


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
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МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ НА
МИНИСТЕРСТВОТО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА СЕВЕРНА МАКЕДОНИЈА

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CENTRAL ASIAN WOMEN AS AGENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE ISLAMIC STATE

Tatyana DRONZINA¹

Ilya ROUBANIS²

Abstract: *The investigation, charge, prosecution, and rehabilitation of female terrorists is a controversial subject. Thousands of women made their way from over 80 countries around the world to the Islamic State realms. Central Asian countries were keen to repatriate women and their children from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, and unlike Western Europe, public opinion was supportive of these humanitarian operations. But the question of these women facing up to their legal responsibility remains controversial. Women from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan left from an overwhelmingly patriarchal context to find a dehumanisingly misogynistic Jihadi society. Their agency as second-class ISIS “citizens” needs to be systematically explored if it is to inform effective counterterrorist strategy; be it profiling, legislation, pre-emptive intervention, and rehabilitation policies.*

Keywords: *female, agency, terrorism, Jihad, ISIS*

Introduction

Female radicalisation and involvement in violent extremist groups remain relatively under-studied and underexplored themes. There is a prevalent view that extreme political violence is primarily embedded in Islamic extremism’s male-dominated identity. This paper reviews female agency’s subject in Jihadi terrorist violence in Central Asia and, more specifically, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. We have interviewed female returnees from Syria and Iraq that migrated to the Middle East to join the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) ranks and have since been repatriated. In sharp contrast to Western Europe, where repatriation was legally contested, the countries in question framed this process as “humanitarian operations” welcomed by public opinion. To understand women’s role as agents of violent extremism, we review the statistical significance of their migration, the conditions of their repatriation, and focus on individual stories seeking meaningful generalisations.

When it comes to male fighters, Jihadi terrorism in Central Asia is often seen as the cumulative result of the social marginalisation of migrants in Russia. Russian nationalism and xenophobia, it is argued, fuels reactionary movements among Central Asian migrants. That is not the case for women who are less likely to individually migrate seasonally or for permanent settlement, “unaccompanied” by their husband or male guardian. However, it should not be assumed that women cannot be agents of Jihadi violence. In the spring of 2004, Uzbekistan

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suffered successive waves of suicide attacks, of whom women carried out 33. Since 2014, Uzbek women have actively engaged in terrorist attacks in northern Afghanistan, and Tajik women were reported as fighting in the Syrian frontline. Women can be agents of politically significant violence.

Central Asian Jihadi volunteers

Literature treats the Islamic State as either a hybrid between a terrorist organisation – akin to the Girondin age of terror during the French revolution – or a political entity that transcends the nation-state territorial model (Berti & Osete, 2015). Between reality and utopia, the one undeniable dimension of ISIS was its international appeal, evidenced by the migration of at least 41,490 foreigners from 80 countries, a quarter of whom were women (4,761, i.e. 13%) and minors under the age of 18 (4,640, i.e. 12%). By 2018, 60% of marriages and births in the Islamic state regime were to foreign-born mothers (Cook & Vale, 2018).

According to the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), Central Asia is the third-largest region of origin of foreign fighters who filled the ranks of Jihadist terrorist militias in Syria and Iraq. Immigrants from Central Asian countries accounted for approximately 20% of all foreign fighters. The final battles for capturing the “capital” of the so-called Islamic State in Syria, Raqqa, were fought in 2017 against a force made in large part of foreign fighters. Following the defeat of ISIS, its Army’s remnants fled the city with their families to North-western Syria. There, they were detained in makeshift prisons and camps under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (YPG). Data compiled and released by international organizations in 2019 suggest that among the detainees there were 12,000 migrants from 40 countries, including 4000 women and 8000 children (Центральная Азия лидирует в международных усилиях по репатриации семей из Сирии и Ирака, 2019). According to Russia’s Federal Security Service, by the end of 2018 approximately half the population of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (6,000) were of Central Asian origin (Попов, Провокация или проверка боем? В Таджикистане боевики ИГИЛ напали на погранзаставу, 2019).

Central Asians in the ranks of ISIS

The Islamic State did not have a census, and we do not know the exact number of individuals from each nationality. The exact number of Kazakh nationals who joined the Islamic State is unknown, but according to the Kazakh Counterterrorism Committee, they were approximately 870, of whom 262 died. According to a Turkish government report published in 2017, Kazakhstan was among the top ten countries of origin for foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (Нурсейтова, 2018). By 1 July 2018, 120 Kazakh men, 250 women and 500 minors had already returned from Syria and

Iraq. From this cohort of returnees, 57 were charged, tried and convicted while the rest are monitored. It is estimated that about 20,000 individuals in Kazakhstan can be described as “radicalised” or adhere to a Jihadi ideology that justifies political violence (Astanatv.kz, 2019).

Tajik fighters joined the ranks of the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan in their droves. According to President Emomali Rahmon, Tajik fighters were recruited by extremist groups while working abroad – primarily Russia – and others during pilgrimage or religious studies (За ИГИЛ в Сирии и Ираке воевали почти 2 тысячи граждан Таджикистана, 2018). The country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded 1899 Tajik fighters known to have left for Iraq and Syria. More than 250 took their families with them (МИД: 92 ДЕТЕЙ И 43 ЖЕНЩИН ИЗ ТАДЖИКИСТАНА НАХОДЯТСЯ В ИРАКЕ, 2019). Of those, about 500 were killed in battle, and more than 700 were detained. By the end of 2019, no fewer than 90 adult women, 200 girls and 240 boys lived in Syrian camps. The age of children born to at least one Tajik parent ranged from 1 to 17 years old; 134 were two year olds or younger, and most of them were orphans (Жизнь без ИГИЛ. Удастся ли адаптировать возвращенных детей из Сирии и Ирака?, 2019). About 30 women and children were detained in Roj and about 400 in the Al Hol camp (Мумин, 2019).

As of mid-2019, 48 wives of IS Tajik militants were imprisoned in Iraq and Syria, most serving life sentences despite their governments’ best efforts to repatriate them or reduce their sentences (Комитет по делам женщин посчитал жен таджикских боевиков в зарубежных тюрьмах, 2019). By the end of 2018, 22 Tajik women served long term prison sentences in Iraq on charges of terrorist organisation membership. Of those in jail, four were sentenced to death, while the rest serve 20-years-to-life sentences. Tajik courts have also sentenced some returnees – both young and elderly – on radicalisation and extremism charges, although the precise number is not disclosed (Юсуфи, 2018).

According to the US-based Soufan Group, there are 1,500 recorded cases of Uzbek fighters who joined the ranks of various terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq (Gohel, 2017). Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia and the biggest source of labour migration to Russia; in the first half of 2019, there was an estimated population of 900,000 Uzbek migrants in Russia (Узбекистан стал главным официальным поставщиком рабочей силы, 2019). As a rule of thumb, young, poorly educated and underqualified Uzbek migrants making the journey to Syria paid for their journey with money made in Russia. In Uzbekistan proper, ISIS actively tried to recruit a more skilled labour force. During field research in Central Asia (2012-2015), one could see flyers in Uzbek offering a 27 000 dollars annual salary for engineers, medics, and Islamic law experts willing to relocate to the IS realms with their families. According to some estimates, more than 600 Uzbek citizens remain in Syria (Узбекистан и война в Сирии, 2019).

Repatriations

The governments of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were among the first to assume responsibility for their citizens' repatriation, particularly women and minors. Repatriation efforts started long before the western states even considered a similar operation.

Between 2016 and 2018, Kazakhstan repatriated 27 families (“Если мы не умрем, то выберемся в лагерь”: казахстанка о жизни в Сирии (видео) , 2018). The number of people willing to return surged following the ISIS military defeat of 2018. At the time, the Kazakh government planned a three-stage repatriation operation codenamed Zhussan (Bitter Wormwood) with the logistical support of the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (Ашимов, 2019). The operation unfolded in three stages in the Spring of 2019, bringing home mostly women and 357 unaccompanied minors, that is, children whose parents had died in battle, were injured or imprisoned (“Жусан-3”: 171 ребенок эвакуирован из Сирии в Казахстан - видео, 2019). Upon return, the overwhelming majority were housed in a special rehabilitation center near Aktau, under quarantine, and questioned on their involvement in terrorist activity (Казахстанские спецслужбы раскрыли подробности секретной операции “Жусан-2”, 2019). Only 16 were detained and prosecuted on terrorism charges.

The Government of Tajikistan first called on its citizens to return from the lands controlled by the Islamic State in 2016 (Бахром, 2018). At the time, only 22 individuals took up the offer. Two years later, in April 2018, 4 children were repatriated from camps in Syria (12 таджикских женщин в Ираке ждут своих приговоров). Early in 2019, the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered assurances that children of Tajik descent could return to the country and, in time, 75 parents made arrangements to that effect (МИД: 92 ДЕТЕЙ И 43 ЖЕНЩИН ИЗ ТАДЖИКИСТАНА НАХОДЯТСЯ В ИРАКЕ, 2019). In spring the government repatriated minors born to mothers serving sentences on terrorism charges in Iraq (Жизнь без ИГИЛ. Удастся ли адаптировать возвращенных детей из Сирии и Ирака?, 2019). Many were given for adoption, while some remain in orphanages.

Uzbekistan's “Operation Good” begun in the holy month of Ramadan in May 2019 and was completed in autumn of the same year with the facilitation of Kurdish authorities in the city of Kamyshli. The government committed to medical, psychological, material and moral assistance to the returnees, who were portrayed as victims of brainwashing (Операция «Добро». Узбекистан вывез из Сирии и Ирака 156 своих граждан, 2019).

Methodological Notes

In our discussion on the motives of women who joined ISIS, we reference four interviews with women from each country in question: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan. It should be noted that access to these women is severely limited and, when available, “opening up” these women is difficult. Without exception, they were reluctant to engage. The questionnaire structuring the interviews entailed 27 variables: demographic (9), social and religious (9), and specific experiences and circumstances of their repatriation (9).

Typically, the women we reached out to started their journey from their home country, travelling via Turkey to Syria and, at times, Iraq. That is a more typically female experience, as men were more often than not recruited in Russia. There is only one reference to a Tajik woman individually recruited in Russia – rather than follow her husband – who travelled via Turkey to Syria.

Profiling and Generalisations

All the women interviewed were 24-to-35 at the time of their interview, having lived five-to-six years in the Islamic State realms. So, at the time of their journey, they were typically in their early 20s. Without exception, all women can be described as “socially vulnerable”, with the question of gender being central to their social circumstances. They were all married young and had children between 17-and-19 years old, barely completing secondary education. They all had problematic relationships with their husbands that ended up in an abusive relationship or divorce.

There are roughly two clusters of women that emerge in this study.

The first is women who saw their journey to Syria and Iraq as part of a narrative of submission to their male guardian, that is, their husband’s or father’s will. One Kazakh woman describes how her father surrendered her to their smuggler – facilitating the passage from Turkey to Syria – as a “reward”. Her “marriage” was followed by enforced indoctrination, in which she was made to wear a burqa under the threat of corporal punishment. Several women describe being lured to Syria by other women, that is, a narrative typical of human trafficking. Others describe a journey that begins in Russia, Moscow or St. Petersburg, and then via Turkey to Syria. They were often told that Turkey was their final destination and were then physically abused or economically coerced to follow their husbands to the next leg of the trip.

The second cluster of women saw the Islamic States realms as an escape. We see for instance a 34-year-old kindergarten Tajik teacher – one of the most educated of the interviewees – pretending to take a holiday in Turkey, and continuing her journey to Syria instead. However, the narrative of women being deceived is more common than the other way around. An Uzbek woman describes how she was lured to Syria by a colleague and then “auctioned” off to an ISIS fighter who reigned over her with corporal punishment, water and food deprivation. The use of peer-to-peer techniques, using women to lure women, is typical rather than exceptional.

Once in Syria, there is a common theme of submission to an all-encompassing male-dominated set of expectations that conditions their free will. All women had

multiple marriages, losing their partners in battle and then remarrying. The term “husband” appears to be as casual as that of a sexual partner, without indication of choice. There is no romantic aspect of their narrative. What is clear is that once in Syria and Iraq, they were often motivated to escape from the Islamic State realms, usually via the Kurdish-controlled territories, even if they initially endorsed the Jihadi narrative of the Islamic State.

Most women describe their life in the ISIS realms as effective captivity, on the move, with hunger, poor housing, cold, limited access to water, poor sanitation, bombings, and constant male brutality. As a rule of thumb, one can say that it is more probable that women who travelled alone to Syria were likely to be emotionally invested in the regime and play a more active role in fighting or recruitment. The Tajik kindergarten teacher created an account on Odnoklassniki under the alias Parvina Aminova, posting pictures of herself with a machine gun and calling for armed struggle. It is alleged that she later became a recruiter of women for IS. She is serving a 13-year sentence and is the first convicted Jihadist woman in the country.

Nevertheless, even the most motivated women appear to have a shallow understanding of theological principles. Their social context appears more relevant to their motivation than a process of theological “revelation”. Syria was often seen as a clean slate or new beginning, away from family, with a degree of moral legitimacy. In this context, there are several issues with inviting these women to reflect on their motivation to move to the Islamic State. At times, there is evidence of their state of mind at the time of their immigration, on social media, with women articulating a complete narrative of where they are going, why, as well as professing a desire for martyrdom. That profile is the exception rather than a rule.

Discussion

Research suggests that while women’s motivations to immigration cannot be linearly and instrumentally explained by reference to their chief male custodian, their gender and power relationship to men is central to their self-perception as “citizens” of the Islamic state. In travelling to Syria and Iraq, the Central Asian women of ISIS either submitted to their husbands or fled their fathers and husbands. Those fleeing home were more emotionally invested in the Islamic State, “burning the ships” of their return, until their wish to protect their children and their lives prevailed.

The demographic profile of the women that immigrated to Syria and Iraq is that of a young woman, not a teenager. They are all older than 18 and typically between 22 and 25. They were nearly all married, and nearly all had children. Their socioeconomic profile is not uniform. There seems to be an overall impression of poverty, consistent with the fact that Central Asia does not have the mass middle-class societies to which we are accustomed in Europe. However, some of the women with the most apparent Jihadi motivations often had a lower-middle-class background and sought in the ISIS realms the opportunity for a clean slate: new job, family, and purpose.

As a rule of thumb, women who made this journey had only basic high school education at best and rarely vocational or other qualifications that would allow them to make a living

independently. Education does not appear to be the main explanatory factor for their choice, except that the school failed to inspire them to pursue new career trajectories. Again, some of the more motivated and better-educated women appear to be escaping to Syria seeking a “meaningful destiny” away from their immediate social circumstances.

Still, without exception, most women come from what one may call an “unsuccessful household”, marrying young, soon after pregnancy or through an arranged marriage. Rather than their marital status being an inhibitive factor, it seems to make part of their overall decision-making context. They either submit to their fate or run away from their husband and, at times, children.

Women themselves will often explain their experience by reference to their male custodian, in which case the term “recruitment” does not really apply. This can be seen as a gender equivalent of a “Nuremberg” defence strategy, in which a woman denies agency by virtue of following the wishes of her male guardian. Nevertheless, that narrative is often convincing. Men are often seen as agents of violence, reacting to an experience of social oppression.

Less often, women will own up to their decision to immigrate, recognising in the process a person that was genuinely catalytic in their recruitment, typically a female workplace peer. Therefore, their decision cannot be likened to grooming underage teenagers but is more akin to peer-to-peer recruiting techniques that echo human trafficking for sexual exploitation. That defence strategy is not prevalent, as women who travelled to Syria do not see themselves as “trafficked” but rather as “recruited” to a holy cause. Their experience of being passed from man to man may be akin to forced sexual exploitation, but it is not categorised as such.

In most cases, women who ended up in Syria and Iraq played a role consistent with the overall “auxiliary” social status, that is, a traditional expectation of acting as housemaids and child bearers. Their overall experience appears to have been negative from the outset, with few exceptions. Interestingly, the broader family network often disowns their women, claiming retrospectively that they never endorsed the decision of the husband or their daughter. They will either denounce the couple or morally chastise the woman’s decision to abandon her household. In sum, the threat of shouldering some of the responsibility for joining the ranks of ISIS dilutes family loyalties. Often, relatives are character witnesses for the prosecution.

Much of the evidence used in trials to convict returning women comes from social media accounts and witness statements brought forward by close relatives. Typically, women face charges relating to an attempt to recruit relatives and friends as fighters or brides for the ISIS realms. Social media posts are treated as authentic expressions of their motives without corroborating witnesses with first-hand knowledge of their actions in Syria and Iraq. Western European countries have often argued that such trials need to take place in Syria and Iraq so that the investigation can yield better evidence and witnesses, although claiming that these countries prioritise legal rather than political considerations is questionable.

In any event, further access to returnees and a systematic examination of trial evidence will be instrumental in creating gender-specific terrorist profiles for investigative purposes or the development of more informed pre-emptive and rehabilitating counterterrorist policies.

As suicide bombers, women have been deployed in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. That includes women from Central Asia who, presumably, offer militias a tactical advantage. Usually, women are not expected to engage in combat and, therefore, have a de facto “stealth quality”. In turn, women have articulated a fantasy of martyrdom that merits individual evaluations, a phenomenon that was also present among the women interviewed in this study. However, these women are not typical of the women of ISIS.

In this sense, comparisons of women from different socio-cultural backgrounds – such as Western Europe – may more usefully inform counterterrorism policy, especially when seeking to identify women who participate in combat. Comparing the social context from which the women of ISIS come from, including gender identity in political violence, appears critical in all stages of counterterrorism policy: investigation, prosecution, trial, sentencing, and rehabilitation.

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EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA RELATIONS: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP THROUGH THE LENS OF GEOPOLITICS AND GEOECONOMICS

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Abstract: *Many scholars had researched the EU-China relations through the prism of international relation theories. Indeed, their works are based on realism, economic liberalism, and constructivist theories offered some visions for the next steps in that complicated relationship. This paper aims to use the geopolitical and geoeconomic research methodology. We will examine the geopolitical, mainly critical geopolitical reasoning and geoeconomic influence from China embodied by Belt and Road Initiatives and cooperation mechanisms “17+1”. Both subjects of the analytical framework have had geopolitical and geoeconomic influences. The central thesis aims to demonstrate the manner in which the two analysed subjects contribute to the EU geopolitical transformation and strengthening the EU unity or disunity.*

Keywords: *Geopolitics, geoeconomic, EU, China, Belt and Road Initiatives, “17+1”.*

Introduction

Throughout the geopolitical and geoeconomic framework, the authors will highlight the most critical actions related to EU-China relations. Historically framed, from the beginning of the diplomatic relations between EU and China in September 1975 and the signing of the EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 1985, the two subjects' relations were moving through different stages depending on the changing nature of the world geopolitical order. It started with the “Cold War” ambience and united front against the former Soviet Union and the USA and ASEAN in the '70s and '80s of the XX century. That stage had laid the foundations for the growing trade and economic cooperation from the '90s. This is followed by an excellent period of warm and active international cooperation from 1995 to 2005. From 2006, “normal” relationship was established, where the two sides recognise fundamental differences in their international outlooks and visions of world order (Wong, 2013). That period paved the path for the “EU-China strategic cooperation agenda 2020”, adopted in 2013. In 2012 and 2013,

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the two projects, which are the subject of our analysis, were launched. First, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the “16+1” mechanism of cooperation (today 17+1).

The methodological approach will use critical geopolitics because most recent geopolitical surveys are more inclined to critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics is concerned with exploring the geographical features and assumptions included in global geopolitics’ creation and practice. It seeks to expose and explain how political actors made the territorial division of international politics and represent it as “the world” characterised by specific spatial locations. This type of analysis and approach to geopolitics is not a neutral analysis of pre-determined geographical factors, but a deeply ideological and politicised form of analysis. Critical geopolitics rejects traditional questions as geography may not affect policy, but explores how geographical claims and assumptions can function in political debates and political practice. Although critical geopolitics has not been an adequately defined field, numerous papers still focus on explaining how the political practice is related to the territorial definition (in any way). Critical geopolitics, as access to geopolitics, starts from the premise that geographical knowledge is not clean and objective. Then, geography is treated as a technology of power that is not easy to describe and creates a political space.

Each global analysis of human/state relationships contains geographical imaginations (Kuus, 2007: 7). Within critical geopolitics, there are emerging two different types of geopolitical thinking, practical and formal. Critical geopolitics has a third dimension, i.e. popular geopolitics that has also contributed to the development of relations between the states and sends a solid geopolitical message. Practical geopolitics suggests territorial practices applied by some Statehood practitioners, such as statesmen, politicians, and military commanders. These people are preoccupied with the daily running of the foreign policy of their own countries.

On the other hand, formal geopolitics suggests territorial practices of strategic thinkers and public intellectuals who work in strategic institutes and other observers and analytical centres within civil society. Their thinking is shaped by relatively formalised rules that produce specific territorial descriptions, statements, and research on the international stage (ÓTuathail, 1996).

The economic rise of China changed approaches in geopolitics and geoeconomics, but also IR research. Today we faced a situation that much more of the contemporary scholarly and policy discussions in world affairs are about the multipolar world’s implications. More narrowly, about the consequences of China’s increased economic and political leverage. (Vihma, 2018).

Additionally, the BRI and “17+1” mechanism of cooperation can be observed and analysed through the geoeconomics lens. Edward Luttwak, in 1990 defined geoeconomics as “the logic of conflict, translated into market terms.” In the field of analysis, Luttwak includes rivalry over territories, adding that “the support that top companies receive has become an instrument of power in the service of the state”. Based on that assumption, it is evident that in Europe, the United States, China, and Japan, given the intensity of their trade, military power, and classical diplomacy have lost their traditional significance (Mileski, 2015: 200).

Mark Beeson recently has researched geoeconomics with Chinese characteristics. He concludes that more nuanced readings of emerging geoeconomics capture some of its complexity and contradictions. Beeson supports the constataion that changes in the international system challenged geopolitical conceptions. Furthermore, it may better be captured today by a geoeconomic conception of space, power, and security. That means and sees geopolitical forms recalibrated by market logic. In that direction, geoeconomics recasts rather than replaces geopolitical calculation. In those circumstances, geoeconomic competition pointed out by Luttwak could be vital to understanding modern international relations (Beeson, 2018). The

appropriate geo-economy choice as an analytical approach in IR is affordable and recognisable by Scholvin and Wigell. They suggest that geoeconomics is both a foreign policy strategy and an analytical approach. As a foreign policy strategy, states apply economic means of power to realise strategic objectives. Herein, geoeconomics' concept refers to a specific strategic practice, providing an alternative option to military-based power politics. Indeed, much current scholars use the term geoeconomics in this sense, referring to it as a substitute for "economic statecraft". Also, geoeconomics transcends IR Liberalism and IR Realism insofar as it focuses on geographical features inherent in foreign policy-making and international relations. It means that geoeconomics may deal with the economic bases of power that have a precise geographical dimension. Some countries possess resources that others need globally, and these resources are transported along strategically crucial corridors, for instance. Alternatively, geoeconomics "is about how economic instruments are used to control specific geographical areas such as the sphere of influence of a regional hegemon" (Scholvin and Wigell, 2018).

We stand in with the decision to use geoeconomics as an analytical approach based on Luttwakian tradition. Also, we use Critical geopolitics as discursive practices, which offer opportunities for imagining and re-imagining geographical space.

Belt and Road Initiatives: spatial landscape, historical and contemporary aspects

In the last decade, China has made some dramatic foreign policy decisions. Primary means, increasing its military presence in the South China Sea, developing weapons that may challenge the US Navy in the Western Pacific, constructing the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and a massive increase in foreign direct investment across the world. The BRI, forming in conjunction with initiatives such as previously mentioned AIIB than BRICS's (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and New Development Bank (NDP). These dominantly economic subjects were shaping the economic landscape in Eurasia with significant consequences for global business (Johnson, 2016). In this light, as a multi-continent and multi-ocean infrastructure project that combines economic goals with increased diplomatic presence and overseas security commitments, BRI is positioned as the centrepiece of China's current foreign policy (Flint and Xiaotong, 2019).

One of our central research questions is BRI. According to the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Peoples' Republic of China and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a naming change was adopted. Namely, the cooperation framework that encompasses the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road should no longer be referred to as "One Belt One Road" in English. The revised official translated name of the strategy is "The Belt and Road Initiative". With BRI as its acronym instead of the catchy "OBOR," that has been the new buzzword at government, transport, logistics, and business events throughout Eurasia for the past years since Xi Jinping brought it forward in late 2013 (Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2016).

Quite justifiably, it is logical that the following imposed questions should be asked. How and when the idea started? Before we start with explanations, searching

in scholarly and political founded reasoning that the most exploit questions in western critical thought (political establishment and academic research) deal with whether the BRI has a hidden agenda? What are the strategic goals of the BRI? How will China valorise BRI, and what are its benefits? In Southeast and Central Asia, concerns, driven by their bad historical relations with Western powers, raise as to whether the BRI will be a repetition of colonialism's historical patterns in the 21st century? Are China's cheap loans promoting China as a leader and world hegemon?

These questions answers are most vividly delivered by the former Greek minister of foreign affairs, Nikos Kotzias. He told Euractiv: "I believe the pandemic and the crisis of the US democracy as we have experienced the last few days, shows that we are in a period where if the West does not democratically renew itself, history will read it as the transition from American hegemony to at least a binary US-China hegemony, and Chinese hegemony in the long run." (Michalopoulos, 2021). That means a consensual concern is that the BRI's potential seemingly depends on the nature of China's goals.

On the other side, China emphasises the "win-win" perspective of the BRI. Overall, it is seen as a strategy to expand China's geopolitical and geoeconomic interests from a prism of realistic theory of international relations. Li Xing, in the edition "Mapping China's "One Belt One Road" Initiatives", in the chapter named "China's Pursuit of the "One Belt One Road" Initiative: A New World Order with Chinese Characteristics?" explained lessons from history. He argues that realist analysts argue that China will unavoidably become a rising military power as a rising economic power. China's extraordinary economic growth has been coupled with the "world's largest military build-up". A country with a large merchant fleet, capital and production outward expansion needs a military navy and support points

China's One Belt, One Road



Fig. 1 The silk road economic belt and the maritime silk road route. (Source: Li Xing (Ed.) 2019, Mapping China's One Belt One Road Initiative. (Palgrave Macmillan, p.93.)

(security for capital and production) across land and ocean. The fact that China is expanding its Marine Corps for deployment in Gwadar port in Pakistan and Djibouti port in the Horn of Africa is seen as a repetition of the history of imperial expansion. The expansion seems imperative to protect China's maritime lifelines and its growing interests overseas, such as the BRI (Xing, 2019: 8).

Since it was first announced in 2013 by the president and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on his visit to Kazakhstan, BRI motivated the world-comprehensive scholars and politicians to research and employ political acting on all BRI aspects. In its essential principles, the BRI comprises two components. First, a Silk Road Economic Belt represents a trans-continental passage linking China with South East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe by land. Second, a 21st century Maritime Silk Road represents a sea route connecting China to Europe. More precisely, China's coastal regions with South East and South Asia, the South Pacific, the Middle East, and Eastern Africa. At the end of February 2021, 140 countries have joined the BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China (Baruzzi, 2021). In the official Chinese statements, BRI represents a modern reinvention of the ancient Silk Road that emphasises mutual trust, equality, inclusiveness, and mutual learning, and win-win cooperation. It has far-reaching strategic significance with a global impact. In that direction, Cristopher Johnson, analysing official Chinese sources, made an underscore that if BRI becomes a reality, it will create a promising economic corridor. That economic corridor directly benefits a population of 4.4 billion people or 63% of the global population. That geographical area is covered a collective annual GDP of 21 trillion US dollars that accounts for almost one-third of the world's wealth (Johnsen, 2016). Those initial premises make a massive change in Chinese abroad politics. According to the 2018 report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, BRI investments exceed 1/2 a trillion dollars at the end of 2017 through funds channelled through Chinese state-owned commercial banks, the Silk Road Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank (USCC, 2018). Jianfu Chen offered the most interesting analysis of the BRI investments. He noticed, "In today's value, the BRI investment is said to be seven times the size of the US Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after the Second World War or 12 times that of the Marshall Plan, according to another calculation. From the end of October 2019, China had signed 197 cooperation agreements with 137 countries and 30 international organisations to participate, to various extents and in different forms, to implement the initiative." (Chen, 2020).

New add-ons to BRI and its geopolitical and geoeconomic implications

The extent to which China is involved in the BRI is not entirely clear. However, the project will shape the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century in a way that the transatlantic community cannot ignore. Hence, it must be acknowledged that China has

risen to the world's largest trading and naval nation in the last thirty years. It is currently the world's second-largest economy, third in military power, and a technological giant playing a vital role in the global value chain. Although an obvious trigger for the West, China is an important partner and a critical link in the global economy.

Previous research of the BRI in the broader geostrategic analysis abounds with a multitude of interpretations. However, recent research shows BRI as the composition of three interrelated initiatives: Silk Road as an economic zone, maritime Silk Road, and the latest "Digital Silk Road." In theory, the first two initiatives consist of six corridors through which China seeks to connect with East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and Europe.

The Belt and Road Initiative: Six Economic Corridors Spanning Asia, Europe and Africa




Fig. 2 Source: Christian Tybring-Gjedde, (2020) China's Belt and Road Initiative: A Strategic and Economic Assessment. Economics and Security Committee (ESC), 033 ESC 20 E, the 19th of March 2020

The third pillar of the BRI is the latest creation. It is potentially consistent with the digital economy that should play a dominant role in the global economy for decades to come. At the first forum of the BRI in 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the so-called "Big data" will be under the BRI umbrella and called the "21st Century Digital Silk Road". The digital Silk Road should provide advanced information technology for the BRI countries, including broadband networks, e-commerce hubs, and smart cities (El Kadi, 2019). These activities are led mainly by Chinese technology companies that want to expand their market share and establish dominant positions in emerging markets and developed ones. This aspect of the BRI is becoming a source of concern for the West for many reasons. In particular, in 2020, former US Secretary

Mike Pompeo repeatedly emphasised that the Chinese company Huawei's investments are "predatory." On the 2nd of October, 2020, in a statement to the Italian "Daily la Repubblica," Pompeo noted that Huawei's investments are not private but are subsidised by China. Hence, they are not transparent, accessible, commercial transactions like many others, bringing exclusive benefits to China's security apparatus (Reuters, 2020).

Similarly, following the United States example, some of the EU members, not all, decide to ban China's 5G technologies. This action has shown the disunity of the EU as permanent determinants for a long time. Germany is an example of how to protect the security interest and delegitimize EU unity. Namely, after two years of deliberation, at the end of 2020, Germany's interior ministry finally released its long-awaited proposal on the role high-risk companies like Huawei will be allowed to play in rolling out Germany's 5G networks. The cabinet minister in charge, Horst Seehofer, hailed the draft IT Security Law 2.0 (amending the already existing IT Security Law from 2015) as a "breakthrough for Germany's cyber security". However, vendor security remains: Berlin appears to have no desire to ban any individual supplier outright from Germany's 5G networks. In German society, the legislation has received harsh criticism for its bureaucratic approach to the Huawei problem. Berlin for telecom vendors seeking access to Germany's 5G networks has created a complicated two-part assessment mechanism. More precisely, along with a technical evaluation, the draft law requires a vendor of so-called "critical components" (defined in Art. 2 para 13 of the already existing law) to issue a declaration that its components cannot be used for "sabotage or espionage". The draft law provides for the producer to issue this (guarantee) declaration (Art. 9b para 2). Even more precisely, this guarantee declaration has to be issued through the whole supply/trade chain, from vendor to vendor.

Consequently, once registered, the company enters into 30 days during which the competent Ministry of Interior in Berlin must decide whether or not to allow it to take part in Germany's 5G rollout, regulated in the new Art. 9b para 3 and 4 of the draft law (Thomas, 2021). While Germany's weighing up a decision on its 5G rules, France (while saying a ban is unlikely) has encouraged operators to look elsewhere. In Italy, Huawei was shut out of a recent tender to supply new generation 5G technology (Goodier, 2020). If we analysed only 2020 for 5G technologies in a European country, we would see 2020 as a decisive year for Huawei. In June 2020, Denmark's defence minister said that the government wants to exclude suppliers from countries not considered security allies, though an official decision has not been made yet. In July 2020, the UK government excluded Huawei from its 5G networks, strictly ordering its gear's total removal by 2027.

Moreover, in the same month 2020, France tells telecom operators that their licenses for Huawei gear will not be renewed once they expire, implying a de facto phase-out by 2028. Hence, this practice continues in August 2020, when new draft legislation would effectively exclude Huawei from Romania's 5G networks. Also, Slovenia signed a joint statement on 5G cooperation and security with the United

States, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic that have all signed similar declarations (Huotari et al., 2020).

Most current, the occurrence of the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the significant weaknesses of the public health infrastructure of developed and developing countries worldwide. Recent activities and China's engagement in the health sphere slowly suggest establishing a fourth pillar of the BRI or Health Silk Road (HSR). The beginnings of HSR can be identified through the Chinese government's initiative, i.e. Health China 2030, introduced in 2016 (WHO, 2016). In the document Health China 2030, more precisely under the chapter of "International health cooperation", it is stated that China would embark on a global health strategy and comprehensively promote international health cooperation. Using bilateral cooperative mechanisms as the basis, China would innovate on health cooperation models and strengthen people-to-people exchanges with countries on the BRI. President Xi spoke of the concept with former Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte on the 16th of March 2020. On the 24th of March, a People's Daily commentary elevated the HSR as a new platform for BRI cooperation, contributing to global health governance. On the 24th of April, the Beijing-based Belt and Road Think Tank Alliance organised the first online forum on the HSR, where more than thirty scholars and retired foreign politicians participated (Chow-Bing, 2020).

These aspects of BRI and HSR will enable China to practice health diplomacy, which we can already see through the geopolitics of distributing medical aid, vaccines, and the like. HSR, apart from the not clear definition of what it represents, covers a broad scope of activities, including bilateral and multilateral health policy meetings and networks, capacity building, and talent training, mechanisms to control and prevent cross-border infectious diseases, health aid, traditional medicine, and the healthcare industry.

Does BRI enable progress towards the EU as a geopolitical actor?

The above mentioned evidence enables us to conclude that every geopolitical project, no doubt BRI is one of the hugest in world history, has a geographical imagination. That imagination is motivated by different political, economic, and strategic perceptions, spatial actions, and future visions. As we can see, Chinese politics has made an effort to position China on a geopolitical and geoeconomic chessboard as a prominent partner player, or for the long run, dominant player. This situation is monitored by the EU, and we noticed the first reaction in 2019 when the European Commission proclaimed China as a systemic rival (European Commission, 2019).

Next, we want to examine if, with its grandiose geographical imagination and most extensive geopolitical meanings, the BRI could accelerate the EU process of becoming a geopolitical actor? The changes in the EU's institutional cycle in late 2019 came with an unknown type of rhetoric. The new European Commission presi-

dent, Ursula von der Leyen, spoke of establishing a “geopolitical Commission”. The term “geopolitical” as used by EU politicians connotes an approach to a foreign policy focused on distributing military and economic power and the resulting power dynamics. Both Ursula von der Leyen and the EU’s new foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, insisted that the Union must now “learn to use the language of power”. Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that Europe would “disappear geopolitically” unless it began to act as a strategic power (Lehne, 2020). Those practical geopolitical meanings undoubtedly are novel in the EU functioning and denote another approach to strengthening its cohesion.

How BRI enables progress towards geopolitics? Some analysts have expressed concern that the BRI aims to increase the dependence of individual countries on China. As countries become dependent on Chinese investment, infrastructure and trade, they will become less and less critical of China on the international stage on sensitive topics such as human rights and imperial ambitions. Hence, some analysts assess China’s cooperation mechanism with Central and Eastern Europe (today 17+1) as an engagement that could undermine the general European unity (Kavalski, 2019).

At the same time, some of the participants in the BRI are becoming more cautious about China’s intentions. For instance, Daniel Kliman, as part of a research at the Center for New American Security, identifies seven serious dangers for participants in the BRI. First, *erosion of national sovereignty*. He explains that Beijing gains control of specific infrastructure projects through capital investments, long-term leases, or multi-decade work contracts. Second, *lack of transparency*. Many projects have inconsistent tender procedures for contracts and financial terms are not subject to public scrutiny. Third, *unsustainable financial burden*. Chinese lending to some countries increases the risk of debt arrears or repayment difficulties, while specific completed projects do not generate sufficient revenue to justify the costs. Forth, *exclusion from local economic needs*. BRI projects often involve the use of Chinese firms and construction workers, which contributes little to the transfer of skills to local workers, and sometimes involves unequal profit-sharing arrangements. Fifth, *geopolitical risks*. Specific infrastructure projects financed, built, or operated by China may compromise the recipient state’s telecommunications infrastructure or put the country at the centre of strategic competition between Beijing and other major powers. Sixth, *negative environmental impacts*. In some cases, the BRI projects occur without proper environmental assessments or have caused severe environmental damage. Seventh, *significant potential for corruption*. In countries that have detected high levels of corruption, projects involve payments to politicians and bureaucrats (Kliman, 2019).

Furthermore, Christian Tybring-Gjedde argued the following point within the NATO Economic and Security Committee. A report from March 2020 conveys research that reveals the fact that at its core, the BRI embodies China’s ambition to achieve its aspiration to become a global superpower with robust trade, diplomatic and military ties with Central and Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Tybring-

Gjedde emphasises that European concerns about the BRI have grown in recent years, as have concerns about China's challenge to European interests and values. At the same time, China is a critical partner and a vital link in Europe's supply chains and trading system. For instance, The Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, argues that some European governments may already be adjusting their policies to favour China in what it maliciously describes as "preventive obedience". As we previously mentioned in 2019, the European Commission, for the first time, characterised China as a systemic rival. It began to encourage member states to be more cautious about China's growing economic power and its investment strategy's strategic intent. The problem for Europe is that the member states are not united in understanding the political and geopolitical implications of this situation (Tybring-Gjedde, 2020).

The BRI is a challenge to several core European values. China's labour, environmental, and human rights standards are fundamentally different from those in much of Europe. The risk is that China's views on these matters, together with that country's enormous financial power, could begin to undermine European approaches if Europe is not sufficiently united and vigilant. There are indeed signs of growing Europe's divisions over how best to approach China and the BRI. Some of these divisions go hand in hand with the existing economic and political fractures in Europe and now threaten to exacerbate them. The most obvious are the different views of European countries regarding the construction of the 5G infrastructure.

Most recently, the situation could escalate in academia as well. The Government of Hungary announced that it intended to build a Budapest campus of the Chinese Fudan University with Chinese contractors, financed by a €1.25 billion loan from China. According to a Euractiv report, Fudan University has close ties with Chinese intelligence services. At the Chinese campus, Fudan launched its spy school in 2011. Members of the Hungarian opposition noted that the Hungarian campus of the Fudan university could pose a risk not only to Hungary, but to the EU and NATO as well, and the fact that the campus will also train diplomats is incredibly worrying (Ágnes and Kovács, 2021).

"17+1" mechanisms for cooperation: China's geoeconomic performance

The twenties of the 21st century are marked by rising tensions between the United States and China. In such a constellation of relations, it seems that the European Union is stuck between the two powers in their strategic competition. The "17+1" mechanism is primarily aimed at economic cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries. This cooperation is not spared from the economic confrontation between the United States and China. The most glaring example, previously widely explained, is the political and public campaign against Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei in the EU and CEE, where most countries are allies of the United States.

Starting from 2012 as a “16+1” mechanism, with the first Prime Minister’s Summit held in Poland in 2018, this mechanism grows into “17+1” with Greece’s accession. The seventeen countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Twelve countries are EU member states, while five Balkan countries are aspiring to join the EU. All countries in the initial “16+1” format have a common communist heritage.

From the moment of establishing this mechanism, in 2012, then as 16+1, there is a noticeably reduced progress in the CEE countries’ expected benefits. Most of China’s investment projects are under negotiation, with some postponed and some halted.

This landscape within the EU creates an uncomfortable feeling that this mechanism could split the EU. Hence, China needs to improve its status as a solid and responsible partner of the EU and CEE countries by reforming the “17+1” mechanism aimed at a more transparent, effective, and inclusive regional mechanism that will include all interested countries. Overall, this regional cooperation mechanism “17+1” between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is intended to facilitate investment flows and trade to facilitate the development of China and the CEE region.

China’s main motive or narrative within the “17+1” regional cooperation mechanism is to improve relations between China and the less developed region. The mechanism is part of a larger strategy aimed at the European Union. From this perspective, many analysts conclude that the “17+1” mechanism is an element of Chinese regional diplomacy (Vangeli, A. 2017). Hence, certain European countries and the United States observe the “17+1” mechanism as China’s invasion of Europe, resulting in severe threats to those countries’ national interests. Overall, the EU has no positive view of Chinese investment in the CEE region, fearing that they could implement a “divide and rule” policy towards the European Union. Such a view is not entirely unfounded given China’s growing influence in some CEE countries, such as Greece and Hungary. In these two countries, Chinese investments are the largest. As a result, the two countries have been blocking unfavourable EU resolutions on China for years, creating fears in the EU that other “17+1” member states could follow suit because of their excellent relations with China.

Geo-economical analysis shows some interesting parameters. Over the past few years, China’s trade with CEE countries has increased, while trade with Western European countries has declined. For example, in 2016, China’s trade with 16 CEE countries reached 58.654 billion US dollars, an increase of 9.5% over the previous year and 30% more than in 2012 when the “16+1” format was introduced, which accounts for more than 10% of China’s total trade with Europe. Meanwhile, China’s trade with the EU fell 3.1% in 2016 to a total of 547 billion US dollars. In 2017, China-CEE countries trade reached 68 billion US dollars, up 15.9% from 2016; Trade between China and the EU has also increased, but at a much slower pace. This is natural because China-EU trade is relatively mature, while China-CEE trade is still low, and there is much prospect of further development (Brinza, 2019).

Recent data show, according to the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), volume trade between China and CEE countries in 2018 was 82.23 billion US dollars, which is an increase of 21% over the previous year. The same source states that Chinese exports to CEE countries amounted to 59.19 billion US dollars. In comparison, imports simultaneously reached 23.04 billion dollars, marking a deficit of 36.15 billion dollars on the European countries' side. According to Katarina Zakić, it is necessary to emphasise that the original plan was to raise the volume of exchange to 100 billion dollars in the first five years, which did not happen. In addition, the import of Chinese products increased, but on the other hand, it was not accompanied by a sufficient increase in CEE country's exports to the territory of China. As for investments, MOFCOM states that Chinese companies have invested 10 billion in CEEC, while they have returned 1.5 billion US dollars. Therefore, we can say that China's economic interests and priorities were almost more focused on the EU, on Western countries within the EU, both in trade and investment. In terms of trade, the situation has not changed, and China and Western EU countries still have a high degree of cooperation, while the investment situation has changed significantly. Due to special laws within the EU related to the screening of foreign investments, to which it was particularly exposed, China has reduced the volume of investments in this territory. Another reason was influential in the reversal of China's strategy – it turned out that some acquisitions within the EU were not successful and sound, so it was necessary to better plan and design the acquisition system and raise domestic liquidity. In the end, China decided to direct more funds to the countries that are signatories of the BRI (Zakić, 2020).

By supporting investment projects, China is directly “conquering” territories economically. Specifically, in the Balkan countries, it has invested the most in Greece, 11.08 billion US dollars, and Serbia, 10.26 billion US dollars, respectfully, through various investment projects from 2008 to 2018. Some of the most exciting projects supported by China, active and proposed, are Belgrade-Budapest railway – active; Montenegro – Albania highway (Blue Corridor) – active; Project Three Rivers among Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia – proposal; Rijeka – Zagreb – Budapest railway, among Croatia and Hungary – proposal; The Three Seas Project, energy cooperation and better information technology connecting Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania – proposal; Una railway infrastructure Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina – proposal; Extension of the Belgrade – Budapest railway infrastructure N. Macedonia, Greece, Slovakia – proposal (Zakić, 2020: 37).

Recently, China has not allowed the Covid-19 pandemic to diminish its economic ambitions. It can be argued that the BRI and “17+1” could be beneficial for the global recovery in the post-pandemic period. China was the first major economy to experience a virus-related downturn and was the first to return to everyday economic life after managing to curb the disease's spread. Some argue that the West and America are in a technological recession, while China is not (Bhaya, 2020). Also, Beijing's apparent success in doing so

has given it some economic benefits, although China will not fully recover from the crisis until its trading partners begin to recover. The IMF, perhaps optimistically, predicts that China's economy will grow by 9.2% in 2021, while the US economy is expected to shrink by 5.9% and the Eurozone by 7.5%. China also has significant foreign exchange reserves and is one of the few international actors positioned to make ambitious investments when asset prices fall globally. As its strategic rivals battle the pandemic, China could find itself in a unique position to advance its international geoeconomics ambitions (Tybring-Gjedde, 2020).

Despite the projects for the vast investment in CEE, China systematically organises and undertakes diplomatic action to achieve cooperation in specific areas. In the course of last year, 2020, the EU did not share the US hostile stance on the origin and spread of the Covid-19 pandemic and continued to achieve agreements of great importance. At the same time, the EU was paving the path for the Strategic Agenda for Cooperation 2025.

In conclusion of the above mentioned, economic cooperation between the EU and China will strengthen the partnership and make economic competition based fair. More precisely, the signing of an important agreement between protecting 100 European geographical indications in China and 100 Chinese geographical indications in the European Union against usurpation and imitation became public on the 9th of July (EUR-Lex – 22020A1203(01), 2020).

A new trend of cooperation has been observed between the EU countries and China. Namely, Bureaucracy in Brussels in terms of law and norms could be avoided with higher possibilities for European regions and cities to cooperate with China. That conclusion and recommendation we could find in Tomasz Kaminski research article related to the role of the regions in EU-China relation. Kaminski suggests the subnational dimension of EU-China cooperation. He is probably motivated by EU bureaucracy. Guided by previously mentions, Kaminski points out that sub-national cooperation has started to be a visibly important EU-China relations element. More and more regions cooperate with Chinese counterparts in many different areas: from economy to environment and cultural to academic exchange. Kaminski also concludes that in five analysed countries (France, Spain, Germany, Poland, and Italy), cooperation with China partners has been declared by 80% of the regions (Kaminski, 2021).

Conclusion

The Post-Cold War era brings changes to international affairs, tectonically. When establishing BRI projects and mechanisms of cooperation with CEE countries, China recently moved energetically to establish relationships with the European countries, either members or not of the EU, and undoubtedly achieved a lot.

Also, there is no doubt that the EU recognises China as a major geopolitical actor. Recently, we examined that China also wants to recognise the EU as an important geopolitical actor. The EU did not address consistent geopolitics because it did not have a consistent foreign policy in geopolitical acting. Things have started to change recently. Establishing

a “Geopolitical Commission” and Macron’s warnings about Europe’s geopolitical disappearing possibilities were two cornerstones of the geopolitical transformation of the EU. China wants to see the EU as a geopolitical and strategic partner. Simultaneously, the EU and China are competitor (economic, geopolitical) and system rivals. Some of the scholars are trying to find a simple solution to rivalry and competition. It is possible if China no longer has perceptions about the EU as a disunited entity to stop undermined unity with partial agreements with EU members. The EU no more talks about system rivalry to promote a significantly different approach to respect human rights.

China needs to demonstrate its willingness to comply with international law. That means including customary international law as evidenced by many of the non-binding policy principles adopted by multilateral forums, such as the 2016 G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking. In short, China needs to be a contributor, not a challenger or competitor, to the reform of global governance and development of international law (Chen, 2020).

Furthermore, the contemporary geopolitical era produces both centrifugal and centripetal dynamics. The absence of solidarity (Covid-19 era), non-consistent politics about EU enlargement (Western Balkan), disunity within EU members (human rights resolution, EU budget, external sanction) clearly shows that the EU does not act as a united geopolitical actor. Burdens of contemporary and, for the first time, EU geopolitics depend on leadership, unity, and clearer strategic visions and thinking. The most important to know is that geopolitics begins at home (Lehne, 2020).

Good relations with China at the government level foster subnational cooperation. Bilateral agreements between governments, EU declarations of interest in the BRI have encouraged European and Chinese regions to cooperate. This situation indicates the rise of regional geopolitics within the EU. That is another indicator of the need to facilitate the strategic partnership and cooperation between the EU and China. Also, we identify it as the step that could contribute to the accelerated transformation of the EU as a geopolitical actor.

We can also conclude that BRI and “17+1” upset the actual political balance and patterns of influence. That means recent China’s action has had geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences. However, let us move away from the traditional understanding of geopolitics centred on international security, military forces, and warfare. The EU can be seen as a prominent player in the geopolitical game triggered by China’s new international growth.

Last year’s manoeuvres clearly show that the EU will be working on its geopolitical identity. Nevertheless, transatlantic security alliances and arms embargoes are not all geopolitics. If one takes other fields into account, for instance, trade, law, and norms, the EU has become an independent and influential actor in international affairs, with considerable geopolitical reach and the capacity to respond to Chinese engagement. On this basis China-EU relations have already reached considerable maturity. The degree of development of the EU’s geopolitical identities will largely depend on China’s regional engagement and the development of relations within the nexus strategic partnership – competitiveness – systemic rivalry.

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GEOPOLITICS OF CHINA

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Abstract *In the past three decades, China has grown into a world superpower that can only compete with the United States and the EU. What was its path from the time of Deng Xiaoping's reforms to the membership in the World Trade Organization and Trump's "trade war"? To what extent did the pharaoh "Silk Road" project affect its geopolitical and geo-economics vision? Its "infrastructure investment diplomacy" and "debt-creating" policy for Western Balkans states have been well received by the region's impoverished political elites, but such agreements were concluded without a prior tender procedure, and that is contrary to EU rules because it stimulates corruption. In this paper we will proceed with a basic review of the Chinese geopolitical specificities and especially in relation to the USA, EU and Western Balkan Countries.*

Keywords: China, geopolitics, EU, United States, Western Balkans

Introduction

In his book, "China Shakes the World" Jack Belden announced China's demographic potentials, solidarity with the Third World and its A-bomb as a major threat to world peace. Six decades later, in 2011, President Nixon's former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in his book "On China" 21st century US-China relations perceives through the slogan "less partnership – more co-evolution". This means that both countries will follow internal imperatives, cooperate wherever they can, and adjust bilateral relations to avoid conflict. What does the advice of the wise diplomat Kissinger mean in practice? Above all, the United States and China are neither a priori friends nor foes. According to Kissinger, their relationship in the 21st century will be a "marathon race" and a "duel of the century". The United States and China will have to set the boundaries of their confrontation, as the world will have found itself in a similar situation to before World War I. Thus, the clash between the United States and China will escalate into a "new Cold War" and therefore it is desirable that the "frontiers of confrontation" be determined in advance. In a slightly harsher manner, FBI Director, Christopher Wray, in his address at the Hudson Institute in Washington emphasized that "China is the biggest threat to the United States" (BBS-News-8 July 2020). The aforementioned

¹ Full professor, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy from 1987 to 2011, Ambassador to NATO from 2001 to 2008, Rector of the First Private University from 2001 to 2020

² Full professor, University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius-Skopje, Faculty of Philosophy-Institute for Security, Defence and Peace

theses present a strong provocation for a more serious analysis of the Chinese foreign policy, its attitude towards Europe, USA, the Balkans and North Macedonia.

China's Foreign Policy

China's foreign policy is complex and therefore its precise analysis presumes a pluralistic and interdisciplinary approach. China's foreign policy priorities continue to follow the strong geographical hierarchy that surrounds China. Its economic development, its social and political stability represent the most significant priorities for the leadership. China's "fundamental interests" in the immediate vicinity are its privileged topics and are focalized on the close geography of Asia and the Pacific. These are primarily the dossiers on Taiwan, the South China Sea and especially the East China Sea (Domenac J-L, 2002: 44).

Regarding the aforementioned strategic points, China shows determination and strives to initiate a number of strategies in relation to the geopolitical zone of non-surrounding. However, Chinese diplomacy does not limit itself to this region. The rapid growth of Chinese overseas investments over the past two decades has prompted diplomacy and the military to initiate new missions. In this regard, Beijing shows initiatives for the protection of economic as well non-economic interests in foreign countries, strives to stand out with assessments and anticipation in the protection of material or human risks and losses, and closely monitors crises in distant geopolitical areas. In addition to caring for national interests, China is engaged in defending the global multilateral positions of the UN or other international organizations. China's foreign policy also engages against illegitimate regime changes such as those in Syria, Libya, Iraq and North Korea and above all against any unilateral intervention by other major superpowers (Ekman Alice, 2018: 33-51).

One of China's most subtle international initiatives is the pharaoh "*Silk Road*" – "*One Belt One Road*" project officially launched in 2013. Of all the Chinese projects with a significant geopolitical structure, this project stands out and is called "project of the century", with the help of which China's leadership will strive to fully open West Asia to the world by 2050 (Garcin Thierry, 18.02.2018). The "New Silk Road" represents a complex operation of establishing communications, but also a newly designed giant corridor that is more than that. For China's President Xi Jinping, this project promises expansion of China through a long-term vision. The new silk roads are on the one hand, material projects, transport infrastructure, but also intangible projects such as e-commerce platforms, promotion of new standards and norms, creation of arbitral tribunals, border, police, legal projects and other types of cooperation and so on. In principle, China is proposing a new form of globalization which competes with the one of the United States and Europe (Garcin Thierry, 18.02.2018). Being aware of this ambitious project, the EU embarked on a serious strategic reflection, which was announced in September 2018, as a joint global strategy between Europe and Asia.

However, in this document, the intangible dimensions are underestimated. There is no doubt that the EU had been impressed by the new silk roads which represent a huge set of bridges, roads, water corridor, a kind of new offer for managing the movement of goods, people, data. Figuratively speaking, the project seeks to intrigue the EU: “what kind of globalization should be expected in the next three decades?” (Ekman Alice/ Ivan Sand, 13.01.2019).

Specific China

How can China and its evolution be perceived? To talk about China as a historical, cultural and political continuity is a mistake, argues Sylvan Can, Professor of Political Sciences, author of *The Land of the Europeans* (*Le Pays des Europeens*, Paris: ed. Jacob Odile, 2021). The People’s Republic of China is a specific regime characterized by Leninist remnants that the ruling Communist Party of this gigantic state is constantly reminded of and referred to. Its main goal is to preserve the fundamentals established by Mao Zedong and not to repeat the mistakes of the USSR from the late eighties of the last century. In 2049, China will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the communist regime and this date is in the spirit of the entire political elite but also a landmark around which China will strive to prove its strength, power and success. (Domenach J-L, 2002:44).

However, Leninist ideology is not the only ideological platform of the Chinese political strategy. There are original Chinese thoughts and strategic cultures that influence the policies of the ruling and sole party, but the regime is characterized by a political hyper-realism. All speeches and messages about possible opening and closing are founded in that framework. Chinese politicians are defending positions that allow them to seize new opportunities after the opening of borders. Thus, the strategy of PR China towards the EU is part of a broader strategy in which Europe and its main countries France and Germany are seen as a “balance factor” in the conflicting position between China and the United States. This strategy is no different from that of the USSR in the 1960s during the Cold War.

On the other hand, the European perception of China has long been perceived as a distant and exotic country, rich in tradition and culture. Europe recognizes the original and enormous contribution of Chinese civilization, but one gets the impression that the complexities and nuances of China and Chinese man are not known in detail. Frequently, the strong Chinese diaspora in European countries has created a false sense of familiarity and knowledge of this gigantic country. China is not a bloc and therefore in both Europe and the United States, and even more so in the Balkans, one often does not fully understand Chinese initiative, habits, hidden traps, wisdoms. Europeans, focused on events in Europe and the nearby geopolitical space, did not see the dynamism and development of China when it began to open. One can even conclude that a post-colonial view of China has been present in Europe for a long time. At the beginning of its opening, Europe began

to perceive China as Eldorado with cheap labour and production but also a market of over a billion consumers that must be conquered (Domenach J-L, 2002:65). On the other hand, the Balkan countries burdened by the economic crisis (Greece) or the problems of transition (Serbia, North Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania) accepted with great pleasure the Chinese loans and investments, aware of their geo-economic attractiveness.

EU and China: Developing Relations in the 20th century

Long regarded as a purely demographic superpower, China has transformed into a trading and economic giant after the 1980s (Mamoudou Gazibo/Roromme Chantal, 2011: 12-25).

China and Europe have been cooperating for several centuries on trading and economy, but European colonialism imposed unbalanced, discriminatory conditions in the trade domain, especially after the Opium Wars (1839-1842). European countries received concessions in all Chinese ports and benefited from privileges such as the principle of extraterritoriality, which barred foreigners from being held criminally liable under Chinese law. Customs duties on European products were 5%.³ The feeling of “unequal agreements” due to the monopoly of the Europeans remained in the Chinese general memory. Prior to World War II, Europe imposed economic and technological hegemony on China, which ended ingloriously in the 1950s. After a series of crises, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the reasons for the departure of Europeans from China gradually matured. The extraterritorial status of European citizens, as well as other concessions was abolished in 1946.

After World War II, all European colonial powers in Asia began to withdraw. Between 1945 and 1954, the Netherlands left Indonesia, Great Britain left India, France lost Indochina and Singapore soon gained independence. Due to the longevity of the Cold War, the lack of closer cooperation between China and Europe can be explained. It was not until the 1970s that dialogue and contacts with Europe began with the evolution of the political-economic context. After a long period of autocracy Mao Zedong changed his position on the two superpowers as of 1971. The USSR was perceived as an imminent threat that was more dangerous than the United States. At the same time, China completely opened up to Western Europe and offered a different perception of the EU with some moderate respect.

China's strategy evolved thanks to the visions of Deng Xiaoping about the “territory of the three worlds”, which he presented to the UN in 1974.⁴ According to

³ Wouter Zweers et al.,;China and EU in the Western Balkans: A zero sum game? Clingendael, 31 August 2020

⁴ La bataille anti-révisionniste en France » Le Parti Communiste révolutionnaire (marxiste-léniniste) » A propos de la théorie des trois mondes (1977)-Front Rouge, novembre - décembre 1977 et début 1978 et 10 fev.1978.

<http://lesmaterialistes.com/>

Xiaoping (1904-1997), China understood the world through the existence of the three poles of power: the first world comprised the two superpowers, the second world were the developed countries that are subordinate to the superpowers, while the third world, where China belongs, were the developing countries.⁵ This concept contradicted the condominium concept of the superpowers, and the Chinese leadership's idea was that China was not part of the hierarchy and was under constant threat from potential alliances. In this context, for China's leadership, European countries had become potential allies. In 1972, when détente received strong support from the EEC, Brussels agreed to organize the European Conference in Helsinki in 1975 (CESC), from which the present-day OSCE originates. At this event, the principles of peace and détente between the East and the West were affirmed on a lasting basis in accordance with the broad economic cooperation. EU-China relations were formally established in 1975.

For more than thirty years, China and the EU have been developing close trade relations. These relations were significant and created noticeable economic effects. However, politically, the partners remained constrained regardless of the convergences on how to manage conflicts in the international community. China did not treat the EU as a real political entity and gave it secondary role on the international stage. From the mid-1990s, Beijing began to demonstrate certain interest in European politics. In the eyes of Chinese diplomacy, the EU's global strategic ambitions were perceived as an alternative to the American unilateralism (Dacos Antonin /Sylvain Kahn, 24.01.2021).

If the speeches of the leaders of the EU and China were consensual and moderate, ambitions were aimed at developing cooperation in all domains, although their visions faced numerous obstacles. In this regard, a hypothetical question arises: what were the reasons that influenced both partners to hesitate about their cooperation? China is a country with a long history and more than one billion inhabitants. It is a developing country led by the Communist Party and a communist regime inspired by Lenin's ideology. On the other hand, the EU is a creation of the 20th century, consisting of 27 member states, including the richest in the world. In the first decade of the 21st century, China and the EU have sought to deepen cooperation and geopolitical rapprochement. In principle, economic and trade relations were a platform for further development of the Chinese-European dialogue, but political and strategic relations were much more difficult to develop.

At the China-EU Summit on 5 September 2005, in Beijing, the two partners celebrated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Thanks to the role of one of the first two British European Commissioners Christopher Soames, diplomatic relations were established in 1975 between the then EEC (EU) and the PR China. In this regard, the great satisfaction with the deepening of relations and the changes that have emerged in the direction of greater affirmation of the global strategic partnership were emphasized.

⁵ Ibid. Front Rouge

In the beginning, the relations were marked by dynamization of the economic and trade exchanges. The first trade agreement between EEC and China was signed in April 1978. The same year, Deng Xiaoping began implementing a reform policy aimed at rapidly modernizing China in the fields of agriculture, industry, science, technology and the military. From 1979, Deng Xiaoping completely opened China to the world and replaced the collectivist way of functioning with the famous four pillars of the reforms. In 1985, a new agreement was signed between Brussels and Beijing on economic and trade cooperation which encouraged Chinese production and scientific and technological development, and at the same time gave China the status of the most privileged nation (6 May 1975).

Discrepancy between Economic and Political Relations

Between 1975 and 1989, the EU and China generally developed strong economic and trade ties, however, political cooperation remained marginal. In contrast, China had developed political relations with the superpowers of the USSR and the United States, with which it believed that it should participate in managing world affairs. With the new privatization policy of more than 40% of production coming from private enterprises, China had begun to see a large increase in the development of the annual average rate of 9%.⁶ At the same time, large European enterprises through joint ventures with Chinese enterprises had made a major breakthrough in the Chinese market. The huge market had become the subject of numerous fantasies and desires of Western business people, both due to cheap labour and the vastness of the market.

However, the development of diplomatic and political relations lagged behind the trade and economic relations. It was not until 1988 that the EEC established a permanent diplomatic delegation. The delay could be explained by at least two reasons. The first one being that the nature of the EU is based on economic and trade grounds. At the same time, it is connected to the diversification of bilateral relations maintained by every European country with China. While the EU acted in dispersed chaos where individual member states were developing relations with the Asian giant, China accepted the game and privileged bilateral relations, but at the same time had no objections to establish a dialogue with Europe. In this context, political relations with the EU took on secondary importance. The events in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, in 1989, when the Chinese authorities brutally suppressed student demonstrations, broke the rising trend in relations between Brussels and Beijing. However, a year later they were back on track. The second wave of rapprochement between China and the EU was manifested by instituting the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established with the Maastricht Agreement from 1992.

The Cold War showed the failure of the socio-economic model of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR. When threats to Europe's stability became real, China

⁶ Wouter Zweers et al., China and EU in the Western Balkans: A zero sum game? Clingendael, 31 August 2020

began to fear for its independence and possible ideological-geographical isolation due to its communist-Leninist course. At the risk of being marginalized and reduced to an average power, China decided to establish strong political and strategic positions with the non-Asian countries.

Dissolution of the socialist bloc urged China to rapidly adapt to capitalist rules. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping in 1992 accelerated the concept of the “socialist market economy”. However, to keep pace with change, China needed strong economic partners to support its entry into the world market, especially the World Trade Organization. The actor that could play the role of a useful pivot was the EU. There is no doubt that China’s strategic approach in this period was guided by Europe’s utilitarian vision for economic and scientific cooperation.

The second phase of the strategic rapprochement between Europe and China is linked to the new political dimensions of the European construction in the early 1990s. The Treaty of Maastricht, which significantly redesigned the EU and its foreign security policy (CFSP), entered into force on 1 January 1993. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty nominated the CFSP High Representative, while the 2001 Nice Treaty established the Political Security Committee (COPS), which defined the EU’s political orientation. In the mid-1990s, it became clear that China and the EU shared a common interest in mutual political and economic rapprochement.

Global Partnership Perspectives

Since the late 1990s, Chinese-European relations have undergone a strategic upheaval and political and diplomatic exchanges have multiplied. In 1994, it was agreed to hold at least two annual meetings at the level of ambassadors and foreign ministers of the EU and China. A document named “*Establishing a global partnership with China*” was signed in 1998 under the British Presidency, which was renewed in 2003 and redesigned in 2013. Furthermore, in 2013, a *Global Investment Agreement* was also initiated between the EU and China. The goal was a greater opening of the Chinese market for European investments and setting the rules for a more balanced competition (Jean-Pierre Cabestan, 2015).

Relations towards global friendship between the EU and China were inaugurated with the first EU-China Summit, held in London in 1998, chaired by Prime Ministers T. Blair and Zhu Rongji. The following year, at the second Summit in Beijing, attended by EC President Romano Prodi, embarrassing issues on respecting fundamental human rights were shyly evoked. In May 2000, the EU and China signed an agreement paving the way for China to join the WTO, which, due to the socialist methodology of its economy, did not qualify for WTO entry. Due to the great strategic interest of the EU and the United States in the huge Chinese market, Brussels and Washington had released 20 million euros to help overcome the shortcomings of the Chinese economy. China was finally admitted to the WTO in 2001 (Parlement Européenne - Direction generale des politique exterieures, 2011).

As it is mentioned in (Bretherton C. et Vogler J), despite the spectacular development of the Chinese-European relations, the EU's geopolitical weight in China remains disproportionate to the trade and economic relations. The reasons for such an anomaly are the numerous shortcomings such as the insufficient geopolitical presence of the EU in Asia, on the one hand, and the absolute dominance of the US in the region, on the other (Bretherton C. et Vogler J., 2006:273).

The EU is burdened with a number of geopolitical weaknesses. The EU was physically absent because there is a spatial distance of 8000 km between China and Europe. The last traces of Europe's presence in the region ended with the withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999. The geopolitical dynamics after World War II, and especially the turbulent geopolitical soil, left a mark on Europe's indifference to Asia. The Cold War influenced Europe to enter into an alliance with the United States during the constitution of NATO, because of the Euro-Asian challenge (USSR-China), that is the perils to which Halford Macinder pointed out through the theory of Heartland (Sloan, G.R., pp. 15–38). Europe lost its superior international position before World War II, and France and Great Britain could hardly develop complete relations with China. However, on the other hand, Russia, which borders China (4370 km), and Japan and the United States were much more present in this area. Russia has long been a privileged trading partner of China, especially in the areas of economic, technological and military cooperation.⁷ Japan has been China's traditional geopolitical rival in the Far East, an important strategic neighbour, with strong cultural ties. China and Japan have influenced each other for centuries and lived through complex and tragic events in history. At the same time, in the last few decades, they have been competing with each other. Japan along with South Korea and Taiwan has remained a key strategic partner for the United States (Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Chapter 6, 2015: 319 and 368).

Europe between Trade Deficit and Inconsistent Foreign Policy

The EU has had a trade surplus for a long time, but from 1993 to 1999 the EU deficit towards China began to grow and reached 49.65% versus 19.35 billion euros, which is -30.30 billion euros deficit of the EU. Meanwhile, the deficit in 2004 reached 78.69 billion euros.⁸

The deficit was due to accelerated imports of goods from China (2.65% growth between 1995 and 2000), while exports progressed at a much slower rate (1.72% be-

⁷ Yang Baoyun-La Chine et la Russie, *Revue, Cairn, info, matieres a reflexion, Dan outre –Terre* 2003/3, n.4, pages 181-188

⁸ (Eurostat, China-EU trade in goods: €164 billion deficit in 2019... <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/webs>, 2020, *China-EU trade in goods:€164 billion deficit in 2019 - Products Eurostat News ..*).

tween 1995 and 2000).⁹ The reasons for the negative trend were the insufficient openness of the Chinese market and the low availability of Europeans for larger investments and greater interest in the field of trade and economy.¹⁰

The second problem with the European deficit arose from the competitiveness of Chinese products with European ones. Cheap labour in China and mass serial production in the textile industry, for example, have made China more attractive and much cheaper, not only in this area but also in other areas.

The conclusion about the aggressiveness of China's economic and trade policy was gradually maturing among Europeans. Chinese products were beginning to threaten European products en masse (Benoit Aufrere, 2018).

The real weight of the EU in China depended on the perception of Beijing of the European influence in Chinese-European relations. In this sense, the bilateral relations of certain member states of the Union had significantly disrupted the global relationship between China and the EU. China's geopolitical ambitions had weighed on relations with the EU, and they had been seen as utilitarian rather than strategic in value. Furthermore, European countries have diverse perceptions of the relations with China. Depending on the history of their bilateral relations, European countries have more privileged (Great Britain and France) or less privileged positions (new EU member states).

After the fall of communism in the USSR, China, which had constantly insisted on multilateralism, found itself alone in the face of the American superpower, seeking to develop political relations with the EU as a counterweight to the United States. Chinese leadership has called for "pacifistic development" and promotion of security "internally and externally". Past experiences are indicative in respect to the notion that in times of heightened tensions, China becomes closer to the EU and that occasion has its own purpose (such as profiting from the import of advanced technologies). Meanwhile, at the time of dentente, it was turning to the United States to the detriment of relations with the EU. A similar manoeuvre was withdrawn by China after the 9/11 assassinations. However, the United States has been much more cautious about trade cooperation and has refused to export advanced technologies as the EU has done.

It is certain that China and the United States have maintained better relations since 2001. However, the conciliatory Chinese tone after the assassinations is more an expression of China's desire not to remain on the sidelines as the world fights terrorism. Furthermore, China has no intention of abandoning its strategy for promotion of multi-polarity. Its joint position with France and Russia against the American intervention in Iraq (2003) reaffirms this position. In order to neutralize the American unilateralism, Chinese diplomacy has also focused on international integration such

⁹ Eurostat, Ibid.

¹⁰ European Commission, September 23, 2008, / Francois Godement, *Chine: Les répliques en Europe*, Paris: Institut Montaignes, August, 2020.

as APEC, ASEAN, Asian regional forum, ASEM, Conference-Shanghai, and Beijing has also acted as a mediator in the North Korea-China relations. This prevented the United States from imposing itself as a unilateral decision-maker.

Europe Changes Strategy

The new EU strategic rapprochement with China was formalized on 10 September 2003 with the document known as “Common Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations: Towards a Mature Partnership”.¹¹ This document outlines five principles that would guide the new global partnership: a) improving the image of the EU in China; b) supporting China’s transition to an open society; c) promoting China’s economic opening from inside and outside the country; d) understanding the Chinese-European cooperation as mutually beneficial; e) affirmation of mutual responsibility in promoting world-burning issues. Among these five principles, the last two reflect the new spirit within which EU-China relations should be constituted. In that manner we expect that in the new global relations, EU can become less “naïve” and more cautious, of course, with greater demands for its “partner”.

The Eurocrats realized that the Chinese elites wisely followed the moves and naivety of Europe and the United States and used the mistakes to their advantage. With the huge project for the continental transport infrastructure “The New Silk Road” (Belt and Road Initiative-BRI), China has strongly sparked a European fantasy about the capacity of the Chinese economy. At the same time, the realization of this project took advantage of the weaknesses of the European territory and showed the lack of a vision of Europe towards Chinese investments. The lessons learned helped the EU to act more carefully and to establish certain frameworks for trade regulation. By imposing higher standards on China, the EU seeks to improve its own position but also to diversify economic relations. In recent years, the EU significantly moved closer to India, with which in 2019 it achieved a total trade exchange of 101 billion euros. Beijing has not accepted the EU’s opening to India, which is considered a rival to China, with great sympathy (*L’UE et l’Inde veulent renforcer leurs liens pour faire face à la Chine-*, Paris: *Le Figaro avec AFP* 15/07/2020).

In the context of this analysis, the position of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who qualifies China with three metaphors: “negotiating partner, economic competitor and systemic rival”, is significant. Actually, it is important to emphasize that these three qualifications are not new, but rather they are the result of a careful assessment of China’s strategy towards the EU. Therefore, it is important to stress that in 2016 the EU tinted its report on China and began to per-

¹¹ The Document http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/d9539fd0-ea74-47b6-9084-d4e691c192d7.0002.02/DOC_2

ceive it differently. Thus, one can conclude that after the sensitive growth in Chinese investments, they saw a significant decline during 2017.¹² Therefore, Beijing showed less enthusiasm for massive investment, while in some EU countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic or in the United States this increased the vigilance and scepticism about Chinese trade activities. Hence, of particular importance is to stress that contrary to expectations and the popular image related to Marxist ideology, economic integration has not led to political liberalization.

In those circumstances, the European Commission had called for a stricter policy towards China and highlighted China's violation of human rights in Uyghur and Hong Kong. However, von der Leyen, did not fail to encourage the Chinese partner for "further cooperation in the field of trade and environmental protection". Thus, for example, if the EU faces certain misunderstandings with China, it is certain that the EU will not imitate Donald Trump's tough stance on China. On the contrary, the EU is likely to continue to show some optimism towards China which will need to be complemented by a clearer strategic vision. Europe, which has acted ephemerally and disorganized in China, has realized that it does not have the capabilities of a great power as the United States. German and French business investors soon realized that "the Chinese market was not as open and interesting as it was thought" and therefore more favourable agreements between Brussels and Beijing were needed (En Chine, les entreprises européennes frappées par une concurrence locale de plus en plus innovante, ? Les Echos, le 20 juin 2018, Paris).

In this occasion, it is important to note that the disappointment of Europeans from China became more realistic and enabled the formation of a new European realism. EU member states gradually realized that they could stand behind Von der Leyen's qualifications for China as a "systemic rival". European institutions expected the EU to take an initiative for greater rigor towards China, including on the issue of basic human rights. Such a strategy does not prevent the EU states as before, to lead the "double game" freely, that is, individually and in a joint bloc through the EU. However, as Valery Nike points out, the EU still does not understand China, and by the way there is a lack of readiness and means for greater diversification of partners, for example to implement a more functionally Indo-Pacific strategy (Dacos Antonin/ Sylvain Kahn, January 2021).

It is obvious that in these circumstances, the evolution of relations will largely depend on China's ability to meet the expectations of the West. If Beijing puts in place essential files such as human rights or environmental protection, it will be perceived as a conscientious and utilitarian state in the current world order.

It is more visible and significant that Europeans are aware that they are facing a centralized state ruled by a Leninist ideology. One can only assume how Chinese

¹² Francois Godement, *Chine: Les répliques en Europe*, Paris: Institut Montaignes, august, 2020, conclusion.

business partners and officials viewed the naivety of European countries as a big joke. However, when PR China was attacked by trade weapons of the US President Trump, the Chinese Government did not hesitate to seek a credible trade ally in the EU. The EU, according to Sylvain Kahn (Sylvain Kahn Ibid.p.6) must not forget how the big Chinese corporations showed the EU how China functions when it blackmailed Greece into selling ports in Athens and Thessaloniki. It is a symbol and a case in which the EU did not have a strategic vision (Pourquoi la Chine achète-t-elle compulsivement les ports d'Europe? Keith Johnson, 8 février 2018, Slate, France).

So far, as an excuse, and with the awareness of its impressionist qualification we want to put the attention on the notion that the EU is less “naïve”. Namely, control of foreign investments in the EU is already being institutionalized to eliminate unfair competition from state-subsidized Chinese companies while the PR China has stopped claiming the status of a “market economy” within the World Trade Organization.

In this context, it is important to note that it is possible to equalize the situations with the announced Investment Agreement between the EU and China. In particular, both partners concluded a “principled agreement” on “reciprocal protection of investments” (Ursula von der Leyen) and (Charles Michel) after a video conference with the President of China (Xi Jinping) established the agreement on 30 December 2020. Such Agreement guarantees the conditions for the activities of business people and it is expected to be signed during 2021. Eurocrats are convinced that such an “economic-political agreement” will pave the way for balancing the trade and business activities of the EU and China (Accord sur l’investissement: la Chine négociera “à son rythme” avec l’UE-<https://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/accord-sur-l-investissement-25.12.2020>)

Geopolitical Dominance of the United States

The next step in the analysis that deserves attention concerns the geopolitical dominance of the United States. Namely, at the beginning of the 21st century, in the geopolitical space of East Asia, the EU was faced with the geopolitical dominance of the United States, which became even stronger after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. The American “leadership” in that part of the world was created after World War II and during the Cold War when only the great Western powers had the capacity to exert more serious influence in the region. The United States faced the USSR and Mao’s China, which sought to play a greater diplomatic and strategic role. Therefore, when the American ping-pong team participated in the World Championship in Japan in 1971 the Chinese government made a strategic turn and invited the American team to visit China. The world witnessed the rise of ping-pong diplomacy that resulted in the visit of US President Richard Nixon to China and the return visit of a Chinese delegation to the United States.

In this regard, one should also mention the role of Henry Kissinger, Head of Richard Nixon’s National Security Council, who used the World Championship in

ping-pong to inaugurate rapprochement with China in 1972. For the United States, maintaining the influence in Asia was essential. In order to maintain its leadership, the United States had multiplied bilateral agreements with countries in the region and increased its ongoing military presence. At the same time, by this act the Soviet Union distanced itself from China, which represented a decades-long desire of the American diplomacy (Question internationales, Documentation française, 2004, N.6). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China paid close attention to the principle of “internal and external stability”, fearing the Soviet scenario, backed by the United States.

In this context, it is of great importance to analyze the period between 1991 and 2001, because it is a period of tension between China and the United States. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 induced a new strategic American policy in Asia. Washington renewed its alliances with its traditional partners Japan, South Korea and Australia, and strengthened its presence in Central Asia through its anti-terrorist campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. China did not experience the strong presence of the United States in the region positively.

For our analysis it is important to mention the fact that the Chinese perceive the United States as a new superpower of the 20th century with a brief history and a poor civilization as opposed to the millennial history and culture of China. Bilateral relations between Washington and Beijing have gone through various stages. During World War II, the United States and China were allies, then rivals in the wars in Korea and Vietnam, to go through warming of the relations (1979) when China was recognized by Washington until the open trade war under President Trump. However, America was not very excited until 2010 when the Chinese economic boom began. This changed the picture described as “what if 26% of world industrial exports come from China, when it is just a huge factory that makes cheap products?”. Actually, it is important to emphasize that changes that followed. In particular, in 1998, the United States earned 26.8 times more than the Chinese, and already in 2019 this went down to only 1.7 times. Furthermore, the fact that in 2001, the number of Chinese billionaires with more than 50 billion dollars rose to 15 tycoons is more than significant. An example of success that the United States cares about the most is the Huawei company, which is present in 170 states and employs 194.000 people. What particularly worries the Americans is that the Chinese economy has become larger than the American economy. Based on the analysis of the World Bank, the IMF and the “Big Mac Index”, London *Economist* concluded that China, by the size of its own economy, surpassed America by 2016. What absurdity? Once “*McDonald's*” was a symbol of American supremacy, today Big Mac shows how China is taking over that power” the *Economist* concludes.¹³

China is thought to be struggling to adapt to world transformations. In this regard, Trump's strategy of “maximum pressure” has paid off, as he has limited China's

¹³ Agence France press: La Chine a detrone les Etats Unis comme premier partenaire ecommercial de l'UE, La Press, 15 february 2021, p.1)

boundless ambition for expansion and hampered Beijing's technological advancement. Chinese-American relations plummeted under Trump and were marked by a trade war between the two powers. Trump's aggressive strategy has successfully thwarted China's ambitions and prevented China from gaining too much confidence and dreaming of conquering Taiwan (Allard Patrick, n° 36, mars 2019, IFRI, 18.03.2019).

This would allow for greater expansion of the PR China to the EU, which itself is unable to meet the Chinese challenge. However, it seems that both Democrats and Biden, if they appreciated anything about President Trump that would be his policy towards China. It is predicted that Biden's policy towards Beijing will be even stricter than that of his predecessor (Capital.fr-Joe Biden plus coriace que Trump vers la Chine, 10.11.2020, Agence France Press/ Courrier Internationale- Face à la Chine, la politique des États-Unis ne changera pas-Nikkei Asia, 3.11.2020). The London *Economist* called the clash "epic", while Joe Biden qualified it as "extreme competition".¹⁴

The Economist also supports the Biden administration's latest initiative to form a "four" (India, Australia, Japan, and the US), a coalition to help stop China. In fact, not all experts agree with such a strategy. Kichore Mahabumbani, Singapore's long-time ambassador to the UN, in his latest book "The Day China Will Win" (Le jour ou la Chine va gagner) published in March 2021, predicted an "end to the American domination" and advised that "instead of hard relations and trade wars, China should cooperate primarily within the multilateral institutions".

China and the Western Balkans

It should be noted that the five Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) which are also aspirants for EU membership, account for more than 70% of trade and 60% of EU direct investment.¹⁵ In second place is China¹⁶ whose presence is part of its policy of global cooperation with Europe. As the most efficient tool of its "infrastructure diplomacy", it is facing the EU norms. When it comes to China's geo-economic ambitions and projects in the Western Balkans region, the EU aspirants face, on the one hand, rigorous EU criteria and, on the other, China's financial tropism. China is engaged in the Western Balkans mainly as a financer of infrastructure projects and as a source of direct investment. The interest in these countries emerges from the geopolitical position of the Western Balkans at rimland corridor that starts from the port of Thessaloniki via Vardar-Morava to the

¹⁴ (The Economist - Joe Biden's government has not yet committed to a path on trade in technology with China, 8 Mai 2021)

¹⁵ Wouter Zweers et al., China and the EU in the Western Balkans; A zero sum game?, Clingendael, 31 aout 2020/Vladimir Shopov, Five mounting challenges for China in the Western Balkans, European Council on Foreign Relations, 17 juin 2020.

¹⁶ Ibid. Vladimir Shopov, 2020

Danube. China's sole strategic goal is to develop corridors for the express transport of goods between land and sea, as part of the major "Silk Road" initiative in order to improve the China – EU relations.

Although China does not pursue a single global regional strategy towards all the countries of the Western Balkans, it seeks to integrate bilateral relations in the region within the 17+1 cooperation platform, which includes the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as members and aspirants to the EU, including Greece.

It must be borne in mind that China's strategy towards the Balkans is progressive, systemic and long-term. Complementing this is the argument that China is perceived as an economic power that invests in infrastructure and is willing to lend easily. Otherwise, there is no strong division between the leaders and political elites in the Balkans into pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese. In the region, China is perceived as an economic saviour, a factor in accelerating development, a model of economic prosperity run by the country. That is why local elites continue to demonstrate openness to Chinese investment commitments (China and the EU in the Western Balkans-A zero-sum game? Clingendael Report, Netherlands Institute of international Relations, August 2020).

However, China's attitude towards Serbia should be emphasized. For example, it is considered that "Serbia is a port for Chinese investments and this is an opportunity in two to three years to become a country with the highest economic growth in Europe", (Statement of the President of Serbia, Vucic after the signing of the agreement with Chinese partners for Radio Free Europe 12.09.2018). In addition to this is the argument that during the visit of the Chinese delegation to Serbia, agreements were signed for the takeover of the Mining Smelter worth 1.4 billion dollars, investment in the tire factory "Shandong Linglong", in Zrenjanin from 1 billion dollars, and a contract for construction of the industrial park in Borcha settlement in Belgrade. Furthermore, for the realization of a ring road around Belgrade, and the construction of the new bloc of the Kostolac thermal power plant and Drmno coal mine, Serbia received a loan of 608.2 million dollars, provided the arbitration of the possible dispute would be conducted in Beijing, in accordance with Chinese law, without the right to appeal. Serbia's debt to China is estimated at 3.320 billion euros, representing 12% of its total debt to foreign creditors.¹⁷

Meanwhile, economic cooperation between North Macedonia and China began in the early 1990s. China has lent about 80 million euros to North Macedonia to build the Kozjak hydropower plant. The construction was a partnership between ELEM and the Chinese *CWE* (*China International Water and Electric Corporation*). Another significant project of China in North Macedonia is the Chinese loan for the construction of the highways Miladinovce-Shtip and Kichevo-Ohrid, in the amount of

¹⁷ Arta Seiti/Barthelemy Courmont-Belgrade-Pekin: Quand la Chine se positionne au Coeur de l'Europe, Institut des realtions internationales et strategiques, Paris> IRIS, Fevrier 2017. P.16

580 million euros. The cooperation of the two countries includes the construction of the gas pipeline network, purchase of busses, electric locomotives and telecommunications, so that the debt of North Macedonia to China amounts to 1 billion euros or 20% of the country's external debt. Many of these transactions are assessed as murky deals with corrupt commissions (Xavier RichetLa, 2020:511).

It is worth to mention that particularly important are the economic ties between Albania and China, which are condensed through the Chinese company Geo-Jade, which is exploring the Patos-Marinza oil field. China is integrating the port Durrës into a network of ports which are connected to various ports in China, as well as in the construction of road infrastructure and Tirana airport. Furthermore, China has also invested in Albanian agriculture and boosted agricultural exports to China. These investments are estimated at around 385 million euros.¹⁸

Meanwhile, Chinese investments in Montenegro were concentrated in the construction of road and rail infrastructure (Bar-Boljare), several hydro and thermal power plants, amounting to 909.6 million euros.¹⁹

China's cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina materializes in the construction of three coal-fired power plants (Stanari near Doboj, Tuzla) and the construction of a highway worth 1.018 billion euros (Barisitz St. & Radzyner A., 2018, Karaskova, I et al ii, 2020, Lettre Europe du sud-Est.).

Early experiences have shown that Chinese direct investment is unfavourable because Chinese partners insist on hiring their companies and using their machinery, materials and labour. As Trivikj argues "...The Chinese provide the equipment, the workers, they lend us money and then with the same money we pay for their labour..." (Trivikj Branka, Radio Free Europe, 19.09.2018). Some economic analysts, such as Miyat Lakichevikj argue that "Chinese loans are not cheap at all. Unlike those of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the European Investment Bank or World Bank where interest rates for infrastructure projects are at most from 1% to 2%, the Chinese are between 2% to 3%. In particular, Serbia signed a financing agreement for the construction of a ring road around Belgrade in the amount of 207 million euros with an interest rate of 3% and the main contractor is the Chinese company Power China Construction Corporation."²⁰

According to Arsikj Miloško, the afore-mentioned loans are not much profitable. If we observed the Chinese loans for infrastructure projects in isolation, taking into

¹⁸ Arlind Qori-Entre l'Albanie et Chine, l'heure des grandes retrouvailles, Le Courrier des Balkans, 24 novembre 2017, p.3

¹⁹ Le Montenegro piège dans le scandale de l'autoroute chinois, Euronews, 6 Mai 2021/ Vincenzo Nigro- La Chine pourrait « acheter » le Montenegro, candidat à l'UE, Bruxelles, Le Soir, 27.04.2021

²⁰ Arta Seiti/Barthelemy Courmont-Belgrade-Pekin: Quand la Chine se positionne au Coeur de l'Europe, Institut des relations internationales et strategiques, Paris> IRIS, Fevrier 2017. P.4

account the rate as well as additional concessions in terms of hiring their companies, they turn out to be non-favourable engagements (Arsikj Miloško – 19.09.2018 Radio Free Europe). Otherwise, when the Chinese approve loans, they have no control over their spending, as is the practice with the Western financial institutions. In the EU, for example, a road cannot be built without announcing tenders. In the Balkans, the construction of highways in North Macedonia or the Belgrade-Budapest railway was signed without a tender. The EU strives, in accordance with its directives, to announce tenders, respect free competition and full transparency in the implementation of projects. Experiences with the Chinese are not like that and deals are negotiated directly. China's investment policy in the Balkans, which can also be called "debt diplomacy", worries Europeans. However, how not to upset the Chinese investors who during the period 2007-2017 allocated 12 billion euros intended for investment in the Western Balkans (La Chine investit les Balkans, ce qui inquiète l'Europe-//trends.levif.be/economie/trends-tendances-139.html).

Part of the expert public believed that there is no proper control over China's investment deals and it is not known how much the construction of infrastructure projects will cost in the end, as is the case in North Macedonia. Relations between the Balkan countries and China are not institutionalized and regulated by agreements such as the Stabilization and Association Agreement or those on EU enlargement. The forms of cooperation between China and the Balkans deviate from the rules of operation in the economic, political and security domain of the EU. At the same time, the EU imposes criteria for good governance, macroeconomic stability, environmental protection, transparency in public markets, fight against corruption, human rights. On the other hand, China is skipping these criteria, which arises critical attitude of the EU towards its behaviour.

Conclusion

Many analysts are convinced that the 21st century will be a century of great rivalry between the American eagle and the Chinese dragon. In the last three decades, China has grown into the most serious geo-political, geo-economic and economic challenge to the United States. In the period of the establishment of the institutional cooperation between the EU and China in the mid-seventies, and later the recognition of China by the US, through the membership in the World Trade Organization to the historic economic and technological boom of China which in 2013 presented the project "The Silk Road", China has grown into a geopolitical giant, with an appropriate geopolitical strategy. This strategy is characterized by stability and security, both internally and externally, and multilateralism as a principle of functioning of the international community. China has benefited from the EU's chaotic policies, its naiveté and the individual interests of its member states. The road to strengthening its strategic positions went through many strategic meanders, agreements, concessions and breakthroughs, which finally resulted in the awareness of the EU and the United States for more balanced cooperation with the signing of strategic partnership agreements. President Trump's trade war with China for a moment affronted the offensive character of the US, but that is not the end of the rivalry. The Western

media see this battle as a clash between “autocracy and liberal values”. The United States is not easily reconciled when someone threatens their global and regional power.

At the same time, China is also manifesting itself in the Western Balkans region. For a long time, the West considered Russia as a major competitor in the impoverished and fragile region of South-Eastern Europe. However, China has grown into a major player, which is inevitably to be reckoned with and which spares no investment in developing infrastructure weaknesses and supporting the rebuilding of their dilapidated industries. China’s “investment diplomacy or debt diplomacy” has not yet reached its final output, but “concluding contracts without a pre-tender procedure strengthen corrupt deals, in case of non-performance by the Chinese side, the Chinese arbitrators will be held accountable by Chinese legislation and the “appeals” clause. In other words, Chinese diplomacy has been able to exploit the inconsistent policy of the EU and the United States towards the Western Balkans and the difficult access of the Western Balkan countries to the European financial markets. With the help of the “Silk Road” project, China has managed to make a serious geo-economic and geopolitical breakthrough in the region. For now, the pharaoh project is just an idea that stretches through Corridor 10. However, it is not surprising that the proposal to build a high-speed railway line Athens-Budapest via Skopje and Belgrade, as the first step in the “One Belt-One Road” land communication.

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GREAT BRITAIN'S EXIT FROM THE EU- BREXIT

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Abstract: *This paper analyzes the attitude of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland towards European integration before and after the referendum on 23 June, in which the citizens of Great Britain voted to leave the full membership of the European Commonwealth.*

The paper points out that Great Britain had certain reservations about the realization of the plan for European integration, and it underlines the complexity of Great Britain's attitude towards European integration, which can be most clearly shown through the analysis of its traditional geographical and cultural isolationism, but also through integration, before and after its accession to the European Community in 1973.

In the end, it is concluded that Brexit surprised the ruling elite in both Great Britain and the EU and it is emphasized that it is a historical event of first-class importance for the country itself, which produces numerous economic and geopolitical consequences for Europe and the whole world.

Key words: *European Union, United Kingdom, Brexit, Article 50, Treaty on European Union, negotiations.*

Introduction

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as it is known, is located along the northwest coast of Europe, across the English Channel, the Dover Sea and the North Sea. Its neighbours are Ireland in the west and France in the southeast. The United Kingdom includes England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and the overseas territories of the world.

The United Kingdom is the centre of the British Commonwealth of Nations, made up of former British colonies that gained independence or dominion status (Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, Zimbabwe, etc.). The character of the British Commonwealth was determined at the Imperial Conference in 1926, and the Westminster Statute of 1931 determined the status, rights and obligations of its members. Great Britain is a unitary state,³ a constitutional and

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³ Although constitutional reform is under way, the Parliament of Scotland has been formed, as well as the National Assemblies of Wales and Northern Ireland.

parliamentary democracy headed by the Windsor dynasty. The Parliament has two houses. The House of Lords is made up of representatives of the hereditary aristocracy, as well as prominent figures of political, religious and social life, who acquire titles by position, by appointment from the monarch or by election. The House of Commons has all legislative rights, its members are elected every five years by general, direct and secret ballot of all citizens over the age of 21. The lower house has 650 deputies who belong to different political parties, and for a long time now, the most represented are the representatives of the Conservative and Labor parties.⁴

The United Kingdom is considered the cradle of democracy, with a rich history of statehood. The arbitrariness and absolutism of the rulers were first limited by the Grand Charter of Freedoms (Magna Carta Libertatum) of 1215, the Habeas Corpus Act, the birth of parliamentarism, and the founding of the General Council (Parliament) in 1258.

Throughout its rich history, England has waged several wars to conquer colonies or dominance at sea and in world trade. During the reign of Queen Victoria (Victorian era), the British Empire covered a quarter of the globe. It was an empire "in which the sun never sets", the center of the world in political, economic, scientific, cultural and every other sense. Many authors have dealt with the "secret formula" of British progress. In his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Paul Kennedy claims that they are: the navy, which dominated the world's seas and had no competitors in the world for a long time, the colonies and finances. The erosion of the United Kingdom's power, as a global superpower, was caused by the rise of the United States and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and ended with the Suez Crisis, where Britain's weakness, without US support, became evident.⁵ At the domestic level, the process of initiating constitutional reforms and internal reconfiguration of the state is noticeable. This is evidenced by the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assemblies of Wales and Northern Ireland. Great Britain, by the way, faced the situation in Northern Ireland with more or less success over the years, where the religious division into the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority was a constant generator of conflicts between the two communities. During the escalation of the 1969 conflict, the British government sent military forces to Northern Ireland and took sides with the Protestants. This encouraged the escalation of IRA terrorist actions and led to long-term instability and conflicts, which were brought under control, with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.⁶

Although many today call Great Britain "an aged and disabled lion", it is still among the 10 most developed and influential countries in the world. For its position in international relations in modern times, the United Kingdom, in addition to a strategic alliance with the largest global power in the United States, should primarily thank the sources of "soft power", such as: economic-financial, communication-informational, political and political democratic-social sources, which originate from the rich past and tradition.⁷

However, the fact is that today, after leaving the EU, Great Britain is facing one of the biggest challenges in its history. After long and difficult negotiations at the last moment, after

⁴ They following are also active on the political scene: the Scottish Nationalist Party, the Welsh Nationalist Party, the Ulster Unionists, etc.

⁵ Henri Kisindžer, *Diplomatija I i II*, Verzalpress, Beograd, 1999, str. 471–475.

⁶ The Belfast Agreement, better known as the Good Friday Agreement ([ir. Comhaontú Bhéal Feirste](#)), signed in Belfast, on April 10, 1998, on the Christian holiday of Good Friday, by the British and Irish authorities. The agreement entered into force on 2 December, 1999.

⁷ Look further in : Nikolić, G. (2013), „Tajne službe Velike Britanije“, Službeni glasnik, Beograd str. 13-15.

the threat that they would leave the EU without an agreement, Great Britain left the European Community of Nations. The first sparks in the post-Brexit relations, between the EU and Great Britain, appeared at the beginning of the year, due to the redistribution of the vaccines for Covid 19 from the the companies AstraZeneca and Pfizer.⁸

1. The attitude of Great Britain towards European integration

The idea of creating a European Union is not a new one. It appeared in the Middle Ages, then it was frequently discussed in the 19th century, so that plans and debates on this issue intensified after the First World War. It is important to point out that in the debate on the continent, the place of Britain in any of the proposed versions of a united Europe was controversial from the very beginning. Due to the British ties with the Empire and the Commonwealth, Richard von Kudenrove Kalergi and his pan-European movement did not take British participation into account significantly. Even after the Second World War, Great Britain had certain reservations about the realization of that project. This was especially evident when the Conservative Party was in power in this country, which continued to maintain a special love for the cult of Britain as a superpower without foundation. A strong impetus for the inclusion of Great Britain in the process of European integration was given by the United States of America, which saw this country as a kind of a bridge, which would connect the countries that had been confronted for centuries - France and Germany. But, perhaps more importantly, the United States also saw Britain as a representative of its own interests in Europe. Despite such insistences, Britain has long remained outside essential European integration.

The complexity of Great Britain's attitude towards European integration can be most clearly shown through the analysis of its traditional geographical and cultural isolationism, but also through a review of British society's attitude towards European integration, before and after joining the European Community in 1973.

In Britain, there is a constant social and political conflict between the two approaches to the image of social development. The first approach, which was dominant through the rule of the Conservative Party until the second half of the 1990s, is an isolationist or Eurosceptic concept of the development of Great Britain. It is based on the aspiration to preserve one's own identity in all spheres of European integration, which is understood as a certain "necessary evil". This approach is based on a mythological-obsessive view of the former position of this European country. The second concept of development is based on integrationist postulates and strives for the full inclusion of Great Britain in all European integrations. In the political sense, it is articulated and led primarily by the Labor Party.

While studying the political anthropology and political geography of the Old Continent, many authors have relied on the factor of the geographical position of Great Britain and associated with it the traditional isolationist concept of Great Brit-

⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-55865539>

ain, which was one of the most influential countries in the world. Such a geographical separation from the rest of the continent established a fundamentally new concept of the development of society. In addition to certain features that have been expressed during modern political history, Great Britain made a significant contribution during the groundbreaking industrial revolution in the 17th century. Then, with its long-cherished parliamentary tradition, it managed to impose itself as a model of modern democracies. The monarchist tradition and the cult of the sovereign as a representative of the unity of Britain have long been nurtured in British society, but also the cult of the Anglican Church,⁹ in which there is a mixture of religious and national.

Key changes in the economic sphere also contributed to the birth of a new form of state administration, which necessarily required a strong apparatus of political channeling, embodied through parliamentary democracy.¹⁰ Such a development of democratic traditions also causes the emergence of three dominant political parties in Great Britain: the Conservative and the Liberal,¹¹ which emerged during the 18th century, and the Labor Party, which was formed at the beginning of the 20th century. The Conservative and Liberal parties become the political and ideological bearer of the original principles of liberal capitalism, while the later Labor Party emerges as a political response to all the internal contradictions of such a system (impoverishment of workers, initial accumulation of capital, exclusive individualistic social perception, etc.). The third important determinant of British domination during the past century is colonialism,¹² which manages to be preserved in certain milder forms, primarily through a cultural formula, even today in the Commonwealth countries.¹³

Even the wartime Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, saw the necessity of connecting European states in 1946 and presented the idea of creating the United States of Europe, following the example of the United States of America. However, this idea could not find substantial support at a time when latent intolerances between individual European countries were still ongoing. However, it was decided to start the process of European integration with “step by step” tactics. Thus, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was established, and a little later the European Union for Nuclear Cooperation (EUROATOM). The goal of these com-

⁹ Church of England - Protestant state church of Great Britain. It was created by separation from the Roman Catholic Church in 1534. The state sovereign is formally the highest head of this church, See in: Jean Boisset, *Protestantizam – kratka povijest*, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1985, str. 48–50. i 221–222.

¹⁰ Great Britain is a parliamentary monarchy in which the sovereign is the formal head of state. Power is divided into executive (government), legislative (bicameral parliament) and judicial.

¹¹ The Liberal Party was formed at the end of the 18th century. In 1988, it was united with the Social Democratic Party (formed in 1981), and thus the Liberal Democratic Party was formed.

¹² Great Britain was one of the largest colonial powers. It had colonies in East Africa, then Burma, Afghanistan, the Union of South Africa, Egypt, Somalia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, as well as a number of islands in the Pacific Ocean.

¹³ The Commonwealth countries accept the supreme authority of the British sovereign, whose representative in them is the governor.

munities was to prevent the development of the military industry and create a secure environment in Europe. The third community, the European Economic Community, was established in 1957 and its competence was related to cooperation in the field of free trade. By uniting all three mentioned communities in 1965, the European Community was created.

The United Kingdom did not participate in the formation of the European Community, and its government showed constant restraint and substantial reservations about this project.¹⁴

2. Great Britain in the EU

The first initiative for Britain's accession to the European Community was put forward in 1961 by the conservative government of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, but French President De Gaulle vetoed it and thus blocked the country's entry. More than 10 years later, on 22 January, 1972, the Final Act was signed, which opened the possibilities for the admission of Great Britain to the European Community on 1 January, 1973. In the first years of its membership in the EC, Britain continued to show certain reservations and often blocked the work of the Community bodies. A few years later, a 1975 referendum was held on the country's membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), which would later become known as the European Union (EU). The outcome of the referendum was in favor of the state's survival in the EEC. This trend continued and could be most drastically observed in the period 1979-1989, when, thanks to Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister of that time, and her policies, the work of the Community was often blocked. This period in the development of the Community is often referred to as the "Euroclerosis" period.

The process of partial obstruction of the Community continued during the first half of the 1990s. This was also shown by the strong opposition of British opinion to the Maastricht Treaty (1993), and the division within the ruling Conservative Party which almost led to the fall of the John Major government¹⁵ due to opposition to the ratification of the treaty in the British Parliament. The opposition to the Maastricht Treaty was caused by the growth of the European Economic Community into the European Union, that is, the growth of a purely economic community into a political union.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Britain and the European Communities*, British Information Services, London, 1971, str. 1-35 i Miriam Camps, *European Unification in the Sixties: From Veto to the Crisis*, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, str. 125-155 i 157-195.

¹⁵ Trevor C. Hartli, *Osnovi prava Evropske zajednice*, COLPI – Institut za ustavnu i pravnu politiku, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 1998, str. 7.

¹⁶ Look further in : Nikolić Goran, „Velika Britanija i evropske integracije“, *Bezbednost*, Vol. XLVII, broj 6, Beograd, 2006, str. 917-938.

Prior to this, a Referendum on the independence of Scotland was organized, which was held on 18 September 2014, following an agreement between the Scottish Government and the Government of the United Kingdom, on 21 March 2013. Voters decided in a referendum on an issue formulated on the recommendation of the British Election Commission, which read: Should Scotland be an independent state? The main issues discussed in the referendum campaign concerned Scotland's economic strength, its defence, future relations with the rest of the United Kingdom and membership in international organizations, especially in the European Union and NATO.¹⁷

On the wings of success in Scotland, the British government set out to organize a referendum on remaining in the EU. All public opinion polls spoke in favour of remaining in the EU, which was also advocated by Prime Minister David Cameron. To stay in the EU, the UK government ran a campaign called "Britain is stronger in the European Union". David Cameron, who was the Prime Minister then, the leading voice of the campaign against the independence, after reaching an agreement with other leaders of the European Union, pointed out that the agreement would significantly change the conditions of British membership in the EU if the country voted against independence.

Cameron claimed that the agreement would give Britain a "special" status and help solve some things that the British do not like about the EU, such as the high immigration rate, but critics said that the agreement would actually change very little. Sixteen members of Cameron's cabinet, including Theresa May, also supported the stay. The Conservative Party was divided on the issue and officially remained neutral during the campaign. The Labor Party, the Scottish National Party, the Wales Party, the Green Party and the Liberal Democrats were in favor of staying.

The then President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, also wanted Britain to remain in the EU - unlike his successor, Donald Trump, an ardent supporter of Brexit - as well as the leaders of other EU countries - France and Germany.

The proponents of Britain remaining a part of the EU have argued that the country has received a major boost from its membership - it facilitates the sale of goods to other EU countries and the influx of immigrants, most of whom are willing to work, boosts economic development and boosts payment for public services. They also said that Britain's status in the world would be weakened by leaving the EU, and that the country is safer as part of a club of 28 countries, than to be left alone.¹⁸

¹⁷ The referendum was a success for the UK government, with 44.7% of voters voting for independence and 55.3% against independence

¹⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/cyr/svet-46870721>




Figure 1. Three Brexit forecasts

Source: (Springford, Tilford, Odendahl, & McCann, April 2016, p. 12).




Figure 2. Trends in UK goods trade with the EU and the rest of the world

Source: (Springford, et al., April 2016, p. 27)




Figure 3. UK trade balances

Source: (Springford, et al., April 2016, p. 39)

David Cameron¹⁹, his finance minister George Osborne and many other high-ranking figures who wanted to stay in the EU predicted an immediate economic crisis if the United Kingdom voted to leave. Similar estimations were also made by famous economists and experts, the IMF and the GB Industrial Union, Stiglitz, Krugman, many well-known economists from the London School of Economics, experts in international trade, finance and foreign direct investments, and also many macroeconomists. Most economists shared the same opinion: the Great Britain's exit from the European Union will result in significant negative consequences for Great Britain, its economic position, competitiveness, macroeconomic performances and standard of living, both on the short and long-term basis. There were a small number of economists who had a positive opinion about the Brexit economic outcome; among them was Professor Patrick Minford, who said that the economic growth could top four per cent.²⁰ It is true that the pound fell only one day after the referendum, and is currently some 10% lower against the dollar and some 10-15% weaker against the euro. The predictions of the current collapse were wrong, because it is estimated that the British economy grew by 1.8% in 2016, which is immediately after 1.9% of Germany among the leading industrial G7 countries. The British economy continued to grow at almost the same rate during 2017,

¹⁹ EU referendum outcome, Prime Minister David Cameron statement;

²⁰ Minford, Mahambare and Nowell, (July 5, 2005), *Should Britain Leave the EU*, Edward Elgar Pub, Cardiff University;

although that growth was less than 0.6% in the first half of 2018. Inflation jumped after June 2016, but has since eased and stopped at 2.2 percent. Unemployment continued to fall and stopped at 4%, which the lowest rate in the last 43 years. The annual growth of house prices has been steadily declining from 8.2% in June 2016 to 3.2% in August 2018, according to official ONS data. It is the lowest annual price growth in the last five years, but it is still higher than inflation, so that real estate continues to show a jump in prices in the “real sense”.²¹

3. Great Britain Exit from the EU

The referendum was held on 22 June, 2016 and surprised the government of Great Britain, as well as the professional public and members of the European Union. Although it was not obligatory, the British government took it upon itself to respect the results of the referendum and to activate the application of Article 50 of the EU Treaty²², that is, to start negotiations on leaving the Union and to complete the negotiations by 29 March, 2019. From that moment, Brexit became the main topic in both the domestic and foreign policy scene. After the failed referendum, the government collapsed, the Prime Minister resigned and was replaced by the then Home Office Minister, Theresa May.

In the referendum, all 32 election precincts in Scotland voted to stay in the European Union, the percentage of positive responses was over 60%, a similar ratio was in Northern Ireland above 55%, while the overall score at UK level was 51.9 % to exit, thanks predominantly to votes from England and Wales. The turnout was 71.8% with more than 30 million people voting. In response to the result, Scottish government officials said they would start planning a second referendum on Scottish independence.

In an attempt to leave the EU, the United Kingdom found itself in the greatest crisis in its post-war history. The question is what determined the average Briton to vote for Britain's withdrawal from the EU. Ordinary citizens feel that Britain is hampered by the EU, which they claim has imposed too many regulations regarding business and charged billions of pounds a year in membership fees by giving little in return. They also wanted the UK to pass all its laws, instead of creating them by joint decisions with other EU countries.

One of the main principles of EU membership is “free movement”, which means that you do not need a visa to travel to another EU country and live there. The departure campaign also opposed the idea of an “ever closer union” between EU members and what it sees as a step towards the creation of a “united European state”.²³

²¹ <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/cyr/svet-46870721>

²² The Treaty on European Union (Article 50)

²³ <https://www.bbc.com/serbian/cyr/svet-46870721>

Some analysts also claim that Brexit is a direct consequence of the great social dissatisfaction that has accumulated over the years. Dissatisfaction has now spilled over to the wrong side and threatens to endanger not only the future but also the very survival of the state.²⁴

One of the important reasons was the emigration crisis and the large immigration to Great Britain. First of all, it was about immigration from Eastern European countries that became members of the EU. The British press pointed out to the government that it is inevitable to change the labor market policy towards the admission of workers from these new EU countries. The government in London announced that the number of workers coming from the Central and Eastern European EU member states is 30 times higher than expected after the wave of accession of Eastern European countries to the EU.




Figure 4. Rapid growth in EU immigration from 2004.

Source: (Springford, et al., April 2016, p. 88)

Statistics show that there are 427,000 migrant workers in Britain from 8-10 countries that joined the European Union in just two years. According to the Ministry of the Interior, it is possible that 600,000 people arrived in Britain. Illegal migrants are not included. Poland, the largest country admitted to the European Union, also had the largest number of workers in Britain, more than half of all immigrants - 264,560. It was followed by Lithuania and Slovakia. The UK government initially had a projection of 15,000 immigrant workers a year from Eastern European countries. The number

²⁴ <http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/421565/Pogledi/Populizam-i-liberalni-autizam>

of immigrants from the European Union increased from 900 thousand in 1995 to 3.3 million registered ones in 2015, where of 172 thousand are from the EU countries in 2015 and around 191 thousand from countries outside the EU.




Figure 5. Net immigration to the UK, 1991–2015

Source: (CEP, June 2016, p. 59)

Although one of the main principles of the European Union is the freedom of movement of people, goods and capital, the excessive number of migrants from the enlarged EU led London to consider closing the borders for the reception of citizens from Romania and Bulgaria, with the proposal of waiting up to seven years before being equated in this respect with other Europeans. In connection with that, there is also the statement of the former Minister of the Interior, John Reed, who said, unofficially, the truth, that he “does not believe in the free movement of labor”.²⁵ The government’s stricter stance on immigrants, along with the Daily Telegraph, reported the largest influx of immigrants in British history, complemented the release of data showing that unemployment in Britain had reached its highest level in six years. Nearly 1,700,000 Britons were out of work. There are also positive attitudes about the contribution of young newcomers, including a small number of those who use social assistance, but much louder are the conservatives who call for strict restrictions on quotas for workers from the new EU member states.

However, the European migrant crisis and the thousands of migrants who waiting to reach Great Britain in the French port of Calais had already poured a glass half full for Britons, who were already skeptical about the European Union.

²⁵ *Politika*, 29. avgust 2006, str. 25.

The main stumbling block in the negotiations was the issue of the Irish border, about 500 kilometers long, as it is the land border with the United Kingdom. An insurance policy for Ireland is a “safeguard mechanism” by which the Irish government wants to keep the border fully open to trade in goods, people and services in the event that no agreement is reached or there is no negotiation of a future relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU, and thus Ireland.

The United Kingdom and the EU have agreed, at the end of the first phase of negotiations on Brexit, that there will be regulatory harmonization between the two parts of the Irish island, in case no agreement is reached. That agreement from December was called into question, and then annulled after the remarks of the Democratic Union party, which was not consulted. To allay the concerns that Northern Ireland would be treated differently after Brexit, Theresa May also agreed that there would be no regulatory barriers in the Irish Sea. This immediately sowed the seeds of discord and created an unsolvable problem, unless Great Britain concluded an agreement that included remaining in the single market and the customs union, which are two red lines that, according to Theresa May, no British prime minister will cross.

Following that firm British stance, the EU proposed a legal text that would establish a “common regulatory area” between Ireland and Great Britain in Northern Ireland, that is to say, to reach a special agreement for Northern Ireland. British Prime Minister Theresa May fully agreed that there is a need for a “protection mechanism” and that the border with Ireland should be without the classic border infrastructure, but she promised not to allow Northern Ireland to be a different regulatory area in the UK, and she said to “move the border in the Irish Sea”, which is also something that no prime minister could accept. EU negotiator for Brexit Michel Barnier offered to change the protocol in the draft agreement on leaving the EU, in order to deal with political sensitivity in Westminster and to prevent a split during the Conservative Party’s conference. The EU’s new offer related to the Irish border meant that border checks would be carried out with the support of technology, which in Britain is understood as “softening” of the EU position. Barnier said that the checks could take place at different places, on ships, in ports outside Ireland, and could be done by technological means. The justification for such a request by the EU lies in the concern for the protection of the single market and the concern that below standard goods would not enter Ireland via the Britain-Northern Ireland route, and through it to other EU countries.²⁶

The aim of the proposal was to try to convince the UK that most goods going to Northern Ireland go through Dublin, so that checks on EU standards in British ports could be part of the solution. However, Downing Street said it would not consider additional EU checks whether carried out by EU staff or British staff in British ports. Theresa May had not provided any alternative to the EU legal text, but argued that the

²⁶ Barnier used the example of Asian shrimp, which contained increased doses of antibiotics and as such could cause blindness, so they were banned in the EU, and they entered Ireland via Liverpool and Belfast.

EU Additional Verification Plan constituted a de facto blockade of the negotiations.

In the opinion of the UK government, if Britain already had a “common rulebook” harmonized with EU standards, for food and other goods, then in the British opinion, additional checks were not necessary. Checks on the customs declaration and VAT paid can, in their opinion, also be done electronically.

The Irish government’s position was fully represented by Barnier, with the support of the other 26 member states. Barnier offered a new way to keep the border open, but did not offer to abolish additional checks. The Irish government argued that a “safeguard mechanism” was needed, not only to ensure unhindered trade, but also to protect fragile peace. The government in Dublin also stated that the “normalization” of life at the border is a by-product of cross-border cooperation in trade, schools, health and agriculture, which has flourished since the agreement signed on Good Friday. Barnier also pointed out that the protection mechanism must be “for all time”, not only for the scenario without an agreement, but to preserve the status quo on the island in the unlikely, but possible case that the future government in Britain will not be very friendly.²⁷

The government of Great Britain, led by Theresa May, had great problems in defending the results of the negotiations in the parliament, so the survival of the parliamentary majority was also called into question. The media also mentioned the holding of a second referendum. In March, the UK government asked for an extension of the deadline for leaving the EU, Theresa May even asked for the support of the opposition in order to vote for the agreement and leave the EU with dignity. Prime Minister Theresa May even warned conservative lawmakers who were considering voting against the agreement she reached with the EU to risk “Brexit not happening at all”.²⁸ European Court of Justice ruled that the UK could annul the Brexit process from Article 50 without the permission of the other 27 EU member states and remain a member of the EU according to the valid regulations, provided that the decision was made in a “democratic process”. However, due to her inability to defend the agreement reached with the EU, Theresa May announced on 24 May that she would resign from the leadership of the Conservative Party and the position of Prime Minister. After the party elections, the representative of the hard line of negotiations with the EU, Boris Johnson, came to that place on 23 July. He stated that Britain must leave the EU at any cost by 31 October, 2019, even if that would mean leaving without an agreement.²⁹ After the elections, and only nine days before leaving the EU, on 22 January, 2020, the British Parliament approved the agreement on Brexit. The agreement stipulates that Northern Ireland will apply EU rules on agricultural and industrial products, as

²⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/19/>

²⁸ She was referring to the new referendum, which was supported by the SNP, the Liberal Democrats, the Wales Party, the Green Party, a small number of conservatives and a large group of Labor MPs, who want the public to have the last word, with the option to stay in the EU. They tried to gain the support of the Labor leadership, but Jeremy Corbyn first wanted to help hold the general election.

²⁹ <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/23/uk/boris-johnson-prime-minister-uk-gbr-intl/index.html>

well as continue to apply European customs regulations, while the rest of the United Kingdom will withdraw from the customs union.

After that, on 31 January, 2020, after 47 years of membership and three and a half years of delay, Great Britain officially left the EU. However, the changes did not occur immediately, as a transitional period followed, which lasted until December 2020, in which residents and companies adjusted to the changes that would occur. During that time, Britain continued to apply EU regulations until 31 December of the same year. The agreement that entered into force contains new rules on how the UK and the EU will live, work and trade together, but the most important thing for both parties is that there are no restrictions on trade, i.e. quotas and customs duties do not apply. The EU is the UK's largest trading partner and in 2019 alone, trade amounted to 668 billion pounds.

The agreement accepted the EU request that Northern Ireland still have a different status from the rest of the United Kingdom, because it will continue to be part of the EU single market for goods. The agreement brought the greatest changes regarding the movement of the population. The United Kingdom is introducing a new immigration system, which means that the free movement of people to and from the EU is coming to an end. EU citizens will no longer have the automatic right to settle in the UK and the British will automatically lose the right to live, work and retire in the rest of Europe.

During the negotiations, the adjustment of British foreign policy to the post-Brexit environment followed. The fifth report for the 2017-2019 season of the Parliamentary Committee on International Relations, entitled "UK foreign policy in an unstable world order", analyzes the contemporary foreign policy environment of the UK.

For those who are uninformed, the surprise is the deterioration of relations between Great Britain and the United States, which are no longer as strong as they used to be. To a lesser extent, this is the result of the UK's preoccupation with the Brexit negotiations, and to a greater extent to the Allies' doubts about British military capabilities and the existence of the will to use them. This was especially evident in 2013, when the UK government decided not to participate in a possible military intervention in Syria. On the other hand, the United States has made a number of unilateral decisions that run counter to British national interests, such as the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the Iranian Nuclear Agreement, the UN Human Rights Council, and the imposition of trade tariffs on allies, undermining the UK's efforts to successfully resist global challenges critical to the country. However, with a change in administration in Washington, it is realistic to expect an improvement in UK-US relations.

China is said to be a growing economic and political power with growing global influence. The government's open door policy towards China is supported, because, as it is stated, it is not in the interest of Great Britain for China to be systematically treated as an opponent. However, the government is required to ensure that the good relations with China do not jeopardize the relations with the United States, Japan and

India. In the future, the government will have to weigh the response to the strategic challenge related to China's growing economic power and China's understanding of its own international role, as well as the impact of that understanding on the rules of the established international order.

However, there is an interesting turn in the foreign policy of the UK, during the negotiations on leaving the EU. Thus, the development of economic and trade ties with India has been set as a priority, and it is proposed to reset the relations with this country and raise them to a higher level, with a focus on strategic priorities such as cyber security and maritime issues in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, it supports the reshaping of the policy towards India and the post-Brexit environment. Also, the Government is recommended to take into account the growing regional influence of middle-ranking emerging powers in Africa, Asia and Latin America which requires close cooperation with them in resolving the problems and disputes arising in their regions.³⁰

Conclusion

The British withdrawal broke the monolithic nature of the Union, because the Union will no longer be the same. The movements in Italy have strengthened - the Northern League, the Netherlands - the Freedom Party and France - the National Front, Marie Le Pen, which are advocating for the exit of their countries from the EU, Should the population of the mentioned countries be blamed if social circumstances are taken into account? According to the author of the article in Politika "Populism and Neoliberal Autism", Nebojša Katić, 87% of those who are employed in France today get a job only for a certain period of time, most only for a period of less than a month, and even a third get a job for only one day or just for a few hours a day. According to the same author, social inequalities have grown so much in Germany that they are the largest in the eurozone today. In Europe's powerful economic locomotive, about 40% of households own nothing or, as the economic dictionary puts it, the value of their net assets is zero.

In the context of strained transatlantic relations, increasingly strong China and Russia, which disrupts the established world order and clear changes in the global balance of power, it remains in the UK's national interest to maintain the strongest possible foreign and security policy partnership with its European partners both bilaterally and at EU level after Brexit. The government needs to re-emphasize alliance building around the world and engage in networks with partners who share the same views on key issues of national importance.

The way we look at it, if this neoliberal trend continues, with deepening social disparities, a mass influx of migrants and terrorist attacks could lead to the UK not being the only country to reach for Article 50 of the EU Treaty, while at the same time the EU has no alternative in economic and security terms for most of the countries of the Old Continent, and especially for the countries of the Western Balkans. At the end we should remember Churchill and Spinelli, but also Monet, Schumann and Delors. None of them insisted that the European Community project would be simple, cheap and easy. However, they did claim its additional value was high enough to respond to most problems concerning Europeans (both of security and economic nature), and to correspond to Europe's interests. The only logical conclusion is that the EU should

³⁰ See further in: Select Committee on International Relations, *UK foreign policy in a shifting world order*, Published by the Authority of the House of Lords, 18 December 2018.

commence further integration in order to go back to its starting position of strengthening unity and dividing responsibility for promoting European values.

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POLITICIZATION AND SECURITIZATION OF GAS TRADE - A CASE STUDY OF THE EU-RF RELATIONS

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Abstract: *This paper explores a case study of the change in the role of gas trade in the EU-RF relations through its politicization and securitization. It explores how gas ceased to be a commodity and became a strategic resource, and its trade - an economic instrument consciously used to project political power: gas trade in the case study did not lead to conflict, but generated power. The research was prompted by the disagreement in the scientific community over the enabling conditions, manners, purpose and moment of change in role of gas trade, and by the insufficient research of the EU response to its politicization. A qualitative research design was used and an embedded single case study methodology was chosen. In order to describe and understand both the "world of facts" and the "world of meanings" a Straussian variant of the grounded theory method and a critical discourse analysis were used. A detailed descriptive conclusion from the objectivist constructivism perspective and a coherent theory about the new role of gas trade was generated, showing that interdependence is more important than the volume of the trade and that the EU-RF gas trade is a relationship of asymmetric interdependence, which suggests that interdependence does not exclude power. Also, it will be shown that the RF uses gas trade as an instrument of power differently, depending on the addressee. The 1970s oil crises are included in the research as a historical context since they facilitate the understanding of the gas crises from the mid-2000s. This paper also presents the empirical implications of the new role of gas trade, as well as the empirical and theoretical implications of the securitization process, followed by a contextualized definition of energy security.*

Keywords: *gas trade, EU, RF, politicization, energy security*

Introduction

In this paper, a case study of the EU-RF gas trade was explored from a political science perspective. The focus of the research has shifted from the traditional subject of realist-liberal debate about whether foreign trade contributes to conflict or peace between the actors involved, towards exploring the nature of power that lies in this economic, originally non-security, relationship. The research has linked the economic concepts of foreign-trade cost and benefit to important political concepts - liberal interdependence and realistic concepts of power and security.

The immediate subject of research was the processes of politicization and securitization of this specific trade relationship. The politicization began when the goal of trade

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ceased to be economic (profit-making, compensating for limited resources) and became a realistic maximization of political power, thus turning the trade into an instrument of power. The research started from the assumption that this cold-war, almost exclusively economic relationship based on the liberal paradigm of interdependence and cooperation, along with the issue of low politics, has been politicized, materially used and further constructed by the RF as a substitute for force. In response, the EU seeks to make gas trade a security issue. According to the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CSSS), the process of securitization requires, as a prerequisite, a discursive construction of an issue as an existential threat to survival by using traditional security grammar.

Both processes are related to the concept of power: politicization associates foreign-trade relationship with foreign policy using it as an instrument of power, while securitization brings it into the realm of national security through the discourse of power. According to Buzan et al. (1998:31), to study securitization implies the study of the concept of power politics. The use of gas trade in power politics legitimizes the study of this traditionally non-security issue within security studies, because the use of power or the threat to use power automatically makes an issue a security issue (Kolodziej, 2004). The research has thus also contributed to the knowledge of how the connection between the economics and politics affects security and how energy issues are becoming a non-traditional field of interest for security studies.

Why and how was it researched?

The research was motivated by dilemmas in the scientific and political communities about the enabling conditions, manners (supply disruption?), purpose (economic goal?) and moment (collapse of the USSR?) of change in the role of gas trade, and by the fact that “reactions of a more dependent state” (Stegen, 2011:6507) have not been sufficiently explored. Since there is no consensus in the scientific community about the reasons for the frequent use of the concept of *energy security*, the link between this concept and the new role of the EU-RF gas trade was examined. The chosenselected research questions, based on previously known unstructured empirical data, were helpful in resolving these dilemmas - they guided the research and provided a framework for its systematic conduct. The main research question was: What enabled, and how, the change in the role of gas trade, what were the consequences for the actors and their relationship, and are there any consequences that go beyond that relationship? Auxiliary research questions were the following: Which characteristics of the foreign-trade in general, and specific to gas trade made this possible? How have internal and external contexts influenced this? Which motives inspired the actors: strategic, economic and/or ideational? What are the reasons and consequences of a failed securitization? How and with what consequences did the new role of this trade affect the increase in importance of the concept of *energy security*? In addition to the realistic concepts of power and security, the economic concepts of foreign-trade cost and benefit, related to the liberal concept of interdependence, which can change from symmetry to asymmetry

and lead to a short-term sensitivity or a long-term vulnerability in the relationship, played an important role in exploring the new role of the EU-RF gas trade².

The chosen research questions, the inclusion of historical context and ideational factors (how we understand and define gas trade, what framework we give it accordingly and what are our interests and identity) in the research and stimulating a new concept development lead to the qualitative research design and partly constructivist epistemology. A single case study was chosen because the research subject is an individual, specific and contingent case, which is not a “sampling unit” and therefore implies an analytical rather than a statistical generalization. It aims at an in-depth and contextualized description and explanation of the conditions and consequences of the process, and at the interpretation of meaning, rather than at general applicable conclusions. An embedded single case study was chosen, whose integrated units are the empirical processes of politicization and securitization, which are causally related, but occur separately and are investigated by various auxiliary methods. This methodology enables extensive analysis and understanding of the research subject.

The perspective of objectivist constructivism was used: the constructivist perspective is a complement, not a substitute for the realistic-positivist one. A focused, in-depth, extensive analysis was conducted to describe and understand both the “world of facts” and the “world of meanings” (Corbetta, 2003:2). In the “study of knowledge”, the Straussian variant of the grounded theory method was used, and in the “study of meanings” a critical discourse analysis, resulting in a detailed descriptive conclusion, which implies contextual understanding and explanations of non-causal character. Additional analytical techniques (one based on the general logical principles, *process-tracing*, *evidence-based causal chain* and *congruence analysis*) enabled additional causal explanations and facilitated the integration of facts into theory. As a result, a coherent theory of the new role of gas trade in the EU-RF relations was generated, which is an abstraction of the actors’ actions and their meanings, thus this paper fulfilled its methodological goal.

Connection between the concepts of power and interdependence

The central concept of this paper is the dual understanding of power: as an instrument of power and a power of influence; differentiated between the power

² Several scientists have explored the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability and their connection to the transformation of interdependence in a relationship. Hirschman (1980) distinguishes between the current and final loss, concluding that a short-term loss brings more power, for example, supply disruption as an urgent and difficult problem to solve. Ney (2010) distinguishes short-term sensitivity, referring to how quickly and strongly a change in one system causes changes in another, from long-term vulnerability, which implies the relative cost of change in system structure and produces more power.

as an attribute and as a relationship (Brown and Ainley, 2005:81), and the power as a capacity and exercising of power (Cairney, 2012:84). Gas trade, as an instrument of power, serves as a resource for achieving certain foreign-policy outcomes. Hence, the resource needs to be converted into the exercised power, where it is crucial to choose a quality conversion strategy (Ney, 2012:8,100), because the power measured by capacities is not equal to the power of influence, the power to change the outcome.

According to the classical realistic world conception, dependence, from which power arises, is inherent even in the most innocuous foreign trade. From this perspective, in the EU-RF gas trade, interdependence is more important than the volume. Dependence relies on material factors and subjective perceptions, and produces negative consequences: it brings worries over relative costs and paves the way for economic and political manipulation. Since dependence is difficult to measure, the ability to bear the disruption cost or drastic changes in relationship to a level which produces a short-term effect, or a possibility of finding a long-term alternative, are being used as a substitute measure.

The EU-RF gas trade is a relationship of asymmetric interdependence. The relationship being asymmetric suggests that interdependence does not exclude power (Emerson, 1962: 33-4), it is merely a “euphemism for dependence” (Waltz, 1999), because “evil potential” (Hirschman, 1980) or “disruptive power” (Kester, 2018) inherent in foreign-trade relationships motivates its transformation. It follows that the liberal dogma on interdependence being symmetrical is analytically unfounded. The fact that the relationship is still interdependent suggests, however, that the relationship is valuable for both sides and that both sides wish to keep it, and as long as it is so, a less dependent actor owns the source of power.

Asymmetric interdependence leads to “tensions of imbalance” (Emerson, 1962) due to a greater short-term sensitivity and potential long-term vulnerability of the EU in this relationship, which is also being used in a discursive construction of gas trade with the RF as a security issue. This results in “dependence/energy dilemma”, a sense of competitiveness, insecurity and fear due to threat perception from the shift in dependence balance, which can jeopardize autonomy and threaten national security. This disproves yet another liberal thesis: the economic security dilemma is not a looser concept than the cold-war military security dilemma.

Gas trade is an instrument of power for achieving political goals, whose use depends on the addressee

The “evil potential” of foreign-trade impregnates economic and political relations. Due to a spill-over quality of dependence (and cooperation), economic dependence can lead to a non-economic one, determining the goal to be achieved. A conscious choice of economic inefficiency and strengthening of the role of the state at the expense of market is being used as measurement unit. Economic goals (e.g. an increase in one’s own revenues, rise in production costs or financial losses

of another) are usually articulated or serve to justify activities. Political goals are directed at foreign policy control or change and are usually inarticulate. Although the RF mostly justifies its activities economically (by arguments such as rising prices, technologically and capitally ever more demanding extraction, equalizing of the gas price with the “European price”, non-payment of debts etc.), it has articulated its political goals for gas trade already in the 2003 Energy Strategy (RF, 2003), explicitly terming the energy sector “an instrument for conducting domestic and foreign policy”.

The RF uses gas trade as an instrument of power differently, depending on the addressee. It openly threatened the “near abroad” countries with gas supply disruption which were incomplete, short, announced and not in the coldest part of the year. Also, the RF is arbitrarily raising gas prices to countries at the time of their rapprochement with NATO and the EU. Keeping the narrative of a reliable supplier, the RF implements a differential pricing policy towards the EU too, using the foreign-policy cooperation and a level of dependence on Russian gas as a criterion. Moreover, the RF wishes, regarding the EU, to keep this instrument of power, because it seeks to avoid high fixed costs of politically motivated supply disruptions and negative legal consequences from breaching of contract, while still not having secured an alternative market. Supply disruptions are the most tangible and, in the short-run, the most effective way to use the instrument, but are rarely applied; this could also be an unnecessary measure, because the mere awareness of its potential produces an effect. With respect to the EU, supply disruption is more of a perceptive than a material instrument of power, while the control of the flow of foreign trade, the subtle monopolistic structuring of the market, is more important.

The importance of historical context

The oil crises of the 1970s provide a historic context which facilitates the understanding of the gas crises of the mid-2000s. The use of oil trade as an instrument of foreign-policy power has revealed the changing nature of power, which moved away from militarily and economically dominant countries towards the countries richer in energy sources, with a necessary condition of market cartelization (in case of gas trade, it is all about market monopolization). This turned economic issues, in the realistic paradigm degraded to a sphere of low politics, into issues of high politics, while affecting the secure energy supply being treated as a security issue and dependence on energy trade perceived as vulnerability.

Furthermore, the responses to oil crises influenced the responses to current gas crises: they provided a model for the introduction of riskification and diversification measures. Also, they influenced the emergence and defining of the concept of *energy security*, as well as differences in perception and framing of energy trade


with the USSR among the transatlantic allies – they initiated gas trade between the Economic Communities (ECs) and the USSR, to move away from the oil and Middle East, while causing an inclination in the US towards securitization and militarization of energy issues. Consequently, the US conducted - and keeps doing so today - an active policy of preventing energy trade between the EU and RF, which also includes extraterritorial sanctions.

Although gas crises could be perceived as a “new face of the old geopolitics” (Bridge, 2015), there is an important difference in the efficiency. Oil trade was politically unsuccessful, but economically successful instrument³, while gas trade is a more potent political instrument. Therefore, the rising prices and unavailability of oil lead to market disruption, because in oil trade market is global, prices are market-based and transport is flexible. The result is a redirection to other sources, and higher prices are the consequence of a secure supply. In gas trade, due to regional market, fixed and bilaterally agreed prices and transport through fixed gas pipelines, the market response to supply disruption and arbitrary price increase is not possible. Therefore, the RF, rich in oil and gas, uses gas trade in power politics, whereas it is making profit on oil using it for the internal-political and economic consolidation.

Theory about the change in role of the EU-RF gas trade

A coherent theory about the change in the role of gas trade between the EU and RF was generated, enabling contextual understanding of factors influencing the change in the balance of dependence between the actors of gas trade, as well as the response of the EU; so the research has achieved its goal in a cognitive sense. A schematic representation of the theoretical model looks like this:

³ For example, Saudi Arabia cut off oil supplies to Great Britain and France in 1956 and extended the embargo against Israel after these countries occupied the Suez Canal, which had been nationalised by Egypt. The supply disruption was unsuccessful because the US supplied oil to the three states and they did not withdraw from the Suez Canal because of the oil embargo, but because of the US pressure.



Source: own figure

The model shows that the ideational factor was crucial. Based on Putin's idea (a), the RF decided to give gas trade a new framework, aiming to achieve and also materially and perceptually strengthen asymmetric interdependence in gas trade (b) and consequent sensitivity/vulnerability of the EU (c) in order to use gas trade as an instrument of hard power, politicize it (event A). RF's aim was to strengthen the power of influence over the EU, so as to reclaim its superpower status and strengthen the ability of global power projection, to effect change in polarity of the international system (strategic goal) and preserve its sphere of influence in the "near abroad" coun-

tries (tactical goal). The RF having become an aggressive energy actor abusing its position as a dominant supplier was facilitated by its political-economic order, which guarantees aggregated political power and monolithic decision-making. Its materially and perceptually empowered self-constructed identity of “energy superpower” is also important, as well as a number of other material factors such as the volume of trading, energy trade characteristics, such as geologically-conditioned distribution of this strategic resource, which is scarce and difficult to substitute; an institutional form of trade inherited from the Cold War based on bilateral intergovernmental and business agreements with a fixed price and restrictive “take or pay” and “final destination” clauses. The RF further uses monopolistic gas market structuring techniques such as offensive investment penetration, networking, propaganda activities, gas diplomacy, soft power and diversification policy. Its over-proportioned influence is ensured through discursive techniques of perceptual strengthening of power, i.e. by constructing narratives about the power of gas trade, based on objective facts (for instance, the RF is the largest gas exporter to the EU) or careful manipulation (for instance, when constantly announcing the construction of new gas pipelines regardless of the previous announcements having not been fulfilled⁴), or non-discursively, when using gas trade as an effective instrument of power in the “near abroad” countries, which in turn raises fears of it happening also in the EU.

Due to its politicization, the EU no longer perceived gas trade with the RF as an expression of cooperation, but as a threat (event A/factor d), and, influenced by external actors (e) and new EU member states (MSs) historically averse to the RF (f), as well as by external crisis events such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises as key catalysts for the process (g), tried to securitize this trade (event B). One of the main external actors is the US, which, after the first gas crisis in 2006, put *energy security* in the focus of its foreign-policy activities, establishing the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) for the first time in history, proposing joint activities to the EU within the EU-US Energy Council, and taking care of the EU *energy security* by launching its own production and shale gas exports, as well as by adopting the European Energy Security and Diversification Act in 2018. China is another important external player, which has the potential to become an alternative market for Russian gas exports, thus increasing the blackmail potential of the RF. Ukraine is the third external actor, also the culprit for the 2006 and 2009 gas crises as external crisis events that made the EU aware of its asymmetric interdependence in gas trade (the RF could endure longer without gas exports than the EU without its imports). Such a conclusion was influenced by material facts (physical absence of gas supply), but also by the perception of the supply disruption threat, making the question of whether the threat exists objectively or only subjectively irrelevant.

⁴ The narratives can have material effects, e.g. the realisation of the South Stream gas pipeline has not even been initiated, but the decision to cancel its construction led to the fall of the Bulgarian government in February 2014, and previously in 2012, to a competition between the Republic of Croatia and Hungary to enter the project.

This sensitivity/vulnerability of the EU in gas trade with the RF is the main factor (c), which thwarted securitization attempts, as it caused fear in the EU of a Russian reaction in the form of gas supply disruption, creating a dilemma of vulnerability. This same factor made it easier for the RF to use gas trade in the power politics.

The securitization moves are just the distinctly non-economic part of the EU's actually hybrid response to the gas trade politicization. It has responded with other, often parallel, measures in an attempt to maintain economic benefits with as much political autonomy as possible. These are, first of all, free market measures, since the EU, due to its liberal-economic identity, equated free market with secure supply. These measures were not sufficient, as the problem was not in the market imperfection, but in the targeted use of trade in power politics. Therefore, the EU responds also in partly economic but non-market measures, which imply redundancy and opportunity cost, a certain financial cost compared to the initial solution. These are: the normative-technical riskification measures, which in the short run reduce the cost of supply disruption, but do not reduce the more important asymmetry of interdependence; and diversification measures, which are in part market ones (making a monopoly weaker and price manipulation difficult), but not economically viable, and more political, because their goal, as emphasized by the European Parliament (EP, 2012), is to get "as further away from Russian gas as possible". To reduce the asymmetry of interdependence in the gas relationship, the EU, for instance, is building economically inefficient LNG terminals and the Southern Gas Corridor. Ultimately, in order to stop being an intruder in the increasingly realistic world of gas trade, the EU brought the state and politics back into economy, so there was a politicization of gas trade on the EU part too. An example is the 2019 Regulation on the Control of Foreign Investments (EP/EC, 2019), its purpose being to suppress the threat of an uncontrolled inflow of foreign investments into the strategic sectors of the EU MSs for the sake of protection of national security, public order and strategic interests. The European Commission (EC) explicitly emphasized that these are investments from China, the United Arab Emirates and the RF (EC-PR, 2019).

Empirical implications of the new role of gas trade on the EU

The new role of gas trade has an ambivalent effect on the EU - it strengthens or weakens the EU energy actorness, its substitute measure being solidarity of the MSs. On the one hand, it had an integrative effect: it strengthened the role of the EC, which became a catalyst for the long-term energy security. Ultimately, the energy policies of the EU MSs have been communitized, albeit with a still shared responsibility in decision-making between the EU and the MSs, but thanks to the institutional organization launched within the European Energy Union (EEU) in 2015, the EU energy policy (EPEU) should become more consistent, coherent and professional. Besides, the EU, previously isolating gas trade from the foreign policy due to its identity, has

now begun to use the energy diplomacy as an instrument of aggregated market and political power, seeking to integrate the external dimension of energy policy and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The externality of this process, due to the potential for a positive spill-over effect on the CFSP, could be the strengthening of the European integration in general.

On the other hand, this new role has a disintegrating effect: it strengthened energy nationalisms thwarting collective negotiations and agreements with the RF and de-solidarized MSs - some of them frame the gas trade economically and advocate the economization of security, while the others give it a security frame and advocate securitization of economy. This has made the EPEU incoherent and inconsistent. The inconsistency is evident in different treatment of the SS and Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipelines in the identical context of the Ukrainian crisis and the EU disapproval of the Russian foreign policy. The EC managed to block the SS, which was meant to supply new, weaker EU MSs in Southeast Europe, but not the NS2, which was opposed only declaratively and whose entry point was Germany, the old, big and strong member state. Satisfying the interests of this large importer has enabled the RF to make a credible threat to the gas-dependent and less friendly new EU MSs – it could cut off their supply without affecting Germany. The new role of gas trade thus indicated the existence of a relative power relationship in the EU, which is one of the reasons for the failed securitization of this trade in the EU.

Securitization is a matter of political choice, and in the EU, an intersubjective construction of gas trade as a security issue was absent for several reasons. Securitization is the antithesis of the liberal approach, therefore it is contrary to the EU identity - “liberal desecuritization” was carried out because the EU as a postmodern integration renounces the use of force and does not wish to incorporate gas trade into a traditional, military-political understanding of security. Furthermore, securitization has normative, political consequences, obstructs the search for rational models, monopolizes solutions and requires activities “outside of normal politics”. The most important reason is different interests and threat perceptions of the EU MSs due to different material structures of the national energy sectors and different historical experiences with the RF. The opponents of the securitization argued that it could spill over to other areas of relations with the RF, but what actually spilled over was desecuritization. The consequence is a lack of coherence between the EPEU and CFSP: the EU openly does not support the Russian policy in Ukraine, but did not include in its sanctions regime the RF gas policy, although it serves its foreign policy. Thus, the EU responds incoherently and inefficiently not only to Russian energy policy but also to its foreign policy.

Theoretical implications of the securitization process

The concept of *energy security* in the EU was developed⁵ because of inability to eliminate gas imports and even more of inability to substitute Russian gas imports. Due to the absence of a performative dimension of securitization, the securitization moves have left the gas trade intact in the material sense, but because of discursive dimension of securitization moves, it became *energy security*. The use of the phrase does not indicate that securitization has taken place, but it suggests the possibility that securitization is still latently going on, since it is an iterative process. This is all the more important since the discursive dimension can change reality and become a catalyst for certain processes; its empirical use can have political implications.

The case study provides an empirical basis for the analytical distinction between the concepts of securitization and riskification⁶, two processes that represent different performative logics of security although both have its origins in the speech act. The concept of riskification develops terminology around the risk, which is long-term, diffuse, often indirect, inevitable, but manageable. It represents the logic of survival and vital systems safety and implies preventive activities to strengthen the ability to adapt, and make society resilient through the system of strict rules, established in the usual, regular legislative procedure. The riskification measures have been used in the EU since 2004, for the purpose of decreasing gas supply disruptions risk in the short run, and increasing the manageability of the consequent crisis while preserving the market activity for as long as possible by applying the principle of subsidiarity. The concept of securitization develops terminology around the classical national security discourses, since it focuses on immediate threats, and implies the existence of the Other, thus representing the realistic, state-centric logic of war. The case study showed that the logic of riskification could be an alternative to the logic of security: it does not become intensified nor it turns into the logic of securitization, but makes the securitization unnecessary, because it helps to keep the issue within the “normal” policy.

The case study provides an empirical basis for both, the theoretical understanding and the definition of *energy security* concept. It is a hybrid concept because it implies a non-traditional, non-military security threat due to a non-traditional instrument of power, used in a traditional and non-traditional way, it has a traditional threat object, it is strengthened by using traditional security grammar, and responses to its use have the characteristics of traditional security practices. Therefore, the concept has not advanced the security analysis - it represents a realistic, conflictual, state-centric, almost a cold-war manner of political thinking, to which the traditional logic of security is

⁵ In 2014, the EU adopted the first strategic document dedicated exclusively to *energy security* – the European Energy Security Strategy, which has “a strong geopolitical tone, unprecedented at the EU level” (Szulecki, 2018).

⁶ The term riskification was used by Olaf Corry in his 2012 paper “Securitisation and ‘riskification’: Second-order security and the policy of climate change”.

applicable. The phrase is actually semantically incorrect: the attribute *energy* beside the noun *security* should refer to the reference object of threat, which in this case is not the energy sector, but the constitutive principle, the foreign-policy sovereignty of the EU and its MSs; so it indicates only the instrumental connection to the energy sector. This implies that there is no need to add a new sector to the broadened CSSS security concept, because the *energy security* is covered by sectors of economic and even more of political security.

The concept of *energy security* is insufficiently empirically contextualized and theoretically conceptualized, and it could be instrumentalized politically because in the absence of a clear definition it can become an umbrella term for various political goals. It is important to define it in order to prevent an automatic merging of security and energy, its holistic use, because security is not ubiquitous in any sector, not even in the energy one. It is also necessary to distinguish *energy* from other security areas and *energy security* (as high politics) from energy policy (as low politics). An updated and contextualized definition of this contingent concept is necessary, so three definitions are presented in the paper, each depending on the framework given to gas trade. The most commonly used definition was created during the oil crises and it defines *energy security* from a market-centric perspective (since the use of oil trade in power politics was economically successful) as “uninterrupted access to energy sources at affordable prices”. From a riskification perspective, this definition should be expanded as “the ability to manage for a certain period of time the external influences on uninterrupted supply and shocks related to prices that the market alone cannot eliminate or balance”. Both perspectives point more to the semantics of the verb ‘ensure’ in the sense of providing for functional needs, than to the semantics of the noun ‘security’ in the traditional sense of security of survival, which refers to a security-political perspective. From this perspective, *energy security* can be defined as “the absence of a threat to foreign-policy security through the use of asymmetric interdependence in gas trade as an instrument of power”. This, of course, is not an all-time but a contingent definition, related to a specific case.

Conclusion

The EU-RF gas trade has not generated a conflict between the actors involved in accordance with traditional realistic predictions. During the Cold War, it was considered an issue of low politics or at least an issue undisturbed by politics, and was based on the liberal paradigm of cooperation and interdependence. Subsequently it began to be materially used and constructed further as a weapon in order to strengthen the power of influence and thus became an issue of high politics. In the case study, gas trade is used as a direct instrument of power by being suspended or structured in a way that strengthens its power of influence. Being unable to substitute the Russian gas imports, the EU has in fact decided to reduce the asymmetry of interdependence in trade in order to reduce the cost of using it in power politics. The EU responses are a mixture of economic measures (communitization of MSs energy policies inward and externalization of norms outward), technical measures (new gas interconnections and storages), public policy

measures (energy efficiency, use of renewables, riskification measures) and partly or completely political measures (diversification, securitization, politicization). The politicization of gas trade on the EU part has also two implications: firstly, it indicates the gradual transformation of the original liberal-economic identity of the EU into a realistic-political one, and secondly, it suggests that securitization does not have to be an intensification, in accordance with the CSSS hypothesis, or a logical continuation of politicization. In the case of the EU-RF gas trade, the politicization is the origin and externality of and can be equated with desecuritization.

The research has generated open questions. The first is whether gas trade has contributed to preventing escalation and helped to desecuritize or at least to keep the political and military securitization of the EU-RF relations after the Ukrainian crisis at a low level? Furthermore, how the EPEU and the EEU development are affected by the non-monolithic perspective from which this gas trade is viewed by the EU MSs? And the most interesting question is: The impact of discontinuity in gas interdependence between the EU and RF on the continuity of the organization of international system, through measuring of the effect of the new role of gas trade on the EU foreign policy? Answering to this question presents a real methodological challenge, because, how to measure the exercise of power of influence, a “degree of change of mind” (Ney, 2012)? This measurement would assume the isolation of gas trade from the numerous, simultaneously and synchronously used instruments in hybrid warfare, and besides, the process of converting gas trade into an instrument of power is not even complete. This issue most likely remains to be explored from a historical perspective since one of the key features of gas trade is long-term planning.

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PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: CAN DEMOCRACY SURVIVE THE MASS-SURVEILLANCE IN THE ONGOING DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

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Abstract: *The ongoing digital transformation and the changing security environment pose serious challenges in providing national security without jeopardizing democratic values and international human rights law. The article explains how the new threat vectors in the contested and unpredictable security environment urged democracies to introduce authoritarian measures to preserve national security. It argues that if democratic governments are about to win against authoritarian challengers this practice must be changed and aligned with the international human rights law and principles and standards.*

Keywords: *Human rights, International law, Mass-surveillance, Privacy National security*

Introduction

The exponential change of the national security threat landscape under the pressure of the power shift from state to non-state actors and digital transformation urges the government to partner with corporates and undertake extraordinary measures to ensure national safety and security. Nevertheless, as the Snowden case or the Macedonian case demonstrated the potential for misuse of these technologies is significant. Moreover, the scandal about the abuse of information on more than 80 million Facebook users for political campaigns by a shady consultancy company, Cambridge Analytica, reinforced growing discomfort about the power accumulated by private digital platforms exploiting massive amounts of user data and steering public opinion.

Although striving to ensure national security is a legitimate government task, securing the proper balance between national security and civil liberties is also essential to preserving democracy in these troubling times. Moreover, defending democracy is one of the key spheres that require particular protection against the authoritarian challengers who build their strategies on undermining democratic legacy, by provoking its guardians to harm the democracy by defending it. The article begins by explaining how changing security environment challenges democracies among others, by applying harmful practices of mass-surveillance that undermine privacy and human rights. It then tests whether surveillance can be democratic at all and explains the applicability of international human rights law. Finally, the article provides some guidance for preserving democratic values while protecting national security under international law.

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On digital transformation, the limits of western power dominance, and the test for democracies

The post-Cold War victorious days of Western liberal powers are long gone. While expeditionary mission in promotion of democracy and supporting the nation-building efforts marked the first decade of the post-Cold War Western triumph the terrorist attacks on 9/11 have changed it all. The first decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rising strategic importance of terrorism (following the attacks of 9/11 and the so-called Global War on Terrorism), increased dependence on cyberspace, and greater interdependence between consumers and producers of energy (Dzambic, Summer 2011). At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009, NATO leaders decided to update the Strategic Concept. The main idea was that the new document at that time had to define NATO's strategy for the post-9/11 era, which is characterized by non-traditional and unconventional threats. Exploiting technology, interconnectivity, interdependence, decentralized and federated security and the rise of corporate actors, some states saw an opportunity to utilize asymmetric tactics and non-state actors and thus compensate the strategic disadvantage to the West (NATO *per se*). These strategic shifts (recognized as hybrid threats) have begun to dominate the national security debates across the West in a pursuit to address the hybrid threat vectors significantly challenging democracy. In this context, states have employed proxies to achieve strategic ends immersing and uniquely messing the democratic realm. The annexation of Crimea or the attack on the key corporates (crucial national security service providers) echoed the old-new geostrategic competition.

The ongoing digital transformation continues to redefine the geopolitical security landscape at an unprecedented pace, rising the importance of geographically unbound space, cyber domains and a pervasive information environment. Emerging technologies such as information and communication technologies (ICT), artificial intelligence (AI) applications and systems (particularly in terms of machine learning and robotics), virtual and augmented reality applications (VR/AR), nanotechnology, space technology, biotechnology, quantum computing, etc. continue to digitally transform, among others, the geostrategic competition. This ongoing digital change is multidirectional, blurring the lines between physical and non-physical domains. It changes existing business models, consumption patterns, socio-economic structures, legal and policy measures, organizational patterns, cultural barriers, etc (Cochoy, Johan, Niklas, December 12, 2019). Moreover, it transforms the way, individuals and groups, across society live, work and interacts. At the same time, state and non-state actors, employing technology through multiple instruments of power simultaneously across all domains, produce disruptive dilemmas exploiting Alliance vulnerabilities. Authoritarian regimes have proved keen to adopt digital transformation, erecting barriers of filtering and censorship to control information flows on and into their territories. They use surveillance, cyber attacks, and disinformation to consolidate their power and expand it beyond borders

(see, e.g., Deibert, 2015; Hussain & Howard, 2014; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017;). The security professionals are vocal and advocate that if the democracies remain reactive in the highly contested dynamic and uncertain environment, it may risk failure (see for example Herpig, Schuetze, Jones, October 2018). Moreover, they argue that to be able to defend the national military and security forces (including intelligence agencies) must be able to act against the backdrop of other security challenges (climate change, pandemics, mass migration) that will continue to pose an increasing strain on the defence while protecting the core liberal values (The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018). Investment in smart solutions that will enhance the ability for cross-domain command, as the key deliverables in achieving multidomain defence and layered resilience is a trend. In accomplishing their duties to provide a safe and secure environment and protect democracy, among others, technology has made mass data gathering, analysis, and storage a financially and technologically feasible option for governments and private businesses. Hence, sophisticated algorithms using the power of Big-Data, Machine-Learning and Artificial Intelligence have become common denominators of national security. The technology has enabled governments and private businesses to collect and store thousands of data points on every individual, which has put the individual's privacy under constant threat. Nevertheless, utilizing disruptive technologies at a high rate on a national security contextual basis is affecting both the everyday life on an individual level and the functioning of democracies. Many civil society organizations, academics, human rights protagonists, but also international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and The European Union, have taken pride in advocating for democratic values and fundamental rights, among which we find digital rights. Yet, upholding these is a constant struggle and therefore individual and societal data protection concerns are now more tangible than ever.

Can surveillance be democratic? A view from the human rights protagonists' perspective

By now it is a well-established fact that today, everyone is being watched. Even though targeted surveillance is not new, "mass surveillance" is a relatively recent practice utilized by non-state actors-corporates and state agents. Trying to provide evidence of how democracy is in danger Marcus Michaelsen and Marlies Glasius from the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands systemized digital authoritarian practices into three categories (1) arbitrary surveillance, (2) secrecy and disinformation, and (3) violation of freedom of expression (Michaelsen & Glasius, 2018). At the same time, the mainstreaming of surveillance has helped spark an anti-surveillance, pro-privacy movement that straddles across academics, policy debates, human rights protagonists, political discourse, and public awareness.

While many have stressed the need to "transform traditional governance structures and policy-making models" and adapt more "agile" methods of governance to

preserve democracy (World Economic Forum, January 2018), others have raised serious concerns about the techno-totalitarian world we are heading. In this new world where corporations and governments get in bed with each other, due to our obsessive consumption of technology, the masses remain powerless and at the mercy of governments and the corporations they serve. (Allan, 11 November 2020) Hence, western democracies are under serious challenge for two reasons. First, to provide tangible national security solutions in the age of emerging disruptive technologies. Second, to preserve the core democratic values before they erode by the authoritarian type of measures and turn into a weapon of authoritarian manipulation campaigns against democracies themselves.

Understanding the ongoing popular privacy narrative is significant because it sets the terms of debate for the discussion of privacy and surveillance that will have - and already has had - significant real-world consequences (Anderson & Rainie, February 2020). For the ultra-libertarian critics, mass surveillance cannot in any way be democratic. Moreover, they argue that the “popular” privacy narrative (as opposed to the academic narrative) in democratic societies tends to focus on the impact of surveillance for the middle class and elites. (Bridges 2011; or Gilman 2008). For them, the rise of government surveillance and the rapid pace of technological progress have given the more privileged classes of society a glimpse of the longstanding experiences of the less privileged classes. This democratization of surveillance provides a unique opportunity to democratize privacy (Franks, 2017). Now that everyone’s interests are affected by surveillance, everyone’s interests must be considered in resisting surveillance. The ultra-libertarian critics also argue that by focusing on the concerns of the privileged, the privacy movement that has emerged from these developments undermines its own transformative potential.

Another contextual challenge for democracies in defending mass-surveillance practices that undermines the democratic narrative is looming large from their longstanding partnership with notorious authoritarian regimes (Uniacke, 2020). In this line, for example, the criminalization of human rights defenders is an important contextual framework for understanding the impact of surveillance on human rights. In countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or similar western partners, targeted surveillance does not happen in a vacuum. It happens in a world where human rights defenders are increasingly being smeared as “criminals and terrorists” identically as the practice is being utilized by the Western rivals-Russia or China. (Amnesty International, May 19, 2018).

The human rights defenders argue that surveillance cannot be democratic because data that were collected can be misused, a practice witnessed in democracies too. (Aaronson, January 9, 2018) For example, in a report released in 2018, called “Dark Side: Secret Origins of Evidence in U.S. Criminal Cases,” Human Rights Watch documented the use of parallel construction by federal and local police agencies, finding the practice is used in the United States “frequently and possibly even daily”. (Human Rights Watch, 9 January 2018) Examples from the EU and other

countries are also fresh and astonishing for the human rights defenders. (Legislative train, February 2021)

In a response to revelations by the whistleblower Edward Snowden about the extent of monitoring carried out by Government Communications Headquarters - GCHQ in the UK and the National Security Agency (NSA) in the US Ben Emmerson QC, the UN's special rapporteur on counter-terrorism published a critical study, arguing that mass-surveillance of the internet by intelligence agencies is "corrosive of online privacy" and threatens to undermine international law (Human Rights Council, July 2014). This study denies claims of both governments that their bulk surveillance programs, which the barrister finds endanger the privacy of "literally every internet user", are proportionate to the terrorist threat and robustly constrained by law. To combat the danger, the study endorses the ability of Internet users to mount legal challenges to bulk surveillance (Human Rights Council, July 2014). These programmes, according to him, "pose a direct and ongoing challenge to an established norm of international law".

More general critics emphasize that mass-surveillance even targeted surveillance are undemocratic because the advent of digital transformation is slowly turning into digital repression and is profoundly affecting the relationship between citizen and state. New technologies are arming governments with unprecedented capabilities to monitor, track and surveil individual people. Even governments in democracies with strong traditions of rule of law find themselves tempted to abuse these new abilities (Feldstein, January 2019). Liberal democracies across Europe are racing ahead to install automated border controls, predictive policing, safe cities, and facial recognition systems. In fact, it is striking how many safe city surveillance case studies posted on Huawei's website relate to municipalities in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain (Feldstein, January 2019). A Carnegie-supported study found that liberal democracies are major users of AI surveillance. The index used for this study showed that 51 percent of advanced democracies deploy AI surveillance systems. In contrast, 37 percent of closed autocratic states, 41 percent of electoral autocratic/competitive autocratic states, and 41 percent of electoral democracies/illiberal democracies deploy AI surveillance technology. Liberal democratic governments are aggressively using AI tools to police borders, apprehend potential criminals, monitor citizens for bad behaviour, and pull out suspected terrorists from crowds (Feldstein, January 2019). This, however, does not mean that by definition democracies are employing surveillance technologies in all cases unlawfully.

What does International law say about the protection of privacy against mass-surveillance?

The essence of principles and standards that provide a legal framework to regulate/protect against mass-surveillance are entrenched in the International Human Rights Law (IHRL). However, from the practitioner's perspective of view, it could be

argued that the ongoing digital transformation to regulate mass-surveillance requires the application of a “complex regime” governing ICT and AI applications and systems. Hence, to correctly answer (or at least with some sort of accuracy) the question it would be more appropriate to say that the legal framework regarding the mass-surveillance stems from multiple sources. This includes the existing body of international law, political agreements, and voluntary norms; an ever-growing body of technical protocols and standards on internet governance managed by technical groups and research communities; national regulations; self-regulation by the private sector; and other forms of nonbinding soft law. These norms span different topical areas, straddle numerous international regimes, and require the engagement of multiple actors. At the same time, international and regional courts, international human rights treaty bodies, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, and special rapporteurs, have all published authoritative statements on the law surrounding the right to privacy in the sphere of surveillance. Hence, although the right to privacy is a highly contested issue it is the essence on which the human rights law builds protection against mass-surveillance and constructs a binding regime for targeted surveillance as well. Giving the limited focus of this debate we will just address the human rights dimension-the core of the legal regime that addresses privacy.

The early concept of privacy as an essential human right is based on philosophical debates elevating privacy as the fundamental right. In their famous 1890 essay, *The Right to Privacy*, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote that the right to privacy was not to be understood as a mere property right, but as something even more foundational: the right to human personality itself. According to Warren and Brandeis, the right to privacy should not be confused with a property right, but is based on an even more foundational and absolute principle: “that of an inviolate personality” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). The legal regime that protects privacy, nevertheless, stems from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (United Nations, 10 December 1948). According to Article 12 *“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”*. Regional conventions further cement this recognition. For example, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, in Article V, predicts that *“Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honour, his reputation, and his private and family life.”* Similarly, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life (4 November 1950) predicts that *“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence; and 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,*

or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”. Another important source on privacy is written in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in its Article 17 (16 December 1966) the Covenant predicts that “*1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.*”

All of the above, clearly shows that in general there is a well-established body of international law entrenched in the *ius coegens* norms, but also the “treaty international and regional law”. Nevertheless, mass-surveillance endangers human dignity beyond just violating privacy. The interception of digital communications and the collection of personal data which includes the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, and to seek, receive and impart information; to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; and to family life – rights all linked closely with the right to privacy and, increasingly, exercised through digital media (Human Rights Council, July 2014). Other rights, such as the right to health, may also be affected by digital surveillance practices, for example where an individual refrains from seeking or communicating sensitive health-related information for fear that his or her anonymity may be compromised (Human Rights Council, July 2014). There are credible indications to suggest that digital technologies have been used to gather the information that has then led to torture and other ill-treatment. Reports also indicate that metadata derived from electronic surveillance has been used to endanger the right to life i.e., *analysed to identify the location of targets for lethal drone strikes* (Human Rights Council, July 2014). Such strikes continue to raise grave concerns over compliance with international human rights law and humanitarian law and accountability for any violations thereof. The linkages between mass surveillance and these other effects on human rights, while beyond the scope of the present debate, merit further consideration.

How can respect for human rights help democracies to survive digital transformation in the context of mass-surveillance

Although many human rights protagonists rightfully try to turn the world’s attention it should be clear that the right to privacy is not, an absolute right. Once an individual is under suspicion and subject to a formal investigation by intelligence or law enforcement agencies, that individual may be subjected to surveillance for entirely legitimate counter-terrorism and law enforcement purposes. The problem, however, is that protagonists on both sides of the spectrum of the balance between privacy and national security are right. Namely, most of the existing regulations, based on international principles and standards of international law are made on the assumption stemming from the social contract theory. In simple words the social contract theory means that people live together in society following an agreement that establishes moral and political rules of behaviour. People sacrificed their freedom to receive the protection provided by the government. The most

desirable form of governance according to this contract of course is a democratic form of governance based on checks and balances and free elections-where people empower political representatives to enforce the rule of law and provide among other security and safety. Therefore, when states agreed to accept, adopt, ratify and implement the modern human rights principles and standards under the UN framework (see for treaty law in Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties, 23 May 1969) they agreed that while human rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible they are restricted/limited for two reasons 1) the rights to the other individuals and 2) public safety or the common good (Douglass, February 1980). Over time the power and therefore most prerogatives and monopolies such as to use force, build and maintain infrastructures, provide services, etc. was only possible by the state. The ongoing redistribution of power and technological development has changed the environment rapidly. The unitary sovereign state has now itself been replaced by a new pluralism-a pluralism of function rather than one of political power-because it could neither satisfy the needs of society nor perform the necessary tasks of community. Hence, as Shearing & Wood asserted the challenge that faces us now... *“is to make the pluralism of autonomous, knowledge-based organizations redound both to economic performance and to political and social cohesion”* (Shearing & Wood, 2003). These autonomous organizations that gained unprecedented power (something which was previously reserved for states) are not subjects of the law (such as states and international organizations that they formed). These organizations (referred to as non-state actors, for example, corporates organizations, terrorists or criminals) are just the objects of the law-meaning it is hard to establish direct accountability. Hence, the most extreme critics perceive that the existing regulations among others in the context of mass-surveillance and privacy are obsolete for the digital world. These views, but also the employment of the new technologies in the changing environment, create an urgent need for states to revise national laws regulating modern forms of surveillance to ensure that these practices are consistent with international human rights law. As Ben Emmerson, the UN's special rapporteur on counter-terrorism observed *“The absence of clear and up-to-date legislation creates an environment in which arbitrary interferences with the right to privacy can occur without commensurate safeguards. Explicit and detailed laws are essential for ensuring legality and proportionality in this context”*. Moreover, referring to the bulk surveillance practice by some states counter-terrorism practices he concludes that *“The prevention and suppression of terrorism is a public interest imperative of the highest importance and may in principle form the basis of an arguable justification for mass surveillance of the internet”* (Emmerson, October 23, 2014). The technical systems applied for the surveillance programmes currently in operation are so wide that they could be compatible with article 17 of the covenant only if relevant States are in a position to justify as proportionate the systematic interference with the internet privacy rights of a potentially unlimited number of innocent people located in any part of the world.

Recognizing how the gap between democracy and the rules of law can harm the international order on 24 September 2012 the United Nations General Assembly

adopted the Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. The Declaration reaffirmed that “human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations”. Indeed, government responsiveness to the interests and needs of the greatest number of citizens is strictly associated with the capacity of democratic institutions and processes to bolster the dimensions of rights, equality, and accountability (The United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2012). The declaration also reaffirms that the rule of law should not be considered as an instrument of power at the government’s disposal. The law should rather be considered as a rule to which the entire society, including the government, is bound. This approach is fundamental in practicing and expanding democracy in a digital age where the rule of law does not end with just the simple application of norms and procedures. The law in its essence and moral context has a more profound role such as framing the protection of rights within the broader discourse on human development (Tommasoli, 2012). In ensuring this correlation democracies should restrain from limiting the evaluation of the democratic governance only to enforcing the principles of “rule by law”. In such case, the absolute practice of the principle introduces risks to divorce the government from being democratic pushing it to autocracy simply because “rule by law” means that the law is an instrument of government and narrow implementation of the law in this fashion will simply consider government as being above the law. On the other hand, “rule of law”, implies that everyone in society is bound by the law, including the government. Essentially, constitutional limits on power, a key feature of democracy, require adherence to the rule of law.

Normative standards for lawful surveillance thus must consider international human rights law standards and principles, as well as the experience gathered in jurisprudence and principles developed by multiple stakeholders, including civil society organisations (Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 2014)². The application of such rules, however, must extend not only to communications surveillance, metadata retention, or policing activities, but to those new practices that involve hacking, bodily surveillance, biometric data gathering, and any future form of data collection mediated by technology. The government’s action can be aligned with the international rules of law if measures by the governments’ agents are legal, necessary and proportional.

Legality requires that measures of targeted surveillance are applied by the legal authority for the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of intrusive surveillance technologies, as well as for its development and importation or exportation. Processes, purposes, measures, requirements, probable causes, possible targets, and institutional authority as well as proper restrictions and limitations with an exact timeframe of the

² Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 2014), “Necessary & Proportionate: International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communication Surveillance”, available at: <https://necessaryand-proportionate.org/es/necesarios-proporcionados3>

applications must be stated by law. Necessity urges limitation of surveillance activities to what is strictly needed for a legitimate objective. The mere availability of low-cost surveillance technology, or its offer by a vendor (for example), does not justify acquisition or deployment. In this line, surveillance measures must be appropriate for the legitimate aim and only after exhausting all alternative means of collecting information and data that are less restrictive of human rights. Finally, these measures must be proportionate. This means that surveillance measures must be preceded by an analysis of the existence or likelihood of a crime or threat, that intrusion might very likely allow gathering relevant evidence, that less invasive measures are not available or would be useless, that no other information will be kept, that only relevant authorities will have access, that no other use or transfer will occur, and that fundamental rights will not be affected in their essence.

Conclusion

The ongoing digital transformation poses serious national security challenges, but also presents a test to democracies. Although preserving national security is imperative, providing it in a wrong way will do more harm than good. In this line, the growing tug-of-war between the individual's privacy and freedom vs. national security has renewed the concerns about where the fine balance should lie between the two. Respecting the international human rights law is an essential element to preserve and promote democratic governance as an antidote to the authoritarian and rouge alternatives. While privacy is not absolute the surveillance practices must be aligned with the international rules of law. This is possible if government actions are legal, necessary and proportional.

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WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY

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Abstract: *In order to create conditions and opportunities for increasing the leadership potential and capacity of women leaders, education in the field of leadership and management, improving certain skills for applying leadership tools, as well as gaining new knowledge are needed in these areas. Regardless of the field in which women work, there is always an opportunity for career advancement, improving the quality of work, affirmation at and outside the workplace, improving the characteristics of women, bridging gender barriers, etc. The authors of the paper provide an overview of the current situation with women members in security institutions, as well as the possibility for advancement in their careers.*

Keywords: *woman, leadership, career, security, etc.*

Introduction

Leadership, in theory, is found as a process in which an individual influences the thinking, attitudes, behavior and responsibility of others. To be able to make such an impact, an individual who is identified as a leader needs to have the skills that other members of the group do not have or do not use. Such skills are related to motivating, inspiring, directing employees, initiative, and more. There are several definitions of leadership, but it most often refers to the interpersonal influence that is achieved when one person can obtain consent from another to achieve the desired goals of the organization.

In the past, there were certain stereotypes about what a successful leader should look like, but today those views have changed. It can be concluded that you are not born a leader, you are made one. To become a successful leader you need education in the field of management, communications, stress management, decision making, public appearance, etc. By acquiring these and other skills and knowledge, conditions can be created for the formation of a successful leader. (Malish Sazdovska, Dujovski, 2009: 68)

A good leader is a leader who acts as the first among equals, listens to his/her co-workers, adequately motivates them, and is an example of a responsible person, a professional within his/her profession and, an expert in his competencies.

Managers achieve managerial goals by influencing the work of others within the organization. The power of the manager is directly proportional to his ability to influence and control the behavior of employees.

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Leadership

In theory, several theories determine leadership in many ways and it is seen from many aspects. Thus, leadership is determined from the characteristics, i.e. the characteristics of the leader.

The leader stands out and leads the others. His/Her subordinates follow him/her of their own free will and it is not a matter of coercion or violence against them, but more of an initiative taken by the leader, who among other things has greater knowledge in the field or represents and supports the specific case. The leader is often distinguished from others by his/her behavior at the meetings he/she leads or is a member of, with his/her broad knowledge of the topic of discussion. The leader should know to listen carefully and listen to the needs of the employees, but he/she should have the qualities that others do not have, that is, to turn into initiatives what he/she listens to.

The most effective leadership “varies” according to the maturity of the employees. Maturity is a desire to achieve, a willingness to accept responsibility and, an ability related to tasks and experience.

The leader should not identify himself/herself with the manager. The manager or director of an organization or institution is formally in that position and is of course in charge of managing that organization or institution and makes decisions about the work and the effective completion of the tasks. The manager does not have to be a good leader. To be a manager and a good leader, one should have proper behavior towards the employees, to motivate them, to lead joint actions, to be a good listener and interlocutor, and at the same time to be an example of a professional, skilled, motivated, hard worker. Only in that way the manager can be a good leader and lead the employees towards mutual successful activities and tasks.

Female Leadership

Women should be completely equal and participate equally with men in the private, public and, political life in a country and society. It should be noted that women should fight for their women’s rights; to take an active part in decision-making at all levels of society to build a just society; fight against discrimination; fight for adequate representation of women at decision-making positions; promote tolerance, human rights and equality; initiate various activities to help and support women.

In the Republic of North Macedonia, gender inequality and gender-based discrimination are still prevalent, as well as gender-based violence and domestic violence, while women remain unequally represented in the public sphere. Gender equality means that women and men have equal rights and opportunities to realize their potential, contributing to the economic and social development of their country and in return benefiting from their participation in society. (OSCE, 2020)

The question arises about gender equality and the possibility for women to

advance in their careers. Unfortunately, compared to men, there are still inequalities and differences in career development among women, different salaries for the same kind of job and the same competencies, existence of stereotypical opinions that a woman should primarily be a mother with her patriarchal role in society. In practice, no distinction should be made between female and male leaders and the rule of the “female principle”, i.e. the “male principle”. Given the current social conditions, economic empowerment of women and their professional affirmation is necessary. World leaders need to manage changes to contribute to gender equality. There are different opinions on the causes of inequality between men and women. These include cultural barriers, lack of self-confidence, conservative society, insufficient education, misunderstanding and, mistrust by the environment, etc. The advancement of women as human resources should be aimed at the development of competencies, skills and, abilities.

According to some authors, female leadership is characterized by the following features:

- women are more efficient at leadership positions (54.5% for women and 51.8% for men). There is, however, a paradoxical situation, that although women represent more than half of the workforce in organizations, the higher we go up the ladder of managerial positions, the lower the percentage of women so that on the highest positions of general managers only 3% to 4% are women. (Sherwin , 2014)

- women leaders deserve the respect from their co-workers, effectively present their vision, mentor their subordinates, solve problems creatively and flexibly and honestly reward the successful ones; (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2013)

- a common characteristic of female leaders in the treatment of equality within the family, which encouraged them to learn, explore and establish their own opinion. (Ganesan, 2016)

According to some opinions, successful women leaders have six main and common characteristics:

1. They protect their rights, guided by facts, not emotions.
2. They are aggressive, in the best sense of the word. They always achieve their goal.
3. They empathize, without being unnecessarily sentimental.
4. They are confident, their ego is under control.
5. They know it is vital to take care of them. The energy they need to get the job done comes from good mental and physical health.
6. They can handle huge levels of stress.

The possibility for the development of women’s leadership arises from the fact that leaders are not born, but leadership can be advanced, i.e. everyone can strengthen their skills and gain new knowledge. (Malish Sazdovska, 2018: 31)

Female leadership is characterized by a strong vision along with a full commitment and an opportunity to inspire others. The leadership qualities that women

generally possess are related to their ability to realize their vision. Their main characteristics are perseverance and passion. They also have patience, compassion, humility, and strength. (Folta et al, 2012)

Women face numerous stereotypes and obstacles in their career development. They can be of various types. According to some researches, the negative obstacles that women face are:

- Feeling guilty about not spending enough time with the family because of their work,
- Family responsibilities that interfere with their work,
- Resistance from other current leaders,
- Must surpass male leaders to be considered an effective leader,
- Lack of support for household chores when needed. (Calliper Research& Development Department, 2014)

Women are generally considered to have strong communication skills, so it can be assumed that they would excel in business connections. But connecting in the business world often revolves around activities that are considered “male”, such as golf or hunting. Women with significant family responsibilities have limited time to build professional relationships or socialize with colleagues outside the workplace. (Barriers and Bias, 2016)

Program Documents

To increase the presence of women at all levels of decision-making in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for prevention, management and conflict resolution, Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted on 31 October 2000. It proposes increased participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes; the appointment of more women as special representatives and delegates, as well as the expansion of the role and contribution of women in United Nations field operations, especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian workers. This Resolution reaffirms the importance of the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution and building peace, as well as the urgent need to equalize gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations.

The decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens on the participation of women in political and public life calls on member states to “take concrete measures to achieve the goal of gender balance in all legislative, judicial and executive bodies”. In many societies, men are generally seen as the provider of the family and are therefore required to earn more, while women are generally seen as caring for other family members. (OSCE, 2019)

By adopting and implementing some decisions, OSCE participating States reaffirm the importance of empowering women to take an active part in policies and processes related to building a public sector based on integrity, openness, transparency,

accountability and, the rule of law. The OSCE recognizes that equal rights for women and men are essential to fostering peace, sustainable democracy and, economic development. The OSCE aims to provide equal opportunities for women and men, but also to integrate gender equality into policies and practices, both within the participating States and within the Organization. (OSCE, 2020)

To implement this Resolution in the country, a Draft Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security was adopted - UN 1325 entitled Women, Peace and Security. It states that the role of women in promoting peace, maintaining security and dealing with conflicts is often misunderstood or simplified. Returning to the conflict as a situation in which different needs, interests and different perceptions of needs and interests are identified, it can be concluded that gender perspective is an important element in creating, maintaining and resolving conflicts. In practice, the gender perspective refers to the phenomena in which women are in a subordinate situation compared to men, which significantly affects the understanding and analysis of the deep causes of conflict. (Proposed Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security, 2012)

The goals of this Plan are:

- Strengthening the gender perspective in the formulation and implementation of the Peace,

- Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Macedonia;

- Strengthening the participation and contribution of women in international, civilian and military missions in which the Republic of Macedonia participates;

- Prevention of violence and protection of women's rights during peace, conflict and humanitarian disasters. (Proposed Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security, 2012)

With the realization of these goals, greater representation of women in the institutions of the security sector is expected and also their participation in decision-making, as well as in the creation of security policy.

In July 2020, the second National Action Plan of the Republic of North Macedonia for the implementation of UN Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security was adopted. This Plan promotes the principles of integration, inclusiveness and integrity. The Ministry of Defense will establish a "Body for coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the second National Action Plan (NAP)" to implement the obligations during the timeframe of the second NAP. The implementation process is expected to be dynamic, creative and future-oriented while overcoming prejudices, barriers and stereotypes. (Second NAP North Macedonia, 2020)

At the national level, the Action Plan envisages commitments to increase the number of women in the security sector, especially in the police, military and peace-keeping operations. Many police and armed forces have adopted gender policies and stepped up efforts to recruit women by adapting to employment-friendly criteria and processes and making family-friendly policies and targeted employment campaigns. However, the number of women in the security sector remains far from equal compared

to the number of men. In many countries, as more women become part of the police and armed forces, there are structural conditions that discourage them to endure. Women are often disproportionately underrepresented in low-ranking jobs and eventually leave as a result of their unused skills, discriminatory attitudes and, policies, sexual harassment and difficulty combining work responsibilities with family responsibilities. (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women, 2019)

Women's Leadership in the Field of Security

Gender awareness and consideration of gender and women have increased greatly over the past decade in the security and justice sectors. Gender balance in many institutions of the justice and security sector is improving worldwide, especially in countries that are not in the northern parts of the world. Women are given higher positions and ranks in the hierarchy and the external control and internal mechanisms for combating gender-based discrimination, harassment, exploitation and abuse have been strengthened. Such measures have helped these institutions to become more inclusive and representative and to better perform the task assigned to them - to promote gender equality. Despite these positive developments, there are still major challenges to achieving gender equality and overcoming gender discrimination in both the security and justice sectors and the wider community. (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women, 2019)

The judicial and security sector deemed to have gender equality, diversity and inclusion is a sector that achieves success in terms of women's employment, their retention at work and their purposeful participation. Also, gender equality goes hand in hand with achieving a diverse and inclusive institutional culture holistically. Diverse and inclusive security and justice institutions attract, retain and promote diversity of women, men and individuals of other gender identities. This occurs where institutional culture and work practices are inclusive, non-discriminatory and open to diversity.

In security, there are still certain stereotypes about the participation of women in the security organs. Regarding the representation of women in defense, according to the data published in 2013, it can be concluded that:

- 5.69% of women are represented in the Armed Forces in the Republic of Macedonia;
- of the total number of employees, 2.94% are women in command positions;
- 6.67% of women are represented in officer training. (SEESAC, 2014)

To increase the number of women leaders in the Armed Forces, the following measures are proposed: attracting quality personnel, promotion of the profession, informing about competitions and information materials, equal access to training, etc.

To increase the representation of women in the Armed Forces and especially in decision-making, policy-making and implementation, i.e. the positions of women leaders, the following recommendations have been adopted: to develop and apply a long-term strategic approach to increase the number of qualified candidates; increase

the representation of women in vocational training and education by encouraging decision-makers to identify and refer qualified women, as well as encouraging women to apply; to adapt the infrastructure, uniforms and equipment to the working conditions of women; to improve the measures of harmonization of private and professional life, etc.

Regarding women and their representation in the Police, it can be noticed that women are more represented in certain jobs and certain tasks. For example, women are involved in the crimes of rape, domestic violence, juvenile delinquency, human trafficking, etc. Women in the police have good communication skills, can establish co-operation and have the trust of citizens who are victims, witnesses, etc. Women in those situations show greater patience, understanding and tolerance. (Stankovski, 2013, 107)

In 2013, 18% of the employees in the Ministry of Interior were women, and their representation by sectors is as follows: 8% in administration, 6% in uniformed police and 4% in criminal police. Regarding the education of women for police work, women were first included in a four-year secondary school police education in 1993/1994. A special feature of the work of women in the police is their engagement in the Special Task Force "Tiger" in 2014. However, the conclusion is that the representation of women in the Police is not at a satisfactory level and we should work to increase their representation. Therefore, the initiative "Network of women - police officers of Southeast Europe" was launched to promote the role of women in the Police and represent the principle of gender equality. Among other recommendations, one is to increase the number of women mentors who will increase the professionalism and expertise of the Police. It should also be noted that there were two women ministers in the Ministry of Interior.

There are also several women employed in private security agencies, but still, that number is not satisfactory. As a result of certain researches, the following results have been obtained:

- Only 4-5% of the employees in this sector are women;
- Basically, there are no prejudices and stereotypes towards women in the field of private security, but there is a certain restraint in the public;
- Positive Macedonian legislation does not differentiate between employees based on gender;
- There is a principle of equal chance for the perspectives of women in this security sector;
- Women in private security are employed in various jobs and positions, but rarely in managerial positions, etc. (Gerasimovski et al., 2013, 183)

Women are also involved in the areas of protection and rescue, crisis management and natural disaster management. The representation of women in this area is 21.63% in the protection and rescue forces, while there are only 9.1% women in managerial positions. The engagement of the protection and rescue forces begins with the planning phase when the conditions for engaging women and men in certain activities are considered. Then, team leaders are in charge of inclusion and gender representa-

tion in the teams. Although there are numerous activities for gender representation of women in the field of protection and rescue, there is still no significant improvement. (Timovska at all, 2013:211)

The population in the Republic of North Macedonia, according to the population estimate (as of 30.06.2019), has 2 076 694 inhabitants. The percentage share of women and men in the total population is almost equal, 49.9% of the population are women and 50.1% are men. In the records of the State Statistical Office there is no special category of employees in security, just in the Public Administration and Defense with compulsory social insurance there are 15 685 women and 37 741 men. In other words, the gender structure comprises 29.4 women and 70.6 men. According to the statistics for the employees by occupation and by gender in 2019 about 5% of women were employed with military occupations (armed forces occupations). (Women and Men in the Republic of North Macedonia, 2021)

Although the above data do not provide an accurate picture of female employees in the police, military, private security and other security institutions, it can still be concluded that this number is small and that in the coming period we should work on increasing the employment of women in these bodies and institutions.

Based on the Annual Report of the state administration bodies on the progress of the situation of equal opportunities for women and men for the Ministry of Interior, it can be concluded that the percentage of employees in the Ministry of Interior is 20.11% women and 79.88% men. Of these, managers with higher education - women 1.5% and 5.99% men, non-managerial employees with higher education 7.47% women and 20.5% men and non-managerial employees with secondary education 9.43% women and 47.17% men. (The Annual Report - Ministry of Interior, 2019)

These figures shown as a percentage indicate that women are not represented in sufficient numbers within the Ministry of Interior because they are 20.11% versus 79.88% men. Although the report lists measures and activities to improve gender representation, it is still not at a satisfactory level. 13.72% of women and 86.28% of men were sent for professional specialization during 2018. This number is even lower in the Ministry of Interior, where from about 20%, only 13.72% were provided with professional specialization. The report states that strategic plans and appropriate programs have been adopted, but questions are raised about their implementation. However, thankworthy is the preparation of manuals on gender-sensitive issues, the conducted training and the participation in workshops and training, the organization of a project for female mentors, etc. We hope that the implementation of the set goals in the strategic documents and increasing the number of employed women in the Ministry of Interior will improve the gender representation of women and the opportunity for their career development in this Ministry.

The Annual Report of the state administration bodies on the progress of the situation of equal opportunities for women and men for the Ministry of Defense presents data on gender representation in this Ministry. The report shows the following statistics:

- Gender data of administrative officials by categories in 2018:

Category B - 4.50% women and 6.30% men

Category C- 20% women and 32.43% men

Category D - 16.65% women and 20% men, i.e., in total, 41.15% women and 58.73% men.

With respect to support and technical staff, out of a total of 239 employees, 36 are women - 15.06% and 203 are men - 84.93%.

- Gender divided data on military personnel in the Ministry and the Army in 2018:

Officers - 13% women and 87% men

Non-commissioned officers - 11% women and 89% men

Professional soldiers - 5% women and 95% men

Civilians - 38% women and 62% men.

-Gender divided data on military personnel - participants in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions:

Women - 9%

Men - 91%.

It is further stated that in 2018, out of a total of 369 participants in training: 129 (33%) were women and 260 (67%) were men, out of a total of 255 persons sent for vocational training and training abroad 20 (7.85%) were women, and 235 (92.15%) were men. A good practice in the Ministry of Defense are the certified gender trainers who are directly involved in the gender sensitization process; conducting gender training for all categories of personnel, the Ministry and the Army; exchange of experiences, cooperation and participation in activities (conferences, training, etc.) of an international character. (The Annual Report - Ministry of Interior, 2019)

However, if the presented results are analyzed, it can be concluded that a small number of employees in the Ministry are women, especially in the officer corps and professional soldiers, while this percentage increases for civilians. It can also be noted that the deployment of women in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, as well as vocational training abroad is minimal.

The conclusion for this Ministry as well is that the strategic documents represent the commitment for gender equality of women, but we should still work in the coming period on increasing their number, as well as creating conditions for career development equal with men's career development.

Some Aspects of Women's Leadership in Security Services and Authorities

According to the principle of gender equality, it is necessary to have adequate representation of women in all organizations and institutions, but in certain segments

of social life, there are areas where women are less represented. This is especially present in the field of security as a specific profession where the prevailing opinion is that certain jobs are typically male. It is, therefore, necessary to pay special attention to the employment of women in security, but also the number of women in managerial positions should be increased. In some high positions, for example, ministerial, in the past, there were women appointed to these positions, but this mostly referred to politically based positions. What needs to be worked on in the coming period is appointing women to managerial positions in the field of operative dealing. Namely, another conclusion for women leaders in the security services and bodies is the fact that there are women heads of departments for legal affairs, human resources, statistics and analytics and in the sphere of criminal police in certain positions related to juvenile delinquency, prevention, domestic violence, etc.

Given the fact that a half, or perhaps even more among the students and graduates of the security faculties are women who achieve good success in education, the question arises why they are in a much smaller number on managerial positions in the field of operational work in security services and authorities?

A manager in the Ministry of Interior can be any employee of the Public Security Bureau and the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate, who has a managerial role in the hierarchical arrangement. In carrying out the tasks within his/her competence, he/she is responsible for the work of the employees in the sector. Performing the managerial role, he/she uses the activity of police officers and authorized persons, organizes and coordinates the work, communicates with other managers at both higher and lower levels. The role of the manager is to communicate with the immediate executors, motivate them in performing security tasks, stimulate self-initiative, develop interpersonal relationships, etc. (Malish Szadovska, 2014: 28)

Police officers should act in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, laws and bylaws, and be decent, objective, and correct in their relations with citizens and have equal approach to all, regardless of national, religious, political or any other affiliation. Hence the obligation of women leaders to make every effort to perform the assigned tasks, to take care of the overall activity of employees, their professional development, readiness to perform security tasks, etc. Women in managerial positions in the police should behave in a way that is appropriate for the job and serve as an example to other employees.

One of the basic authorities of women police leaders is to issue orders, which can be written or oral. The employee is less treated as an object of management and more as a subject of leadership. Although the employee participates in the decision-making on certain security issues, he/she also participates in shaping the vision, designing the strategies and defining the goals of the service where he/she works. The traditional hierarchical relations, which were the main feature of the security services, are slowly but surely giving way to cooperation and joint activities in the performance of security tasks, commitments and set goals.

Women leaders in security services and authorities should focus on the employees and their safety when performing their security tasks. They should also motivate the employees to perform complex security tasks, develop communication skills, train on the principle of lifelong learning, etc.

Security services managers should strive to neutralize or minimize the negative qualities of individuals and recognize and activate positive values and available potentials to achieve the goals of the service.

Conclusion

Security is a specific area of work where in the past period men were predominantly employed to perform the planned tasks. But women are also skilled and have the expertise to face all the challenges and tasks in the security area. Therefore, women should be employed in the security institutions and bodies in the Republic of North Macedonia based on their qualifications, acquired knowledge and skills and previous experience. In the recent past, there has been a trend to sensitize these issues, especially after the ratification of certain international documents that impose the trend of gender representation in all spheres of social life, including in the field of security. This is especially noticeable with the adoption of certain strategic and other documents for the representation of women, as well as the appointment of persons responsible for the implementation of these policies. It can be concluded that there is a certain trend of approving the employment of women, their involvement in certain processes, but still, it is not at the satisfactory level.

Namely, in addition to the employment of women in security institutions and bodies, they must be appointed to certain operational functions at higher levels in the hierarchy, because so far women are advancing only in the area of administrative-legal and other similar areas. In the next period, it is necessary to create conditions for successful career development of women in these institutions who could apply for certain high-ranking jobs equally with men and have equal opportunities for career development. At the same time, the level of awareness among women should be raised and they should be motivated to advance in their careers based on their competencies. Only in that way, it will be possible to achieve a balance in the gender representation of women in security institutions and bodies.

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THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE PREVENTION AND FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND DEALING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

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Abstract: *This article discusses the benefits of using the knowledge and tools of psychology in counter-terrorism, which can contribute to maintaining security and defense nationally and internationally. A number of contemporary psychological strategies, such as increasing the awareness of the general population, using methods and techniques for staff selection, offering psychological support and training, as well as increasing the resilience of individuals can provide typical and proven psychological solutions in the fight against terrorism. The problems and challenges faced by cyber security employees, as well as the possible psychological response to such challenges are briefly discussed. It can be concluded that the greater the range of psychological interventions that will be used in repairing the psychological consequences of terrorism, the greater the benefit for the whole community, and not only for those directly involved in the terrorist act.*

Keywords: *psychology, counter-terrorism, psychological strategies*

Introduction

The rapid progress of the world in the twenty-first century makes terrorism one of the most complex concepts faced by governments of all countries, as well as the international community.

When it usually comes to defending against terrorism, the emphasis is on technological innovation and technical means that contribute to the success of terrorists. Terrorists use the mobility provided by modern transportation, as well as connectivity and autonomy through contemporary ways of communication. The main goal of counter-terrorism is to increase the capacity of governments to counter the threat of terrorism. In addition to the benefits of numerous scientific studies in areas such as electro-optical counter measures, information technology and the technical aspects of protection, knowledge from the social sciences has made a major contribution to the defense against terrorism. Above all, psychology with its various subdisciplines stands out as a key social science for understanding the defense against terrorism in all its forms, such as anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, and managing the consequences of terrorism (Koltko-Rivera and Hancock, 2004).

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There are many definitions of terrorism as a complex concept of the new age that differ according to which aspect is positioned as central. One definition defines terrorism as 'acts of violence deliberately committed against civilians in order to advance an ideological, religious, or political goal' (Borum, 2004, p.4). It can be defined as a special kind of strategy that uses public violence intended to bring about social or political change. In order for an act to be categorized as terrorism or an act of a terrorist nature, it must contain approximate victimization of non-combatants, civilians, to influence far more distant actors, both governments and agendas (Taylor, 1988). In the name of the cause, people are killed, which is a symbolic means of achieving a far more ambitious goal (Hofman, 1998).

Contemporary research in psychology focuses on fundamental findings that address a number of key issues, the results of which can have effective practical implications. Psychology as a science tries to answer the question why some individuals become terrorists or engage in terrorism. Several analysts suggest that the connection between perceived injustice, affiliation and identity determines the decision to join terrorist groups (Basra and Neumann, 2016; Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006). Motivation stems from the need to belong, to have a stable identity, or, the individual need to unite oneself and society, which explains the similarity in the behavior of terrorists in groups with different composition and purpose (Post, 1984). Belonging to a terrorist group gives a sense of true affinity, which creates a powerful pressure of conformism by organizing against the society. The results of the research in the field of psychology of terrorism indicate that mental disorders are not usually critical factors in the behavior of terrorists (Weatherston and Moran, 2003; Corner, and Gill, 2020). Numerous theoretical foundations have been laid for the extent to which individual experience is relevant for understanding and preventing terrorism. Based on the research results, there is a view that is consistent with the theory that enthusiasm for a terrorist activity is primarily a developmental phenomenon of the late adolescence and the early adulthood (Achtar, 1999). The idea of terrorism as a result of psychopathology is discredited.

Terrorist activities have a cycle of stages, including planning, preparation, execution, escape and evaluation (Koltko-Rivera and Hancock, 2004). Each successfully completed action encourages the start of another or spiral of several other attacks on a larger scale. Counter-terrorism and the involvement of the security forces at one of the stages is an end to that cycle. Counter-terrorism operations include measures to monitor, prevent, gather intelligence, deter, intercept and direct actions of terrorist activities that take place in the country or are internationally widespread. Counter-terrorism involves more than just technological solutions. Numerous psychological methods can be included and applied, the application of which shows great effectiveness in counter-terrorism.

Development of psychological resilience in the population

The psychological, cultural, and economic impacts of terrorism reach far more people than those who have been directly injured or in close contact with those injured in terrorist attacks (Woods, 2010). Steps need to be taken to make the general population less vulnerable to the psychological effects of terrorism. Positive psychology, as an area of psychology can contribute to increasing the subjective well-being of people. Within this subdiscipline, subjective well-being is defined as an optimal psychological functioning, manifested through a positive feeling towards oneself and one's own life,

as a personal experience that arises from self-evaluation of life in general - which is significantly based on the assessment of realized desires and valued things that will make life fulfilled and pleasant (Spasovski, 2013). Hence, subjective well-being is defined as the frequent experience of the life satisfaction and pleasant emotions and only rarely unpleasant emotions, the terrorists create attacks that are dramatic, interrupting daily life, blaming and intimidating the population (Abrahams, 2006). After exposure to the news of terrorist attacks violence, people increase their personal feelings of threat, anxiety, insecurity and loss of control (Delhey and Newton, 2003). Since they are all powerful drivers of anxiety, people respond by seeking order and belonging (Kent, 2019). The usefulness of the programs for promotion of the development of resilience among the general population will help the population to be less vulnerable to the negative effects of terrorism. They become stronger because they refuse to succumb to the tragedies perpetrated by terrorists, and they can help others who have suffered similar losses. This increases the resilience because they recognize the community support, so the terrorists have a good reason to fear resilient people (Grotberg, 2002).

Raising awareness of terrorism among the general population

Psychology focuses on the challenging question how to deal with terrorism. Individuals involved in terrorist acts seek for comprehensive response from society, and not simply their detention (Silke, 2011). Believing in untruths, speculation and pointing out inappropriate attributes inevitably leads to harmful policies, while prolonging campaigns of violence. Educational psychology, as a field of psychology, focuses on the ways in which people perceive knowledge and how they retain knowledge, so it can offer methods for raising awareness of terrorism among the general population. In order to achieve the social goal of increasing awareness of terrorism, the method of persuasion from the psychology of consumer behavior can be used, which changes the personal and social behavior (Koltko-Rivera and Hancock, 2014).

Fabick (2004, according to Arciszewski, T. et al., 2009) believes that one of the possible effective strategies against terrorism is to change the usual process of perception that precedes discrimination, based on the division "we vs. they", also suggesting that social identity and deviation from the group could be the base for terrorism.

Developing communication campaigns that use core cultural values to motivate individuals who oppose terrorism are more likely to be effective than those who either ignore or oppose such values. For the negativity of terrorism and hostility to the state, it is necessary to involve local leaders who will speak and discuss openly with the people (Pyszczyński, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2002).

Using the psychological methods of selection and training of employees in the fight against terrorism. Working in the fight against terrorism is defined as a highly stressful profession. The difference between life and death is in the untimely reaction of the counterterrorism staff, when thousands of people are likely to die.

Counterterrorism staff are involved in detecting relatively rare events but with catastrophic consequences. Changing the nature of terrorist threats to physical and cyber security leads to identifying and planning jobs for future security. Industrial-organizational psychologists are experts in job analysis, job evaluation, performance measurement, individual assessment of individual differences, as well as mental and physical abilities, which can provide analysis of future-oriented jobs (Sanchez and Levine, 2012). Also, with their expertise, industrial-organizational psychologists can acquire skills appropriate for each job based on training and learning models, as well as specialized training programs.

Employees focused on cyber security

The nature of the work of cyber security professionals is complex, since they are on the front line of the defense. Employees who are focused on cyber security may experience higher levels of burnout and exhaustion from work. Therefore, leaving the workplace by these individuals is common, because their work tasks are repetitive and tedious, the work shifts are long or overnight, and are directly burdensome for the employees. The number of cybersecurity practitioners is relatively small, although the needs for the profession are growing. The findings show high prevalence of burnout in cyber security employees (Dykstra and Paul, 2018). When employees feel exhausted, cynical about the job and have reduced self-efficacy, their job performance decreases. Psychologists with knowledge of industrial-organizational psychology face the challenge of exploring the role of cyber security professionals, and can provide valuable assistance in structuring the work shifts, redesigning work, increasing employee motivation and engagement. Employees focused on cyber security do a job in which they face people who are actively trying to ruin the day, 24/7 (Schueler, 2019), thus experiencing a high level of burnout and therefore it is necessary to develop self-awareness, mental health care and maintain the well-being. Hence, there is a need to organize training and support for employees focused on maintaining cyber security, so that they can do the job as best as they can.

Psychological training and support

Psychological training is aimed at improving the quality of mutual communication and cooperation, as well as trust and cohesion among the members involved in the counter-terrorism team. Counterterrorism staff need ways to optimize performance under stress. In addition, they face problems in mental health and well-being as a result of the traumatic events they encounter at work. Most often faced by members of the military and staff of intelligence teams, they need to be encouraged and offered psychological support so that they can overcome stress faster and return to work faster. Occupational safety and health psychology as a subdiscipline of industrial-organizational

psychology is aimed at improving the quality of work life, maintaining and improving occupational safety, assessing factors related to resilience and well-being of employees, understanding how leadership and teamwork factors affect the development of mental health symptoms, as well as providing support to employees who need mental health treatment (Landy and Conte, 2019; Quick, 1999). Counter-terrorism staff, such as military personnel and intelligence teams, include frequent relocations, separation from family, and 24/7 access, murder requests, murder avoidance, care for the wounded and witnessing deaths and injuries, so these are professions that operate in a high-risk context (Adler and Castro, 2013).

Diversity in the workplace in security and counter-terrorism teams

As in all organizations, members of the military and members of counter-terrorism teams face differences in the workplace. The challenges of diversity, equality and inclusion, followed by sexual harassment, ethnic discrimination, sexual orientation and gender identity lead to anxiety and worry about staying in the job. Industrial-organizational psychologists have employment policies that take into account the discrimination and the harassment. They also develop models of assimilation, recruiting, selecting, training and motivating employees to have the same values and organizational culture, a model of protection that identifies the disadvantaged and underrepresented groups and gives them protection, as well as a model of values where each element of the organization is valued for what it is unique to the organization (Herriot and Pemberton, 1995).

Psychological strategies in educational security programs

The two most important roles of education are teaching the students how to learn, but not what to think, and let them appreciate that learning is a lifelong activity. Innovative thinking and broader understanding will make it easier for them to adjust to the future and take appropriate conflict resolution strategies. The dramatic changes expected in the future require a profound transformation of how services educate and prepare leaders at every level. Industrial-organizational psychology abounds in rigorous methods for measuring knowledge and skills, as well as organizing trainings and education that facilitate the development of the necessary skills. Industrial-organizational psychologists have different approaches for assessment, including structured tests and assessment centers. The assessment centers represent a set of procedures for evaluating a group of individuals in simulated exercises, performed by several assessors (Landy and Conte, 2019) up to integrity tests. By linking knowledge, skills and other relevant characteristics to workplace performance, they can adequately determine whether the knowledge gained from military education and security education is applied in the workplace. The revision of security education programs with the inclusion of psychological strategies is necessary for national strategies in the fight against the terrorism in the future.

Conclusion

Terrorism physically hurts only a small part of the society, leaving many more people with consequences followed by periods of hardship, stress and fear, a period in which they question their choices about the life and the work (Inness & Barling, 2005).

The value of psychology in the fight against terrorism is increasingly being recognized, but it is necessary to involve psychologists directly. It is necessary to include programs explaining the aspect of psychology in the already existing traditional training for education of the staff that will be involved in the fight against terrorism, as well as to hold in continuity workshops for professionals already working in this field. In addition, it is necessary to expand the models of assistance beyond the witnesses and the services that are first responders, including the entire population. Psychological methods are used by governments to raise awareness of terrorism among the general population. With an explicit understanding of the professional context and the use of culture, mental health initiatives can become even more effective tools for promoting the well-being of employees involved in the fight against terrorism. The immediate recognition of the benefits of incorporating psychology focused on problem areas directly related to the relevant issues in the fight against terrorism will be evident in the near future.

Psychology can offer very much in counter-terrorism, but it can also be very useful for developing programs for education, prevention and overcoming the consequences of terrorist activities.

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APPLICATION OF DETECTION RECONNAISSANCE TECHNOLOGIES USE BY DRONES IN COLLABORATION WITH C4IRS FOR MILITARY INTERESTED

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Abstract: *Information in the 21st century represents power, and thus the safest and most legitimate “machine for domination”. The consequences of the rapid growth of information technologies and their usage for army purposes make information one of the key concepts of unconventional warfare. With the tendency for creating modern, better equipped and more effective armed forces, in all the armies of the world, there is an increasing need for gathering intelligence. As the precision and lethality of armed systems is increasing, so is the need for the rational and effective use of data. In this context there are technological and operational challenges to be met in terms of progress of the data collection and processing platforms, sensors, communication systems and their varieties. As one of the resources for collecting intelligence, the drones emerged with their different spectrum of use: significant amount of collected data in a short time period, in a large area and inside opponent’s territory, high accuracy and veracity of collected data, possibility for quick transfer of the focus of reconnaissance, i.e., a possibility for changing the object of reconnaissance during the reconnaissance mission. The purpose of this paper is to present a model of the system for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – a C4ISR system with a focus on detection and reconnaissance by the use of drones in collaboration with C4ISR (supported by GIS) for military purposes.*

Key words: Drones, C4ISR, military, reconnaissance, GIS.

Introduction

Armies in the 21st century have to manage difficult operations in the field of unconventional warfare. Today, battles are won in the middle of large cities and on the computers in the operational center where information is the most powerful tool. Buildings and streets are the new battlefields, in which every corner hides different types of danger. Soldiers have very difficult tasks, to observe and save themselves from various attacks. There are objective

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needs for the implementation of drones, the use of which would provide adequate support to military units in conducting operations. It is possible to find a large number of drones on the market with different characteristics and different purposes.

Since their initial use for military purposes, drones have been adopted by governments and legal entities to provide a wide range of services, including traffic management, delivery of goods, inventory tracking, disaster management, wireless networks, etc. (Chamola et al, 2020; Liu et al, 2018; Zhao et al, 2019; Alladi et al, 2020a; Alladi et al, 2020b). A large number of armies of the world have different types of drones in their armament. The requirements of the army and the police for the characteristics of drones for use in different types of operations are very uneven. Drones have shown their importance and value in modern combat operations. The use of drones for military and civilian purposes is increasing.

The term drone has a broad meaning, it is a means with a motor that is remotely controlled by the operator or it is a means that has a certain level of autonomy (control is achieved using communication software, and often artificial intelligence is used together with different types of sensors), which can be used once or more and can carry deadly or non-lethal cargo and transmit data in real-time. It is a synthesis of the means and devices necessary to manage it. They differ in purpose, construction characteristics (shape, dimensions, weight, payload, maximum flight altitude, maximum range, flight time, speed, etc.), the environment in which they are used and the energy source that drives them. Depending on the purpose, they can be used in different environments such as land, water, air and space, and the broad spectrum of possibilities has enabled their use in defense and security (for the needs of the army and the police - original purpose), agriculture, construction, traffic, trade, communication, science, medicine, research, architecture, video and photography, geology, forestry, mining, oceanography, environmental management, sports, mapping, etc.

The focus of the paper is on the application of drones in the air. It is often found in literature that the term drone means all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), regardless of whether they are remotely controlled by RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aerial System) or aircraft with a certain level of autonomy. The analysis of the content leads to the conclusion that the term air drone means the synthesis of an unmanned aerial vehicle and the device necessary to control it. (Milić et al, 2019) A broad spectrum of drone capabilities allows the use of drones for recording, monitoring, detection, tracking, (Radovanović et al, 2020) command, control, management, reconnaissance, etc., and these functions provide the possibility of using drones in the military units. There is a significant interest across the world in the development of drones that have the ability to fly in different environments and locations, perform realize different technical - technological missions. The type of drone is represented by UAVs - unmanned aerial vehicles that can fly over a space of several tens of meters to several thousand kilometres (Cavoukian, 2012), and are used for both military and civilian needs. The original use of drones for military purposes was for conducting observation missions, due to the possibility of displaying the image in real-time. Today, the use of drones is present in various activities.

The limitations of drones include limited autonomy of movement, battery life, limited payload, limited movement depending on the environment and physical obstacles (Hamurucu and Eren, 2020). The application of drone technology using drones along borders can reduce the cost of securing the border and reduce the involvement of people in border patrols (Mirzaeinia et al, 2020). Drones can reconnoitre and detect activities in areas with limited movement for

humans and they achieve a significant advantage in cooperation with C4IRS systems (National Research Council, 2006; Figueira et al, 2020; Bihl and Talbert, 2020; Bommakanti, 2020). The greatest problem with the use of drones in reconnaissance and detection operations is the inability to communicate with them at greater distances. In order to solve this problem, two new principles are being developed (Milić et al, 2019):

- Communication with drones from fast-moving platforms;
- Communication with drones using drones as relay (mobile) stations.

Classification of drones

Drones differ in their characteristics depending on the platform and the purpose or practical use. (Krijnen and Dekker, 2014; U.S. Department of the Army, 2003) When classifying drones, it is necessary to thoroughly consider all aspects that can have an impact on different understandings of drones, in order to classify them as accurately and precisely as possible using methods of analysis, synthesis and classification. Today, there are several different divisions of drones depending on the institution that has classified them into different categories. Drones are most often classified in relation to the environment in which they are used, the purpose, the construction characteristics, in relation to the task, the source of energy that drives them and autonomy which is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Drone classification factors

In relation to the environment, drones are divided into air, ground, water, underwater, space, as shown in Figure 2, where the complete classification of drones is outlined by the author. (Minoshma et al, 2019; Xiang et al, 2015).




Figure 2. Classification of drones

The European Association of Unmanned Vehicles (EUROUVS) has created a classification of drones based on the following characteristics: in terms of purpose, flight altitude, flight duration, speed, maximum payload (MTOW), aircraft dimensions, signal range, etc. (Arjomandi et al, 2006; Stevanović et al, 2019) In relation to flight altitude, takeoff weight, cargo weight, maximum range and maximum flight time, drones are divided into five categories as shown in Figure 3.

CONSTRUCTION CHARACTERISTICS				
Class I	Class II	Class III	Class IV	Class V
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weight > 250 kg • range > 70 km • service ceiling > 3000 m • endurance > 6 h • payload > 10 kg 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weight 30 - 250 kg • range 30 - 70 km • service ceiling > 3000 m • endurance 3 - 6 h • payload > 10 kg 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weight < 30 kg • range 10 - 30 km • service ceiling > 3000 m • endurance > 1 h • payload 2 - 10 kg 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weight < 10 kg • range < 10 km • service ceiling > 300 m • endurance 15 min - 1 h • payload < 2 kg 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weight < 1kg • range < 1 km • service ceiling < 300 m • endurance < 1 h • payload < 100 g

Figure 3. Drone classification

Based on the classification of drones, it is concluded that the characteristics of drones usually depend on their purpose. It is necessary to analyze the tactical and technical characteristics of drones in order to consider the possibility of their use in reconnaissance operations in cooperation with C4IRS.

Drones supported by C4IRS in geo - reconnaissance military operations

GIS is widely used in almost all branches of modern armies. GIS uses the following capabilities: command and control, defense mapping organizations, base operations and facility management, force protection and security, military engineering, mine clearance and mapping, mission planning, terrain analysis, etc.

The term reconnaissance means preliminary observation or research of a specific field for a mission to obtain information about the enemy or to locate it. Geo-reconnaissance determines the specific type of information gathered from the visual observation or other detection methods, which give us information about the terrain, geographical elements of it and objects in that specific area that can help us create a better picture of the enemy and the resources they are using.

C4IS is defined as a Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Information system. The Arc-GIS platform is an information technology infrastructure, and as such, provides a horizontal, crosscutting technology that is very different from other GIS

technologies. One concept made a big step forward in the use of GIS for military purposes, especially military requirements. It is a NCO that represents a concept of Network-Centric Operations i.e. the use of a network to connect decision making across multiple defense domains and beyond. Therefore, NCO is much more than warfare. It connects warfare with strategic intelligence, and by that with installation management. This frame is way beyond the traditional defense and intelligence domain. Arc-GIS have a critical impact on each of the three concepts of NCO:

- Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance - ISR;
- Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence C4I;
- Precision engagement – PE.

The C4I domain supports timelier and better decisions by using a variety of tools to analyze, assess and plan actions. Arc-GIS bolsters C4I capabilities by providing a common spatial context and the tools to provide decision-makers, commanders and war fighters with a distributed and scalable environment for decision support.

The development of military technique management command systems seen in recent years has been made possible primarily by the development of microelectronics, the rapid decrease in size of IT tools, the enormous increase of their capacity and the integration of their capabilities into a single system. This is applied by maneuvering robot aircraft, unmanned flying devices – drones and by all other armament management, deployment management systems, which are, on the one hand in interactive contact with the environment, and guide interactively the given object, on the other.

Hence, one of the ways of data gathering is by aerial photographs and space images. The advantage of these kinds of data collection is the possibility for gaining information without getting any contact with the earth surface directly, but by contacting a mediatory unit carrying information about the surface. That kind of mediatory unit which carries assessment equipment to gain information is today's popular unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), commonly known as a drone. With proper equipment, they can be used to observe and make live photographs of the enemy terrain. This method will reduce the number of people risking their lives for the purpose of collecting information.



Figure 4: GIS Cloud mapping with drones

Developing a new concept and model of an information system that will include all these parts is the main idea of this paper. Creating an appropriate application for portable devices based on the model of the information system will facilitate the usage of these complex concepts. The Geo-reconnaissance and command (GRC) information systems are based on the GIS usage supported by drones for both Geo-reconnaissance and C4IR - Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Information and Reconnaissance. Thus, through the wide utilization of drones in collaboration with GIS, we want to create one completely defined information system which will help soldiers, commanders and strategic decision-makers to better observe their current situation, decide on their future actions, and, of course, provide after-mission feedback and analysis of the mistakes and give directions for further improvement.




Figure 5: Model of Geo-reconnaissance and command (GRC) information system supported by drones and GIS

Based on our previous classification of drones in Figure 4, according to the characteristics of drones depending on their purpose and with a proper analysis of their tactical and technical characteristics in order to consider their possibility of use in reconnaissance operations in cooperation with C4IRS, we can make a multivariate use in a military operation.

Class one drones can be used for long-range reconnaissance operations supported with video live stream, multilayer Lidar data recording, thermal recording and weapons.

Class two drones can be used for middle-range reconnaissance supported by all previous systems, but with lower time capabilities.

Class three drones can be used for small range reconnaissance operations for live streaming, thermal recording without any possibility for weapon launching, because of the small weight capacity.

Class four and five drones can be used just for close distance operations for rescue operations with limited capacity for streaming and weight. In our model of Geo-reconnaissance and command (GRC) information system supported by drones and GIS in Figure 5 we use class four or in some specific operations, class five drones.

Drones - information system - geo-reconnaissance and command

The 1st step into creating this kind of complex system is equipping the direct participants i.e. soldiers with proper geo-locating equipment and that will be an emitter that will constantly send out signals. The receiving device, because sometimes the terrain is not accessible for all kinds of vehicles, will be set on the drone and it will forward the signals to the commander. The device set on this drone also will be in the role of an emitter, so it will send out various kinds of signals to the soldiers on the battlefield.

The 2nd step is receiving the information about the location of the unit and the soldiers in the commanding unit. In this unit, the commander with the help of the staff (headquarters) based on the locations of the soldiers shown on the monitor using GIS software (Arc-GIS and Geo-Rover), decides what actions will be taken. In this section, the functioning of the information system is mostly affected by the GIS usage for C4IRS, already described in the previous topic. Arc-GIS capabilities help in the decision-making process, giving to commanding unit various kinds of information, from a situational picture on the field to decisions made by other commanders, visualization of unit deployment, reports, and of course information received from the geo-reconnaissance.

Geo-reconnaissance actually is the parallel step to the geo-location step. Geo-reconnaissance, in fact, is the major element of this information system. With drones which is equipment with aerial photography, infrared sensors, lidar images, the command gets data and information about the situation on the enemy territory, about the enemy's soldiers, objects in the deep of the enemy line, fortification obstacles, and other information that can be beneficial later in the decision making process.

Geo-locating and Geo-reconnaissance give the input values in the information system. Then the human factor makes a decision, which represents the output from the system. This output can be in the form of directions about the movement, use of weapons, withdrawal, locations of IEDs. The orders are transferred to lower instances, and at the end, every soldier has a specific task to complete. If the "output" represents specific directions about the movement, that order is shown via GPS on the GPS navigator which is part of the equipment of every soldier.

An integrated part of the information system is the recording and live streaming section. A camera is set on the drone above the battlefield, so it records the real action. The video is transferred to the command, which can help make a better decision if the information is received from other sources (geo-reconnaissance, geo-location, radio devices). Additionally, the video material can be used later for mission analysis or battle. Drones are controlled by the command and their location and movement depend on the mission requirements.

Conclusion

Drones have a fast growth in today's world, but its capabilities have not been explored completely. The possibilities provided by drones supported by GIS have a wide range of use, and therefore this information system nowadays is being increasingly used in various fields of study. Of course, military industry discovers different ways of developing this information system by manufacturing new devices as drones, vehicles and weapons and also by integrating the GIS in the existing technologies.

A military information system based on connecting these two powerful usages of drones and information systems will help the armies in the world and decision makers to better observe the mission or battle and give accordingly specific orders based on the information collected from geo-reconnaissance and live-streaming of the situation on the battlefield. The data from geo-reconnaissance, i.e. the situation on the enemy's terrain and the geo-location of their own units and soldiers serve as input values for the commanders. The command makes a decision which represents an output value of the system, and it is sent out to the soldiers as a voice order or as movement navigation.

The greatest impact is that this system can be used in managing civilian crises, such as: earthquakes, floods, forest fires, road accidents, monitoring traffic in urban areas, first aid response with medical supplies, locating lost persons in the mountains, after earthquake search missions with thermal camera drones, search operations on inaccessible terrain, etc.

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NON-MILITARY INSTRUMENTS OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

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Abstract: *The dynamic nature of security risks and threats, continuously initiates the necessity of updating existing ones, as well as of applying new responses and tools in dealing with them. Among other, this position is confirmed by the development of the concept of preventive diplomacy. Actually, with projected dominant military instruments at the beginning, preventive diplomacy as an approach in preventing violence and conflict escalation begins to be based on a wider range of military and non-military instruments and activities by the end of the 20th century. The economic sanctions objective as a part of non-military instruments is primarily focussed in forcing a target state to change or undo an objectionable policy conduct. Still, the use of economic sanctions as part of preventive diplomacy imposes the necessity for adequate analysis of several aspects, especially the political context and the closer regional environment as well. It is no doubt that the sender countries, or the International organizations, are after all, acting as third parties to the conflict. Regarding to this, they should choose an adequate approach that is sensitive to both the type of conflict and the degree of conflict intensity. This paper's aim is to research the role of economic sanctions in international efforts of conflict prevention, as well as the extent to which sanctions can play a significant role related to this issue. In this sense, the paper closely analyses the objectives and effectiveness of economic sanctions at different conflict phases.*

Key words: *preventive diplomacy, conflict, sanction, prevention, security*

Introduction

Preventive diplomacy is perceived and understood as a preventive mechanism based on the principles of the UN Charter, from today's point of view. In fact, the genesis of the development of preventive diplomacy presents that it is most often associated with the application of a wide range of instruments and activities aimed at preventing a possible escalation of misunderstandings in armed violence between two or more parties. In addition, the UN is recognized as a major actor with a recognized significant role in the prevention and settlement of both international and bilateral disputes. An Agenda for Peace (1992), Addendum: Agenda for Peace (1995), the conclusion of the Security Council that conflict prevention and peace-building must be accepted as long-term processes (2001), as well as all previous UN military and non-military missions have an adequate contribution to such perception. There is no doubt that security risks and threats after the Cold War have necessitated a broader, multidimensional approach in dealing with them. In this sense the paper analysis is based on the broad understand-

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ing of preventive diplomacy and its impact to conflict prevention that includes the prevention of conflict escalation and post conflict peacebuilding.

In addition to other preventive diplomacy non-military instruments, such are: confidence-building measures, fact-finding process, mediation, early warning, etc., non-military sanctions also play an important role in non-military conflict prevention. In this regard, Article 41 of the UN Charter refers to measures that might be taken by the Security Council in implementation of its decisions and which do not involve the military force use.

Actually, after the First World War period, sanctions were understood as a preventive guarantee within the system of collective security, as well as a preventing wars instrument.² However, starting from that period until today, many analysts conclude that economic sanctions are not the most appropriate means in achieving larger goals. Still, they can be more useful in achieving limited goals.³

Debates over the issue whether sanctions are appropriate and effective have resurfaced since 1990 and Iraq invaded Kuwait. In fact, peace organizations have generally supported sanctions as an alternative to military warnings and pressure before the invasion, but have opposed them as a form of pressure on the Iraqi people, since the end of the war.⁴ Therefore, the decision making process of sanction application must be based on the context, purpose and type of sanctions that should be taken into account as well.

The paper analysis in general is divided into two parts. The first one that analyses the theoretical aspects of preventive diplomacy, its instruments and approaches in conflict prevention, and the second one that analyses the economic sanctions effectiveness and contribution in achieving the preventive diplomacy goals.

Preventive diplomacy: Theoretical aspects

There are many definitions of preventive diplomacy insight the scholar and research community. The reason about this is mainly due to the fact that different authors and policy makers apply different research approaches in the analysis of preventive diplomacy. The absence of such a universal shared definition amongst policy makers has in fact generated divisions between stakeholders, some of whom view preventive diplomacy as 'soft' mediation while other refer to 'muscular' diplomacy which includes credible threats of pre-emptive military action. However, it is indisputable that its theoretical and terminological development is most often associated with United Nations Organization.

The United Nations Organization established after World War II, had as its mission the maintenance of peace in the world.⁵ In this regard, the term preventive diplomacy was first used by former UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, who viewed preventive diplomacy as a means to fill the power vacuum between the cold

² Daoudi, M.S., Dajajni, M.S. (1983): *Economic Sanctions*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.18.

³ Hufbauer, G.C., Schott, J. (1990): *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 2nd ed, Institute for International Economics, p.79.

⁴ Георгиева, Ј. (2014): *Творење на мирот*, Филозофски факултет, Скопје, стр.37.

⁵ Mitrevska, M., Grizold, A., Buckovski, V., & Vanis, A. (2009). *Prevention and management of conflict –the case of Macedonia*, p.39.

war powers of the Western and Soviet blocs. Actually, he noted, "Experience indicates that the preventive diplomacy, to which the efforts of the United Nations must thus to a large extent be directed, is of special significance in cases where the original conflict may be said either to be result of, or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs. Preventive action in such cases must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counter-action from the other side".⁶ His interpretation is that the UN should have sought to keep new potential conflicts, away from the sphere of differences between the superpowers in that period.⁷ Actually, according to him, early engagement (preventive diplomacy) of the global organization could act to forestall the destructiveness of conflict created by external military intervention and arms transfers.

Since then the concept has evolved considerably. The end of the Cold War and the beginnings of the development of a new security environment, have initiated a need for a new preventive diplomacy understanding. Actually, the new appeared security risks and threats in that period have imposed a necessity of developing new approaches in dealing with as well as preventing them. As a result, a broader development of the preventive diplomacy concept was launched, which includes a clearer institutionalization of the UN role in this issue as well as the establishment of a new preventive diplomacy instruments and approaches. Regarding to this, Emmers & Tan, state that there has been a shift from a focus on preventing inter-state conflict during the Cold War, to preventing intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War era.⁸

The first step towards a new understanding of preventive diplomacy has been taken by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the sixth UN Secretary-General, and his report, *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. Actually, in this report preventive diplomacy was defined as: "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".⁹ Actually, such a Boutros-Ghali approach connects preventive diplomacy within a range of conflict management techniques that include peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping and essentially reflects on those activities that usually, but not always, fall under the purview of the United Nations, such as confidence building measures, arms control, and preventive deployment.

This early definition provides a core understanding of the goals of preventive

⁶ Hammarskjöld, D. (1960): Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 16 June 1959 – 15 June 1960. In General Assembly, Official Records (15th Session, Supplement IA).

⁷ Митревска, М. (2015): Превентивна дипломатија и мировни операции, Филозофски факултет, Скопје, стр.61.

⁸ Emmers, R., Tan, S.S.(2009). *The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A failure in practice* (Working Paper No. 189). Singapore: RSIS.p.8.

⁹ Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992): *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

diplomacy, which the United Nations and others have associated with a specific set of actions such as good offices, facilitation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication and arbitration. Accordingly, it does not include what others refer to as conflict prevention, which primarily includes human rights, as well as humanitarian and development assistance intended to ameliorate the underlying sources of conflict by improving the quality of governance, social and economic conditions, equality and the management of shared resources.¹⁰

Five years later, Michael Lund, defined preventive diplomacy as: “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change”.¹¹

Ten years after *An Agenda for Peace* was published, preventive diplomacy had come to refer to a response generated by a state, a coalition of states, or a multilateral organization intended to address the rapid escalation of emergent crises, disputes, and interstate hostilities. Preventive diplomacy entails primarily, but not exclusively, short and medium-term consultations using non-compartmentalized and non-hierarchical forms of information gathering, contingency planning, and operational response mechanisms.¹²

Kofi Annan, the seventh Secretary-General of the UN, renamed the activity called preventive diplomacy as preventive action.¹³ Actually, he viewed preventive diplomacy as a part of several forms of action that could have a useful preventive effect, such are: preventive deployment, preventive disarmament, preventive humanitarian action, and preventive peacebuilding. He categorized all these forms under the term of preventive action. However, all of these forms are intended to stop armed and violent conflicts before they escalate to widespread violence.

As all above mentioned, it could be concluded that preventive diplomacy is mostly related to conflict prevention. In this regard, the notion of preventive diplomacy implies conflict prevention, which is considered as the perception of intervention and not the escalation of the situation into a greater human tragedy.¹⁴ Preventive diplomacy is principally an operational response. It is premised on incentive structures

¹⁰ Zyck, A.S., Muggah, R. (2012): Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention: Obstacles and opportunities, in: *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, Vol. I, issue I, p.69.

¹¹ Lund, M. (1997): *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, p.37.

¹² Carment, D., Schanbel, A. (2003): *Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion?* United Nations University Press, p.13.

¹³ UN Department of Political Affairs, (1999): “Preventive Action and Peacemaking”. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.html>>

¹⁴ Georgieva, L. (2004). From the idea to the culture of conflict prevention in Macedonia. Conflict prevention, from the idea towards the culture of conflict prevention in Macedonia. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Construction of Peace Initiative and Democracy Partners in Peace and Prevention. Skopje, p.11

provided by outside actors to change specific kinds of undesirable behaviour. Preventive diplomacy is therefore targeted and short-term and preventive action taken relates directly to changes in conflict escalation and conflict dynamics.

Preventive diplomacy should successfully stop the escalating tendencies and return the parties to the path of constructive, collaborative resolution of their differences by non-violent means. However, consolidated peace through diplomacy may need to be preserved through the application of measures, which means that preventive diplomacy can be combined with the preventive deployment of military force.¹⁵

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Ditchley Foundation research, preventive diplomacy is consisted of proactive, non-violent measures in prevention violence escalation of political conflicts as well as in promotion of peaceful resolution of disputes.¹⁶

From all of the above mentioned, it could be noted that preventive diplomacy in general is an action taken to prevent misunderstandings between the parties in order to prevent their escalation into conflict, as well as to limit its further spread.

Economic sanctions: opportunities and challenges

In terms of security and peace, economic sanctions are part of a broad spectrum of policy instruments available to governments and international organizations as well. Therefore, they can be imposed unilaterally by one state or multilaterally in concert with other states or organizations. Their attraction for policy makers is based on the fact that there is no danger of bloodshed and a lower risk of an escalatory conflict dynamic.

The practice shows that the sanctions objectives could vary to a large extent and that they are determined by the policy context. However, according to the literature, there are several objectives that should be achieved by the using of economic sanctions. Such are the following objectives:

Compliance – sanctions should force the behaviour of the target state to act towards a compliant conduct. This objective is based on the approach of cost/benefit calculations. Actually the costs of the sanctions should exceed the target's benefits deriving from a non-compliant conduct.

Subversion – is often an implicit objective of sanctions.¹⁷ It intends to remove the target's leaders (leaving the political system intact) or to overthrow the entire regime.¹⁸ For example, the post-Gulf war sanction regime on Iraq only partially served to pressure Iraq to comply with the obligations of the cease-fire arrangements contained

¹⁵ Митревска, М. (2015): Превентивна дипломатија и мировни операции, Филозофски факултет, Скопје, стр.62

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Lindsay, J. (1986): Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.30, p.155.

¹⁸ Ibid

in UN Security Council Resolution 687.¹⁹ But, the widely acknowledged unofficial purpose was to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Deterrence/Compellence – sanctions appear here as a signal that the sender is prepared to use coercive means, if necessary, to prevent repetition of an undesired action in the future. Deterrence-oriented sanctions should be understood by the targets as a message for more coercive measures to come, should they continue their objectionable behaviour.

Punishment – punishment does not figure officially on the agenda of policy makers, but the record of past sanctions leaves in several instances with no other reasonable explanations. Punishments differ to deterrence to the extent that punitive action is not necessarily anticipatory to the future conduct of the target.²⁰

Effectiveness is one of the basic questions underlying the use of sanctions. By and large, there is a critical dilemma as to whether sanctions can be used as an effective policy instrument. Still, effectiveness is hard to measure and generalisations about the inefficiency of sanctions may not be very adequate. Sanctions do have an effect on target groups, but the main question regarding this is what criteria are used to measure success or failure.

There are two sides to the question of the effects of economic sanctions: the impact upon the target states and the collateral damage on third states. The effects on the target state are difficult to predict, primarily if the state is in turmoil, fragmentation or armed conflict.

But often sanctions generate a political effect, what literature refers to as “rally around the flag effect”.²¹ The case of former Yugoslavia depicted this effect when sanctions provoked a unified and defiant response against the United States and the UN, strengthening at the same time the rule of Milosevic, who skilfully rode on the wave of nationalism.²²

The collateral effects on neighbouring states have gained much prominence in the international community in the context of the sanctions against Iraq and Yugoslavia. The official acknowledgement of this problem led to the institutionalisation of compensation mechanisms that, in turn, can serve as a reminder to the international community that sanctions incur costs not just to the target, but also to the senders.

Effectiveness also requires a minimum degree of cooperation of the international community. Sanctions do not have the desired effects if there is no sufficient collective support and political willingness to bear the costs of sanctions equitably. Lack of uni-

¹⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Source: <https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf>

²⁰ Tanner, F. (1997): Economic instruments of conflict prevention, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, p.8.

²¹ Kishner, J. (1997): The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions, Security Studies, vol.6, no.3, p.38

²² Tanner, F. (1997): Economic instruments of conflict prevention, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, p.8.

versality does not only undermine the economic effects of sanctions, but it also sends the wrong political signal to the target state.

The legitimacy issue also seriously challenges the viability of economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument. For example, the former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, called sanctions “a blunt instrument”.²³ In this regard, two legitimacy aspects could be analysed: 1) sanction as a form of intervention, and 2) their impact on vulnerable groups within the target state.

About the first one, it is no doubt that sanctions are generally described as a soft form of intervention. Still, the main dilemma in this sense is based on the circumstances under which the international community does have the rights to interfere in internal affairs of other states by using coercive measures. The legitimacy of sanctions depends to a large degree on the purpose of sanctions. In the UN system, the argument has spread that sanctions could only be regarded legitimate if they contribute to conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The early phase of UN's use of sanctions as a means for advancing the UN mandate to preserve peace and security (1990-1994) was dominated by the influence of the five major permanent members of the council. Still, although sanctions provided the major powers with a powerful tool for collective action within the UN, the wide-ranging social impacts of these measures resulted in declining consensus on Iraq and disagreements on the appropriateness of sanctions for attaining council goals of peace and security.

The humanitarian aspects of the sanctions effects have become more important with the adoption of sanctions against failed states or war-torn countries. In this regard, it is necessary a proportional aspect among sanctions and their objectives. This is a first condition for any decision maker to protect parties and civilians from the sanctions effects. Actually, at the international level, there are several criteria that should be met when UN goes ahead with sanctions:

Permitted only after all other peaceful means of settling the dispute had been exhausted;

Permitted only after the Security Council had determined the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression;

Inadmissibility of creating a situation in which the imposition of sanction would cause significant material and financial damage to third states;

The inadmissibility, without the appropriate Security Council decision of making new demands on the State against which sanctions have been imposed or to stipulate additional conditions for ending or suspending the sanctions;

The inadmissibility of imposing sanctions without a time limit.²⁴

The above mentioned conditions are a clear confirmation of the economic sanc-

²³ Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Security Council/1995/1, and p.17.

²⁴ Basic Principles for UN peace-keeping, Press Release L/2756, 1996.

tions complex nature as well as about the serious challenges faced by the policy makers regarding to the process of beginning and the manner of implementation of the sanctions. The impact that sanctions may have on innocent citizens should also be taken into account in this regard. Actually, there are critics that condemn sanctions because they injure innocent civilians in the target country, and thus violate a moral proscription on injuring political innocents. Two main points are relevant to this criticism. First, while the injury to innocents is a drawback to sanctions use, the cost should be compared to the benefits that sanctions provide. The value of avoiding harm to innocents is not absolute, and should give way if the benefits of sanctions are greater. Second, the likely alternative policy instrument— force— usually also risks harm to innocent civilians.

The role of the economic sanctions in preventive diplomacy

The historical record contains more than 125 uses of economic sanctions by states and international organizations since 1914. Most of the literature analysing these economic sanctions focuses on the general question of the sanctions' effectiveness. There is no writing that specifically evaluates economic sanctions as a tool for preventing deadly conflict.²⁵

Hence, the analysis in this paper is aimed at researching the effects of sanctions in different phases of the conflict.

Above others preventive diplomacy approaches and instruments, economic sanctions could be perceived as policy instruments in influencing the outcomes of disputes and conflicts. Actually, economic sanctions may increasingly be associated with mechanisms of conflict prevention in this sense. Therefore, they should prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts as well as to limit the spreading of the consequences when they occur. However, this initiates the question about the effectiveness of sanctions at different stages of the conflict.

In a conflict prevention process, the use of sanction should address proportionally the degree of conflict escalation. It is no doubt that in this sense preventive diplomacy would firstly use instruments of peaceful settlement of disputes. Actually, such instruments could range from offering good offices and mediation to the exhaustion of all other peaceful measures. After this, policy makers would have to contemplate the use of nonviolent coercion, such are economic sanctions.

In this regard, sanctions should contribute to efforts in keeping and preventing conflict escalation and eruption. Still, it should be noted that conflict prevention also applies to other development conflict levels. As it was mentioned above, according to the Agenda for Peace, preventive diplomacy interacts with conflict on three basic levels: 1) as an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties; 2) as an action to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts; and 3) as an action to limit

²⁵ Rogers, S.E. (1996): Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, p.2.

the spread of the latter when they occur.²⁶

About the connection of economic sanctions with the developmental stages and cycles of the conflict, it is significant that the early use of sanctions could actually accelerate the escalatory phase of conflict. Therefore, in certain situations the possibility of using economic incentives or the threat of economic sanctions on other hand should be taken into account. The application of such an approach should be in the initial stage of the conflict. In this regard, the offer of extra aid, for instance, or the signalling of not renewing economic assistance packages could be relevant preventive diplomacy response in preventing violent escalation of current dispute. It means that within the first phase, i.e. conflict prevention, the purpose of economic sanctions is aimed at preventing disputes among the parties as well as preventing their violent escalation.

In the next phase, i.e. the phase in which violence is already present, the purpose of economic sanctions should be aimed at preventing the possibility of escalation of violence. At this stage, the use of sanctions should be sensitive and aimed at reducing the dynamics of the conflict. At a time of conflict escalation, for instance, the rapid imposition of full sanctions represents an all-out attempt to limit the further increase of violence.

In the third post-conflict phase, the threat of re-imposition of sanctions can serve as a means to convince countries to effectively carry out their post-conflict commitments.

In post-conflict situations, the sanctions have a higher propensity for conflict prevention than in a pre-conflict situation. First, sanctions may have a déjà vu appearance and their re-imposition is less likely to lead to a firebreak effect. Second, the procedures of adopting and re-imposing sanctions are less onerous; in fact, sanctions may just have been suspended and could easily be re-imposed by an executive act of national leaders.²⁷

The above analysis presents that the conflict level is the most important aspect towards sanction policies in preventive diplomacy. Still, it should be noted that it is not the only important aspect. Actually, the type of conflict is also an important issue in this regard. Traditional conflict prevention dealt with inter-state conflicts. On the other hand, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention today is geared primarily towards internal armed conflicts. Still, it does not mean that there is no international dimension to these conflicts.

The fact that in many cases today foreign troops are directly involved in internal armed conflict is a clear confirmation about their international dimension. Moreover, these conflicts might constitute a threat to international peace and security because of massive human rights abuse, or because of large-scale refugee flows and humanitarian disasters.²⁸

²⁶ Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992): *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations, New York, p.12.

²⁷ Tanner, F. (1997): *Economic instruments of conflict prevention*, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, p.10.

²⁸ Ibid

Regarding this aspect, on one hand, interstate/internal conflicts, practice shows that the application of non-military sanctions is based on a clearer idea when it comes to interstate conflicts. For instance, sanctions seem more relevant in cases of military aggression or intervention of one state against another, as it was the case with the sanctions on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.

On the other hand, it could be noted that the domestic nature of internal/intra-state conflict complicates the task of using nonviolent coercion for conflict prevention purposes. Actually, sanctions could be irrelevant in cases of civil war that may occur in conjunction with the collapse of state institutions. The main reason for it is the fact that even though the international community can in such cases very well anticipate the breakdown of law and order, still it does not have the necessary instruments to prevent it. Therefore, sanctions in such scenarios seem appropriate primarily in the post conflict prevention phase.

Additionally, in the context of human rights violations in internal conflict, sanctions objectives could rely on a wide choice of conditions that a target state has to comply with. Such conditions could include legislative reforms or the holding of free and fair elections. Moreover, free and fair elections, in turn, require freedom of movement, freedom of expression, free access to media and free media as well.

A serious challenge in such situations is the perception of the public and the political elites about the justification and the goals of the sanctions themselves. Usually in such situations, political elites see sanctions as external pressure and interference in the sovereignty of a particular/their state. If such a perception would be developed among the majority of citizens and the public, then it could be expected that the sanctions will hardly achieve the goals for which they were undertaken.

Hence, whenever it comes to the role and impact of economic sanctions as part of preventive diplomacy, the dilemma of their effectiveness in different situations and environments will be present. However, regarding the necessary conditions that economic sanctions must have as part of preventive diplomacy, Lund points out the following:²⁹

Need for international solidarity and burden-sharing: third parties must be prepared to pursue a unified and coherent approach towards the target actor. Sanctions do not work if they are ignored or only partially implemented.

Sanctions must be part of multi-tracked intervention strategy addressing the various dimensions of the conflict. Isolated uses of sanctions do not make sense. A multi-track strategy presupposes the capability to enforce sanctions with military means, if necessary.

Time limit: the duration of economic sanctions in preventive diplomacy should be limited to no more than 3 to 4 years.³⁰

²⁹ Lund, S.M. (1996): Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos*, United Nations Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., p.392.

³⁰ Napolitano, M.A. (1996): Sanctions as a preventive diplomacy instrument, in Fred Tanner, *The Effect of International Sanctions*, The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta, p.27.

The above mentioned conditions point to the fact that economic sanctions cannot be perceived as an isolated instrument of preventive diplomacy. On the contrary, they can achieve the goal for which they were undertaken only if they are part of a broader and multidimensional approach. In addition, their purpose must be clearly defined, especially in terms of the conflict developmental phases. It means that the goals of the sanctions taken in one phase of the conflict, cannot automatically apply to the other phases. In order to ensure their success, it is necessary that the reasons and objectives for the sanctions must be clear, specific, and with defined time limits. Exceeding of the established deadlines, could be a clear signal about the limited sanctions contribution. Still, it should be noted that there are no guidelines as to what the trigger events for the employment of economic sanctions should be. The growing intensity of hostility within a country provokes reactions of the external world only if some countries are directly concerned with the developments.

Conclusion

Today, preventive diplomacy is considered important, due in part to the evolving nature of conflict. The shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict is also well documented. However, this change in itself is not sufficient to generate a call for revised thinking on preventive action. It is the surrounding circumstances, the ability of such complex conflicts to spread vertically and horizontally – in essence the potential of such conflicts to do harm to others, ordinary citizens, neighbouring states, refugees, and minorities – that generate preventive diplomacy efforts. An integral part of such preventive efforts are precisely the economic sanctions.

Economic sanctions as a preventive diplomacy instrument is not considered as a novelty in international affairs. Still, there is an absence of consensus about the aspect that specifically evaluates economic sanctions as a tool for preventing conflict, especially for preventing deadly conflict. As a result, the necessity of further refinement of the conceptual understanding of sanctions in a context for conflict prevention is still open.

In this regard, the sanctioners/senders should be able to pursue a flexible and multidimensional mix of instruments and measures. The multi-track approach would have to fine-tune the measures towards both the type and the degree of conflict. Measures should not, a priori, alienate the targeted leadership, but compel them into a cooperative mode. Most appropriate measures at an early stage of an emerging dispute or conflict are positive and negative inducements, i.e. measures that cannot be associated with coercion. If necessary, in the following steps, the senders should be prepared to install universal and mandatory embargo and threats of financial and trade sanctions.

However, as a result of all previously mentioned, it no doubt that conditions for using economic sanctions in preventive diplomacy purpose are more auspicious today than in the past and should remain so for the foreseeable future. In order to successfully use sanctions, sanctioners must better understand the roots and causes of modern security risks and threats, learn to better anticipate their occurrence, and become better able to decide on effective solutions.

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BASIC APPROACHES TO FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE EU

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Abstract: *Organized crime as a concept, phenomenon and a threat attracts attention and raises interest to be studied. Moreover, it provokes reactions both among the academia and practitioners. This paper offers various theories useful to understand and explain organized crime and, in addition, how to deal with it both as a criminal and social threat. Also, it identifies what is missing. Thus, it provides a theoretical range of definitions and legal frameworks for the notion and the act of organized crime. Theorizing about organized crime and dealing with it within the European Union by top scientists in this field offers an authoritative and at the same time easy approach for it to be embedded into the legal framework needed for further communication and coordination by practitioners in law enforcement and other agencies in the EU member states. This paper is intended to be a central development reference not only to understand organized crime but also a point for further research work about the forms and ways to prevent and deal with it.*

Key words: *Organized crime, European Union, fight*

Introduction

Drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud (especially against the European Union's interests), corruption, trafficking in aliens and their exploitation are all forms of illicit behaviour that constitute a mounting threat not only to the individual states of the Union, but also to the European Community as a whole.³ All these forms of organized crime within the Union are a challenge for the law enforcement agencies of the Member States whose primary goal is to protect and provide security for their citizens. According to the research carried at the level of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU), organized crime is a threat to European citizens, businesses, state institutions, and the economy as a whole. To be more specific, research on the global aspects of organized crime is an on-going process among politicians, academics and, above all, among law enforcement officials who are directly involved in the fight against it. Having recognized the importance of this challenge, the EU has gained more competencies in the field of home affairs and has become more active in the fight against organized crime.

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³ S. Adamoli, A. Di Nicola, E. Savona and P. Zoffi, *Organised crime around the world*, Helsinki, Heuni, 1998, p.107

However, the very recognition of organized crime at European and world level is necessary and it is the first step toward dealing effectively with this threat. The changing nature of organized crime drives police organizations into operations related to the fight against organized crime. However, the isolated responses of state authorities competent to combat the international dimension of this threat are insufficient, inadequate or too slow.

The problem posed by this theoretical research is related to scientific and practical aspects, because the EU initially and explicitly recognized the threat of organized crime. However, although this mere recognition further led to various initiatives designed to improve the capacity of EU institutions and member states to reciprocate, there is still a lack of research in this area. It is worth to mention that due to the scope of the research problem defined in this work, there was a need to use numerous data sources available in the scientific academic literature, professional journals and other publications in which this risk to safety is addressed.

The theoretical nature of the subject of research determined the descriptive model to be applied as to give a broader description of the concept of organized crime, its perception and understanding.

Content analysis was applied when analyzing the scientific normative literature, legal acts, previous research, other data presented in similar research and websites. According to experts and researchers, the main methodological problem when studying organized crime is the question related to sources of documentation and knowledge. It pinpoints that data on this phenomenon often come from sources that are not publicly available. Often, statistics can not be verified due to lack of transparency and classified sources. Hence, this research was targeted to determine and recognize the threat of organized crime and define it. Consequently, to offer institutional solutions that would lead to its prevention and suppression. In addition, to consider various possible situations in the field of social, criminal and legal practice, which lead to rational and practical solutions.

Defining Organized Crime

Organized crime as a form of criminal manifestation is one of the main risks to human security. It is a threat to state security, but it also hinders social, economic, political and cultural development, attacks public, financial and security institutions and erodes the basic obligation of the state to protect peace, order and justice. Transnational organized crime is often said to be the product of criminal networks or criminal organizations that consciously employ national jurisdictional boundaries so as to avoid criminal law enforcement efforts.⁴ According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, organized crime is diverse, becoming global and reaching macroeconomic proportions: illegal goods coming from one continent, being traded across another and sold to a third. The list of crimes in this category varies from drug and human trafficking to counterfeiting and money laundering. Choosing a definition that fits the objectives of the study is an important first step in the development of research design (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992). This paper defines organized crime as: illegal activities carried out by structural groups of three or more persons, which

⁴ Eugene McLaughlin, John Muncie, *The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology*, SAGE Publications, London, 2013, p.305

persist for a long period and aim to commit serious crimes through a specific act of intimidation, violence, corruption or other things, and thus directly or indirectly to gain financial or other material benefit.⁵

In this study, as in the rest of the literature, there is no common ground for a comprehensive understanding of “organized crime”. Term organized crime refers to “diversity and analytically greater range of actors, activities and harmful consequences” (Edwards & Levi, 2008: 364). The broad interpretation of organized crime gives us opportunity to consider this notion from an academic and political perspective. Organized crime is seen as a pervasive presence in society, including wealth and poverty, elite and marginalized people. Basically, as with *Albini* and *McIlhain*, the concept of organized crime rests on the notion that it is a structured, multi-stakeholder enterprise which depends on a network or networks of all classes that are created over time in both the illegal and legal realms.⁶ Organized crime is crime committed by structured groups which provide illegal goods and services to others. (Andersen & Taylor, 2007: 168). It is also defined as a criminal activity committed by a permanent structure or organization developed or primarily committed to making a profit through illegal activities. Organized crime has the characteristics of a formal organization: division of labor, coordination of activities through rules and codes, and distribution of tasks in order to achieve certain goals. An organization seeks to protect itself from external and internal threats. (Conklin, 2010: 73). Little information is available on the periodic persistence of organized crime. Academic literature focuses to a greater extent on the definition and politicization of transnational organized crime (see Edwards & Gill, 2002; Ruggiero, 2000; Sheptycki, 2003; Woodiwiss, 2003), where much fragmented information can be found in the available empirical literature as well as from journalistic and autobiographical sources. Furthermore, due to the diversity of transnational crime, it is difficult to determine the general characteristics: different forms and degrees of “transnationality” of crime, and challenges that arise from this “transnationality” which vary in the type of crime and the geographical location. From a legal point of view, part of the United Nations Convention in Palermo defines “organized crime group” as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefit”.⁷ As noted above and from an academic point of view, the definition of organized crime is still subject of discussions (Edwards

⁵ Совет на Европа, 2002

⁶ Lippmann, “Underworld: Our Secret Servant,” *Forum*, 85 (1931), pp. 1-4, 65-69. (Quoted in Nikos Passos (ed.), *Organized Crime* (Dartmouth, VT, 1995, p. 9

⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime and the Protocols Thereto,” United Nations, 2004.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organisedcrime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf

and Levi 2008; Hobbs). Academic experts on organized crime have spent a great deal of time advancing their perspectives debating the lack of competent definitions. Hundreds of definitions of organized crime can be found in the world literature by different authors and various areas. Organized crime, in its many different forms, has been portrayed as a threat to political, economic and social development: it can foster violence and corruption, undermine the rule of law, good governance and the democratic process; it can jeopardise economic growth and poverty reduction, and pose significant risks to public health and environmental sustainability.⁸

Kambovski (2005) in his book “Organized Crime”, provides a really large register of definitions of organized crime. This is to be emphasized as to pinpoint the great diversity, but also the dynamics of the phenomenon itself which is subject to scientific definitions. This author also defines organized crime as “the commission of criminal offenses by criminal associations for the purpose of making a profit and / or gaining power, by using violence, or by using a special position in society, by reducing risk by engaging in legal economic, political and other activities, as well as a pre-made system for protection against prosecution”.⁹ In addition, as economically motivated illegal activity undertaken by any group, association or other body consisting of two or more individuals, whether formally or informally organized, where the negative impact of the indicated activity can be considered from economic, social, violent, health, security perspective. (Porteous, 1998, p.2). Interesting definition is provided by *Joseph Albin* and *Jeffrey McIlwain*, who say that organized crime is: a form of criminal activity occurring within a social system composed of a centralized or decentralized social network (or networks) of at least three actors engaged in an ongoing criminal enterprise in which the size, scope, leadership and structure of the network is generated by the ultimate goal of the enterprise itself (i.e., how the crime is organized). This goal takes advantage of opportunities generated by laws, regulations, and social customs and mores and can be pursued for financial profit and/or the attainment of some form of power to effect social change and/or social mobility via the leveraging and brokering of the network’s social, political and economic capital.¹⁰ Defining the term organized crime today plays a particularly important criminal-political function: setting a criminal

⁸ Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Development Responses to Organised Crime: An analysis and programme framework, Department for International Development, Geneva, April 2016, p.1

⁹ Камбовски Владо, 1996, «Правна држава и организиран криминал», Правен факултет, Скопје, стр. 8 и 9.

¹⁰ Joseph Albin and Jeffrey McIlwain, *Deconstructing Organized Crime: A Historical and Theoretical Study*, London, 2012, p. 81-82.

justice framework for a proportionate response to increasingly serious and more organized forms of crime by raising the effectiveness of measures of prevention, detection and prosecution. In addition, defining organized crime facilitates the work of law enforcement institutions by providing a clearer focus. Hence, it tends to increase its effectiveness, by avoiding the loss of human and financial resources. It is in this criminological context that this is particularly important, as there is no mutual agreement among scholars on the term - or rather the terms “organized crime” and “organized crime groups”. This has led criminologists to try to formulate an operational definition of organized crime, in order to achieve a de facto understanding of the complexity of organized crime. FBI defines organized crime as any group with a formal structure whose primary purpose is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their positions by spreading fear or apply violence, corrupt public figures, apply bribery or extortion. In general, they have a significant impact on the people in their place, region or the country as a whole.¹¹ As stated earlier in the paper, organized crime, for our purposes, indicates a relatively well-organized set of criminal activities, including a number of individual actors or groups, which often involve corruption and violence. Their aim is making illicit profits. Difficulties arise from the diversity of activities carried out by criminal groups and differences in their structures (while some of them are hierarchically set, some of them are loose and flexible).¹²

A definition of organized crime should be taken into consideration as a fundamental element when applying anti-organized crime instruments, which are still a challenge for the lawmakers. However, it should be emphasized that there is no universally accepted definition of organized crime, even in specialist circles.¹³ EU specialists in the field of police and judicial cooperation underline that a number of issues include a legal definition of organized crime, as well as the fact that organized crime is treated differently in the criminal law of each Member State.¹⁴ That is, despite

¹¹ Retrieved from: FBI Official Website - last review on 07.02.2013

¹² Piotr Bąkowski, The EU response to organised crime, Library of the European Parliament, 2013 p.1-6

¹³ And indeed the problem seems to be really theoretical until the moment when it comes to police and judicial cooperation - especially the exchange of information on certain types of crimes - each of the different parties involved has to agree precisely on what is considered organized as an crime.

¹⁴ V. Mitsilegas (2011), “The Council Framework Decision on the Fight against Organised Crime: What can be Done to Strengthen EU Legislation in the Field?”, PE 453.195, European Parliament, Brussels; A. Scherrer, A. Mégie and V. Mitsilegas (2009), “The EU role in fighting transnational organised crime”, PE 410.678, European Parliament, Brussels; V. Mitsilegas (2009), *EU Criminal Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009; V. Mitsilegas (2001), “Defining Organised Crime in the European Union: The Limits of European Criminal Law in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, *European Law Review*, Vol. 26, p. 565-581

many EU efforts to develop a common definition of organized crime, each Member State continues with its own approach and formulation of the phenomenon. Consequently, definition remains very broad and very flexible and does not provide any consistency. Furthermore, the absence of a clear definition creates potential for a wide range of criminalization of organized crime across the EU. So, first it is important to have a clear definition as to achieve the current level of harmonization and approximation of organized crime legislation among EU Member States as a crucial element for effective fight against organized crime. Next, which is partly related to the first justification is the fact that several international institutions responded to the request for harmonization in the organized crime sector. This included the Council of Europe, the United Nations and the European Union. These intensive efforts to harmonize criminal legislation to deal with organized crime have produced a number of policy documents, recommendations, and studies. The Council of Europe (2002) adopted the following definition which is also contained in Recommendation Rec (2001) 11 of the Committee of Ministers of 2001: Illegal activities carried out by a structured group of three or more several persons which exists for a longer period of time and undertakes joint activities for the purpose of committing one or more serious-serious acts, in order to gain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefit. In 2005, European Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers a new Framework Decision, which contained a definition of an “organized crime group” identical to that of the Palermo Convention. The Framework Decision of the Council for the Fight against Organized Crime enters into force on 11 November 2008. Framework Decision (2008/841 / JHA)¹⁵ is the third international instrument for providing a definition of organized crime. Differences between different perceptions and definitions of organized crime are «ironed out» using common risk assessment formats and national reports; In the framework of this paper, it is emphasized that the EU has never provided an official definition of organized crime. Organized Crime Framework Decision of 24 October 2008 very broadly defines “a criminal organization as a structured association established over a period of time by more than two persons acting in order to commit acts punishable by deprivation of liberty or detention which entails imprisonment of at least four years or a more serious sentence for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, financial or other material gain” (European Council, 2008b :). Furthermore, within the European Union, Member States are already obliged to bring national laws closer together in order to combat organized crime, under European Union Law (see Articles 83 (1) and 87 (2) (c)).) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).¹⁶ The adoption

¹⁵ The Framework Decision (2008/841 / JHA) defines a structured association in a negative way. ((Article 1, item 2) of the Council Decision).

¹⁶ 115/47 *Official Journal of the European Union*, 9 May 2008. Arndt Sinn, ‘Das Lagebild der organisierten Kriminalität in der Europäischen Union: Tendenzen, rechtliche Initiativen und Perspektiven einer wirksamen OK-Bekämpfung’, in W. Gropp and A. Sinn, above note 37, p. 506ff.

of the Lisbon Treaty opened new avenues in the approximation of EU criminal law, including organized crime. Article 83 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European Union provides the legal basis to establish minimum rules to define criminal offenses and penalties in the area pertaining serious crime with cross-border dimensions. Certainly, organized crime is one of those areas. However, there is some ambiguity in the wording of security because organized crime is represented by a list of crimes (eg trafficking in human beings) often committed by organized crime groups. These minimum rules can be established through directives of Parliament and the Council, adopted through day-to-day legal procedures. Article 83 (1) can serve as a legal basis for a directive defining criminal offenses of organized crime and related sanctions for these offenses. Article 83 (2) of the EU Treaty provides another opportunity for approximation of criminal law, and thus effective implementation of Union policies in areas that have been subject of harmonization measures. Hence, supranational claims outside general public international law are superior to national law, even in terms of defining “organized crime”. According to the so-called EU working definition used in many reports and documents: In order to talk about organized crime, at least six of the following characteristics must be present, four of which must be those numbered 1, 3, 5 and 11:

1. Cooperation of more than two persons;
2. Everyone with their own assigned tasks;
3. Extended or indefinite (refers to stability and potential durability);
4. Using some form of discipline and control;
5. Suspects of committing serious crimes;
6. Operating internationally;
7. Use of violence or other means suitable for intimidation;
8. Use of commercial or business structures;
9. Involved in money laundering;
10. Influencing politics, media, public administration, judiciary or economy;
11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and / or power.¹⁷

An interesting phenomenon occurs when defining organized crime, - main influence in the fight against this phenomenon comes from the international community, which is undoubtedly a reaction not only to the unequal approach of states, but also to the fact that it is the only way the states which are criminalized to force themselves to take certain measures in the fight against organized crime.

¹⁷ Towards a European strategy to prevent organised crime’, Commission Staff Working Paper, здружен извештај од Commission services и EUROPOL, SEC (2001) 433, Annex, p. 42, достапен на: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/forum_crimen/documents/sec_2001_433_en.pdf

Concepts of fighting organized crime in the European Union

The challenge of organized crime must be met with well-organized activity both nationally and according to the EU plan and internationally. Awareness of the great threat of organized crime is widespread around the world, both nationally and internationally. Activities of criminal groups are threatening to jeopardize the effectiveness of any intervention aimed at supporting democratic institutions and market economies. Measures related to highly organized criminal groups as a result of globalization of economies and the rapid advancement of communication technologies have increased at every step in the world, thus making organized crime to become an acute problem in the European Union. Members of organized crime groups operate easily across EU borders, creating the need for consistent action at European level. Operational activities such as prosecuting criminals remain the responsibility of the EU countries. International organized crime can not be effectively dealt with unorganized policing. If law enforcement agencies cannot offer a unified and coordinated response, then the areas of freedom, security and justice will never be realized. One of the central aspects of policing is the fight against crime and many police tasks are, in a way, related to dealing with violence against the law (Loveday, 1996). Fighting organized crime involves preventing and tackling this type of crime. European Union's response to organized crime has been adapted to the complexity of this phenomenon, which includes trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs, economic and financial crime, corruption and money laundering. It also covers new dimensions of organized crime, such as cybercrime and environmental crime. The EU will need to address these challenges with appropriate tools based on the best laws in the Member States.¹⁸ This approach should be developed within EU agencies and bodies.¹⁹ This is through a review of measures and activities undertaken by the European Union agencies in the fight against organized crime. Success in the fight against organized crime depends in particular on the desire of EU Member States to make full use of the instruments available under the Amsterdam Treaty.²⁰ Furthermore, it requires development of a multidisciplinary approach by completing administrative prevention measures, both nationally and across Union borders. At the same time, it is important to identify the main challenges and determine what can be done at European level, i.e. determine the form of cooperation. The issue of police and judicial co-operation has been a pillar of European activities in the fight against organized crime. In addition, coordination is necessary among Member States, which after all remain the overwhelmingly dominant players in this respect. Consequently, the EU has an important role to play in this

¹⁸ Chapter VI of the Treaty on European Union provides a legal framework for all EU initiatives in the fight against crime.

¹⁹ According to: Justice and Home Affairs Ministers' meeting on a multidisciplinary and administrative approach to combating organised crime, 8 March 2012, 349283.

²⁰ Working Paper, The European Union and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, European Parliament, Brussels 2001 p.5

regard. Firstly, because international organizations are to some extent too polarized. They are designed to serve police systems that are not only different, but also have different responsibilities in the same systems. But crucial part in the area of preventing and tackling organized crime is played by the great number of agencies and institutions dealing with this policy area. Hence, it is necessary to develop synergies. Also, EU policies against organised crime must be coordinated at the global level, which implies not only cooperation with key strategic partners, but also adjusting the external dimension of internal policies with foreign policy tools and agendas.²¹

Conclusion

Organized crime remains a threat to EU member states. By its seriousness and risk, it is an important international security and political issue. To define organized crime by any approach whether it is criminological, criminal law, international law, academic, etc., is an initial challenge. However, it is a solution to the problem. The efforts put by EU member states through their institutions and international organizations to define what organized crime is clearly disclose the reasons and modes of actions. In addition, it provides an opportunity to see the consequences of such action, as well as to determine more precisely the generally accepted legal measures to deal with it. However, there is not a clear definition of organized crime at EU level yet. What exists is a commonly accepted definition which is used in the law-making process. Defining by itself has a significant criminal political function to establish a criminal justice framework and legislation for a proportionate response to the increasingly serious and organized forms of crime by raising the effectiveness of prevention, detection and prosecution measures. Organized crime is a form of crime that is still typical for the national jurisdictions. However, this study explicitly showed that the definition of organized crime is a serious step in the joint and united struggle of Member States against this threat. Furthermore, there is a need for police agencies to take a proactive approach to conduct criminal investigations by carrying out police operations at national, regional and international level in the fight against organized criminal groups. The EU approach to security and organized crime is fragmented, bureaucratic and characterized by a high level of institutional inertia. However, political coordination at EU level ensures a coherent and compatible response to organized crime. To conclude, the elaboration of the research issue given in the introductory part of this paper has been justified in the sublimated work of various academic and professional literature pertaining to the fight against organized crime processed herein. Hence, it is a solid basis for further research work.

²¹ Partners in crime? The EU, its strategic partners and international organised crime ESPO working paper n.5 May 2014, p.14

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**„SOVREMENA MAKEDONSKA ODBRANA“
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL**

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

International scientific journal "CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE" is a theoretical journal published by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of North Macedonia. The magazine comes out regularly twice a year and once a year there is a special issue on a particular topic. The magazine publishes original scientific papers, reviews of books in the field of defence, security and peace, on a national, regional and global level.

The magazine publishes only reviewed and specialized papers: original research papers, accompanying research papers and professional papers and book displays.

If the Magazine accepts the paper the authors are not allowed to publish it in other journals.

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The manuscript should be submitted in electronic form. The pages and appendices should be numbered.

Papers should be written in English, where the paper should have a title, abstract and keywords.

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The paper should include: title, author, institution, abstract, keywords, introduction, main part, conclusion and reference. The full paper should not exceed 5000 words in English.

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Deadlines for submission of papers - 30.03. and 31.10. in the current year

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