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MACEDONIA AFTER THE OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT– CAN "POWER SHARING" BE A CONFLICT PREVENTION MECHANISM?

Rizvan SULEJMANI[1]

Abstract: *The Republic of Macedonia, since its independence until today, has constantly dealt with political crisis which easily escalate in security risks. The latest crisis of 9th of May 2015, reminded us of the existence of a security risk, when the political battle between political parties sharpens. Yet, the Republic of Macedonia had its biggest security crisis in 2001 when there was a risk of escalating of an interethnic war-conflict. The signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement created new foundations for Macedonia, and there are still debates about defining it. In our analysis we start from the position that from a structural point of view, political statics, it is established in an unconventional form, but with elements of "Power sharing". In the beginning we give a short description of the process of independence and the challenges which the country is facing, eventually turning to analysis of the structural position after the 2001 conflict. We list some amendments which were changed due to the implementation of this agreement, focusing more on the meaning of "Power sharing", as a model for managing conflicts in multiethnic countries. We give some definitions of the meaning of Power Sharing and we describe several models, which can be used in different circumstances, based on Libhard and Horovitz. Finally, through the data from surveys of the public opinion, we attempt drawing a conclusion whether this model is sufficiently efficient to prevent security risks of interethnic character. As a final reference point for measuring the effects of this agreement transformed in constitutional amendments, we take the goals which should be achieved, defined in the preamble of the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. In the end we give our conclusions and suggestions.*

Key words: *Ohrid Framework Agreement, conflict, prevention, managing sharing power,*

The process of independence of the Republic of Macedonia – the challenges

Following the example of the other former Yugoslav republics, the Republic of Macedonia proclaimed independence via referendum organized on 8 September 1991. The process of independence had its own characteristics which are linked with the geopolitical and other circumstances of the state. It is why the question was formulated controversially: "Are you in favor of an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, with the right to enter in future alliance with sovereign states of Yugoslavia".[2] The referendum question was a compromise between the dominant political parties, but

[1] The author is a professor at the State University-Tetovo, RM
[2] The Official Gazette where the referendum was published should be cited.

did not reflect a consensus among the communities. Relations with the other former Yugoslav republics and the rest of Yugoslavia[3] were a particular concern of the government at the time[4]. The Albanian community representatives insisted on a referendum question that would refer to the internal relations in the state rather than the relations with the rest of Yugoslavia. In the course of the political debate several amendments were proposed by Albanian Members of Parliament, but they were not accepted. This was the primary reason why Albanian leaders did not encourage voters to participate in the referendum. Despite the referendum having a positive outcome, it was boycotted by the Albanian population. The same happened later in the same year, when the Constitution was adopted on November 17th.

In all of the phases of the adoption of the Constitution, the Albanians participated in the parliamentary and public debates. The discussions of the Albanian Members of Parliament were in favor of constituting a multiethnic state in which Albanians would be a constitutive people in the state. All amendments of the Albanian MPs were rejected by a majority vote in the Parliament[5]. That was the reason why the Albanian Members of Parliament did not vote in favour of the constitution and left the Parliament during the voting process in protest. In the course of the adoption of the constitution, no broader consensus among the communities was achieved. The decision-making system was based on the majority vote, disadvantaging non-dominant communities. When the constitution was written there was a consensus within the Macedonian community and the international community,[6] but not among the other communities.

The consensus among the political parties and with the international community was confirmed by the fact that all political parties of the Macedonians were in favour of the constitution and the Badinter Committee gave a positive opinion that the Republic of Macedonia fulfils all criteria for becoming an independent state[7]. This

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[3] At that time the largest Yugoslav Republic, today's state of Serbia aspired to keep Yugoslavia complete, or at least be the legal heir to the state which was falling apart.

[4] Dimitar Mircev, (2006), "The Macedonian Foreign Policy 1991-2006", Skopje, Az-Buki, p:110.

[5] Here we focus on the Albanian community because the other smaller communities did not have any special demands.

[6] In order to develop joint position on the situation in former Yugoslavia, EU decided to form a Committee led by the famous French expert in Constitutional Law, Mr. Badinter. The assigned task was to define criteria under which the future states will be recognized. This meant that Macedonia needed to obtain a positive estimation from this Committee as well as a confirmation that all criteria for recognition as an independent and sovereign state are fulfilled.

[7] January 11th, 1992, the Arbitrary Committee of EU submitted a report in which Estimation No.6 was included. It elaborated that the Republic of Macedonia fulfills all criteria for recognition as an independent state. Badinter gave several views: At first he underlined that Yugoslavia was in phase of "dissolution". Then he presented some criteria referring to the rights of the minorities which should be respected. In the same report he emphasized that Croatia does not fulfill the criteria set for recognition, while Macedonia and Slovenia do. Many believe that this was a political mistake, because it inspired Bosnia to a referendum as well. It may have legal validity, but it turned out at the end that it was a fatal political mistake.

approach of building a state, by which solely the requests of international actors were met, but not the requests of all citizens, has made the Macedonian political parties responsible, whereas the international community was "part of the problem and not part of the solution" [8]. No balance between the internal needs and the external criteria was reached. Under this constitution, the Republic of Macedonia was constituted as a national state of the Macedonian people[9], while complete equality was provided for the other communities. This approach is noted in the Preamble, which stated that "... as well as from the historic fact that Macedonia is constituted as a national state of the Macedonian people in which …." [10]

The claim to incorporate only the Macedonian nation in the state was certainly less developed than had been the case in most of the constitutions of the former Yugoslav republics, a phenomenon aptly termed 'constitutional nationalism' by Robert Hayden.[11] The Law on High Education is considered as one of the biggest political failures in terms of reaching a cross-community compromise. The Albanian representatives insisted on having the possibility for high education in Albanian language, but no agreement was reached. On 17 and 19 December 1994, three municipalities in western Macedonia with predominant Albanian population: Tetovo, Gostivar and Debar decided to form an Albanian-language University on their own initiative[12]. Although the Albanian political party PDP was in power on a central level, it supported this idea at the local level in those municipalities. In addition, the second Albanian party, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) – in opposition at that time—also supported the project. The state did not recognize that university[13].

The second unsuccessful attempt to reach an agreement was the Law on National Symbols. In July 1997, the Mayor of Gostivar, Rufi Osmani, a charismatic and young politician from DPA raised the Albanian flag in front of the municipal building. Under pressure of the second political party in power on central level at that time, PDP, the Parliament adopted the Law which regulates the use of the flag in a reduced form. In the late evening hours of 8 July the law was adopted. Early the next morning, the police intervened, removing the flag, which resulted in casualties and many injured[14].There were

[8] Christopher J. Bickerton, "States without Souls. Contradictions of state-building in 21century", Paper Prepared for SAID Conference "Sovereignty in the 21 Century", Oxford, 29 October 2005,http:www.said-workshop.org/bickerton.oxford.paper.doc

[9] Savo Klimovski (20000, "Politics and institutions", Prosvetno Delo, Skopje, page 139

[10] Decision on Proclaiming the Constitution No. 08-4642/1 dated November 17th, 1991 (Preamble text of the Constitution).

[11] Robert Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided. The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 71-72.

[12] The Law on High Education from that period provided the possibility for the municipalities to be founders of high education institutions (the law from that period should be examined).

[13] In the police raid on February 16th, among the many injured, student Abdilemin Selami lost his life.

[14] The police intervention on July 9th, 1997 claimed the lives of three young demonstrators while hundreds of others were harassed and convicted, including Mayor Rufi Osmani and the Mayor of Tetovo Alajdin Demiri.

some further attempts for consensus building, but generally Albanians were outvoted by the Macedonian majority.

To conclude: The Macedonian political framework during the 1990s was contradictory: The constitution and the understanding of the majority of parties asserted the 'ownership' of the majority over the state. Based on the logic of nations and republics during Communist Yugoslavia and the perceived threat by neighbors over identity and name, reinforced a proprietary approach towards the state.[15] At the same time, a tradition of broad coalitions emerged since 1992, which consistently included Albanian parties in the government. This contradiction was unable to accommodate the interethnic tensions during the conflict in 2001 and highlighted that stability required more significant inclusion of Albanians than just at the level of government, whereas Albanians had remained underrepresented in the public administration and lacked adequate protection of group rights.

Macedonia after 2001, Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA)

In 2001, the Republic of Macedonia entered a deep crisis. An armed group[16], by the name of National Liberation Army (NLA) [17], committed several armed attacks against the state security structures and promoted their own political leadership[18] and political demands. These demands included a call for constitutional amendments. These demands coincided with the statements by Albanian politicians who claimed that the constitution is the crisis generator[19]. With no intention to elaborate what led to the conflict, for which there are many theories and views, I will just mention the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which was signed under the pressure of this military formation. During the security crisis, a broad coalition was formed with the intention of helping the end of the conflict. The four biggest political parties in the Parliament – two Macedonian and two Albanian, VMRO-DMNE and SDSM and the Albanian PDP and DPA[20], as well as some other smaller parties formed this grand coalition. An all-out war was prevented by an Agreement negotiated in Ohrid. The Agreement was signed by the four leaders of the bigger political parliamentary parties, the President of the

15 See Graham Holliday, "From Ethnic Privileging to Power-Sharing: Ethnic Dominance and Democracy in Macedonia" Sammy Smooha, Priit Järve (eds.), *The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe* (Budapest: LGI-ECMI, 2005), pp. 139-166.

16 "Armed group", the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 07-1072/5, dated March 18th, 2001.

17 Gëzim Ostreni, (2006), "Vështrim kritik mbi veprën 'Lufta në Maqedoni në vitin 2001' të gjeneralit Mitre Arsovski, Prof. dr. Stojan Kyзев dhe gjeneralit Prof. dr. Risto Damjanovski", Shkup, faq: 12.

18 Ali Ahmeti was promoted as political leader who later formed the political party of DUI. He is the current leader of the biggest political party with majority of Albanian members.

19 The former President of PDP Aburahman Aliti stated several times that the Constitution is the crisis generator in the Republic of Macedonia.

20 Previously, the leaders of the two political parties signed a document for harmonization of the goals with the NLA leader Ali Ahmeti in the Kosovo city of Prizren.

country and the EU and USA facilitators[21]. The Agreement was signed in the presence of the Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson and the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Politics, Javier Solana on 13 August 2001 in Skopje. Although reached in unaccustomed conditions, the Agreement can be referred to as the first consensus among the political leaders in the state. When proposing the constitutional amendments deriving from the agreement, President Trajkovski emphasized:

"The Agreement that is before you is the result of incorporating the European values of human rights, democracy and compromise, eliminating the grounds for war and multiethnic conflicts in the Republic of Macedonia. It contributes to increasing internal stability which directly reflects to peace in the region as well and finally strengthening of the European and Euro-Atlantic perspective of the country"[22].

In the case of Macedonia it is a fact that the conflict in reality was not about the state as a project, but rather about competing ideas on the nature of the state. The agreement has effectively transformed Macedonia from an uneasy national state with some elements of accommodation to a power-sharing system, which has opened the state to the Albanian community (to a lesser degree also other minorities). The constitutional approach taken in Macedonia has been considerably more promising than in other countries in the region, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Constitutional amendments in the function of conflict prevention

The sources of conflicts in divided, multiethnic countries

There are many theories about the sources of conflicts of one society. Fukuyama in his book "The end of history and the last man" lists the reasons for a society to be in conflict, in the end leading to the conclusions why, when and how can we finish history and open space for the future. According to him, there is history when there are conflicts and there are conflicts when there is inequality. Inequality can be of different nature, from violation of the elementary freedom and rights of a man, up to the inability to express their cultural identity, inequality in the access to resources, to the inability to be admitted as individuals and members of a certain collective. Fukuyama in the same book says "every society tends to balance the freedom and equality" [23]. This means, that every society which still has not balanced these two values is still in the phase of creating history, meaning that it is still conflicting. According to Violeta Petreska Beska, the conflicts can occur because of different reasons, but, can be categorized in

[21] The Agreement was signed by the President of State, Mr. Boris Trajkovski, the VMRO-DPMNE leader and the President of the Government, Mr. Ljubco Georgievski, the SDSM leader, Mr. Branko Crvenkovski, the PDP leader, Mr. Imer Imeri, the DPA leader, Mr. Arben Djaferi and the facilitators , Mr. James Perdiew as USA representative and Mr. Alan Leothar as the EU representative.

[22] Extract of the stenograph from the President's speech before the Parliament when proposing the constitutional amendments in 2001.

[23] Франсис Фукујама (1994) „Крајот на историјата и последниот човек", Култура, Скопје, стр. 463.

three main levels: first, conflicts because of limited resources; second, conflicts because of non-fulfilment of the basic needs; third, conflict because of different values[24].The well known scholar of interethnic conflicts Donald L. Horowitz divides the interethnic conflicts according to the reasons of three kinds of ethnic conflicts[25]: Conflicts because of the context of modernization, conflict because of economic interests, conflict because of cultural differences. Because of these reasons, very often the scholars like Karl D. Deutsch are convinced that in the future it is expected that the tendencies of national states will strengthen and decay of the countries with mixed population[26]. In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, surely there are intertwined more of the above mentioned reasons which can lead to a conflict or are a potential source for conflicts.

This implies that the Republic of Macedonia needs to build a model of state, which will prevent all attempts for political and security destabilization. There are many reasons why it could not be a standard unitary state, federal state or a kind of cantonization. However, it needs to be a model of state, which will not eliminate conflicts but will manage them. The models of solving the conflicts are given in the taxonomy of McGarry and Brendan O'Leary[27]. The taxonomy of the macro-political regulation of the ethnic conflicts according to these authors contains; method of eliminating conflicts, such as: genocide, forcible displacement of the people, separation or secession and assimilation and method of conflict management, such as: hegemonic control, territorial autonomy (cantonization and/or federalization, non-territorial autonomy or (consociational or power-sharing) or multicultural autonomy. Surely, the established method of dealing with conflicts before and after 2001 is in the part of managing conflicts, but not a method of eliminating conflicts. The reason for this is because, the Republic of Macedonia became a democratic country and the method of eliminating conflicts is not a characteristic of democratic countries, on the other hand the method of managing with conflicts interacts with the democratic regimes, so the Republic of Macedonia made an effort to manage instead of eliminate conflicts. However, whether it succeeded and how much it succeeded is a subject of political and theoretical analysis. The opinions are divided between that it is a good model which can be taken as an example, and that it is in constant conflicts which from time to time escalate in violence.

[24] Виолета Петреска Бешка, „Конфликти, што претставуваат и како се решаваат", (1995), Filozofski Fakultet, Skopje.

[25] Donald L. Horowitz,(2000), "Ethnic Groups in Conflict", second edition, University of California Press, page 95-140.

[26] Karl D. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review 55 (Sept 1961): 493-514.

[27] Will Kymlick and Wayne Norman, "Citizenship in Diverse Societies",(2000), Oxford University Press:12-18.

Macedonia after 2001– "country with a formal structure of division of power"

According to Florian Bieber, the Republic of Macedonia after 2001 with the Ohrid Framework Agreement is converted to sui generis decrypted as below:

"The Ohrid Framework Agreement converted Macedonia from a self defined national country with informal big coalition, in a country which is stuck between being a national country, civil or a two national country with a formal structure of division of power" [28]

According to F. Bieber the structures of state are based on division of power. If it is so, let us explain what it means, Power sharing? Power sharing in deeply divided societies can encompass a range of different measures to accommodate ethnic (or other) diversity. It would be flawed to conceptualize power sharing as a rigid catalogue of institutions and legal protections that have to be accommodated to qualify as power sharing. Already the variety of tools put forth by scholars of power sharing point to the absence of an agreed set of instruments.[29] When determining a narrow definition of power-sharing, we can draw on Arend Lijphart's definition of a consociational arrangement, which is more limited than power sharing in general.[30] Lijphart identifies the following five main criteria of a consociational arrangement: (1) grand coalition, i.e. the inclusion of all major groups in government; (2) proportional representation of all relevant groups in parliament and the public administration; (3) inclusion in government of the major groups; (4) veto rights; and (5) a high degree of autonomy. [31] A second approach to power-sharing has been articulated primarily by Donald Horowtiz, who has argued for a more incentive-based or centripetal system. While the consociational approach rests on the premise that each group in a divided society should be represented by their respective elite, usually articulated by one or several parties, Horowitz has advocated a political system which would encourage the cooperation across the divided ethnic communities and incentives for cooperation. As such, the system focuses less on representation and to a greater extent on inducing cooperation or even the emergence of new, more inclusive elite. This incentive-based system of power-sharing can be characterized by 5 features: a) *Dispersion of Power* where *p*ower should not be concentrated either in one office or one location. Such dispersion prevents major conflicts. b) *Devolution of Power* and power-sharing is aimed at increasing interethnic co-operation at the local level and reducing the symbolic significance, which some decisions might acquire if decided by higher levels of governance; c) *Fostering Cooperation through*

[28] Флориан Биебер, (2008), „Поделба на власта и спроведување на Охридскиот Рамковен Договор, „Фондација Фридрих Еберт, Канцеларија Скопје, стр 23.

[29] See Timothy D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington: USIP, 1996), pp. 34-45

[30] On the relationship between power sharing and consociationalism, see Matthijs Bogaards, "The Uneasy Relationship Between Empirical and Normative Types of Consociational Theory," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2000), pp. 395-423.

[31] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 25.

legal mechanisms such as election laws requiring inter-ethnic coalitions; d) *Promoting Cross-cutting Cleavages* can cut across ethnic lines and help mitigate the pervasiveness of ethnic identity in deeply divided societies; and e) *reducing disparities* focuses on preventing ethnic differences being reinforced by other inequalities.[32]

The difference between the approaches to power sharing proposed by Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart and developed by a number of other scholars (i.e. John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary and Ben Reilly) could be seen as being ideal types as part of a continuum. Consociational power sharing assumes that representation of relevant groups by the group's respective elites and significant autonomy is the key to successful interethnic accommodation. Centripetal power sharing underlines the need to create an institutional dynamics, which prevents the ethnification of the political system and results in a more integrated elite. Both approaches contain a number of risks. Consociational power sharing runs the risk of reinforcing ethnic divisions and transforming ethnic belonging into the main or at least the dominant identifier. As a result, it might worsen interethnic relations it seeks to regulate. Defenders of the system emphasizes that consociationalism is appropriate for deeply divided societies where ethnic identity already matters. Centripetal power sharing on the other hand runs the risk of minority groups being co-opted rather than fully integrated. Without the same degree of representation and inclusion as with consociational arrangements, minorities might feel marginalized.[33] In case of Macedonia, both theories are incorporated. Having in consideration the abovementioned, let us analyze the data of the public opinion whether, the structures effectively prevent the potential conflicts or, Macedonia is still living under threats.

Assess the effects of the implemented measures

Due to the fact that there are divided opinions regarding the objectives of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, by the actors directly involved in the preparation and negotiations, but also by the scientific community, in our case we are going to use the preamble of the agreement, vision for the future of the Republic of Macedonia, which should be implemented through several strategic goals, as a referent common goal. The Preamble, the "vision for the future of the country", reads:

"The following points provide an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's democracy and enable the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society, while respecting the ethnic identity and interests of all Macedonian Citizens"

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32 Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 653-680.

33 Brendan O'Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics. Normative and Explanatory Arguments," Sid Noel (ed.), *From Power Sharing to Democracy. Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill University Press, 2005), pp.3-43.

From this preamble, “mission for the future of the state,” four strategic objectives can be drawn, through which the mission should be implemented, as follows: a) Ensuring the future of democracy in Macedonia, b) Euro-Atlantic integration, c) Peaceful and harmonious development of civil society, d) Development of a multi-ethnic society, respecting the ethnic identity and interests of all citizens. Achieving these goals considering the five basic principles, which, we in our analysis, will name “measures”: 1) Constructive problem solving, 2) preservation of the integrity and the unitary character of the state, 3) democratic state where the constitution will provide fully meeting the needs of its citizens, 4) The multi-ethnic character of the state reflected in public life, 5) Local Government for greater citizen participation in public life and the preservation and promotion of the identity of the communities.

Evaluation of the achieved strategic goals

Now, we will present some comments to the results from the survey conducted at the end of 2014, by the Institute for Political Research and Good Governance. The results are given in the order as they were defined in the Preamble as strategic goals of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

a) Securing future of the democracy in Republic of Macedonia

In order to see what kind of Macedonia the citizens wish in the future, we asked the question; What kind of Macedonia do you want? The results of the survey show that the majority of the Macedonians (46%), wish an ethnic country (of the Macedonians) with guarantied rights for the minorities, 28% desire an ethnic state (of the Macedonians) and only 15.65 would want a civil state. On the other side 39.0% of the Albanians want a bi-national state, 30.9% a multicultural state and 23.2% a civil state.

Table 1. What kind of Macedonia do you want?

Possible answer	Albanians	Macedonians	All
Ethnic state (of the Macedonians)	2.3	28.2	21.9
Ethnic state (of the Macedonians) with guaranteed rights for the minorities	3.1	46.4	35.6
Bi-national state (of the Macedonians and Albanians)	39.0	1.0	10.6
Multicultural state (of all the ethnic groups)	30.9	6.0	12.5
Civil state (state of all the citizens with respect towards the differences in the sphere of culture, language, religion and customs)	23.2	15.6	17.1
Other	.8	2.0	1.6
No answer	.8	.8	.7
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Tab. 1. Source: the Institute for Political Research and Good Governance (2014)

In order to get an insight why the communities prefer more a polity where the communities are in first plan instead of citizens, we asked the question: how does the state behave towards the minorities? The majority of the Macedonians (80.1%) are convinced that the state refers equally towards all the citizens, versus the only 5% of the Albanians which share the same opinion. On the other hand 45% of the Albanians think that they are treated as second-hand citizens, versus the 26.6% of the Macedonians. 26.6% of the Albanians think that they are treated as equal citizens, who are discriminated in certain fields, and 17.4% think they are treated as enemies without rights. This attitude of the citizens leaves a lot to think about.

Table 2. How does the state behave towards the minorities?

Possible answer	Albanians	Macedonians	Total
Equal, as all citizens	5.0	80.1	60.1
Equal citizens who are discriminated against in certain areas	26.6	14.0	17.3
Second-class citizens	45.2	2.9	14.3
As enemies, without rights	17.4	.3	4.6
No answer	5.8	2.7	3.7
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Tab. 2: Source: the Institute for Political Research and good Governance (2014)

b) Development of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes

In the preamble of the OFA it is written „and enabling the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community„. This formulation in the preamble is the reason why the process of the integration in NATO and EU got linked with the OFA: at the conference in Ohrid it was said that "OFA without the Euro-Atlantic integration is impossible" it is in a sandwich between NATO and EU" (R.Sulejmani)[34].

However, what kind of impact would the integration in the EU have on the interethnic relations? A high percentage of 62.2% of the citizens see it as positive and only 15.9 think that it would have a negative impact. Seen by the ethnic groups, 70.3% of the Albanians have a positive thinking versus only 11.0% who think that it would have a negative impact, and 16.3% who do not know or do not have an answer. On the Macedonians' side this percentage is a little bit lower, but again, 58.2% think that it would have a positive impact, versus 18.1% who think that it would have a negative impact and 6% who do not have an answer or do not know.

[34] See transcript of the International Conference held in Ohrid 2011 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of this agreement, part of R. Sulejmani

Table 3. What kind of impact would the integration process in the EU have on the interethnic relations?

Possible answer	Albanians	Macedonians	Total
Positive	70.3	58.2	62.2
Negative	11.0	18.1	15.9
No impact	16.3	17.8	17.2
I do not know / No answer	2.3	6.0	4.7
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Tab. 3. Source: the Institute for Political Research and Good Governance (2014)

As regard to the NATO membership, the percentage of the people that think that it would have a positive impact is even higher (66.6%) of the total number of surveyed. Seen by ethnic groups between the Albanians and Macedonians the percentage of the people with positive view towards the NATO membership is the same, 68.3% and 65.6% respectively. For more details see table.37

These results show that the biggest consensus by ethnic groups is shared for the NATO and EU integration. Therefore the view that the integration processes are the "glue" for linking, or at least one component of that glue, is confirmed.[35]

c) Development of a peaceful and harmonious civil society

What do the surveys show? Unfortunately, the scale of the ethnic distance of the Macedonians is the highest towards the Albanians 1.11, then towards the Roma 1.20 and the lowest towards the Serbs 3.45. The Albanians the highest ethnic distance towards the Serbs with 1.82, then the Roma 1.98 and they have the lowest distance with the Turks 3.45 which is very close to the distance from the Macedonians which is 3.35. It is evident that the distance between the Macedonians and the Albanians towards each other is asymmetric, which means that the Macedonians are much more distanced than the Albanians[36]. The surveys show that there are still prejudices towards the ethnic groups.

[35] For more details see „Кој ги одржува заедниците заедно во мултиетничка Македонија"– ДЕДЕ, лепакот на поврзување, Р. Сулејмани, book in the process of publishing

[36] For more details see: Констатин Миноски, „Етничка одалеченост (дистанца) и етнополитичката мобилизација во Република Македонија„, „Меѓуетнички односи во Македонија„, Македонски центар за меѓународна соработка, Скопје 2011 година

Table 4. With a score of 1 bad to 5 best, how would you rate interethnic relations?

Possible answer	Albanians	Macedonians	Total
1	21.2	6.0	9.9
2	28.6	28.4	27.9
3	37.8	47.9	44.2
4	12.4	15.9	16.4
5		1.8	1.5
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Tab. 4. Source: the Institute for Political Research and Good Governance (2014)

The results of the previous question made us seek the reason why the Albanians are more critical in their evaluation. We assume that they, as an ethnic group, feel endangered or in a subordinate position. We received the answer to the question about the reasons why some ethnic groups feel subordinate from a previous survey done by MCIC. From the table we can see that 55.2% of the Albanians feel that the state discriminates them and 26.9% think that they are not respected as a minority[37].

d) The development of the multiethnic society, with respect towards the ethnic identity and the interests of all the citizens

We can see in the results of the survey how citizens evaluate the interethnic relations at the moment with grades from 1(bad) to 5(great). In this case also the Albanians are more critical and their grade ranges from 1-3 and there is 0% who evaluates them with the highest mark 5(great). The grades of the Macedonians respondents, on the other hand, mainly varies from 2-4, and the highest percentage (47.9%) have evaluated them with 3(good). Generally, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia evaluate the interethnic relations between 2 and 3.

From the analysis of the data obtained from the survey on this issue it is apparent that the communities have different perception of the representation of communities both in the state administration and the local level of administration. In general, Albanians are still not convinced that they are fairly represented at the central level, showing an even lower percentage in local level representation.

[37] МЦМС, Меѓуетнички односи во Македонија, Сашо Клековски, Скопје 2011 година

Table 5. Do you think that your ethnic community is fairly represented in the state administration?

Possible answer	Albanians	Macedonians	All
Yes, totally	29.3	74.6	61.3
Mostly represented	34.1	16.7	21.4
Partially	26.6	5.9	11.8
Not at all	7.3	1.2	3.7
No answer	2.7	1.6	1.8
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Tab. 5. Source: The Institute for Political Research and Good Governance (2014)

Freedom of usage of symbols (flags)

Having in mind the sensitivity of the issue, a poll was conducted in order to see the attitude of the citizens on this issue. This is another issue in which the public is divided on ethnic grounds. For the Albanians the usage of symbols and flags of ethnic communities is fully acceptable with 50.6%, versus the Macedonians, only 9.5% of whom accept it. Among the Macedonian population it is mostly acceptable with 23.5%, the same percentage as that of the Albanians, while the highest percentage of respondents declared as Macedonians see it as partly acceptable with 34.6% and 30.3% see it as not acceptable.

Table 6. What is your attitude towards the usage of the symbols and flags of the ethnic communities?

Possible answer	Albanians	Macedonians	All
Totally acceptable	50.6	9.5	21.1
Mostly acceptable	23.6	23.5	23.1
Partially acceptable	15.8	34.6	29.1
Not acceptable	8.5	30.3	24.9
No answer	1.5	2.0	1.8
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Tab. 6. Source: The Institute for Political Research and good Governance (2014)

Conclusion

The Republic of Macedonia, by the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, went under numerous constitutional changes, which transformed the country from a one national state in a sui generis, which has a lot of elements of “Power sharing”. This kind of polity is theoretically processed by Arend Lijphart and Horowitz, and also by other authors, with the goal of setting theoretical basis for managing conflicts in fragmented countries. The Republic of Macedonia is a multiethnic and multi-religious country, which until now has successfully dealt with the challenges of interethnic conflicts. After the OFA, there is a significant improvement in the interethnic relations, but from time to time tensions can be sensed, which can escalate into security risks.

In order to give a contribution for the early warning on possible threats of this kind, we decided to analyze whether “Power sharing”, to the extent it is used with the constitutional amendments after 2001, is a successful mechanism for preventing interethnic conflicts. As an indicator of this, the data gathered from the survey on the public perception in the entire territory of the Republic of Macedonia are used.

The survey was conducted by the Institute for Political Research and Good Governance towards the end of 2014. We make our analysis on ethnic grounds, Macedonians, Albanians and total, in four parts, which in the preamble are set as goals which need to be accomplished. We can see from the data that the society is divided on ethnic grounds almost on all the issues. In the part of Securing future of the democracy in the Republic of Macedonia, the communities prefer ethnocentric concept of polity versus the civil. The difference is huge in the perception of the ethnic groups on how the state treats the communities. If the Macedonians, with more than 80%, are convinced that the state equally treats all the communities, 45% of the Albanians feel that they are treated as second-class citizens.

In the part of Development of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, we can see the only common issue in which the communities agree, which is that the EU integration positively affects the interethnic relations, even though the Albanians have a more positive attitude. In the part Development of a peaceful and harmonious civil society, the marks between 2 and 3 dominate, while 21% of the Albanians have graded it with 1, from the possible marks of 1(worst) until 5(best). In the part of The development of the multiethnic society, with respect towards the ethnic identity and the interests of all the citizens, the society is again deeply divided on ethnic grounds. 74.6% of the Macedonians are convinced that the communities are equally represented in the institutions, on the other hand only 29% of the Albanians share the same opinion. The same division on ethnic grounds is evident also in the issue of the usage of the ethnic symbols.

We can conclude from the data that the statics set by OFA, where there are elements in “Power sharing”, the political dynamics, which is developing through the political life of the parties, is making a huge pressure to disrupt this statics. These results show that there is a tendency of development of centrifugal forces which can easily lead to political tensions. This, on the other hand, can raise the interest of the politicians to promote the concept of eliminating conflicts according to the taxonomy of McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, which states that the destruction of the unitary character and separation, would inevitably lead to conflict. In order to prevent these on time, the harmonization of the political statics with the political dynamics is necessary.

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Scientific paper

PUTIN'S NEO-TSARIST RUSSIA: A BALKAN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PATTERN OF RESURGENCE[1]

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Abstract: *The West has been witnessing a concerning trend of Russian penetration into South Eastern Europe, more palpably since 2008. The beginning of the implementation of the South Stream gas pipeline project seems to have marked a "stealthy" shift in the regional balance. Also, as Russia continues with its global "politicisation" of energy resources and strategic wielding of non-military power other relevant aspects of its Balkan strategy – most notably its post-1999 defence ties with Serbia as its regional bastion No.1 – are often overlooked. Russia's Balkan and eastern Mediterranean pattern of resurgence inevitably raises the general question of the western strategic dilemma with the "awakening bear."*

Keywords: *The Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Russia, resurgence, strategy, Serbia, defence cooperation.*

Introduction

One big Balkan problem, as witnessed by the recent past, is that local compromises achieved under immense western pressure, on a purely political and bureaucratic level, are hardly implementable. Such palliative solutions to local quarrels, whether existing or yet-to-be forged, may become even less sustainable in the years ahead as *emerging empires and eastern tendencies on the rise* boost their presence in the region, taking advantage of the sluggish western integration processes. Russia is a friend, crucial NATO and EU partner, especially in the field of high-end strategic concerns, and most importantly, a resurgent power and historical shaper of the predominantly Orthodox Balkans - facts that simply cannot be ignored. Moscow deserves at least a proportional share in the region, especially if the West intent is to build a smarter global governance paradigm for a less violent 21st century. Unfortunately, regional power-sharing is a double-blade sword so far as Balkan security is concerned. Allowing Kremlin control over a larger piece of still unconsolidated Balkans might have a stabilizing effect, yet only temporary. Future Balkan constellations must not be confused with a bipolar, Cold-War type stability. Given the West's ambitions to own the Balkans despite the delicate nature of emerging multipolarity,

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any significant division of the region into *"fluid," unclear, and overlapping spheres of influence* could easily render an opposite mid-to-long-term effect: renewed local violence along the "domino" line, particularly in Serb and Albanian dominated areas. That said, the West has been already witnessing *a concerning trend of Russian penetration* into South Eastern Europe, more palpably since the 2008 Russo-American schism over Kosovo's independence.

The South Stream Project: A "Stealthy" Shift in the Regional Balance

Putin's empire has been confidently rising from the ashes of the former Soviet Union as Gazprom's mega-empire has been gradually occupying all the previously "unconquered" parts of Europe. At a first glance, the Russian diplomacy has won a key battle in the geopolitical game for controlling the broader Eurasian energy resource base and corridors. As thoroughly explained by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, at the time of the South Stream's formal inception in June 2007, "the Great Game" between the two emerging geopolitical blocs - the US/NATO-led West versus Russia, China, Iran and their allies - had already gone a long way in favour of the West.[3] Before Russia made its decision to go "solo" and build its own pipeline across favourable Balkan territories, both Moscow and Tehran had been seriously entangled into the Nabucco scheme simply by the virtue of being the world's largest natural gas suppliers. The fact that many Maghreb, Middle East, and Central Asian actors - such as Libya, Egypt, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan – had been envisaged as important pieces (co-suppliers and/or transit fulcrums) in the original Nabucco mosaic is yet another reason to think of *the unfinished Arab Spring as a continuation of the global geopolitical battle*.[4] Quite predictably, one of the masterminds of contemporary Russian geopolitics makes use of *the concept of sub-imperialism* to simplify the Arab Spring blueprint and outline its fairly pessimistic view of the future: by building unprincipled alliances with Al Qaeda and Islamist fundamentalists in general, overthrowing secular and pro-western dictators, gradually dismantling all the sovereign, anti-American, and Shia -dominated regimes in the Greater Middle East, installing in power either so called democrats under direct control by Washington or Salafis, Wahhabis, and (Muslim) Brotherhood members within the orbit of sub-imperial US allies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as by further supporting the contesting geopolitical systems of its sub-imperial units (including Israel), the US-led West, itself instrument in the hands of the global financial elite, is continuing its march against Syria, Iran, Russia, and China, that is towards WW3.[5] With or without WW3 - experts have a priori proclaimed the Hobbesian multipolarity scenario as very unlikely - the East has been nonetheless anticipating

[3] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, "The 'Great Game' Enters the Mediterranean: Gas, Oil, War, and Geo-Politics," Global Research, October 13/14, 2007, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-great-game-enters-the-mediterranean-gas-oil-war-and-geo-politics/6862.

[4] See Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

its own destabilization.[6] The ultimate goal, as many geopolitical thinkers as different as Nazemroaya and George Friedman outline in their prophetic studies, is "to encircle and ultimately dismantle China and Russia [preferably from within]." Whereas the euphemism "fragmentation" is frequently met in Friedman's compelling prophecy for the next 100 years, "balkanization" is Nazemroaya's word of choice.[7] On the other hand, thinking for a moment in a defensive realist fashion, what springs to mind is: "making room for Russia?" The "Great Game" aside, can a plausible speculation be made that the Russian comeback including via South Stream is due to a sort of *compensation*, some really great one, discreetly offered by Washington for all the US "sins" regarding Kosovo and other regional issues against Kremlin's will? What do the ambiguous EU and US attitudes towards South Stream imply?[8] Has at least one of the western empires entered a "grand bargain" with Moscow, thus becoming tacitly permissive on the issue of Balkan geopolitics for the sake of keeping smooth relations with Putin's Russia and future strategic gains? Despite general antagonisms there is always a degree of peacetime cooperation, or at least a minimum compromise, among great powers based on common understanding of the need for sharing a contested political space and relenting in case-specific bargains. Given the scope of Russian resurgence in the Balkans it is possible that Washington has engaged Moscow in a cooperative manner, but only to a lesser extent, without significantly limiting its options in the Balkans. Also, specific Russo-American bargains and compensations concerning the region, if true at all, have certainly stemmed from necessity rather than good will, meaning no one has left the "Great Game" yet. So, is South Stream a pure Russian win over the declining West or just a necessary deal that would not really make the US cease and desist further attempts at containing the Russian power? Either way, even when seen through the lenses of Gazprom's mega empire stretching across four continents (Eurasia, North Africa, and Latin America), the South Stream project is all but one of a dozen. On the downside, this huge, multi-billion Russian endeavour is rather leading to a *stealthy shift of the regional balance*. Serbia has been placed right at the heart of the project whose main infrastructure is to transit through three more Balkan states. With the recent abandonment of the pipeline's south-western,[9] the number of Balkan states expected to be tied up to Russian interests on energy grounds has not decreased at all. Gazprom has been resolved to buy the Greek national gas company (DEPA) despite anticipated problems with the anti-monopolistic rules of the EU's third energy package effective since March 2013 as well as potential influences emanating from Washington and Brussels in the

[6] Ibid.

[7] George Friedman, *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century* (New York: Doubleday. 2009), 64, 71,136, 138, 145, and 152; and Nazemroaya, "The 'Great Game' Enters the Mediterranean.

[8] See Margarita Assenova, "EU and US Policy on South Stream Remains Ambiguous," The Jamestown Foundation, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 9, no. 211 (November 16, 2012): n. p., http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40126&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=49f127243ffb0e34deeed7bd143eaf44.

[9] Ibid.

course of the bidding process.[10] Furthermore, Greece and Russia are still pushing for the Burgas - Alexandroupoli pipeline, a parallel project co-initiated by Athens and Moscow in the early 1990s but temporarily frozen due to successive Bulgarian obstructions since 2009.[11] Meanwhile, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska), Montenegro, and Macedonia have all expressed their interest to hook up on the South Stream's main line via separate connectors. Economic and environmental benefits aside, seeing its potential connection to the pipeline as instrumental in a national security context, Macedonia has been particularly active in lobbying Russian authorities. Still, when it comes to energy security, Croatia and the Bosnian Federation, which is, so to speak, half western-oriented and half pro-Turkey, prefer another pipeline option over Russian gas supplies. Along with Albania and Montenegro they are very likely to prioritize the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) project in the period ahead.

Kremlin's Balkan Strategy: Cultural-Informational, Political, Military, and Economic Aspects

As Russia continues with its global "politicisation" of energy resources and strategic wielding of non-military power other relevant aspects of its foreign policy towards the Balkans are often overlooked. First, its enhanced *cultural* and *informational activities* in the predominantly Orthodox region pass largely unnoticed by outsiders.[12] More important, Kremlin's *political and military influence* in the Balkans seems to have been underrated for quite too long. As early established, the assertive notion of Russian national interest in the Balkans has only intensified in the Putin era.[13] Last year ACUS Vice President Damon Wilson reprimanded Montenegro to "get rid of Russian domination" before it could join NATO.[14] But the government in Podgorica has apparently ruled out the post-2009 Bulgarian formula in dealing with Russian investors. As

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10 Ibid.

11 Svetlozara Kazasjan, "Clash over Burgas-Alexandroupoli in Parliament," Bulgarian National Television (BNT), Video 03:11, Sofia, March 7, 2013, http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/96512/spor_za_burgas_aleksandrupolis_v_parlamenta; and Margarita Assenova, "Lukoil under Pressure in Bulgaria," The Jamestown Foundation, *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 8, no. 167 (September 13, 2011): n.p., http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38393.

12 As posted on the *Russia beyond the Headlines project* website, 'Since 2007, Russia beyond the Headlines has published monthly supplements about modern Russia in [27] leading global media.' Of the 27 supplements published globally, five can be found in some of the most popular Balkan dailies and periodicals. See 'Products', Russia beyond the Headlines, accessed January 22, 2013, http://rbth.ru/about_us/products.

13 James Headley, *Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin* (London: Hurst & Co., 2008); and Robert Legvold review of *Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin*, by James Headley, *Foreign Affairs* 88, no.2 (March-April 2009): n.p., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64774/robert-levgold/russia-and-the-balkans-foreign-policy-from-yeltsin-to-putin.

14 Beta, "Montenegro Must Get Rid of Russian Domination to Join NATO," B92, April 18, 2012, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=04&dd=18&nav_id=79827. ACUS stands for Atlantic Council of the United States.

a result, the country that has been continuously denounced as a top money-laundering destination remains Russia's second Balkan stronghold.

Russia and Its Regional Bastion No.1: The Other Side of Serbia's "Pragmatism" Over Kosovo

As for Russia's first, unmatched bastion in the region, that same Serbian leadership which has been recently vaunted as pragmatic over Kosovo and fond of rapprochement with the West has always espoused an emotional view of Russia as Serbia's "closest friend" and major supporter of Belgrade's Kosovo platform;[15] not to mention the local Putinomania occasionally sending the broader Serb society into exaltation and feeding the enduring myth about "the small Russia [-ns] in the Balkans."[16] Based on past lessons the Serb politicians may have ceased acting as if they lead a nation of "80 million with 50 atomic bombs,"[17] but the spirit of "small Russians" alongside tradition remains a strong socio-psychological determinant within and beyond Serbia. Due to such longstanding and favourable Serb sentiment Russia has been able to expand its regional bastion No.1 across the Bosnian border, to Republika Srpska. One can actually draw a nice parallel here: whereas the Neo-Ottomans in Ankara have put a "special focus" on BiH as a whole, devising "a parental and protective approach" mainly towards the Bosnian Muslims,[18] Russia, which is normally suspicious of Turkish activism in the Western Balkans, has seen itself as the tribune of the Bosnian Serbs.[19]

The West has clearly failed to make sufficient efforts to embrace post-Milošević's Serbia and the Serbs in general. Even the most vehement pro-western voices in the country, whatever the success of their reformist effort, resignedly concede that the West's rigid stereotype of the Serbs as adamant, Russia-minded barbarians is not going to change any time soon. As a result, Serbia remains asymmetrically divided: on the one side there are the unconvincing pro-western democrats, including the financial elite close

[15] See Tanjug, "Serbia Has to Assess Its Strength by April 2," March 24, 2013, http://www.tanjug.rs/news/81602/serbia-has-to-assess-its-strength-by-april-2.htm; "'We Seek Maximum Rapprochement with Russia, Our Closest Friend' - Serbian PM Ivica Dacic," Radio Voice of Russia, April 10, 2013, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_11/We-seek-maximum-rapprochement-with-Russia-our-closest-friend-Serbian-PM-Ivica-Dacic/; and Tanjug, "President Loves Only Serbia More than Russia," B92, September 10, 2012, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=09&dd=10&nav_id=82164.

[16] Tanjug, "Voice of Russia: Why Serbs Love Putin and Putin 'Kisses' Serbs," *Politika* (Belgrade), February 20, 2013, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Glas-Rusije-Zasto-Srbi-vole-Putina-a-Putin-ljubi-Srbe.lt.html; and Emir Kosturica, interview by Vladimir Snegirev, "World and Emir," *Rosijskaja Gazeta* (Moscow), April 17, 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/16/kystyrica-site.html.

[17] Edward Luttwak, paraphrased by Milomir Marić, debate comments, "Ćirilica - Milovan Drecun, Nenad Prokić, Boško Jakšić & Momčilo Pantelić," Goli zivot, published January 8, 2013, Youtube Video, 01:33:02, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FB2mw55t7rc.

[18] Erhan Türbedar, "Turkey's New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles," *Insight Turkey* 13, no.3 (2011): 142-44 (139-158), http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_13_no_3_-2011_turbedar.pdf.

[19] Ibid., 156n15.

to US, German, IMF, and World Bank circles; on the other side, the real Serbia *at her best,* and only at her best, dreams of enjoying the EU boon one day without profoundly changing its status of traditional Russian bastion and regional proxy power. With the global financial crisis still underway, worldwide perceptions of western decline, Putin's return to Kremlin for many years, and on top of all that, the 2012 Serbian elections, Belgrade has stepped up its *appreciation of Russia's role* in the region. The current "national-socialist" government in Belgrade is said to have a "more sincere" relationship with Kremlin compared to its predecessors.[20] Indeed, since the trio (Tomislav) Nikolić – (Ivica) Dačić - (Aleksandar) Vučić came to power in May 2012, Serbia's cooperation with Russia has intensified, particularly in the strategic (energy and defence) domains. In light of the recent increase in mutual trade and bilateral agreements, experts are tempted to argue that the Russo-Serbian relations have not been better since the fall of the Iron Curtain.[21] Meanwhile, Serbia's genuine perception of its wavering foreign policy has been far more nuanced and calculative than what has been suggested by "binary" western analyses.[22] Given the delicate context, watching Belgrade take the middle road and publically promote its EU/CSDP priorities along the "western vector" of its foreign and defence policy should come as no surprise.[23] First, featuring one of the world's top two anti-NATO (US) sentiments,[24] the divided Serbian society remains seriously handicapped on its Euro-Atlantic path. As an illustration, several years into Serbia's PfP membership (2006), the country's expert community, which continues to be dominated by pro-Russian minds, embarked on a NATO debate, scrutinizing even the hypothetical implications for Serbia of the remaining US tactical nuclear forces in Europe (about 180 B61 gravity bombs deployed to six NATO bases in five European NATO members and typically stored in WS3 underground vaults).[25] Of course, such deliberations have abounded with less substantiated arguments and general disregard

[20] "Upitnik - Sta je nama Rusija? (Zorana Mihajlovic Miroslav Lazanski Ognjen Pribicević" [Questionnaire - What is Russia to Us? (Zorana Mihajlovic Miroslav Lazanski Ognjen Pribicević)], Youtube video, 51:38, uploaded by GaboonV, 19 December 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WlzUswI88d0.

[21] Ibid.

[22] The West tends to see Serbian foreign policy after (Vojislav) Koštunica as a two-pronged enterprise. See for instance Steven Woehrel, "Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service (CRS), Washington DC, July 30, 2012, p. 3, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22601.pdf; Hrach Gregorian, "Serbia Between East and West," Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, April 2012, p.4, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Serbia%20Between%20East%20and%20West.pdf. Although such simplification might be analytically useful, in reality, Belgrade has thought of its foreign policy in a more delicate fashion. According to the genuine Serb perception, Serbia's diplomacy is/should be based on four pillars including those along "the eastern vector."

[23] Milovan Drecun, debate comments, "Ćirilica - Milovan Drecun, Nenad Prokić, Boško Jakšić & Momčilo Pantelić," Goli zivot, published January 8, 2013, Youtube video, 01:33:02, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FB2mw55t7rc.

[24] "Strongest Anti-American Sentiment in Serbia, Pakistan," B92/Beta, July 9, 2009, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=07&dd=07&nav_id=60329.

[25] "Miroslav Lazanski - WS3, Srbija i NATO," ("Serbia and NATO: Random Partners?"), uploaded by vucko558, January 16, 2010, Youtube Video 05:55, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbIzHP2KSkk.

for the reductionist trend in the field of nuclear disarmament, including the recent "global zero" campaign for "expedite" removal of all tactical nuclear warheads from the European theater.[26] Second, Putin's wishful idea of a single Eurasian commonwealth spanning from Lisbon to Vladivostok [27] – the debate on which has particularly flared up following Moscow's 2009/10 rapprochement with Berlin[28] - resonates well among the Serbs. And what else can be expected when even the ideologue of Russia's contemporary Eurasian vision, Dugin himself, advises Serbia that its "only salvation lay in [its] integration in the [post-Soviet] Eurasian alliance and addressing the Kosovo problem through reliance on Russian atomic weapons?"[29] On the other hand, seeing Russia's Eurasian concept more realistically, Fyodor Lukyanov, celebrity strategist close to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, admonishes the Serbs as well as the other Balkan Orthodox "brothers" not to place too much hope on contemporary Russian identity and its predominantly economic ways of imposing itself in a broader European context.[30] Unfortunately, compared to Dugin's "atomic alternative," untriumphal messages such as Lukyanov's hardly penetrate through the blind Balkan pride. Third, in order to relieve itself from western pressure and get the maximum it can from an eventual compromise on Kosovo, the current government in Belgrade has openly sought to (re) balance its foreign and defence policy. Thus, in line with its debatable neutrality, as Milovan Drecun puts it, Serbia is now "trying to relax" its main problem (Kosovo) with the West by "strengthening the 'eastern vector'" of its foreign and defence policy and taking advantage of Russia's resurgent role on the international stage.[31] In the wake of the tenth, presumably decisive round of Serbia-Kosovo normalization talks in Brussels, Belgrade, in close coordination with Moscow, is de facto blackmailing Washington and Brussels to reconsider their partiality towards Priština and come up with a much better offer regarding the status of Kosovo Serbs.

[26] Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission, *Removing U.S. and Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons from European Combat Bases,* Report prepared for the 48th Munich Security Conference (Vancouver, B.C./Washington D.C.: Global Zero, 2012), http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/all/files/GZ%20 NATO-Russia%20Commission%20Report%202012%20-%20EN.pdf.

[27] For a brief explanation on Russia's Eurasian vision and its predominantly economic methods to impose itself upon Europe see Fyodor Lukyanov, "Brotherhood and Calculation," *Geopolitika*, Russia and Serbia, no. 63, May 2013), 16-7, http://www.geopolitika.rs/images/stories/rusijasrbija.pdf;

[28] Ben Hall and Quentin Peel, "Paris and Berlin Seek 'Reset' with Moscow," *Financial Times*, October 17, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f5ba97c-da1c-11df-bdd7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ZTJjm96z; and Richard J. Krickus, "The Road to Resetting Moscow Ties Passes through Berlin," Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 24, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Road_To_Resetting_Moscow_Ties_Passes_Through_Berlin/1966883.html.

[29] Dugin, interview by Erić, "Global Destabilization Phase."

[30] Lukyanov, "Brotherhood and Calculation," 16-7.

[31] Drecun, debate comments.

Back to the Past:
Permanent Naval Presence in the (Eastern) Mediterranean

To the disappointment of many, the Russian forces have been steadily returning to the eastern Mediterranean, while also planning, despite objective limitations, to set their foot again in the Balkans. The 2003 Russian military withdrawal from the region was, no doubt, symbolic in many ways and truly painful to the (Kosovo) Serbs. Based on President Putin's decree of May 5, 2003, by August that same year the Russian military authorities demonstratively pulled out 650 airborne troops from Kosovo and over three hundred Bosnia-based peacekeepers. Kremlin's official explanation was that Russia did not want to legitimize – especially not through an indecisive military presence - NATO's illegal occupation of Kosovo and all the anticipated intrigues regarding the Serb province's final status. Less than a year later, the absence of the Russian paratrooper battalion from Kosovo, of those same men that took NATO by surprise in June 1999, would apparently prove devastating to local Serbs as Kosovo Albanians launched a violent unrest against the remaining Serb community in the province. What then followed seemed like a temporary gap in the regional balance. Nonetheless, a few years ago Kremlin began pouring lots of money into the costly modernization of the Russian naval fleet and strategic forces. Simply, were they to tackle US hegemony or each other, Moscow and Beijing could not ignore the basic law of strategy and geopolitics since the 15th century and the making of the European maritime empires: naval forces are supreme over land forces and "transoceanic freedom" is the key to an ultimate win in any "Great Game."[32] Since the Five Day War with Georgia in August 2008, the Russian Navy has significantly increased its level of readiness and mobility in the eastern Mediterranean.[33] For instance, *Caesar Kunikov Ropucha*, a class-I large amphibious landing ship from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), known to have been involved in the Russo-Georgian war, has frequently drawn public attention either by taking part in Black Sea drills or by cruising prominently across the Mediterranean.[34] Montenegro and Greece have been among the BSF's favoured destinations.[35] It is well known that the Montenegrin coast, notably *Boka Kotorska* (Bay of Kotor), has attracted the Rus-

[32] Nazemroaya, "The 'Great Game' Enters the Mediterranean."

[33] RIA Novosti, "Russia's Black Sea Fleet Conducts Anti-Sub Warfare Drills," October 6, 2009, accessed November 23, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20091006/156371162.html; and Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet Information Support Group, press release, "BSF Task Unit Returned from Mediterranean," November 21, 2011, http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=13667.

[34] RIA Novosti, "Russian Warship en Route to Black Sea for Naval Drills," April 8, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100408/158487103.html; quoted in Jorge Benitez, "Russian Warship en Route to Black Sea for Naval Drills," Atlantic Council of the United States, April 9, 2010, http://www.acus.org/natosource/russian-warship-en-route-black-sea-naval-drills; Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet Information Support Group, press release, "Landing Ship Caesar Kunikov Prepares for Long-Range Cruise," September 15, 2011, http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=13039.

[35] Russian Navy, Southern Military District Press Service, press release, "Black Sea Fleet Restored Permanent Presence in Mediterranean," November 30, 2012, http://rusnavy.com/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=16591&print=Y.

sian Navy since long before getting owned by Russian tycoons.[36] In response to the indefinitely prolonged proxy war in Syria, where Russia has major and even existential interests at stake, since early 2012 the Russian Navy has successively dispatched all sorts of warships from its Black Sea and Baltic Fleets to eastern Mediterranean waters – such as large landing ships, replenishment vessels, destroyers, cruisers, ISTAR ships, and even the flagship aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* - all tasked to perform maneuvers nearby the Syrian coast and/or visit Russia's modest naval installation in Tartus. As an important milestone, last November the Navy announced its decision to restore permanent presence in the Mediterranean.[37] With Russia now preparing to deploy for the first time since the USSR breakup (1992) a permanent Mediterranean Task Force envisaged to tackle the US Sixth Fleet,[38] western scrutiny over Kremlin's regional ambitions and naval-strategic capabilities is only about to grow.

Setting the Stage for a Military Foothold in the Balkans

Playing the "Great Game" simultaneously in the heart of the Balkans, Moscow has not limited itself to economic means, though the latter are expected to remain its predominant strategic tool globally. Through a subtle work with Serbia's security and defence authorities over the past few years, Russia has been exploring the potential for expanding its "small Eurasian NATO (ODKB/CSTO[39])" on NATO's account, using, ironically, proven cooperative security methods. If over the unipolar 1990s there were significant limitations for establishing a long-term strategic cooperation between Milosevic's Serbia and Yeltsin's Russia – notably the latter's weakness and economic dependence, the absence of a comprehensive bilateral strategic arrangement, as well as the lack of emerging integration frameworks in the East - the present strategic context is totally different. On April 11, 2013, Serbia, along with Hamid Karzai's Afghanistan, was granted observer status in the Russia-led military bloc.[40] Thinking of this as only a trial balloon or a cunning political maneuver aimed at earning Belgrade a better deal on Kosovo in the diplomatic showdown under EU auspices is simply wrong. The

[36] "Russian Navy to Get Yugoslav Base?," *The Prague Post*, April 20, 1994, http://www.praguepost.com/archivescontent/14647-russian-navy-to-get-yugoslav-base.html and Alexander Naumov, "Russia and Montenegro: A History of Common Ties (Part I)," Russkiy Mir Foundation, December 24, 2008, http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/publications/articles/article0132.html.

[37] Russian Navy, "Restored Permanent Presence in Mediterranean."

[38] RIA Novosti, "Russian Navy Starts Forming Mediterranean Task Force," March 11, 2013, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130311/179943892/Russia-Starts-Forming-Mediterranean-Task-Force.html.

[39] CSTO stands for Collective Security Treaty Organisation. ОДКБ/ODKB (**Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности** / Organizatsiya Dogovora o Kollektivnoy Bezopasnosti) is the original acronym frequently used in Eastern Europe.

[40] Vladimir Zinetdinov, press release, "Parliamentary Delegations of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Republic of Serbia Granted Observer Status in Parliamentary Assembly of Collective Security Treaty Organization," CSTO, Moscow, April 12, 2013, http://www.odkb-csto.org/news/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1776.

recent advancement of the Russo-Serbian defence cooperation is just an overture to a long-awaited strategic framework soon to be signed by Belgrade and Moscow. Both are to implement the increasingly prominent "eastern vector" of Serbia's foreign and defence policy, regardless of the sincere EU ambitions among Serbia's ruling elite and civil society. Seen from a broader perspective, all these developments, starting with the 2008 Russian "return" to the Balkans, actually lead to restoring Russian military presence in the heart of the peninsula – but this time, arguably, with a more decisive military force and hardware in response to the US/NATO fortified dominance and missile shield in Eastern Europe - and effectively reshaping regional geopolitics.[41] The ongoing Russo-American ABM issue is actually becoming a good excuse for Russia's future military moves towards the Balkans. Also, a derivate of this whole trend is a private line of thinking in Belgrade suggesting that "this is what Milosević was missing prior to the NATO bombardment."

Post-1999 Russo-Serbian Defence Cooperation, Some Compelling Aspects

The post-1999 Russo-Serbian defence cooperation has included some compelling military-technical and institutional aspects. Beginning first with the most piquant "technical" details, one cannot miss the fact that remains of the US *Nighthawk* mysteriously shot down over Serbia on March 27, 1999, have more mysteriously reached some of Russia's top defence research and development centers. According to the latest report on the issue, the "new exponat [exhibit]" – namely, a part of the downed F-117A's cockpit - displayed in the museum of the *Tikhomirov* Scientific Research Institute, a leading radar technology development facility, has "accidentally" revealed the Serbian military secret simply by being tagged as a victim of the Russian anti-aircraft missile system BUK (NATO reporting name SA-11 "Gadfly"), one that is said to have never been in possession of the Serbian or ex-Yugoslavian military but has been *de facto* produced in several modified versions in *China* and other countries based on the Soviet original. Furthermore, the report continues, the remains of the stealth aircraft, along with "the most advanced anti-aircraft missile system," have suddenly popped up in the *Gromov* Flight Research Institute, Russia's foremost scientific facility for studying new composite materials and flight technologies (testing avionics engineering research and prospective aircraft hardware).[42] Not many relevant details leaked to the public

[41] Vladimir Muhin, "Serbian Foothold of Collective Defence: Russia's Military Presence in the Balkans Could Be Answer to Deployment of U.S. Missile Defense Systems in Europe," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), April 12, 2013, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2013-04-12/1_serbia.html, quoted in "UPDATE: Iskander Missiles And Russian Fighter Bomber Squadrons In Serbia?" InSerbia News, April 13, 2012, http://inserbia.info/news/2013/04/iskander-missiles-and-russian-fighter-bomber-squadrons-in-serbia; and "The Military Presence of Russia Reshape[s] the Balkans," Turkish Central News, April 15, 2013, http://turkishcentralnews.com/2013/04/15/the-military-presence-of-russia-%E2%96%BCreshape-balkans/.

[42] Dmitry Litovkin, "Chinese Secrets of Serbian War," Ruska Reč, April 23, 2013, http://ruskarec.mk/politics/2013/04/23/kineskite_tajni_na_srpskata_vojna_20957.html.

except for the general fact that Serbia had long hoped to modernize its air force and air defence by procuring new Russian weapons systems; reinvigorate its defence industrial base with Russian money and support as well as with new factories for armoured vehicles and artillery modeled after a formerly renowned domestic tank manufacturer; and finally, try using Rosoboronexport's global presence to successfully broker its own arms trade.[43] For influential Serbian experts, who have always leaned towards Moscow, modernizing Serbia's military, preferably with Russian support, is of "urgent" importance and "essential need."[44] The most vehement among them, celebrity war journalist and Belgrade-based *Politika* military analyst Miroslav Lazanski has been perhaps the first to publically reveal the specifics of the recent Russo-Serbian defence cooperation and armaments deals. Above all, the prospective opening of new arms manufacturing facilities in Serbia (one in Velika Plana said to have been near completion in December 2012) for licensed production of two types of armoured personnel carriers based on Kamaz engine and chassis and final assembly of self-propelled howitzers.[45] Apart from future possibilities for Serbia's defence industry and arms trade, when asked about the country's national priorities, Lazanski apologetically advocates the case of military modernization, stressing inevitably Russian Deputy Prime Minister (Dmitry) Rogozin's latest offer consist of "12 MIGs 29 M/M2 [to replace the old Yugoslav MIG 21 Bis and complete far more a capable squadron of 16 aircraft], Pantsir and S-300 missile systems along with missiles intended for S-400, and several new long-range radars."[46] All systems of this sort – let alone the most advanced versions - are known to have extended operational engagement, engagement altitude, and target velocity ranges, whereas S-300 in particular (comparable to the US MIM 104 Patriot and SM 3), depending on the chosen variant, might further include nuclear, ABM, and/or strong anti-stealth capability. Advanced variants of S-300 have been recently scrutinized in the context of both the simmering Iranian problem and the ongoing Syrian conflict,[47] and

[43] *Večernje Novosti*, "Russians, Our Brothers in Arms Too," *Vesti* (Belgrade), August 26, 2012, http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/249598/Rusi-braca-i-po-oruzju.

[44] Diana Milošević, "What Would Serbia Gain from Modernizing the Military with Russia's Support? Is Essential Military Cooperation with Moscow Possible without Correcting the Official [Foreign Policy] Course?"), Belgrade, April 17, 2013, http://www.standard.rs/sta-bi-srbija-dobila-modernizacijom-vojske-uz-pomoc-rusije.html; and Miroslav Lazanski, debate comments, „Upitnik - Sta je nama Rusija?" ("Questionnaire: What is Russia to Us?")

[45] Lazanski, debate comments, „Upitnik - Sta je nama Rusija?" ("Questionnaire - What is Russia to Us?).

[46] Miroslav Lazanski, quoted in Milošević, "Modernizing the Military with Russia's Support?"; and "Topic of the Day: New 'MIGs' and S-400 Coming to Serbia," *Politika* (Belgrade), December 1, 2012, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Novi-migovi-i-S-400-stizu-u-Srbiju.lt.html. According to the latest media reports, by the end of May Serbia will buy only six MiG 29 M/M2 aircraft and a couple of new radar systems. **Đ. Barović, "We Give a Billion for Russian MiGs,"** *Vesti* (Belgrade), April 26, 2013, http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/309102/Dajemo-milijardu-za-ruske-migove-.

[47] David Lev, "Report: Russia Sent Syria Super-Advanced S-300 Missiles," November 24, 2011, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/150059#.UZB_NLXvsuR; and AFP, "Lavrov De-

Serbia is said to have been offered even missiles fitted for S-400. Roughly speaking, should Serbia pursue a political decision towards buying (off) the Russian offer as a whole (reportedly due in late May 2013), its future air defence could be potentially capable of engaging hypersonic targets up to Mach 15 (5000m/s), at five meters to about 30 km altitude, and out to 400 km distance. The potential equipping of the Serbian military with such formidable Russian missile systems, which are said to be highly effective even in a severe jamming environment and against complex SEAD measures,[48] gives substance to Rogozin's recent message. Last November Russia's Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Defence Industry expressed his hope that, following the implementation of the latest Russo-Serbian procurement dealings, 'Serbia will become a stronger state, namely *so strong that one will have to think twice before raising arms against her* [emphasis added].[49] In defending the case of Russia-aided military reincarnation of Serbia, Lazanski does not invoke merely his standard, cost-effectiveness and time-saving arguments (comparably much cheaper weapons systems, plus Serbia's air force and military logistics having been used to Russian military equipment).[50] At his dissenting pro-western opponents at home, some of whom define the national interest as if they were Serbia's own Franz Oppenheimer(s),[51] he also shoots poison arrows: "…those saying we [Serbia] are surrounded by NATO countries have no clue about geo-strategy. Neither Macedonia nor BiH are in NATO, and even Montenegro is not in NATO. That's one thing, and the second is: Austria is [also] surrounded by NATO countries and Switzerland [too], but they don't seem to raise the question what to do about it. We [Serbia] threaten no one and have no offensive military doctrine."[52]

The Niš Center Controversy: Russian Military and Strategy of Asymmetric Reply Already in the Balkans?

Excuses aside, perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the post-1999 Russo-Serbian defence cooperation comes with the recent establishment of EMERCOM, a joint emergency response center based near the city of Niš, southern Serbia's regional hub, only about 122 km (76 mls) air distance from Camp Bondsteel.[53] The center has been

fends Supply of Russian Missiles to Syria," XIN Msn.com, Video 00:49, May 10, 2013, http://video.xin.msn.com/watch/video/lavrov-defends-supply-of-russian-missiles-to-syria/yqcs1kwa?from=gallery_en-sg&sf=Relevancy.

48 Jane's Intelligence and Insight Press Centre, press release, "Exclusive – NATO Aircraft Will 'Hunt' Russian Missile Systems during Defence-Suppression Exercise," March 17, 2005, http://web.archive.org/web/20070610012817/http://www.janes.com/press/articles/pc050317_1.shtml.
SEAD stands for Suppression of Enemy Air Defence.

49 Lazanski, "New 'MiGs' and S-400 Coming to Serbia."

50 Lazanski, quoted in Milošević, "Modernizing the Military with Russia's Support?"

51 For a critique of Franz Oppenheimer's ultra-liberalism see Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political,* expanded edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2007), 76-7.

52 Milošević, "Modernizing the Military with Russia's Support?"

53 Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, press release, "Russian EMERCOM Humanitarian Center Open in

in brewing at least since late 2009. On October 20, 2009, Dačić, then deputy prime minister and interior minister of the Republic of Serbia, and Sergei Shoigu, then emergency preparedness minister of Russia, signed an agreement envisaging the so called “humanitarian” center. Promptly after the event, Senior Jamestown Foundation Fellow Vladimir Socor interpreted the emerging project as a potential “Russian military foothold” in the region, exemplary of Kremlin’s affluent neo-imperial tactics: “It seems hard to imagine a European country agreeing to host Russian *militarized fire-fighting*, flood-response, or chemical-protection units on its national territory in anticipation of some catastrophes. Serbia’s bizarre agreement with Russia is the first of its kind. Russia’s Emergency Situations Ministry is a fully militarized ministry. This agreement opens the door for Russian uniformed personnel, helicopters, and dual-purpose supplies to be forward-deployed in Serbia on a long-term basis […] Moscow’s tactics are designed to prolong an ambiguous situation in Kosovo, set Belgrade at odds with the US and EU on that issue, keep Bosnia-Herzegovina dysfunctional in order to stop its course toward the E.U. and NATO, and encourage Serbian past-oriented nationalism as a means for Russia – alongside its economic means – to compete against the West in the Balkans [emphasis added].”[54] The Niš center was then jointly declared by Serbian and Russian representatives on October 17, 2011, amid some promising exchange between Belgrade and Brussels that had been undersigning Serbia’s EU/CSDP orientation.[55] Touching upon both the political-strategic overtones of Serbia’s controversial move and the fact that Belgrade had “clearly acquiesced to the presence of the Russian base…out of economic considerations;”[56] experts agreed that Serbia, albeit still under President Boris Tadić, was turning towards Moscow less ambiguously. Sensitive to any improvement in the Russo-Serbian ties - let alone the witnessed development of a bilateral civil-military structure conducive to promoting the CSTO security framework in the Balkans - the West grew suspicious. The joint declaration gave immediate rise to grave speculations about Russia’s specific strategic intentions in the Balkans. First, quite common in this regard has been the assumption that the Niš centre is about to embark on an off-the-record mission to spy on NATO’s regional activities, especially “the US military facility being set up in Romania” as part of the US/NATO ABM shield.[57] Of course, since day one Kremlin has squarely denied any military (intelligence) function of the new center, [58] including by sending in tonnes of humanitarian

Serbian Nis Today,” Moscow, April 25, 2012, http://www.mchs.ru/upload/iblock/f02/f02c1a68f434299cc938892be5397a26.pdf.

[54] Vladimir Socor, “Medvedev Exploits Past-Oriented Nationalism in Belgrade,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 6, no. 197 (October 27, 2009): n.p., http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=35654.

[55] Czekaj, “Does Russia Want a Toehold in the Balkans?.”

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] AFP / CBS, “Russia Denies New Facility in Serbia Is for Spying,” CBS News, October 17, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/10/17/ap/europe/main20121330.shtml.

supplies to the center's location and even offering the mistrustful West the option of multilateral participation in the center's demining teams. Second, given the tense post-2008 Kosovo situation and Russia's unequivocal support for Serbia aimed at maintaining strategic ambiguity in the Balkans, the EMERCOM's potential military role has been inexorably linked to the future developments in North Kosovo and the broader region. Many see it as a military base in evolution. Matthew Czekaj, for instance, while pinpointing to a sudden inflow of Bushism (pre-emptive thought) among Russian military experts in addition to the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) elements of "the Medvedev doctrine" relevant to Kosovo Serbs as potential holders of Russian passports, goes so far as to proclaim the Niš facility a "toehold" for future Russian intervention in North Kosovo.[59] Third, having in mind the central dispute between Washington and Moscow dating back from the early days of the Bush administration, the Niš center could not have avoided speculations of it as being the first step towards deploying Russian equivalent of the US/NATO missile defence system in Europe. Regardless, the work on EMERCOM has significantly progressed since last year's inauguration of the centre's premises in the course of which the Russian delegation once again "handed over…humanitarian cargo."[60] Today, the official government line in both Belgrade and Moscow stays about the same: they "Are Opening a Humanitarian Center [Not a Russian Base]" as part of their "global project - the strategic partnership of which an agreement is to be signed soon [in late May]."[61] The humanitarian hub will be reportedly staffed with 39 combined personnel, mainly emergency preparedness and disaster relief experts. It is expected to reach FOC (full operation capability) by the end of the year.[62] Yet, doubts persist. Despite the Serbian authorities being purportedly tired of explaining to the West that the whole enterprise has nothing to do with forward Russian military presence,[63] Washington and Brussels continue to question the Niš facility's declared remit. Many observers, not necessarily related to the EU and NATO (US), consider the project Kremlin's second military installation outside the former Soviet territory (Tartus having been first) and potential ISTAR node. What is more, as soon as the Balkan media learned about Serbia's recently upgraded CSTO status their rich imagination went a step further in alarming the West: whereas Vojvodina's separatists and independents mainly felt indignant at seeing the Serbian "Guberniya" join the "Neo-Warsaw Pact,"[64] some branded Croatian and Macedonian dailies spec(tac)ulated

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59 Czekaj, "Does Russia Want a Toehold in the Balkans?."

60 Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, "Russian EMERCOM."

61 Tanjug/Kurir, "Dačić: We Are Opening Humanitarian Center, Not Russian Base," *Kurir* (Belgrade), April 25, 2013, http://www.kurir-info.rs/dacic-otvaramo-humanitarni-centar-a-ne-rusku-bazu-clanak-763407.

62 Tanjug,/Kurir, "Dačić: We Are Opening Humanitarian Center."

63 Ibid.

64 Miloš Podbarčanin, "Serbia in Neo-Warsaw Pact," Slobodna Vojvodina, December 2, 2012, http://www.slobodnavojvodina.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1410:srbija-u-neo-

that "…soon Russia will be unloading its heavy arsenal in the Balkans and will start assembling the weapons of the *Russian missile defence shield* [emphasis added; remember Rogozin's offer for modernizing Serbian military and Lazanski's related hints?)."[65] Have the West and local pro-western voices been overreacting a bit? Not exactly. It is Russian strategists who say that "the goals of Russia in the Balkans are far broader," thus not only confirming many of the said speculations but also revealing new, exclusive details about Russia's possible plans. According to Captain Konstantin Sivkov, reports *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, it is possible that Russia has been preparing to countervail the US Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo as well as NATO's missile defence system in Europe by deploying *multiple* Russian military facilities and equipment in Serbia, including air bases, fighter-bomber squadrons, and even Iskander tactical ballistic missiles (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone).[66] All these heralded "potentialities" in addition to the existing Niš centre are part of Kremlin's *strategy of asymmetric response* against the US "hedge" strategy. The part of the US hedge strategy concerning Russia is thought by Moscow to have heavily relied on two elements: the ABM shield in Eastern Europe and the practice of stirring up local and regional conflicts affecting Russian interests. Furthermore, as Russia under the lead of Defence Minister Shoigu has reworked the transformation of its Soviet-time Special Operations Forces (SOFs) with a view of creating modern and prestigious *Specnaz 2* under the command of the General Staff and the President as the Commander-in –Chief, strategists around the world are curious to know whether and to which extent the transformed special forces will be employed as part of Russia's asymmetric reply strategy in the Balkans. Thinking of the Russian maneuvers in the Balkans as regional "factors of restraint" that would only strengthen Serbia's sovereignty, Sivkov and other members of the Russian brass basically add to Rogozin's recent thesis on a sufficiently powerful and feared Serbia.[67] Regardless, were one to believe that the Niš facility is intended to serve a purely civilian purpose – as humble as supporting upon request first responders *throughout Europe* – one should be also mindful of the *geopolitical "catch"* implied in the whole enterprise. As well known, a comprehensive crisis response based on optimal use of civilian instruments has been the CSDP's hallmark of distinction; at least on paper. The EU's latest constitutional changes have only furthered its strategic leverage in the realm of civilian crisis management. Under the Lisbon Treaty (as well as the ill-fated 2004 Draft European Constitution) Brussels has been entitled to offer antiterrorist and disaster relief assistance to foreign "populations, countries and regions confronting natural or

varavskom-paktu&catid=41:politika&Itemid=55.

[65] Aleksandar Srbinovski, "Russia and Serbia One Step from a Military Pact, Macedonia Carefully Watching"), *Nova Makedonija* (Skopje), April 19, 2013, http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=41913858324&id=9&setIzdanie=22860.

[66] Muhin, "Serbian Foothold of Collective Defence," quoted in "UPDATE: Iskander Missiles," InSerbia News and "The Military Presence of Russia," Turkish Central News.

[67] Ibid.

man-made disasters."[68] So far as the (Balkan) EU members are concerned, "in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster" the EU Solidarity Clause enables them to rely on mutual support as well as supranational assistance (upon request) that is to include "all the instruments at [the EU's] disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States." [69] Second, consecutive Balkan and Afghan lessons have driven NATO to devise its own integral (civil-military) platform for crisis management. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and Unit (EADRU) were established as early as 1998 and in the past couple of years it was the Balkans and Turkey that mostly benefited from this 24/7 NATO anti-catastrophic service. This is not to suggest that amid robust western arrangements in the field of disaster response and humanitarian relief the specialized "fire-fighting" centre in Niš will be of no use. Nonetheless, from a geopolitical perspective, the center is nothing but a sophisticated attempt for throwing a CSTO shadow over the Balkans under the veil of co-op security and furthering Russia's great Eurasian dream by providing her with yet another tool for subtle involvement in Europe. Politically correct statements that CSTO has been no rival to NATO are actually wrong. Besides the functional complementarity among state-actors and global governance structures there is an ongoing battle for geopolitical space and influence. Disaster response aside, the Russia-led military alliance long ago "announced with greater emphasis, like NATO, that it too is prepared to get involved in Afghanistan and global 'peacekeeping' operations."[70]

"The Awakening Bear," a Never-Ending Western Strategic Dilemma

In conclusion, the *western strategic dilemma* regarding the awakening bear would have been much less puzzling had Washington and Brussels known for sure that, despite the temporary challenges of Putinization, Russia would be getting politically and strategically closer to the US-led West until completely merged with it. But there has been one huge problem: is Putin a temporary phenomenon? Nearly two decades after Samuel Huntington published his *Clash of Civilizations* one is tempted to conclude that Russia, given its size, tradition, national pride, and inherent Janus

[68] European Union, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union C 306/25, 17.12.2007, Article 1, amendments 24) and 50), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union C 326/13, 26.10.2012, Articles 21 (2) (g) (ex Article 10 A), and 43 (1) (ex Article 28 B), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0013:0046:EN:PDF.

[69] European Union, Treaty of Lisbon, OJ C 306/100, Article 2, amendment 176), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0042:0133:EN:PDF; and Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 222 (ex Article 188R), Official Journal of the European Union C 83/15, 30.3.2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF.

[70] Nazemroaya, "The 'Great Game' Enters the Mediterranean."

face, will never fully align with a US-dominated West, especially not under American terms.[71] No doubt, the great land from Ural to Siberia to Vladivostok has been within "the pale of the Western civilization" ever since her adoption of Christianity in 988.[72] Parts of today's urban Russia, Moscow in the first place, impress with their hybrid look as "somewhere between Europe and America.[73] Furthermore, over the past decade the Russian society, similarly to that of Serbia, has been divided in two: the Russian opposition, West-bankrolled democrats and NGOs, unsettled oligarchs, and liberal reformers within the government (many around Prime Minister Medvedev) versus the purportedly "isolated" Putin who has been teamed up by his conservative *siloviki* (ex KGB, FSB) and the majority of the Russian people.[74] That in a new age of empires no political outcome can be predetermined confirms Trenin, venturing to say that "At some point, driven by the same logic [of pragmatism and necessity], Russia may even discover the value of trans-Pacific ties with North America [and likely against more assertive China, Japan]."[75]

Russia's Foreign Policy Philosophy: A Sovereign, Independent Approach to Global Affairs

Nonetheless, the internal consolidation of the world's largest country and her gradual return to global prominence has been the general trait of Putin's rule. Russia's preoccupation with itself and immediate Eurasia is foreseen to last at least until the end of the decade.[76] The four stages of its post-2000 development in international context - from a consolidation of power and "an alliance with the United States, coupled with the 'European choice,'" to nationalization, oil-based economic boom, and "defensive self-assertion," to recovery and quest for western-aided modernization, to economic stagnation, "sovereignization," and attempts for a global comeback over the Syria case[77] - have all been devised to put the once-feared superpower back on track. These stages, while largely corresponding to Putin's successive terms, are regularly misconceived as

[71] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 315; Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West* (New York: Random House, 2005); both quoted in Jolyon Howorth, "The Major Challenges Ahead," *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 244.

[72] Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov" in *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,*, 2nd enlarged edition, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 354-5 (354-75).

[73] Kosturica, interview by Snegirev, "World and Emir."

[74] Dugin, interviewed by Erić, "Global Destabilization Phase" and Tomothy Heritage, "RPT-Russia's Putin Looks Isolated in New Kremlin Term," Reuters, US Edition, May 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/13/russia-putin-idUSL6N0DT06X20130513.

FSB stands for Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service [FSS]).

[75] Trenin, "The Putin Doctrine."

[76] See Friedman, *The Next 100 Years*, 73-4.

[77] Trenin, "The Putin Doctrine."

four distinctive foreign policy doctrines.[78] Speaking of their single underlying orientation that now only comes to the surface, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov asserts - as if such thing is needed at all - that *a sovereign, independent approach to global affairs* has been the key political philosophy behind Russia's foreign policy.[79] Without own approach, independent in foreign affairs and slightly authoritarian on domestic ground, Russia is mindful that it cannot hope to survive as such let alone *restore its regional influence and ultimately create a desired neo-imperial framework.* This approach has nonetheless proved unpalatable in a world dominated by liberal democracies whose main interest lay in remotely-controlled open societies and market economies. Driven by familiar strategic motives to weaken and completely subjugate Russia to its own model, the West has centered its propagandistic and subversive effort upon the authoritarian elements of the Russian political system. Doing so, unfortunately, ignores not only the historical character of Kremlin's iron-handed leadership but also the fact that such leadership is able to draw power as a direct reaction to the West's attempts to carve out Russia's future on its own terms.[80] It has been clear since day one that during the Putin era - at the least - Russia will be defying western strategy, while also trying to build a favourable neo-imperial framework that would make it a geo-political center and thus mitigate its strategic concerns relative to both the East and the West. In this regard, some realistic and fairly critical Russian experts such as Lukyanov somehow conceal or embellish Kremlin's neo-imperial ambitions, for instance, by squarely claiming that Putin has so far failed to realize his wishful Eurasia; that Russia will never be another USSR, nor any superpower in a Soviet sense; that Moscow might opt for a new Balkan game along Slavic and Orthodox lines only by exception, if such endeavor is deemed instrumental in a broader European context; and that Russia's evolving and yet-to-be defined national identity is seeking to engage Europe in a common enterprise via more sophisticated means.[81] This is not to say that Lukyanov does not speak the truth. However, while technically no state-actor could fully match the former Soviet Union and its imperial predecessor, nor would be willing to do so, western strategists believe that resurgent Russia should be timely constrained or the world "will look very much like it did from 1945 to1992."[82]

[78] See for instance Ibid.

[79] Sergey Lavrov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Philosophy," *Geopolitika*, no. 63, Russia and Serbia, May 2013), 8-9, http://www.geopolitika.rs/images/stories/rusijasrbija.pdf.

[80] For a Russian advice against such western efforts see Trenin, "The Putin Doctrine."

[81] Lukyanov, interview by Evtov, "Vo Centar 'Amerikancite Dignaa Race od Makedonija!?' .mp4" [At the Centre "Americans Gave Up Macedonia!?" .mp4]; and "Brotherhood and Calculation," 16-7.

[82] Friedman, "The Medvedev Doctrine," and *The Next 100 Years*.

Russia's Grand-Strategic Thought in the 21st Century: Three Visions for a Desired Neo-Imperial Framework

Russia's present-day grand strategic thought and geopolitical ambition have been informed by *three largely overlapping concepts* – each having profound implications for the future of the Balkans and the West.

First, two decades after the USSR breakup the image of the powerful Soviet empire still fares well in Russia's collective memory. In fact, despite the common understanding of the irreversibility (and among many, the undesirability) of the Soviet project, a considerable portion of the Russian society, mainly impoverished mid-to-low-class citizens (Putin's support base), remains nostalgic even of the Stalin times.[83] While the contemporary creators of the revamped Russian identity have sought to avoid the proven wrongs from the communist era, certain status elements attributed to both the former Soviet Union and the preceding Tsarist Russia – such as formidable military strength and broad regional influence – are generally appealing and will be most likely pursued by any future host of Kremlin. Today, the reflections of the ex Soviet and imperial spirit are typically associated with Putin's authoritarian modus operandi. But the fact is that such spirit is more integral to the Russian military itself. That is why ever since the onset of the Russian military transformation in the mid-2000s there has been a revival of the historic clash between the two factions of Russian strategic thought: the "eager westernizes," so called "Academics," vindicators of western military doctrine, modern force structure, and hi-tech weapons systems versus the "ardent believers in Russia's special strategic advantages," also known as "Traditionalists" or "Nationalists," contemporary guards of the Tsarist and also, since 1991, Soviet military tradition, morale, and spirit.[84] The lengthy reforms set off by the now-sacked defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who went on from being Russia's 21st century "Academic" specifically mandated to do away with inefficiency and corruption in Russia's defence sector to ending up as a scapegoat because of insufficient preparedness of the Russian armed forces and political elite for changes, have collided with Soviet and Tsarist military traditions.[85] This has especially applied to the reorganization of the strategic and operational command and control (C2) of the Russian military, a move that has required dismantling of the celebrated Soviet divisions to brigade-level units and strategic HQs relocation. In late 2012 General Shoigu was obviously brought in not so much to abort Serdyukov's "erratic" military reform – for Kremlin has been well

83 Niall Fergusson, "They've Got Used to Freedom, So Why do Russians Still Hunger for the USSR?," August 16, 2005, http://www.niallferguson.com/journalism/politics/theyve-got-used-to-freedom-so-why-do-russians-still-hunger-for-the-ussr.

84 Pintner, "Russian Military Thought," 374-5.

85 Beta / *Vesti* / *Pravda*, "Putin Urges for "Drastic Advance" of Armed Forces in Next Five Years," *Pravda* (Belgrade), March 1, 2013, http://www.pravda.rs/2013/03/01/putin-pozvao-na-drasticno-unapredjenje-oruzanih-snaga-u-narednih-pet-godina/.

aware of the need to generate a 21st century force if Russia is to retain a competitive role in the world arena – but to lead the Defence Ministry forward while also addressing the main concerns of the "old guard" in the Russian military, preserving some of the holiest military traditions, as well as maintaining *l'esprit de corps*. Thus, despite issuing dozens of restitution orders, including the ones restoring the two celebrated WW2 divisions (Tamanskaya and Kantemirovskaya), Shoigu has carried on with reforms in line with his predecessor's fundamental principles (four districts as strategic-operational commands; a tertiary system build around the brigade as the central unit; outsourcing; improved military education, new equipment for all services).[86] As a cumulative result, the Russian military has recently seen a number of tangible improvements: a fully reorganized C2 structure; preservation of almost all recently created brigades; reversion of the less credible portion of Serdyukov's military (education) reform; unannounced combat readiness drills (a full-fledged airborne division suddenly deployed to Ural; massive war games in the Black Sea) for the first time in the past 20 years; the entering into service of *Yuriy Dolgorukiy* - the first of eight Borei-class strategic submarines carrying Bulava-30 SLBMs continuing improvement of the entire strategic forces complex, particularly its naval component; filled gaps in the air force and army aviation inventories with "fourth ++" generation fighters (MiG 29M/M2, Su-30, 34, 35; the fifth generation Su PAK FA to be introduced by 2016) and latest attack helicopters (Ka-52 Aligators and Mi-28H3 Havocs) respectively; and the inauguration of Specnaz 2, Russia's transformed special operations forces. The latest news also suggest that the Russian brass is poised to follow the US RMA-oriented, transoceanic footsteps by gradually building, as Admiral Viktor Chirkov explains, the navy of the future - based on the modular, universal vessel concept and centered around ultimate carrier platforms equipped with robotized weapons systems, multirole aircraft, and unmanned vehicles for undersea, surface, air, and space operations.[87] Given the old-time sentiment and pride of its society, military, and leadership, Russia has been vying to *resurrect its imperial character* and *grandeour* in some form, using, among other things, more sophisticated, financial means. That the country's evolving political identity is not that far from what it used to be only two to three decades ago confirms Oleg Dushin while explaining the purpose of Russian "brotherly" loans issued to countries like Serbia and Cyprus: "Russia has been striving to partially restore the type of influence in the world *that the USSR once had*. Crediting on a government level, where political agreements are concluded along with loan agreements, is a means towards that goal [emphasis added]." [88] The second grand strategic concept informing

[86] Viktor Litovkin, "Russian Military Reform Carries On," Ruska Reč, March 18, 2013, http://ruskarec.mk/opinion/2013/03/18/prodolzuva_reformata_na_ruskata_armija_19531.html.

[87] Viktor Litovkin, "The Grand Prince 'Yuriy Dolgorukiy' and His Company," Ruska Reč, January 10, 2013, http://ruskarec.mk/articles/2013/01/10/knezot_jurij_dolgoruki_i_negovata_druzina_17161.html; and "Russian Military Reform Carries On."

[88] Oleg Dushin, quoted in Turisheva, "Money Isn't Everything," 5.

Russia's foreign and defence policy is based on the old Slavic idea. The latter was elaborated in great detail in 1895 by the intellectual father of pan-Slavism Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky. In his seminal work *Russia and Europe* Danilevsky determines 10 cultural-historical types – the Slavs and the Romano-Germanic race being the ones in focus – and applies a teleological theory of evolution so as to distinguish the former as a relatively young cultural type with fairly good development prospects. Based on this, Danilevsky puts forward a plan on socio-political development of the Slavs, ultimately urging for their unification into an Orthodox empire ruled from Constantinople / Tsarigrad (Istanbul).[89] It is exactly this policy-relevant part of Danilevsky's study - abundant with strategic ideas, say, from introducing Russian as the empire's official language to "the necessity" of Russian naval power and a Black Sea fleet – that serves as an inspiration for all contemporary visions of pan-Slavism and Orthodox brotherhood.[90] For Danilevsky, the Slavic idea was "the Most Sublime Value," one that Kremlin should nurture as both its own "angle" in observing the old continent and "a single criterion" for assessing European developments.[91] Hence, while mindful of the impossibility and undesirability of Russia being completely separated from Europe, the pan-Slavic guru is excessively hard on the West: not only is Russia advised to stay away from the European political system but it is also reminded of its duty to counterweight Europe in a "combat-ready" position.[92] Amid such ambiguous and distant relationship, the notion of "European interest" does not apply to Russians and Kremlin should therefore "refute any though of solidarity" with the Romano-Germanic interests.[93] Without any further examination it can be claimed with high confidence that of all the grand strategic concepts currently influencing Kremlin, pan-Slavism, especially Danilevski's perception of it, is the least appealing to Russian leadership. First, the Slavic and Orthodox political concepts are hardly implementable if not unfeasible at this point. It is enough to take a look at the strategic position vis-à-vis Moscow taken by Poland, the whole Višegrad group, or until recently, Ukraine and Georgia. Second, the concept is geographically associated with parts of Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, and it is therefore all too narrow compared to Russia's ambitions. In fact, the Slavic idea's best chance is to serve as a preliminary tool for Russia to impose itself on Europe, though its utility even in this regard is highly debatable. Third, however authoritarian and alienated Putin's neo-Tsarist rule could possibly become, Russia and Europe are very unlikely to cohabitate at the level of mutual distance suggested by Danilevsky.

[89] Nikolay Jakovlevich Danilevsky, *Russia and Europe. A Look at the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavic World to the German-Roman* (St. Petersburg: Panteleev Brothers, 1895), http://www.runivers.ru/bookreader/book10067/#page/1/mode/1up.

[90] Ibid., 450-55, 508-10.

[91] Vyacheslav Charski, "Nikolay Danilevsky: The Slavic Idea as the Most Sublime Value," Ruska Reč, December 26, 2012, http://ruskarec.mk/articles/2012/12/26/nikolaj_danilevski_slovenskata_ideja_kako_najvozvisena_vrednost_16699.html.

[92] Danilevsky, *Russia and Europe*, 450, 475, and 513-97.

[93] Charski, "Nikolay Danilevsky: The Slavic Idea."

As already hinted, many in Moscow, starting with President Putin himself, are essentially Europe-minded, seeing the old continent, and particularly Germany and Italy, as a necessary partner in the potential realization of Putin's ultimate neo-imperial design stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The Russian elite (not only dissident tycoons) have embraced the West in an economic-material sense at the least. The Russian President, as Trenin puts it, has been recently much more comfortable meeting western CEOs over lucrative businesses - such as the 2011 Rosneft-ExxonMobil deal - rather than chatting about stiff issues (democracy, human rights, regional conflicts, and ABM shields) with his western peers.[94] Feeling pressure on its western frontiers as well as in the Far East, Kremlin is presently mostly fascinated by the vision of Eurasia as a joint venture of Russia, the former Soviet republics, and Europe. Mindful of being perhaps light years away from such a wishful design, Moscow has temporarily focused on select post-1991 integrations in the former Soviet space which have the potential to serve as vehicles towards Europe. CSTO aside, it is mostly about the six-member Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) and Russia's recently created Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus, both ambitiously planned to evolve by 2015 into a single EU-type Eurasian Union that would further seek to merge with the EU single market. It should be noted that western analyses of Putin's ambitions somehow prefer to elucidate Russia's first grand strategic concept, paying much less attention to its Eurasian vision. Thus, Russia-led integrations in the former Soviet space have been mainly regarded as a USSR in resurrection even though Kremlin's ambitions might have been slightly different and arguably much bigger. Obviously, common to all three complementary grand-strategic visions elaborated here is their (neo-) imperial dimension. Those questioning this dimension, which is known to have formed the centuries-old essence of the Russian political culture, could actually benefit from asking questions about what people from the Near Abroad think of Kremlin's attitude.

Conclusion

The incomplete EU/NATO area in the (Western) Balkans remains a dangerous geopolitical hollow where emerging actors and potential eastern empires have been seeking to establish themselves as a preliminary stage in imposing their strategic interests upon the West. Recent Balkan compromises devised under immense western pressure may become less sustainable in the years ahead as eastern tendencies on the rise continue to engulf the region. Russia is a friend, crucial NATO (US) and EU partner, and most importantly, a historical shaper of the Balkans deserving at least a proportional role in the region, especially if the West is intent to build a smarter global governance paradigm for a less violent 21st century. Unfortunately, regional power-sharing in the inherently fragile Balkans, potentially associated with "fluid," unclear, and overlapping spheres of influence, could easily render an undesirable mid-to-long-term effect: renewed local violence along the infamous "domino" line. In this regard, future

[94] Trenin, "The Putin Doctrine," 9.

Balkan constellations shaped by emerging multipolarity must not be confused with a bipolar, Cold-War type stability. That said, the West has been already witnessing a concerning trend of Russian penetration into South Eastern Europe, more palpably since 2008. The beginning of the implementation of the South Stream gas pipeline project seems to have marked a "stealthy" shift in the regional balance. Also, as Russia continues with its global "politicisation" of energy resources and strategic wielding of non-military power other relevant aspects of its Balkan strategy are often overlooked. On the military side, the Russian forces have been steadily returning to the eastern Mediterranean, while also planning, despite objective limitations, to set their foot again in the heart of the Balkans. Russia's regional bastion No.1 has proved particularly instrumental in this context. Despite its debatable EU ambitions and recent pragmatism over Kosovo, since 2012 Belgrade has swung closer to Kremlin, strengthening the "eastern vector" of its foreign and defence policy. In addition, the post-1999 Russo-Serbian defence cooperation has included some compelling military-technical and institutional aspects, enabling Russia to pursue its strategy of asymmetric response as well as a potential enlargement of "its own NATO" (CSTO), right through the Balkans. Russia's Balkan and eastern Mediterranean pattern of resurgence inevitably raises the general question of the western strategic dilemma with the "awakening bear." This dilemma is likely to perpetuate beyond 2018 given Russia's growing insistence on a sovereign, independent approach to global affairs and its search for a neo-imperial framework suitable to its strategic interests. On the more positive side, however, the said pattern of resurgence highlights the importance of one challenging western option: "Serbia in NATO and Russia with NATO" could be the game winner for all sides involved, yet *without* necessarily pressing Moscow to accept the western model.

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Review

SECURITY VERSUS PRIVACY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES

Biljana KAROVSKA ANDONOVSKA[1]

Abstract: *Special investigative measures are techniques that are applied to collect data and information relevant to the prevention or detection of serious crimes, including acts of terrorism. These measures include interception of communications, recorded in the home or other private space, insight in realized telephone and other electronic communications, search of personal data, etc. The obtained data have evidential value in criminal proceedings. The application of special investigative measures is a result of the confrontation of the modern states with serious security threats perceived primarily in terrorism and transnational organized crime. However, their application penetrates in some fundamental rights of the individuals, especially in the sphere of personal privacy. In this context, privacy and security are seen as concepts that are mutually excluding and cannot coexist. This is due to the fact that the overlap between them is evident and often implies the need to limit privacy in order to protect public and national security.*

Key words: *security, privacy, special investigative measures*

Introduction

In the last thirty years the world's states are faced with asymmetric security threats perceived primarily in the so-called "unconventional" forms of crime, such as terrorism and organized crime, and also corruption, money laundering, etc. They are executed with sophisticated tools and methods. By using the benefits of modern information and communication technologies, these criminal activities often have a transnational character. The severity of these phenomena imposed the necessity of their appropriate treatment not only nationally, but also globally. This is especially true after the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 and others like them that later occurred in other parts of the world. These events changed the treatment of terrorism and organized crime forever. These phenomena require a reassessment of traditional criminal law institutes. In their efforts for prevention, detection and prosecution of unconventional crime, the international community is united in the view that these threats have to be addressed with new special measures. They imposed themselves as the only alternative. But, the special

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measures confronted the modern states with two conflicting challenges: 1. To introduce new (unconventional) methods of collecting information about planned or committed terrorist and other criminal acts; 2. To remain consistent with international standards of respect for the fundamental human rights.

Special investigative measures

One of the relevant definitions of special investigative measures is contained in the Recommendation of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe related to special investigation techniques for cases of serious crimes, including acts of terrorism.[2] Special investigative measures are defined as techniques that are applied by the competent authorities in the context of criminal investigations for the purpose of detecting and investigating serious crimes and suspicions, to collect information in a way that will not put the targeted persons in an awkward situation. The special investigative measures are taken in respect of persons for whom there are grounds for suspicion of involvement in terrorism or other criminal activity. So, the special investigative measures are proactive undercover police activities through which collected and processed information or data relevant for further criminal proceedings are gathered. New methods include monitoring of telephone and other electronic communications and also communications in the home, insight in realized telephone and other electronic communication, search of computer systems, search of personal data, simulated opening of companies, infiltration of undercover agents, etc. The collected material has evidentiary value in the criminal proceedings. So, the gathered material in the criminal proceedings is presented as an evidence for involvement in a terroristic or other criminal activity. The necessary intrusion into the private sphere is considered legitimate, if it is done in accordance with statutory requirements. However, the special investigative measures, especially some of them, have an extremely invasive nature. The problem with their implementation is the fact that they are in collision with certain fundamental human rights. Special investigative measures are an attack on privacy which should be inviolable. Therefore, the research of truth in applying special investigative measures is experienced as an intervention in individual interests of the suspect, starting by monitoring, through questioning, wiretapping and research, until the arrest occurs.[3] In addition, special investigative measures are non-selective, both in content and in personal terms. Namely, the application of special investigative measures de facto endangers certain rights and freedoms not only of suspected persons, but also persons who are in the private or business environment of these people.

[2] Recommendation (2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on „special investigation techniques" in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 April 2005

[3] Rezner, D., 30 problems in Law of criminal procedure, Franz Wallen GmbH, Munich, 2007, p. 6

Therefore, they are quite controversial. Also, special investigative measures are applied especially before tort and are aimed at prevention of threats. This modern tendency is directed towards not waiting for the criminal act to be executed, but to prevent in that manner that will explore the dangers of its occurrence.[4] Therefore, in terms of human rights, their application is on the verge of viability.

The trend of using special investigative measures and techniques was evident in the European and the American Legal System. It was particularly pronounced in the series of organized terrorist acts at the beginning of the new millennium. The basis for their introduction is contained in international documents, conventions, recommendations and other documents adopted by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other relevant international organizations that deal with transnational organized crime and terrorism. Reforms in the criminal procedural legislation in this regard were made in almost all countries in the world. Reforms basically refer to extensive powers of the police services and intelligence agencies. In the rush to reduce the risk of future terrorist acts and thereby strengthen national security through the reformed legislation, states have expanded their control over the citizens. And they did so without adequately considering the long-term impact on democratic freedoms.[5] One of probably the most criticized laws in terms of human rights, in the context of the application of new investigative methods, is the USA Patriot Act.[6] The act was passed by the US Congress less than two months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The decision occurred amid the creation of a paradigm of collective security which propagates fear of general endangerment. The Patriot Act is a complex act that changed more than hundred sections of fifteen existing federal laws. In the name of fighting terrorism, this act expanded the powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities, leaving space for deviation from the traditionally protected human rights. Title 2 of the USA Patriot Act covers all aspects of surveillance on suspected terrorists and foreign intelligence agencies involved in clandestine activities. Certain segments of Title 2 are assessed as extremely controversial. Among them is the power of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct a search of a home or workspace without the permission and knowledge of the owner or the person who is in possession of the space (the person later is informed for the completed search). However, in this particular case it is necessary that there are reasonable grounds on which the court estimated that a prior notice will not achieve the expected effect. USA Patriot Act also modified authorizations for the use of means of interception of telephone calls. Namely, the court issued a special order to install and use devices for monitoring of telephone calls throughout the United States, if you accept the claim of the prosecution that way you get information about a particular

[4] Schroeder, F.K., Criminal and procedural law, ARS Lamina, Skopje, 2010, p. 83-88

[5] E. Waak, The Global Reach of Privacy Invasion, Humanist, November/December http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/waakND02.htm

[6] The term is an acronym of the words Uniting (and) Strengthening America (by) Providing Appropriate Tools Required (to) Obstruct Terrorism Act

criminal investigation. Moreover, the court order can cover multiple devices without a special order for the mobile phones of the suspect. The introduction of this so-called Roving wiretap is justified by the need to address the technologically sophisticated terrorist activities. However, this was estimated as an opportunity for violation of privacy of all persons who are in daily contact with the suspects by the critics of the USA Patriot Act. However, USA Patriot Act amends the terms of use of the means of monitoring of telephone calls in three important ways: 1. The amendments clarify that agencies responsible for enforcement can use appropriate orders for the interception of communications through the Internet and other computer networks, 2. Orders of this type issued by federal courts, have effect throughout the US, 3. Agencies responsible for enforcement must give a special report to the court whenever they use such orders to install their own monitoring tools on computers belonging to the public provider.

The terrorist act of September 11, 2001, had a strong influence on the rest of the world. In the laws of almost all European countries the current powers of police authorities were expanded, while going deeper into the privacy of citizens. There is an obvious continuity in the expansion of the powers in terms of video surveillance, supervision of communications, including the tapping of telephone calls, monitoring Internet communications, etc. In this respect, Britain, which was also the target of terrorist attacks in 2005, significantly tightened existing legislation and adopted new laws, too. Britain today is considered to have one of the most comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation in Europe. British authorities have broad powers in control of telephone and other electronic communications. Telecommunications enterprises are obligated to submit all available links and data in case of suspected terrorism.

This trend of direct relationship between the executive terrorist attacks on the legislative intervention is still evident. Thus, since the recent terrorist act in Paris exerted on journalists of the satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo” France passed a new law to combat terrorism. This law extended the powers of the secret services, among others by overseeing all communications, putting cameras in private residential buildings, etc. In addition, Canada adopts a new law to combat terrorism which is called C-51. One of the reasons for the act, among other things, is a terrorist act that took place in October last year to the Parliament in Ottawa. The law introduces a significant expansion of the powers of the police and intelligence agencies. Among other things, they can use a huge database of monitored private communications which are available, authorization for exchange of information without adequate protection, the possibility of holding a person in custody to seven days without charges, etc.

Security vs. Privacy in the context of the application of special investigative measures

The need for application of special investigative measures in combating national and global threats to security is undisputable. Benefits from their application are certainly evident, especially when they are applied in function of prevention. However, the special investigative measures opened a wide controversy and conflicting points of view, especially in terms of respect for human rights and also the ethical, legal, political and sociological aspect. The issue that undoubtedly emerges is regarding the legitimacy of limiting the Millennium standards for personal human rights. This is especially true because of the fact that the special investigative measures basically assume derogation from some traditionally protected human rights. In this context, the right to privacy of personal and family life, the presumption of innocence, confidentiality of personal data, privacy of communications, the free flow of information, etc. is jeopardized. Therefore, special investigative measures are often assessed as acts that lead to the erosion of civil liberties and rights. The basic fear is that in the name of fighting terrorism their application significantly reduces the constitutional protection of the human rights. Hence the question - is it justified that the privacy and other personal rights must be sacrificed for security? According to some research, the public is more willing to accept the threat to certain rights and freedoms for greater personal safety and security, especially in circumstances of real threat of terrorism. However, it is undisputed that the policies that may jeopardize some of the personal rights are accepted only if they are effective in preventing future terrorist attacks. In this context, privacy and security are seen as opposing concepts which cannot coexist. The overlap which occurs between the two concepts often implies the need to limit privacy in order to protect national and public security. Hence the question arises - for the purpose of security, can we derogate the guaranteed human rights as universal standards?

Universality as a characteristic of human rights means that their compliance as an obligation applies to all in relation to all. However, only some fundamental rights are absolute. This means that human rights which are not absolute can be limited in order to resolve the conflict between the rights and to establish a balance between human rights and other constitutional values. A clash between human rights may occur during their implementation, and conflict resolution assumes that one of the rights prevails. Narrowly understood, the right to privacy in a healthy democracy, which largely relies on public availability of information, may seem undemocratic in practice to get less weight when weighed against interests that are considered common good, including especially the fight against organized crime, terrorism, etc.

Undeniably, national and public safety is the highest priority of each state. However, undoubtedly, security too can be achieved only under conditions of democratic rule of law and respect for individual rights and freedoms. Violation of human rights in the name of security, however, will not increase security. Neither will it affect the feelings of the people that are really safe. On the contrary, they will feel unsafe even in their home or in relation to private communications exercised daily. In this connection the general agreement that must be paid to the shape and intensity of the criminal legal reaction is emphasized, which could lead to distortion of the basic principles and rules to the extent that means destruction of the very democratic values in the name of whose protection such a reaction is undertaken.[7] Therefore, the application of special investigative measures should be carried out according to a precisely defined procedure and in the context of the specificities of each case. This is in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe that each response to crime also must be a confirmation of the basic principles of democratic states through the rule of law and respect for human rights. For this reasons, today, the protection of the privacy of individuals has become a challenge for modern democracies. However, whether states fail to provide adequate protection is still open and fairly debatable issue.

Balancing general versus individual interest

Finding the boundary within the scope of human rights in situations where they are in conflict depends on the factual circumstances of the case. Therefore, countries should seek a fair balance between the various interests. The art of balancing human rights implies broad interpretation of the rights in conflict and a detailed analysis of the case in which one of the rights should be given priority.[8] The balancing assumes measuring of the weight of all the relevant facts in favor of each of the rights, but also of those against the favoritism of one versus the other right, in each specific case of conflict. Because of that it is undisputed that the application of special investigative measures needs to balance between the need to protect the broad public interest versus individual rights. This will be achieved if we accept a reasonable compromise between the, relatively speaking, conflicts of interest. The uptake in the private sector can and should be tolerated only under strict legal requirements.

The Council of Europe created specific principles aimed at eliminating opportunities for unjustified invasion of privacy through the use of special investigative measures. The Council of Europe encouraged the Member States to adopt legislation allowing or expanding the use of measures such as surveillance, wiretaps and other investigative techniques.[9] However, at the same time they stressed that no matter how serious the situation in society in terms of crime, every response to crime must be a confirmation of the basic principles of democratic states through the rule of law and respect for human rights.[10] The Council of Europe has stressed the need for member states to maintain the proper balance between the interests of the community to respect the law, on one hand, and the rights of individuals established by the European Convention on Human

[7] Kambovski, V., Organized Crime, Skopje 2005, p. 359

[8] Treneska, R., For the constitution limitations of human rights: absolute or „prima facie" right, Proceedings "Eurointegration-ideas, conditions, realization, Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, Skopje, 2002, p. 605

[9] Recommendation (2001) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning guiding principles of the fight against organized crime, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 September 2001

[10] Recommendation (1996) 8 on Europe in a time of change: crime policy and criminal law, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 5 September 1996

Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand. In terms of safeguards to protect against unfounded application of special investigative measures, significant are the following principles that the Council of Europe set out in the recommendations to Member States:[11]

1. States should define the circumstances and conditions under which one can use special investigative measures, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. This principle, gives guidelines for a precise and clear national legislation in terms of determining the offenses for which measures can be applied, the duration of their application, storage of materials of the applied measures, taking control measures and other details.

2. Use of special investigative measures in the extent necessary for a democratic society and suitable for effective criminal investigation. Necessity weighed against the need to make the invasion of the personality of an individual for the purpose of effective criminal investigation.

3. Member States shall ensure control over the application of special investigative measures in court or out of court control through prior authorization, through supervision during the taking of measures or review ex post facto. Regarding the conditions for use of special investigative measures, extremely important are the following segments of the recommendations of the Council of Europe addressed to the Member States:[12]

1. The existence of a certain degree of suspicion - special investigative measures should be used only when there is sufficient reason to believe that a serious crime or act of terrorism has been done or there are preparations for it. In other words, the application of these intrusive measures should presume high degree of suspicion of the involvement of a person in criminal or terrorist activity to the point that because of it, his privacy will be endangered.

2. Proportionality (proportionality) in the application of special investigative measures in relation to the importance of high societal interest in the protection of which they are targeted. The proportionality should be provided in two ways

- between the objective to be achieved and the means used for this purpose;
- among the gene al interests of the community and protection of the rights of individuals.

3. Subsidiarity in the application of special investigative measures, that is to resort to the application of less intrusive investigative measures if they can achieve the purpose. Subsidiarity assumes gradation in the imposition of measures, from less to more intrusive. According to this principle, the application of the most intrusive measures should be ultima ratio.

[11] Recommendation (2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on „special investigation techniques" in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 April 2005

[12] Recommendation (2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on „special investigation techniques" in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 April 2005

The process of creating legislation that seeks to reduce the minimum limit opportunities for violation of privacy and confidentiality of the communication function in the control of severe forms of crime and terrorism significantly influences the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Since wiretapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations constitute a serious interference in the private life and communications, the Court insists for them to be based on law that is particularly precise. National laws must meet European standards in terms of the importance of the law and they must not restrict or reduce the right to the extent that would call into question the substance of the law. If the respondent State calls for a legal act which established certain discretionary freedom before the European Court of Human Rights, then the law must have a certain level of security and to determine the limits of that discretion by the state. The Court insists on clear rules, especially given the ongoing development and improvement of technologies used in the investigation. The rules must necessarily be grounded, irrefutable without terminological ambiguities that would make them contradictory. It is the only way to ensure minimal invasion of the rights of individuals in applying special investigative measures and guarantees to eliminate the opportunities for abuse in the application of these measures.

Conclusion

Terrorism and organized crime are phenomena which undoubtedly will leave a mark in the era in which we live. In their efforts to prevent and detect, the states are united and aware of negative consequences that they may cause in national and global security. From this angle, any method or means of their prevention seems clearly justified. But, civilized societies are based on standards that guarantee every person's basic personal rights. These are innate rights that every person possesses by the fact that he/she is a human being. However, despite the accepted universal standards of human rights, the world has seen cases of panic reactions in the endeavour to control public security or under the veil of security protection. There is no doubt that major contributions to these reactions come from the realized terrorist attacks and the continuity of dealing with them. These events forever changed the attitude to terrorism and cause changes in the management of its prevention and suppression with direct implications on human rights, particularly the right to privacy and the presumption of innocence. Underestimating the human rights in the name of fighting terrorism cannot be an effective way to improve security. We can only stifle freedom and create more victims. Hence, between the general interest of protecting the safety and interest of individuals to preserve the minimum privacy, a fair balance and proportional terms must be established. In this respect, the individual interest in privacy must deviate only if it determines that it is the only way to protect high social interests. The assessment cannot be general. The purpose of the derogation must be carefully weighed in each individual case in the context of all the circumstances of the case. Failure to follow these general principles can mean a priori underestimation of privacy before the interest of protecting security.

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Review

LEADERSHIP IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Abstract *This paper elaborates on a very important issue regarding good and bad leadership command, which is important for successful military operations. For this purpose there are numerous tests made on the bestselling books (papers) of military leaders that have conducted military operations in the most dangerous zones of the world.*
What are military leaders supposed to be doing in case of loss of life and casualties (victims) during military actions? What should be done in order to provide continuity throughout military operations?
The long-term involvement in military operations, has led to creation of experienced leaders in the armed forces in the world, who bravely, with dignity and professionally gained the trust of the uppermost leadership of the state and armed forces.
The experience gained, especially in the combat missions"Freedom for Iraq", "FENIX", "ISAF", "ALTEA" contributed to the increase of the level of command and the commandants of the contingents. This experience transferred in the armed forces in the form of lessons learned and the creation of training programmes is of immense value for the armed forces.

Key Words: *mission, military operations, stress, capabilities, symptoms.*

Introduction:

The choice of the subject of this text has been determined by the need to identify leadership as a key factor in order to manifest successful accomplishment of military operations. The development of military technology and industry have contributed to the increase of the combat power of armed forces, and analogously the importance of leadership itself and leaders has significantly increased, as the most responsible in conducting military operations. The research emphasized the leadership in conducting military operations and all direct consequences as a result of the operations. Risk and combat stress are the most exploited syntactical terms. Considering combat stress, it is defined as a term used to denote stress (internal mental and physical processes – pressure, anxiety, unease, etc.) that occurs among individuals as a result of exposure to combat situations. Individuals may feel fear of death, fear of failure, other intense and painful feelings, such as grief and guilt, uncertainty, concern for the family and other internal conflict

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and physical processes. Combat stress situations represent negative reactions that the military personnel could manifest as a response to the events and combat stress.[3]

Considering the risk on the other hand, it is defined as an assumed, expected, foreseen, possible future event or some kind of human factor occurrence, a technological process or a natural occurrence, that may cause certain kind of danger to people, property or other cultural or natural goods, under certain conditions or due to some reasons.[4]

Risk and combat stress will always be part of the challenges of military operations that should be controlled. Leaders of military operations can be divided into indirect and direct. Indirect leaders of military operations are leaders in charge of leading and commanding with larger units such as tactical, operational and strategic, and can conduct several military operations through direct leaders.

Direct leaders are the leaders of missions and are part of missions, and command tactical units directly on the field (company, platoon, squad, or team). Direct leaders should also be well trained tactical leaders.

In the text below we elaborate on the role of direct or firsthand leadership in military operations. Leaders of military operations should understand that combat stress occurs in moments of retreat or losing the battle, in cases when the unit does not successfully finish the task, or in extreme cases when there are injured or killed within the unit. Soldiers who experience injury or death of a friend during a battle, become more aware of the fact that one day, they themselves could be wounded or killed.[5]

Leadership during war is a unique form of leadership, where leaders should first and foremost know themselves entirely, to be aware of their responsibilities, of their subordinates, as well as the military power they possess. Direct leaders who are part of missions on the field should be skilful tactical leaders as well, to be able to make the right decisions quickly whenever necessary, as well as to be able to lead and motivate their subordinates in difficult situations. They should know how to motivate their subordinates in any hardship.

The leaders themselves should be able to deliver every combat task and always be able to make the right decision during tensions, explosions and confusion on the battlefield. They should be able to know how to motivate their subordinates when they face difficulties. When subordinates will recognize these traits (qualities) of the leader, they will feel more confident and will have trust in their leadership. The qualities that characterize the leader to be capable to face the effects of fear and to successfully complete combat tasks are the following: good preparation and planning, and rigorous training. The real drill developed and performed in an ambient similar to the authentic ambient where the unit would be deployed, is the first case to raise the level of self-confidence and the level of preparedness of the military personnel. Furthermore, the capacity to lead, self-confidence, skilfulness and courage are the qualities a leader should possess, so that the unit or group would be able to face the most difficult situations during battles.

[3] Handbook for leaders for control of combat and operational stress in ARM, 2014

[4] Jordan Spasevski, Pero Aslimovski, Saso Gerasimovski, Private Security, Skopje-Ohrid, 2008

[5] US Department of the Army, Field manual FM 6-22.5, Combat Stress, 2000

Challenges of leaders during missions

Direct leaders should be well trained and be capable tacticians, and at the same time they should be able to perform every combat task and make the right decision during riots, explosions, confusion and other combat hurdles.

The demand of information is great. To be able to meet the criteria from this demand, focusing on the operational model and on the basis of operational security (OPSEC), is a special challenge, and not an easy one. The members of the armed forces should be disciplined, in order to follow the criteria and rules when it comes to establishing contact with their families in such a case that they should use the address on the social network. The mere fact of being part of the elite units that perform tasks of operational and strategic importance requires rigorous protection of the nature of missions, their duration, the location, the buildings etc. Disrespecting of the rules not only can endanger the lives of members, but can also have a great deal of political implications, even in the foreign policy of the state.

Presence of leaders on the battlefield

Leaders should lead on the battlefield, in order to see, communicate and delegate their subordinates, thus, ensuring a better view of the conditions that they act upon. The presence of leaders (commanders) in specific combat operations also influences the motivation and the high morale of the military personnel during the mission. This increases the confidence of subordinates in their leaders, and they find true motivation in order to successfully complete missions. Personal presence on the battlefield, primarily due to direct leading and commanding, as much as possible in such operations, is a challenge for every leader. Leaders will not always be able to directly be involved in every operation. Depending on their agenda, military leaders should determine their priorities regarding involvement in operations with subordinate units. The time leaders spend conducting missions, including directly on the field as well, enables enhanced motivation for achieving goals, and it also influences the considerable enhanced success in accomplishing missions.

The physical presence of the commander is the only way to fully understand the operational ambient, to be able to see the advantages of the pre-deployment exercise, as well as the equipment and armament that are used. The continual increase of operational level and the decrease as much as possible of factors that may endanger the combat units, indubitably requires understanding of communication means, intelligence equipment, night vision equipment, armoured vehicles, the level of technical, tactical and physical readiness of the units.

Self-righteousness or sense of security?

Long term missions and tasks in most cases provide a false feeling of security in the units, or among their members during the mission. This type of feeling comes from a variety of reasons, but basically, self-satisfaction could be defined as a feeling of self-confidence or false security, because one cannot perceive the shortfalls and dangers, which are not perceived as such at the first glance. This is indeed a great threat to security because troops during mission are exposed to unexpected risk that can cause severe consequences. In order to prevent the former, leaders should take serious steps. Part of which is the following:

- Performing regulations by priority reliably and consistently;
- Rotating tasks to different units is conducted by providing all details regarding the security of the operation;
- Constant training during the mission;
- Clear and constant explanation of the mission goal and the reason the unit is on a mission;
- Enhancing physical readiness as a key element to preparedness and morale;
- Clear identification of long-term, mid-term and short-term goals;
- Taking security measures for the needed rest of subordinates and their involvement in non-military actions, during their spare time;
- Involving all troops in the process of planning and analyzing of tasks;
- Performing tasks for the unexpected and learning from mistakes and lessons learned;
- Elimination of all shortfalls identified in the previous mission;
- Rigorous performance of the standard operating procedures (SOP);
- Performing practical exercises (tests) before all specific operations, i.e. task and detailed control of the knowledge and equipment to be used during the mission;
- Understanding of the morale, the psychological and other condition of all members of the mission by the leader.[6]

Effective leadership during the mission

Communication abilities

Leaders should effectively communicate with their subordinates, live with them; carefully listen to all their needs, in order to be able to understand them correctly for successful completion of the mission. The knowledge gained from experience points out that the qualities such as: moral figure, personality, dignity, adequate communication, way of expressing, ability to lead the mission, as well as tactical technical and professional readiness of the leader, provide effective and efficient leadership. These attributes help the leader and are closely connected to the tasks from the domain of special operations, such as parachute jumping, diving, participating along with the personnel during exercises in all weather conditions, running with the personnel, etc. The leader should be with the subordinates at all times in order to deal with as many of their problems as possible, taking measures for more suitable and better equipment, as well as better exercising

[6] US Department of the Army, Field manual FM 6-22.5, Combat Stress, 2000

and training. Leaders should know how to and find a way to listen to and respect their subordinates when they suggest or raise various issues regarding the exercise and task completion. Being a leader means leading operations, a prerequisite for respect from the subordinates. Moreover, leaders should openly communicate with superiors in order to be able to maintain and direct the units under their command and to provide continual acceptance of the given orders without doubt or hesitation.

Decisions made by leaders should be based on the information received from their subordinates. Information should be timely, useful and detailed in order to enable appropriate decision making and to contribute to the mission in as much safe manner as possible.

Leading by personal example

Leaders are responsible (competent) for their subordinates. They should show maximum professional conduct or behaviour and clearly demonstrate their expectations to their subordinates. They should determine the best possible option for appropriate deployment of the personnel and adequate commanding for successful completion of the task. Their participation in the tasks significantly increases the morale of the operation, and thus contributes to the increase of safety (security) of the operation, since the experience of a successful leader influences the safe completion of the mission.

Developing capabilities and trust among subordinates

Good leaders should always control and develop the capabilities of their subordinates up to a level in case it is necessary they would be able to take the leading position. They should train their subordinates and provide them the opportunity to complete all exercises and tasks, thus providing better understanding of the equipment they would subsequently use on the field. In this way the subordinates should develop the sense of security in completing their tasks. The continual control of the knowledge, occasional assessment (testing), as well as joint attendance at the exercises along with the subordinates, directly influence the understanding of the operating capacities, and the physical and technical condition of the equipment intended for the mission of the personnel.

Combat stress, causes and measures that should be taken into consideration

Elite combat forces, which are always used to perform exceptionally difficult tasks and missions, inside and outside the country, are exposed to high level of danger. In most of the cases, tactical and operational tasks that they perform, including their units and subunits, in accordance with the special forces declaration, have a high risk factor.

Although well prepared, well equipped and trained, with great experience to face challenges, tasks and special missions, the members of elite combat forces are under constant risk of combat stress.

Factors that influence the instigation of this stress could be well characterized as external and internal. Some of these factors are the following:

- Six months up to a year duration of combat missions;
- New deployment in missions or performing tasks without a period for rest;
- Sleeping less than six hours per day during a mission;
- Duration of tasks up to three days;
- Witnessing death of a friend or fellow worker during an operation or a combat task;
- Death of a family member or a close friend during a mission;
- Financial and personal problems in the family;
- Lack of self-confidence towards the fellow workers in the unit or subunit;
- Loss of cohesion within the group[7]

The best method to minimize the fear is not the denial of its effects, but familiarization with them and acceptance, as well as acceptance of the direct dealing with them.

According to the vast experience of one of the authors in securing the borders of the Republic of Macedonia, these troops who experience continual stress, viewed through the prism of animal behaviour, could be categorized and identified with certain animal characters in situations of intensive combat stress, or in other words some individuals behave as “wolves” killing uncontrollably, others as “bears” looking for a shelter and in case they feel threatened they defend, and others behave as “rabbits”, simply not completing the task and abandoning post and fleeing.

Physical and mental fatigue

Signs that are attributed to this stress could be: distraction, not being able to focus or inability to cope in an action, i.e. absence of action, difficulties in determining advantages, difficulties in performing regular tasks, unnecessary concern or excess of concern, (anxiety) about minor issues, difficulty in focusing on different tasks, loss or lack of initiative, old age and long service of an individual in one unit, etc.

Muscular tension

Involvement in elite combat units for a considerably long period of time causes the personnel of elite combat units to be exposed to intensive stress, which upon a certain period of time starts to manifest its first signs. Discharges with a round parachute (static), dives in deep water and cold water, without consultation with a doctor diver, mountaineering exercises on arctic terrains for a long period once every year, long running with the daily load, enduring the burden over the long period of time of missions, etc. cause serious injuries to the personnel in the elite combat units. Some of the visible signs associated with this stress are the following: headache, constant pain in the limbs or the back, inability to get rest, severe body injuries during the operations, constant anxiety, insomnia, etc.

[7] US Department of the Army, Field manual FM 6-22.5, Combat Stress, 23 June 2000

Digestive system

Visible signs that reflect this stress are: stomach pain, constant vomiting and loss of appetite. The loss of appetite is a serious problem when there is a great loss of body mass or when the individual does not have a balanced diet to keep healthy body and mind in operations of long duration. For this purpose, leaders of missions should constantly be informed by the doctor of the mission regarding the physical condition of the personnel and the problems that occur as a consequence of missions with long duration, due to taking measures for avoiding such issues, i.e. their elimination.

Respiratory system and blood circulation

Some of the visible signs are the following: Short and uncontrolled heartbeat, over sweating, short and fast repeated breathing, dizziness and uncontrollable trembling of hands.

Sleep loss

Some of the visible signs that reflect this stress are sleep problems. This happens when individuals are involved in tasks for a longer period of time and cannot get sufficient sleep even when they have the need for it. And if they eventually fall asleep, they constantly wake up and experience difficulties going back to sleep again. Another significant sign of the lack of sleep are constant nightmares, after the end of the operation where there were killed or wounded (the wolf agenda).

Nightmares

The fear of death, injuries or pain causes nightmares which to a certain extent might be dangerous for the individual, as well as for the entire group. In extreme cases this feeling appears when individuals experience death of their fellow worker during war. Individuals may lose self confidence; feel threatened and not able to perform the task. (Rabbit type)

Leaders should always be cautious in order to detect the symptoms of stress and should be well prepared to prevent combat stress in order to decrease the possibility of the stress becoming a serious and constant problem.

Increasing cohesion within the unit.

Speaking of cohesion, the term itself derives from the Latin word cohaesinus and at the same time represents mutual strong physical attraction and compactness among homogenous parts.[8] Speaking of military etymological sense, this means that one cohesive unit, well disciplined, well equipped, motivated, working under good living conditions, well trained, is very effective and capable of performing even harder, longer and more complex tasks.

[8] Velika Shrilova, Lexicon of foreign words and expressions, Toper, Skopje,2001

Units or teams that have a high level of mutual respect and trust, loyalty and pride are less affected by the stress caused by war. A special attention should be paid to the new members of the units who do not have the necessary experience. They are more prone to experiencing the stress of war, and therefore every leader should make efforts to provide favourable conditions in order to familiarize these new members with the rest of the group, putting them in the position of ‘’guardianship’’ of the members with the greatest combat or military experience, who will help them “catch up with” the struggle to survive.[9]

Taking measures to provide the necessary rest to the personnel

Most people would not be able to work efficiently if they did not rest (sleep) for at least 6-8 hours during the day. Lack of sleep or insufficient rest affects the normal function of the body and mind and could also negatively influence individuals’ performance during operations. Under such circumstances the members may make wrong decisions or have slow reactions (reflexes) and thus become more exposed to combat stress.

Leaders should make sure that all members of the unit take at least 6 hours of rest a day. If this is impossible to achieve, then leaders should make a sleeping schedule for all members to take turns. Additional rest should also be planned in cases when as a result of unexpected activities units are involved in long tasks on the field. Leaders should be very focused and careful in the process of planning.

Drafting an effective plan for the service of the unit for delegating responsibilities and schedules is of great importance during the deployment (dislocation/assignment/development), in order to provide sufficient time for regeneration of the unit returning from a mission completion.

Delivering sufficient (necessary) information to subordinates

One American expression says: “Information is motivation”. When personnel has enough information about something is supposed to happen in future they are ready for that and at the same time less threatened by the unexpected, including the combat stress.

The aforementioned underlines the necessity of establishing informational and intelligence system in the best possible way that will be updated constantly. This would provide that before each task the personnel would be better informed regarding the terrain, the shortfalls, limitations, behaviour of the opponent, line of communication, supplies, etc. This timely and precise information significantly increase personnel’s confidence, and this in turn creates favourable conditions for efficient and safe performance of the planned operations.

9 ADM McRaven, Special Ops Study, 1997

After action analysis

The analysis after each performed task or operation is the best method of giving and sharing information during any action or future deployment. This is done in order to make certain conclusions (lessons learned) and to make corrections in the next operation cycle.

The open discussion during the analysis is extremely useful and will remove the burden of guilt, and at the same time it will boost the self-confidence among all unit members. The gained experience indubitably point out the need of analysis of all positive and negative aspects of the mission. The reason for possible shortfalls related to task performance, determined by the analysis, would result in conclusions and guidelines for further procedures, outlined in standard operating procedures, to match the condition on the field.

Keeping personnel in good physical shape

The good physical shape or readiness of the military personnel is one of the chief factors that positively affect the performance of special tasks. At the same time, the physical readiness will decrease the possibilities of military personnel to be under the influence of the stress caused by war. To be in a good physical shape means increasing the capacity of each individual to deal with any kind of stress.

Conclusion

One of the most difficult situations for leaders is when they suffer losses during the military operation. This problem results in additional difficulties. Firstly, there are objective reasons about whether the direct leader is capable of managing that situation and decreasing the possibilities of injuries and deaths of other members of the unit. Secondly, another problem is the collective psychosis among members of the unit, who in spite of their professionalism, experience the loss personally as part of the collective shock.

Injuries or death of a member of the unit during military operations causes psychological consequences among all members of the unit. After one such incident, they become aware of the possibilities of getting injured or killed in the next military operation. This feeling causes fear and anxiety among each and every individual. Leaders have the moral responsibility to motivate their subordinates and to find a way to successfully perform future tasks, in order to fulfil the mission.

Having in mind the aforementioned and the experience of the authors of the text, we can claim that leaders successful in managing stress in military operations should attain the following:

- To create and provide all conditions for the wellbeing of the subordinated military personnel.
- To increase the self-confidence and confidence in the members of the unit, the leaders and the military equipment.
- Leaders should be decisive and confident, demonstrate strong authority to guide/ manage their personnel by their example in war/battle.

- To secure enough rest for the subordinates, especially during longer operations.
- To set the right goals for progressive development of the members of the unit or the subordinates.
- To regularly monitor the accomplishment of the aforementioned goals.
- To be able to comprehend that the intensity and duration of tasks directly affect combat stress.
- To be aware of the fact that individuals and units react differently to similar stress.
- To be able to recognize the signs of combat stress.
- To secure constant dissemination of information using all tools of commanding.
- To practice control over stress through exercises, and correctly define the tasks.
- To understand that fear is a normal part of stress during war.
- To be cautious with the signs of combat stress, as well as the lack of capacity to deal with stress of each individual or subordinate.

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Review

RESERVE COMPONENTS OF MODERN ARMED FORCES IN ACHIEVING SECURITY OF THE STATES

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Abstract:*The security challenges regarded as necessarily acceptable, are leading to the creation of structures for reaching the required and desired goals. Translated into a process of transformation, they bring closer the divided attitudes and define the necessary standards. The need for a model of reserve components that will be able to respond to the modern challenges with new abilities and standards is more than essential. The dimension of the reserve officers and their function with the implementation of social values and capacities is in function of the state, and through the state, with planned, coordinated and controlled access is providing comprehensive process of full integration of the community. The community integration perceived through the equality of the reserve and active components in their essential existence, is giving a feature of military force expressed through the armed forces structure, where the community load of the defence and security function of the state lies right on the reserve components that offers many opportunities.*

Keywords*: organisation, ability, tasks, functions, defence.*

Introduction

The development of security, upon the end of the Cold War, had an impact on military organizations all around the world. The army reserve components received new tasks, and along with the active components are obligated to: protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, or wider, of its citizens, international peacekeeping and peace imposition operations, aid in accidents, inner security tasks (helping the civilian authorities in law enforcement for keeping order, if it is disturbed in emergency cases), participation in nation building (societal function).

Despite of the new security challenges and threats, the function of the reserve components is to defend their own or any allied countries from foreign military assaults. That task does not include only the protection of the country, but the protection of the society in general[3].

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[3] Ibid.

Since the end of the Cold War, alongside the armed assaults, the unarmed assaults (fourth generation warfare), such as terrorism, diversions, sabotages, civil wars, organized crime, cyber attacks, traditional problems, etc., become the threat for national security. These non-military threats forced almost all of the armed forces to a process of reforming with the following goals:

- democratization, characteristic for many post-communist, post-dictatorship and post-conflict countries. The democratization of the armed forces represents bringing them to responsibility of democratically elected political leadership, otherwise the armed forces represent a threat to democracy. Furthermore, the democratization represents balancing of the resources that armed forces need along with other social needs.

- adaptation to the new social surrounding, means adaptation to the size and the budget of the armed forces regarding the new security threats. That implies preparing the armed forces for new missions, such as peacekeeping.

- internationalization, or adjustment to the abilities for international cooperation. Nowadays, armed forces are much less active on their own territories. This international cooperation within the UN peacekeeping operations or long-term and institutional cooperation by membership in NATO, but it can also be bilateral or multilateral. International cooperation positions armed forces in part under the international command and organizational structure. Increasing of the opportunities of the armed forces to work with foreign armed forces in terms of interoperability with systems, equipment, training, language, informing, commanding and control, provides the ability for interoperability. The ability for interoperability is compensated in permanent international units, such as: 1.German-Dutch corps, Baltic battalion, consisted from a part of the armed forces of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, Polish-Dutch-German corps, TISA battalion, multinational engineering battalion consisted of forces from Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine[4].

The access to transformation imposes connecting the ultimate goals, ways and means for accomplishing them, within the strategic context of the organization[5]. The process of transformation is connected directly with the people in military organizations; it promotes the development of the culture of innovations and has set goals and results for highly awarded future abilities. That what the defence system makes him adjustable on the targets and politics of the national security is the place, the role and meaning of the reserve components.

The United States of America

Since the end of the Cold War, the size of the active and reserve component of USA was reduced for about a third. As in other countries, the reserve component of USA armed forces is reflected through the national history, satisfying the requests of security and constitutional provisions of the country. The reserve components and The National Guard are the reserve component of the USA armed forces and they are

[4] The Geneva centre for democratic control of the armed forces, (2003), Parliamentary monitoring of the security sector: principles, mechanisms and practise, Manual for MP no.5, p. 54

[5] Kem. J. (2006), „Military Transformation: Ends, Ways and Means“, Air & Space Power Journal, USA, p.1-4, available on: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles.html, taken on 16.07.2013.

necessary, compulsive part, or necessary component of the armed forces[6]. They are completely integrated in the military forces. The personnel in the Reserve components are primarily citizens that entered into an agreement on certain period, which makes them soldiers, airman, sailors or marines. They represent a vital layer, or key link between the armed forces and American people. Together with the members of the active component they symbolize the readiness expressed through the willingness of the citizens to take the responsibility for national security, i.e. the nation.

About 400.000 members of the guard and the reserve were engaged in the II WW, Korean War, almost 1.000.000 members and in Vietnam with 37.000 members[7]. The reserve component was observed primarily as strategic reserve, or additional force and accumulation of forces required for the main combat operations. Because of such access, the reserve components participated in peacekeeping missions in humble extent. The organizations composition, the implemented training, the degree of equipment and the level of readiness, are indicating their purpose in the defence system, or that the Guard and the Reserve are going to be primarily used as "force in reserve" in case of a "big war". Such access was based on the assumption that there will be enough time to train and equip the reserve components. Having this in mind, the expectations of the reserves were that they will not take part in long-term operational missions to a significant degree, maybe once in the entire career[8].

Nowadays, the Reserve Component of the USA continues to represent strategic protection, but it is far more integrated in military operations with membership in highest level in operational missions like never before. In "Desert Storm", the membership of the reserve component in missions enlarged, which contributed to less use of the active forces. The opinion of the political leadership that the reserve component is capable of performing the tasks that the mission is requiring, contributed to its permanent growth. Between 1992 and 1996 sustainable level of 12-13 million reserve forces for a year, called on duty was reached[9]. Inevitably, as a result of reached operational abilities, during this period, the operational role of the reserve component started to take shape. In the next period the expectation that they can rely on the capa-

[6] Weitz R. (2007), *The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government, p.5-6.

[7] Executive Summary & Main Report (2011), *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component,* Volume I, p.15.

[8] The invasion of Kuwait in 1990, put on complete test the concept of total force during the USA response to it. About 267.000 members of the reserve component were mobilised for the operations "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm". The participation and accomplished results of the reserve component during the "Desert Storm" justified the expectations and trust. It has shown that they are a capable force, force in trust which can be certainly considered and can provide backup for the active component. That was an important milestone in shaping the use of the USA reserve component in the next decade.

[9] Executive Summary & Main Report (2011), *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component,* Volume I, p.16.

bilities of the Guard and the Reserve is going to enlarge. They represent almost a half of the total American military personnel[10].

The imposed need for making the reserve component the one who will support the American armed forces in dealing with the challenges of the 21 century was recognized in the need for a process of transformation. The main goal of the process of transformation was definitive construction of flexible and network connected armed forces, capable to defend the territory, population and the interests of USA, and also achieving fast victory over the enemy primarily from position of intimidation, with minimal resistance[11]. The need for military transformation in USA is recognized from a perspective of four primary imperatives – strategy, technology, threat and risk reducing, defined as drivers of the transformation[12].

The transformation of the armed forces was conducted in that context, but also of the reserve component. For instance, the army reserve identified six imperatives of the transformation process[13]:

- reengineering the process of mobilization,
- transforming the command and control,
- restructuring of units,
- improvement of the human resources,
- constructing of rotary-based forces and
- improving in individual support of military command posts.

Restructuring of the army reserve was contained in implementing of a new structure of forces in which the number of HQs was reduced, the training was consolidated and new command structures were made[14]. During 2005 regrouping was performed in bases where the reserve units were a part of the reserve component from at least one other military unit. The length of the training before deployment was reduced, and for raising the degree of collective readiness of the reserve component, the "Strategy of training-mobilization-deployment" was developed, instead of the former "Strategy of mobilization-training-deployment" used during the Cold War[15]. All these measures were designed to construct sustained army reserve because of the need for fast force deployment, which is already a characteristic of the American military operations. The basic idea of the transformation is providing training and equipment to the army reserve and acquisition of ability for its implementation in a wide spectrum of operations in one year during a five year period. Appropriate cycle of deploying the

10 Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government,p.9.

11 *Transformation Planning Guidance*, (April 2003), page 21–26.

12 Ibid, p. 12–16.

13 U.S. Army Reserve, *Six Imperatives of Army Reserve Transformation*, available at: http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/NEWS.htm. 12.07.2013

14 Helmly R.J. (2005), *Army Reserve 2005 Posture Statement*, Washington, DC, p. 7.

15 Ibid p. 11-12, 15.

national army is one deployment at every 6 years. This model, according to the army planners is acceptable for the reserve forces, their families and their employers[16].

Despite all taken measures, the ministry of defence in an attempt to make the reserve component more efficient and to improve its capacities and abilities, is seeking the reserve forces to work together with the members of the active component. The attempt is to involve the reserve component in the work of joint HQs through joint involvement[17]. In an attempt to make the reserve component more available for fast operations, the time for their mobilization is reduced.

Great Britain

The British reserve force is consisted of two main components: regular reserve and voluntary reserve forces, which are also divided into reserve component with high level of readiness and sponsored reserve component[18]. The regular reserve forces are former members of the regular forces that still have the obligation during mandatory mobilization. For example, persons dismissed from the regular army are required to join the regular reserve, but that depends on their age. The regular reserve forces primarily are more passive, than ready reserve force. They get at least 21 days for mobilization. The regular reserve force does not have a level of readiness and they are not a subject of routine training. That is why, the British government does not expect any more to mobilize them, except in case of emergency in national vulnerability (but in 2003, the ministry of defence engaged 420 regular reserve forces in Iraq)[19].

The main components of the regular reserve force are: Army reserves, Royal Air Force Reserve (RAFR) and Royal Fleet Reserve (RFR), which is consisted of former members of the Royal Navy and the Royal Navy First Sea Lord. Each component of the regular reserve has a small contingent, usually former regular soldiers who voluntary want to continue their military career in the reserve forces[20].

The military training, such as the mobilization training of the regular reserve forces depends on more factors. Depending on their age, sex, the length of active service they are classified in one of four categories. the CO that have mandatory obligation for training 4-6 years after being dismissed from the regular or reserve forces are in the first category. In the second category are the regular reserve forces that are subject of a mandatory training of 6 years after their dismissing. In the third category are members of the long-term reserve force that have completed the training and served in the reserve component until turning 45 years of age. The military pensioners, former

[16] *Army Reserve 2006 Posture Statement*, p.11.

[17] Zapanta C.A. (2004), *Transforming Reserve Force, Joint Force Quarterly*, No.36, p.71.

[18] *Future Reserves 2020* (the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, July,2011), p. 6-15, available on: http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/pdf, 24.05.2013.

[19] Ibid.

[20] UK Defence*: Reserves*, *Defence Professionals in the UK and France*, available on: *www.dasasurveys.mod.uk*. 23.05.2013.

active personnel, that have achieved pension service, are in the fourth category. They have legal obligation for recall until 60 years of age, without obligation for training[21]. In 2011 the regular reserve counted more than 148.000[22].

The ministry, periodically can engage the reserve forces on training in real conditions, to provide real combat support (for example, filling the operative centers, debarkation, or evacuating medical casualties from abroad) so that the regular forces are not burdened. Despite this practice that is providing the reserve forces with real conditions for training, they can be deprived from the possibility to achieve other basic skills[23]. The readiness of the voluntary reserve forces is different for each service. In 2006, the voluntary reserve forces counted about 37.000, until 2011, when in the meanwhile the number is enlarged up to 46.500[24] and it was consisted of 85% personnel that applied for serving in the reserve component directly from the civil community in the Territorial Army[25].

Territorial Army that was made in 1907 united specially organized elements of the army: volunteers, militia, cavalry and was exclusively designed for fatherland defence. Since the end of the recruit obligation in 1960, the relation between the Territorial Army and regular army was significantly changed. While in I, II WW and the Korean War, the Territorial Army consisted of complete divisions, the ministry of defence in 1967 introduces a concept of “one army” that integrates the reserve units into the regular army[26]. The new concept asked for, after performing a mobilization, providing units up to the rank of battalion intended for supporting the active component. Similar policy has been adopted by the National Guard of the American army after the Vietnam War. The concept of “one army” for the first time established unique chain of command for the regular (active) and the reserve component[27].

In the British army there are few categories of reserve components:

- category of the dedicated reserve forces[28]: full dedication to the service, is a reserve personnel that serves with the active component and it is completely deployable in the country or abroad. This personnel has an agreement for a full-time job with duration from three months up to three years; limited dedication to the service, is a reserve personnel available for deploying up to 35 days in the year, or 21 days at any

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[21] Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S.Government,p.18.

[22] National Reserve Forces Status (UK),available on:www.nato.int/nrfc/database/uk.pdf, 24.05.2013.

[23] Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S.Government,p.19.

[24] Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government,p.19.

[25] National Reserve Forces Status (UK), available on: http://www.nato.int/nrfc/database/uk.pdf, 24.05.2013.

[26] Sjouke de Jong (1992) ,*NATO’s Reserve Forces*, London: Brassey’s, p. 92.

[27] See for: Viggers P. (2003), “Reserve Forces - The Nation’s Insurance Policy: How the Conservatives Should Repair the Damage,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 148, No. 1, p. 68-69.

[28] Ibid.

period of the year; homelands dedication, is a personnel that cannot be deployed or called without their agreement, except in case of essential need for training.

- category of the sponsored reserve forces[29] is an innovation in the British army. This category was imposed by the need for dealing with the enlarged importance of the operation support by the private sector. The civil contractors that have reported for joining in the reserve component have the need for relief in their integration in the British armed forces. In the peacetime conditions they give different favours for the army needs, they maintain complex arms systems; they perform transportation of people and goods through their employers. During conflicts or crises, sponsored reserve forces are obligated to answer the call for mobilization to be deployed for supporting the current military operations. The concept of sponsored reserve force brings benefits for both sides. For the army, it reduces the costs for jobs that the civil contractors are performing, instead of engaging military personnel, which is much more expensive, and for the civil firms the benefit is securing jobs for their employees and additional incomes during the engaging of their employees in the reserve forces.

- category of the highly prepared reserve forces[30] is consisted of personnel that have special skills the army needs. It is expected from them to be prepared for usage in emergency cases and crises situations. By signing the contract for registration in the reserve forces, they are obligated to be in the active service in a period from 1 week up to 9 months, depending on the need.

The British government gives an important role to the reserve component in the security of the country. It is expected from the reserve component to provide military support to the country in unpredicted emergency cases, such as big terroristic attacks, natural catastrophes caused by floods, diseases, such as the great epidemic of the FMD (Fibro Muscular Dysplasia) and the mouth-and-foot-disease in the livestock. The support to the civilian authorities is related only to non-industrial emergency cases.

France

At the height of the Cold War, in 1984, France had military reserve that counted over four million people. The transformation of the French reserve component led from "mass reserve" and performing mass mobilization, to "reserve for employment", or deployment according to the merits. The transformation provided a smaller pool of needed abilities with integrated functions from a large workforce, and as such to represent the component of the French army. The legislation set forth two separate components of the reserve force: operational reserve force and reserve of citizens. In both of them the reserve forces must be French citizens, to be in good shape, they

[29] Weitz R. Viggers P. (2003), "Reserve Forces - The Nation's Insurance Policy: How the Conservatives Should Repair the Damage," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 148, No. 1, p. 68-69.

[29] Ibid.

(2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government,p.25.

[30] Ibid, p.26.

must not have any criminal record and to be at least 17 years old. In 2006, the limit of the minimum age is changed to 18 years old. All of the formation places in the reserve forces are available for women. Maximum age for entering in the reserve component for individuals without military experience is 30. For later joining of the reserve forces for former soldiers, the maximum age limit varies depending on their level of preparedness and rank in military hierarchy. The upper age limit for serving in the reserve forces is 40 for soldiers or 50 for COs and NCOs[31].

In practice, however, the participation of the French reserve forces in missions abroad is limited. Engaged reserve personnel in missions abroad since the beginning of the century is about 3.9%. The main function of the reserve component is to improve the security in France and to replace the active units that are deployed in missions abroad[32].

By the end of 2004, 43.614 volunteers were admitted in the operational reserve, almost complete realization of the planned number of 44.270. The projections planned admission of 94.000 volunteers by the end of 2012: 29.000 for the army, 7.700 for the navy, 8.250 for the air force, 40.000 for the police, 8.600 for the medical corps and 500 for the energetics[33]. By 2015, the French authorities are hoping to have a reserve of 100.000 reserve forces, half of which would be in the gendarmerie[34]. Although primarily the French government tried to construct reserve component composed entirely of volunteers, the legislation in 2006 recognized the values of the active reserve military personnel and allowed its engagement in the operational reserve due to its superiority, training and availability[35].

Germany

Unlike the other NATO countries, Germany complies with the policy for military recruitment. All male German citizens at the age of 18 are subjected to the mandatory military service in the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) with duration of 9 months. After finishing the mandatory military obligation, recruits can additionally volunteer for 2 up to 13 months. As result of that, Bundeswehr has two career forces, COs, NCOs and specialists from certain areas and soldiers who serve for a limited time before returning to civil life. These soldiers voluntarily prolong the service in the army and are members of the reserve component of the Bundeswehr[36]. There is a

[31] "Reserve Opérationnelle: Conditions d'accés," September, 2005, available on: http://*www.reserves.terre.defence.gouv.fr*.16.04.2013.

[32] Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government,p.44.

[33] Fulghum A.D. (2003), "French Military Reserve Strength Increases," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Vol. 159, No. 18, p.57.

[34] Teissier M.G. (2002), "Rapport fait au nom de la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur le projet de loi, n° 187 relatif à la programmation militaire, pour les années 2003 à 2008," p.55, available on: http://*www.assemblee-nationale.com* :14.04.2013.

[35] Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government,p.41.

[36] Ibid, p.49.

prevailing belief that completing the recruit obligation represents a significant function in sustaining the armed forces, and firmly connects the population; especially after 1990 it helps the integration of the former Eastern German citizens. From that perspective, one of the roles of the reserve forces is to get the army closer to the society. They contribute for sustaining the motivation for military service and helping the people to see the security questions in a wider context[37]. Perhaps, due to the complex history of Germany, the leaders are constantly emphasizing the reserve component, and the reserve force is also called “citizens in uniform”. The reserve force consists of 144.548 ground forces, 3.304 in the navy and 13.960 in the air forces, or the total number of the reserve component is 161.812 reserve forces[38]. The defence policy of Germany emphasizes the need for restructuring the Bundeswehr into a more agile one force focused on multilateral prevention of conflicts and crises management, than defence from conventional attacks[39]. The plans for development the forces were that in 2010 Germany had 252.500 soldiers in active service[40], 35.000 of whom would be trained for high intensity operations, and 70.000 soldiers would be intended for humanitarian and post conflict missions for reconstruction of the post war society. 147.500 soldiers would be intended for support, 39.000 of whom would be subjected to civil-expert training. For 2010 additional 55.000 recruits and about 80.000 reserve forces integrated with the active component were planned[41].

The training of the reserve forces is limited to 15 days a year, but it depends on the skills that they possess, so they can be called more often, but there is a possibility that they would not be called at all, if such skills and specialties were not required. The system for training the reserve component emphasizes the individual training and participating in combat exercises, especially for the reserve COs and NCOs. The COs are obligated to be at service on call for training for a period of 10 years, NCOs for 7 years, while the rest of the personnel for 4 years. There is a small number of personnel with special skills, which are important for the army, and they can be periodically called upon on a longer period of time.

The budget of the German defence has specific slots (packages for training) intended for financing every recall of personnel. Each slot consists of value for 365 days engagement and training. For example, the budget for 1993 set forth 4.000 slots for training of the reserve forces. That is sufficient assets for the engagement of 4.000

[37] Struck P. (2003), *The Bundeswehr Reservist Concept*, Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung.

[38] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 2007*, London: Routledge, 2007, p.116.

[39] Weitz R. (2007),*The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis*, U.S. Government,p.51.

[40] Die Bundesregierung, “Die Bundeswehr 2010 nimmt Gestalt an,” и Tom Dyson, “German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership и the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity,” *European Security*, Vol.14, No 3, September 2005, p.380.

[41] “Neue Aufgabe, neue Strukturen”, available on: http://*www.bundeswehr.de*. 17.04.2013.

reserve forces in active service every day of the year. If the recall is individual, depending on the needs and for a smaller period of time, the same assets could serve to recall over 100.000 reserve forces in that year. For illustration, in the height of the Cold War in the early 80s, the budget predicted 35.000 slots, while in 2004 the number of slots was 2.200, which assets financed the individual training for 805.200 days including the reserve forces that took part in missions abroad.

The German army has three categories of reserve forces[42]. The reserve force for reinforcement primarily consisted of volunteers and it is designed for general tasks. The reserve of workforce which covers most of the specialists is completely composed of volunteers who take specific formation posts and perform other tasks limited in time. The general reserve force includes all un-deployed reserve forces and they are subject to mobilization for national need in crises situations. They provide a pool of general workforce without previously assigned positions. Certain number of personnel could be deployed on formation posts and in peace, and sustain high level of combat readiness through participating in training and exercises in duration of at least 72 days in a period of three years. This category of reserve personnel has the task to strengthen the active component if necessary, to be involved in homeland defence, and it could participate in missions abroad, and to perform other temporary tasks. The reserve component trained for homeland defence coordinates the training and exercises with the German civil agencies that perform similar tasks. The military reserve force is used for supplementing the active component when it is necessary, and the overall process covers phases from employment to integrating in reserve units. The Bundeswerh does not plan mobilization of all reserve units, except in rare cases[43].

Conclusion

Allied forces give particular significance to the participation of the reserve forces in today's modelling of operations for peace maintenance and stability. That imposes the necessity of their participation in the individual and collective training, but also participating in exercises. The successful integration strengthens the opportunities of the overall (total) strength. In peace, the reserve forces can be effective alternative for supplementing and sustaining of the already existing active forces. The role of the reserve forces, which represent a valuable asset in the member states of NATO, is all the more important because of their expertise that can help the establishing close connections between the armed forces and the civil community. Many of the persons in the reserve forces have gained expertise knowledge from different areas that can be very useful. Knowledge and expertise from the area of logistics, law, medicine, construction, information managing, languages, public relations, etc. to a great extent predetermine the mission

[42] "Beorderungsunabhängige, freiwillige Reservistenarbeit, ResArb," May 9, 2006, available on: http://www.*reservisten.bundeswehr.de*. Taken on:17.04.2013.

[43] Struck P. (2003), *The Bundeswehr Reservist Concept*, Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. p.12-14.

success in the period of war, but also building trust in the post-conflict period. With the primary goal of application of experience, NATO developed advisory organizations for supporting the reserve component, such as CIOR[44] - Interlined Confederation of Reserve Officer, NRFC[45] - NATO Reserve Forces Committee. NRFC and CIOR share a common interest for providing quality reserve forces in accordance with the national policy for the reserve. The work of each of the organizations, and due to their significant role in supporting NATO, is complementing and leading in the spirit of partnership, especially when their fields of interests are similar[46]. The reserve component of the NATO member states is an important part of their national military power. The reserve forces are consisted of different categories of personnel that can be mobilized, and are not regularly employed with full-time jobs in the military service. The personnel can be consisted of volunteers, former members or conscripts. They can be assigned in organizational units or can serve individually in support of the active units. More and more countries take part with their reserve forces in humanitarian and other operations for peace support. The circumstances under which the operations are conducted provide a priceless experience about the reserve personnel. The experience gained on the battle field is irreplaceable. The persons in the reserve forces have large importance for NATO, especially in the context of its new missions.

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[45] NRFC – formed in 1981, it formally works advisory on the question in the field of reserve forces and reserve personnel, to the questions that are in common benefit. Gives advice and support for CIOR in their activities for achieving the goals of the alliance in accordance with the current NATO documents for protocol, but without penetration in strategic, operational or tactic questions

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Review

NATO'S PARTNERSHIP POLICY AND ITS PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract: *Since its foundation in 1949, the Alliance continually is evolving politics of partnership and cooperation with all non-NATO countries. This policy has a special place in the overall policy of the Alliance. Dating back to the last decade of XX century, the Alliance has tried to establish closer formal partnership relations with states and regional organizations around the world. The purpose of this cooperation has emphasized the importance of closer cooperation with regional actors and international organizations to face traditional and new challenges and threats in the changing world. NATO is strongly convinced that "the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partnerships with countries and organizations across the globe that share NATO's interest in a peaceful world." Now, NATO is faced with rapidly changing world and should be able to strengthen its partnerships with non-NATO partners and other international organizations around the world.*

Key words: *partnerships, partners, cooperation, dialogue, NATO.*

Introduction

Over the past two and a half decades, the Alliance has developed a network of structured partnerships with countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, as well as individual relationships with other partners across the globe. Today, "*NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with 41 partner countries and engages actively with other international actors and organisations on a wide range of political and security-related issues*" (Lute 2014).

NATO develops and builds its Partnerships with partner countries on bilateral, regional and global level through shared and common values, reciprocity and mutual benefit and mutual trust. The partnership policy can be seen as a '*tool*' and '*mechanism*' for promoting and supporting Alliance's strategic objectives, including American foreign policy issues. In the Euro-Atlantic Area, NATO engages in relations with 22 partner countries through the Euro –Atlantic Partner-

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ship Council[3*] established in 1997 and the Partnership for Peace created in 1994. Furthermore, NATO has developed special structures for its relations and cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia (Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security 2014). All this partnerships have contributed in building confidence measures, the development of good neighborly relations, enabled enlargement of NATO with East Europe countries, and beyond.

However, the last few decades NATO is developing its partnership policy based on *geographical locations* with the countries of North Africa through the '*Mediterranean Dialogue*' (1994) as well as with the Gulf region via the '*Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*' (2004). The Alliance also, has deep cooperation with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This Partnership called '*Partners across the globe*' includes traditional non-European NATO allies and contact countries (Chicago Summit Declaration 2012).

All these partnerships can make a concrete contribution to enhance international security, to defend the values, on which the Alliance is based, to NATO operations, and to prepare interested nations for membership. "*Partnership is not a choice between staying at home or going global. It is not peripheral to our business – it is part of NATO's core business*" (Rasmussen 2012a). Moreover, "*global security challenges and threats, crisis management needs; including disaster relief operations in the outside of the Euro – Atlantic area in the past 20 years have demonstrated that NATO needs its partners more than ever to ensure global peace, security and stability*" (Marônková 2012). This is an example for the largest operational coalition in the recent history that gives NATO the opportunity to be ready to act all beyond its borders where it is necessary. According to Jamie Shea, a critical challenge for NATO will be to preserve the existing partnerships beyond the current common interests, and to offer a benefit for new partners to join NATO in its network as a global security hub (Shea 2012).

However, in the last few years, we can see crises in the NATO partnership policy. This crisis can be seen best through stagnation in the enlargement of NATO with new countries in Europe and deteriorated relations with Russia after the Ukrainian crisis

The new Alliance's Partnership Policy

According to the last NATO Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon 2010, the third core task of NATO was '*cooperative security*'. Cooperative security means that the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security. This core task could be achieved only through a wide network of partner relationship with countries and organizations on a truly global scale (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010). In addition, Rasmussen believes that NATO has to invest more in strong partnerships, in modern military hardware, and flexible forces … "*NATO's partnerships start at home, in the Trans-Atlantic area, and in our close neighbourhood*" (Rasmussen 2012a). NATO's new partnership policy aims to prepare the Alliance for a rapidly changing world where security challenges may come from far away, and where solutions may require extensive cooperation with other states and organizations that NATO has not traditionally engaged. This NATO "vast network of security partnerships is truly

[3*] This Euro –Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997 succeeded the former North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

unique... And by working together with our partners, we enhance our own security. We enhance the security of their regions. And we enhance the security of the world we live in" (Rasmussen 2012b). Regarding this, the Alliance will "*have to redefine its partnership policy in a way that will include the smaller and less powerful states in order to guarantee their security and stability*" (Doninovska 2013).

The Alliance, through the mechanisms of partnerships, continually enhances international peace and security, promotes democratic reforms, provides assistance in building democratic institutions, and prepares the countries of the Euro-Atlantic region for membership. All NATO partnerships are developing under the new partnership policy and the strategic and fundamental objectives as follows (Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security 2014):

- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;
- Promote regional security and cooperation;
- Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;
- Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;
- Promote democratic values and reforms;
- Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;
- *Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises;*
- *Build confidence and achieve better mutual understanding, including NATO's role and activities, in particular through enhanced public diplomacy*.

The Alliances has created a numbers of tools and mechanisms to support cooperation with partners such as Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes, Planning and Review Process, Operational Capabilities Concept, Political-Military Framework, Defence Education Enhancement Programmes, Military Training and Exercise Programme, North Atlantic Council-level crisis-management exercises, Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, and other supporting transformations and wider cooperation tools.

At the Lisbon Summit 2010, NATO made a decision and gave guidance to reform its partnership policy. This reform efforts were focused to make dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented. The More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy was endorsed at the Berlin Ministerial Meeting in April 2011. This new policy concerns not only partnerships with non-member countries but also NATO's cooperation with other international actors and organizations. In addition, the Ministers "*gave a new impetus to the partnership policy and enabled the development of new partnership tools, better engagement with partners across the globe, and developed new 28+N flexible meeting formats and introduced individual cooperation menus with all partners*". (Marônková 2012). However, with these new mechanisms, NATO opens the way to involve partners in political consultation and gives partners the same formal, not real decision-making authority as member countries for operations and missions to which they contribute. In line with the new Strategic Concept

2010, NATO is offering its partners "*more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations to which they contribute*" (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010).

Partnership for Peace

The '*Partnership for Peace'* initiative was created and launched in October 1993 by the US Deputy - Secretary of Defence, Strout Talbot. Partnership for Peace (PfP) has emerged as a necessary response to the realized and present changes in all areas of society, primarily in Eastern Europe, where NATO is in a dilemma whether to exist and in which direction to transform. The PfP was a pragmatic solution to the arising problems that led the Central and East European countries to press for full membership. Primary mission of PfP was to contribute in consolidation of Europe after the end of the Cold War. Through the years, PfP was and is an excellent and powerful political platform for cooperation and for enlargement. Since 1994, the PfP has grown to 34 countries (currently 22), 12 of which became members of NATO, over the three enlargement cycles. In 1999, the Membership Action Plan was lunched, as a new 'tool' for other PfP countries, which aspire to become members of the Alliance.

The Republic of Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace in 1995 and since then the cooperation with NATO and Partners is constantly growing. The Republic of Macedonia shares all the gained experience and knowledge through years of experience in PfP, with new partners whenever they request it. In the past, expert help and knowledge was provided by Macedonia to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro in the area of defence reforms.

At the beginning, PfP for Macedonia was a source of knowledge, education, and learning how to implement defence reforms, as well as to establish a civilian and democratic control over the armed forces. For Macedonia, the Partnership with NATO was a very helpful tool, as well as an "obligation" to continue the reforms and to become a developed democracy in which all respect the rule of law, market economy, human rights and freedoms. Above all, the country has become a safe and stable, credible and valued partner in the promotion of regional and Euro-Atlantic stability and security.

The cooperation with partners and NATO within the Partnership for Peace has showed and helped Macedonia in the preparation and achievement of the necessary criteria for Alliance membership. Thanks to the participation and cooperation within the PfP, Macedonia, in 2008 met all the criteria for full NATO membership. Today, the Republic of Macedonia acts as a de facto NATO member. Macedonia will continue contributing in international operations, as a reliable partner of NATO, strengthening peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Army of the Republic of Macedonia actively participates in three international operations (ISAF, ALTHEA and UNIFIL), and provides support to KFOR. Since 2002, "about 50% of the military personnel of the Army have deployed in international operations" (Xhaferi 2014). In addition, the Republic of Macedonia will participate in the European Union Battle Group in the second half of 2014 together with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Luxembourg"(Xhaferi 2014).

Mediterranean Dialogue

Back in 1994, NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The successful launch of the MD, and its subsequent development, has been based upon a number of principles: non-discrimination; self-differentiation; inclusiveness; non-imposition; complementarity and mutual reinforcement; diversity. The Mediterranean Dialogue is the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and Gulf region. However, "*it is not clear what goal the MD is supposed to fulfil, there seems to be three main purposes of the partnership programme: contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding, and dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries"* (Mediterranean Dialogue, 2014).

MD is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO. They strive for enhanced cooperation in the fields of the fight against terrorism, crisis management, interoperability, public diplomacy, science, etc. MD is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). Despite the predominantly bilateral character, MD allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis NATO+7. (Mediterranean Dialogue, 2014)

Through the years, "*it has become a unique forum, where NATO Allies and Mediterranean partners hold regular consultations on shared security issues. But it has also become an important tool for concrete military-to-military and other practical cooperation*" (Brengelmann 2013). At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO's Heads of State and Government elevated MD to a genuine partnership through the establishment of a more ambitious and expanded framework, which considerably enhanced both the MD's political and practical cooperation dimensions. "*Despite the attempts of fostering the MD multilateral dimension through conferences and other initiatives, no actual cooperation on security and defence issues has taken place to date among NATO's seven MD partners*" (Stornelli 2012)

The Strategic Concept 2010 in paragraph 35 refers specifically to MD, stating that: *"We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We will aim to deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region."* Although in its early stages, the cooperation in operations between NATO and MD partners has already proved to be successful and can be further strengthened by the more inclusive arrangements foreseen in the new Partnership Policy (Stornelli 2012).

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), based on the similar principles as MD, was established at the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit to commence cooperation with the interested countries of the wider Middle East. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. To date, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have joined. Saudi Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 2004). The aims of ICI are similar to those of MD: *"enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region"* (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 2004). In this Initiative, a bilateral political dialogue, is open to countries that up to now have been absent from the NATO agenda. Since ICI does not have a clearly defined geographical area, it does not rule out, in principle, participation by current MD members. In its strictly bilateral, non-mandatory approach, ICI is very much like MD when it was first created (Borgomano-Loup 2005).

NATO gives great importance to ICI in the new Strategic Concept (2010), and in paragraph 35 it states: *"We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*" (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010). At the presentation of the Annual Report 2013 on January 2014 in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen following the partnership policy said, *"We are working with our partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative which is the Gulf States partners as well as our Mediterranean Dialogue Partners. We are consulting with them and I hope we will be able to launch initiatives which will enhance our partnerships at the summit (in Britain in September). It is our intention not only maintain but further to develop our ability to work with our partners*." (Rasmussen 2014a). According to this statement, NATO gives more and more importance to straightening of cooperation and partnership with those countries. But in the real terms it is not as in the statements.

Partners across the globe

NATO has maintained a dialogue and cooperation on an individual basis with countries that are not part of its partnership frameworks, on an ad-hoc basis, since the 1990s. "*Such cooperation was formalized in 1998 with the adoption of a set of general guidelines that detailed avenues for cooperation with so – called 'contact countries'"* (Hribernik 2013). Significant steps were taken at the 2006 Riga Summit to increase the operational relevance of NATO's cooperation with other countries around the world. These steps, reinforced by decisions at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, '*defined a set of objectives for these relationships and created avenues for enhanced political dialogue, including meetings of the North Atlantic Council with ministers of the countries concerned, high-level talks, and meetings* *with ambassadors'* (NATO – Partners 2014). These countries referred to as '*Partners across the globe'* or simply '*global partners'* currently are Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Korea. These countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or in some other way. Individual global partners choose the areas where they wish to engage in and cooperate with NATO in a spirit of mutual benefit and reciprocity (NATO – Partners 2014).

The importance of reaching out to countries and organisations across the globe was underlined in the Strategic Concept adopted at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit. As Rasmussen said, "*NATO must adopt a global perspective. This does not mean expanding our footprint into other parts of the world, nor does it involve NATO assuming global responsibilities. A global perspective means that we are constantly aware how global challenges affect our security at home and always prepared to cooperate with partners across the globe to protect our populations and ensure peace and stability*" (Rasmussen 2012c).

Over recent years, NATO has developed bilateral relations with each of these countries. Global partners now have the same access to partnership activities as those in formal partnership frameworks. In line with the new policy, all partners will be treated in the same way, offering them the same basis of cooperation and dialogue. Moreover, there are now more opportunities for meetings in flexible formats, bringing together NATO members and partners with other countries, which NATO may have no bilateral programme of cooperation with (NATO's relations with partners across the globe 2012).

"*Malaysia, Singapore and Tonga are likely the next candidates for the new global partnership, from Asia. In the past few years, NATO ... could include individual partnerships as well, with the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which are, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. Also, some Latin American countries like El Salvador and Colombia are interested to become NATO partners across the globe. The inclusion of these countries will mark the expansion of NATO, through memberships and partnerships, to all six inhabited continents*"(Rozoff 2012). This step will make NATO into an alliance with global membership.

Individual partnerships (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia)

NATO gained individual partnerships with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia through special relations and structures, and in different common areas of mutual interests.

The cooperation between NATO and Russia was set out in the 1997 through the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which provided the formal basis for relations. In 2002 the NATO – Russia Council was established in which the 28 Allies and Russia are equal partners. Russia has established a diplomatic mission to NATO, and Russian Military Branch Offices have been set up at NATO's two top military command headquarters. In Moscow, a NATO Information Office seeks to explain NATO and promote the benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, and a Military Liaison Mission is helping improve transparency and coordination on the military side (NATO's relations with Russia 2014). After Russia's annex of Crimea, NATO relations with Russia were reviewed and they are on the lowest level. The revision of the relation between NATO and Russia has been done on the last NATO Summit in Wales in the United Kingdom in September 2014.

The 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership remains the basic foundation underpinning NATO-Ukraine relations. In line with this Charter, the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) was established in the same year. In 2009, the Declaration to Complement the Charter, was signed which enhances relations between NATO and Ukraine. The NATO-Ukraine Commission directs cooperative activities and provides a forum for consultation between the Allies and Ukraine on security issues of common concern. NATO strongly supports Ukrainian's sovereignty and territorial integrity after annex of Crimea by Russia (NATO's relations with Ukraine 2014).

The cooperation between NATO and Georgia started in 1992 when the country joined to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and in 1994 Georgia joins the Partnership for Peace. In September 2008, NATO and Georgia established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to oversee NATO's assistance to Georgia following the conflict with Russia and to play a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit where NATO leaders agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO. Today, Georgia is an aspirant for NATO membership, actively contributes to NATO-led operations and cooperates with the Allies and other partner countries in many other areas. The NATO-Georgia Commission provides a unique framework through which NATO and Georgia pursue active political dialogue and practical cooperation in support of Georgia's reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations (NATO's relations with Georgia 2012).

The Benefits of Alliance's Partnership Policy

The Alliance benefits of Partnerships are best reflected by sharing the burden of maintaining global peace and security, in the spread of the zone of democratic development, economic prosperity, security, stability and peace not only regionally but also globally. "*International peace, security and stability are not only the obligation and responsibility of NATO and Partners, but it is incumbent on all of us, to all countries from all continents. NATO should re-invest more in its partners and facilitate consultation, information sharing and interoperability, because of many of NATO's formal partners as well as other non-member countries offer substantial capabilities and political support for Alliance missions*" (Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security 2014).

The NATO Summit in Chicago 2012 was the first major event based on the new partnership policy and its more flexible format meetings including Central Asian republics, Russia and Pakistan. In addition, the Alliance organized a meeting with thirteen partners who have recently made their contribution to NATO led operations (Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan 2012).

Referring to NATO operations NATO General Secretary Rasmussen said "*we have learnt how important it is to have partners" (*Rasmussen 2014a). Meanwhile, the annual NATO report says that *"throughout 2013, the Alliance's engagement in the Middle East and North Africa continued to develop through and beyond the established frameworks of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative"* (Rasmussen 2014b).

Despite the political and security benefits, NATO has great support from the partner countries to worldwide contribution to international operations. As of April 2014, around two dozen non-NATO countries were contributing more than 3,200 troops to NATO-led operations.

Conclusion

If NATO wants to continuously develop its partnership policy and partnerships themselves, it needs as soon as possible to overcome crisis in its partnership and enlargement policy. In addition, it is necessary to revise and change its decision-making policy by consensus in a more flexible policy, in certain areas with compromise. NATO needs to set all partnerships frameworks at a higher level with more influence on partners themselves in the overall policies of the Alliance. Contribution to operations is an important pillar of NATO in today's changing world, and it will be even more important in the future. This will require building more trust between NATO and partners. With more confidence, NATO will become coveted alliance for partnerships with all interested countries and international organizations.

The bilateral cooperation between partner countries and NATO has to be deeper. It is desirable all partner countries to develop their own individual cooperation among themselves, not only within the framework of NATO partners, but also wider. Thus, it would strengthen mutual trust, protection of shared values, states' own interests and values.

Partnership for Peace slowly loses its function, and at the same time the number of countries is constantly decreasing with each new cycle of NATO enlargement. Partnerships with the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are functioning ad hoc and have no important role in the overall policy of NATO. These partnerships often come to the fore, only when a crisis arises in the immediate environment of the countries that NATO has an interest in. Contribution to international operations of these countries is not remarkable.

NATO invests more hopes in partnerships across the world or with contact countries of Asia and Australia. The partnership policy with these countries has proved as a very useful in contribution to operations. Australia and New Zealand provided a significant contribution to NATO-led operations, especially in the ISAF in Afghanistan.

Individual partnerships have proved as unsuccessful cooperation forms with NATO. The Alliance invests in these partnerships in situations when its interests are threatened. This was shown in the last case with the partnerships between NATO and Russia and NATO and Ukraine.

In the last twenty years, NATO has developed individual partnership policy with Russia. Having in mind the recent events connected with Crimea's annexation to Russia, this partnership is shattered, and was certainly marginalized. NATO's support to partnership with Ukraine it seems is a little belated. It was actualized when it led to conflict with Russia and it was compromising NATO's interest in Ukraine. NATO and Russia clashed in the case of the Syrian conflict. Those events are a strong signal for NATO to invest more in the enlargement policy with aspirant countries in Europe. If countries like Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia are held under uncertainty, it is more likely that these countries could turn their course and seek for new partners for cooperation.

Therefore, the enlargement with these countries should have been put higher on NATO's agenda at the Alliance Summit in the UK in September this year. The Alliance missed the chance to strengthen its trust between partners and enlargement of the area of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and wider.

It is more likely that NATO will pay more attention to global partnerships with contact countries. Some countries and international organizations have expressed interest to develop a partnership with NATO, but it could be called into question because of the growing political power and influence of Russia and BRIC countries.

In the near future it is likely that NATO could expand partner network with some Latin America, Africa and Asia countries. This expansion would be promoting NATO as "alliance with global membership." By flexible partnership policy and fostering of aspirant countries, NATO will strengthen its position and role globally. It will enable more efficient dealing with challenges and threats in a rapidly changing security environment in the world. If NATO acknowledges these challenges as soon as possible, it will promote NATO not only as the Alliance of today, but as the Alliance of future.

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355.58 (470+571)
Review

THE CIVIL DEFENCE OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION - THE ROLE MODEL OF CONTEMPORARY FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF DEFENCE, PROTECTION AND RESCUE SYSTEM

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Abstract: *Civil Defence as a concept, initially, has implied an effort of a country for protection from military aggression and its aftermath. The concept significantly expanded after World War II and the emergence of nuclear weapons, and even after the Cold War we can talk about its comprehensiveness. The question being set by the change of the defence system of the Russian Federation is whether the transformed system of civil defence in the current United-All Russian system for prevention and elimination of emergency, can be considered as key to integrated security of the Russian Federation. The Russian security approach that civil defence is activity of strategic importance remains unchanged. The importance being given to Civil Defence is confirmed by the fact that Civil Defence was placed under authority of the particular newly established Ministry of Civil Defence. The author also supports the thesis about the modern functional structure of this system with the emphasis that some of the protection and rescue forces, precisely the units of civil defence have a military character. The connection with the armed forces as one of the factors of influence on the development of civil defence is emphasized by the participation of the Internal troops of the Russian Federation in crises management. The role of the armed forces, in this paper is also analyzed through their participation in many humanitarian operations in the last two decades. The wide range of tasks performed by the system of civil defence, as well as equipment and complexity of the organizational structure of the National Centre for Crisis Management is just one more confirmation that the Russian Federation is a European role model for modern and functional structure of the defence, protection and rescue system.*

Keywords: *Civil defence, crisis management, emergency, disaster, EMERCOM.*

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Introduction

The Civil Defence is a key part of the overall defence of a country. There is a general understanding that it is an effort to protect the citizens of a state from military aggression. The programs of such understanding of civil defence concept were initially discussed in the twenties and developed in the thirties of the last century, as a reaction to the threats of war in which airstrikes were intensified. Vigorous implementation of this protection and rescue of population programs take place after World War II, because of the threat of nuclear weapons. Since the nineties of the last century, the concept of civil defence has significantly expanded in its content changing its focus from military threats to the threats caused by emergency situations, accidents, etc. Thus, today, the concept is described with new terms like crisis management, dealing with emergencies, civil protection and so on, although the last one causes some notional confusion because *civil protection* is basically a subsystem and the most important systemic activity of the *Civil defence* system. Most of the countries today with units of Civil Protection, usually submit them in a wide range of actions such as relief in emergency situations as floods, earthquakes, various incidents or civil unrest.

Despite the large overall change in physical terms (such as the size of territory and population) compared to the former USSR, CIS has nevertheless preserved the compactness of the former union. Certainly, the changes, which have occurred at the economic and political level are more significant. Basically, political changes have a great importance for the military and defence power of the Russian Federation. The period after the end of the Cold War, which was characterized by changes in the defence system of Russia, simultaneously was also a period of a great change in the system of civil defence. The changes in civil defence were a logical result of the changes in the concept of perception of threats and dangers, and thus, the current structure of the Civil Defence system in the Russian Federation, although quite evolved still possesses essential features of organization and achievement that are at the level of what was achieved in former USSR. In that sense, this system of civil defence can be seen as a polyvalent category where the current structure and organization are the result of multiple causes that has conditioned the emergence and development of civil defence and the diversity of the functions that the system performs.

History of the development of civil defence in Russia

The roots of civil defence in the USSR extend to the time of World War I, with the establishment of local aircraft defence,[2] although it is correct to say that civil defence was established since the Council of People’s Commissars of the former Soviet Union in 1932 brought the *Regulation for air defence* of the territory, by which the work of the local air defence was regulated. In fact, World War I marked the first major organized protection forms aimed at organizing forces and means of active air defence, measures and activities of passive air defence, as well as protection and rescue of people task force on compulsory and voluntary basis. Basically, these organized forms of protection and rescue are limited to activities of monitoring and reporting to population for incoming

[2] (CIA Historical Review Program, Office of Research and Reports 1954)

aviation attack and creation of fighting fires teams, clearing of debris, providing first aid and repair of roads and factories. The presented content on the organization of local air defence aimed at continuity of work and life in the background, in order to support of the armed forces and the civil population.[3]

It can be concluded that the Russian Civil Defence acquired the first significant experiences in World War II, and that experience is the basis on which this system will be upgraded at a later time when facing an opponent who had nuclear weapons was necessary. In the post war period the ministry of defence will improve the defence against air attacks, by expansion on defence against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.[4] In the period immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union was to develop a civilian component of defence in addition to conventional military component in order of using civil defence as a means to deter an opponent who was superior in terms of the development of nuclear weapons. So, while the US has used nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the USSR has dissuaded by civil defence.[5] The role of deterring the enemy from launching the attack today is considered one of the main explanations for political purposes that the civil defence system has. But even though the Soviet Union has developed civil defence as a means of concealing its own vulnerability, that continuity of development will go on unabated, even after quickly achieving parity in nuclear power. It shows that for Soviets at that time, the new condition of guaranteed mutual destruction was not the reason for rejection of civil defence. In USSR there were several arguments that have supported the development of civil defence, such as: the civil and the military defence act in synergy; the civil defence is also useful in peace; the victory in a nuclear or conventional war is impossible without strong civil defence; civil defence is necessary because of expanded circle of nuclear weapon holders. „In such circumstances, arose the need of creation of a new general national defence system, which would include the preparation and performance measures in the field of protection of people, business facilities and goods across the country, in every province, city, municipality, at any village (...) against weapons of mass destruction “.[6]

Stages of development of civil defence in Russia

Within the changes of the system of civil defence of Russia, which have followed the changes in armed forces and changes in military doctrine, several stages of development can be distinguished. The first one refers to the position of civil defence with its positioning under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence in 1971 and by the increase of its budget.[7] In the context of the responsibilities over the system of civil defence, it is worth mentioning that by the end of the Cold War, in countries with com-

[3] (Civil Defence 2000)
[4] (CIA Historical Review Program, Office of Research and Reports 1954)
[5] (Wolfe, T. 1979)
[6] (Sukljenik 1976, p.36)
[7] (TsSI GZ MChS Rossii 2005, p 18-19)

munist ideology, it could be noted that civil defence was generally positioned under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, while in their NATO pact opponents in terms of the position of the civil defence, the Ministry of Interior, or the Ministry of Civil Defence or a separate emergency ministry or a separate directorate under the authority of the government had the dominant authority.

The second phase is characterized by merging civil defence units with strategic missile units, national units for air defence, ground forces, etc., a stage that matches the gradual introduction of nuclear missile weapons in the USSR in all branches of the armed forces. This positioning of the civil defence forces in terms of functional incorporation in socio-political systems, qualifies the units as units with military character.

The third phase covers the interpretation of civil defence in terms of its definition as an activity of strategic importance.[8] This perspective of the strategic role of civil defence in the Soviet Union will be developed in more detail in the final section of this paper.

The last, fourth stage coincides with the end of the Cold War and the radical change of doctrine, adaptation of training and concepts of warfare that followed, changes in which the civil defence became the responsibility of the Government and was significantly transformed by the creation of a separate Ministry of Civil Defence i.e. Ministry of Emergency which is the case with most countries of the former Soviet republics. With this placement, the main control of civil defence in the Russian Federation is performed by the Government, while in federal regions control is provided by management appointed by the government. Existing rules and regulations that put priority on safety of the civilian population are quite effective, such as the recently adopted laws, including: „Law on protection of civilians in areas of emergency situation caused by natural and technological disasters“, and the “Law on disaster relief and the status of the rescue services and their staff“.[9]

After the Cold War, the focus of the survival of the state and defence from nuclear war has moved to defence against terrorist attacks including attacks from chemical or biological weapons. Considerations show that the civilian population feels protected if there are well prepared and trained civil defence units, advanced technology and innovative tools. The necessity of improvement on protection from chemical agents and radiation was determined, and therefore it was necessary to restore individual means of protection, medicines and medical equipment. In addition, one of the key challenges for Civil Defence is the stability of the economy and companies. Increased risk of chemical, biological or other type of weapons requires the civil defence management to pay more attention to available resources related to control of terrorist activities, such as its monitoring and prevention.[10]

[8] (Wolfe, T 1979)
[9] (UNISDR 2015)
[10] (EMERCOM of Russia 2015)

Factors of influence on development of civil defence in Russia

The unfolding of civil defence in Russia has been influenced by several factors: First, at the time of the Soviet Union it was the existence of a central political power that was in the hands of the Communist Party.[11] It has reflected with simplicity in decision-making and strict directive for its implementation. If the situation had been different, i.e. political system of open democracy, the entire process of decision making in terms of development, budgeting, equipment, training, etc. would have been complicated and subjected to lengthy debates that in some cases as a result could inhibit certain processes of innovation for civil defence system.

The second factor is closely related to the first one and concerns the central state control over the economy, which has its positive and negative side. On one hand, it helped control the development of civil defence in accordance with territorial-production principle of organization of civil defence, which was based on the determination of pre-relocation of production facilities and the construction of shelters on the principle of production, whereas on the other hand, such control is being blamed for shortcomings in sense of vulnerability of many sectors due to unrealized plans for industry decontamination.[12]

The third factor with significant impact on the development of civil defence in the former Soviet Union and Russia today, are the armed forces. It is the integration of civil defence in the armed forces. Thus, not only the civil defence units have military character and therefore the need of their members going through military training, but this relation is reflected in the opposite direction, i.e. through the presence and leadership role of the military officers in civil defence, the functioning of civil defence for the military objectives and the strength of the military traditions and experiences of the two World Wars. [13]

Organization structure and tasks of civil defence in Russia

The organization of civil defence in Russia is closely related to the conditions imposed by historical development. The current organization has stemmed from territorial-production principle on which the civil defence was organized throughout the whole territory of the Soviet Union and in all bodies of management and production-enterprises, institutions and cooperatives. [14] The structure was common for the general structure of the civil defence system that clearly allocated the governing bodies, offices, agencies and forces. At the highest level, the general management was exercised by the *central authorities* who covered the Council of Ministers (Government), the ministries

[11] (Wolfe, T 1979)
[12] (Dorough 1977)
[13] (Vejl 1991, p. 181)
[14] (Civil Defence 2000)

and departments. Lower at the hierarchical structure, as operational expert bodies, were the *headquarters of civil defence* which performed the role of key management authorities on civil defence. They were guided by chiefs. In achieving their goals and tasks *civil defence services* were organized. The most prevalent are the following services: information and communications, medical service, shelter service, fire fighting service, technical service, rescue service, transportation service, energy supply, supply of food and service for decontamination. As for the *civil defence forces*, two components stand out: civil and military.

The role of civil defence in Russia today is mainly determined by the type of tasks that were required by the civil defence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The scope of these tasks allows the civil defence system to deal with the challenges of modern warfare and other forms of threat to Russia, and as such are not only an integral part of the defence activities of the state, but also part of the overall security preparations.

In the context of the role of opposing the non-military forms of threats, it is inevitable to mention the functionality of Soviet civil defence units that played a key role in disaster relief and various humanitarian actions, as evacuation exemplified by the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986.[15] Namely, the defence troops and reserve forces of the country were officially used (as in the case of war) and were put under the command of civil defence brigade in Kiev, so that the designated working group performed high-risk actions, including the removal of radioactive waste.[16]

Generally, tasks of civil defence in Russia can be divided into four categories: [17]

- The first group of assignments come from the time of the World War I and II, and is associated with the immediate protection of the population and the leadership from modern means of destruction, with construction of shelters, evacuation and providing means of personal protection; [18]
- The second group of tasks derives from the Cold War and includes those that are in favour of continuity of functioning of the country's economic system at a time when the economy is susceptible to direct damage of the modern means of destruction. It requires extensive preparation of the economic system for continuous operation of the economy in terms of threat through timely distribution of productive forces across the country, organized transition for the functioning of the economy from peacetime to war operation mode, increase of the production and stockpiling the most important products and more. [19]
- In the third group are those tasks that have a sanitary character and are intended to eliminate the consequences of accidents and disasters by performance

[15] (Medvedev 1992, p. 137)
[16] (Babakov 1998)
[17] (Mandić. 1988, p.219)
[18] (CIA Historical Review Program 1983)
[19] (CIA Historical Review Program 1999)

of rescue and urgent works at the affected parts of the country. The activities include reconnaissance in the affected areas, search for casualties, first aid, fire fighting, clearance of rubbles, decontamination of people, facilities, food, etc.

- The fourth group of tasks includes preventive activities of research and assessment of hazards and threats to the population and material goods of the state and determination of modalities of protection, training and education of the population and professional staff in managing the preparation and execution of the tasks of civil defence, establishment of measures for protection and rescue, planning further development of civil defence, etc. [20]

In 1994, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin, the civil defence is granted to EMERCOM (of Russia) i.e. is placed under the authority of the Ministry of Civil Defence of the Russian Federation, and thus, the primary tasks will be directed toward dealing with natural disasters and technical incidents. [21] The key challenges posed before the Russian civil defence units are: disaster relief and rescue in areas affected by disasters, search of locations that are under the influence of chemical and biological contamination and decontamination of areas and contaminated equipment. The Civil defence units have got the attribute of military units for emergency and elimination of natural disasters consequences, and are intended for use in evacuation of civilians in the issues of an urgent nature, reconstruction of damaged communication facilities, protection of buildings of vital character, and fighting forest fires. The Civil defence units were active in areas of armed conflict such as South and North Ossetia, Abkhazia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, etc. During their engagement, they supplied civilians with food and drinking water and conducted evacuation of the wounded and injured.[22] Civil defence units also have the task of assisting medical staff in patients' evacuation, during major epidemics and diseases.[23]

Structure of the civil defence of Russia

Ministry of Emergency - EMERCOM

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, urgency and elimination of consequences of natural disasters, also known as the *Ministry for Emergencies* (EMERCOM) was founded in 1994, although we may consider December 1990 as the true date of birth of this agency, when the *Russian protection corps* was founded, with

[20] (CIA Historical Review Program, Office of Research and Reports 1954)
[21] (UNISDR 2015)
[22] (EMERCOM of Russia 2015)
[23] (EMERCOM of Russia 2015)

the task for quick response in case of emergency. [24] According to ministry documents, it represents an enforcement power Federal agency that performs the following duties:

- Development of proposals and initiatives in the area of state policy over issues of competence of the Ministry;
- Management of *Civil Defence* and the *Office of Search and Rescue* in the Russian Federation;
- Provision of functioning and further development of the Russian disasters management system (RSDM);
- Organizing the training of the population and government agencies and Forces of the Russian system of management and response to disaster;
- Supervision of use of funds allocated to the Administration of Management and response to disasters;
- Streamlining the activities aimed at eliminating the consequences of large-scale accidents, disasters and other emergencies;
- Conducting special submarine activities;
- Organizing international cooperation in the area of competence of the Ministry. [25]

The following departments function within the Ministry: Department of Population and Territories Protection; Department of Disaster Prevention; Department of Forces; Department of Radiological and Other Disaster Effects Elimination; Department of Science and Technology; Department of Management; and Department of International Cooperation. [26]

The structure is complemented with several committees and boards:

- Interagency Commission of the Russian Federation of Forest Fires Fight;
- Interagency Commission of the Russian Federation for Flooding;
- Interagency Coordination Commission for Maritime Emergencies at Sea and Water Basins;
- Interagency Commission of the Russian Federation for rescuers endorsement.

The Ministry was authorized for international coordination and the ability on calling the local resources, if necessary. Through a link with the office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Emergency may require separate aid from the Ministry of Defence or the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior. [27] Internal troops are gendarmerie forces of the Federal Government of Russia. They support and reinforce the police of Russia, dealing with higher levels of unrest, internal armed conflicts and safeguarding of important objects (such as nuclear power plants). As such, their services were used in all conflicts and violent disturbances in modern Russia, including the First and The Second Chechen War. Internal troops are under the authority of the

[24] (EMERCOM Agency 2015)
[25] (Timothy, T. 1995)
[26] (Ministry for Extraordinary Situation (EMERCOM) 2000)
[27] (Timothy, T. 1995)

military command of the Armed Forces, fulfilling the tasks of local defence and home front security in wartime.[28]

Internal organizational structure is completed with: a) nine *Regional centres of EMERCOM*; b) *Headquarters of Civil Defence and Emergency* which are located on the territorial principle across regions, provinces, autonomous administrative regions, districts and cities; c) a *Major centre for command and control* located in Moscow and remedial centres in all regions; d*) Facilities for training and education* which include *the Academy of Civil Defence EMERCOM*- that train all officers and non-commissioned officers of the Ministry in performance of civil defence duties, Methodology *and training centre*s, *All Russian scientific research institute*, *All Russian monitoring and laboratory control centre* and *Centre for scientific analysis of issues of Civil Defence*.

Because of the need of rapid response, the following forces and equipment are available:

- Fire Service of the Russian Federation;
- Central air mobile rescue team which is equipped with helicopters and transport planes. These teams were involved in UN humanitarian supply operations;
- Civil defence troops- which consist of military divisions and regiments stationed in different regions of the country in order of applying measures during the war and natural and technical disasters in peace;
- *Search and rescue service* that exists in parallel with the *Search and rescue administration* in MOD.[29]

National Crisis Management Centre

The National Crisis Management Centre is a state body for continuous management with the *Russian unified system for prevention and elimination of emergency situations*. In late 2006, the government of the Russian Federation took measures on establishing a National Centre for Crisis Management, with the main objective of accelerating and optimizing the activities of emergency response through the use of modern technologies. The capabilities of the Centre allow maintenance of on-line meetings of the *Federal operative headquarters for emergency relief*. Thus, enables faster management decision making significant and greater efficiency in larger emergency relief operations.

The main tasks of the centre are:

- Monitoring and warning of emergencies;

- Information harmonization in order of attainment safety of the population and territory on federal, interregional and regional level;

- Establishment and continuous development of a solid structure of a United state system for prevention and elimination of emergency situations;

- Management of forces of the Russian united system for prevention and elimi-

[28] (Kulikov 1994)

[29] (Timothy T. 1995, p.232)

nation of emergency situations, organization and implementation of intersectional cooperation while carrying out tasks of emergency prevention and relief.[30]

The National Crisis Management Centre is consisted of the following departments of EMERCOM Russia: NCMC Administration, operational and analytical centre, emergency response centre, telecommunications centre, environmental surveillance centre and IT development centre.

The responsibilities of NCMC include the regional CM centres and headquarters of CM EMERCOM in Moscow and the Kaliningrad region, and headquarters for CM EMERCOM under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, NCMC conducts informational interaction with the crisis centres in other countries.

In terms of informational interaction in order of enabling the work of the NCMC headquarters, the Centre's subordinates are:

- Regional centres of the EMERCOM CMC;
- Duty station of All-Russian forecasting and monitoring of emergency conditions (Antistikia EMERCOM);
- Duty station of Centre for situations and mathematical modelling of technological accidents and disasters of All-Russian science-research institute for fire protection;
- The duty station of the *Decision making centre* of the *All-Russian research institute on issues of civil defence and emergency relief*.

Instead of conclusion: Strategic importance of civil defence in Russia

The Civil Defence has a particular importance in organization of protection of the Russian state. The importance stems from the special interest of the Soviet Union in defence forms of organization. There are analyses showing that the true classic system of civic / civil defence existed in the Soviet bloc, where the system resembled more a militia organization. In the Soviet Union, this system was a part of the military policy of the state, understood as a component of defence with strategic importance, but also as a complex of measures of economic and social character taken for protection of population from the after-effect of accidents, disasters and similar accidents. It was part of the military policy, implemented by peaceful, non-violent means of defence of the population and economy of the country from modern weapons, and security of life and work in its back front. According to Sokolovskii, „The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction in modern warfare against areas deep in the homeland as well as against troops on battlefields has produced a new form of strategic protection of the states vital functions, generally known as civil defence. (…) Civil defence is of particular strategic importance because its effective organization and functioning are a requirement not only for the defence of the home front to a great extent, but also makes

[30] (EMERCOM of Russia 2014)

possible the mobilization of the armed forces during the initial period of the war".[31] The latter is specific to the so-called civil-military cooperation which in content is identical to the activities of *Civil Support* or *Civil Planning* as a concept that is known by the NATO countries. The aim of this concept is through mobilization to ensure the use of the main national energy resources such as human resources, industrial and telecommunications infrastructure, not only for the need of civil society, but also for the direct support of the armed forces. Thus, the civil defence is given strategic importance, and the overall defence of the country is conditioned by successful implementation. It becomes the key to success in the event of war. This is due to the fact that according to the strategic positions in the sixties of the last century, the Soviet Union had to operate without any reserves from the political and economic field, and sequentially the state had to be spared of major damage.

Unlike the approach of the West, the military strategy of the former Soviet Union believed that victory in a nuclear war is achievable.[32] Soviets have planned to minimize the possibility of a nuclear attack on its territory and therefore have invested more in the planning of civil protection than the West, with plans that have been far more effective than those of the United States, based on the assessment of threats.[33] Unverified claims for civil defence in the Soviet Union accounted that nodes of all railway stations were turned into underground bunkers with large durable explosion doors, with compressors and etc. Public transport was structured for rapid evacuation of cities. The Civil Defence was completely under the military command. Due to the development of the Civil defence of the eastern bloc it was claimed that the Soviets would come as "winners" after a total thermonuclear war. Much of Soviet civil defence such as the basic education and training, or the shelters, were either a state secret that the Russian Federation to this day protects, or were only a partial rumour that is not fully confirmed, so it will be quite difficult to disclose the Civil Defence plans of the former Communist bloc with real evidence in support of rumours that anyone who studies civil defence knows to be true.

It is wrong to consider that civil defence is focused only on weapons of mass destruction and nuclear war. It is undisputable that these are the origins of CD,; however, the modern version of the civil defence/civil protection and emergency management takes into account all risks. At present, at a time when the "old" civil defence as a means of military strategies is no longer an effective way in achievement of complete security in society, the success of the state on the security plan can only be made with the constant expansion of civil defence front of action.

Civil Defence in Russia today is one of the most important functions of the state; it is the unity of the defence and security of the civilian population. There are opinions that the concept of civil defence, which treats the overall threats actually calls upon

[31] (Sokolovskii D. 1963, p.161)

[32] (Wolfe, T 1979)

[33] (CIA Historical Review Program 1999)

the “modern” discipline of Emergency Management. Current sources of danger affect the countries to change their own attitude towards the defence and protection, both conceptually as well as the organizational and functional aspects. Defence -protection action gets universal significance and comprehensiveness, addressing overall threats and dangers in an attempt of complex activity. Russia, increasingly emphasizing the importance of security, has moved the issue of defence and protection of military-political to civilian sphere of action. In this respect, the civil defence units in Russia, despite their military character, pay attention to non-military threats such as economic, technological, religious and psychological influences. Defence-protective action in Russia becomes a unique feature with its preventive and protective measures and operational activities against all kinds of threats and dangers, in order to create the best conditions for better security of people and goods across the Russian Federation. The last decade in Russia, the integrated defence and protective action gets more important and more developed, taking the form of a separate, comprehensive activity constituted in the system of civil defence.

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Review

INFORMATION AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE CRITICAL TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AND DEFENCE OF THE NATION

Nikolche MILKOVSKI[1]
Mitko BOGDANOSKI[2]

Abstract:*Information today dominates the world, which is constantly changing. Maintaining the status quo in the field of acquisition of information and its timely and correct application in all elements of combat operations, and non-application of information operations concept will inevitably result in stagnation of the state and the armed forces. Any change in this field, due to their impact on the overall effectiveness of national power must be well and carefully assessed before being applied. The experience of recent conflicts, globally, one can easily conclude that the information is one of the most important tools in the hands of the military decision-makers. Therefore this paper gives an overview of the importance of timely possession of accurate information during military operations and defence.*

Keywords: *information, information systems, information superiority, information environment*

Introduction

According to the history of war, the domination over information has always been at the heart of military operations. In today's "information time", the importance of dominance over information and information superiority must be carefully solved. Modern information technology has dramatically changed the way information is collected, stored, analyzed and shared. The speed, accuracy and timeliness of information have generated the creation of the concept of information operations.

It is very important that military and civilian leaders understand the true value of information and information environment and their importance in achieving information superiority in a conflict.

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Just the right information,
at the right time and for the right customer
is what is valuable!

Information

Delivery of the right information, at the right time, in the hands of the right people, provides a key advantage for individuals, organizations and nations. There is a constant struggle between acquisition of valuable information about our opponent, while simultaneously protecting the information on our own forces, capabilities and intentions. The information should not be considered only as a strategic phenomenon. It is also important in the planning and execution process of operations on operational and tactical level. Today's way of fighting wars has changed, significantly influenced by the technological revolution in gathering, storing, analyzing and dissemination of data.

What is information - Definition

Information is a strategic resource vital to national security. Military operations today, in order to successfully implement multiple simultaneous and integrated activities, are very intensely dependent on information and information systems.[3]

Information can be described as facts, data or instructions that exist in some sort of medium or form. It can also be defined as a sense that humans assign to the data using the known rules used when they represent data.[4]

Information is a term often used to refer to (show) very different points in the spectrum, starting from raw data ending with knowledge. In its basic sense, information is a result of putting individual observations, feedback data from sensors (receptors) or data items in a context that has a (sense) meaning.[5]



Figure 1 The transformation process - from raw data into knowledge

[3] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations,

[4] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of military and associated terms, 256

[5] Understanding information age warfare, Alberts 2001

Data is a presentation of facts, concepts or instructions in a formalized way. The data should be suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or automatic means.[6]

Information and knowledge do not necessarily have the same meaning. The available information suggests conclusions formed on the basis of a known pattern and lead to knowledge.

"Knowledge of the situation can be made on the basis of the conclusions that can be drawn from the information on, for example, the types and locations of entities on the battlefield".[7]

Information environment

Information environment is a sum of individuals, organizations and systems that can collect, process, distribute or act on information ".[8]

According to this definition as part of the information environment, besides systems and equipment that manipulate with information, individuals and decision makers are included. People and automated systems observe, orient, decide and act on the information in the information environment. Therefore, the information environment is the main area of decision making.

Although the information environment is considered special, it still exists within each of the four domains: sea, land, air and space.[9]

To understand how information affects the ability to perform military operations, it is necessary to think in three dimensions - physical dimension, information dimension and cognitive dimension. These three dimensions are presented in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Three dimensions of information environment

[6] Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of military and associated terms,140
[7] Understanding information age warfare, Alberts 2001,
[8] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations
[9] Ibid

The first dimension is the physical dimension. It may be described or characterized as a general truth or reality.[10] Here belong the existing physical platforms and communication networks. Here exist situations over which the military wants to influence and the actions that are taken in order to achieve influence. Elements in this dimension can be easily quantified and measured.

"In the physical dimension there are command and control systems and infrastructure that enable support of individuals and organizations in air, land, sea and space."[11] As examples of physical dimension we can take people, places and capabilities as geographic coordinates and communications infrastructure.

The second dimension is the information dimension, where there is information and information systems. Here, information is created, manipulated and shared.[12] In this dimension actions such as: collection, storage, disclosure and protection of information are performed. This information may or may not truly represent the "general truth". Information dimension is the place where modern military forces communicate and where commander's intent is conducted. This dimension consists of content and flow of information that must be protected.[13]

The cognitive dimension is the third dimension of the information environment. It is thought of as the most important among the three dimensions because here is where wars are actually won or lost. This dimension is "what happens in our brains". Decisions are taking place (being made) in this dimension.

The cognitive dimension can be described as the minds of the participants where there are perceptions, beliefs, prejudice, quality of education, leadership and morale, and where, by using them, decisions are made. Examples of cognitive dimension are: cultural and social factors, the identity and credibility of key decision makers. Human perception is a "filter" through which the entire content of the cognitive dimension passes. This filter consists of basic personal knowledge that a person brings to a situation, personal experience, training and individual capabilities (intelligence, personal style, ability to perception etc.).

The individuals knowledge (understanding, etc.) are also unique. Since these features vary from person to person, the personal understanding of the world is also affected. Therefore, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of manipulation of cognitive dimension and to establish a set of standard rules for success in this area.[14]

Today's modern technology makes the manipulation of data in the information and physical dimension easy. The easier it is to store, manipulate and distribute data, the more vulnerable the data become during exploitation. However, the cognitive dimension is still not easily susceptible to exploitation because modern technology

[10] Understanding information age warfare, Alberts 2001
[11] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations
[12] Understanding information age warfare, Albert+s 2001
[13] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations
[14] Understanding information age warfare, Alberts 2001

still cannot easily modify the beliefs and prejudice of people. Therefore, the party that can manipulate the cognitive dimension is likely to succeed in obtaining information superiority.

There is one reality or physical dimension. This is converted into selected data, information and knowledge by the systems in the information dimension. With training and shared experience we are trying to develop similar cognitive activities of key military decisions makers, but they still remain unique to each individual.

Information Superiority

Information superiority is essential to achieve almost all joint combat capabilities of today's modern battlefield. By nature it is transient and must be created and maintained by conducting information operations. It provides a competitive advantage only when it is effectively translated into superior knowledge to achieve "decision superiority", actually better decisions, adopted and implemented faster than the opponent can act, or in non-combat situation, decisions taken at a pace that allows forces to shape the situation or react to changes and achieve its mission.[15]

Information superiority is a relative concept. It describes a state of imbalance that exists between two or more parties in the information dimension. Sometimes information superiority is wrongly understood and it is treated simply in terms of information and communication abilities which a party has over another. This conception leads to emphasizing the information process: collection, analysis, distribution and storage. However, information superiority is not all that. Therefore, in order to better conduct information operations and to be able to make better decisions compared to the opponent, it is useful to understand what the meaning of information superiority is.



Figure 3. Information superiority

[15] Key Concepts for Information Superiority Dr. David S. Albert

The main task of information operations is interpreted as "achieving and maintaining information superiority"[16], which provides a commanding officer with advantage only when converted to superior decisions.

Information superiority is balancing with the situation of a preference for one side in the information dimension.[17] This can be achieved by getting the right information to the right people at the right time and in the right form, at the same time preventing the opponent of doing the same.

Information superiority is a condition achieved through the establishment of the relative advantage of the information that can acquire competitive advantage. Information superiority is a condition that can be achieved or lost over time. This condition should be understood as relative information advantage - it is comparable and transient.

However, the possession of information advantage does not result in information superiority, unless it can be converted into a significant competitive advantage.

Information superiority is not a goal by itself, but a means of achieving the goal. Its existence and meaning depends on its contribution to this goal and the value placed on the goal, which in military conditions would be achievement of military mission.[18]

The military is designed to function and adapt to the lack of necessary information about the opponent or to deal with the so-called "fog of war".[19] This haze applies to all ambiguities related to where the opponent is assigned, which are his abilities and what are his intentions. Until recently, the commanders on the battlefield were not able to have timely and accurate information on the exact location of their units, and even less about where the opponent is and what his intentions are.

Problems appeared during the implementation of plans for synchronization of forces on the field ground in implementation of even the simplest operations. There are several reasons for this. Some of them are due to the so-called "Fog of war", others because of poor communication and some because of not sharing of the information. Because of the high cost of the errors in the implementation of operations, the military is accustomed to be constantly preoccupied with reducing the effects and risks associated with the "fog of war". The removal of this problem and the deviation from the way in which the military is accustomed to function for centuries requires a valid and strong evidence that the "new" way of thinking and functioning is better, but at the same time robust.

Technological developments we are witnessing today provide an opportunity of reducing the influence of "the fog of war." However, it must be clear that no matter how big the technological advances are, they cannot completely eliminate this phenomenon

[16] US Joint Publication 3-13,Information Operations

[17] Joint vision 2020, General Henry H. Shalton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director for strategic plans and policy, J5; Strategy Division, US. Government printing office, Washington DC, June 2000

[18] Key Concepts for Information Superiority Dr. David S. Albert

[19] Ibid

and the “fog” will continue to exist in some capacity and will persist. Military leaders today need to be aware of this and should find a way to cope with what will continue to exist and persist.

Figure 4 presents the interrelation of the efficiency depending on the extent of the presence of ambiguities that are a consequence of “the fog of war.” Military organizations have always fought to avoid the worst of the area represented on the image (bottom right end tinged with red).



Figure 4. Information superiority - greater efficiency

Today’s technological advances provides the military with the means to easily find the “gray area” of the image where the operations will be conducted with high efficiency in terms of reduced extent of the presence of “the fog of war.” As mentioned before, the military leaders must be aware that the “fog” cannot be fully supplanted and that to a certain extent it will constantly be present and it will continually affect the efficiency with which operations are conducted. Therefore, it is important not only to know how to provide information superiority, but also how to better deal with ambiguities that will certainly exist.

It is important to plan the information capabilities of the organization relative to its needs. The concept of operations, organizational forms, access to command and control, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, the rules of war, the level of education and training and the characteristics of armed systems determine information needs of countries in the war.

The ability of a party in a war to successfully conduct operation largely depends on the extent to which these information needs are met. Information needs of the warring parties differ significantly.[20]

Pursuit to gain information superiority is not a new concept and leaders always tried to do so, and those who have acquired this advantage had considerable success

[20] Key Concepts for Information Superiority Dr. David S. Albert

against the enemy. Sun Tzu Wu was a profound military thinker who was able to highlight some of the most important foundations of gaining information supremacy over an opponent, now called information superiority. Throughout history, the ability to accomplish the mission was designed to minimize the amount of required information and communications, since capabilities in these areas in the past have been very limited. In today's times of asymmetric threats it is likely to face an opponent whose needs in terms of information are different from ours. What matters in this case is: which party would better meet their needs for information, and not which side has better information capabilities.

However, minimization of information capabilities is not a strategy that will result in success. The key to success is finding the right balance in which information capabilities correspond with the concept of operations, organization, access to command and control and capabilities of the people and the armed systems.

The measures used to identify and measure information superiority must be applicable at all levels of war and applicable to every military mission or task. They should be developed to a level of abstraction that will make them stable across a wide range of subjects.

Information can be considered independent from technology, but it must be remembered that the acquisition, processing and dissemination of information today has become very dependent on technology. Because of this, technology has a great contribution to information superiority, if it can be used properly.[21]

Commercial achievements and progress of information technology nowadays have become equally available for both friends and enemies. Bearing this in mind, it is essential for the armed forces to ensure that all military systems have enough open architecture to facilitate the addition of the latest and most effective technologies when they are available, with the ability to just put them in the system immediately to use or the so-called "plug-and-play" feature.

Information and its importance for the military

Information has always been critical item for military operations. Military personnel must understand the vitality of information and act accordingly. It is useful to understand the reasons why information is essential for the military.

"Know thy enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never know the danger. When you are ignorant to the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If you do not know the enemy and yourself, then it is certain that in every battle you are in danger."[22]

The term "full spectrum dominance" implies that "armed forces are able to conduct rapid, sustained and synchronized operations with forces dimensioned for

[21] Cornerstones on information warfare, Ronald R. Fogleman and Sheil E. Widnall 1995

[22] The art of War, Sun Tzu Wu,

specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all dimensions - land, sea, air, space and information”.[23]



Figure 5. Creation of a full spectrum dominance

As shown in the foregoing, the list of dimensions where military operations are conducted has been extended with the information dimension, knowing the present state of war, it is not surprising. But the question is how much information occupies a central place in the military world? The manual “Information Operations: doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures” of the US Army, from November 2003, in the opening sentence clearly highlights:”**The information is an element of the combat power**”.[24]



Figure 6.Elements of the combat power [25]

[23] Joint vision 2020, General Henry H. Shalton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director for strategic plans and policy, J5; Strategy Division, US. Government printing office, Washington DC, June 2000

[24] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-13 (FM 100-6), Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, November 2003

[25] FM 3-0. Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army (2008), February

Due to its complicated nature, there is always some uncertainty in the military environment. In order to overcome this uncertainty, military leaders at all levels must gain information about the enemy and the battlefield. Decision makers can make accurate decisions only when they have timely and accurate information.

The dimensions of information are: relevance, accuracy and timeliness. The upper limit of the information dimension is achieved when the identification of information and removal of the most important goals are achieved every time. The biggest challenge lies in the transient targets, those that are movable and whose value is variable over time.

Even nowadays it is difficult to determine the exact action. Modern advances in technology today allow the commander to better handle information, to understand, analyze and act on what is happening on the battlefield. But there will always be a significant level of uncertainty that will exist in the handling of information. Uncertainty can occur due to flaws and imperfections of sensors that collect information, differences in human perception of the reproduced information and etc. Therefore, the party that makes the least mistakes in handling the information is likely to prevail because it will make (adopt) better and healthier decisions. Today's technology has increased the complexity of collection, processing and dissemination of information. All this will undoubtedly change the way wars are fought and the role it will play in the transformation of the techniques of warfare and the transformation of the structure of units. Therefore it is necessary to constantly review and reassess the organizational structure, doctrine and concept of warfare, new technology and training staff. In order to effectively implement this task on the battlefield, it is necessary to understand the value and importance of information.

Information is a strategic resource that is critical to military operations and security of the nation. The complexity of the battlefield of today makes military operations highly dependent on information and information systems in the processes of integration, coordination and taking actions.

Major challenge for military leaders today is the fact that the instruments of information operations nowadays can be used by the opponent and can cause a significant negative impact on the military environment, because nowadays they are easily available almost anywhere in the world.[26] They are cheap, commercial (COTS - commercial-off-the-shelf), easy to set and maintain and do not require a high degree of expert knowledge to use them.

Information is important in the planning process of military operations. Holders of military decisions should understand the importance of information operations because the desired effect of information operations is not always to fight and destroy the enemy. A thorough understanding of the importance of information will enable the commander to visualize the opponent capabilities for information operations and to take the necessary precautions to prevent compromise of friendly information by

[26] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations

the opponent. The constantly changing nature of the combat zone actually adds more complexity to the process of information processing and thus makes it even more difficult the understanding of information.[27]

Information and its quality

The quality of information is very important. The quality of information is a job that is very difficult, and in some cases almost impossible, to quantify.
Figure 7 shows the quality criteria for information.

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA
ACCURACY Information that conveys the true solution
RELEVANCE Information that applies to the mission, task or solution at hand
TIMELINESS Information that is available on time to make decisions
USABILITY Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays
COMPLETENESS Information that provides the decision maker with all necessary data
BREVITY Information that has only the level of detail required
SECURITY Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required

Figure 7. Criteria for quality of information

Different goals for the use of information require different application of these criteria, and different measurement of each criterion.[28]

The most important thing is to get the right information at the right time, in the hands of those who need it. As there are no tools to measure the quality of the information before it is received, the quality is often subjective. The quality of information varies by cognitive dimension of the individual, his prejudice, education, training, morale and experience.

Information operations are very different from direction in conventional warfare and kinetic weapons, where the measurement of the efficiency of the tool is easier using physical measures.

[27] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations
[28] US Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations

Conclusion

Lesson learned from recent conflicts, starting with the Gulf War, ending with current operations in Afghanistan and NATO operations in Libya, is that what can be seen - can be hit, and what can be hit – can be killed. The function of "seeing" is now much more sophisticated and includes electronic, optical or acoustic sensors that may have even global coverage. These sensors can be connected in real time with computer-controlled weapons systems with exceptional accuracy and killing power. Prerequisite for successful implementation of all this is information.

Gaining dominance over information and superiority in decision-making is crucial to all military activities. Understanding the interconnections and relationships between the capabilities of information operations is critical for the success and achievement of the ultimate goal.

Today, due to the massive use of information technologies in military operations the possibility of exploitation of the flaws and weaknesses in these technologies in hostile activities to disable the information systems and reduction or loss of information superiority is increased.

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