BOGDANOSKI, Drage PETRESKI CYBER TERRORISM– GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT	59
Tanja MILOSHEVSKA GLOBAL SUICIDE TERRORISM	73
Želimir KEŠETOVIĆ, Nikola JOCIĆ THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND NATO – BETWEEN COOPERATION AND A NEW CONFLICT	81
Jugoslav ACHKOSKI, Bojan NIKOLOVSKI PRIVACY SETTINGS FOR ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK	93
Igor GELEV PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTER DIPLOMACY	107
Biljana POPOVSKA THEORETICAL CONCEPTS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES	123
Ljupco STANKOVSKI PLANS FOR SECURING AND ESTIMATION OF SECURITY SITUATION (Planning as a primary and crucial phase of the process of risk managing)	137

SLOVENE NATIONAL SECURITY: BETWEEN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EURO-ATLANTIC REALITY

Anton GRIZOLD¹,
Erik KOPAČ²

Abstract: *National security system consisting two main elements: defense and internal security. At the same time the subsystems of disaster management and private security can be also installed in the context of the national security system. Over time Slovene national security system become part of Euro-Atlantic reality, which is still primarily design to ensure the national sovereignty. While nonmilitary elements of Slovene national security system undergone only minor, although not negligible "internationalization", contemporary Slovene defense concept is increasingly contingent on the transition from a national to collective defense; from defense aimed exclusively at the aggressor to one aimed against multiple threats; and from exclusive dependence on conscripts toward a professional army supplemented with contracted reserves.*

Key words: *Slovenia, national security, defense, internal security, disaster management, structure, system, policy*

Introduction

Prior to independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenian national interests over the centuries had been pursued within the framework of multi-national states entities: Austria Hungary until 1918, and the Yugoslav federation until independence. As a result, Slovenes had only two opportunities in their history to take part in warfare aimed to advance their national interests prior to independence: (1) the first occurred in WWI when Slovene units under General Maister fought against the Germans and managed to liberate a portion of land in the northern part of the present Slovenian state; (2) the second opportunity came during WWII when Slovene partizan units--regarded by many as the first Slovenian national army--fought against the Nazi occupiers.

It is not surprising then that Slovenia entered independence and statehood with little experience or a vision of how to establish its own security. In the initial stages of independence, the country was confronted with a realistic military threat from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army³. But the

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³ The Yugoslav military intervened in Slovenia immediately following the July 1991 declaration to break loose from the Yugoslav federation.

numerically smaller Slovene Territorial Defense and Police units managed to thwart the threat. This experience and the continuing violence connected with Yugoslavia's disintegration (1991-1995) forced Slovenia to seek ways to strengthen and modernize the nation's security capabilities and think seriously of a national security policy.

The purpose of this article is to present the core premises and components of Slovenia's national security. The starting point of this analysis will be the legal framework put in place by Slovenian authorities, which set forth the country's national security goals and the means to achieve them. Slovenian national security encompasses defense, internal security and disaster management mechanisms and instruments.

National security system

National security⁴ is defined as the state of security at the national level and the country's efforts to ensure the security of its citizens against threats from outside (interventions, attacks, occupation, blockades, etc..) and from within society (threat to law and public order, crime, natural disasters and other accidents, etc.). Contemporary national security in the advanced industrial countries is a political and private good that is realized as basic human rights. At national level, modern states ensure the security of their citizens through the activities of their national security systems. The efficiency of these systems reflects not only the capacity of the states to protect their basic social values against threats, to prevent danger and fear – but also their ability to ensure social development as well as the well-being of the population (Grizold, 1994). National security system, which consists of two main elements: national security policy and national security structures, provide security to all members of society (Grizold, 1999).

National security structure is designed to provide security at the level of society as a whole and is specific to each country. Nevertheless, most countries have two common components of this structure: defense and internal security. The tasks of defense component are: to deter any aggressor, to defend the national territory, unarmed resistance to aggression, to ensure the functioning of the political, economic and other social subsystems in the time of war, etc.. To implement these functions defense component of national security system can use two basic elements: the armed forces and civil defense. The tasks of internal security component are ensuring the maintenance of law and order, information and communication activities and the protection of the entire social infrastructure. Building blocks for the implementation of these functions are the police, intelligence services, inspection services, customs authorities and other formal supervisory and justice authorities (Grizold, 1999).

Subsystems of disaster management and private security can be also installed in the context of the national security system. The main task of disaster management subsystem is the protection of the population and material goods in the event of natural and other disasters and in war. Private security refers to a situation in which the protection, preventive and other activities prevent and resolve illegal and other acts that are within the competence of private security services (Čas, 2006). Therefore private security subsystem consist private

⁴ The phrase "national security" is of more recent origin. Its elements can be found in parts of Madison and later works of authors who have dealt with the security dimension of international relations (e.g. Lippman, Hartman, Kennan, Morgenthau, Kaplan et al).

security entities that carry out activities to protect people and property from destruction, damage, theft and other forms of malicious behavior.

Slovene national security system

Milestones of the construction of the Slovene national security system

In the initial stages of Slovene independence, 1991 to 1993, security related developments rested on the legal foundations adopted between 1990 and 1991. The immediate goal was to increase the professionalism of the military so that it can perform military functions, that is, protect and defend the state against outside threats (Grizold, 2008). In 1992, the National Assembly defines the first strategic direction of foreign policy orientated towards Euro-Atlantic political, security and economic integrations. In 1993, the National Assembly passed a resolution setting for the first time NATO membership as a strategic goal.

Enacted in 1994, the National Defense Act institutionalized the organization of the country's defense system. The Act outlines the Slovene military's organizational structure, dividing it into maneuverable and territorial parts. Recruitment is based on conscription and the law provides for general mobilization in situation of national emergency. The legislation details the fundamental principles of military work and provides labor-specific questions concerning professional service in the field of defense. The parameters of civil defense are elaborated and encompass economic and psychological elements. Finally, the Act establishes civilian oversight of the armed forces modeled on principles associated with parliamentary democracies. In 1994, Slovenia entered NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and began adjusting its military structure to meet those of NATO members.

In 1999 the National Assembly approved the Declaration of foreign policy which clearly exposed decision to apply for full EU and NATO membership. In late 2000 and early 2001 Slovene government inaugurated a substantial readjustment in the thinking regarding the nation's security system and the military's state of preparedness. In 2001 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy were adopted, and in 2002 National Defense Act was changed. The country new security concept was contingent on the transition from security aimed exclusively at the aggressor to one aimed against multiple threats; from a national to collective defense; and from exclusive dependence on conscripts toward a professional army supplemented with contracted reserves.

Contemporary Slovene national security system

Contemporary Slovene national security system consist three national security elements: security policy, security structure and security self-organization of civil society (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Slovene national security system

National security policy

The national security policy of the Republic of Slovenia consists primarily of foreign policy, defense policy, internal security policy and the policy of protection against natural and other disasters. The security aspect of the state policy in economic, social, environmental, medical, demographic, educational, scientific and technological, information and other areas is also taken into account in accordance with the modern, multi-dimensional understanding of the national security concept.

The fundamental purpose of the national security policy of the Republic of Slovenia is to (1) ensure the highest possible level of human security, appropriate social development and welfare of the Slovenian society, preserve the national identity of the Slovenian nation, as well as (2) fulfill the international obligations of the Republic of Slovenia and thus contribute to peacekeeping and strengthening of security and stability in the international community (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

a) Foreign policy

One of the fundamental objectives of the Republic of Slovenia's foreign policy is to ensure and strengthen the safe and stable position of the country within the international community. The Republic of Slovenia continues to meet this foreign political and national security objective by participating in the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and other international organizations and associations. As a member of the European Union and NATO, the country is a part of the community of states linked by common values and interests, such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, market economy and collective defense and security. Nevertheless the Republic of Slovenia will take as its basis those interests and objectives that are essential for the security and development of the country (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

b) Defense policy

The defense policy of the Republic of Slovenia remains focused on providing the defense capabilities, which are required for ensuring the national defense within the system of collective defense and security. The defense policy ensures further development of the defense system of the Republic of Slovenia in accordance with the principles of defense planning within NATO and the European Union, as well as the harmonization and interoperability of the defense subsystem with other subsystems within the system of the national security of the Republic of Slovenia. International activities of the Republic of Slovenia in the area of defense are primarily focused on those international operations and missions within NATO and the European Union which have a direct effect on the national security of the Republic of Slovenia (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

c) Internal security policy

The policy of ensuring internal security is directed towards safeguarding and protecting the constitutional order and the institutions of a democratic political system, towards ensuring the continuous operation of the system of law over the entire territory of the Republic of Slovenia and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, towards the fight against crime and the protection of public order, as well as towards the implementation of legislation and internal, judicial and parliamentary oversight of the work of security and intelligence services. The Republic of Slovenia devotes special attention to the Schengen border security and develops new forms of cooperation in the provision of internal security of the European Union, as well as with neighboring and other countries in the region (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

d) The policy of protection against natural and other disasters

The policy of protection against natural and other disasters remains to be focused on the comprehensive management of natural and other disasters. The main emphasis are on the enhancement of preventive activities, on the systematic increase of capabilities for the timely prediction, detection, monitoring and warning of disasters, on the reorganization of protection, rescue and relief forces at all levels and on the active international cooperation in the area of protection against natural and other disasters (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

Security structure

The provision of national security in the Republic of Slovenia is based on the operation of the defense system, the internal security system and the disaster management system, which are all subsystems of the national security system.

a) Defense system

The defense system of the Republic of Slovenia consists of (1) the Slovenian Armed Forces, as the promoter of military defense and the development of military capabilities, and (2) non-military parts of the defense system, which develop and implement the defense policy, provide conditions for the operation of the entire defense system, provide non-military capabilities in support of the Slovenian Armed Forces and allied forces, as well as carry out preparations and implement measures for the defense of the country and for the operation of the defense system in crisis situations. Through the implementation of activities which contribute to the defense of the country, other national authorities, local community bodies and civil society organizations of particular importance for defense are

also included in the defense system (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

The development of the defense system of the Republic of Slovenia is focused on its greater interoperability within the framework of NATO's collective defense, as well as common security and the defense policy of the European Union. Development of the Slovenian Armed Forces continues in line with the adopted or renewed longed medium-term national development plans and adopted NATO Force Goals. Priorities are given to the provision of key capabilities, the preparedness and the deployability of the Slovenian Armed Forces. In addition to the provision of capabilities for military defense, which is the primary mission of the Slovenian Armed Forces, the emphasis is given to the provision of capabilities and efficiency of the Slovenian Armed Forces in the implementation of other tasks such as military contribution to international peace, security and stability, cooperation in protection and rescue activities and support to other national authorities and organizations in the provision of security. Development of one part of the defense system is directed towards the provision of non-military capabilities in support of the operation of the Slovenian Armed Forces and allied forces in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, as well as on international operations and missions (Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Program of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025, 2010).

Slovene Armed Forces

The Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) independently and in cooperation with the alliance: (1) deter possible military aggression against Republic of Slovenia; (2) provide military defense of Republic of Slovenia and (3) contribute to international peace and stability. To achieve this mission SAF maintain operational readiness, activate and mobilize forces, deploy forces to the area of operation, conduct defensive operations, conduct offensive operations, contribute to international peace, security and stability and support in ensuring the safety and welfare of Slovene citizens (Military Doctrine, 2006).

The Slovenian Armed Forces are organized as unitary armed forces and are not divided into components. They operate at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The strategic level includes the General Staff. The operational level includes the Force Command and the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command. The tactical level includes brigades and battalions. In terms of their combat role, the Slovenian Armed Forces are divided into: combat forces, combat support forces, combat service support forces and command support forces (.

The Slovenian Armed Forces are manned with active and reserve component members. The active component is composed of professional Slovenian Armed Forces members, while the reserve component includes citizens who have signed a contract for service in the contracted reserve (Table 1).

<i>Component of Slovene Armed Forces</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
Active component	7544	82
Contracted reserve	1599	18
Total	9143	100

Table 1: Composition of the Slovenian Armed Forces

Source: Slovene Armed Forces, 2012.

The active component of SAF includes professional military service members: soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, uniformed specialists. Within SAF are employed also civilians and clerks; however, they do not perform military service (Table 2).

<i>Military service members and employees</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
Officers	1145	15,2
Non-commissioned officers	2023	26,8
Soldiers	3278	43,4
Uniformed specialists	617	8,2
Civilians	462	6,1
Clerks	19	0,3
Total	7544	100

Table 2: Active component of the Slovenian Armed Forces

Source: Slovene Armed Forces, 2012.

On May 1997, the Slovenian Armed Forces deployed its service members to a crisis response operation for the first time. The first unit deployed to the humanitarian operation Alba in Albania was a Medical Unit of the Slovenian Armed Forces and four liaison officers. Since then, the number of Slovenian troops in multinational operations and missions has been increasing. In February 2007, for the first time in the history of its participation in multinational operations and missions, the Slovenian Armed Forces deployed an entire battalion-level unit. Today, the main effort concerning the participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in multinational operations and missions is focused on multinational operations and missions in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR), while Slovenian troops are also present in Bosnia in Herzegovina, Lebanon, Syria, Serbia and Macedonia

(Table 3). In addition, the Slovenian Armed Forces contribute a part of its forces to the EU Battle Group and the NATO Response Force intended for operation within and beyond the borders of the Alliance (International operations and missions of SAF, 2012).

<i>International operations and missions</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>
Afghanistan – ISAF (NATO)	69	90	89	86
Bosnia and Herzegovina - JOINT ENTERPRISE (NATO)	2	5	6	3
Kosovo – KFOR (NATO)	395	332	301	294
Macedonia - JOINT ENTERPRISE (NATO)	1	4	1	1
Serbia - JOINT ENTERPRISE (NATO)	3	3	2	2
Iraq – NTM I (NATO)	2			
Bosnia and Herzegovina – ALTHEA (EU)	25	16	15	15
Somalia - ATALANTA, EU	1	2	1	1
Chad – CAR (EU)	15			
Lebanon-UNIFIL (ZN)	14	14	14	14
Syria - UNTSO, UNSMIS (ZN)	2	2	3	3
Total	529	468	432	419

Table 3: Slovene Armed Forces participation in international operations and missions
Source: International operations and missions of SAF, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.

Civil defense

Civil defense is a set of non-military measures and activities of state authorities, local government, companies, institutions and other organizations and citizens, which support and complement military defense, the functioning of the government in the war and provide supply, protection and survival of the population in the war (Defense Act, 1994, 2004).

With adoption of the Resolution on National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2001), Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2001) and Civil Defense Doctrine (2002), the civil defense gradually transformed into a civilian crisis planning which is focused to managing a wider range of threats. Civil defense tasks are expanded

with tasks associated with the provision of host nation support, and with the participation of civil structures in international military operations.

b) *Internal security system*

Internal security is provided through the operation of public security institutions, the police, the public prosecutor, inspection and supervisory bodies, the intelligence and security services, other national authorities, organizations with public authority, various security services and private law organizations, as well as local self-government bodies on the basis of their mutual cooperation in the Republic of Slovenia and at the international level. With regard to public safety matters, cooperation with organizations, associations, civil initiatives, and local communities is being established, as well as cooperation within the framework of public-private partnership (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

The development of the internal security system at the regulatory and organizational level is focused on activities for the provision of a higher level of internal security, with the emphasis on the development of the area of freedom, rule of law and human rights, on the development and implementation of tasks of the National Bureau of Investigation, the National Authority for Traffic Safety, the National Forensic Laboratory and the development and promotion of preventive activities in all areas of internal security.

Police

The police performs the following tasks: (1) protecting life, personal safety and property of people; (2) preventing, discovering and inspecting penal acts and minor offences, discovering and arresting those committing penal acts and minor offences, other wanted persons and their extradition to the authorized bodies; (3) maintaining public order; (4) control and regulation of traffic on public roads and non-categorized roads used for public traffic; (5) protecting the state border and performing border control; (6) performing tasks defined in the regulations about foreigners; (7) protecting certain persons, bodies, buildings and districts; and (8) protecting certain working places and the secrecy of information of state bodies (Police Act, 1998).

The police is a body within the Ministry of Interior. Its tasks perform at three levels: the state, the regional and the local levels. Organizationally, General Police Directorate represents state level. At regional level Slovenia is divided into eight police directorates. A good nine tenths of all police activities are performed at 111 police stations, the basic organizational unit at a local level.

Employees in the police service are composed of police officers, criminalists and Special Unit members (Table 4).

<i>Employees in the police service</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
police officers	7666	89
criminalists	885	10
Special Unit members	91	1
Total	8852	100

Table 4: Employees in the police service
Source: Police, 2012.

Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency

Three basic functions of the Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) are: (1) to collect information, (2) to evaluate information and (3) to provide information from abroad or relating to foreign countries (Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency Act, 1999).

The Agency's area of work covers intelligence and counter-intelligence as well as the security aspects. (1) The intelligence activity involves collecting information from abroad, relevant for safeguarding the security, political and economic interests of the state. The intelligence and the counter-intelligence work in the Agency intertwine in collecting information on organizations, groups and persons who, through their activities abroad or in connection with foreign entities, constitute or could constitute a threat to the national security and constitutional order. (2) The Agency's activity in the security field is carried out in cooperation with the relevant state bodies and services, in particular those whose main subject of concern is the security of the country. This cooperation is particularly important for clearance and providing information relevant to the security of certain persons, posts, bodies, facilities and areas. When performing tasks SOVA cooperates and exchanges information also with foreign intelligence and security services and this way contributes to ensuring national and international security (Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency, 2012).

SOVA is an independent government service. In the discharge of its work, SOVA are overseen by the Government, the Parliamentary Oversight Commission, the relevant District Court, the Ombudsman, the Court of Audits and Budget Supervision Office, and the public. Apart from the oversight from the outside, the services are overseen also internally.

The Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia

The Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia protects legal economic flows in the customs territory of the European Union and protects life and health of the people by preventing illegal imports of products and substances. The service controls import and export of goods and the international supply chain, and maintains balance between

security, protection and financial interests of Slovenia and the European Union on the one hand and enhanced competitiveness of the economy on the other.

The customs service tasks include: (1) customs and excise control of goods and clearance of goods; (2) levying, charging and collection of import duties, export duties and other taxes and excise duties; (3) customs inspections; (4) prevention and detection of customs and excise offences and other punishable acts; (5) control of entry, exit and transit of goods for which special measures are regulatory due to interest of security, protection of health and life of people, animals and plants, and protection of environment, cultural heritage or intellectual property; (6) control of declaration of domestic and foreign currency on entry and exit; (7) collection of statistical data on the trade in goods between EU Member States; (7) implementation of foreign-trade measures and common agricultural policy measures and; (8) implementation of EU customs law and international customs agreements (The Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, 2012).

The Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia is a body within the Ministry of Finance. The custom performs its tasks at three levels: the state, the regional and the local. Organizationally, General Customs Directorate represents state level. Ten Customs Directorates are established at regional level. At local level 27 customs offices are located on borders and inland. The custom employs a staff of 1650 (The Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, 2012).

c) Disaster management system

The disaster management system⁵ is intended for the protection of people, animals, property, cultural heritage and the environment against natural and other disasters, with a view to reducing the number of disasters and preventing or reducing the number of casualties and other consequences of such disasters. The disaster management system includes programming, planning, organisation, implementation, supervision, and the financing of measures and activities for protection against natural and other disasters. Within their jurisdiction or the scope of their rights and responsibilities, protection against natural and other disasters is provided by the citizens of the Republic of Slovenia either as individuals or organised in voluntary associations, professional organisations and other non-governmental organisations engaged in protection against natural and other disasters, by public rescue services, commercial companies, institutes and other organisations, local communities and the state. Protection against natural and other disasters is implemented as a unified and integrated national security subsystem organised at the level of local and wider self-governing communities, regions and the state (Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).

The development of the disaster management system at the regulatory and organisational level is focused on the promotion of an integrated approach to protection

⁵ The term disaster also includes the consequences of war, use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as consequences of terrorist attacks and other forms of mass violence.

against disasters with the emphasis on preventive activities, on the reduction of compulsory service units and on the increase in the effectiveness of other protection, rescue and relief forces, as well as on capacity building for the mutual assistance in case of disasters within the European Union and with other countries in the region.

Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief

Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (ACPDR) performs administrative and professional protection, rescue and relief tasks as well as other tasks regarding protection against natural and other disasters (The Doctrine on Protection, Rescue and Relief, 2002). Within its scope, the ARSCPDR is responsible for: (1) risk assessments for the territory of Slovenia as well as national civil emergency plans; (2) monitoring, notifying and alerting in the event of a disaster; (3) organisation and equipping of national civil protection units and services, provision of guidelines for the development and readiness of all public rescue services within national jurisdiction and co-funding of fire-fighting units that are of great importance for society and other organizations and societies and (4) coordination and implementation of international protection and relief activities of the Republic of Slovenia with neighbouring and other countries as well as within regional initiatives and international organizations (NATO, UNO) and the European Union (Act on the Protection Against Natural and Other Disasters, 1994, 2006).

ACPDR is a constituent body of the Ministry of Defence. ACPDR is divided into six internal organizational units based in Ljubljana as well as 13 other ACPDR branches operating throughout Slovenia. Within each branch there is a regional notification centre that performs a 24-hour duty service. Altogether, 300 people are employed at ACPDR branches and notification centres (Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief, 2012).

d) Private security and security self-organization of civil society

In addition to institutionalized security provisions at the level of the state, Republic of Slovenia also has provisions to ensure security at individual or community level. These embrace: spontaneous self-protection (self-defense) activities of individuals, and various forms and levels of self-organization of social groups (interest groups, local communities). However, the security activities of civil society are still immanently linked with the security system of each particular society.

Private security represents the protection of people and property carried out as an economic activity by companies and independent entrepreneurs, namely: (1) as a gainful activity for contracting authorities on the basis of a contractual relation (contractual security) or; (2) as a non-profit activity for one's own needs (internal security). The activity of private security is adjusted with sectoral policies in the field

of national security of the Republic of Slovenia, especially the policy of ensuring internal security (Strategy in the Field of Private Security, 2010).

Conclusion

Slovenia's security situation in the twenty-first century is substantially different than in the early 1990s, and the scope and structure of its security system have also been modified. At the dawn of independence (and before) the country depended on Territorial Defense forces and Police units. Their task was to protect and defend the nation's newly-found sovereignty. Today Slovenia finds itself in a fundamentally changed political security context. As an actively engaged EU, NATO, and UN member the country participates in international forums and is committed to do its part to strengthen peace, security and stability in region and beyond. These require the implementation of an even more modern security system, capable of effectively adapting to the changes and challenges of national and international security.

Therefore it is not surprising that today Slovene defense concept is contingent on the transition from a national to collective defense; from defense aimed exclusively at the aggressor to one aimed against multiple threats; and from exclusive dependence on conscripts toward a professional army supplemented with contracted reserves. The military is organized in full accordance with NATO and EU conceptual and technological standards. Depending on their combat role, the troops are being divided into compartments for war fighting, support, war preparatory units, and leadership. The force's organizational structure has also been transformed, with the goals to correct past inefficiencies of bloated and "hollow" military structure intend solely for its own national defense; and to help the military fulfill its responsibilities and mission as a member of a collective security organizations.

On the other hand other elements of Slovene national security system experienced much smaller, although not negligible "internationalization". Internal security is provided through the operation of public security institutions, the police, the public prosecutor, inspection and supervisory bodies, the intelligence and security services, other national authorities, organizations with public authority, various security services and private law organizations, as well as local self-government bodies on the basis of their mutual cooperation mainly in the Republic of Slovenia. With regard to public safety matters, cooperation with organizations, associations, civil initiatives, and local communities is being established, as well as cooperation within the framework of public-private partnership. Protection against natural and other disasters is implemented as a unified and integrated national security subsystem organised at the level of local and wider self-governing communities, regions and the state. The system of protection against natural and other disasters is closely connected with other subsystems of the national security system and linked with the international mechanisms in this field. Some principles of crisis management and solutions in the area of crisis management implemented in the EU and NATO have been already taken into account.

It can be concluded that the Slovene national security system become part of Euro-Atlantic reality, but is still primarily design to ensure the national sovereignty.

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FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: A SHIFT IN PARADIGM

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Abstract: *The main goal of this paper is to define and discuss conflict prevention as a range of policy actions and instruments designed to either prevent a foreseen, perhaps imminent, initial outbreak of violence, or to prevent the recurrence of violence after it has been halted, or to prevent its further escalation after it has been contained. As the international security environment has undergone important transitions since the end of the Cold War, a preventive approach has gained in importance as well, for reasons we discuss in this paper and throughout the present work.*

Key words: *conflict prevention, crisis management, peacemaking, violence, mission*

Introduction

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...and for these ends...to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, except in the common interest...

- Preamble to the UN Charter

You've created an international crisis, that's why I've come to see you.

- Kissinger to Sadat, November 1973²

We cannot careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises.

- Warren Christopher³

The international community has often responded to crises and threats to international peace in a reactive, ad hoc manner. Policymakers and theorists interested in conflict resolution today are in broad agreement that preventing violent conflicts is generally preferable to post hoc responses,

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² Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper Row, 1977), 267.

³ Warren Christopher, as Secretary of State designate, Testimony during his Senate Confirmation Hearing, cited in Michael S. Lund, "Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy," in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996)

i.e., after the outbreak of violence. Thus a relatively new conceptual emphasis on conflict prevention has emerged that, in theory at least, provides the logic for peacemaking action prior to an outbreak of internal or international armed violence. In practice, conflicts metamorphose constantly and can go from relative calm to dormancy to massive violence. While a chronological sequencing of international peacemaking efforts has logical appeal, realities on the ground make the *intentionality* and *design* of preventive action more relevant to conflict resolution and peacemaking than the timing and sequencing question of *when* the preventive action actually takes place (although timing is clearly important).

Conflict prevention is defined here as a range of policy actions and instruments designed to 1) either prevent a foreseen, perhaps imminent, *initial* outbreak of violence, or 2) to prevent the recurrence of violence after it has been halted, or 3) to prevent its further escalation after it has been contained. As the international security environment has undergone important transitions since the end of the Cold War, a preventive approach has gained in importance as well, for reasons we discuss in this chapter and throughout the present work.

Conflict prevention is a concept that supports a number of strategic policy actions that seek to prevent an outbreak, escalation or return to violent conflict. Preventive diplomacy and preventive military deployment are the two major areas of purposeful action and in each category there are variations. Preventive diplomacy can include the dispatch of high level envoys from a regional or international organization or state to a conflict zone in order to assist the conflict parties to change perceptions and take de-escalatory actions in the conflict they are engaged in. States and IOs are not the only actors; NGOs, religious organizations and eminent persons acting on their own but in coordination with others can have the same purpose. Regardless of the actor or level of engagement, the principal tool is negotiation or mediation. Preventive military deployments also have a range of possible configurations ranging from humanitarian protection, observation and monitoring of demilitarization, reporting on human rights violations, accompaniment in the return of displaced populations, as well as robust deployments of combat troops for the purpose of deterring an armed conflict or enforcing the terms of a peace settlement or other mandate.

In contrast with the diplomatic and military approaches to prevention, it has been widely argued that development work can be oriented toward the underlying “root” causes of conflicts in such a way that a conflict-prone region or state will be able to escape the onset and escalation of violent conflict. Scholars and practitioners refer to this variant as “structural prevention” and given its conceptual overlap with development and peacebuilding, we do not address here, limiting ourselves to the diplomatic - military variants.

Peacemaking in all of its facets, whether done by statesmen and diplomats, military, humanitarian workers or eminent individuals, is conducted under conditions of complexity. The sheer number of intervenors, the multiplicity and fractious nature of conflict parties (especially armed non-state groups) and the shifting political and economic terrain on which all of these operate virtually assure that both the process and outcomes of peace efforts are plagued by uncertainties. History is strewn with cases of extraordinary peacemaking efforts that nevertheless were undermined by parties internal or external to the conflict. Given the extraordinary challenges of making peace during or after violent conflict, the capacity to predict and actually prevent conflict is intrinsically appealing.

Conflict prevention, as an organized set of activities in favor of the preservation or consolidation of peace, marks a shift from the realist paradigm that emphasized international politics by crisis management (see the quote above attributed to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger) to a more critical and nuanced approach that at the very least seeks to pre-empt violence or massive escalation of violence, and in some cases, seeks to go so far as to redress the root causes of violence before it erupts.

Crisis Management versus Conflict Prevention

Prior to the October 1973 war in the Middle East, Egypt and the United States had no formal relations. Egypt was however, seeking to get the US to play an intermediary role and broker a peace settlement. In secret back channel encounters in February and May 1973, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger signaled to his Egyptian counterpart Hafiz Ismail, that “the United States regrettably could do nothing so long as [Egypt] was the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority.”⁴

Sadat had re-oriented Egypt’s foreign policy away out of the Soviet sphere and inched toward the US, believing that *only the US* could accomplish three goals: first, bring Israeli decisionmakers to the peace table; second, deliver a ‘land for peace’ bargain in which Israel would return the Arab territories it occupied since the June 1967 Middle East War; and third, as the critical consequence of the first two, prevent a further war in the region. But Kissinger was deeply stuck in the assumption that US diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East could best be leveraged if the parties were facing an imminent or emerging crisis. In doing so, he virtually assured that the fourth regional war (the October 1973 War) would be fought in the Middle East.⁵ In his pursuit of ‘balancing’, it can be appreciated that Kissinger’s goals were not about preventing the 1973 war (which took Kissinger by surprise even though he had heard Sadat openly warning about for the three years preceding). His diplomacy in the wake of the conflagration was unapologetically concerned with using the outbreak of violence to further US strategic goals in the Middle East.⁶

In essence, Kissinger was operating according to the logic of crisis management. The prevention of international crises and wars operates according to a very different kind of logic, and to understand how conflict prevention is a conceptual challenge to crisis management, it is necessary to understand both.

Kissinger’s energetic diplomacy in the aftermath of that war was brilliant and strategic with regard to US interests as he defined them especially with regard to sidelining Soviet support for Arab nationalism. Nevertheless it was a product of the original assumption: there was no vision for a new regional order or bold initiatives. He played the shuttle diplomat himself, achieving only the smallest territorial adjustments for Syria and Egypt and no comprehensive peace for Israel, Syria or Egypt. It can legitimately be argued that the Egyptian military offensive—however costly—was a necessary precursor to later diplomatic movement and that it significantly modified both the US and Israeli assessment of Sadat as leader and statesman. But at what cost? Syria and Israel would not seriously

⁴ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 238.

⁵ The regional wars of the Middle East in post World War II era are the war between Arab and Jewish nationalist forces in British Mandate Palestine (1945-1948), which led directly to the ensuing war between the Israeli state and the surrounding Arab states (1948), the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 War (Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria), the 1973 War (Syria, Egypt, Israel), the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1991), the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982). Connected with these have been other conflicts, including the Palestinian uprisings of 1987-1993 and 2001-present, the conflicts between the PLO and Jordan, between the PLO and Syria, the 1996 and 2006 confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

⁶ Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown, 1982).

entertain peace talks with each other until nearly two decades and further regional wars (the Lebanese civil war and the Persian Gulf Crisis) had passed. Sadat had to wait until the next US administration under President Carter, who brought Egypt and Israel into a comprehensive peace agreement that has successfully prevented further Egypt-Israeli wars. The other dimensions of the regional conflict remained unchanged however because the Camp David Accords provisions for addressing the core, underlying Palestinian-Israeli conflict remained unimplemented.

The numerous intrastate wars that were fought during, and especially after, the Cold War, with their consequent humanitarian emergencies, genocidal violence, massive cross-border refugee flows, and other threats such as state collapse all gave impetus to the new emphasis on prevention that revealed a certain fatigue with the classic approaches.

The assumptions underlying conflict prevention as a peace-oriented practice are straightforward enough: Efforts by conflict parties or third party intervenors to insure that expected or feared hostilities do not break out. To do so, a number of instruments need to be used: detection and early warning of an impending violent conflict, accurate analysis of the conflict data, mobilization of political will regardless of the forum (states, IOs, regional organizations or NGOs), expertly deployed diplomatic intervention to help conflict parties find alternative means to achieve political goals, and possible military deployments to deter armed conflict onset or escalation, or to monitor military movements and human rights violations, among other instruments. The novelty is not so much in the instruments themselves as in the intention of policymakers to use them in a preventive capacity.

The Emergence of Conflict Prevention

The practice and study of conflict prevention have burgeoned in recent decades. The Council on Foreign Relations created its “Center for Preventive Action” and the Carnegie Corporation’s Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict gathered researchers and practitioners from all over the global political spectrum and began promoting reflection, teaching, research and diplomacy all premised on the assumption that conflict could and indeed should be prevented. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe founded a Center for Conflict Prevention at the 1990 CSCE Summit. National government agencies, multilateral organizations and civil society organizations have steadily been ‘mainstreaming’ the concept of conflict prevention into their rhetoric and practice. Diplomatic academies and graduate education in international affairs have begun to emphasize and teach conflict prevention, supplementing the classical approach of analyzing historical crisis management cases.

For the international community—the UN, NATO, the EU and other cooperative international organizations—the past two decades demonstrated that the failure to predict and prevent regional and internal wars called into question the very reason for their existence and the processes by which they make policy. In the most egregious cases, including Rwanda on the eve of the genocide and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the aftermath of the break up of FYR, the existing instruments of the international community, including the deployment of armed peacekeepers with humanitarian mandates, high level diplomatic contact groups empowered to craft deals and propose them to the belligerents, simply did not fit either

the timing of those conflicts as they emerged or the sheer scale of human suffering they caused. History would repeat itself in other areas of the world after those failures, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and elsewhere. These very members of the international community began talking in terms of the need to strengthen their capacity for ‘early warning’ of violent conflict, which—it was hoped—would hopefully awaken the political will of national and international leaders who could then mobilize the diplomatic and military resources to make a difference early on; either to prevent a conflict entirely or to forestall its further escalation.

Conceptual Evolution of Conflict Prevention

The prevention of violent conflict has long been a concern of leaders, states, alliances and international organizations, perhaps as long as some of them have chosen violent conflict as a policy instrument. In recent contemporary history, the prevention of conflict has been upheld as an aspiration of international cooperation. The UN Charter, in its preamble, focused on the prevention of war as one of the principal aims of the UN at its founding. In part due to the stalemate of the Cold War and the assumption that wars, even internal and regional conflicts, were proxies for the US-Soviet rivalry, conflict prevention had not been widely practiced even by the UN, the most important and legitimate international organization dedicated to international peace, security and development.

The UN Charter’s Basis for Preventive Action

The UN Charter contains numerous references to conflict prevention practices. For example, Article 34 under Chapter VI “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” provides for the UN Security Council to investigate any “situation which might lead to international friction.” Article 33 authorizes the Security Council to call on any dispute parties to settle their dispute by peaceful means, if its continuance is likely to endanger international peace. Under Chapter VII, “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression,” Article 39 emphasizes UNSC action to “maintain or restore” peace. Article 40 gives the UNSC the power to call upon parties to take provisional measures (such as ceasefires, redeployments, etc.) pending resolution of the conflict. Article 43 calls for UN member states to negotiate agreements for the provision of armed forces available to the Security Council. Article 50 discusses rights of consultation for countries facing negative economic impacts due to “preventive or enforcement” measures taken by the UNSC. Article 99 empowers the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that may “threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Despite so many preventive aspects of the Charter, the UN system as a whole and the international community remained firmly entrenched in a culture of reaction.

Moving From Reaction to Prevention

There has also been a growing sense that such conflicts the violent internal and regional wars of the post Cold War era could have been significantly mitigated or stopped altogether had a culture of prevention prevailed over the entrenched practices of great and

medium powers reacting to conflicts, and only in accord with their political interests. It is now possible to compare the actual cost of reactive peace operations and humanitarian interventions with the projected cost of preventive action: For example, an analysis by the Carnegie Commission concluded that \$200 billion was actually spent on the 1990s operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia and the Persian Gulf War while the comparatively smaller budget of \$70 billion would have sufficed to implement a preventive strategy in those cases.⁷ While such conclusions and arguments involve counterfactual analysis, the possibilities they raise are intriguing to policymakers and theorists concerned with the ever-escalating humanitarian, political and economic costs of violent conflict.

There have been several important conceptual milestones in the development of a more comprehensive and robust international conflict resolution practice that includes conflict prevention. During the 1980s, in the twilight years of the Cold War, a number of international interventions such as those in Namibia and Cambodia created new precedents for more holistic, multidisciplinary peace-keeping that combined military forces and humanitarian assistance with an emphasis on governance and post conflict justice and reconciliation. As with numerous past efforts, these operations took place in the aftermath of violence and upon the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement. The mode of intervention was still 'reaction' rather than prevention.

However, the global conflict panorama began to change in disturbing ways. The concept of conflict prevention has gained in strength as the ferocity of internal, regional and interstate wars grew since the end of the Cold War. Not all of the Cold War legacy conflicts resolved themselves as the Cold War passed away. More importantly, a series of shockingly violent internal and interstate wars were ignited and fought, ostensibly around issues of ethnic and religious identity, among other non-ideological causes. These conflicts often created massive humanitarian crises and civilians were no longer 'collateral damage' but direct targets. Belligerents—whether state or non-state actors—were often fractious, resistant to negotiation, inclined to break ceasefires, and highly committed to violence. International leadership and global public opinion began to align in favor of more assertive action in response to this situation. This was symbolized nowhere more powerfully than in the unprecedented cooperation within the UN Security Council that began in the early 1990s.

The Security Council Summit and An Agenda for Peace

In response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council unanimously authorized a US-led international military coalition to reverse the Iraqi occupation. As the Cold War came to an end, the UN Security Council met as a summit of heads of state or government on January 31, 1992, for the first time in its history. One of the outcomes of the summit was that the Security Council envisioned taking more action for the prevention and resolution of conflict. The Council tasked the UN Secretary General to report on ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for "preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking

⁷ Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, A/55/985, S/2001/574, June 7, 2001.

and for peace-keeping.”⁸ And they noted that his “analysis and recommendations could cover the role of the United Nations in identifying potential crises and areas of instability...”—a reference to the need for detection and early warning of impending conflicts.⁹

Thus, one of the most critical of the contemporary conceptual milestones was the publication, five months after the Security Council summit, of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*.¹⁰ In his report, the Secretary General wrote that the aims of the UN must be:

“To seek to identify at the *earliest possible stage* situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;

- Where conflict erupts, to *engage in peacemaking* aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;

- Through peace-keeping, to work to *preserve peace, however fragile*, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in *implementing agreements* achieved by the peacemakers;

- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;

- And in the largest sense, to *address the deepest causes of conflict*: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression...¹¹

An Agenda set out a multidimensional concept of conflict prevention that encompassed 1) “diplomacy to ease tensions before they result in conflict,” 2) the immediate containment of a conflict in its early stages, and 3) the prevention of a recurrence or relapse of a halted conflict. All three were and continue to be valid and interlocking dimensions of international action to prevent conflict although they differ in terms of timing of such action and the instruments and policies to be used at each stage.

In its purest form, conflict prevention entails action that is taken prior to the eventuality of a conflict, yet in practice, conflicts are dynamic and can overwhelm even the best intentioned of preventive practices. Thus the emphasis on early action after the outbreak of violence and prevention of further relapse are necessary adjuncts to the pure definition.

The instruments for doing so were restated by the UNSG, including the use of:

Diplomatic missions by the SG, senior staff or regional organizations. Such preventive diplomacy would make use of, as needed:

- confidence building measures
- fact-finding missions by the principal UN organs
- early warning networks making use of the UN’s own specialized agencies on the ground in conflict regions, as well as the knowledge of regional organizations

⁸ Note by the President of the Security Council, 3046th Meeting of the UNSC, S/23500, January 31, 1992.

⁹ S/23500, p. 3

¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the Statement at the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, A/47/277, S/24111, June 17, 1992

¹¹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda For Peace*, paragraph 15 (emphasis added).

- preventive military deployments that would either deter an aggressor or reduce tensions among potential internal or interstate conflict parties
- the creation of demilitarized zones, especially on shared borders.¹²

The emphasis in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* continued to be in strict compliance with the requirements of the UN Charter, Art. 2(7) recognizing the domestic jurisdiction of states and proscribing international intervention without state consent. While Chapter 7 of the UN Charter had long before carved out the circumstances under which the domestic jurisdiction provisions of Art. 2(7) no longer applied, the *Agenda* still proceeded with caution.

More assertively, the UNSG also recommended that a long-unfulfilled aspect of the international conflict management system be reinvigorated when he called for the negotiation of agreements under Article 43 of the UN Charter, which was intended to make available both ad hoc and permanently available armed forces to the UN. While it would be the Security Council that would have to authorize such deployments in the case of imminent armed conflict, the UNSG proposed that the units be placed under the command of the Secretary General directly.¹³ Such “peace-enforcement” deployments would be highly useful in the true prevention and deterrence of violence, but also to restore a broken ceasefire and prevent a recurrence of more violence. For a variety of reasons including the structural dynamics of the UNSC membership—which reflected the global balance of power in the wake of the Second World War—most states have tended to be cool to several of the concepts of *An Agenda*. This has tended to undermine the preventive capacity of the UN as a global collective security organization. Most critically of course, any conflict involving a permanent member of the UNSC or even a close ally would be able to evade any preventive mechanisms of the UN.

An Agenda for Peace also argued for a more innovative concept linked to prevention of conflict recurrence: “post-conflict peace-building,” which would entail very comprehensive activities that range from demining, to demobilization, disarming and reintegration, to the support for the creation of democratic governing structures in the post-conflict state.

The Post Cold War Panorama: Failures to Prevent

Naturally, the state of the world did not remain static with the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. States, regional organizations and especially international organizations such as the UN continued to evolve the practice of preventive diplomacy, and the UN Secretary General created the then-new Department of Political Affairs in part to provide early warning of impending conflicts, policy recommendations for UN and international preventive action, as well as analysis of options for action in ongoing conflicts.

The wars, interventions and lessons learned from the conflicts in Angola, Somalia, Haiti and the former Yugoslav republic, particularly the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide, among other conflicts, led the Secretary General to further thinking about conflict resolution capacity of the international community. In January 1995,

¹² *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraphs 23-33.

¹³ *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 44.

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali issued his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*.¹⁴ Among the problems he noted were the UN's lack of senior diplomatic personnel capable of carrying out preventive diplomatic missions or peace-making missions and the difficulties of financing preventive diplomatic missions.¹⁵ He highlighted the continuing lack of UN access to deployable forces: not a single one of the 19 countries that had troops on standby agreed to deploy them to the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda when the Security Council authorized an expansion of UNAMIR while the genocide was underway in May 1994.¹⁶ Of course, this came in the wake of the traumatic events surrounding the UN/US intervention in Somalia.

As the Rwandan genocide took place in the aftermath of a comprehensive peace process, and in the presence of a UN mission, the case brought into stark relief the frailty of international conflict resolution practice and the continuing human propensity for genocidal violence. In many ways Rwanda was a case of the cumulative failure of conflict prevention: even with early intelligence of impending genocidal violence and an international peacekeeping mission on the ground, a small group of *genocidaire* leaders was able to successfully cow the Security Council into paralysis and worse, denial about what was happening and unwillingness to take action that would have prevented the genocide. The force commander, Gen. Romeo Dallaire had warned the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of an impending "extermination" campaign against Rwandan Tutsis in his January 11, 1994 cable.¹⁷ As is now widely known, the DPKO rebuffed General Dallaire, utterly ignored his warnings and denied his requests for permission to undertake vigorous action to raid weapons caches that were to be used in the genocide. The magnitude of violence in Rwanda highlights the fact even robust and sustained conflict resolution efforts—intended to prevent the escalation of violence, if not its initial outbreak—can fail utterly if the peacemakers and mediators are uncoordinated and lack the political will to face the unexpected outcomes of their work, and if the conflict parties see more utility in war than in peaceful settlement.

While a full analysis of the international community's failures in Rwanda is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that the international community was indeed engaged in Rwanda *prior* to the genocide. The pre-genocide war in Rwanda had its roots decades before the events of 1994, and started with the October 1990 incursion into Rwanda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces from Uganda. In focusing on the horrors of the genocide, it is often overlooked that almost immediately after the 1990 RPF incursion, formal and informal mediation efforts were initiated by Belgium, Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda, the UN, the OAU, and another regional organization, the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes Region. According to Bruce Jones' exhaustive study of that peace process, "these efforts were not designed specifically to prevent a genocide,

¹⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, A/50/60, S/1995/1, January 25, 1995

¹⁵ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, paragraphs 28-32.

¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 43.

¹⁷ The cable from General Dallaire entitled "Request for Protection for Informant," to Maj. Gen. Baril, DPKO, January 11, 1994. At <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw011194.pdf>

but they were designed to prevent an escalation of the conflict and lay the groundwork for peace.”¹⁸ Ceasefire agreements were signed in March 1991, September 1991 and July 12, 1992, but broke down each time.

The Rwandan government and the RPF finally began comprehensive peace negotiations in June 1992, skillfully facilitated by Tanzania, with participation and support from a wide variety of neighboring states, the US, France, Belgium, Germany, the OAU and the UN. The official mediation efforts were supplemented by Track II diplomacy, including efforts by the Vatican’s Papal Nuncio. The peace efforts gained momentum and culminated in the Arusha Accords signed on August 4, 1993. And yet, as skillful as the mediation of the peace process was, and as comprehensive as the Arusha Accords were, neither was successful in stopping the ongoing war between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda. Worse still, the prevention and peace-keeping measures taken as a result of the peace process, including the deployment of the UNAMIR mission, provided early warning of the genocide, only to be effectively ignored by nearly every major international actor. The Rwandan genocide, as well as numerous other cases where there was international engagement, are not “failures of preventive action, but failures to act preventively:”¹⁹ pointing us once again to the intentions underlying the actions of international engagement, which would or should determine the ensuing strategies. The Arusha peace process for Rwanda, as comprehensive, well-structured and well-intentioned as it was, resulted in a peace agreement that would not be implemented. It was never structured to prevent the genocide in any way.

The shame of the Rwanda debacle perhaps helps us see why the Secretary General in 1995 went beyond the call to negotiate Article 43 agreements and urged the creation of a UN rapid reaction force always available for the Security Council to call upon in an international emergency. Such a force would have great capacity for conflict prevention in crises where an armed force with a broad mandate was needed to prevent the outbreak, escalation or renewal of armed conflict. As noted above, it bears mentioning that if such a force were available to the Security Council, it would almost certainly be prevented from deploying to a conflict in which a permanent member was either a direct or proxy party. The US ‘war of choice’ in Iraq and, on a lesser scale, the Russian incursion into Georgia in August 2008 are but two examples of conflicts that a P5 member initiated in defiance of international consensus and outside of the frameworks of international organizations or established defensive alliances. In the Secretary General’s *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* he noted that when member states are parties to a conflict—interstate or internal—they raise barriers to the Secretariat’s preventive diplomacy activities. “Clearly the United Nations cannot impose its preventive and peacemaking activities on Member States who do not want them. Legally and politically, their request for, or at least acquiescence in, United Nations action is a *sine qua non*.”²⁰

¹⁸ Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 3.

¹⁹ The quote is from Alice Ackermann, *Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), p. 25.

²⁰ Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 28.

Prevention, as an operational concept, would nevertheless be reaffirmed as a result of the failures of international community regarding Rwanda, notably in the 2004 Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which identified the responsibility to prevent genocide as the most critical of postures for the international community to adopt.²¹

It must be soberly noted that the international community's retrospective on Rwanda did not preclude failures to prevent further wars in Liberia, chaos and collapse in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Israel-Hezb'allah, Palestine-Israel, Iraq, Chechnya, Pakistan, Afghanistan and many other cases.²² And international consensus in favor of ending Sudan's long war with the SPLM/A in Southern Sudan has failed to translate into anything more than frail efforts to end Sudan's warmaking and genocidal violence in Darfur.

In any case, the failures to prevent and the obstacles to action have in no way diluted the necessity of a global emphasis on conflict prevention—however configured. Instead, they have underlined the ongoing urgency of building international consensus in favor of conflict prevention systems, strategies and actions.

While the UN continues to be a pivotal piece of any global or regional approach to conflict prevention, efforts to realize some of Boutros Ghali's recommendations and to innovate others, have been ongoing. Under the Kofi Annan's leadership, the UN made major improvements in its organization and work in order to reduce some of the bureaucratic gridlock and introduce cross departmental, interagency collaboration in the service of prevention.²³ Annan himself has taken the lead on conflict prevention activities, for example, personally engaging in a successful long-term effort to prevent any outbreak of violence between Nigeria and Cameroon before and after a 2002 ICJ ruling that awarded the Bakassi Peninsula, an oil-rich territory they were disputing, to Cameroon. The UN, for all of its shortcomings, is the premier international organization. It can continue to play an ever more robust and well-considered role in prevention activities of all types.²⁴

Preventive Deployment

If all goes well, a preventive diplomacy effort will successfully stop escalatory tendencies and return the parties to the path of constructive, collaborative resolution of their political differences by non-violent means. In numerous cases, preventive diplomacy is undertaken at several levels simultaneously (UN, regional organizations and states) with varying degrees of coordination. However, the peace that is consolidated by diplomacy may

²¹ International Peace Academy, *Ten Years After the Genocide in Rwanda: Building Consensus on the Responsibility to Protect*, Report on the Memorial Conference on the Rwandan Genocide, Jointly organized by the governments of Rwanda and Canada, United Nations, New York, March 26, 2004. Accessed at http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/10_YEARS_AFTER_GENOCIDE.pdf

²² See for example the six devastating case chapters in, I. William Zartman, *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse* (Lynne Rienner, 2005).

²³ Report of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, A/55/985 S/2001/574, June 7, 2001.

²⁴ Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone, *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 2002)

need to be preserved by the threat of more coercive measures, and preventive diplomacy can be combined with the preventive deployment of military forces.

There are two cases of preventive action that successfully combined preventive diplomatic action by the UN and other international actors with a Blue-Helmet preventive military deployment. These cases appear to more closely conform to the definition of conflict prevention activities as they were initiated in anticipation of an outbreak of hostilities. Two 'true' preventive deployments are MINURCA in the Central African Republic and UNPREDEP in Macedonia. We limit our discussion in this chapter to MINURCA only, as the remainder of our book addresses the origins of the Macedonia conflict; the initiation, conduct and termination of UNPREDEP; and the causes and consequences of the post-UNPREDEP ethnic conflict that broke out in 2001. In this chapter, it should be noted that UNPREDEP's contribution to peace in Macedonia was painfully confirmed two years after the mission's sudden demise; violence broke out between a shadowy Kosovo-linked militant group and Macedonian government forces. Henryk Sokalski, Polish diplomat and head of UNPREDEP from 1995 to 1998, has argued that the withdrawal of the mission left Macedonia vulnerable to infiltration from Kosovo and that its continued presence would have helped Macedonians avoid the painful ethnic violence of 2001.²⁵

MINURCA and the Central African Republic

After a political crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) erupted and threatened to become a wider armed conflict with potential regional implications (CAR borders Chad, Sudan, Cameroon, Congo and the DRC), an Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB), was established by the Presidents of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali in January 1997. All four had helped mediate a ceasefire between the government of the CAR and armed rebel groups, which was followed immediately by a comprehensive settlement of the conflict (The Bangui Agreements). However, the political, military and socio-economic situation continued to be unstable and prone to violence, although outright civil war had not broken out yet. Further ceasefire arrangements were signed in June and July 1997. In August 1997, the President of CAR requested that the UN Security Council put MISAB under its authority, and under Resolutions 1125 and 1136 (1997), the Security Council authorized and extended MISAB's mandate under Ch. VII. Upon the expiration of the Security Council's authorization to MISAB in January 1998, the Secretary General called for MISAB to be replaced with a UN peace operation.²⁶ The UN created MINURCA (the UN Mission in The Central African Republic) by Resolution 1159 (1998) of March 27, 1998.

MINURCA did not simply deploy armed men with blue helmets in CAR to monitor events passively. The mission was relatively aggressive in deterring and "curbing threats to the country's stability," therefore creating the stable atmosphere needed for the peace

²⁵ Henryk Sokalski, *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

²⁶ Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997) Concerning the Situation in The Central African Republic, S/1998/61, January 23, 1998.

process to unfold. The Security Council, by successive Ch. VII resolutions, extended the mandate of MINURCA progressively over the next year, to include what are today widely referred to as peacebuilding tasks, including electoral assistance, demobilization, decommissioning and redeployment, and supporting a political mission to monitor and encourage implementation of the Bangui Accords. The overall framework of this extremely small operation remained consistent: the provision of security to the population and the international personnel and thus the prevention of conflict. MINURCA is credited with creating a climate for constructive political dialogue within CAR. In his subsequent reports, the Secretary General affirmed the numerous preventive actions that MINURCA undertook, including strategic deployments around the country and the capital to deter outbreaks of violence, prevent escalations, disarm belligerents, decommission weapons and generally to provide security to the population while the national army was still being reformed in accordance with the peace agreement.²⁷ The Secretary General also noted his inclination to inform the CAR government that MINURCA's continued deployment depended on the government's steady progress in implementing the peace accords.²⁸ MINURCA is a successful case of conflict prevention that relied on a light preventive deployment of UN forces with a broad mandate. Perhaps due to the catastrophic conflicts that surround CAR and the fact that world's intractable and bloody conflicts attract more intervention and media attention than relatively quiet successes, this case has been largely overlooked by practitioners and theorists alike.

Of note, we can appreciate the initially appropriate regional response to the potential conflict in CAR; its eventual transformation into a more robust UN-authorized mission, the Secretary General's explicit linkage between the UN's willingness to support the mission and the government's willingness to implement its obligations under the peace accords.

Critiques of Conflict Prevention

The concept of conflict prevention and the activities that fall within the domain are not without their critics. Conflict prevention as described by Boutros Ghali has been criticized by some as too inclusive. Indeed in the ambitious terms of *An Agenda*, the concept spans the entire cycle of conflict. Others argue that poorly timed conflict prevention efforts may only delay the onset of the violent phase of a conflict. Once again, a plea for strategy and intentionality is in order.

Stedman argued plainly that some conflicts have to 'get worse before they get better'. In his negative evaluation of Europe's early recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence, he argued that "the urge to take preventive action—to do something, anything—can lead to ill-considered policies that lack strategic sense." He further argues: "the prevention of war in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda would have involved substantial risk

²⁷ Third Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1201 (1998) of October 15, 1998. S/ 1998/1203, December 18, 1998

²⁸ Eventually, MINURCA was replaced with a new kind of mission: The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). See United Nations, "Central African Republic, MINURCA background" accessible at <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurcaB.htm>

and great cost.”²⁹ The constructive aspect of his critique urges prioritization, clear interests and adequate resourcing for preventive efforts so that they do not simply become an opportunity for early failure.³⁰

Michael Lund, who has written thoughtfully and published widely on conflict prevention, notes that conflict resolution activities undertaken to address underlying causes of conflict—commonly thought to be all too infrequent but necessary in the long term—may in fact miss the acute indicators of impending political violence, especially in internal wars.³¹ Others have noted that transitions to democracy and free trade capitalism, which seek to provide people with better participation in the political and economic system, can actually exacerbate conflict when emergent political parties organize along sectarian lines and view competition for resources and power as a zero sum struggle even as economic reforms cancel out old ways of distributing patronage and basic security.³²

The question of timing, as noted, should neither be overemphasized nor neglected. An expansive conceptualization of conflict prevention that includes every possible conflict management activity at any point in the life cycle of a conflict reduces the concept’s validity. Yet there are numerous points in a conflict during which preventive activities can have the desired effect. Ripeness theory’s adherents have correctly argued that both a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) help create ripe moments for conflict deescalation.³³ Creative preventive diplomacy can heighten perceptions of the MHS and propose the MEO at any time in a conflict. It is true that timing and structuring mediation poorly may lead to temporarily worse conflict outcomes, as the EU/OSCE mediation conducted by France, Finland and the US in the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008 demonstrated. At the same time, mediation that takes place after significant loss of life, or after a conflict has endured and demonstrated its ‘intractability’ is believed to be less successful than efforts taken prior to massive violence. Preventive diplomacy—in the form of international conflict mediation before any significant loss of life—appears to be seriously underutilized.³⁴

Lund defines prevention as “Preemptive timing of actions at previolent stages of particular incipient conflicts,” and notes that it need not be limited to: mediation, but which might also comprise other conflict resolution activities. These could include but not be limited to arbitration, problem-solving workshops, economic and development assistance,

²⁹ Stephen J. Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling ‘Preventive Diplomacy’,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 17-19.

³⁰ Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order,” p. 20.

³¹ Lund, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention,” 383.

³² J. Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach,” in Crawford, B. and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds. *The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict: Politics, Economics and “Cultural” Violence* (Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press, 1998).

³³ Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, “International Mediation in the Post Cold War World,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001)

³⁴ Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter, “Studying International Mediation: Developing Data Sets on Mediation, Looking for Patterns, and Searching for Answers,” *International Negotiation*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2007), and see also Lund, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention,” 384

mass media and information campaigns in favor of peace, among others.³⁵ Such instruments can be used simultaneously. Lund notes that among the conditions for success for such efforts is the absence of parties attempting to undermine the prevention efforts by provision of military assistance.

Zartman, among the most eminent of scholars of international conflict and its resolution, lauds conflict prevention, while also noting insightfully that it poses a dilemma for analysts and practitioners: "...But how can the attentions of public and government be mobilized when a potential crisis is still cold? And how can one distinguish a conflict that will become a crisis, and therefore needs prevention from one that will burn out on its own and blow away without causing damage?"³⁶

Zartman poses these questions as the introduction to a later chapter by Herbert Kelman, who examines several social-psychological processes that help explain the pervasiveness and duration of conflict. Also noted are the streams of research that call attention to human beings' collective tendency to distort decisionmaking by excessive and inappropriate selectivity in information seeking, and information processing.³⁷

The resistance to change, in this case to taking early preventive action before a conflict results in violence and killing, is up against more than bureaucratic stagnation or difficulties of mobilizing collective action. We are also 'wired' to resist doing anything differently. This is troubling because it signifies that early warning systems, intelligence gathering, and conflict analysis may still fail to persuade decisionmakers and publics that preventive action—whether in the form of diplomacy, security or a combination of both—must be undertaken quickly.

Conclusion

Conflict prevention has grown tremendously in the past two decades as a field of inquiry and a field of practice. This growth has generated healthy debates on the proper analysis of conflict stages, and the appropriate prevention mechanisms that can be implemented in or across the conflict stages. The conceptual evolution has spurred states and international actors such as the UN to reorganize their diplomatic processes internally and coordinate their preventive mechanisms with each other. Cases in which preventive action failed to materialize have motivated the international community to engage in an exchange regarding the need for a culture of action and prevention in contrast with a culture of reaction. Clearly, the international community has a long way to go in terms of mobilizing political will, gathering and analyzing data about conflict, and establishing new norms to guide preventive action. We have begun to learn from failures and to anticipate successes. Prevention, for all the ambiguity and complexity surrounding its actual uses, continues to appeal to all who want humanity to avoid the scourge of war and employ creative and less coercive ways of addressing conflict.

³⁵ Lund, "Early Warning and Conflict Prevention," 384-385.

³⁶ I. William Zartman, ed., *Peacemaking in International Conflict* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, rev'd ed. 2007), 19

³⁷ Herbert Kelman, "Social Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict," in I. William Zartman, ed., *Peacemaking in International Conflict* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, rev'd ed. 2007).

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CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON TERRORISM: IS THERE A STATE TERRORISM

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Abstract: *Originally terrorism appeared as a form of state action and as a mean of establishing and consolidating governance. Despite that and the abundance of real political, state terrorist empirical evidence, contemporary studies of terrorism, without any real justification, neglect the existence of state terrorism. The monopoly that state has on the legitimate utilization of violence does not exclude the existence of state terrorism. State terrorism is a result of instrumental strategic rational state's choice. It is the constitutional element of state action, both in totalitarian states which are being rightfully called "terrorist states" and liberal - democratic states. State terrorism is an instrument of state action on the domestic political and foreign political level and it is being used in the conditions of peace, state of emergency and war.*

Key words: *terrorism, state terrorism, liberal-democracy, terrorist state, studies of terrorism*

Introduction

At the end of November 2012 American journal *The Washington Post* has discovered the existence of the, so called, Disposition Matrix, a list of terrorists that the American administration is planning to liquidate within the framework of an extended war against terror. It is being claimed that on the grounds of the Disposition Matrix approximately 3000 people have already been killed. The analysts named that type of politics states institutionalization of assassination/extra-judicial killings and extra-constitutional repression directed by the president (Van Auken, 2012; Miller, 2012; DeYoung, 2012; Becker; Shane, 2012; Mihovilović, 2012). This introduction repeatedly points toward a deeper content analysis of national antiterrorist strategies. Can we talk about the legal and legitimate (self)defense, controversial "preventative war" or can we claim that the "terror of antiterrorism" and "terrorizing the terrorists" represent a form of state terrorism? Within the studies of terrorism, one of the main disagreements is the lack of generic definition of terrorism.² Can we therefore understand terrorism if we can't determine the significance of a word which represents the origin of every knowledge or opinion? If terrorism is not objectively, coherently and consequently defined, determination of a certain phenomena and behavior as terrorist can only be a matter

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² Authors are claiming that within the literature there is more than 200 definitions of terrorism (Jackson, 2008)

of subjective labeling. Thereby terrorism is not an objectively, empirically defined phenomena, but a socially constructed and historically contingent category of human behavior dependent on the concrete circumstances, sociopolitical context and intentions of actors (Jackson, 2010). As a social-scientific subject, state terrorism is not sufficiently explained and understood, it is theoretically underdeveloped with an array of deficits regarding empirical information essential for the analysis and building of knowledge, in other words it is being neglected³ in the context of terrorism studies. Studies on non-state terrorism, terrorism which is being conducted by non-state organizations has become mainstream in an array of scientific disciplines. Knowledge of terrorism, as a product of academic work, constructs terrorism as a social problem which is being handled by state, not as a problem of state violence per se. Does all this mean that the studies on terrorism are objective and all embracing or they are in a way partial and bias? Can we say, in the words of Richard Jackson, that studies on terrorism function as an “ideological intellectual branch of the state” (Jackson, 2009)? The goal of this paper is to provide at least a small contribution for filling in the gaps that involve the relationship of academic community toward state terrorism. To be able to understand the typology of terrorism so we could provide answers to the question of the existence of state terrorism we first need to answer the question: what is terrorism? The analysis of a number of definitions (Schmid, Jongman, 1988) point to the conclusion that terrorism represents a threat of using, or use of violence (terror), for the purpose of obtaining political goals. There is no terrorism without terror, but every terror, every act of violence, doesn’t signify terrorism. For a certain phenomena to represent terrorism, the act of terror, the act itself has to have a political goal. Terrorism represents a junction between politics and violence with a tendency of obtaining power. Violence is sine qua non of terrorism and its actors who are convinced that only through violence in society they can attain their long term political goals (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism represents an intentional strategy which is being conducted with a certain purpose, it is not only an act of violence to eliminate victims, but a strategy aimed at influencing wider population (Stohl, 2003). Terrorism is conceptualized as an independent, sufficient and systematic/crucial political strategy (Townshend, 2003:5-14). It is a form of, so called asymmetric conflict, specific form of political - military intervention between the two actors⁴ (Lizardo, 2008). Brian Burgoon sees terrorism as a use of politically motivated violence against noncombat forces, while Charles Tilly examines terrorism as a political strategy which is being implemented by those who are trying to centralize their power or those who are, by the means of fear, trying to challenge the existing state in order to obtain power or advantage (Burgoon, 2006; Tilly, 2005).

³ Few information prove without a doubt the neglectation and “underestimation” of state terrorism in a frame of scientific research. Scientists, such as Victor Walter (1969), Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988) warned about this few decades ago. The analysis of the paper topics printed in two world leading magazines on terrorism (*Terrorism and Political Violence*; *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*) in a period 1990-1999 showed that only 2% of papers focused on state terrorism. Similar trend was also implemented later on: *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (1997) out of 768 pages, 12 pages (some sources claim 13) were dedicated to state terrorism; *Encyclopedia of terrorism* (2003) 4 out of 523 pages and *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (2007) dedicated 4 out of 478 pages to this topic. *Dictionary of Terrorism* (2004)(page 318) does not involve the category of „state terrorism“ but „terrorist states“ which covers two pages (267-268). It also deals with the topic of state terrorism within the next topics: *Government Support* (106-107) and *State Sponsorship* (249-250). *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* (2009) does not involve the concept of state terrorism but state terror which is spread over two pages out of 800 (642-643). See: Townshend, 2003.; Thackrah, 2004.; Silke, 2004.; Jackson, 2010.; Combs; Slann, 2007.; Kushner, 2003.; Anderson; Sloan, 2009.

⁴ As the actors of terrorism it is common to emphasize terrorist organizations and states. But, we should point out that there are three strategic actors of terrorism: the third actor is public. The public represents a direct (victims) or indirect (fear as a psychological effect of terrorism) target for terrorist actions. The concrete act of terror also acts as a three-dimensional relationship perpetrator - victim - public. See Cronin, 2009.

Theoretical - conceptual frame for understanding state terrorism

Fred Halliday points out that we shouldn't forget the possibility that in analysis and evaluation the use of violence in political purposes could be characterized as "terrorism from above" (cited in: Jarvis, 2009). Leigh M. Johnson goes one step further claiming that we should seriously question the assumed structural invulnerability of democracy concerning the matters of the use of terror and torture in order to allow the possibility that this behavior is not an anomaly but a constitutive, at least hidden, part of "democracy" (Johnson, 2012). Liberal democratic societies, according to Eric Heeing and Dustin Ells Howes, are not immune to the use of terror (Herring, 2008; Howes, 2012).⁵ To make such a conclusion it is necessary to extract the constitutional elements of terrorism and consider their applicability on the concrete state behavior. As a phenomenon, terrorism is identified alongside conceptually defined characteristics of violence, and it is not based on the character of the actor who is executing violence. Summary overview of the depicted determination of terrorism points to the following essential elements: strategic use of terror; asymmetry of violence; directionality towards noncombat targets; spread of fear as a mean of influencing and coercing broader public: claiming power and gaining political goals. Therefore it is clear that the non state actors are not the sole perpetrators of terrorism. States also often use terrorism (Jalata, 2010; Hindess, 2006). Nevertheless, from most of the consulted definitions of terrorism, state terrorism is excluded as a real possibility, all though their content doesn't suggest that. The discourse of terrorism mostly ignores state terrorism. Why? Can we even classify state violence as terrorism? Maybe the reason for that exclusion lays in the theoretical understanding of the term "state", based on that, the claims concerning the existence of "state terrorism" and "terrorist states" should seem illogical if we consider the definition of "state". According to the classical determination, the state is a political organization, human community that claims/demands monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. The use of force is not the only instrument of action, but for the state it is specific because it is the only one who has the right to use violence (Weber, 2006; 6-7; Giddens, 1987: 17-22; Mann, 1993: 53-63). The use of state force is interpreted and justified as legitimate (and legal) mean which is being used for the protection of national security, suppression of national security threats and endangerments of national interests. According to that, functional state has two basic functions: achieving security and welfare state (Sekhar, 2010; Primorac, 2002). But, monopoly on the use of force cannot be the reason why a state uses violence in any way it chooses; it cannot be the reason for the exclusion of state terrorism from the studies on terrorism. Legitimate right to use violence does not include extra - legal use of violence. Dictionary on International Law states that the right to use violence (*jus ad bellum*) does not mean that the violence is used (*jus in*

⁵ Howes comes to this conclusion by analyzing the relationship between power, terror and rule of law, where he analyzed the works on number of philosophers and statesman from the ancient times till today, such as Homer, Aristotle, Plato, Edmund Burke, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Locke, John Stuart Mill, Michael Waltzer, Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmidt, Giorgio Agamben, Georges Sorel, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and so on.

bello) in the legitimate and legal way. Although it has a monopoly on the threat of using and use of violence, the state utilizes it in an unacceptable way (Jackson and others, 2010:3; Stohl, 2006). Regardless all the theoretical determinations and euphemistic state justifications of the use of force, the analysis of contemporary real - political processes point to the conclusion that states use state terrorism in a large scale. Although we don't have exact empirical research at our disposal, it seems that those authors who claim that, historically speaking, state terrorism is a prevailing form of terrorism are right. Since the times when terrorism arose until today, states have been the most extensive and frequent users of terrorist violence, also state terrorism is more extensive and deadly than non state and it represents much bigger harm than terrorism which is being used by the nonstate factors (Sluka, 2000:1; Townshend, 2003:24; Wilkinson, 2011:6; Blakeley, 2009:17; Primorac, 2002:66; Chaliand; Blin, 2007:6; Nairn; James, 2005:42). In the "Encyclopedia of Terrorism" Sage Publications, (Kushner, 2003) state terrorism is marked as one of the theoretic perspectives on terrorism. The term has been analyzed through two categories: "state - sponsored terrorism" (342 - 344) and "state terrorism" (344 - 346). Of total of 523 pages of encyclopedia, 4 pages of text were dedicated to the topic of state terrorism. It is stated that defining state terrorism is complicated due to the fact that, to a certain measure, all nations use violence. State terrorism usually has one goal: to strengthen states control by intimidating the population. The content analysis of the text points to the fact that the author dominantly connects state terrorism to totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. In order to distinct state terrorism from other forms of state violence, two characteristics are being introduced: international unpredictability and secrecy. While state preparatory actions for war and regulatory actions of internal law enforcement are more predictable, state terrorism is on the other hand unpredictable. Intention of this unpredictable action is to generate escalation of fear. Actions from the specter of state terrorism are conducted in secrecy or are being negated in case of detection, while their effects become obvious later. State - sponsored terrorism implies different types of support (financial, material, trainings, sanctuary and so on) to nonstate terrorist groups. Encyclopedia of Terrorism, from the publishing house Facts On File, (Combs; Slann, 2007) also dedicated 4 pages (307 - 311) out of 478 to the topic of state terrorism. State terrorism is not directly determined, but in a search for a definition it is emphasized that it is states fault if actions of political violence were conducted in a manner where they did not take into consideration the security of innocent people in their intention to induce the feel of fear and confusion among the target group. State terrorism is a strong weapon in the hands of ruthless states. It is stated that terrorism is used as an instrument of internal and external politics. While on the internal level, state terrorism is being used to develop a climate of fear and subordination of domestic population, on the international scene state terrorism is being utilized to spread confusion and chaos among enemies. Referring to the works of Paul Wilkinson and Richard Schultz, Joseph H. Campos (2007:108) determines state terrorism, which is known also under the term repressive terrorism, as a threat or application of different degrees of extra normal forms of political violence, by the already determined political system against external and internal opposition. Terrorist activities categorized under state terrorism are those which are being used

by the political system for the repression of the opposition. Richard Jackson and associates determine state terrorism as an intentional use or threat of violence by the state representatives or their proxies, against an individual or a group, for a purpose of intimidating broader public. Therefore, direct victims of violence are not the main targets, but instrument to intimidate public through the communicative power of violence. Intentional effects of violence are manifested in reaching specific political or political - economic goals (Jackson and others, 2010:3). Historical Dictionary of Terrorism defines state terrorism as a method of conduct which state or state sponsored actors use to brutally and more or less arbitrary victimize certain groups in a way that other persons, who are being identified with the victims, abandon all hope in order to demonstrate obedience or to comply with the demands of the state terrorism perpetrator. Main instruments of state terrorism involves mass arrests, imprisonment without trial, torture, political assassinations, persons “disappearances” and concentration camps (Anderson; Sloan, 2009:viii). Ruth Blakeley introduces the most acceptable determination. She sees state terrorism as a threat of violence or act of violence which is being conducted by state agents whose goal is to ignite an extreme fear among the target population, in order to enforce a change in their behavior. Instrumentality, which involves illegal “targeting” and ignition of fear among the wider population, outside the zone of direct victims, is a determination which separates state terrorism from other forms of state repression. The logic of instrumentality points that the aim is not focused on direct victims but on “terrorizing” wider masses. These are the constitutive elements of state terrorism: a) intentional act of violence against individuals whose security should be provided by the state or threat of such an act in conditions where there has already been established the climate of fear through antecedent actions of state violence; b) such an act has been conducted by actors who act in the name or in collaboration with the state, that involves paramilitary and private security forces; c) violent act or threat of violence have the intention to enforce extreme fear among the wider, target population which is being identified with the victim in order to d) finally, coerce target audience to reevaluate their behavior (Blakeley, 2009:passim).

The typology and “cases” of state terrorism

Social - scientific sources arguably prove that modern states are founded on violence. Violence or intense geopolitical militarism has encouraged the emergence of states and their modernization (Mann, 1993). Within those frames, terrorism emerged. Analysis of the genesis of terrorism points to its transformation: from originally desirable form of states behavior to undesirable anti - state behavior. When the term terrorism was introduced in a socio - political dictionary, it corresponded with the terror established in the time of French revolution. Terrorism emerged as state terrorism and it was a desirable form of behavior, mean for consolidation and establishment of power for the government of that time. For Maximilien Robespierre terror, as an ideal of power, is nothing else than a fast, strict and stringent justice within the frame of commandments of political wisdom that implies guiding your people through reason and enemies of people through terror. His understanding

according to which a state has to be preserved by every mean possible and nothing is unconstitutional except that what leads to the devastation of the state represents a frame for all the later justifications of state terrorism (Mann, 1993; Zadro, 1999; Hoffman, 1998; Hoffman, 2006). From then until today state terrorism has been one of the most significant sources of human suffering and destruction (Jackson and others, 2010:1). State terrorism is the “purest” and most original form of terrorism as a phenomenon. Abundance of documented socio - political empirics points to the conclusion that the use of state terrorism is not dependent on the political system: this form of action is being used by totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic states. State terrorism is being used during wars, in states of emergency and in times of peace, as a part of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism program and as an instrument of internal and external politics. In sum, it is a certain universal form of state action.

The typology of state terrorism can be determined in a number of criteria and in different ways. With certain additions, the typology of Igor Primorac is completely appropriate (Primorac, 2002). Concerning the degree of state involvement we can talk of the use of state terrorism as a systematic strategy, as a form of governance. In that case we can talk of terrorist states. Although, if the use of state terrorism is considered as one of the strategies of state action, used in limited amounts and for limited goals, than it is not all together connected with totalitarian states. A number of forms of such terrorist actions, which certainly represent state terrorism, are also being used by democratic states. States carry out state terrorism as autonomous direct actions or intermediary when state sponsored terrorism is concerned; also it involves actions of sponsorship and support towards state and non-state subjects who implement terrorist action. In all the cases state terrorism can be used on the internal - political level or as an instrument of external politics.

On the topic of totalitarianism and totalitarian systems everything has been researched and documented and almost nothing can be added. Terrorizing of domestic population and brutal assassinations of political and other adversaries are permanent characteristics of fascism, Nazism, Stalinism and other totalitarian systems. Terror is a significant mark of totalitarianism (Giddens, 1987:298-299). That is why we can characterize totalitarian systems as terrorist states. In the words of Hannah Arendt terror is essential component of totalitarianism, it is not the same as violence because in totalitarian systems it represents a form of government (cited in: Combs; Slann, 2007:309). In a sense of killing their own citizens, Asian, African and South American dictatorships weren't so far behind the totalitarian regimes. In a number of states, (pro) governmental “death squads”⁶, have killed in the name of national security tens of thousands alleged regime adversaries. Only in Argentina, in a period when military junta was in power, in the mid 1970s and beginning of 1980s, around 40 thousand people were either murdered or they “disappeared”. Leaders of military junta called their murderous - terrorist praxes “the war for freedom and against tyranny”.

⁶ „Squadrons /death squads“ are pro governmental groups which execute illegal assassinations of those who are considered state enemies and their members are directly or indirectly connected to a certain government or their security forces. A number of case studies (Spain, Northern Ireland, Argentina, Guatemala, Indonesia, Punjab, Kashmir, Philippines, East Timor) of „squadrons/ death squads“ see in Sluka, 2000.

In the time of August Pinochet's (1973 - 1990) military junta, in the conditions of so called "internal war" many adversaries of the regimes were assassinated, while thousands were "detained" for political reasons: in total, it was estimated, around 16 thousand people. Faced with criminal prosecution, right before he died in December 2006, Augusto Pinochet admitted to his responsibility for the actions committed under his ruling. On the other hand, Brazilian military junta called the arrests of leftwing political opponents, in order to spread fear among the wider population, *Operacao Limpeza*. During the eight years in the 1970s, when he was a president of Uganda Idi Amin has turned his country into a "slaughter house". Under a suspicion that they were adversaries of "life term president", approximately 300 000 people were killed (Stiglitz, 2004; Kos - Stanišić, 2009; Klein, 2008; Combs; Slann, 2007; Pettiford and Harding, 2005).

Within the discourse of terrorism often we find dichotomy, double standards and interpretative bias. State terrorism is usually assigned to totalitarian and non democratic regimes, while actions of democratic states are characterized as just and legal no matter what their content really is. Few cases from the acts of war are demonstrating that it is in fact state terrorism and not legal and legitimate act of war. British military campaign, when they bombarded German cities during WW II hardly had a moral justification or any kind of just military goal. It was directed at terrorizing German population, with the aim of encouraging political revolt. In a so called Fire Storm, British bombing of Hamburg in July 1943, 40 thousand people were killed. Experts point out that that was the largest terrorist act in history. Within these frames we should mention the bombing of Dresden in February 1945, but also American nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Similar situation was also in Korean War. By destroying cities, villages and infrastructure, American air forces killed approximately thousand civilians in order to disable the rebellion against the American allies, that is, to disable the logistical support for the American enemies. Intense American air campaign in operation Desert Storm, according to estimation, resulted in few thousand civilians killed. Spreading fear among the civilian population had a purpose to undermine the Iraqi dictatorship of that time (Primorac, 2002; Primorac, 2004; Chaliand; Blin, 2007; Blakeley, 2009). Counterinsurgency strategies often represent a part of wider military actions. Some of them involve the elements of state terrorism. American operation Phoenix, carried out during the Vietnam War, represents a typical example. Operation had a goal of banishing, killing and torturing people, in order to destroy the structure of Vietcong, but also to terrorize wider masses so they wouldn't give their support to Vietcong. According to the testimonies of the participant of the operation, leader of the American Central Intelligence Agency - CIA, within the operation 20.587 members of Vietcong were killed. On the other hand, South Vietnamese government mentions two times that number (Cohen; Corrado, 2005; Jackson and others, 2010; Blakeley, 2009).

For the purpose of achieving national interests, states use different instruments. Period of Cold War generated the existence of one specific instrument, so called covert actions, which, after they were used on the external level, found their purpose on the internal level, often under the sponsorship of democratic states. A number of elements of institutionalized covert actions actually represent a euphemism for state terrorism. As an instrument from the

spectrum of state interventionism, as actions of “third option”, between war and diplomacy, covert actions imply the attempts of governments to influence the events in other states or territories without revealing its involvement (Godson, 1981:1). Covert actions of the CIA most definitely contributed to the American Cold War strategic goals, but they also without a doubt caused a chaos and endangerment of many states national security with the use of state terrorism. All over the world CIA overthrew governments, suppressed rebellions, took part in assassination of “unsuitable” state leaders and installed pro American governments in a number of states. The list is vast. Along with British Secret Intelligence Service - SIS, CIA overthrew (operation Ajax) Iranian prime minister Mohamed Mossadegh and installed pro western Shah Reza Pahlavi. The same scenario was repeated one year later in Guatemala. With covert action “Success” they overthrew the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. At the beginning of 1960s, CIA pushed counter government forces to make a coup d’etat in Zaire. With the immediate actions in September 1960, CIA overthrew Prime Minister Patrice Lumumbe, who was killed three months later. On his place they installed Joseph Mobutu, who ruled in Zaire until the mid 1990s, when he was overthrown. At the same time, CIA was involved in the killings of South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem and leader of the Dominican Republic Rafael L. Trujillo. Also, they attempted few unsuccessful assassinations on the Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Drastic example of the efficiency of CIA’s covert actions was Chile, whose government lead by Salvador Allende, the Nixon administration considered communist danger that could turn South America into “red sandwich” because of its rapprochement to Cuba. With covert actions Track I and Track II during the 1973, CIA pushed the Chilean army to carry out coup d’etat. According to the plans and performance of CIA, in September 1973, Chilean president Salvador Allende was overthrown (assassinated). Power was now in the hands of military junta and the Dictator Augusto Pinochet.

Covert actions represent a form of state terrorism which is being carried out by states as autonomous direct actions. But, covert actions even indirectly represent state terrorism. Some of the actions from the spectrum of covert action include state sponsored terrorism, that is, actions of sponsorship and support for the state and nonstate subjects who use terrorism (Byman, 2005; Chomsky, 2003; Raphael, 2009). In the time of President Jimmy Carter administration, CIA was secretly active in Nicaragua where it supported Anti - Sandistas. President Ronald Reagan ordered covert actions of CIA in Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; these dictatorships, who terrorized their own people, received different forms of assistance. Continuous covert help was given to South American dictatorships (Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina) within the Operation Condor, whose goal was, among others, extrajudicial assassination of political opponents (Bilandžić, 1996; Bilandžić, 2010; Plaw, 2008; Blakeley, 2009).

To conclude, it is valuable to point out that American covert action were an efficient instrument for achieving American national security and Cold War strategic interests. Rational goals for their use and rational justifications were vaguely determined as “higher interests” of national security, “higher goals” of never clearly determined aims of national security, sublimed in a syntagme of “spreading Western values” and containment of communist endangerment. With the goal of acquiring power, covert actions were routinely

directed toward the endangerment of other states national security and the endangerment of other nations and people. A lot of the elements of those actions are not legal, moral or protective of human a civil rights. As a matter of fact, they represent state terrorism.

Counterterrorism as a form of state terrorism

Terrorist acts of non-state terrorist organizations represent a serious challenge for states. Terrorism always represents a security challenge for states and their goal is to influence the socio - political order, destabilize and if possible change the existing order. Terrorism of non-state entities primarily endangers the state through two aspects. First, terrorism strikes at the roots of governmental authority by questioning the states ability to protect its citizens and assets, proving that the state is no longer capable to efficiently conduct its most important task: to protect the safety of its citizens. Secondly, terrorism seriously brings into question the implementation of states actions over which it has monopoly and which should allow it to achieve its primary responsibilities (Donohue, 2004). Non-state terrorism serves as a proof of the existence of violent, non legal and illegal opposition which brings into question the legitimacy of the existing government. Terrorist strikes represent an endangerment of national security and has a negative impact on national pride. National pride is often a factor which conditions the undertaking of state actions above the level of rational and sufficient respond to the endangerment. This is the case that happens when national counterterrorist strategies are applied, as a frame that includes the use of specialized institutions and instruments of national security for the elimination of terrorism and suspension of terrorist actions. Counterterrorist actions have different aspects and content. One of them is “terrorizing the terrorism”, that is, use of repressive state instruments in fighting against terror, during which states actions are often identical to the actions of terrorist organizations whose actions they are trying to prevent. “Terrorizing the terrorism” is just another name for the form of state terrorism. The use of “terrorizing the terrorism” point to another side of the problem - as much as the actions of terrorist organization are scary and unjustified, state terror is even scarier. Terrorism is a phenomenon which is positioned within the “grey zone”, in between war and politics (Townshend, 2003). This is a zone which is unknown to democratic systems and that is why liberal democracies have hard time dealing with terrorism. If search of an “efficient” answer they reach for state terrorism. The paradox is that the state terrorism, as an answer to nonstate terrorism, is directed toward the elimination of national security endangerment, but essentially also to the stabilization of the system and consolidation and maintenance of power. Stabilization of government with the use of state terrorism at the same time means destabilization of wider social classes. If we consider that context, is state terrorism crucial for the security and existence of the state, and in that case, can we talk of inherent terrorism within the state (Franks, 2006:94)? Few counterterrorist action conducted by democratic states might give as an answer.

Eight members of the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September (ar. *Munazamat Ajlul al-Asvad*), disguised as athletes and carrying official accreditations, stormed on November 5th 1972 into Olympic Village in Munich and murdered 11 Israeli athletes and a German policeman. The response of the Israeli state was brutal. The Prime Minister Golda

Meir ordered Israeli intelligence agency - Mossad, on the same day, to conduct a covert action which involved the liquidation of all the members of the Munich massacre. This action became known under the name Operation Bayonet (hebr. Kidon).⁷ Its aim was to demonstrate that you cannot kill an Israeli citizen and go unpunished, but also to use deterrence to prevent future terrorist acts. Within the next seven years Mossad Special Forces located and killed all the accessories in the murders of Israeli athletes. Abdel Wael Zwaiter was killed first in Rome, October 1972, Mahmoud Hamshari was killed two months later in Paris, Hussein Al Bashir was killed January 1973, in Nicosia, Basil al-Kubaissi three months later also in Paris, Zaiad Muchasi in April 1973, in Athens. Action "Bayonet" was also marked with an international incident. In the summer of 1973 officers of Mossad traveled to the Norwegian Lillehammer in search of Ali Hassan Salameh, the creator of the Munich assassinations. Convinced that they accurately identified and located Hassan Salameh, on July 21st 1973 they killed one person. As it was shown later, it was a wrong person. Mossad killed an innocent man, Moroccan waiter Ahmed Bouchiki, who was at a time working in Lillehammer. Six members of Mossad were arrested and prosecuted because of that, but two years later they were released. Nevertheless, Hassan Salameh was murdered in Beirut on January 22nd 1979, after five unsuccessful assassination attempts (Reeve, 2006). For that occasion four innocent people were killed, while eighteen were injured. Incident in Lillehammer did not stop Israelis in their strategic orientation to "terrorize the terrorists". In Tunis, in April 1988, Mossad conducted an assassination on the Fatah leader Abu Jihad, in 1984 and 1993 on the leaders of Libanon Hezbollah (ar. *Hizb Allah*), Sheiks Ragheb Harb and Abbas Musawi. In Malta, in 1995, one of the founders of the Palestinian Islamic jihad (ar. *Harakat al-Džihad al-Islami al-Filistini*) Fathi Shqaqi was killed, in January 1996 Israel Security Agency, Shin Bet, killed the leader of the military department of Hamas (ar. *Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyya*) Yahya Ayyash. In a car bomb explosion in Damask, in 2008, Imad Mugni, an officer for communication between Hezbollah and Iran was killed. In January 2010, 26 members of Mossad traveled to Dubai. They arrived there from different parts of the world using counterfeited British, Irish, German, Australian and French passports. Their target was Hamas leader, Mahmud al-Mabhuh. He was killed in a hotel Al Bustan Rotana in Dubai, on January 20th 2010 (Plaw, 2008; Cronin, 2009; Bilandžic, 2010). Covert assassinations⁸ as part of a decapitation⁹ strategy have been practiced by the Israeli state from its emergence (Plaw, 2008). This form of counterterrorist actions, Israeli government has institutionalized parallel

⁷ Certain sources call this operation „Wrath of God“. See Reeve, 2006; Cronin, 2009.

⁸ International Common Law determines assassination as selection killings of individuals who are considered enemies by sneaky/covert means and ways (Cronin, 2009; 228fn57).

⁹ Alongside assassinations of terrorist organizations leaders, decapitation can also include their arrests. It is being implemented because the states believe that killing the leader will bring to an end the actions of terrorist organizations. According to the results of the surveys it is not an especially efficient strategy (Cronin, 2009).

with the emergence of the Second Intifada, in the late 2000s. The strategy was named “targeted killing”.¹⁰ Officially, its goal comprises of selective killing of the leaders of terrorist organizations and their political wing. It was explained as a form of active self defense, as a reply to terrorist strikes on Israeli civilians who have to have state protection, as a preemptive “targeting” of the external existential threats to the state (Guiora, 2004). But the strategy also aims at dissuading future terrorist acts and intimidating wider social groups who give their support to terrorist organizations (Cronin, 2009:29-30, 229-230fn68). “Targeted killing” has definitely brought the conflict between Israel and Palestinian terrorist organizations to a moral symmetry and has eroded the legitimacy of Israeli viewpoint on standing up to terrorists.

During the 1980s Spain also implemented the politics of “targeted killing”. In order to fight *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* - ETA, socialist government led by Felipe Gonzales formed “Squadrons of Death”: Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* - GAL). During the “dirty war” against ETA, in a period 1983-1987, GAL has killed 28 members of ETA. Later investigations showed that few of them had no connections to ETA (Sluka, 2000; Plaw, 2008).

Russian Federation is implementing one of the most aggressive campaigns of “targeted killing”. In Russian - Chechen conflict, within the frame of “war against terrorism”, security forces have killed almost all the Chechen leaders: Ibn Kattab was poisoned in 2002; Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was killed in a car bomb in Qatar, in 2004; Aslan Maskhadov in March 2005; Abdul Khalim Saidullayev in June 1006; Shamil Basayev in July 2007 (Cronin, 2009).

“Terrorizing of terrorists” and “targeted killing”, as a form of counterterrorism, is also known to exist in Britain. At the beginning of 1980s British government was conducting a policy “shoot to kill” in its fight against Provisional Irish Republican Army - PIRA. The usage of such a politics proved that democratic British state did not care too much for the democratic, legal and moral standards when destroying PIRA was concerned. During the three incidents at the end of 1982, six members of republican terrorist organization were brought to “final court of justice” (Bilandžic, 2005). Six years later, British Security Forces illegally killed three unarmed members of PIRA in Gibraltar. This action was a result of a the United Kingdoms decision to allow its Security Forces to use all means possible in fighting terrorism, that is, government wanted to prove its competence in that struggle by killing terrorist wherever and using what ever means necessary (Murray, 1998). British government went one step further in fighting republicans. In their attempt to solve the Northern Ireland conflict in the second half of 1980s, British government lead by Margaret Thatcher order the implementation of a very aggressive security policy. This was consolidated with the understanding that terrorism is a question which should be seriously confronted (Thatcher,

¹⁰ For this type of state actions many different terms are used. The George Bush administration used the term „sudden justice“. A number of euphemisms are also being used, such as “targeted thwarting”, “preventive liquidation”, “interception”, but also a number of morally, contextually and legally acceptable syntagmas: assassination and “extrajudicial killing”. See: Plaw, 2008.

1993). Central feature of this security policy was usage of covert actions which involved the liquidation of the members of the republican terrorist organizations, their supporters, politicians within Sinn Fein, but also innocent catholic citizens. In this "dirty war", assignments for the British government were carried out by the protestant terrorist organizations, primarily Ulster Defense Association - UDA. During the period 1987 - 1990 the government of United Kingdom knew of approximately 30 assassinations or attempted assassinations and 62 cases UDA-s assassination setups. British government did not do anything to prevent these murders. More so, for the central loyalist organization, they made plans for the liquidation of democratically elected politicians of Sinn Fein and picked "targets" which should be liquidated, in other words, in Northern Ireland they were organizing state terror. One of the most insolent actions was the murder of a catholic attorney Patrick Finucane, who made his reputation as a successful attorney after he discovered the real background of the counterterrorist strategy "shoot to kill". By questioning the actions of Security Forces and Northern Ireland's legal system, Patrick Finucane became a target. Cold-blooded murder of Patrick Finucane, which was conducted on February 12th 1989, provoked indignation among the public and international condemnation of the British government for being an accessory in his liquidation. Within the frame of covert actions, British intelligence and security institutions established a direct control over loyalist terrorist organizations. They were needed to work as certain "squadrons of death" for the British government (Murray, 1998; Davies, 1999; Bilandžić, 2005).

Death campaigns that American CIA was conducting all over the world, provoked not only a reaction among the American and world public, but also within the American Congress. Investigations in the Church Committee and Pike Committee in the 1975 discovered the involvement of the CIA in the assassinations of foreign leaders all over the world. Illegal and immoral actions of the CIA, according to the findings of the Congress, made a serious damage to the American interests. To stop this from ever happening again, Gerald Ford made an Executive Order 11905, which states that direct or indirect involvement in the political assassinations is forbidden for any employee in the American administration.¹¹ Legal ban to participate in assassinations and experiences from the past did not make the USA a prosperous candidate for repeating the policy of "targeted killing" which is determined by Johns Hopkins University professor Steven David as an intentional killing of certain individuals or groups of individuals with the explicit approval of the state (David, 2002),¹² in other words, this implies killing in advance selected persons. But, Al Qa'ida strike and formation of the "war against terror" changed the American approach. In October 2001, President George Bush made a National Security Presidential Directive 9, called Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States. Although the Presidential Directive is still a secret, the analysis of the available parts of its content, point the experts to a conclusion that it contains the authorization for the American army and CIA to use deathly force against the terrorist threat (Plaw, 2008). All the dilemmas were eliminated when National

¹¹ With the Executive Orders 12036 and 12333 that was later confirmed by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.

¹² Exceptional analysis of moral, political and legal aspects of „targeted killing“ is included in the book „Targeting Terrorists“ (Plaw, 2008).

Strategy for Combating Terrorism was brought in 2003, which states that the goal of the American government is to defeat Al Qa'ida by using aggressive offensive approaches and it involves the elimination of terrorist's options concerning their existence and actions; all this also implies the attacks on the headquarters of Al Qa'ida. This represents a frame within which a, so called, Disposition Matrix was created, that is, the list of Islamists preordered for liquidation. "War on terror" has set terrorism in the center of security discourse. Terrorism has become securitized¹³ problem, it has been determined as an existential threat that requires undertaking of special security measures outside the standard political procedures. Enforcement of the "war on terror" is not spatio - temporally specific.¹⁴ It is a frame within which the USA again started conducting "targeted killing". But that is not the only form of state terrorism which is being used. Different forms of torture (Cohen; Corrado, 2005; Johnson, 2012; Carter, 2012) in order to extract intelligence information concerning possible terrorist strikes, extraordinary secret kidnaps abroad and rendition of dubious terrorists¹⁵, arrests and long term public and secret detentions became the permanent constituent parts of the American counterterrorist politics (Blakeley, 2009). The character of those actions was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights. In December 2012, the Court ruled Macedonia guilty for participating in the CIA's program of secret kidnappings abroad and extradition of suspicious terrorists, this implied that a number of regulations of the European Convention on Human Rights were violated (ban of inhumane behavior, right to security and freedom and so on). This was the first court ruling that confirmed that CIA organized counter legal arrests in Europe. In 2003 Macedonian government arrested and extradited a German citizen with Lebanese origin Khaled El - Masri, who was tortured in the next six months in various locations: Macedonia, Afghanistan and Albania. At the end, without further explanations, under the order of the American State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, he was released and left on the road in Albania, sometimes by the end of 2012. Later on it was found out that a completely innocent person, that has nothing to do with terrorism, was arrested and tortured. The identity of the German citizen was identified with Khaled al-Masri, one of the members of the Hamburg cell of Al Qa'ida that took part in the attack on the USA (Manasiev, 2012). New terrorist threats required taking new measures, because under new conditions the traditional measures, according to the American understanding, weren't adequate for the prevention of the endangerment of national security. Within that context, the state of emergency and extraordinary measures which followed became a permanent norm (Agamben, 2008). In the words of Ozren Žunec, state of emergency as

¹³ On securitization see: Emmers, 2010; van Munster, 2005.

¹⁴ In March 2009, President Barack Obama has kicked out the term „war on terror“ from the official use in the American administration (Wilson; Kamen, 2009). Instead he introduced the term Overseas Contingency Operations – OCO. But, although the term was changed, the methods, in their essence, remained the same.

¹⁵ According to the testifying of Michael Scheuer, counterterrorist expert of the CIA and the author of the Rendition Program, this program has been established in 1995 and is considered one of the most efficient counterterrorist actions of the American government. The goal of the program is to "remove from the streets people who are planning or are involved in terrorist strikes on the USA and its allies". The investigation of the European Parliament in 2006 determined that European states were involved in this American program: United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Germany, Cyprus, Italy, Sweden, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Belgium, Litva, Kosovo, Poland and Bulgaria. See: US Congress, 2007; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2007; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2012.

a legal norm that suspends a legal norm has created a legal norm which perpetuates the suspension of legal norms (Žunec, 2007:529). That is a frame for the implementation of state terrorism, frame within which political legitimacy and political violence “meet”. In the name of security of democracy we are witnessing terrorizing of democracy. But this is not an American specificity, because all the democracies, when it that situation, act the same. Liberal democracy transforms into militant democracy which is acting in a non democratic manner by using state terrorism¹⁶ in order to preserve democratic values. Instead of democracy it becomes a “security state” (Hallsworth; Lea, 2011), instead of democratic principles and the rule of law it is being governed by securocracy.¹⁷

Conclusion

State terrorism is valid and analytically useful concept for understand the state, the government and state repression. Normative and similar theoretic frames point to the conclusion that state has, not only monopoly on the use of force, but also the right to determine terrorism and define its own actions within those frames. That is why it is completely logical for states to negate calling their own behavior terrorism or they hypocritically justify it as the usage of “necessary measures”. But the abundance of empiric points to the different conclusion. Terrorism arose as a form of state action, as an instrument for maintenance and consolidation of power. From then until today state terrorism has been an attribute of state action no matter the types of government, from the totalitarian systems, through autocracies, all the way to democratic orders, no matter if it involves external or internal political actions in the conditions of peace, state of emergency or war. State terrorism is a result of a strategic political decision, it is an act which was created by the states decision and it does not represent an individual act of a certain governmental official. It is a result of the states instrumental rationality. In conditions of expected utility, calculations that it is more efficient instrument than the other types of politics and strategies, makes state terrorism a desirable mean of states action. The reason for taking these actions from the spectrum of state terrorism is found in the efforts to stop the endangerment of national security and the realization of national interests. The discourse of national security has been creating for decades an environment in which state terrorism has been trying to be justified as a legitimate mean for preserving national security. It is a method and a mean for projections and fulfillment of state (and national) power which states implement when they want to project their own power without accepting responsibility. Next to the totalitarian systems which are rightfully being called terrorist states, democratic states are also not immune to the use of state terrorism. Not even the fact that one of the elemental duties of liberal

¹⁶ The usage of non democratic praxes (terror) in order to defend democracy, Jacques Derrida, taking the concept from the biology, calls autoimmune tendencies of democracy. The accent is on the fact that the democracy is never stable and that its behavior, in the name of its own preservation, is risky for the democracy itself because of the dilemma - is this making it more perfect or is it endangering democracy. Autoimmunity is an anomaly which results in the lack of possibility to distinguish yourself from other and that leads to a wrong type of behavior, that is, immune response (attacking yourself) (cited in: Johnson, 2012).

¹⁷ When analyzing the praxes of „Death Squads“ in Spain during the 1980s and South African Republic in the last 15 years of the Apartheid, this concept is being used by Avery Plaw.

democracies is for them not to turn to “terrorist states”, does not stop them. Is state terrorism an efficient mean for the fulfillment of states goals? In regards to the micro goals and short term, the analysis of the sociopolitical praxes, historical and contemporary, partially points to the affirmative response. But if we look at it overall and long term, state terrorism is destructive for an individuals, communities and societies and states in general. Accepting Richard Jackson’s correctly claims we can conclude that state terrorism causes a number of negative consequences for human rights, social cohesion, social capital, social welfare, institutional legitimacy, democratic participation, order, reign of right, national, social, human and international security, international order and international relations, interstate relations and many other aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life, on national and international level. In order to illustrate these negative effects maybe it is enough to point out to the modern era of counterterrorism. A number of instruments of modern counterterrorist strategies of democratic state are just another name for state terrorism. But, with the intentional myopia, state terrorism is being justified with “essential counterterrorist measures”, and the attribute terrorist is being assigned exclusively to non-state subjects. Finally, counterterrorism is using violence over non-state subjects whose violence it wants to eliminate and that creates a spirals of violence. State and non-state terrorism are so closely interlinked so they feed each other in cycles of violence. Comprehensiveness, frequency and complexity of the state terrorism, together with its consequences projected on the overall national and international movement clearly point to the conclusion that scientific - research neglect of state terrorism is unjustified. It is an epistemological demand that research on terrorism should be systematic and it should involve state and non-state terrorism. To be more precise, demands of the experts from a few years ago, that state terrorism should be returned within interdisciplinary studies of terrorism, sounds completely rationally, progressive, rightful and humane, but also justified from a strategic and security point of view.

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CYBER TERRORISM– GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT

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Abstract: *It is more than obvious that the way of conducting terrorism with the time is becoming more sophisticated. The cyber terrorism is real threat to fast technology development. Potential targets are systems which control the nation's defenses and critical infrastructure. The terrorist of the future will win the wars without firing a shot - just by destroying infrastructure that significantly relies on information technology. The fast growth of the Internet users and Internet dependance dramatically increased the security risks, unless there are appropriate security measures to help prevention. To understand cyber terrorism it is important to look at its background, to see how the terrorist organisations or individuals are using the advantage of new technology and what kind of measures governments and international organizations are taking to help the fight against cyber terrorism.*

Key words: *syber; attack, security, terrorism, DoS*

Introduction

Although there are a number of definitions which describe the term terrorism, one of the definitions that are frequently encountered is that terrorism is “the unlawful use or threatening use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or forcing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons.”²

Interactions between human motives and information technology for terrorist activities in cyberspace or in the virtual world can be addressed as cyber terrorism. Yet this is the definition of cyber terrorism that Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford from Symantec have used in their efforts to define “pure Cyberterrorism.”³

The cyber terrorism as a concept has various definitions, mostly because every expert in security has its own definition. This term can be defined as the use of information technology by terrorist groups or individuals to achieve their goals. This may include the use of information technology to organize and execute attacks against networks, computer systems and telecommunications infrastructure, and to exchange information and perform electronic threat. This kind of security

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² S. Best, *Defining Terrorism*: <http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/Defining%20Terrorism.htm>

³ www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/cyberterrorism.pdf

threat can manifest itself in many ways, such as hacking computer systems, programming viruses and worms, Web pages attack, conducting denial of service (DoS) attacks, or conducting terrorist attacks through electronic communications. More common are claims that cyber terrorism does not exist and that actually it is a hacking and malicious attacks. Those who support these claims do not agree with the term "terrorism" because if we take into account the current technologies for prevention and care, the likelihood of creating fear, significant physical damage or death among population using electronic means would be very small.

Considering the fact that the terrorists have limited funds, cyber attacks are increasingly attractive, because, their implementation requires a smaller number of people and certainly smaller funds. Another advantage of cyber attacks is that they allow terrorists to remain unknown, because they can be very far from the place where the act of terrorism is committed. Unlike the terrorists that place their camps in countries with weak governance, cyber terrorists can store anywhere and remain anonymous.⁴ It is believed that the most effective use of cyber terrorism is when it is used in combination with physical terrorism. For example, disabling the operation of emergency services in situations where the need for deployment of such services is caused by the use of physical terrorism is really an effective way of pooling of mentioned types of terrorism. There are huge possibilities of conducting cyber terrorism through Internet using advanced technology. As possible targets of cyber terrorism can be considered government computer networks, financial networks, power plants, etc., and the reason for this is that the terrorists identifies all the above as most suitable targets to be damaged or put out of operation in order to cause chaos. Systems manipulation through "secret entrance" software, stealing classified information, data deletion, Web sites damaging, viruses inserting, etc. are just a few examples of how terrorists can enter into the secured system. The terrorist attacks enabled by computer technology can be also conducted through the air traffic control system or by remote damage of the power supply networks.

The new information technologies (IT) and the Internet are more often used by terrorist organizations in conducting of their plans to raise the financial funds, distribute their propaganda and secure communications. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, in his statement in 2000 for global security threats, explained that the terrorist groups including Hezbollah's, Hamas and al-Qaeda, for support of their operations, use computerized files, e-mails and protection (encryption). The convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef, the main planner of the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in encrypted files in his laptop computer stored detailed plans for aircraft destruction in the United States.⁵

The terrorist organizations also use the Internet to "reach out" their audience, without need to use other media such as radio, television or holding various press conferences. Web pages are used as a way to highlight injustice and to seek support for as the call "political prisoners" which are "illegally captured". Typical Web pages will not display any information related to the violent activities and will usually claim to be left with no other choice but to resort to violence. They claim to be persecuted, that their leaders have been targets of assassination and their supporters were massacred. They use this tactic to give impression that they are weak and to present themselves as outsiders. This public performance is a very easy way to recruit supporters and members. Besides propaganda, on the terrorist organizations Web sites can often be found content and instructions on

⁴ M. Cereijo, *Cuba the threat II: Cyberterrorism and Cyberwar*, 16 Maj 2006: <http://www.lanuevacuba.com/archivo/manuel-cereijo-110.htm>

⁵ R. L. Dick, Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee Washington, DC, 05 April 2001, <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/issue-of-intrusions-into-government-computer-networks>

how to make explosives and chemical weapons. This allows them to identify the most common users that can have sympathy for their cause and because of that this is an effective method for recruiting.

This also helps individuals acting as terrorists to engage in terrorist activities. In 1999, a terrorist named David Copeland killed 3 people and injured 139 in London. He did this with the help of bombs placed in three different locations. At his trial it was discovered that he used *Terrorists Manual* (Terrorist Handbook - Forest, 2005) and *How to Make a Bomb* (How to Make Bombs - Bombs, 2004), which had downloaded from the Internet.⁶

Cyber terrorism

The terrorists use cyberspace to cause uncertainty. They, for their own reasons, are struggling against state authorities and governments and use all available means to achieve their own aim. Cyber attacks occur in two forms, one used to attack data, and others focused on control systems.⁷ Data theft and destruction leads to service sabotage and this is the most common form of Internet and computer attacks. The attacks focused on the control systems are used to disable or manipulate the physical infrastructure. For example, you can perform remote power supply networks, railway and water supplies in order to achieve a negative opinion on larger geographic areas. This is accomplished by sending data over the Internet or by penetrating security systems. These weak spots in the system were used in the incident in Australia that occurred in March 2000, where disgruntled employee (who failed to provide full-time employment) used the Internet to slip one million liters of unprocessed sewage into the river and coastal waters in Queensland.⁸ In fact, after 44 unsuccessful tries, the 45th was successful. The first 44 trials were not detected at all.

After the September 11 attacks, the auditors of public safety are worried because the most critical infrastructures are owned by private companies, which are not always interested in possible security threats.

In 1988, a terrorist guerrilla organization, within two weeks, flood embassies of Sri Lanka with 800 email-s a day. The message which was appearing was "We are the Internet Black Tigers and we are doing this to disrupt your communications." Department of Intelligence characterizes the attack as the first known terrorist attack on government computer systems.

Internet saboteurs in 1998 attacked Web site of the Indian Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and stole e-mails from the same center. The three anonymous saboteurs through online interview claimed that they protest against recent nuclear explosions in India.⁹ In July 1997, the leader of the Chinese hacker group claimed that temporarily disallowed Chinese satellite and announced that hackers set up a new global organization to protest and prevent investment by Western countries in China.

In September 1998, on the eve of parliamentary elections in Sweden, saboteurs attack the Web site of the right-wing political party in Sweden and created a link to a Web site on

⁶ *www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet*, 21 February 2007: <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4627>

⁷ R. Lemos, *Cyberterrorism: The real risk*, 2002: <http://www.crime-research.org/library/Robert1.htm>

⁸ Ibid

⁹ D.Briere, P.Hurley, *Wireless network hacks and mods for dummies*, 2005, Wiley.

the left and to the pornographic sites. The same month, saboteurs attacked the website of the Mexican government in protest against government corruption and censorship. Analysts point out these crime examples as low level information warfare.

Romanian hackers on one occasion managed to intrude into the computer systems controlling the life support systems at an Antarctic research station, endangering the 58 scientists involved. Fortunately, their activity is stopped before any accident occurred.

During the Kosovo conflict, Belgrade hackers conducted a denial of service attack (DoS) on the NATO servers. They “flooded” NATO servers with ICMP Ping messages, typically used for diagnostic or control purposes or generated in response to errors in IP operations.

During the Palestinian-Israeli cyber war in 2000 similar attack has been used. Pro-Palestinian hackers used DoS tools to attack Israel’s ISP (Internet Service Provider), Netvision. Although the attack was initially successful, Netvision managed to resist subsequent attacks by increasing its safety.

Also in April 2007, numerous journalistic organizations associated with the “Associated Press” reported that cyber attacks on critical information infrastructure on Estonia is conducted by computer servers located in Russia, although it was later determined that it is a Distributed DoS attacks carried out by different locations around the world (U.S., Canada, Brazil, Vietnam and other locations). Of course, the locations of the computers involved in the attack do not always shows the location of the direct participants in the attack. It is actually the location of the so-called “zombie” machines that act as intermediaries during the attack, without their knowledge or without any knowledge of the direct attackers. The attack completely put out the function of the Web sites of many governmental, media and financial institutions and leads to diplomatic talks which was a reason to examine the possibility of creating a NATO-supported research center capable of identifying the source of cyber attacks. In August 2008, a similar attack was conducted against Georgia. It is assumed that the attack was perpetrated by Russian hackers.

In October 2007, hackers attacked the Web site of Ukrainian President Viktor Jushenko. The responsibility for this attack took over the radical Russian nationalist youth group, the Eurasian Youth Movement.¹⁰

An analyst from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publicly revealed that in January 2008, hackers successfully stopped power supply networks in several U.S. cities. In November 2008, the Pentagon had a problem with cyber attacks carried out by computer virus, prompting the Department of Defense (DoD) to take unprecedented step of banning the use of external hardware devices, such as flash memory devices and DVDs.¹¹ Officially, U.S. never felt cyber terrorist attack.

One of the examples that have caused global panic occurred in late 2008, when a group of hackers called “Greek Security Team”, “intrude” into CERN computer systems (European Center for Nuclear Research) so deep, that they were very close to take control

¹⁰ Radio Free Europe, 2007

¹¹ FOX News, 2008

of one of the detectors at LHC (Large Hadron Collider), the largest particle accelerator. Hackers broke into the system on the first day of the experiment and placed a fake page on the site of CERN, whose aim was to defame the experts responsible for computer system, calling them “a group of students.” CERN officials said that it was not caused any damage, but knowing that the detectors and all valuable equipment is vulnerable to digital threats is really uncomfortable.

Methods and techniques of the cyber terrorism

As we already explained, except for offensive operations the terrorist can effectively use the cyberspace for secure communications.¹²

Information security is of great importance to many organizations, including the terrorists. The reason for this primarily lies in their malicious activities, so it is obvious that they will be faced with a well-equipped government security forces and coalition forces, that can easily reveal their intentions through the interception of communication using sophisticated monitoring equipment.

This problem is well known for the terrorist organizations, which is the reason for them to pay great attention to security aspects during the transmission of subtle information.

“Al Qaeda Training Manual” is just one of the many evidence of the commitment of terrorist organizations for safe communication. Notably, among the most important and most extensive lessons described in this guide are two lessons that provide guidance on the proper usage of communications and data protection. Special emphasis on this issue is placed in the thirteenth lesson “Secret Writing and Ciphers and Codes” which aim is to train potential members of this terrorist organization for secure data transmission.

Data hiding by the members of terrorist organizations is revealed on many occasions, but for sure it can be said that the number of cases where the data transmission covered using steganographic methods is not registered by security services is much larger.

Evidence for the use of steganography by al-Qaeda terrorist organization is the arrest in Berlin in 2012 of a 22 year old Austrian who had just arrived from Pakistan. Later it was confirmed that he is a member of this terrorist organization. The digital storage and memory cards he tried to hide were password protected and the information were invisible. After the initial analysis it was found that inside memory cards was buried a pornographic video “Kick Ass” and a file named “Sexy Tanja”. A few weeks later, after great efforts to combat a password and the software to make the file almost invisible, German researchers encoded in the video of a treasure trove of intelligence – over 100 documents including al-Qaeda firsthand about some of the plots of the terrorist group and a bolder road map for future operations for which there were not specified neither the date nor the location. Also various terrorist training manuals used by this organization were found. All these data were hidden using steganographic tools.

¹² M. Bogdanoski, A. Risteski, & S. Pejovski, (2012, November). *Steganalysis—A way forward against cyber terrorism*. In Telecommunications Forum (TELFOR), 2012 20th (pp. 681-684). IEEE.

The National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), in a report released in 2006's gave the following statement:¹³

"..... immediate concerns also include the use of cyberspace for covert communications, particularly by terrorists but also by foreign intelligence services; espionage against sensitive but poorly defended data in government and industry systems; subversion by insiders, including vendors and contractors; criminal activity, primarily involving fraud and theft of financial or identity information, by hackers and organized crime groups..."

"International interest in R&D for Steganography technologies and their commercialization and application has exploded in recent years. These technologies pose a potential threat to national security. Because Steganography secretly embeds additional, and nearly undetectable, information content in digital products, the potential for covert dissemination of malicious software, mobile code, or information is great."

"The threat posed by Steganography has been documented in numerous intelligence reports."

Rumors about the usage of Steganography by terrorists first appeared in the daily newspaper "USA Today", on 5 February 2001, in two articles titled as "Terrorist instructions hidden online" and "Terror groups hide behind Web encryption". In October 2001, the information looked even more precise: "militant wired Web links to jihad". In October 2001, "The New York Times" published an article claiming that al-Qaeda had used steganography techniques to encrypt and insert messages into images and then transported via e-mail and possibly via USENET to prepare and execute the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

With reference to research on Jamestown Foundation, captured terrorist training manual "Technical Mujahid, a Training Manual for Jihadists", contains a section titled "Covert Communications and Hiding Secrets inside Images".

Centre for Steganographic Research and Analysis, during the latest research, identified more than 725 applications for digital steganography.¹⁴

National responses to the cyber terrorism threat

The European Commission adopted a provision that requires all members of the European Union all activities defined as "attack through interference with information systems" to be punishable as terrorist act, if their goal is "serious alteration or destruction of political, economic or social structures". France expanded police power to search private property without warrants.¹⁵

¹³ A. Jahangiri, *Cyberspace, Cyberterrorism and Information Warfare: A Perfect Recipe for Confusion*: <http://www.alijahangiri.org/publication/Cyberspace-Cyberterrorism-and-Information-Warfare-A-Perfect-Recipe-for-Confusion.htm>

¹⁴ E. S. Othman, *Hide and Seek: Embedding Audio into RGB 24-bit Color Image Sporadically Using Linked List Concepts*: IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSRJCE), Volume 4, Issue 1 (Sep-Oct. 2012), PP 37-44, <http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-jce/papers/Vol4-issue1/G0413744.pdf>

¹⁵ E. Waak, *The Global Reach of Privacy Invasion*, Humanist, November/December: <http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/waakND02.htm>

Spain, similar to the UK legislation, restricts the activities of any organization that is directly or indirectly related to the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) - an armed separatist group for Basque Homeland and Freedom. The European Council took steps to establish the wanted level across Europe and to define the term “terrorist crime.” Germany’s government cuts the limits about monitoring telephone calls and monitoring e-mails and bank accounts and restores previously limited communication between the Secret Service and the police. In June 2002, the United Kingdom, under the pretext of counter-terrorism, tried to bring regulations that would mandate almost all local and national government agencies to gain access to data communications traffic without the need of a warrant.¹⁶

Australia introduced a law on terrorists in order to intercept electronic mail (giving power to the main Australian Security Intelligence Organisation), and to create an attack directed against the preparation and planning of terrorist acts. This law allows the terrorist property to be “frozen” or taken away. New Zealand has introduced similar legislation in order to comply with the bilateral agreement on legal harmonization between these two countries.

India also brought its own decree to protect against terrorism, enabling authorities to apprehend suspect without trial, to conduct surveillance and to seize money and property of suspected terrorists, and in some cases to implement the death penalty.¹⁷

Some states, such as is the case with the U.S. and Australia, recommended setting of network operation center in cyberspace, which will include Internet service providers, and developers (programmers) of computer hardware and software.

Their task is to develop safe technology, as intelligent analysis software, that will be able to analyze existing data, both public and private, in order to detect suspicious activities.¹⁸

Multilateral responses to threats of cyber terrorism

Response of cyber terrorism by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

As sophisticated political-military alliance, NATO has long been familiar with the use and defense of electronic and information warfare. For years, NATO is involved in efforts to transform the military organization and conduct of operations by “networking oriented warfare” and “network enabled capabilities”. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO leaders decided to strengthen its capabilities to defend against cyber attacks. Decision in Prague resulted in many initiatives.¹⁹

A new NATO Cyber Terrorism Program is initiated, involving various NATO bodies: NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA), described as the “first line of defense against cyber terrorism,” NATO INFOSEC Technical Center

¹⁶ K. Curran&Others, Civil Liberties and Computer Monitoring, 2004: <http://www.jiti.com/v05/jiti.v5n1.029-038.pdf>

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ B. Simons, & E. H. Spafford, Inside Risks 153, *Communications of the ACM*, 46(3), March 2003

¹⁹ NATO Prague Summit Declaration Article 4(f), 21 November 2002: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.

(NITC), responsible for communication and computer security; NATO Information Assurance Operations Centre (NIAOC), responsible for management and coordination of cryptographic equipment in response to a cyber attack against NATO; NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), whose task is to protect the NATO encrypted communications systems.²⁰

After the cyber attack against Estonia in April and May 2007, NATO ministers agreed on the outline of the NATO's cyber defense concept, which was brought in Nordwijk, in October 2008.²¹ This concept at the beginning of 2008 was developed into a NATO Policy on Cyber Defense.²² The NATO members were informed in more details about this policy on the NATO Summit held in Bucharest at the beginning of April 2008.²³

Following the Summit, NATO established Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA), in order to bring together all key players in the NATO activities related to cyber defense, and better management of the cyber defense support to any member of the alliance in defense against cyber attack, upon request.²⁴ At the same time, NATO leaders agreed with the formal establishment of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCD-CoE), which has been in development since 2004. The significance of the CCD-CoE, based in Tallinn, was confirmed during the attack of Estonia in 2007, so in October 2008 the NATO Council grants the Centre *full NATO accreditation* and the organisation obtains the *status of International Military Organization*.²⁵

"The mission and vision" of the CCD-CoE are described as follows: "enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned and consultation" and to be "the main source of expertise in the field of cooperative cyber defence by accumulating, creating, and disseminating knowledge in related matters within NATO, NATO nations and partners".²⁶ The organization current has eleven "nations-sponsors": Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the USA. Invitation for membership is open to all NATO members, but cooperation projects are also conducted jointly with NATO partner countries, academia and the private sector.

²⁰ NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency: http://www.ncsa.nato.int/topics/combating_cyber_terrorism.htm

²¹ European Security and Defence Assembly, 'Cyber warfare' (Assembly of the Western European Union, Defence Committee Report C/2022. 5 November 2008), p.19.

²² NATO, 'Defence against cyber attacks', 26 June 2008: http://www.nato.int/issues/cyber_defence/index.html.

²³ NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, Art. 47, 3 April 2008: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>.

²⁴ NATO, 'Defending against cyber attacks: what does this mean in practice?', 31 March 2008: http://www.nato.int/issues/cyber_defence/practice.html.

²⁵ CCD-CoE, 'History and way ahead': <http://www.ccdcoe.org/12.html>

²⁶ CCD-CoE, 'Mission and Vision': <http://www.ccdcoe.org/11.html>

United Nations (UN)

Cyber security is one of the main themes on the traditional debates on security policy in the UN system. Normally this refers to those debates related to the threat of terrorism and in the form of Resolutions of the UN Security Council.²⁷ The topic is covered in the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee established by Security Council,²⁸ and it is mentioned in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

In the latter case, the goal is not only “counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet”, but also with more active approach to “use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism.”²⁹ Wider in the UN systems, cyber security is regularly recognized as a central feature that will be constantly developed in the international agenda for international security.

In the UN system, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has highest responsibility for the practical aspects and applications of the international cyber security.

The *ITU mission* statement embraces the *issue of cyber security* in direct terms. The purpose of the organization is to develop confidence in the use of cyberspace through enhanced online security. Achieving of the cyber security and cyber peace are some of the most critical concerns in the ICT development, and ITU takes concrete measures through its Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA).³⁰

In September 2008, the ITU and the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) signed an agreement under which GCA is located in IMPACT headquarter in Cyberjaya, Malaysia.³¹

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Issued in 2002 by the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry of the OECD, Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks have become a standard reference point for national and international cyber security initiatives. Non-binding guidelines adopted by 19 of the 30 members of the OECD as well as Brazil, and the European Union. The Guidelines apply to all participants in the new information society and sug-

²⁷ See UN Security Council Resolution 1373: reference to ‘use of communications technologies by terrorist groups’ (28 September 2001, para. 3(a)): <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm>. UN Security Council Resolution 1624 refers to the need to ‘prevent terrorists from exploiting sophisticated technology, communications and resources’ (14 September 2005, p.2): <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/510/52/PDF/N0551052.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁸ UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee: <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/index.html>. See also UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005)’ (S/2006/737, 15 September 2006), paras 6, 16, 43: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/520/37/PDF/N0652037.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁹ The Use of Internet for Terrorist Purposes: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - Vienna, (September 2012, p.vi), http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf.

³⁰ ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA, Framework for International Cooperation in Cybersecurity), ITU 2007, <http://www.ifap.ru/library/book169.pdf>

³¹ Curbing Cyberthreats-IMPACT: <http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/impact/index.html>

gest the need for a greater awareness and understanding of security issues and the need to develop a “culture of security”.

The guidelines are based on nine complementary principles that organize and implement a safety culture: Awareness (the need for security of information systems and networks); Responsibility (all participants are responsible for the security of the information systems and networks); Response (participants should act on security incidents in timely and co-operative manner); Ethics (respect the legitimate interests of other users and promotion of best practice); Democracy (security measures should be compatible with the basic values of a democratic society); Risk assessment (broad assessment of threats and weaknesses as a basis for risk management); Security design and implementation (security measures should be an essential feature of information systems and networks); Security management (comprehensive approach involving all stakeholders at all levels, addressing threats as they appear); Reassessment (continuous review, revision and modification of security measures as risks evolve).³²

Other cyber security initiatives include a series of OECD reports on information security and privacy, including topics such as national guidelines for information security, OECD guidelines for policies to identify radio frequency and many others,³³ and finally the Working Party on Security of Information and Privacy (WPSIP), which aims is to provide a “foundation for developing national co-ordinated policies.”³⁴

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

OSCE’s interest in the challenges of cyber security is increasing. In December 2004, the OSCE Ministerial Council decided to dedicate to the “extent of use of the Internet by terrorist organizations,” including a number of activities, such as recruiting of the terrorists, foundation, organization and propaganda.³⁵ Two years later, the foreign ministers called for greater international cooperation and utilizing more effort to protect “vital critical information infrastructures and networks from the threat of cyber attacks.”

The participating countries were asked to closely monitor Web pages of the terrorist and extremist organizations and to exchange information with other governments in the OSCE and other relevant forums and it is asked “more active participation of civil society institutions and the private sector in preventing and countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.”³⁶ OSCE’s Permanent Council has also been a venue for debate and discussion concerning cyber security.³⁷ In June 2008, for example, Estonian Defence

³² OECD, Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks: Toward a Culture of Security (Paris: OECD, 25 July, 2002), pp. 9-12: http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_2649_34255_15582250_1_1_1_1,00.html

³³ OECD Resources on Policy Issues Related to Internet Governance: http://www.oecd.org/document/t/21/0,3343,en_21571361_34590630_34591253_1_1_1_1,00.html

³⁴ OECD Working Part on Information Security and Privacy: http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34255_36862382_1_1_1_1,00.html

³⁵ OSCE Ministerial Council Decision 3/04: Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, 7 December 2004: http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2004/12/3906_en.pdf

³⁶ OSCE Ministerial Council Decision 7/06: Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, 5 December 2006: http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2006/12/22559_en.pdf

³⁷ OSCE Permanent Council: <http://www.osce.org/pc/>

Minister Jaak Aaviksoo spoke about immense amount of work that has to be done in the the field of cyber security.³⁸

The OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) also contributed to the organization's involvement in the field of cyber security. Although the FSC's work has been concentrated largely on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures,³⁹ lately, the forum began to be more interested in cyber security. In October 2008, FBS (in joint session with the Permanent Council) decided to convene an OSCE workshop on a Comprehensive approach to improving cyber security in March 2009.⁴⁰ Finally, the OSCE supports national efforts, such as the Armenian Forces on Cyber Crime and Cyber Security.⁴¹

Council of Europe (CoE)

Contribution of the CoE in the international cyber security policy is primarily through the Convention on Cyber Crime, which was opened for signature in November 2001 and which entered into force in July 2004. It is important to note that, although the Convention was signed by 46 countries, including Canada, Japan, South Africa and the U.S., until today it has been ratified by only 26 countries, including Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia, 11 EU states have yet to ratified the Convention and five CoE member states have not even signed (including Russia). Convention was signed and ratified by countries that are not members of the CoE (Canada, Japan, South Africa and USA).⁴² Sixteen other countries that are not members of the Council of Europe are reported as "known to use the Convention as a guideline for their national legislation" (including Brazil and India).

The CoE Convention on Cybercrime is important for several aspects. First, the Convention addresses the illegal activities and practices that features across spectrum of cyber security threats. Second, the Convention establishes common standards and procedures that are legally binding on its signatories. Third, the Convention is open to the Member States of the CoE and others, which increases its authority as an international instrument. Finally, the Convention introduced requirements for handling data and access that have led to concerns about the privacy law and civil liberties.

G-8

The main contribution of the G-8 in international cyber security policy is a Sub-group of High-Tech Crime, created as a subset of Lyon Group in 1996 to combat trans-

³⁸ OSCE Permanent Council, 'OSCE can play important role in cyber security, says Estonian defence Minister', Vienna, 4 June 2008: http://www.osce.org/pc/item_1_31483.htm

³⁹ OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation: <http://www.osce.org/fsc/>

⁴⁰ OSCE FSC/PC 36th Joint Meeting, FSC Decision No. 10/08, 'OSCE Workshop on a Comprehensive OSCE Approach to Enhancing Cyber Security', 29th October 2008: <http://www.osce.org/fsc/>

⁴¹ OSCE, 'OSCE office organises discussion in Yerevan on cyber security threats', 21 March 2006: <http://www.osce.org/item/18450.html>

⁴² Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG>

national organized crime. The purpose of this subgroup was to “enhance the ability of the G-8 countries to protect, investigate and prosecute crimes committed using computers, network communications, and other new technologies.” The mission of the subunit was subsequently extended to include the use of the Internet by terrorists and the protection of critical information infrastructure. Subgroup is trying to deal with cyber crime not only within the jurisdiction of the G8 countries, but also to create guidelines that could take and implement other countries. The subgroup has created 24/7 network of contact for high-tech crime and international Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CCIP) Directory. Subgroup has published its best practice documents and guidelines for assessment of threats to computer and network security and has organized international training conferences for cyber-crime agencies.

Conclusion

This paper gives a short overview of the term of cyber terrorism and describes the most known cyber terrorist attacks. Taking in consideration the fact that the cyber terrorists are using smarter methods and tools to attack computer systems and government institutions, and the main objective is to achieve their objectives; the national and global security are subject to higher risk.

The second part of the paper represents a response to the cyber security challenges at national level and by various international organizations. NATO, for example, is a long-standing political and military organization, with extensive experience in the field of cyber terrorism and cyber security.

One of the limitations that occur during the acquisition of various cyber security measures is a balance to be made between security measures and civil liberties. There should be also a balance between the provision of specific interests to a particular organization or government, and more general requirements for the benefit of all legitimate users to be formed an international communications and technological environment that will be unfriendly-oriented to the ambitions of cyber terrorists and extremists, cyber criminals and hackers.

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GLOBAL SUICIDE TERRORISM

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Abstract: *This paper has confirmed that the variables of occupation, nationalism, religious difference, and rebellion are all necessary variables for the adoption of suicide attacks. Suicide attacks have been adopted as a method of last resort to escalate insurgencies rather than giving into foreign occupation. When terrorist groups or insurgencies are forced to decide between giving into the foreign occupation and raising the insurgency, suicide attacks are adopted by those choosing to escalate.*

The ability to perceive suicide terrorism mainly as a reaction to foreign occupation rather than a creation of Islamic fundamentalism has significant implications for how the governments should conduct the war on terrorism.

Following the analyses of terrorism and suicide terrorism trends, the paper explains that suicide attacks have enhanced radically and have developed into a global phenomenon.

Key words: *suicide attacks, terrorism, terrorist organizations, global threat.*

Introduction

Suicide attacks are the targeted use of self-destructing humans against a perceived enemy for political ends.

Suicide terrorism is generally defined as “the readiness to sacrifice one’s life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal” (Gunaratna 2000).

It is a phenomenon that is closely associated with fourth-wave—or religious—terrorism, although it is practiced among secular groups as well (Rapoport 2004). Suicide terrorism is distinguished from “classic” terrorism in that the terrorist intends to kill himself or herself in the process of conducting an operation. Suicide bombings may be used in military operations (targeting military personnel, infrastructure, etc.) or they may be directed against civilian targets. In the latter case, suicide attacks become “ends in themselves, designed to terrorize the civilian population and provoke some political change” (Bloom 2005).

Suicide as an accepted operational strategy dates to antiquity. The suicide bomber is, however, a recent phenomenon. The suicide bomber is the epitome of the smart bomb; he or she can avoid most defenses, penetrate to the heart of the enemy, abort when required, switch targets with little thought and when exploded, leaves little for investigators afterwards. Suicide bombers are a very

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efficient mode of killing. In a September, 2004 interview, Hamas leader Sheikh Hamed Al-Betawi stated, “[o]ur people do not own airplanes and tanks, only human bombs.”

Suicide attacks have become more widespread globally, adding in strategic significance with disrupting effects that flow upon the political, economic and social routines of national existence and international relations.

The strategic logic of suicide attacks

There is little connection between religious fundamentalism (and for that matter, religion) and suicide attacks. The leading instigator of suicide attacks between 1980 and 2001 were the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a radical nationalist group whose members are from Hindu families but who are adamantly opposed to religion. Religion is used effectively by the Palestinian radical groups Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to recruit suicide attackers and to raise operational funds. But the leadership of these organizations has a secular goal: to coerce the Israeli government to change its policies and to leave the Palestinian territories. The point here is that even if some suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership of the groups that recruit and direct them is not (Pape 2005).

Pape’s study offers the theory that suicide attacks follow a strategic logic specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant political and territorial concessions. According to Pape, the reason for the rise of suicide attacks over the past two decades is that ‘terrorists have learned that it pays’. Suicide attacks by members of Hezbollah and Hamas have been since 1983 highly successful in compelling American and French troops to leave Lebanon and in forcing Israeli troops to quit Lebanon in 1985 and the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995. The Tamil Tigers succeeded in winning major political and territorial concessions from the Sri Lankan government from 1990 onwards using this tactic. In the 1990s, suicide attacks by the Kurdistan Peoples Party succeeded in winning partial cultural and political concessions from the Turkish government. The withdrawal of the

American troops from Saudi Arabia in 1996, under terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda supporters, also fits in with this pattern.

Critique of Pape provides greater dimension in noting that while foreign occupation may explain patterns of “traditional” or “localized” suicide attacks, it does not explain groups like al-Qaeda that are engaged in a “globalization of martyrdom” in the service of rather nebulous goals.

Tracking the logic of suicide terrorism, one should distinguish between motivation for a political decision to launch a martyrdom campaign (strategic level of analysis) and factors motivating individuals to serve as suicide bombers (individual and structural levels of analysis) (Ismayilov 2010).

There are 8 key factors explaining the utility of suicide terrorism.

1. Suicide attacks are more lethal than their conventional counterparts.
2. They are highly effective in gaining the spotlight and international attention.

3. In enabling social circumstances, suicide attacks build solidarity with one's political base.
4. They can deflect or reduce the possibility of backlash over civilian casualties.
5. Suicide attacks can be "auto-propaganda" motivating a group's internal membership.
6. Can be used to gain competitive advantage over other rival terrorist groups.
7. As noted above, suicide operations are cheap.
8. It is sometimes rational to appear irrational (Gottlieb 2010).

The coercive logic of suicide terrorism is that the strategy aims to compel a target government to change policies by inflicting enough pain and punishment to that society to either force the government to change the policies or induce their population to revolt against that government. The coercive nature of suicide terrorism as a strategy of a weak actor relies on leveraging the future expectation of damage. A suicide bomber's willingness to die amplifies the effect of this punishment and generally inflicts more damage than other types of terrorist attack. Such attacks are a very convincing way to signal the future likelihood of attack. Terrorist groups that rely on these tactics are better positioned than other terrorist groups to increase the expectations about escalating future costs because they intentionally violate the norms in the use of violence by crossing thresholds of damage, pushing the envelope on what is considered a legitimate target, and it helps broaden recruitment (Reichert 2010).

There are several reasons why suicide missions have become a weapon of choice among insurgents groups. These include:

1. Major psychological impact and exceptional media coverage.
2. Suicide missions serve as symbols of dedication, commitment and Islamic martyrdom.
3. They serve as sources of political and financial support from the community and also aid in recruitment of potential suicide bombers (Cordesman, 2005).

Terrorist groups that use suicide bombings

The phenomenon has seen a growing popularity especially among Islamist fundamentalist terror groups, though different groups in various locations of the world have used them. Suicide-capable groups differ in form, size, orientation, goal and support. A review of the key characteristics of the 10 suicide-capable groups reveals that any group can acquire suicide bomb technology and engage in suicide terrorism. Some of suicide groups are motivated by religion, religious/ethnic nationalism, or ethnic nationalism.

Suicide operations are attractive to terrorist organizations, as they result in many casualties, cause extensive damage, attract media coverage, guarantee the most appropriate time and place with regard to the circumstances at the target location, are extremely difficult to counter and require no escape plan. Today, there are about 10 religious and secular terrorist groups that are capable of using suicide terrorism as a tactic against their governments and/or foreign governments. These are: the Islam Resistance Movement

(Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad of the Israeli occupied territories, Hizbullah of Lebanon, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Gamaya Islamiya (Islamic Group - IG) of Egypt, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, Barbar Khalsa International (BKI) of India, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey and the Osama bin Laden network (Al Quaida).

Suicide bombers are described as the "ultimate asymmetric weapon". They have quickly become the weapon of choice for many terrorists groups. Suicide bombings have a high symbolic value because the willingness of the bomber to die signals his high determination and dedication to the cause. They serve as symbols of the justness of the bomber's struggle, galvanize popular support, generate financial support for the organization and become a source of new recruits for future suicide missions. From an organizational perspective, suicide bombing is the epitome of political realism. Suicide bombers force their adversary to make concessions. Bombers, by their demonstration of merciless resolve, also crowd out other less ruthless organizations, the so-called "market share theory" of suicide bombing. Suicide bombers obtain the highest kill ratio of any other form of terroristic endeavour. The average number of victims in a shooting attack is 3.32; in a remote control explosive attack, 6.92; in a suicide attack with an explosive vest, 81.48 and with a vehicle borne improvised explosive device, 97.81 (Pedahzur & Perlinger 2006).

As a tactic, suicide bombing can be extremely efficient and effective. The explosives are aimed precisely at a target by means of the most direct form of human guidance possible, with both the physical location and timing of the explosive device under full human control. Target selection plans can be modified at the discretion of the bomber as circumstances warrant. Because of the ability to exercise such discretion on the ground, the amount of damage to a target can be more devastating than that achieved by conventional guided weapons, which are, in any event, unavailable and unaffordable to those who plan such attacks. Suicide bombings tend to be especially destructive when directed by more capable attackers at more carefully selected targets (Frost 2009). 80 percent of suicide bombings that have occurred since 1968 took place after 9/11. That percentage had increased to 95 percent by 2007.

- Global trends from 1981-2011 shows that were 2297 suicide bombings attacks which killed 29951 people in 36 countries.
- Suicide bombings are 4 % of all terrorist attacks but accounted for 32 % all terrorist fatalities.

Year	Average yearly suicide attacks	Deaths per suicide attack* (refers to the minimum number killed)	Average yearly non-suicide terrorist attack	Deaths per non-suicide terrorist attack
1981-2006	46	12	1094	1.1

Lethality of suicide attacks (MIPT & FUSTD 2008)

Pape's and Feldman's "occupation theory", which holds that suicide terrorism is not caused by Islamic fundamentalism but by foreign occupation. As the authors observe, "What every campaign of suicide terrorism has in common is that they are occurring as the central feature in violent resistance to foreign occupation of territory that the terrorists view as their homeland or prize greatly." The target of the bomber, the authors argue, is almost exclusively the military forces of democracies. Democracies are more susceptible to public opinion. The aim of the suicide bomber is to undermine public support, among the citizens of the occupying countries, for the occupation, and thereby hasten the end of the occupation.

To support their thesis, the authors present detailed case studies on the causes of suicide terrorism in: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, Chechnya and Sri Lanka. Each country is examined by means of several variables: the number of terrorist groups; the nature, goals, weapons and targets of terrorist groups; the specific trajectory of suicide campaigns, and the local recruitment and community support of terrorist groups. By way of example and to prove their hypothesis; prior to 9/11, the only suicide bombing in Afghanistan was the assassination of the leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Masoud on September 9, 2001 (Coll 2004).

In the aftermath of the invasion, between 2001 and 2005, Afghanistan experienced only fourteen suicide attacks. In 2006, there were 93. By 2007, the number had increased to 137, a year later to 138 and in 2009 to 98. The authors argue that: the incremental expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) throughout Afghanistan (particularly in the southern traditionally Pashtun territory of the country); the consequential increase in force support and number of coalition bases; and the accompanying use of problematic American tactics (air strikes with high collateral damage and night raids) have led many Afghans to believe that their country is, in fact, occupied (Pape & Feldman 2010).

This view is compounded, according to the authors, when one considers the corruption and wide spread alienation of the Karzai government.

We may argue that foreign military occupation, not Islamic fundamentalism; the so-called “Islamic Narrative” is the root cause of suicide terrorism. As examples of the secularization of suicide bombing, we may point to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PPK) and Hezbollah, none of which are Islamic and all are working for nationalistic i.e. political ends.

Suicide assassins represent the ideal weapon for the terrorist organization. The living bombs are a rationally useful instrument in asymmetric conflict. They combine maximum gain and minimum risk, an ideal constellation. The comparative advantages of suicide attacks include the following:

- ✓ Training suicide assassins does not require much manpower. They are an easy-to-handle weapon of low cost.
- ✓ The suicide attacker does not need protection nor plans for withdrawal and escape. The planning needs for such an operation are thus small.
- ✓ Usually, the suicide attacker will not be caught by the enemy since the loss of his life is inscribed into the operation. Therefore, he cannot pass information to the enemy when in interrogation. This makes it extremely difficult for the enemy to gather information.
- ✓ The suicide attacker is not easy to detect, even when much manpower is commanded. Preventive measures are thus difficult to be taken.
- ✓ This enlarges the threat to the enemy. The presence of threat is permanent and ubiquitous.
- ✓ The suicide assassin can make very last minute changes when conducting his operation. This makes him a very flexible weapon.
- ✓ The suicide operation promises high precision, target effectiveness, and utmost material and psychological damage to the enemy, most importantly, among the civilian population where panic, hysteria, and feelings of powerlessness (Kummel 2008).

Some of these advantages point to the communication character of suicide terrorism in particular and terrorism in general. Communication effects are expected in two dimensions: they not only aim at the psyche of the enemy’s society, but represent a call to rally round the flag within the own society and community. Passing messages of insecurity and threat to the enemy society, and passing messages of mobilization and imitation to their own society go hand in hand together. That these messages are heard is due to the “unholy alliance of terrorism and the mass media”, i.e., the fact that the media depict terrorist acts in a sensational manner and give them enormous publicity. Terrorist organizations count on this effect; it is an integral part of their action plan.

Finally, this paper found that the coercive success of suicide attacks may have been overestimated. While suicide attacks are a powerful coercive tactic, their realistic abilities remain limited in achieving concessions or gains from an occupying power.

An effective strategy for combating suicide terrorism requires a layered approach that works on three levels in a coordinated way:

1. A last line of defense involves the attempt to protect sensitive populations and installations from attack. Mostly through development and use of scientific technology, efforts are made to block suicide terrorists from hitting their targets or to lessen (through preparation) the effects of an attack that has not been prevented.

2. A middle line of defense involves preemptively penetrating and destroying terror organizations and networks, mostly through a combination of intelligence and military action.

3. A first line of defense involves understanding and acting on the root causes of terrorism so as to drastically reduce the receptivity of potential recruits to the message and methods of terror-sponsoring organizations, mostly through political, economic, and social action programs.

Billions upon billions of dollars have been targeted on countermeasures associated with the last and middle lines of defense (protection, mitigation, preemption). These measures may have helped to thwart a steep rise in suicide attacks; however, they have produced no appreciable decline of suicide terrorism.

Conclusion

Suicide terrorism is a growing threat in the world today, and it can now be found on virtually every continent of the world. It is a phenomenon that was once believed to be transitory, but increasing evidence suggests that the tactic is being sustained by a momentum of its own, and thus it is likely to become a permanent feature of terrorism in the years and decades ahead.

It remains notable, however, that although suicide terrorism is not a new phenomenon, its current role in contemporary terrorism and the scale of violence that it has brought are unprecedented.

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327.51(47:100-622 HATO)

327.56(47:100-622 HATO)

Review

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND NATO – BETWEEN COOPERATION AND A NEW CONFLICT

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Nikola JOCIĆ²

Abstract: *When on 26 December 1991 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) dissolved world believed that a new era of cooperation and development finally came. Cooperation was improved significantly with Russian accession to the NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and later The Partnership for Peace (PfP) and founding of NATO-Russia Council. Unfortunately, cooperation was burdened from the start by the past and lack of real willingness to achieve mutual goals. Both sides had shown interest in partnership. Important documents were signed, but lack of realization is obvious. War in Yugoslavia, Kosovo crisis, enlargement of NATO, missile shield, energy crisis and many other disputes prevailed over cooperation and dealt serious damage to partnership. Russia and NATO are endangered by many threats that could be efficiently solved in bilateral and multilateral partnerships. If they don't devote themselves to full cooperation they will be condemned to relive mistakes of the Cold War.*

Key words: *Cold War, Russian Federation, NATO, cooperation, conflict, crises, perspective*

Introduction

How could yesterday's enemies become tomorrow's friends?³ Since the end of the Second World War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union lived in frozen conflict. World was in constant fear of new global war, which could bring unseen destruction. Fear was boosted by the possession of nuclear weapons on both sides. If we recall on the reason why NATO was formed, protection of the West against emergence of a threat posed by communism, which was seen as a product of the Soviet Union, there is no further need to analyze reasons for Russian negative positions against NATO. West had their own reason to be defensive. Reason was Warsaw Pact, which was led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). We can conclude that state of conflict that could spread across the world was a real threat.

In the same time, there was opinion that way out is cooperation. In the years 1985-91, there was substantial debate and discussion in the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the United States on

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³ Ponsard, L. (2007). Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security. Bringing the gap. New York, Routledge.

the construction of a “Common European Home”.⁴ Unfortunately, this concept, created by Mikhail Gorbachev, did not have enough support to prevail against never ending preparations for war that never happened. Regardless of this, it is important to present the fact that even in those turbulent times, there was a voice of cooperation. Concept had three issues of great importance. First was the place of United States in Common Home, second was theirs own place, and third regarded institutional architecture of the Common Home. Gorbachev’s view of the United States, in Perestroika, as being an essentially alien and worrisome power and presence in Europe, was also reflected in his statement that “We would not like to see anyone kick in the doors of the European home and take the head of the table desperate – to win sympathy and financial support amongst western governments”.⁵ Even that voice of cooperation had its own limits, it is important for later comparison with today’s foundations of partnership.

When in 1991 the Soviet Union relatively peacefully ceased to exist on geopolitical map, new opportunities for cooperation were possible. That gave the World a brief chance to respite. Now two opposite Western views for further development of strategy had to be confronted. One view called for full integration of Russia into NATO since the Soviet threat had been rooted out. Opposite view argued that it would give Russia an opportunity to bring instability to NATO from the inside. However, in their views, the perspective of Russia remaining at the border of the Euro-Atlantic zone was not very attractive either. A number of obstacles seemed to be in the way of any constructive relations between the two parties.⁶ West mainly did not believe that Russia truly wants to cooperate. It was very difficult to switch public opinion from seeing Russia as advisor to new associate in the security field.

When the Russian Federation accessed North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later The Partnership for Peace (PfP), tensions decreased to a point where we could really acknowledge that a new world reality arose. Today, many see possibility of war between Russia and NATO as unlikely to happen, but there are many potential conflicts that could disintegrate cooperation, and pull back world in new Cold War.

A new world reality after the Cold War

Many authors agree that Western allies, led by the United States, are the winners of the Cold War. In December 1991, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia declared independence and the Soviet Union disappeared from geopolitical map of the world. Even for America this was a shock. Nonetheless, American republicans were quick to claim credit for winning the Cold War. They thought that military spending’s forced the Soviets to the brink of the economic collapse.

Was this a real victory? The United States spent trillions of dollars arming themselves for a war that, fortunately for the World, never happened. Furthermore, that the dissolution of the USSR should not be regarded as his defeat in the Cold War, no doubt supported by the fact that the post-Soviet space is not found in chaos, a rocket-nuclear potential of the Soviet Union is fully preserved and transferred to new bases on the territory of Russia,

⁴ Smith, M. A. (2006). *Russia and NATO since 1991. From Cold War through cold peace to partnership?* New York, Routledge.

⁵ Smith, M. A. (2006). *Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War through cold peace to partnership?* New York, Routledge.

⁶ Ponsard, L. (2007). *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bringing the gap.* New York, Routledge.

which is recognized as legal successor of the disappeared state.⁷ There is no doubt that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to newly formed states would be a much higher threat. Having SSSR nuclear potential in mind, this was the best way to end the conflict that could end humanity.

As many thought, the collapse of the Soviet Union, did not bring world peace and stability. Only one thing was certain, multipolar world ceased to exist. Without Soviets, NATO was in a dead end. Way out was to add new goals, that could contribute to security of the new global society. Today, NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the international stage. Through its crisis management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.⁸ Purpose of this article is not to advocate proclaimed and real goals neither of Russia nor NATO, but to analyze current cooperation and potential conflicts.

As Samuel P. Huntington wrote, world politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be.⁹ While some are skeptical, others see cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO as a real and necessary foundation of world peace and development.

Cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO in the security field

Cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO officially started in 1991. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established by the Allies on 20 December 1991, as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO's former Warsaw Pact adversaries. The NACC was a manifestation of the "hand of friendship" extended at the July 1990 summit meeting in London, when Allied leaders proposed a new cooperative relationship with all countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ That was the time of great geopolitical changes in Europe. Inaugural meeting of NACC witnessed very important turning point. As the final report was being agreed, the ambassador of the USSR reported that Soviet Union had dissolved during the meeting and that he now only represents Russian Federation. In post-Cold War period NACC was focused on solving emerging security threats, occurred as a by-product of the Soviet Union disintegration. In order to stabilize new geopolitical and geostrategic reality, Council had to carefully monitor, and maybe even more important, prevent possible new conflicts, which could follow withdrawal of Russian troops from Baltic States. Special efforts had to be made to prevent conflicts that were breaking out in parts of former SSSR and former Yugoslavia.

⁷ Primakov, Y. (2010). *A World without Russia? Where short-sighted political thinking can lead*. Belgrade: Official Gazette of Faculty of Security Studies.

⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO operations and missions. Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm

⁹ Huntington S. (1996). *The Clash of civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York : Simon & Schuster

¹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm site visited: 20/4/2013

NACC created new era where cooperation had potentially significant influence on security, era where cooperation should put wars in history.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was a next great step toward cooperation. In January 1994 NATO initiated PfP. Programme's initial goal was to boost cooperation and trust with states derived from Warsaw pact. Focus was on former Soviet states, but states created by disintegration of Yugoslavia, and five members of European Union, that were not members of NATO, also joined the program. On 22 June 1994 Russia signed Partnership for Peace, the program of cooperation which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered to East European countries and former Soviet republics. It is an immediate plan for transformation of relations between the NATO and the countries participating in it¹¹. Throughout the world, including the Russian Federation, there were opinions, ranging from negative to highly positive, on the Russian approaching to NATO. At first the official policy of the Russian Federation presented reserves to the idea on Partnership. Russian officials warned that this program did not take into consideration the status of Russia as a great power and that it actually meant enlargement of the NATO influence area. Fortunately, opinion that Russia should not pull back from the accession to Partnership, which was also accepted by the Russian diplomacy, but that it should try to impose its conditions which would ensure it a special status in that program. By the agreement which was signed on 22 June 1994 the NATO took into consideration that Russian Federation was a great, European, world and nuclear power and it obligated itself to consult and work with Russia about the problems of European continent. Following this new obligation of NATO, Russia accepted to actively participate in the partnership. This meant active role in planning of defense and military budget, as well as strict civilian control of the army. NATO presented its great dedication to cooperation by giving explicit right of veto to Russia. All this had many positive impacts on Russian stability, which was burdened by serious political and economic problems. If we analyze relationship between the USSR and Western Allies, which could be defined as a state of frozen and grooving conflict that could explode at any second, and situation after Russian accession to the Partnership for Peace, it is more than obvious that in relatively short time, two great powers went a long way from adversaries to new associates. Even that PfP gave new perspective for partnerships, adversaries of Russian accession to Partnership for Peace feared that "NATO, mainly through the Partnership for Peace, took strategic advantage over their former sole rival for global leadership-Russia"¹².

In order to reinforce further cooperation the Russian Federation and NATO adopted Founding Act On Mutual Relations, Cooperation And Security Between NATO And The Russian Federation. Act was signed in 27 May 1997 in Paris, France, and it created path for further integration. As presented in this vital document, NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their

¹¹ Damian-Lakićević, A. (1994). Russia and Partnership for Peace. Belgrade, International problems.

¹² Mutavdžić, R. (2010). Partnership insecurity: Program Partnership for Peace and the concept of cooperative security. Belgrade, DefenseMedia Center.

shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.¹³ This Act also defines goals and mechanisms needed for realization. As presented, they are: cooperation, joint decision making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between the Russian Federation and NATO. Act also recognizes NATO dedication to transformation, a process that will continue. It is very important to notify that in this Act NATO stated that it is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Founding Act recognizes Russian continuous building of democratic society and the realization of its political and economic transformation. Russian devotion to the adjustment of national security concept and revising of its military doctrine, that will ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities, deserves its place in this vital document. To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATO and Russia will create the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.¹⁴

Russia and the 19 NATO member states signed the Rome Declaration, establishing the NATO-Russia Council. Western leaders hailed the development, with British Prime Minister Tony Blair saying that it "marks the end of the Cold War".¹⁵ Goals and mechanisms of Council were agreed in Founding Act On Mutual Relations, Cooperation And Security Between NATO And The Russian Federation. Joint decisions and actions include fighting terrorism, military cooperation, which involves joint military exercises and personnel training, cooperation on Afghanistan, where Russia provides training courses for anti-narcotics officers Afghanistan and Central Asia countries in cooperation with UN, transportation by Russia of non-military freight in support of NATO's ISAF in Afghanistan, industrial cooperation, cooperation on defense interoperability, non-proliferation, and other areas. Having in mind that the Russian Federation and NATO have challenges and interests that are mutual for both sides, it is logical that the NATO-Russia Council is seen by the both sides as effective at building diplomatic agreements between all parties participating since 2002.

¹³ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France. Available from

http://www.nato-russia-council.info/media/59451/1997_nato_russia_founding_act.pdf site visited: 28/4/2013.

¹⁴ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France. Available from

http://www.nato-russia-council.info/media/59451/1997_nato_russia_founding_act.pdf

¹⁵ NATO Parliament Assembly. (2002). CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS: NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (through 2002). Available from <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=232>

In Bucharest summit meeting in April 2008, both sides pointed that there is a lack of actual content resulting from the Council. In January 2009, the Russian envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said the NATO-Russia council was “a body where scholastic discussions were held.” A US official’s shared this view’s, stating: “We want now to structure cooperation more practically, in areas where you can achieve results, instead of insisting on things that won’t happen.” Although the Council was called Permanent this was not to be taken literally. Rather, it involved regularly assembled meetings. As mentioned above, it had no full-time-existing institutions. If it had had them, NATO and Russian representatives, working together, would have soon developed habits of cooperation and elements of understanding. In fact, this was not the case.¹⁶ The Permanent Joint Council and the Russia-NATO Founding Act were effectively suspended by the Russian government in March 1999 in protest against NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia. One of Council’s goals was to prevent crises in Europe, but unfortunately, it ceased to exist because of one of them. Lack of real cooperation and insufficient willingness to overcome conflict inflicted damage to relationship that will be hard to heal. One of the lessons derived from this failure could be briefly presented with few words “Do less, but do better”. Still, Russia and NATO have many similar threats and needs that can only be surmounted with cooperation. If both sides decide to get back to Founding Act they will have much bigger chance to succeed in partnership because of experience that instead of cooperation brought new potential conflicts.

Active and new sources of conflicts

Many authors criticized cooperation method of the Russian Federation and NATO, claiming that it is based and realized on paper and that it seriously lacks real actions and results. Disproportion of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation and its embodiment, NATO-Russia Council, as shown, did not achieve any of its proclaimed goals. We recognize efforts that both side made towards cooperation, but we can’t ignore conflicts that overburdened and damaged cooperation. Here, we will analyze present and conflict that could arise in closer future.

Recruitment of new members to NATO is everlasting challenge to Russian national security, as seen by Russian public. When in 2004 Baltic state’s¹⁷ became members of NATO, it was obvious that Western Allies are at the border of Russian Federation. This gained even more importance when in the same year Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO. This was very important because West gained important geostrategic access to the Black Sea. Expansion did not stop, and, as seen by the military and political official, possible accession of Ukraine and Georgia would simply be the last frontier where Russia will have to react. Accession of Ukraine to NATO presents “differential point through which Russia could hardly exceed¹⁸”. When Ukrainian government, who was led by Yulia Tymoshenko fell, and was replaced by a pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych, further expansion of NATO was halted.

¹⁶ Trenin-Straussov, P. (1999). The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997-1999: Anatomy of a Failure. Berlin information-center for Transatlantic Security. Available from <http://www.bits.de/public/researchnote/rn99-1.htm>

¹⁷ Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia became a full members of NATO

¹⁸ Petrović, D. (2007). Russia at the beginning of the XXI century. Prometej, Novi Sad.

Under the President Viktor Yanukovich's government, Ukraine is not presently seeking membership of the Alliance, however practical cooperation with NATO continues in a wide range of areas.¹⁹ Among other issues, Russian Federation is opposing Ukrainian accession to NATO because they have a common border longer than thousand and a half kilometers long. It is obvious that in order to improve the level of safety it is necessary to find a compromise acceptable to all the parties. In Georgian case, we have a similar relation. When in 2003 Mikheil Saakashvili became the President, new crisis arose, as a result of change in external political course. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO. This decision was subsequently reconfirmed at successive NATO summits in 2009, 2010 and 2012. NATO and Georgia pursue an active political dialogue and practical cooperation, including through the unique framework provided by the NATO-Georgia Commission, to assist and support Georgia in achieving its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.²⁰ Like in the case of Ukraine, Russian Federation was against this course of Georgia. They were against this because they share a common border, long about seven hundred twenty-three kilometers. This is not only problem that Georgia will have to face on accession path to NATO. NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said in October 2007 that Georgia should resolve the separatist conflicts if they want to pursue NATO membership.²¹ We can conclude that the accessions of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO are the greatest enlargement conflicts of Western Allies and that it possesses high level of possible conflict with the Russian Federation.

Next potential conflict is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is constructing a missile defense system in Mediterranean Sea and in the territories of several NATO member states, that it seen in Russia as a direct threat to theirs IBMS. Plans have changed several times, but it will be realized as soon as possible. Before exploring their reactions and insights, it is useful to identify salient elements of U.S. missile defense and place the issue in context. There are two main strategic missile defense systems fielded by the United States: one is based on large high-speed interceptors called Ground-Based Interceptors or "GBI's" located in Alaska and California and the other is the mostly ship-based NATO/European system. The latter, European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is designed to deal with the threat posed by possible future Iranian intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel, and allies in Europe – and eventually attempt to protect the U.S. homeland.²² Russian concern is boosted by the mobility of the system, because it possesses possibility to relocate and therefore have a theoretical capability to engage Russian warheads. This concern is backed up with many arguments,

¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's relations with Ukraine. Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1F3FEB36-6EF6B7E2/natolive/topics_37750.htm?

²⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's relations with Georgia. Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm

²¹ Nichol, J. (2006). Georgia (Republic) and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications. Available from http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R522829_20090306.pdf

²² Q&A Session on Recent Developments in U.S. and NATO Missile Defense with Dr. Yousaf Butt and Dr. George Lewis. Available from <http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/03/qa-session-on-recent-developments-in-us-and-nato-missile-defense-with-dr-yousaf-butt-and-dr-george-lewis/>

such is the statement of General James Cartwright where he explicitly mentioned this possible reconfiguration – or global surge capability – as an attribute of the planned system: “Part of what’s in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.” There were negative statements from the Russian side, such is one by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “It happens so that NATO in its inner elaboration of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) intends to make a step or two steps further than we will be doing together as part of the NATO-Russia Council”, and added “I hope however they (NATO) will not again try to pin us down to the facts, otherwise we will not escape the implications”.²³ Lavrov pointed that Russia’s agreement to discuss cooperation on missile defense in the NATO-Russia Council does not mean that Moscow agrees to the NATO project which are being developed without Russia’s participation. Both sides are showing readiness, but unfortunately, not towards the cooperation. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin gave statement “Russia’s strategic forces are capable of penetrating the US missile shield and it poses no military threat to the country”²⁴. NATO gave its statement too, when NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told the media “The United States and our European allies (are) investing in common security, and it is an excellent example of the renewed culture of cooperation, which we call ‘smart defense’²⁵”. It is hard not to notice that both sides are not showing enough willingness to overcome this conflict. While NATO is continuing to realize its missile shield, Russian Federation is preparing to defend from it. Tensions are still high, and as many people noticed, this situation is inevitably similar to the Cold War. Even today, compromise for this ever grooving conflict is far from its end.

Energy crisis as a new frontier

Today, maybe the most urgent discussion between Russia and Europe, which is inevitably issue of interest to NATO, is energy security. The term energy security has not been clearly defined, which makes it hard to measure and difficult to balance against other policy objectives. In literature, term energy security is often presented as supply security. There are several competing definitions of supply security. They all include the idea of avoiding sudden changes in the availability of energy relative to demand. However, the definitions show strong differences in the impact measure that is used for the benefits of increased continuity and the level of discontinuity that is defined as insecure.²⁶ For purposes of this work we will present threatening of energy security as threats that have impact on the energy supply chain. Sudden interest in this subject emerged as a product of 2006 crisis between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz. With Gazprom insisting that it was supplying the correct contractual volumes to its European customers, and Ukraine insisting that it was not taking gas from the transit pipelines to Europe to which it was not entitled, it was

²³ Lavrov says missile defense projects should not ‘upset parity’. (2011. Feb. 05). Available from <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110205/162465891.html>

²⁴ US Missile Shield No threat to Russia. (2013. 04. 16). Available from http://en.rian.ru/trend/missile_shield_europe/

²⁵ NATO declares European missile shield up and running. (2012. 05. 21). Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57438103/nato-declares-european-missile-shield-up-and-running/

²⁶ Winzer, C. (2011). Conceptualizing Energy Security. University of Cambridge, Electricity Policy Research Group.

initially difficult to understand what was happening. But falling pressures and non-delivery of gas reported by European companies on January 1 can only have resulted from Ukrainian companies diverting gas from the pipelines or because Gazprom failed to pump enough gas into those pipelines. Given Gazprom's concern about supply security and desire to earn money from gas exports to Europe, the only explanation is that gas was taken by Ukrainian customers.²⁷ We will not analyze this conflict as it is not of highest importance for this article. Here it is important to present the point where crisis started and how it impacted or relations between Russian exporters and European consumers. This crisis started as a Russia-Ukraine conflict but it had spread fast to Europe, and simultaneously on NATO. There are few subjects as controversial and emotive as the energy relationship between the EU and Russia. On the one side, there are those who argue that the nearly 500 million EU consumers are very fortunate to have Russia as a huge energy provider as its neighbor. On the other side, there are those who argue this is a curse as it allows Russia to 'blackmail' European countries by threatening to turn off oil and gas supplies or by offering lucrative deals to European companies in an effort to 'divide and rule' the EU.²⁸ Energy security is becoming an issue of increasing importance to the United States and its European allies, as some energy producers are showing a tendency to use oil and gas as political leverage. Although most European allies believe that a market solution exists to ensure security of energy supplies, NATO has begun to discuss the issue as an allied concern.²⁹ The United States and its European partners have begun to discuss the appropriate institutions and policies for ensuring energy security. The Bush Administration presented a discussion of energy security at NATO in February 2006, with the support of key allies such as Britain and Germany. Even that energy crisis had been solved on a relation Russia-Ukraine, it gained a new level. Today, energy crisis have a Russia-NATO dimension. Russian officials continuously claim that their state did not use energy as a weapon, but NATO took steps that they perceived as a crucial to prevent any future disruption of energy supply. NATO governments (although not NATO as a whole) have already been involved in military efforts to secure energy resources. The first Gulf War, while not a NATO operation, involved key member states such as the United States, France, Britain, and Italy that sought not only to liberate Kuwait but also to ensure that Iraq did not control Kuwaiti oil and threaten Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers³⁰. Both Russian Federation and NATO, again, reacted like we could expect in the Cold War. In the time when this article was written (April 2013), energy crisis lost some of its initial upswing, but it would be irrational to conclude that energy crisis is over and that it will not again overburden any chance of cooperation.

²⁷ Stern, J. (2006). The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

²⁸ Cameron, F. The Politics of EU-Russia Energy Relations. Available from <http://bit.ly/15SQxPU> visited 4/29/2013

²⁹ Gallis, P. (2006). CRS Report for Congress: NATO and Energy Security. Available from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473481> visited 4/29/2013

³⁰ Gallis, P. (2006). CRS Report for Congress: NATO and Energy Security. Available from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473481> visited 4/29/2013

Conclusions

In the near future military conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO is not likely to occur. Russia-NATO relations will oscillate from cold friendship to cold adversaries, mainly because of the lack of will and antagonisms of the past. There are many frozen conflicts that will have to be resolved on the path to partnership. Russian Federation will exploit its energy superpower position. Further investment in industry and democratization of society could give Russia position of even greater influence on post-Soviet states. If that process of rapid progress continues through longer period of time, we could expect to see Russian impact on whole Euro-Asian dimension. NATO, in near future, will stay the strongest political and military alliance, and will most likely continue to spread on strategic points on the Grand Chessboard³¹. NATO's greatest advantage is its attractiveness to newly formed countries and strong infrastructure.

In order to achieve cooperation both sides will have to give much more effort and to show tolerance. Also, Russia will have to admit that NATO is the strongest military and political alliance on global scale, and NATO will have to consider the Russian Federation as equal partner and global energy and nuclear superpower. When this is achieved both sides will have many benefits from honest partnership. For example, fight against global terrorism is not possible without cooperation.

There is much work that needs to be done on the path of partnership, but we hope that both sides will see cooperation as only positive resolution for conflict and prevention of new disputes.

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³¹ Brzezinski, Z. (1997). *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York, Basis Books.

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PRIVACY SETTINGS FOR ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK

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Abstract: *Throughout this article an attempt is made to indicate to the applicative users of social networking sites the ways to protect their privacy. Also the article as a target group has set the applicative users of social networking sites. Through a series of actions and settings user profile can be done adjusting the settings with the ultimate goal of reducing the risk of invasion of privacy.*

Keywords: *Privacy Policy, privacy settings, social internet networks, adjusting the settings*

Introduction

The rapid growth of social networking sites, especially in combination with the use of portable digital devices such as mobile phones and tablet computers³ lead to an increased risk of invasion of privacy. A number of social services of almost all social networking sites are created by users to enhance their impact. For example, Facebook allows users to photograph or publish various content for interaction with other users⁴.

Through this article an attempt is made to indicate a way to protect personal safety and privacy through a series of measures and actions taken on the user profile.

Comparative analysis of popular social networking sites Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Match.com.

Besides Facebook several sites have tried to provide to the people to connect to each other. Some of the most popular sites are Twitter, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Match.com.

In some cases these sites have different goals from Facebook, LinkedIn, for example, is a tool to connect with people specifically designed for business and careers.

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³ Ross, C., Orr, E. S., Sisic, M., Arseneault, J. M., Simmering, M. G., and Orr, R. R. , 2009. Personality and motivations associated with Facebook use. *Computers in Human Behavior*, March 2009 , p 578-586

⁴ Erol Maksud, Mary Shandulovska, Assoc. prof. Saso Gelev 2012, New ways of communication: Social Networks, *Proceedings of Skopje*, p 390-398

MySpace originally started as a way for small local bands to gain popularity outside the complicated political music industry by creating a space for people to connect with others who have similar tastes in music. Match.com is a site specifically geared to target people, and that is finding a partner.

Alternatively, other sites have the same goals as Facebook but they have different strategies. MySpace allows users complete customization over the look and feel of their profile, while Facebook maintained a fairly consistent design and expects customers to differentiate their profiles by uploading unique content. On the other extreme, Twitter allows its members to share their thoughts in short text messages and it is actually a super simple consistent way to exchange information while on Facebook this field allows more flexibility in terms of sharing photos, videos and more.

Based on the statement above, it is very difficult to determine which online social network is useful. Different people prefer different social networking sites based on their own needs and desires.

Adapting and updating the privacy settings on Facebook

Adapting and updating the privacy settings on Facebook are a “necessary evil” that is imposed on applicative Facebook users. Namely, these settings are needed whether it is about data published in the News Feed⁵, or the people in photos.

The Internet social network Facebook, which is semi-private⁶ very often opens opportunities for setting privacy, in addition Facebook regularly adapts the basic privacy settings. When debating the protection of privacy, it must be taken into account facts for whom and to what extent users make announcements, to whom they are available and the consequences of posting.

Internet social network Facebook is in constant conflict to establish a balance of options for adjusting the privacy settings. Conflict is imposed by who has to control privacy, namely whether it be customers or company that does not have real possibilities to monitor all users.

If this is reformulated in an understandable way, Facebook wants to have a sharing of information, but in a normative framework, the company is responsible to manage within the laws and ethics taking care to allow the users a scope of information sharing in order to retain the fictional thought for privacy control.

Defining and differencing public and protected Tweets

First we shall elaborate what is the difference between public and protected Tweets. Basically on opening the account or when the user is signing up for Twitter, there is a possible

⁵ News Feed is the updated list published on their own page of Facebook available on the web http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/Facebook_News_Feed.html (accessed na15.03.2013)

⁶ Chew, Monica, Balfanz, Dirk, and Laurie, Ben. ,2008. (Under)mining Privacy in Social Networks. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://w2spconf.com/2008/papers/s3p2.pdf>. [access date 18.04.2013].

option to keep Tweets public (which by the way is the default account setting for Twitter) or to protect the Tweets⁷.

Just to clarify, for the accounts with protected Tweets it is mandatory to have a manual approval for each and every person who may view that account's Tweets.

Basically, public Tweets (as we already mentioned are the default setting) are visible to anyone, whether or not they have a Twitter account and, on the contrary, the protected Tweets may only be visible to your approved Twitter followers.

In order to put this in perspective, let us give some examples that can explain this adaptation in a simple way. Basically, if anyone has public Tweets at a certain time, those Tweets will always be public and searchable, even if a change to the protection settings is made. Only the Tweets made after updating the settings will be protected. Also, we must take in consideration that if anyone decides to unprotect the Tweets instantly that action will cause any previously protected Tweets to be made public.

Privacy settings on Facebook user profile

As already mentioned, Facebook over time has expanded around the world dramatically increasing the possibilities for sharing information as well as the scope and depth of privacy⁸.

Also you can see a change in the way of tuning the privacy of the account, namely five years ago all the profile information is edited together.

But in the past it changed, namely the various settings privacy settings are adjusted from different places on users account. The possibility of deciding on how to share information is present. Setting is possible via the site which regulates personal information. So you can decide for visibility or access to a specific set of data for individuals, a group of people or information not to be available.

Another feature that is useful is the possibility that Facebook gives users a visual overview of their own account in the same way as they have the opportunity to allow other users to see their profile.

The option was available previously, but the setting page of privacy has been adjusted now it is more accessible and is located in the upper right corner of the Profile page under the image of the Timeline.⁹

The list of activities that the Activity Log option is seen as the View As ... can verify that the information and content have access.

⁷ About public and protected Tweets -What is the difference between public and protected Tweets? Available on the web <https://support.twitter.com/entries/14016> (accessed on 04.06.2013)

⁸ Boyd, Danah, and Marwick, Alice., 2011., Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens' Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies. A Decade in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society. Oxford

⁹ Timeline was introduced in September 2011 and is mandatory for all users in February 2012. Timeline is actually a combination of the user's Facebook wall and profile of a single page, creating a more holistic visual profile. Timeline includes chronologically details the history of the user's life with key points, including birthdays, weddings and other large events. Available on the web <http://www.techopedia.com/definition/28406/facebook-timeline> (accessed 18.03.2013)




Figure 1 Layout of Activity Log

Alternatively, by clicking the link public it is possible to inspect the layout of your public profile for those who are not your friends and those who have just subscribed¹⁰ to monitor the content they share. Checking the settings of privacy is almost mandatory when Facebook makes changes to Facebook privacy settings because they can relate to the basic setting (default) options for your account has probably differentiation or diversity of the settings that were set the last time ¹¹.

Adapt and control of LinkedIn privacy settings and managing social advertising on LinkedIn profile

LinkedIn upset their users when it altered its settings to show, by default, the names and photos of users within the third-party advertisements they have recommended or followed. This attempt of altering the user privacy was so significant that the reactions to it forced LinkedIn to change back the settings just several days later.

Rather than showing user photos and names in third-party advertisements, LinkedIn now presents the number of users in your network who have recommended or followed the brand.

¹⁰ Persons who are not friends but follow your activity

¹¹ Irina Shumadieva 2012, "How do we protect the privacy of Facebook?" Skopje: Metamorphosis.

The screenshot shows the LinkedIn homepage. At the top, the LinkedIn logo is on the left, and links for 'What is LinkedIn?', 'Join Today', and 'Sign In' are on the right. Below the logo, a headline states 'Over 225 million professionals use LinkedIn to exchange information, ideas and opportunities'. Three icons with text describe the benefits: 'Stay informed about your contacts and industry', 'Find the people & knowledge you need to achieve your goals', and 'Control your professional identity online'. On the right side, there is a 'Join LinkedIn Today' box containing a registration form with fields for 'First Name', 'Last Name', 'Email', and 'Password' (with a note '6 or more characters'). A 'Join Now' button and a link 'Already on LinkedIn? Sign in.' are at the bottom of the box. Below the main content area is a search bar with the text 'Search for someone by name:' and input fields for 'First Name' and 'Last Name', followed by a 'Go' button. Below the search bar, there is a link to the 'LinkedIn member directory' and a link to 'Browse members by country'. At the bottom, a small asterisked note states: '* By joining LinkedIn, you agree to LinkedIn's User Agreement, Privacy Policy and Cookie Policy.' A footer bar contains various links: 'Help Center', 'About', 'Press', 'Blog', 'Careers', 'Advertising', 'Talent Solutions', 'Tools', 'Mobile', 'Developers', 'Publishers', 'Language', and 'SlideShare'. Below this bar, there are more specific links: 'LinkedIn Updates', 'LinkedIn Influencers', 'LinkedIn Jobs', 'Jobs Directory', 'Company Directory', 'Groups Directory', 'Skills Directory', and 'Talent Directory'.

Figure 2 LinkedIn home page

Now we will try to explain one of the ways for turning off the social advertising:

The detailed procedure follows in the next paragraph. When the user is on the main page on their profile or LinkedIn homepage, several things should be made. First the user must open the Settings menu. To open this menu the user must click user name in the upper right corner of the home page. By doing this, the drop-down menu will appear, then select "Settings" then "Account" in the column next to "Account", and finally click on "Manage Social Advertising". By deselecting the box next to "LinkedIn may use my name, photo in social advertising" this adaptation is made. So LinkedIn does not have the authorization to use users name in social advertising.

In accordance with these settings, the users can manage other settings like "who can email the user" and "manage visibility of information".

First let us discuss how to protect users from third-party companies to store user information in their adverts.

Starting on LinkedIn homepage, click on user name in the upper right corner. On the drop-down menu, select "Settings". From the "Settings" page, select "E-Mail Preferences". In the column next to "E-Mail Preferences", click "Turn on/off partner InMail". By deselecting the two boxes, LinkedIn does not have authorization to use users email in third party advertising. Second, if users want to manage Who Can Save users Information a few steps should be taken by the user.

Users have the option to prevent the unwanted information sharing. This is done by

adapting the “Turn on/off data sharing with 3rd party applications” in Groups, Companies and Applications tab, listed just under E-mail Preferences. So LinkedIn does not have authorization to use user information.

Protecting the Tweets: from the users account

In order to make a change to the privacy settings on the Tweeter account, several steps must to be made on the account.

First of all, the user needs to make changes on the account settings by clicking on the gear icon at the top right of the page and selecting Settings from the drop down menu. Second, by scrolling down to the Tweet privacy section, the change can be made by checking the box next to Protect my Tweets. And finally by clicking the blue Save button at the bottom of the page the changes will be made. At the end, the user will be prompted to enter their password to confirm that the changes are made intentionally by the user.



Figure 3 Layout of Tweet privacy

In the previous paragraph, we explained the change from unprotected to protected Tweets, and now let us elaborate how to make the reverse change on the user account.

Basically, the user can always make the Tweets public by unchecking the Tweet privacy option that was explained above (see figure 3) in the user account settings and then saving the changes. In order to be sure, the user must review the pending follower requests before making the Tweets public otherwise any requests left pending will not be accepted automatically. As we already stated previously, unprotecting the Tweets will cause any previously protected Tweets to be made public.

Sharing content

One of the major developments in the recent significant changes in privacy settings is the ability to always ask in new statuses, pictures or links to choose with whom to share the content.

The basic options for sharing are¹²:

- Publicly available (Public),
- own friends (Friends),

¹² Adjust the privacy settings available web <http://www.facebook.com/help/385017548218624> (accessed.18.03.2013)

- no friends acquaintances (Friends except Acquaintances),
- exclusively personal (Only me) and
- persons with a special designation given access (Custom).




Figure 4 Options for adjusting the privacy of contents

The last option enable you to allow visibility of contents to the friends of your friends as well. The friends who are placed in a list of friends, certain friends or custom and the friends that are marked with a tag.¹³ By setting the above-mentioned option, the visibility of friends or the friends list may be prohibited. Some of the above options are currently displayed visually or with a graphic display.

The content you are posting from Internet portals, by pressing the Like¹⁴ or comments that you post on websites that use the system for commenting on Facebook, appear on the wall of a public profile. So when you look down the button the way you want to share some content, you should consider that information will be publicly available.

Marking locations and friends

The field intended for statuses, links or photos has increased options for labeling, the location, and friends alike. This capability facilitates tagging of friends that are doing something together in time.

¹³ Tag is a special kind of link. When a person will be tagged or marked to create a link on their Timeline. Besides photography can designate a person to publish a post (status) who also published the Timeline the user. For example, you can tag a photo to show who is in the picture. If you marked or tagged by a friend in a status update, everyone who has access to updating you with one click on the name of your friend access their Timeline. Available on the web <http://www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337/> (accessed 18.03.2013)

¹⁴ When you click on Like the Facebook page of a particular ad or content on Facebook are doing the same connection. Your like will appear on the Timeline and can also occur in the News feed. Your name with a link can be shown on the page that you clicked Like, can also appeared in ads for that page in front of your friends. Available on the web <http://www.facebook.com/help/131263873618748/> (accessed 03.18.2013)

Instead of setting the AT symbol «@» before the name of the person, it is necessary to click the sign that indicates adding a friend and it is necessary to choose from a list of friends¹⁵.

Marking the locations is an opportunity for invasion of privacy and personal security as well as the people you have marked.

However, despite the above risk many users continue to use the options to publish or ultimately mark the places they visit.




Figure 5 Access to privacy shortcuts

An important change made by Facebook in terms of opportunities for deletion of tags. Option for acceptance / rejection tag can be done directly from the page display the photograph or publishing status via Options-> Report / Remove Tag photos, Edit or Remove - Remove Tag on certain links or statuses¹⁶.

Options relating to labeling are set in the Privacy Settings section and hence the Timeline and Tagging on Edit Settings.

By adjusting the settings option in the preview posts before you publish your timeline or in the original Review posts friends tag you in before they appear on your timeline provides opportunities to have controlled publishing service discipline tagging markings.

Based on friends who are on your list, situations can implement adjustments which parts of your podcasts will be available, with prohibitions and restrictions on content that others post on Timeline of which are marked.

¹⁵ Ibid 9

¹⁶ Ibid 9

Restricting access to albums with pictures

When setting a new photo album, you can determine the extent of its being open / available to the public. You can specify the date of the pictures from that album, location, or individuals that have the same opportunity to be available.

Also, it is possible to set photos and later change the privacy settings.

If necessary to remove a tag from a photograph, it is done by selecting the Remove option which is located in the right part.

Following this step you have the option to delete the photos from their own account, but the picture will remain available on the profile of the person who posted it.

Also, there is an option to report certain photographs or offensive content if it is too explicit. All this can be done via the option Report / Remove Tag from the Options and specifying the appropriate reason for the request to remove the photograph would lead to additional options for resolving the case¹⁷.

Track content from users who do not have friends

Track content from users who do not have friends is a tool for monitoring persons whose activity you are interested in without a mandatory acceptance of an offer of friendship. A condition for this activity is the profile that you want to monitor contents to be public.

In such a case, the profile is interesting and has the desire to follow the top of the page select Subscribe, and it updates the user specific will arrive in your News Feed.




Figure 6 Method to mark Subscribe (subscription) to persons who want to follow¹⁸

With the click of a button you Subscribed to determine what exactly you want to get such type information in your news feed as shown in the picture above.

¹⁷ Ibid 9

¹⁸ Taken from the <http://www.fluxfun.com/2011/11/14/the-facebook-subscribe-button/> (accessed 18.03.2013)

These filters can also apply to those already in the circle of your friends whose information you actually automatically subscribed.

This option is great in terms of giving greater freedom of information and monitoring the activities of some people whose work is of interest, including operation and intelligence services.

Generally, sharing information and activities would be available to people who are not part of the list of friends through News Feed¹⁹.


This opens the opportunity for which you need detailed viewing settings for sharing on Facebook. In order to disable the subscription account, it is necessary to change the settings in the Account Settings, and through the Subscribers tab to deselect the named option and thus disable monitoring of the profile.

Blocking people and applications on Facebook

Certain groups of intentional (intelligence, hacking profit and non-profit organizations, etc.) and unintentional (marketing tele-selling companies etc.) often performed abuse the opportunities offered by social networks including the access of users.

In order to protect the security and privacy of unwanted invitations or followers on your account it is possible to block users or groups.

This option can be configured so that by the last option of page settings for privacy by blocking people or applications or original Blocked People and Apps.



This tab has three (3) levels of restricting access to interacting with you.

Figure 7 Method of blocking people and applications


These three ways are:

- the option of blocking users or original Block users. This option is made directly to the people that block and the interaction with them

¹⁹ Ibid 9

is possible only through common membership in certain groups or applications.

- Option to block from invites from applications or the original **Block app invites**. This option, as previously stated, enables direct blocking, but only of certain applications.
- Option to block **Block event invites**. By selecting this option, the in-



vitations sent to you are blocked for certain events and manifestations.

Figure 8 Three levels of restricting access for interaction

If you want to limit the access to the information that you share with certain friends keep in mind that blocking is just one of the options. I would recommend here using those listed Restricted, and from this location by editing or adding people.

Other security measures

For added protection of data from other applications, the most useful is the use of HTTPS²⁰ -protocol²¹ whenever possible. In order to use this protocol, it is through the Account Settings menu in the Security option to select Edit in the space that refers to the Secure Browsing. Choosing the Browse Facebook on a secure connection (https) when possible enables secure connection when it is possible.

²⁰ Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (https) is a communication protocol that ACE used for secure communication through computer networks taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Secure (accessed 18.03.2013)

²¹ Anna. Kovachevic 2009, Leaking information through Facebook-Annual faculty of security studies universities between 2009 Belgrade - Faculty of Security, Belgrade

Choose Your Privacy Settings » Manage Blocking

[← Back to Privacy](#)

Block users Once you block someone, that person can no longer be your friend on Facebook or interact with you (except within apps and games you both use and groups you are both a member of).

Name:

Email:

You haven't added anyone to your block list.

Block app invites Once you block app invites from someone, you'll automatically ignore future app requests from that friend. To block invites from a specific friend, click the "Ignore All Invites From This Friend" link under your latest request.

Block invites from:

You haven't blocked invites from anyone.

Block event invites Once you block event invites from someone, you'll automatically ignore future event requests from that friend.

Block invites from:

You haven't blocked event invites from anyone.

Figure 9 Display of accessing HTTPS-protocol

You can enable a double authentication system to ensure that you are the only Facebook user who logs in with your user data. On this site it is necessary to choose the Login Approvals and marking the option will be required to enter a login code from unauthorized device access personal profile. Also there is a possibility of getting notifications whenever a login to your account from a device that has not been previously used.

Conclusion

In conclusion, all the above mentioned indicates that the users of the social network Facebook have to adjust their privacy settings.

The expansion of companies, such as Facebook, Tweeter and LinkedIn over the years has diminished the data privacy. There is an attempt to find a balance between security and commercialism. The paper gives global framework for some features to protect privacy for users of applicative nature on the social networking sites.

By applying the settings given in this paper, the level of privacy will drastically increase. However, to avoid any misunderstanding, absolute security on the Internet networks realistically is not achievable; yet, but implementing the list of settings through the user account security can drastically increase.

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COUNTER DIPLOMACY

Igor GELEV¹

Abstract: *In the time when traditional politics occupied international relationships over power and domination, the most important issue of its time was the main military power holder and thus later the main economical power as well in terms of those who had the upper hand in ruling over such main factors. But today witnessing the dawn of the superiority over issues associated with informatics and such technology development interwoven over political issues on a global scale things have become apparent that 'the story superior' becomes more and more praised on the main battlefield, or in other words the main armament of defeat and victory is the 'story' itself rather than other things associated to the past. That is to say national narratives are seen upon as form of material or dollar currency. Governments themselves on the other hand keep being persistent among themselves on a level of competition, and as far as this battle would involve other "unregistered" (that lay on rather illegal foundations) organizations, getting in this way their higher reputation established and quarantined to the detriment of others. In the context of the so called global civil society, the internet and social networks play very important role, what is more the main role master indeed. Modern diplomacy has been established in time as non-governmental actors have come to be variable and this way flexible, and this also would give the birth of the so called open public diplomacy. Wikileaks gave push to this process of demystification on modern diplomacy to open doors on people and societies. In this way the question over functionality on modern diplomacy for the future originated and was taken into consideration. Diplomacy came to be too important for only politicians to be actively involved in it. Involving new actors in the process of diplomacy is one of the main gates on global core change in the essence of diplomacy itself, and it was all made possible by the innovation of the internet. Wikileaks is perfect example of what it means to catalyze and launch a new era of diplomacy globally changing the old international campaigns lead by the hundreds of diplomats, as today these can be lead by only a few and what is more usually people which work as anonymous having their own gadgets and tolls of modern-day informatics such as computers that can be transported and remain hidden in their "undershirts". Wikileaks instigated this message that in time of modern globalization and the dawn of informatics there would be zero toleration to secretive diplomacy.*

Keywords: *Wikileaks, soft power, non-governmental actors, great powers.*

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Introduction

The choice for the topic of this very text is determined by the trend of happenings on a global level inside the world of diplomacy, and the phenomenon called Wikileaks which without any doubt represents an earthquake epitomized on this global diplomatic scene, and thus already has been called the diplomatic September 11.

The international happening in the recent years have been marked as troublesome, as a result of unpredictable happenings such as for example the Arab spring, also the unknown outcome from the intervention and the reforms taken in Afghanistan and Iraq, the uprising trend of inter terrorism and last but not the least the economical crisis itself have also been a mayor factor on this especially by understanding the essence on the importance of its relocation from the world's center to the outskirts.

The laden and constrictive communication to technology system and the birth of the newly formed electronic mass media contributed for all these changes to be seen and head almost everywhere, and the world itself in the context of this becomes more and more something similar to a "global village".

Since the beginning of the cold war the most advanced and developed countries started to promote the new concept on how to explore the worlds diplomacy and also how to indoctrinate your own. And for the purpose of the lately stated we have seen the progress form traditional diplomacy to modern-day diplomacy, or in other words the public diplomacy itself, which on the other hand, all by itself introduced the trend of some couple of phenomena such as diplomacy export, regime change, and this of course has been made possible by the influence and the establishment of the actors of a civil society as well as other non-governmental actors involved. This was supposed to be something of the sort of switching from traditional diplomacy to promoting of the concept of soft power instead of the current hard power diplomacy.

The ignorance in the relationship and behavior, and the half-heartedness of the international community on the issue for solving all the questions that remain the main source of all regional conflict all over the world, and on the other hand showing much tolerance on the military exploits launched from the world's main power, was dramatically changed with the appearance of the Wikileaks. It was sort of an earthquake on the global diplomatic system in impact in times when diplomacy represents the only possibility to justify the illegal military interventions in front of the eyes of the home stage as well as the public majority. The point is that there were incriminating videos and photographs release which were set or released on many world's governments and corporations, especially the most influencing ones. For many this was enough to point out to Wikileaks as a representative of modern contra diplomacy or some sort of "divulge body" to all (wrong) deeds of the public diplomacy in its aspect, and also the military operations led by the Great powers. Wikileaks originated this revolution on the concept of knowing or getting to diplomacy once step closer and thus has contributed for the global civil society to stand a major chance on contra diplomacy, and at the same time for the classic diplomacy to inspect its own flaws and incompleteness in their turns of professionalism and moral concept crisis. The investigating journalism has been launched to its better perspective talking about peace and security.

Diplomacy in modern international relationships

The concept of this text is the question on modern diplomacy and the Wikileaks phenomena on its main role to modern diplomacy, based on the events and the scandals that followed once Wikileaks was able to reveal all the active states involved in the war on

terror and some information nowhere to be seen on the instance of this very concept that originated for the first time in front of the public's eyes. In this way the profile of Wikileaks as out-of-the state/non- governmental actor was established by determining the goals the methods and the ways of instigating and imposing influence over third countries and the international community as well. The analysis of this question should give precise answer on the question if Wikileaks would ever hold ground to suppress influence on the international community in the near future. The theoretical principle that deals with the whole "quantum" of data and analyses is based on the concept of "normative power" to international diplomacy as a holder, according to which the world's diplomatic harmony is based on predetermined diplomatic correspondence doctrines that are highly respected among states. But this concept is made more troublesome and entangled based on the usage of theoretical arguments that chiefly refer on the analyses information published from the internet portal Wikileaks, and what matters is that all this has been structured following the pattern of Justinian (a diplomat from the 15-th century) in which it is stated that a diplomat is an honest person, an emissary or an envoy to another country having being deployed there for the purpose of bearing in mind the idea to hold lies on the issues of his own country or unrevealing statements of truth to this concern.² In this way Wikileaks contributes for some serious seismic tectonic shakes and rolls inside the diplomatic community on the whole damaging primarily all American administration as revealing all detective stories as well as higher status membership employers associated to it to a level of going to even the slightest detail of family plot investigation quibbles concerning members of UN and EU, and all for the purpose of ensuring diplomatic and economical-military support for all military campaigns of the major forces.

The latest theoretical analyses set the question on the focus : is it the case that normative power (that is both soft and hard case power) of diplomacy on the theatrical stage over world domination creates and shapes the world's understanding even when it comes to questions where explicit violence has been managed in the name of humanitarian issues? In the sense of this, the study itself presented based on constructive basis and additional sources will provide us an answer to this and similar types of questions by recognizing Wikileaks as an safe internet portal to all anonymous potential candidates that may well submit verified and truthful documents referring to all that modern-day and (un) democratic institutions, which on the other hand have tried to hide it from the face of the public, and yet it is still somehow considered to be a formal part of external or internal politics led by a country. In that sense, we are discussing the integrity of the diplomatic establishment and the responsibility towards its citizens. As a whole the theoretical determination of the problem of investigation is located within the fringes of international diplomacy, or in other words to different theoretical postulates such as institutionalism, globalization, collectivism, liberalism and so through different theoretical postulates such as diplomatic processes starting with diplomatic functionalism and all the way leading to liberal- intergovernmental-ism as well as the diplomatic cultural-ism.

² Joe Johnson, "How Does Public Diplomacy Measure Up?" *Foreign Service Journal* 83, no. 10: 44–52, 2006

Talking about Wikileaks and its identification to contra diplomacy seen as a process which lays the foundations of all modern diplomatic postulates, we need to make a small digression and elaborate modern diplomacy seen through the eyes of public diplomacy since public diplomacy shaped the process itself, or in other words it was the catalyst on contra diplomacy.

The newly formed public diplomacy illustrated, seems similar to old wine sealed in new bottles. By the way, despite the fact that public diplomacy is considered to be a phenomenon to all inter-state relationships, I would still claim that public diplomacy is nothing more but logical transformation derived from the old same dysfunctional traditional diplomacy. That is to say, public diplomacy represents (not) official communication to actors of the state and non-governmental actors as well, or international organizations correlating non-governmental actors (this refers to different civilian groups or other source of state belonging institutions). Public diplomacy is a sort of crossroads to a two-way intercepting one-way street, and its purpose would be multilateral communication reaching all systematically inconsistent institutions, or simply just an official creation of intercultural communication to a cultural level, and in the context of this making the citizen's concept once step closer to all traditional societies.³ This pattern has increasingly been popular after the terrorist assaults over USA on September 9-th 2001, since its prior goal is upgrading and improving values of the western world and in this way bringing them closer to the rest of the world.

Public diplomacy compared to traditional diplomacy has been shown as a game where roles and responsibilities of all actors in international relations are clearly set and refined. This means that inside traditional diplomacy there are some clearly determined rules of how to play which have certainly been well respected and unique to a successful rule and domination of diplomatic relations in first place. There is restricted maneuvering space to all actors in the world of diplomacy, and they represent nothing but an instrument of the central governmental politics.

Compared to this, public diplomacy itself has almost no boundaries or any restrictions at all (in a positive legitimate sense), and as for the inner correspondence to non-governmental actors it would certainly almost be unimaginable to be seen upon from a traditional point of view. Public diplomacy includes multilateral communication to all state of non-governmental actors, formal and non formal meetings etc. As a pointed example was the western public diplomacy established to the Libyan president Gaddafi. That is to say, Gaddafi although proclaimed dictator, promoter of state terrorism and similar other cases, still had the British prime minister Tony Blair led this informal diplomacy to the very person mentioned, and what is more, this case of diplomacy has never been at any stands characterized as secretive diplomacy case.

Public diplomacy establishment in modern-day communication has certainly been accepted by all major organizations which on the basis of it can now much easier achieve their goals even under such circumstances when there is apparent case of international law

³ (David Welch, 'Powers of Persuasion', *History Today*, 49, August 1999, pp. 24-6.).

violation. Organizations such as BRIKS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South African republic) or MIKT (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) use public diplomacy for their own development and progress, as well as mass- propaganda and achievement of economical goals, and what is more it would be very probable as well that they use it as a transitional roll model to a possible foundation of some kind of political to military union, that is to say in the near future. Western hemisphere has been outfacing far less problems in order to rule, control and incorporate public diplomacy, compared to traditional East countries, because of the fact that there are still not enough powerful non governmental actors to be found on their soil (non- governmental organizations, citizens corporations, informal political cultural and economical organizations) or in other words the society itself is formulated on different concept.

Other characteristic of public diplomacy is pseudonym - diplomacy which itself means and stands for full operative course of all official organs to interstate representation of states at focus support, as well as performance of some other state functions to foreign countries which is made possible in such a way that they are simply given legitimacy through their membership legislature and legitimate agencies by the country incorporator or to put it in a simple way , they just accept them the way they are ,and chiefly they depend on the character and the goals of the mission. The main characteristic of these agencies is that they hold no status of officials of their own government. This means that they hold no diplomatic character, which would mean that their own business is made possible only on the premises on the governmental support in which they co-exist and only in a pre-determined way. Pseudonym –diplomacy is an important input to harmonize interconnected relationship in states that hold the status of federative representative countries or Unitarian countries in such a way that there is room left for more entities establishment in order to provoke and keep political and cultural corporation of the central power to other sub-subjects which have no ruling power but still represent a factor to some targeting groups. The fact that makes public diplomacy interesting enough although it still represents a good solution case to some individuals or groups or contrary to this a full unacceptable business, even to the level of being marked or targeted as a threat, it is the bare facet that it still successfully exists in a society's domain so they hold no ground to simply accept it or reject it. One can say that public diplomacy successfully exists on sub- institutional level whether through cultural or mass media or on some instances of cases sports support, or may even be the case of some other citizens segment, so what remains for governments themselves is to fully accept it or to try at least to slightly modify, and still to feel the effect, although it may happen in some sort of delay afterwards.

On the other hand there have been registered numerous rebel organizations, outcast non- governmental actors identified from one side as terrorist and taken from other side as free liberators, and these indeed so called organizations of the type have managed to comprehend public diplomacy as a commercial multi lateral diplomacy and on the basis of such believes they create their own success in progress. Public diplomacy has been seen upon as a threat in the Islamic world, a thread coming directly from the Western countries, but later they themselves would manage to comprehend the outlet to inner corresponding

possibilities derived from the usage of the so called public diplomacy and later this would also manage sub institutional communication among belligerent and enemy states.

Globalization and diplomacy

The explanation on globalization and diplomacy certainly well moves into direction that diplomacy is an instrument on the whole into the process of globalization itself. In the era of globalization (in which we have been involved from a long time ago) diplomacy may or should exchange warfare that happened during that period of time. That is to say, diplomacy (will) have to achieve the goal to create the model of deterioration (according to official record documented), but what actually happens is the process of internationalization on some world's given benefits. What does it mean? This means that diplomacy (public diplomacy) represented through transnational non- governmental actors , multinational corporations ,the regional organizations as well, which in fact are the cells of the process of globalization ,through them it will work for the benefit of the macro perspective of the new 'better of improved world' Thanks to diplomacy there will be a better possibility for smaller actors to stand a better chance on proclaiming or holding ground upon important questions which have to do with the global debate and stand on its own benefit. This will well bring for a better peace treaty possibilities to corporate better and in this way transform conflict. Another important role of diplomacy will be reduction in the civilized notch or knot by focusing on homogenization of some economical ideology based doctrines and thus coming up with the creation of universal religious philosophical and citizenship values. ⁴

Public diplomacy and liberal empire

After the twin towers assault which happened on September 11 and was marked as an extraordinary event in negative sense, American people were terrified and disgusted by the very act. This was also somehow amplified simply by having the feeling that it happened on our/their soil and it all came by surprise as result of instrument or composure of politics that not formally we can say were supported by a single civilization. What mattered after the event were the questions that would lead to the whole process of investigation. Why would someone at all hate American people? What is the prior reason that led to its occurrence and who was the originator of the horrible event? What wrong deeds have the American establishment contributed with for this horrible event to take place and blew out the American dream to nothing but a soap opera bubble bits and pieces? American government was there to answer all these questions that resented American people and the common American citizen that looks after their family. All this resulted in obscuring the gab even more between the west and the east which also would result in numerous wars led on middle and the far east on this bumpy way moving forward. ⁵

⁴ (Richard Holbrooke, 'Get The Message Out', *Washington Post*, 28 October 2001.)

⁵ Joseph. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and J. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Perseus, 2004).

The Bush administration came out with the answer of preemptive self protection and the same time has located the blame holder from the other side. But later when it became apparent that that American people are there to look better answers for their own protection and protection of their families, politicians somehow had to compel themselves and push through the effort of consulting peace investigation authorities on this troublesome issue. The outcome and the offered solutions did not match the concept of the foreign affairs politics nor with the concept of national strategy on how to defend. For this reason primarily there was once again the concept of public diplomacy being accepted on a large scale temporarily as a by-pass of foreign affairs politics, and later it would also grow to become and promoted as the official foreign affairs politics.

This sort of diplomacy was multi effective it had the home support and the allied forces support at the same time offering solutions and possibilities to truce and collaboration, and what is more in this way in its raw nature public diplomacy at the same time would prove citizens supportive and constructive, and as for the bitterly formulated and sensitive historical questions which are hard to resolve it would enlarge the possibilities for the citizens sector to better delegate them.⁶

This type of diplomacy was determined as the main instrument in the construction or laying the foundations of the so called liberal imperialism promoted as a new way in the politics of international politics. If liberalism was supposed to mean total freedom for the American commoner contrary to this it was taken to be occupation for the members of the Arab world. The liberal logo of promoting freedom, justice and possibilities is known to have become domination, chaos, and despondency. This actually led to the promotion and foundation of public diplomacy, the question yet to be solved was that particular cross idealism in the sense of civilized gap dominion. The role of contractors of such diplomacy fell to the public and civilian sector membership, which active role would have certainly had impact onto the over whole cycle in the process of liberalism export.

Public diplomacy has basically two components in its structure (mentioned before in the latest couple of editions), on of these components is hard and the other one is soft. American foreign affairs politics used those two components which stand in a harness. The hard and the strong component (war as an instrument) has verified or justified its deeds pleaded and it also confirmed much of its existence in legitimacy spinning the mechanisms of soft power. Mechanisms of soft power enable building up political relationships and reducing the negative public meaning even in those who represent everlasting opponents.

Public diplomacy as a brand or concept to cross barriers

It can be concluded that public diplomacy has a wide range of possibilities. Its usage can provide overcoming gaps to belligerent sides and whatsoever on the basis of this we can imply the thesis on why Republic of Macedonia by using this sort of public diplomacy never tried or managed to solve problems of the similar kind to belligerent opponents. Instead of reserved official bilateral negotiation with some of our neighbors, positions instead could

⁶ Vulving, Alexander L., How the soft power works?.2009

be in first place softened and in this way worked out these problems of making things work even better in crossing barriers.

But for this purpose first we need our political establishment made possible on identifying their own flaws and weak points that have contributed or arose the common Macedonian citizen to ask the question why the United States of America put on such a bad and nationalistic jingoistic politics towards Macedonia? What would be the reason why Macedonian citizens would never feel safe in some of the neighboring countries, and what is more even in some own parts of their own country? Which would be the consequence in impact form that particular type of constructive politics led by the political elites since the foundation of the country until present-day?

This kind of questions and similar to them in origin touch the Macedonian citizen who therefore does not live in illusions that as citizens might be superior and that all others surrounding them have rejection on them because of such reasons. On the other hand self-pitying to own oppression does not go hand in hand for the better future of the state. Creating foreign affairs and home politics should be based on rational and competent analyses over international trends and current happenings in order making success come one step closer in rational time by focusing on it instead of stolidity and quiescence in a way it projects invisible enemies.

Public diplomacy offers mechanisms on how to repair the consequences but also taking up on some serious measures and steps to thorough and secure building up of positions in time which would come desired and qualified as friendly and neighboring, to inter political, economical and cultural collaboration.

The process of dimensioning a political to citizen society is the basis that leads to inner cohesion and logically in this way putting on a strong platform to achieve pan-European agenda. This means delegitimizing the principle of mono-ethnic political subjects epitomized through political parties, even when it comes to wings and parties that have liberal sense of touch and portent instead of the spirit that citizens behold, and this therefore has indeed grown to become ethno-national democratic spirit. Promoting citizens ideology as a protective measure to all political subjects would ensure that the foundation of the political ideology would be citizen concept, the focus of the citizen and its rights. This would be a guiding motive which would later implicate the citizens of republic of Macedonia to become identified as state citizens or citizens occupying the state - (this especially reflects nationalities), and if they come to identify themselves with the political allegiance than it all is supposed to reflect citizen ideology as a party belonging emblem and also what is more its own establishment. It all should be understood as an investment in the citizen and non-governmental sector which should be an act of democracy to given priority in the process of creation of internal cohesion within the ranks of the state inside of which no one would feel discriminated or worried for oneself or one's family. In order to create professional administration, health care system, legislature, and security forces it is necessary to have promotion of fair preconditions to enter the labor market, as well as absolute no bias on all institutions run by the central force or dominion power, also "lowering the level of crime and corruption referring political neutrality" and on the other hand introducing and

respecting individual abilities to leadership and promotion. Dimensioning is required as well, creating the necessary preconditions set to shape non- governmental actors through which their own non- governmental sectors will be able to promote the European spirit of human rights and freedom of speech.

These non governmental actors are supposed to have grown after a while into a regional non- governmental actor by foundation of international non-governmental sector which in its own ranks will fulfill agendas such as truce promotion and European freedom of spirit.

Public diplomacy in the sphere of Informational operations faced towards Republic of Macedonia.

Following the taxonomy of managing this kind of diplomacy one could say that public diplomacy altogether with psychological operations, secretive undercover actions (activities), and the public relation sector represent sub elements of informational operations. These five sub elements create or design the informational space around.⁷ In the element of informational operations public diplomacy has managed to locate its place and to confirm its position as powerful tool in the process of creation substantial surroundings manageable for the actor. That is to say, public diplomacy has its prior goal to convince the wider auditorium over issues of different origin concerning and verifying truth aspects, through indirect diplomacy and political compromise as well as other additional instruments to use. It is the case that many times in diplomatic lobbies especially those considered traditional, public diplomacy is identified as dislocation of “hot chestnuts” by spinning truth. Spinning such “confirmed truths” many times would result directly intercepting credibility over solutions, but would at the same time keep governmental legitimacy.

The spin itself as an element has its own cycle and it doesn't represent a lie but a rather different projection of truth. All elements involved in the cycle have their own product by which we determinate final product. In that sense and direction Republic of Macedonia deals with the possible problem that there might be existent some speculations over eventual spins over time length and the process of prolonging the issue correlated with the outcome of the possible treaty agreement reflecting the country's name. It is made apparent that public diplomacy deriving from many of the non- governmental actors over this problem are part of the so called “informational space” and the results of these or those activities would be made recognizable and clear on longer time period.

In the recent analyses conducted by renown foreign analytical press centers the reports coming on the issues related to Macedonia in the part known as 2013 challenges, it is stated that Macedonia will not be involved in war?! This all by itself sets the hypothesis why should there be made apparent such a case of war conflict in first place? This is the logical question on the content inspired from the text. It is certain that informational space in time on local elections which are articulated from all political subjects in the style of “to be or not to be” (involving towns such as Kichevo and Struga), which for that this thesis

⁷ Thomas de Zengotita (Mediated: how the media shapes your world and the way you live in it, 2005. pp 23)

encumbers all spins of all out-of state , non- governmental actors which explore appetites of local politicians. But they go even further by going into analyses over the Kosovo subject as a pan-dam situation in Republic of Macedonia which all by itself is a non-sense according to many international standards and it has nothing to do with the Macedonian problem.

Meanwhile in such ‘‘ constrictive informational space’’, politicians coming from the neighboring Albania additionally make the regional political scene troublesome by insisting on the act of proclaiming a separate nation or state ,which actually represents prologue which opens doors for possible scenario with devastating consequences. Of course that well respected analytical agencies go further on the question in order to complement the challenge conclusive with 2013 on the issue involving the possible solution over the name of the country, but also on the other hand the reaching preliminary agreement for maintaining and keeping good relations to republic of Bulgaria.

Another evident spin in the informational space deriving from one irrational parallel is the one deriving from that possible fail over the treaty solution enrichment between Serbia and Kosovo and would therefore well reflect in territorial shortage in Macedonia, at the same time fulfilling the spiral of violence to unsolved status issues especially those over the unitary outcome of the state. Seen from another perspective there is increase in the intensity of activities and happenings in the informational space to glorify military and political success or rather said failure on all the states in the region. The latest analyses show that the so called ‘‘ blue infants’’ of revolution (on the Balkan) rage out of control with increased appetites although reprimanded clear and loud from the international state to fully come to cycle and close the questions on the Balkan.

Additionally, the political elections in Macedonia, resurrected nationalism resulting in space bring created for a well established political platform to erect its own political rating. In this type of constellations in the Republic of Macedonia in the part of concerning national strategy, although allegedly there was supposed to (be) a clearly distinctive public diplomacy to inner and outside inhibition and act on political challenge and opposition to these processes, all at the same time building up positions for the EU integration, which undoubtedly will for sure destroy the possibilities to feel an aversion from the unity character of the state, and what is more, at the same time ,this type of diplomacy will provide oblivion of all political subjects on the issue of bringing up for reaching not such popular strategic decisions for the future of the state.

Diplomatic guerilla

The latest research showed that in the past decade people needed 24 seconds medium time to support a skirmish in a battle in terms of time restriction. But the latest relevant data from more well renounced research centre show that today people need only 8 seconds medium time from the ‘‘glorious’’ CNN, BBC or Al Jazhira to fight a battle more effective compared to just one-day NATO bombing campaign. The example of the air borne assault over Iraq showed that only a single medium lap in which there were scenes of mass graveyard shown never left the wide audience of spectators unmoved or simply detached,

and as for the political elites they were having the prior task to prepare the home public on taking up sides in the so called "distant war" and what is more even making them contribute in victory over "evil". Such similar examples are also given in the "Arab spring" movement where the destruction of the "home peoples political leaders" was welcomed in ovations from the democratic audience. But for the purpose of this Al Jazhira as a given pan dam shown scenes of "western journalist rape cases" on territory what once used to be a tourist attraction, or to be more precise what we have in mind here was the city of Cairo itself, controlled by the liberators -the suppressed and the oppressed or downtrodden. The scenes of depletion of the victims of dictatorship as well as collateral damage (on children) shown by the humanitarian organizations would fall one after another on the medium scene without anyone asking the question "why" or "for what" when all these victims were innocent suffering. Violence gives birth to violence. If we draw a parallel it wouldn't be controversial to say that there is such similar example on our territory, of course all run by different scenario, intensity and forms of interpret.

The new era of information trade determinates the origin of the so called diplomatic guerilla, which is trained, drilled and used under terminate complex conditions of nonconventional warfare in all political economical and military warfare cases. The fight over superiority and world's domination set the standards over political and military neutrality.⁸ Under such similar circumstances all non legitimate state members or non-governmental actors takes sides and its own role determined by the geopolitical surroundings.⁹ The trend to always choose the stronger one does not always come as the best solution although the variables are always forced strife. To be more popular on this we can say that home estimations are not always equal to those when we put them in practice. Under such similar circumstances also seen from the geo-strategy point of view, Republic of Macedonia should well prepare to smart choice and solution of course when the country itself has set in advance the needed standards, conditions, and chances to point it out.

The political establishment should take advantage of the lessons learned from the past but also from the world's events and based on this knowledge we need to "keep close pace" with the dynamical period that follows in the regional political surrounding. We also need to take the fact into consideration that all actors in one way or another are supported by states and mechanisms of interwoven political interests and issues. The (non) diplomatic guerilla in Macedonia and wider in the region has been present for quite some time and slowly but surely finalizes its own issues and interests. This particular development of events is well expected taking it into consideration the fact that the frozen standstill relationships on conflicts have been solved not so much in appreciation and with not such suitable solutions which are present de facto and thus later may well therefore be packed and seen as de jure.¹⁰

⁸ Carnes Lord, *Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006)

⁹ Richard Langhorne *The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors*, 2005; pp 21-35

¹⁰ Seong-Hun Yun, "Toward Public Relations Theory-Based Study of Public Diplomacy: Testing the Applicability of the Excellence Study," *Journal of Public Relations Research* 18, no. 4 (2006): 287-312.

Counter diplomacy, and non- governmental actors

The diplomacy led by the great forces has been changing in accordance to new challenges and sources of threat to the regional peace (never world's power) but it also has been led by its own interests. These interests are declarative national interests, although in more pragmatic sense it is the question of economic interests over states but still very often these are economical interests of business corporations which are in contraction to decision makers. This trend of transcending international diplomacy got determined by the geopolitical changes in chronic crisis regions and the same has culminated by promoting new public diplomacy. We have mentioned that public diplomacy is led from the side of states but as for today it has become matrix for creation and leading its own politics over many international non- governmental actors.¹¹ Public diplomacy in its two components of soft and hard power is almost always successful model to realize its own goals. This is how the question imposed on actually how one international actor with strongly positioned powers, capacities and resources to public diplomacy leadership will challenge public diplomacy led by the great powers?¹² The answer to this question is the emergence of the phenomenon Wikileaks.

Wikileaks

Wikileaks is an international nonprofit organization which has published 1.2 million not only private but also content considered classified deriving from anonymous sources.¹³ Wikileaks footholds its work on official documents and multimedia content which have been published on some of the internet portals, content which furthermore has been reproduced in order to disable their ban, at the same time making it open to million of subscribers all over the world. The story of Wikileaks began with the American soldier Manning who at the time was being deployed to a mission in Iraq and than was hold to responsibility that allegedly he had discriminated classified documents belonging to the founders of Wikileaks. That is to say Manning, a member of the administrative section on a military base in Baghdad had access to a server of data base used by the official site of the government authorities of USA for the purpose of transmission classified information in a form of documents and media content. The published content contributed for a large number of political changes to be seen especially inside the internal politics of some countries involved, than change in the geo politics in some separate crisis regions it was also witnessed ,and what is more there are even some numerous cases of parameters showing that Wikileaks catalyzed the Arab spring happenings for the fact that some of the state leaders were too corrupted (something that would throw the emergence of Wikileaks and its role into public diplomacy)

Wikileaks is marked as a phenomenon in modern diplomacy, or in other words contra diplomacy opposing the public main diplomacy as well as the published content which

¹¹ (Bull, 1977, p. 270; compare with Badie & Smouts (1992:70)

¹² (Evans and Newnham, 1990, p. 397

¹³ www.WikiLeaks.com

summoned up quite some change in the current political course of major forces especially USA, but at the same time demystifying the role and the motives of some separate financial and media fractions, and also some other major players involved on the wide political scene. Wikileaks sent this coded message that in time globalization and informational era won't tolerate secret diplomacy.

Thanks to Wikileaks and the transparency of so called secret diplomatic connections, people as well as common citizens today can make retrospective and analyses of some of the events that took place and those that will take place in the future or are in current ongoing process. These connections are subject of analyses and analytical approach to many institutions that deal with the creation of external foreign affairs or internal politics within states generally speaking on whole international stage. Contra/counter-diplomacy opened new direction in the computer era and communications in a way it opened possibilities to the creation of its own politics (or set the necessary conditions to create a third side) and domination on the medium space. As Wikileaks came about there were many affairs that followed coming from influential media through which their own owners "launched" strong political figures to re-track home or international politics too. So some several cases of resignation of politicians followed, representatives of UN than exempting influential non-governmental organizations and human fighters as well as launching court trial processes against many influential state holders in some countries. This is how the spiral of revealing many public secrets and (dis) deeds of the great forces began.

Conclusion

Public diplomacy is considered to be mass-effect product of the process of globalization, simply because it has been welcomed by its supporters but also those that never gave its support in first place. What is more, some diplomatic lobby organizations coming from the Asiatic countries have been considering public diplomacy as some sort of resident evil which is a necessity as it vitalizes the function of the old regimes which are in total distinction to the fast growing economy of countries. The world's progress and development enforces the process of commercialization on public diplomacy and for that particular reason public diplomacy has evolved into three basic concepts. In first place it is the propaganda, or the transmission of ideas and values serving for some specific goals that need to be achieved, especially for the one who uses it. Of course the stated above would not mean by any case some kind of imposing or persuading ideas being introduced but instead this concept should be seen as a promotion of some kind of values, or in other words making them become one step closer or better introduced to the so called target group, or the whole of the group. The second concept is national branding but what it actually represents instead is national re-rendering, or roughly claimed it should be understood as national identification code erasure, or simply just homogenizing the nation that stands in higher brand that is. The true example of it is the EU which of course has nothing to do with erasing national identity, instead it deals with identifying with some sort of civilization rather than the nation as a representative emblem, which of course has its advantages especially in the process of preventing some chronic regional conflicts. *Modus Operandi*

is all about the claim that public diplomacy is no different in the aspect from the point of view of goal treatment compared to traditional diplomacy – the difference is just the time limit or the deadline given in order to fulfill those goals.

The third concept is the cultural relations and it implies promoting human rights, respecting the differences apparent and also promoting democracy. This concept has been called concept belonging to one whole generation because it promotes its own (or theirs rebranded) values as something well acceptable to the younger population, and in such a way that they at the same time will be well accepted by the majority when they will manage (once they have managed) to support the idea of warning international relations on the countries which support diametrically different claims to central power. The techniques of this very concept have been determined by the long time period which is different from the tradition and cultural development of the targeting group. It can be said that public diplomacy is some sort of obvious example of an existing phenomenon on the development and progressing upstream line of diplomacy itself but also establishing new era of society constitution in time of globalization.

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THEORETICAL CONCEPTS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES

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Abstract: *Reconciliation is a long-term process of resolving the antagonisms in culture and identity-based conflicts. It involves a transition from contesting to cooperation, including reconstruction of the society and creating conditions for normal cooperation and life. Some authors call it "transformation" (Lederach), or peacemaking (Curle). They define conflict transformation as a solution, which involves transformation of enmity relations into mutual acceptance and cooperation between the actors of the conflict. The conflict could lay dormant and activate from time to time unless reconciliation is achieved among the conflicting sides. Thus, instead, a sustainable peace the society is polarized and divided societies conducive to occasional or continuous escalation of new conflicts are formed. Peacebuilding links together different threads from conflict prevention, crisis management, peacemaking, and post conflict stabilization often challenged with efficiency, coordination and sustainability which impose the need for good knowledge of the current peacebuilding architecture. This paper is a small contribution in that line and an effort to give an overview of the different concepts of conflict resolution and peace building.*

Key words: *theoretical concepts, conflict resolutions, peace building, integrated approach, divided societies, reconciliation.*

Introduction

The goal of this paper is to give an overview of some theoretical concepts relevant to conflict resolution and peace building in divided societies. My general hypothesis states: *The Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the escalation of the fighting in the Republic of Macedonia, has nonetheless for ten years perpetuated the underlying conflict, albeit in a latent form. It has arguably preserved the internal security of the country and made possible the sustainable security of Macedonian society. However, a negative tendency can sometimes be seen in certain educational indicators, not to mention the obvious segregation of society along ethnic lines. Therefore, it is important to find out what lies behind the lingering post-Ohrid discontent*". As Richard Solomon asserts, sustainable peace requires long-time antagonists not merely to lay down their arms but to achieve profound reconciliation that will endure because it is sustained. It builds a society-wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and addresses the root causes and enmity before they can

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regenerate destabilizing tensions². Peacebuilding does not start and stop with say, the launch and the termination of a UN operation, or with the establishment of political parties or the holding of elections. Rather, “peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships.”³ The nature and characteristics of contemporary conflict suggest the need for a set of concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy. Constructing the house of peace relies on a foundation of multiple actors and activities aimed at achieving and sustaining reconciliation⁴. In lieu with it, this paper will provide an overview of concepts and definitions followed by the players involved in the peace building process. We cannot hope that it can be comprehensive, but the aim is nevertheless to provide not only a general introduction to the topic but also context for future analyses of specific aspects of peacebuilding. It aims to point out the importance of the reconciliation in the process of establishing a sustainable peace. In addition to give the construct to create specific cases like the case of post conflict Macedonia by trying to answer the question as to whether the country is moving into a direction of a divided society or not. This would justify why most of the concepts, notions and ideas below are related to ethnic conflict as such has been the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia.

Concepts, notions and ideas related to ethnic armed conflict

According to Kaufman, an author cited by Anthony Oberschall⁵: “Ethnic group” denotes a large aggregate of people who have a self-defined name, believe they share a common descent, have common historical memories and elements of shared culture (such as religion and language), and have an attachment (even if only historical and sentimental) to a specific territory. Horowitz, another author cited by Oberschall writes “Ethnic groups tend to have solidarity and we-feeling; their members experience something of “ourselves” in each other”. “Nationality refers to a large group of people having a common and distinguishing racial, linguistic, and cultural background, and forming a constituent element of a larger group”⁶. The two terms, “ethnic group” and “nationality,” overlap and often used synonymously.

Oberschall argues that well-being in a society depends not only on person-to-person transactions but also on collective goods. Consensus on collective goods (e.g. language, group identity, collective symbols of shared values and group dignity as expressed in the celebration of holidays, the naming of streets and public monuments, the role of religion in public life) reduces contentious conflicts in politics and makes for low-cost governance. Ethnic groups tend to have a viable communal organization with dense interpersonal networking and cultural, social, and religious associations embedded in the ethnic community. Political mobilization of ethnic groups does not start from scratch. Ethnic activists redirect a preexisting robust ethnic infrastructure of associations and networks to political pursuits, adapting ethnic symbols and loyalties to political goals.

² Richard Solomon in Lederach, 1997:Foreword

³ Lederach, 1997

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Oberschall, A.2007

⁶ *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, 1981

Theories of ethnic conflict

There is no shortage of theories about the causes of these conflicts. Each suggests a particular mode of ethnic conflict management. Ancient hatred (AH) assumes that ethnic identities and group membership are primordial, sharply distinct, resilient to change, salient across all institutions and activities, and present high risk for repeated destructive conflicts (Kaplan, 1994)⁷. Ethnic groups resist assimilation and erosion despite education and ethnic relations are burdened with collective myths, fears, and hostile emotions. Embedded in culture and socialization, their histories highlight past conflicts and threats from other groups. Manipulative elites (ME) assume social construction of ethnic identities rather than primordial origins (Gagnon 1994/5)⁸. Ethnic elites contend for power by manipulating ethnic divisions and blowing them out of proportion with fear and hate propaganda. Rival leaders demonize ethnic opponents who can never be trusted and must therefore be dominated or defeated. Identity politics (IP) holds that divisive ethnic myths, symbols, stereotypes, and fears are embedded in folk culture, socialization, and institutions of divided societies (Kaufman 2001)⁹. Conflict management consists of building overarching shared identities and symbols, and providing political institutions that organize interest and divisions that cut across ethnic lines. Security dilemma (also referred to as the spiral of insecurity) holds that, under conditions of state failure and breakdown (approaching anarchy), all groups fear for their life and property, and some ethnic groups mobilize for their own defense against rivals they view as threatening, including by arming, which in turn is threatening to other groups, who in turn arm, which leaves all more insecure and stimulates further mobilization and countermobilization, as in an arms race between states (Posen 1993)¹⁰. The process can be modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma. What drives the conflict is not hatred, as in AH, but mistrust and fear. Economic roots (ER) disputes that ethnic divisions are at the root of major contemporary internal armed conflicts (Collier et al. 2003)¹¹. Instead, ER holds that the root causes of such conflicts are poverty, economic stagnation, unemployment, corruption, and a failed state on the demand side, and warlords organizing unemployed young men into armed bands, opportunities for making a living by aggression and robbery, trafficking in narcotics, controlling revenues from natural resources such as oil and diamonds, and favorable terrain for insurgency on the supply side.

All of the above theories could be true, but that is not decisive for peace making. What happens is that violent conflict fuels ethnic hatred, brings to power manipulative elites, creates fear and insecurity, is responsible for economic ruin, and fosters exclusive identities and divisive symbols. What conflict managers and peacemakers have to do is to deal with these consequences of conflict, whatever the status quo ante. In Chaim Kaufmann's words, "solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes" (1996: 137)¹².

⁷ Oberschall, A. 2007

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

Peace making is a phase of a longer process of changing relationships among adversaries and third parties. There are relatively stable periods when the conflict lies dormant. Obershall refers to these processes as “conciliation and conflict dynamics,” CCD for short. As Obershall writes, CCD is less than a fully articulated theory of ethnic conflict yet more than an elaborate descriptive account with ex post plausible explanations. It is mindful of internal factions and shifting coalitions, of bystanders joining the conflict as issues accumulate, and of ordinary men recruited because of the security dilemma rather than because of hate. It is mindful of the original core issues in the conflict but supplements them with derivative issues that grow out of confrontation and peace making. In addition, it clarifies and explains the causes, courses, and outcomes of conflict. Peace making generates divisive issues that may become as contentious as the original core issues. After the fighting stops, political leaders continue divisive mobilization in elections and in politics against both internal rivals and their main ethnic adversaries. The polity, the economy, and the society change during armed conflict. In a television interview, Senator George Mitchell (2002) observed about his experience as a mediator in ethnic conflict that “There is a fixation and obsession with the past that hampers the ability to look at the future . . . unless people . . . look at the future, they are going to continue and relive the past with all the negatives that brings.” For a full-fledged peace process, all the parties in the peace process must shift from coercion to conciliation: not just the principal leaders and organizations, but the lesser factions and organizations¹³. For all these reasons, negotiations for peace are messy and complex. It should also be remembered, “How can a leader justify the sacrifice to the families of the fallen and to the public if he yields that territory or principle on the cheap”?

Contemporary armed conflict

Wallensteen and Axell, authors cited by Ledarach, have suggested a delineation of categories for assessing armed conflict by death tolls, locality, and issues. They provide three subset categories of armed conflict. The first is that of minor armed conflict, defined as a conflict between armed forces in which fewer than twenty-five people have died in a given year, and in which at least one of the parties was a state. Intermediate armed conflict is defined as a situation in which at least one thousand deaths have occurred over the course of the conflict, with at least twentyfive deaths occurring in a particular year. War is reserved to describe a conflict in which at least one thousand deaths have occurred in a given year. Armed conflict comprises the total of the three categories. This categorization is widely used by other researchers, but there are some variations with some, such as the “Armed Conflict” reports, which define an armed conflict as a conflict that claims more than one thousand lives over its course.

During the Cold War Era, the dominant explanation for armed conflict was related to ideological considerations. Conflicts in the post-Cold War world are primarily internal and internationalized disputes in which the direct fighting is often akin to communal or intercommunal strife. These conflicts are characterized by deep-rooted and long-standing animosities that are reinforced by high levels of violence and direct experiences of atroci-

¹³ Ibid.

ties. As a result, psychological and even cultural features often drive and sustain the conflict more than substantive issues¹⁴. Lederach says that at first, we must find innovative ways to transform an international culture that is based on poorly developed mechanisms for non-violent conflict transformation, that has a deep economic commitment to arms production, and that readily accepts the availability of weapons on the world market as legal and legitimate. Then, he says, the peacebuilding task must take into account the long-term horizon of protracted intermediate conflicts and wars, and develop a comprehensive, multifaceted strategy for ending violence and achieving and sustaining reconciliation. This calls for concepts and approaches that deal with the specific nature of contemporary armed conflict. In addition, as he says, we must acknowledge that war protracted armed conflict is a system, a system that can be transformed only by taking a comprehensive approach to the people who operate it and to the setting in which it is rooted. He concludes that we must also take up the challenge of how to prevent newly emerging minor armed conflicts from becoming full-scale wars. It is to these challenges that we should turn our attention.

Building peace a conceptual framework

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published an important document, titled *An Agenda for Peace*. In it, he proposed responsibilities and responses for the United Nations and the international community in dealing with contemporary conflicts. The proposal included four major areas of activity: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post conflict peacebuilding. His framework suggests that at different times and in diverse contexts a variety of sequential response mechanisms and functions are needed to promote the resolution of conflict and sustenance of peace. The secretary-general qualifies the use of the term by connecting it exclusively to the postconflict support of peace accords and the rebuilding of war-torn societies. Lederach agrees fully that this is an increasingly critical phase, to which much attention must be paid. For him peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct. Such a conceptualization requires a process of building, involving investment and materials, architectural design and coordination of labor, laying of a foundation, and detailed finish work, as well as continuing maintenance¹⁵. Conceptually, he understands a framework as providing the general parameters, the boundary outline that helps create meaning and focus; concepts are the more specific ideas and analytical elements that make up the framework. In other words, a framework helps situate things with a context and provides lenses through which we can look at them. The framework provides categories such as structure, process, relationship, resources, and coordination. The framework must address and engage the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding.

¹⁴ Lederach, 1997

¹⁵ Ibid.

A conceptual framework for reconciliation

First and foremost is the perhaps self-evident but oft-neglected notion that relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution. This was well articulated by Harold Saunders and Randa Slim, who put forward relationships as the focal point for sustained dialogue within protracted conflict settings¹⁶. Reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma of loss and their grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustices experienced. Acknowledgment is decisive in the reconciliation dynamic. It is one thing to know; it is yet a very different social phenomenon to acknowledge. Acknowledgment through hearing one another's stories validates experience and feelings and represents the first step toward restoration of the person and relationship. At the same time, reconciliation must envision the future in a way that enhances interdependence. In all contemporary internal conflicts, the futures of those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and interdependent¹⁷. Opportunity must therefore be given for people to look forward and envision their shared future.

Lederach begins constructing his conceptual framework for building peace by asserting that genuine peacebuilding is more than the post-conflict support of a peace agreement. Rather, it "involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords, including "processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. Relationships, Lederach asserts, are built through reconciliation, which balances four concepts: truth, mercy, justice, and peace (figure 1). Truth represents "the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences". Mercy "articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning". Justice "seeks vindication of individual and group rights while advocating for restitution and social restructuring". Peace "underscores the need for interdependence, well-being, and security". Reconciliation, in Lederach's view, is both the process of balancing the four concepts and the social space where parties encounter each other and engage in the process¹⁸. The immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside the competence of international diplomacy.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ To explore this idea in more detail, he offers an experience in Central America, which emerged from a theological perspective when he was serving as an adviser to a religiously based conciliation team that mediated negotiation between the Sandinista government and the Yatama. At the opening of each village meeting, the Nicaraguan conciliators would read Psalm 85. In two short lines at the heart of the text (85: 10), the Spanish version reads (in translation): "Truth and mercy have met together; peace and justice have kissed."





Figure 1: The Place Called Reconciliation

Source: Lederach, 1997

Lederach has found it helpful to think of leadership in the population affected by a conflict in terms of a pyramid (figure 2). In this instance, he says: We are using lenses to capture the overview of how an entire affected population in a setting of internal armed conflict is represented by leaders and other actors, as well as the roles they play in dealing with the situation. The pyramid permits us to lay out that leadership base in three major categories: top level, middle range, and the grassroots. The pinnacle, or top-level leadership, represents the fewest people, in some instances perhaps only a handful of key actors. The grassroots base of the pyramid encompasses the largest number of people, those who represent the population at large. On the left-hand side of the pyramid are the types of leaders and the sectors from which they come at each level. On the right-hand side are the conflict transformation activities that the leaders at each level may undertake.



Source: Lederach, 1997

Approaches to peacebuilding

To provide a structure for reconciliation, Lederach recommends coordinating the

peacemaking efforts of a society's top-level, middle-range, and grassroots leaders. The top-level political and military leaders generally negotiate cease-fires and peace accords. Middle-range leaders (e.g., leaders of academic, religious, business, professional, agricultural, and nongovernmental organizations who have ties to upper-level and grassroots leaders) conduct problem-solving workshops, train people in conflict-resolution skills, and lead peace commissions. Grassroots leaders (e.g., community and refugee-camp leaders, health officials, and members of indigenous nongovernmental organizations) achieve agreements to end fighting, implement policies made at higher levels, and set the stage for a movement toward peace. Two examples of peacebuilding efforts targeted at the grassroots level before formal peace and electoral structures took place in Mozambique, where initiatives emerged from both the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)¹⁹.


Concluding remarks: An Integrated framework

Lederach points to a crucial overlap between the structural and procedural lenses, as elements of a broad peacebuilding paradigm. "Structure" suggests the need to think comprehensively about the affected population and systemically about the issues. "Process" underscores the necessity of thinking creatively about the progression of conflict and the sustainability of its transformation by linking roles, functions, and activities in an integrated manner. He proposes an integrated approach to peace building, visualized in Figure 3. The vertical axis is taken from the Dugan nested paradigm²⁰. The horizontal axis is the time frame model that links short-term crisis with longer-term perspective for change in the society²¹.

¹⁹ The CCM-initiated program "Preparing People for Peace," was conceived as a way to open up and deal with conflict and peace issues in the Mozambique setting, with a specific focus on the provincial and district levels. The CCM program began with a national seminar in summer 1991 that brought together church representatives from all of the provinces; these representatives were then given the responsibility for implementing seminars at local levels. On average, each seminar involved between thirty and fifty participants, both pastors and laypersons, and lasted for two weeks. Over the course of sixteen months (toward the end of which the national peace accord was signed), more than seven hundred people participated in the seminars, several of which were held in refugee camps in neighboring Zimbabwe. The second example from Mozambique was the UNICEF project, "Circus of Peace." Like a circus, the project was organized as a traveling show that wove drama and the arts into its explorations of the nature and challenges of war and conflict and the possibilities of reconciliation, including the skills of resolving conflict. The show not only captivated audiences but also served as a way to publicly grieve over the losses the country had suffered, to address concerns of the people, and to set the stage for changes and movement toward peace.

²⁰ Concept, proposed by peace worker and theorist Maire Dugan, which views a specific incident of conflict as part of a relationship between the parties. Their relationship, in turn, is part of a subsystem to which the parties belong, which in turn is part of a larger social system. Dugan and Lederach recommend using middle-range leaders, acting at the relationship and subsystem levels, to connect short-term "issue concerns with long-term "systemic concerns". In: Dugan, Maire A. "A Nested Theory of Conflict." *A Leadership Journal: Women in Leadership - Sharing the Vision* 1 (July, 1996): 9-20.

²¹ Lederach adopts another nested paradigm to explain the types of activities required at each stage of the process. The first stage, crisis intervention, usually takes two to six months. The second stage, preparation and training, involves short-range planning that takes one to two years. The third stage, design of social change, is akin to dispute-resolution system design and takes five to ten years. The fourth stage, desired future, involves articulating and planning for social change over decades.



The two dimensions intersect at five points, each of which represents a distinct and too often discrete community of thought and action in the broader field of peacebuilding.

At one intersection of the two paradigms is a place for peacemakers to consider the past and determine the root causes of the conflict. At a second intersection, peacemakers resolve immediate issues through crisis management. At a third intersection, peacemakers absorb the lessons of the conflict and devise short-term strategies to prevent the conflict's recurrence. At a fourth intersection, peacemakers envision the distant future and the social changes necessary to build peaceful relationships between the conflicting parties. At the fifth intersection, peacemakers design the strategies necessary to transform the existing conflict to the desired future. Integration begins with recognition that the middle range holds special potential for transformation, but that change will be needed at every level of human experience and endeavor. Specifically, the middle-range perspective suggests that we need to achieve integration in at least three strategic ways: 1) develop the capacity

to think about the design of social change in time-units of decades, in order to link crisis management and long-term, future-oriented time frames; 2) understand crisis issues as connected to systemic roots and develop approaches that explicitly anchor issues within a set of relationships and subsystems; 3) recognize the integrative potential of middle-range leaders, who by their locus within the affected population may be able to cultivate relationships and pursue the design of social change at a subsystem level, thus helping to make the vertical and horizontal connections necessary to sustain a process of desired change. When we combine the elements in the integrated framework, we begin to establish an infrastructure for sustaining the dynamic transformation of conflict and the construction of peace. An infrastructure for peacebuilding is oriented toward supporting processes of social change generated by the need to move from stagnant cycles of violence toward a desired and shared vision of increased interdependence. Such an infrastructure must be rooted in the conflict setting and emerge creatively from the culture and context, but not be a slave of either. The purpose of the processstructure is reconciliation that centers on the redefinition and restoration of broken relationships. To rebuild relationships, we must develop innovative ways of providing space within which the emotional and psychological aspects of the conflict can be addressed. Traditional approaches to diplomacy have tended to see reconciliation as peripheral, or worse, as irrelevant to the substance of building peace, when in fact reconciliation is the ingredient with the capacity to create the conditions for proactive sustainable change. Our challenge is to find strategic and practical approaches that help establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation and that take seriously the immediate and deeprooted needs of divided societies. Peacebuilding, Lederach asserts, requires two types of resources: socioeconomic and sociocultural. As to Lederach's concept of socioeconomic resources, he recommends that peacemakers encourage funding agencies to develop categories of funding related to peacebuilding, lobby governments and other agencies to raise and allocate funds for defraying the social and material costs of weapons use, and encourage administrators of peacebuilding funds to allocate those funds to the types of activities that are most cost-effective. As to sociocultural resources, Lederach deems it essential to build a "peace constituency" within the conflict setting by using the cultural resources available in the setting. Resources are most effective when they are coordinated. To achieve coordination, Lederach recommends that peacebuilders develop a "peace inventory (i.e., a list of the people and organizations performing various types of peacemaking activities), improve communications between top-level and mid-level leaders, engage in conferences among donors of peacebuilding resources, create broad-based resource groups that participate in the design of the peace process, and coordinate the work of "internal peacemakers (i.e., those working within the conflict area) with the work of "external peacemakers (i.e., those working outside the conflict area). Because the integrated peacebuilding framework requires numerous and specific capacities (e.g., violence prediction, dispute system design, cultural resource analysis, and strategic social futures design), Lederach foresees that many people will require training to acquire those capacities. He asserts that we are not impaired by a lack of resources, if we choose to invest wisely and practically in peace. We are limited only by how far we are willing to cast our vision. We must not

despair at the depth and breadth of the challenge, but rather rise to meet it. Reconciliation is possible. The house of peace can be built.

Conclusion and recommendations

This paper has offered an overview of concepts and theories related to peacebuilding, which come by a scholar and a practitioner side. However, it is important to mention that this is not an exhaustive overview. The notion of peacebuilding remains one that is notoriously difficult to pin down in terms of not only meaning but also differentiation from other similar and linked terms such as conflict prevention and post conflict stabilization. The UN activities that support what are peacebuilding activities are multi-faceted and might include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants (DDR); anti-mine actions; security sector reform and other rule-of law related activities; the protection and promotion of human rights; the electoral assistance and support to the restoration and extension of (legitimate) state authority. Unsurprisingly, the complexity in terms of both the conceptual understanding of peace building and its practical implementation is mirrored in the EU context. The distinctiveness of the EU's approach lies in the potential nascent or realized to respond to variety of challenges. Conceptually peacebuilding in the EU context includes both the conflict prevention role as well as the ability to immediately to respond to conflict and crises. The "distinctive" EU approach is though fully compatible with the UN's peacebuilding activities and on several occasions, such as the ESDP military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 or the contemporary rule of law mission in Kosovo has demonstrated this in a particular manner²². The concept of peacebuilding is itself slowly evolving and being shaped within the EU institutions and the EU members. The EU has a formidable potential to link together all of the various facets of its influence, ranging from its trade, development and assistance tools, to the "harder" aspects of its profile being developed through ESDP. The attainment of this potential will depend very much upon the internal dynamics of the EU institutions but in particular upon the political will of the Member States to support the EU's peacebuilding efforts. In fact the challenge goes beyond the EU to include efforts of important partners notably the UN, to the same end²³.

In addition, I would I would like to refer to the goal of my paper explicitly stated at the beginning of the paper. Its main purpose has been to provide not only a general introduction to the topic but also context for future analyses of specific aspects of peacebuilding and point out the importance of the reconciliation in the process of establishing a sustainable peace. Also, to give the construct to create specific cases like the case of post conflict Macedonia as stated in my general hypothesis - by trying to answer the question as to whether the country is moving into a direction of a divided society and what lies behind the lingering post - Ohrid discontent. I sincerely hope this paper has set the stage for it. Hopefully, analysis made on justice, policing, partition, power-sharing, and external mediation in a post conflict country could offer a treasure trove of research hypotheses that could

²² Duke and Courtier, 2009

²³ Ibid.

fill volumes of future books. Finally, study of deeply divided societies²⁴ or societies which have the potential to become divided is valuable both to enriching the understanding of democratic models of governance and to informing institutional arrangements to facilitate peace and reconciliation.

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²⁴ A “deeply divided society,” as defined by Adrian Guelke, is one where violence or the threat of violence keeps it divided. What distinguishes deeply divided societies from fragmented ones is their inability to agree on a common process for decision-making, making peace and reconciliation difficult, if not impossible to achieve (Guelke, 2012)

PLANS FOR SECURING AND ESTIMATION OF SECURITY SITUATION (Planning as a primary and crucial phase of the process of risk managing)

Ljupco STANKOVSKI¹

Abstract: *Protected persons and objects have always been subject of interest of the executers of different crime acts, that through different criminal activities, in many cases managed to jeopardize the safety of protected person, to destroy or damage certain objects, to endanger the security of the persons present inside of them, or things to be taken from that objects or illegally acquired certain items.*

During the providing of protected facilities and persons, and as well as in the provision of public gatherings and events, one of the most important tasks is preparing security plans.

Planning is primary and essential phase in the managing process and it is the responsibility of all managerial levels. Briefly, planning is the formulation of the aims and methods of their realization, which is in function of creating and adaptation of the organizational structure, management style and pattern control. Above all, it represents the goals choice and ways to achieve them. Planned decisions are the result of the planning process.

For the purpose of this paper planning process has a crucial meaning and presents the primary and essential stage in the managing process which represent responsibility of all managerial levels. Concisely determined, planning is the formulation of the goals and methods of their realization, which is in function of creating and adaptation to organizational structure, management style and pattern control. That, above all, presents the goals choice and manner for theirs achievement. Planned decisions are the result of the planning process. Planning decisions are oriented for the management team, whereby each managerial level brings its own planning decisions. Planning, especially in the security management is a process that contains several reciprocally connected stages. First stage of planning is defining the goals, then making a security estimation, risk assessment, decision-making and making of security plans. In the planning process, as part of strategic planning, are defined security politics and organization strategy, that derives from planning.

Primary, a good management requires a proactive approach, i.e. predicting the problems and timely preparing for their closure. Forecasting or estimation is the main point of the planning. The security plan term, implies the estimation of the security situation of endangerment of protected object or person and security measures that get done and effected.

*According to available regulations and practice are composed three plan types: **regular, special and emergency plan.***

Keywords: *plan, estimation, vulnerability, security measures, management.*

¹ The author is MA, and an expert in providing persons and property and crisis prevention and crisis management

Introduction

In accordance with today's lifestyle, safety represents kind of a value (state, national, political, moral, economic, personal, etc.).

Will the removal of endangerment carriers, solve the problem with endangerment? A good condition analysis of the relevant security occurrences is a primary condition to rule with security situation, but also for the purposeful, systematic and timely directing to the security operations to remove negative security occurrences.

By analyzing the security situation, trends must be determine and their emerge forms of security risks, challenges and threats over protected object, legalities in the manifestation of negative security circumstances and the reasons for the occurrence of negative security events.

Determination of the security situation is synthesized conclusion about the state and nature of the security events with a detailed description of the nature of each occurrence and prognosis of its impact on the security situation in the future.

Bringing the conclusions with an evaluation of the security situation involves a synthesis of all security problems and defining indicators of safety.

Indicators of security situation are specific measurable magnitudes, whose measuring and value comparison of different indicators, can achieve precise evaluation of the security situation.

Based on the values of the indicators of security situation, over security situation, estimation is done together with additional explanation. During the security situation preparation, should be estimate operation of the organizational units within the organization that deals with the security problems and the security service itself.

The plan needs to be made about what is going to be controlled. Although the politics needs to be defined, and is going to contain the legislature, the liabilities, the governing with the risk and the organization's strategy, as well as the criteria for the risk evaluation.

Under security plan is taken the evaluation of the security situation for the jeopardy of the secured object, person or the measures of security that are done or made.

Planning is primary and essential phase in the managing process and it is the responsibility of all managerial levels. Concisely determined, planning is the formulation of the goals and methods of their realization, which is in function of creating and adaptation to organizational structure, management style and pattern control. That, above all, presents the goals choice and manner for theirs achievement. Planned decisions are the result of the planning process. Planning decisions are oriented for the management team, whereby each managerial level brings its own planning decisions. Planning, especially in the security management is a process that contains several interrelated stages. First stage of planning is defining the purposes, then making a security estimation, risk assessment, decision-making and making of security plans. In the planning process, as part of strategic planning, security politics and organization strategy, that derives from planning, are defined as well.

The evaluation is an act where is needed to identify, quantify and make the priorities of the risk according to the actual criteria for taking the charge for the risk and objectives of the enterprise. The result of the evaluating the risk is defining the ways for managing the security risks and implementation of control for defense from the risks. The process of evaluating the risk and choosing of concrete controls, by actual need can be repeated more and more, only to comprise all the segments of the enterprise. Evaluation of the risk is containing the analysis of the risk, the comparing and categories of the risk, to define how serious the risk is, and the evolution of the risk. Evaluation of the security risk must have clear definition of the possible risks so it can be effective.

Before analyzing you should define the criteria for taking the risk. For every evaluated risk you must make a decision for analysis of that risk.

The evaluation for jeopardy and possible dangers in a concrete building is going to be based on the detection of the possible jeopardy and dangers, their prediction according to the chronologic analysis that was made, what is a danger, what is risk, why you need to make evaluation of the risk, how, you can make it, which information you should collect, how you can collect them, how you can identify the danger, how to plan the activities to eliminate or decrease the risk risen from the danger, and how to make documentation for evaluating the risk.

Forecast the movement security situation

This forecast implies to trends and legalities of negative security appearances in a specified time period. To be able to perform such a prediction, should start from the previously performed analysis in previous phases of construing the security assessment. According to some rules, its easier to predict on a short time period on the occasions under the influence of a smaller number of variables. Should be careful with the assessments of security occurrences that due to the complexity and a long time period of time their manifestation expectation, have big degree of uncertainty. In such conditions most worthwhile is to predict a framework where you can rise the appearance in order to prepare a flexible organizational structure and system of general security measures that will be adaptive in the short term, for the new situation.

Prediction is very important for security management, because good prediction allows timely brought decisions, planning and organizing, that is always confirmed through practice as a decisive advantage. To make a good prediction, very special meaning have indicators of the situation for the safety and well-determent trends and rules for the movement of security appearances.

Types of Plans

During the work of the security for buildings and people, or security of manifestations and public conventions, one of the most important deal is to make security plan.

Security plan is an evaluation of the security situation for the jeopardy of the secured building, person or the measures for security which are taken.

Under the legal terms and routine, 3 kinds of plans are made: constant, special and plans for unusual situations.

Permanent security plans are prepared for all protected objects and persons, and constitute by the competent authorities or security services of so-called normal (permanent) situations.

Specific security plans are made for certain concrete situations such as: when a protected object expects particular, domestic or foreign person or delegation, or when a particular foreign person or a delegation has an official visit to the country (presents plan for concrete security action).

Emergency plans include fire, flood, earthquake, attack of protected objects or object used by a particular person.

Starting from the normative act by which an object is placed into protected object category, safety plans contain: estimation of the security situation for endangerment of

protected object and plan and security measures that are applied in the present case - precisely elaborated.

Estimation of the security situation is, of course, the most important part of any plan for the security of which essentially depends planning and taking safety measures in any specific situation. Estimation of the security situation must be kept current, at any time must represent a real reflection of the situation of the protected object or person. With a good plan and estimation, that are provided the factors that can and can not control and they can be managed successfully, and managed to evacuate or shelter vulnerable people, can provide the event, the entry and exit routes, and to ensure safe movement in contaminated environments, the number of staff, type of communication etc.

Plan of security measures

With this plan, that presents an integral part of the security plan, should detail elaborate all measures that will take bigger part in the future speaks of providing the facility and measures taken for their protection.

- Operative - preventive security measures - detail elaborated measures for monitoring the activities and safety cover over the certain categories of persons for which is assumed that may endanger the safety of the protected object and personality, with reason.

- Measures of physical security (external and internal security).

- Preventive - technical protection measures (measures for protection against sabotage, protection measures against eavesdrop, safeguards against secret or violent impact into the protected facility and fire protection measures).

- Measures for sanitary - technical, biological and chemical protection.

- Measures of health care.

Integral part of each safety plan are sketches of protected object (with exact labeled so-called critical points), regions and alignment of movement photo-documentations and other relevant data that are important for security of the protected object or person.

With the security plan (which is a professional secret), i.e. the assessment of the security situation and security measurements plan, especially with critical points of the protected object, the employees in security, who will be engaged within the protected object must be introduced to it. Also, these employees should be detailed familiar with all normative acts regulating this issue, regularly to inform for all security - interesting information and data that are important for successful job performance and the tasks entrusted to them.

Operative preventive measures

Operative-preventive measures are taken for timely detection, monitoring and prevention of hostile activities aimed towards jeopardizing protected objects and persons on any grounds staying in them.

Object protection takes following operational preventive measures and actions:

- Assessment of the security situation, preparation of safety measures plan and oversee its implementation.

- Timely and accurate informing for all knowledge - data relevant to the safety of the object and the people found inside them.

- Permanent direct cooperation with local authorities of Ministry of Interior .

- Security preparation of certain persons (drivers, employees in protected object)

- Control over the closest environment of protected object (with occasional observation, if the object is within another building or effecting temporally rounds around object and the immediate surroundings, if it comes to an independent object).

- Inquest of the persons entering in the protected object for preventing the carrying inside the object fire weapon, explosive and flammable substances.

- Identification of unknown or suspicious persons in the area or in the provided object.

- Prevent entry of unauthorized and suspicious persons in the object.

- Surveillance and control of effected works around protected object.

- Control of the movement and retention of persons in the immediate area of the protected object.

- Control of motor and vehicles park area around protected object.

If discussed for protection of the object used by certain people, authorities and security services, undertake other operational security measures:

- Surveillance of certain groups and categories of people (potentially dangerous and people inclined towards threats, violence, etc..) and taking the necessary measures to prevent such activities.

- Checking for person's data who stay in the close surroundings of the protected object.

- Checking the data of persons who permanently or temporarily are engaged for tasks of importance to safety of the object and protected figures.

- Organizing and conducting security protection of certain organs and enterprises, i.e. protected objects and persons employed inside of them.

Physical security measures

Physical security measures are taken for immediate protection of an object, for his near and distant surroundings and the people who reside in it. Physical security is providing the object, property and transport objects from destruction, damage, theft and other forms of harmful activity, as well as providing people in apartments and other private space of endangering their lives, physical and mental integrity, privacy and personal rights, and other forms of endangerment of their personal safety.

The physical security is performed by armed and educated people, in some cases, with the help of trained dogs. The physical defense often combines with technical defense, and that one is constructed from lots of activities and measures needed for obstructing any jeopardy of people or assets, the secured object in general.

In that way, the physical security is a subsystem in the wider area of security of property and assets security, with an action on non-government, private or economical properties. Quality of the physical - technical security nowadays, presents very important element in the general functioning of the commercial subjects, enterprises, and represents an economical category, although doesn't affect the productivity of the enterprise work.

Physical security is providing people for their personal protection and security of property from entry of uninvited persons, destruction, damage, unlawful deprivation and other forms of harmful activities.

Security of protected object is implementing with external and internal physical security measures:

External physical security measures – are implementing:

- With Guardian Service. The first element of physical security is the guard. Man has been and will remain a major factor in protection system, and for the selection of the people to perform such work, must pay special attention.

- Besides the general duties, as subscribed by the regulations of a legal entity, the guards get familiar with the special requirements and duties prescribed for certain guardian posts.

The force and composition of the guardians, are conditioned by the facility security assessment, signification and size of protected object, territory's configuration, the situation of technical protection ...

For effecting this tasks, persons performing providing, use weapons, equipment and technical means by which assistance will be most effective, timely to discover and prevent activities directing over the endangerment of security objects and persons inside of them (monitoring devices, binoculars, IC devices for night observation, against sabotage protection equipment, connecting devices, cameras for photo documentation ...).

- Strengthening of engaged reconnaissance and patrol services in the close object environment which is protected as required, i.e. by assessment and by depth.

Public Security Service assisted by Patrol (auto patrols, street police) and scout, covers a certain area and their engagement controls the close environment of protected object for their protection from damage or destruction or prevention of jeopardizing the safety of the protected object and people inside.

During activity is necessary to reach a continuous and close cooperation between patrol-scout and persons engaged in the provision of the protected object. Namely, both have an obligation to inform each other for all security information and knowledge, that may learn from work, which are from great importance for the safety of the protected object and persons inside of it.

- Counter reconnaissance – by surveillance of covered (hidden) places for observation for the control of a wider space around protected object, especially those places that can effectively be observed, sketched or record the provided object.

This measure is commonly taken during providing the military facilities. But by taking these measures might be achieved very good results in the coverage of the wider security protection zones and larger organizations.

The main tasks of the persons performing duties of outside object security are:

- Immediate care facility, devices, equipment and installation inside of it as well as vehicles,

- Immediate protection of persons who are in the protected object,

- Preventing the attack over the object or violent intrusion into the building and certain premises,

- Control over somebody's approaching to the protected object,

- Motion control and keeping people around protected object,

- Parking control of the vehicles around protected object,

- Preventing the disruption of public peace and order in the vicinity of the protected object,

- Insight and control of the works around protected object, i.e. in his vicinity (saboteurs and terrorists often performed actions pretending to be postmen or workers in utilities),

- Monitoring and control of a wider space around protected object - especially on places from where object can effectively be observed, sketched and recorded,

- Effecting a smooth and safety arrival of persons in the object, or their departure ...

Internal Security - the person responsible for security inside the building, performs the following tasks:

- Directly protects the object, devices, equipment and installation inside of it,

- Direct protection of the persons on any grounds that stay in the object (employees, clients, guests ..),

- Effects Insight - control of certain premises at the protected object (after arrival to work, during the shifts and after business hours),

- By need or assessment, performs direct protection to certain premises in the building (where are located confidential documents, vaults, safes ..),

- Performs regular control of the accuracy of alarm and other security devices in the protected object,

- Performs security over facility entrances - controls the entrance or exit of persons importing or exporting materials, equipment ..

- By need or assessment, the person who performs security can call the suspicious person to control to determine whether the person carries fire weapon or other dangerous means (explosive, flammable) that could jeopardize the safety of the building and the people inside of it,

- Controls the permits or security documentation of persons employed at the facility and issues temporary passes to the parties, guests ..

Controls established mode of movement and retention of clients in protected object - does not allow them movement outside the premises which are provided for their reception,

- Reviews the postal and other letters before entering into facility according to a previously established procedure (or manual),

- For the actions of individual workers which threatens the security of the building and the people inside it, which violate the order and complicate the work, and other preserving security that are of importance protected object and the persons in it, the workers should notify their supervisor,

- After the business hours, reviews and locks all entrances to the protected object,

- He is engaged to remedy the consequences of the elementary accidents (earthquake, flood, fire) of the protected facility in accordance with the emergency plan,

- Duties of the responsible persons in the protected object: controlling light - sound signaling of the alarm system; functioning TV system in the closed circle, using UKT system and other functional links, deciding on the employment of intervention teams, inform the Ministry of Interior and competent managers for all security-relevant information and knowledge, ensures for the implementation of the plan for security measures.

Preventive technical security measures

The aim of these preventive measures is to minimize the possibility of eventual setting an explosive device, getting through a vehicle - bomb, or entering of a suicide bomber.

The technical defense of buildings represents the use of internal video monitoring (system of a closed circle), use of anti-burglary systems and alarm systems, use of special x-ray devices and detectors for weapons and explosives, keeping a radio connection for special uses, etc.

Preventive and technical security measures are taken in order to:

- Detection and removal of explosive, flammable, radioactive and other dangerous goods (protection against sabotage),
- Detecting and removing eavesdrop devices (protection against eavesdrop),
- Establishing and removal of technical disabled devices and installation in the protected object,
- Fire protection,
- Prevents or disables security threat over protected object with the use of modern combat means,

Technical provision is providing of the object and property, transport values and people with technical means and devices in accordance with prescribed regulation's standards.

Providing protected objects and the people inside, in preventive and technical protection, runs:

- Ordinary and extraordinary preventive, technical checks,
- By taking certain preventive technical measures and
- Installation and use of certain technical means of protection.

Common elements essential to any specific security processes

Common elements, essential for any specific security processes are as follows:

- Political and security situation in the country - especially in the area where the protected facility is located or where resides protected person or held meeting or event (due to the actuality in a regional or wider kind of social gatherings).
- Crime situation in the country or region where protected facility is located (the most common forms of security threats over protected object).
- Conclusion whether the authorities or security services have a disposal concrete data and findings, that suggest the possibility of direct or indirect jeopardizing security of protected object or person, or for the security maintenance of public gathering or event.
- Analysis of the previously done criminal attacks over protected facilities, or certain person, the analysis of the criminal activities of certain groups or individuals in relationships with the public gatherings or events.

- Estimation of the amount of material damage, or the possibility of human losses in case of attack, or jeopardizing the safety of the protected object and people in it.
- Estimation of the danger degree of the object, the present people in it and the wider environment from dangerous materials.
- The type and property value in protected object.
- The danger of fire outbreak and causing the explosion, i.e. imputation of explosive devices.
- The location, size, appearance and age of the building structures of protected object, condition and quality of installation.
- Cooperation with local authorities of M.I.

When it comes to “recording “ of security situation of the concrete protected object, for the timely planning and taking appropriate ensure measures, and above all for decision for implementing certain technical devices for protection against cover or violent intruders into protected object, and other preventive technical measures, it is necessary to do an external building review and the immediate environment, and it is necessary to precisely determine which so-called critical points of the protected object. Related to this, it's necessary to pay attention to:

Passes into the buildings, entrances and basement rooms (storehouses): in those places, unless they are highlighted and duly protected most easily, in the dark, to set explosive devices that can be triggered at some point. Briefly, crossings - entries must be regularly maintained, illuminate and secure (walled or some other way to protect) which provides immediately to be noticed suspicious items.

Various shafts - gaps near the protected object (sewage, tunnels, PTT channels, etc.).

Fan's gaps and climates,

Doors and frames - Locked doors and obstacles can save a man's life in case of attack over protected object - it is important exterior doors to be well secured and keys to be stored in a safe place (doors and frames should be made from quality materials and well fitted for building construction).

Locks - Enhanced entrance door, quality locks and metal shields on their cylinders or as some prefer - a chain on the door and three locks, which will inhibit the thief, which allows time to call police.

Hinges represent the weak side of the door, especially those doors that open on the outside. Besides the ordinary hinges, usually are placed and specialty hinges, consisted of two parts which are mounted on the door and parts that are attached. Both parts are match when the door closes.

Windows and glass rooftop surfaces - must be protected in many ways - physical (metal bars or shutters - easily accessible windows and with locks, hard to reach windows and glass roof surfaces).

Entrances - security of the entrances is also important for the prevention of violent entry (intrusion) at the premises of protected object. If on the entrance of protected facility has no TV camera, it is desirable to incorporate video inferior or wide-angle peephole with special lenses and seen angle of 180 °, through which the person in front can be seen from

head to toe, are there embedded and what are already embedded devices in protected object and workspace (the protection system from secret or violent intrusion into the protected facility, personal protection system, internal alarm system).

When considering setting up a system and protection devices from secret or violent intrusion in protected object, i.e. within the protected object, based on their given specificity, in order to make it concrete choice for devices and resources, it is necessary to realize the following:

- Climatic conditions of the location of the protected object (humidity, type and strength of the wind, temperature changes, foggy ..),
- Terrain configuration (rough terrain, density of trees ..),
- Soil type (arable, sand ..),
- If there is a fence around the protected object and the type of the fence (hedges, walls, metal fence ..),
- Closeness to public and other roads and traffic frequency,
- Closeness of high-voltage lines and other sources of electromagnetic radiation.

Conclusion

Each organization is exposed to certain security risks, whether they originate from external or internal environment. The first step in recognizing security risks is the creation of a safety culture. The solution should be searched in educating employees, creating a dynamic behavior and involvement of all resources that are available.

Therefore, should define a policy, which will cover all the legal requirements, contractual obligations, risk management and strategy of the organization and the criteria for risk estimation.

It is recommendable bigger introducing to all participants within the safety culture in order to respect the values and their direct involvement in the decision making process and ultimately in security policymaking.

It is important to establish priorities for taking the measures and activities by security services, because there are activities that can not be delayed and require urgent action.

Weak management, real problems conceals and does not solve the crises of that organization, and fails to find reasonable solutions, which ultimately leads to inflicting great damage on the organization, as a consequence of the inability to perform basic functions, nor to find a sustainable option.

Good management requires a proactive approach, i.e. forecasting the problems and timely preparation for their solution. Forecast or estimate is the main base of the planning.

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DEFENCE
24

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24

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