

МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ

# СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

46

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

CONTEMPORARY  
MACEDONIAN  
DEFENCE  
Vol. 24, Number 46, 2024

46

VOL. XXIV  
SKOPJE  
JUNE 2024

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА	Год.	Број	Стр.	Скопје
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE	24	46	1-128	2024
	Vol.	No	pp	Skopje



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

**СОВРЕМЕНА ОДБРАНА** **CONTEMPORARY  
MACEDONIAN  
DEFENCE**

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ISSN 1409-8199  
e-ISSN 1857-887X

Година 24, бр. 46, јуни 2024 / Vol. 24, No. 46, June 2024

Skopje  
June 2024



# **СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА**

Издавач:

**МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА СЕВЕРНА МАКЕДОНИЈА**

Министерство за одбрана

„СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА“

„Орце Николов“ 116 1000 Скопје

Телефони: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

WEB на Министерство за одбрана:

<https://www.mod.gov.mk/современа-македонска-одбрана/>

Списанието излегува два пати годишно.

ISSN 1409-8199

Скопје, Јуни 2024 година

# **CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE**

Publisher:

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA**

Ministry of Defence

„CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE“

„Orce Nikolov“ 116 1000 Skopje

Tel.: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

WEB of the Ministry of Defence:

<https://www.mod.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defense/>

The magazine is published twice a year

ISSN 1409-8199

Skopje, June 2024

# СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

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МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ НА  
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UDK 355.02:[551.583:502.14(497-15)]

## CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SECURITY ISSUE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Ljupcho STOJKOVSKI <sup>1</sup>

Julija BRSAKOSKA BAZERKOSKA <sup>2</sup>

**Abstract:** *Climate change is a global challenge with direct environmental, political and socio-economic repercussions for countries and peoples around the world. It is a direct threat, for example, to the territories of some states due to rising sea levels or fires and droughts, but is also a “threat” or a “risk” multiplier, undermining food security, energy security, economic security and access to fundamental natural resources, while also impacting the health of individuals and communities. This article deals with the connection between climate change and security and the security risks that climate change poses. It elaborates on the theoretical approaches to treat climate change as a security issue and argues that climate change, which is a multidimensional problem, should be seen, inter alia, as a security issue. In this context, the article also focuses on the risks and perceptions of climate change in the Western Balkan countries.*

**Keywords:** *Climate Change, Climate Security, Human Security, UN Sustainable Development Goals, Western Balkans.*

### Introduction

At the 2021 open debate in the UN Security Council on climate and security, acclaimed natural historian and biologist David Attenborough stressed that “climate change is the biggest threat to security that humans have ever faced”, warning that “[if] we continue on our current path” – that is, on the path on not abiding by the Paris Agreement commitment to limit global warming to 1.50 C – “we will face the collapse of everything that gives our security – food production, access to fresh water, habitable, ambient temperatures and ocean food chains” (Security Council Report, 2021, p.1). According to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, “we are in the fight of our lives [...] and we are losing”; we are forming a “collective suicide pact” if we proceed with our insufficient efforts to tackle climate change (United Nations, 2022). He has emphasized on many occasions the linkage between today’s “climate chaos” and tomorrow’s conflicts (Ibid), between climate change and its impacts and the maintenance of international peace and security (United Nations, 2024; United Nations, 2021a). Similarly, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stressed that climate change “not only exacerbates

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threats to international peace and security; it is a threat to international peace and security.” (United Nations, 2011).

These statements clearly point to two interrelated things. Firstly, climate change is an actual, global challenge with direct environmental, political and socioeconomic repercussions for countries regardless of national borders or sovereignty. As one of the central global issues of the 21st century, climate change represents a completely new and indistinct threat to the global climate system upon which the entire humankind depends. Climate change effects need to be mitigated fast, mainly because humanity has reached a point in which climate change poses an increased risk to people, the economy, infrastructure, ecosystems, societies and international relations. Serious consequences are foreseen, like a temperature increase from 2 to 5.0 °C which will lead to the melting of the glaciers on the North and the South Pole and the increase of the sea level which will directly affect the coastal lands and the island states and will increase the number of hurricanes and inundations. The Western Balkans region is no exception to the severe impacts that are caused by climate change throughout the world. In 2020, for instance, the European Commission observed that the Western Balkans is one of the regions in Europe that is most deeply affected by the impact of climate change (European Commission 2020). It has been estimated that if the trend of rising temperatures is projected to continue, the temperature increases in the region are estimated to be between 1.7 – 4.0°C, and even exceeding 5.0°C by the end of the century (Regional Cooperation Council, 2018). These projections are dependent on the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but they raise great concerns in the region, mainly because of the serious climate security risks stemming from increasing climate hazards such as drought, heatwaves, and tropical storms (Brsakoska Bazerkoska & Stojkovski 2024).

What is also clear from the abovementioned statements is the linkage between climate change and security. Although the association between security and climate change and its impacts dates back to the 1970s, it started to come to prominence in the 1990s, as a national security matter, but especially since 2007, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Report was issued, and when the UN Security Council discussed for the first time the question of climate change (Trombetta, 2023(a), p.2,3). Following that year, climate change has been often portrayed as “a threat in itself and as a “threat multiplier” or “risk multiplier” (Ibid, p.3). In addition to posing territorial threats, in the form of, for instance, rising sea levels or fires and droughts, climate change undermines the basic environmental security, which consists of food security, energy security, economic security and access to fundamental natural resources, and it impacts the health of individuals and communities, with the poorest and most vulnerable individuals and communities most at risk. The degradation of the environment might result in increased rates of conflict over scarce resources, which have the capacity to produce environmental refugees that will likely flee affected areas. When these essential components of security – health, community, environment, livelihoods and the economy – are affected by climate change, the rising human insecurity can contribute to rising national and global conflict and insecurity (Castro Pereira 2015).

Yet, despite these connections, many states and authors still do not agree with framing climate change as a security issue. This is mainly the case because climate change should be seen as a sustainable development issue and not as a security issue. Moreover, the scientific evidence for linking climate change and security is not sufficiently clear (UN Doc.S/PV.8926, 2021, p.4, 12).<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the securitization of an issue in itself

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<sup>3</sup> *As China and Russia have argued in the UN Security Council debate on climate and security.*

carries numerous problems. In this context, the article will deal with the connection between climate change and security and the security risks that climate change poses. It will further elaborate on why climate change, as a multidimensional problem, is, *inter alia*, a security issue. Finally, it will focus on the Western Balkans, and the security challenges climate change poses in this region.

### **Climate change as a security issue**

In order to answer whether climate change should be seen as a security question, it is necessary to deconstruct the concept of security into its components. For many scholars, answering what security is, includes defining, first and foremost, the “referent object” of security, or who should be secured and what values should be secured (Baldwin 1997, p.13-16; Martin 2022, p.249, 250)? Additionally, it is necessary to ascertain who should provide the security, by what means it should be provided and what is the actual threat to be protected from (Ibid)?

The traditional, and for a very long time predominant, view of security is through the lens of the nation-state, and realism as an IR theory. The state, in this account, is the referent object of protection, and territorial integrity and stability, as well as political independence, are the values that should be secured. The threat is external, meaning it comes from outside of the state borders, usually in the face of another state, and it involves the (threat or) use of force. The response to this kind of threat is mainly reactionary and involves the state’s armed forces.

But this understanding has been highly contested throughout the years. Many scholars emphasize that the understanding of a “threat” should be much broader and include not just external and military dangers, but occurrences such as “epidemics, floods, earthquakes, or droughts” (Baldwin 1997, p.15,16; Ullman 1993). In fact, even the UN Security Council, the international community’s primary authority on international peace and security, endorsed this view when it characterized the Ebola virus outbreak in 2014 in Western Africa as a threat to international peace and security, in light of Article 39 of the UN Charter (UN Doc. S/Res/2177 (2014)). The Council even authorized a series of measures to address the spread of the virus. For instance, it called on all UN member states to lift general travel and border restrictions, which were imposed due to the Ebola spread, to facilitate the delivery of aid and personnel to the most affected countries, and to fight against misinformation about the outbreak (Ibid). In this case, the referent object of protection is not a single nation-state, but the whole region of (Western) Africa or the whole international community; the values to be secured were human health and human life; the means of protection were not military, and the “threat” was not remotely related to the use of force, nor was it “external”. Therefore, all this discussion shows that the concept of “security” is socially constructed, and not a given term (Trombetta 2023(b), p.77). It is an amalgam of social practices that include “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al. 1998, p.25). Security can include traditional, military threats, but it can also encompass threats that in themselves do not concern the use of force, but which are of huge gravity and which could further impact traditional security concerns.

In light of this, climate change, which is a complex and multidimensional issue, should be treated, *inter alia*, as a “non-traditional” security issue. Climate change has strong connections (much stronger compared to Ebola, for example) with international security. To begin with, according to one recent research, “62.3% of the studies find evidence that climate change variables are associated with higher levels of conflict” (Sakaguchi et al 2017, p.640). Granted, climate change is “rarely a direct cause of conflict”, but “there is ample evidence that its effects

exacerbate important drivers and contextual factors of conflict and fragility” such as increasing “resource demands, environmental degradation and uneven development” (Detges et al. 2020, p.11, 4 International Crisis Group 2021). Thus, as the UN Security Council recognized in its Presidential Statement on climate change, in the long run, climate change may “aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security” (UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/15 (2011)). In this regard, the Council has pointed out in its decisions on some specific conflicts and crises (most notably, the Lake Chad Basin and Somalia) the link and adverse effect between climate change and violent conflicts.<sup>4</sup> Environmental considerations can also be found in UN peacekeeping operations (Maertens 2018). Furthermore, while climate change may in some cases be a direct threat to communities and individuals, like, for example, the prediction of the disappearance of (the territories) of four Small Island Developing States by the middle of this century due to climate change-driven rising sea levels (Nevitt 2021, p.529, 535), in principle, climate change and its implications pose indirect threats. Many experts explain that, in addition to temperature rises, melting glaciers and rising sea levels, climate change will (continue to) cause and/or exacerbate extreme weather conditions, such as the increase in the intensity and/or frequency of heatwaves, fires, storms, floods, droughts, etc. (Ibid, p.533-535; Barnett & Adger 2007, p.640). This will lead to shortages of and will reduce the access to natural resources, food and water for many individuals around the world, endangering human health and/or causing the rise of “environmentally induced migrants” (IOM 2007; UNGA 2008), and further impact larger social processes and sectors, like agriculture, the production sector, and the institutional, economic and social development and prosperity of states and individuals (Barnett & Adger 2007; UN Secretary General 2009). Thus, climate change is a threat multiplier or a security risk multiplier (CNA 2007; UNEP 2022). It is for this reason that many states<sup>5</sup> and international bodies, like, for instance, the UN Climate-Security Mechanism (UNEP 2021), recognize climate change as a security issue and further scrutinize the relationship between climate change and security.

Nevertheless, claiming that climate change should be considered as a security issue, since security is a constructed term and climate change is related to and/or exacerbates many security risks, still does not provide a precise enough answer of what kind of security issue is climate change? Who exactly and what values are to be protected against climate change and its effects and by what means? For some, climate change is a national security issue of states, meaning that the referent object to be secured against climate change and its effects is the state itself (US Department of Defense 2019; Kavalski 2023). For many others, climate change is a human security issue, meaning the focus is on the vulnerabilities and insecurities experienced by individuals, groups and societies and not on states as isolated and enclosed entities (UNDP 1994; Adger et al. 2014; Jamshidi 2019). Human security discourses on climate change are often accompanied by or used interchangeably with the concept of “international” or “global” security, which protects the international order and welfare, understood from the perspectives of both the community of states but also (and primarily) the human community (Elliott 2023; Martin 2022). It is not the aim of this article to provide a definitive answer concerning the most appropriate ‘type’ of security for the threat of climate change. However, as the UNDP has stressed,

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<sup>4</sup> See all the meetings as well as documents and relevant passages of the UN Security Council on climate change and its impacts, in *Security Council Report* (2021), pp.18-27; *Security Council Report* (2022) pp.12,13.; Maertens & Trombetta (2023), pp.185-187.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, 113 States co-sponsored a thematic draft resolution to the UN Security Council in 2021 (that was not adopted due to a Russian veto) in which the relationship between climate and security was once again recognized. *UN Doc. S/2021/990* (2021); *UN Doc. S/PV.8926* (2021).

it would be “ethically indefensible” to perceive climate change and its security implications solely from a nationalist and statist perspective (UNDP 2007, p.167), since this is a collective problem that requires collective action (UN Doc. S/2019/113 2019, p.3), and since this would only widen the gap between “the world’s haves and have-nots” causing mass resentment and further worsening of international security for all countries (UNDP 2007, p.167; Martin 2022, p.251). Thus, although in some cases national and human (and the other ‘types’ of) security may not exclude one another but be complementary, it seems that in general, human/international security is a much more suitable framework for analysing and addressing climate change as a security question, since, as Guterres has emphasized, climate change demands a “concept of security that puts people at its centre” (United Nations 2021b).

The bigger point, however, is that climate change poses an enormous, pressing threat to the international community as a whole – states and persons – and that it should be considered as a security issue. What is distinctive about framing an issue as a security one is that securitization draws with itself a sense of urgency and importance, it points to the gravity and prominence of an issue and of the need to lift that issue “above ordinary politics” (Martin 2022, p.250,252; Trombetta 2023(b), p.77). This, in turn, implies prioritization of resources and a certain set of policies over others, and in assigning responsibilities (Trombetta 2023(a), p.4; Martin 2022, p.250). Claiming that climate change is a security issue, however, does not mean that the notorious “securitization logic” of “[allowing] for exceptional measures, the breaking of democratic procedures, and the inscription of enemies” (Trombetta 2023(b), p.79) automatically follows. As Trombetta points out, “[t]ransforming climate change into a security issue is not about applying fixed meanings of security and the practices associated with them, [but] it is a reflexive and contextualized process that generates new meanings and practices”, such as, for example, precautionary approaches or resilience measures, instead of reactionary and military measures, that transform the dynamics and meaning of securitizing an issue (Maertens & Trombetta 2023, p.191; Trombetta 2023(b), p.83). Similarly, stating that climate change is a security issue does not mean that it is not simultaneously a sustainable development, an economic, energy-resources, or a human rights issue.<sup>6</sup> Climate change is a complex issue that has multiple, intertwined aspects. But labelling it, *inter alia*, as a security issue means that, as Kofi Annan stressed back in 2007, “climate change must take its place alongside [the] threats [of] conflict, poverty, [and] the proliferation of deadly weapons [...] that have traditionally monopolized first-order political attention” (UNFCCC 2007, p.24), and that an urgent collective response is needed.

### **Climate change as a security issue in the Western Balkans**

Security-related risks due to climate change have not spared the Western Balkan region. It was in 2014 when a historic flooding caused over €2 billion in damages and losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which equals nearly 15 % of the country’s GDP. The floods caused over €1.5 billion in damages and losses in Serbia – 5 % of its GDP (Gelder 2018). Afterwards, during the summer of 2017 the region witnessed record temperatures that buckled train tracks, and also fueled dozens of fires across the Balkans. The 2017 record temperatures caused a drought in

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<sup>6</sup> See for example, the recent European Court of Human Rights judgment in the case *Verein Klima Seniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland*, available at <https://ennhri.org/news-and-blog/the-grand-chamber-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-issues-groundbreaking-judgment-on-climate-change-and-human-rights/#:~:text=The%20Court%20stated%20that%20Article,being%20and%20quality%20of%20life>.



Serbia which led to a drop in agriculture output of nearly 10 percent. In Albania, €200 million were spent on energy imports amid a devastating drought (Ibid). The summers of 2021, 2022 and 2023 subsequently brought the hottest weather the region has seen for 30 years, which contributed, among other factors, to numerous wildfires in Albania, Greece and Republic of North Macedonia, alongside with other countries in the Mediterranean region (Abnett 2021). These extreme events that occurred in the region in the past decade serve as reminders of how vulnerable the region is to climate-related shocks. They contribute heavily to human health issues, the loss of species, water supply shortages and reduced agriculture production, as well as to the increase of extreme events and migration. All these growing climate hazards, such as drought, heatwaves, and tropical storms, are increasing the climate security risks in the Balkans.

The climate crises, when coupled with the vulnerability of the post-conflict vulnerable societies following the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia, make the Balkans an important region for climate security analysis (Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security 2022). Compared to the other countries on a global level, climate risks in the Balkans fall slightly below average (Ibid). Nevertheless, the region is vulnerable to the security risks arising from the specific combination of factors in the region which is characterized by legacies of war and a political climate that enabled the flourishing of organized crime, corruption and illegal migration, including climate change as part of the equation. The intensifying impacts of climate change have a potential to contribute to the existing post-conflict tensions and to threaten Europe's broader climate goals.

The Western Balkan countries are vulnerable to the climate change effects in the areas that are closely connected to the human security of their peoples. Primarily, the area of water supply in the region is heavily affected by climate change, raising human security concerns. With the projected temperature increase, especially during the summer, the projections are that the requirements for water supply will increase, and in the long-term this might contribute to the lowering of water supply accompanied by worsening water quality. This could lead to an increasing discrepancy between water needs and water availability, threatening human security, and aggravating the sanitary and hygienic conditions, particularly in rural communities (Belgrade Security Forum 2021; Платформа 27 2022; UN Bosnia and Herzegovina 2021; Zurovec et al. 2015).

Moreover, Western Balkan's agricultural production could suffer significant losses by the end of this century if appropriate adaptation measures are not taken as the climate of the region is rapidly changing. The episodes of severe droughts that have been devastating the region in the past few years are decreasing agricultural production and increasing the cost of the basic agricultural products on the market. The projected climate change and temperature rise in the region can only worsen these trends, which further affect human security (Ibid).

Aside from the effects of climate change, there are numerous other challenges connected to environmental protection in the Western Balkan countries. The issue of pollution is an important concern in terms of environmental health, the health of the people living in the region and the overall human security. Air pollution remains an important problem in many urban and industrial areas, due to emissions from motor vehicles and industry, especially emissions from ageing mines and power and manufacturing plants (EEAS Report 2010). Moreover, the generation of municipal waste has risen steadily in the Western Balkans. Waste management is weak in many parts of the region and many waste facilities are old. Another problem are the abandoned landfills. Additionally, the accumulated industrial waste, and in particular mining waste, is also a serious problem in some areas (Ibid).

Furthermore, climate change impacts might also increase the region's vulnerability to Chinese and Russian influence. This is an important factor in light of the implementation of the environmental standards in the Western Balkans, as well as in connection to the energy security of the region. At present, the Chinese investments in the Western Balkans are largely undermining the EU environmental standards and the Energy Community Treaty<sup>7</sup>, to which all the Western Balkan countries are parties. Despite the EU's standards directed towards using renewable energy, there are cases of Western Balkan countries contracting Chinese state owned firms to build coal power units. One example is the Chinese economic influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the coal power plant in Tuzla was built with a Chinese investment. The investment is directed towards replacing the older plant and causing less pollution (Lakic 2019). However, building a coal power plant does not contribute towards the EU and ECT principles for sustainable development and climate change action. In relation to the Russian economic presence in the region, it can be noted that it is not reflected in any major investments in the Western Balkans, but is mainly reflected through Russian energy firms. Russian energy firms enjoy a near-monopoly in Serbia and Bosnia's Republika Srpska (Reljić 2017). Lukoil Neftochim, Gazprom Neft and Zarubezhneft control most of the oil trade in Bulgaria, Serbia and Republika Srpska respectively (Bechev 2015). Gazprom remains a monopoly supplier of gas to most countries in the region, with the exception of Greece, Romania and Croatia. As elsewhere in Europe, Russia uses the gas as a diplomatic tool (Ibid). These influences only increase the GHG emissions, arising from electricity production, especially since it is one of the largest emitters and contributes towards increasing the climate change effects in the region.

## Conclusion

The article elaborated on the theoretical and states' approach on why climate change, which in its core is a multidimensional problem, should be considered as a security issue as well. The analysis of climate change as a global challenge, with direct environmental, political and socioeconomic repercussions for countries reveals that it presents an enormous, pressing threat to the international community as a whole – states and persons – and therefore it should be considered as a security issue as well. In this context, the article argues that framing climate change as a security issue contributes to its sense of urgency and importance, providing for a different approach that includes precautionary or resilience measures, instead of reactionary and military measures. Classifying climate change as a security issue only adds to its complexity. It does not mean that it is not simultaneously a sustainable development, an economic, energy-resources, or a human rights issue, but treating it as a security issue adds to it the need for an urgent collective response.

The article also focuses on the risks and the perception of climate change in Western Balkan countries. All the Western Balkan countries are vulnerable to the effects of climate change and in this context they are all susceptible to different security risks. Therefore, these countries need an engaged climate security action that has the possibility to offer positive opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding and cooperation in the region. This type of action might also contribute towards building a strong framework of human security for the Western Balkans. All these efforts will be critical to continuing to mitigate and adapt to climate change and build peace, security, and climate resilience in the Western Balkans. However, these needs are often

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<sup>7</sup> *The Energy Community Treaty is designed to bring the environmental policies and pollution standards of the Western Balkan countries in line with those of the EU.*

detected and elaborated from outside the Western Balkan countries within different UN and NATO forums. When looking within the countries and their engagement on climate security, there is very little, if any, initiative or action connected to climate security to be found.

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## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

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***Abstract:** Environmental problems usually have a cross-border context, which results in the need for an international solution. Nation-states within their frameworks can partially contribute to the solution of individual environmental problems, but in most cases joint action is needed, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to overcome environmental phenomena and conditions related to climate change, deforestation, desertification, protection of biodiversity and natural resources, etc. Hence, the role of organizations and international environmental law, which regulate the matter of international agreements and conventions in the field of the environment, is of great importance. The authors of the paper review international relations through the analysis of international documents that protect the environment. Moreover, they analyze the weaknesses, as well as the process of implementation and monitoring, which are essential for the efficient undertaking of measures and activities for the protection of the environment, but also of the entire living world, humanity, wildlife, and vegetation.*

**Keywords:** *environment, international conventions, agreements, etc.*

### Introduction

Environmental problems today do not only refer to environmental protection problems within nation-states but to global environmental problems such as climate change, preservation of biological diversity, protection of oceans, decisions on how best to manage common resources such as Antarctica, etc. At the same time, it should be noted that these problems exceed the possibility of a single state to solve them because they go beyond borders, and the international community and international organizations are necessary to be involved.

Globalization processes are characterized by the need to solve global problems internationally (Kuzelj, Cindori, Horvat Vukovic, 2021). Namely, since nation-states do not have the opportunity to solve global environmental problems by independent decision-making, but by reducing their sovereignty, it is necessary to transfer the political power to the global world institutions. In that context, the international legal documents that govern the matter of environmental protection on a global level are significant. These include numerous international conventions and agreements, with the application of which the international community, through international relations, tries to solve combustible environmental problems at the world level.

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### **International law for environmental protection**

International law covers environmental agreements and conventions signed by member countries and elaborates on the matter of environmental protection. The norms of international law for sustainable development are particularly important (Агенда 21, 2001). Their main goals are:

- Development of universally accepted agreements based on efficient international standards for environmental protection, considering the different situations and opportunities of individual countries.
- International review of the possibilities for establishing general rights and obligations of states in the field of sustainable development.
- Measures to avoid or resolve international disagreements in the field of sustainable development, including negotiations on issues that may cause disagreements up to the involvement of the International Court of Justice.

For the realization of these goals, all countries must participate in the creation of international agreements.

When solving global environmental problems at the world level, the problem of managing common resources, promoting the concept of sustainable development, and overcoming the state of deteriorated relations between the North and the South arises. A new consensus-building process and a change in institutional arrangements are needed. International cooperation moves in the direction of negotiations between states, as well as the signing of regional and bilateral agreements for environmental protection. (Саскинд, 2008) Regional negotiations between a large number of countries facing different environmental, economic, and cultural conditions could provide important solutions and make global environmental agreements more effective. However bilateral treaty negotiations, or those involving a smaller number of countries, face similar problems relating to natural resource management or responding to various types of environmental threats.

A typical example of the differences between the North and the South was during the adoption of the Basel Convention for the control of the transboundary transfer of hazardous wastes and their disposal. The negotiations were led by countries that had opposing interests. On one side, there were the highly developed countries that were interested in open options for the disposal of hazardous waste, and on the other, the participants were less developed countries, mostly from Africa, where the waste was deposited. Finally, the Basel Convention was adopted in 1989, but it was not accepted by African countries. The states of Africa concluded a special agreement between themselves, the so-called Bamako Convention, and banned the import of hazardous waste from countries that are not members of their agreement (Буювска, Богевски, 2012).

When setting the agreements on the global environment, it is necessary to foresee the growth of the population, the need for more justified models of development, as well as to encourage the richer countries to meet higher standards of the environment so as to overcome the growing gap between the North and the South. These negotiations for solving certain environmental problems should result in slowing down the speed of environmental changes, to a pace that the biosphere can tolerate. This is a special challenge for environmental diplomacy. It is possible to do this by improving the processes and by strengthening the institutions in the direction of building a global consensus.

The signing of international agreements certainly has the effect of real improvement in environmental conditions, but there are also some specific problems during their implementation. The basic problem is that a strategy that is well thought out to protect the environment with

respect to the problems that should be solved thereof may be adopted too late. Namely, often the provision of international cooperation takes a long time, so at the moment of its effectiveness, the problem may have reached new and different dimensions in just a few years. Such is the example of species in extinction and the attempt to preserve their habitats.

Another problem related to the effectiveness of international agreements is their ratification by a very small number of states. Thus, no matter how great the desire of others to solve a certain problem, if a large number of relevant countries are not covered, the problem will not be able to be solved (Малиш Саздовска, 2014). For example, even if more countries prevent the dumping of toxic waste into the oceans if several countries do not respect the agreement, it will not be possible to successfully implement the agreement to protect ocean waters. The same is the case with the Montreal Protocol aimed at preserving the ozone layer by banning the use of chlorofluorocarbons. Since a certain number of countries have not signed the agreement, but are producers and users of chlorofluorocarbons, the question of success of the measures arises. In addition to this problem, the agreement does not ban other harmful gases, such as methane.

Also, the economic implications when implementing the measures from the international agreements can be a problem for the effectiveness of the planned activities. It is possible to incur higher costs than planned if some of the countries withdraw their signature when changes in domestic priorities prevent them from acting on their original intentions. In addition to the economic implications, the withdrawal of certain states may occur as a result of disagreements that may arise even though the content of the agreement was reached and elaborated. Dissatisfied countries may withdraw because of such disagreements, and the real reasons are the amount of costs or conflict with the domestic opposition.

### **Challenges to the implementation of international agreements and conventions**

In addition to the above-mentioned problems facing international cooperation in the field of environmental protection, three serious difficulties for global cooperation can be mentioned:

- The worsening division between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South.
- The stubborn persistence of national sovereign power as an important aim in itself.
- The lack of incentives sufficient to bring some countries to the negotiating table for serious discussions regarding the nature of threats to the global environment and the challenges of sustainable development.

We can present the discord between the North and the South by explaining the Brundtland report, which foresees the introduction of the concept of sustainable development and establishes the need to connect economic development and environmental protection (Агенда 21, 2001). A prevailing view in the North is that effective responses to threats to the global environment can be built on the foundations of existing models of economic development, only if key actors accept the importance of resilience (Добсон, Кејнс, 2006). However, the South sees its problems in population growth, food shortages, forest loss, energy production difficulties, the impacts of industrialization, and the burdens of massive globalization, as byproducts of dominant models of economic development. "The South wants the North to accept responsibility for having caused these problems by pushing a form of economic growth and an approach to development that is fundamentally unsustainable. The South expects the North to understand that there must be a change in the way of life that exists in the North. Fairer distribution of the world's resources is to be achieved" (Саскинд, 2008).

A second difficulty for global cooperation is the idea that each nation-state and institution first have their own interests in mind, conflicting with the need to face institutional oversight

and assistance if they enter into cooperative relationships. Thus, with the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, the zone of absolute sovereign authority of individual states is reduced if their actions affect the quality of the environment.

The third difficulty refers to motivating states to engage in global environmental negotiations. There are so-called “free rider” countries, who benefit from the actions of others without participating in the sharing of responsibility or costs.

These difficulties can be overcome by harmonizing the international legal system. The Brundtland Commission recommended the adoption of a universal declaration on environmental protection and sustainable development. In that way, the deficiency of the legal system would overcome the lack of specific national duties for the protection of the environment.

According to some authors, especially Philip Sands (director of the Center of International Environmental Law), there are two key problems:

1. Non-governmental organizations and other “non-state participants” have no status in the international legal system, i.e. they are not recognized as legal entities

### **Environmental rights were not affirmed on an international scale**

According to Patricia Birnie - a legal scholar, “international law can be elaborated either through an agreement, or through custom, or notes to general rules”. Contracts are clear, but customs are not. Customs in international law are practices that provide concrete evidence of a country’s willingness to abide by certain rules. The general principles of what constitutes a law are contained in the decisions of national and international courts. In addition, scientific writings shape their interpretation. Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and resolutions of other United Nations bodies and conferences also shape world opinion regarding general principles of law (Саскинд, 2008).

The reconciliation of interests by diplomacy made it possible to introduce a certain legal order, although there is no centralized legislative body that would formulate or enforce international law. Thus, the international legal framework provides too little and too modest a guideline for regulating treaty-making in the global environment.

In the writing phase of the convention, the goal is to establish the main commitment and to get more countries to agree that some action is needed to solve the environmental problem. During the protocol writing phase, the goal is to find a formula that can be embraced by each party. Such formulas usually contain a certain number of exceptions, and at the same time, it should be considered that no country can be forced to sign. By writing the convention and the protocol, some things are prescribed that are good for one country and bad for another. After some time, the countries come to a common language and the agreements are the result of a compromise of the most powerful contracting parties. Treaties, in effect, seek to stop pollution or regulate the use of resources. This is possible by limiting the activities of countries involved in the exploitation of natural resources. Some countries do not engage in planned actions under the excuse that the economic costs are high, although the main motive should be profit, not the cost of the action.

A large number of issues are related to the management of general resources, that is, to the punishment of “free riders”. The countries must have the incentive to accept some restrictions, and not enable all countries to enjoy the benefits regardless of their behavior.

The negotiations that have been conducted so far have been isolated from negotiations on other important international issues such as debt, trade, or security. But more recently, the idea

that it is necessary to talk about the connection between the actions related to the environment and other economic and security aspects is spreading.

1. The economic aspect is particularly significant in the context of financial globalization and financial integration. The spread of international financial flows has a significant impact on the level of development of countries (Бошкова, 2006). Hence, the relationship between the implementation of the agreements and the financial power of the individual states that participate in the negotiations on the global environmental agreements.

2. Environmental aspects are a very significant factor that affects security, and as environmental threats have a serious impact on global security, we can point out the following:

- Climate change and global warming,
- Depletion of the ozone layer,
- Environmental refugees,
- Food safety,
- Demographic growth,
- Oil, natural gas, and water as natural strategic resources and sources of conflicts,
- Military factor as a destroyer of the environment,
- Deforestation,
- Technical-technological and natural disaster (Милески, 2006).

Conflicts over non-renewable resources establish a direct link between environmental problems and international security. Thus, oil and minerals can easily be turned into state power, and because of this, conflict can be caused. Examples include Japan's attempt to secure oil and minerals from China and Southeast Asia during World War II and, partly, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to regain control of disputed Kuwaiti oil fields (Виоти, Капути, 2009).

The impact of the economy on the environment can be shown through the glaring example of the fastest-growing economy in the world, the economy of China. In recent years, China has experienced rapid economic development, especially in the coastal regions, but it is estimated that the overall damage from environmental destruction is about 15% of China's gross national product. Damages result from factors such as lower agricultural incomes due to water, soil, and air pollution; higher mortality rates due to air pollution; the loss of arable soil as a result of land erosion and construction works; flooding and reduction of soil nutrients due to erosion and deforestation and reduction of timber due to underdeveloped agricultural practices (Виоти, Капути, 2009).

### **Weaknesses of international agreements and conventions**

The weakness of most environmental protection agreements is that they are "ad hoc" agreements that include only a weak monitoring system and rules for the application of force. Certain countries, so-called "free riders" act in the direction of satisfying their interests first and foremost, and only then taking into consideration the global ones. So, for example, the United States agreed to sign the Climate Change Convention after the original version was heavily modified. Just one month before the Earth Summit, the European Union was adamant that would not support the Climate Change Convention, and would not include the imposed goals and deadlines for the reduction of the emissions of gases that cause the effect of "glass garden" (Саскинд, 2008). Yet, after the action of the USA, the Europeans changed their attitude.

Another weakness of contracts is the possibility of discouraging participants. It stems from the need to construct an agenda, and we have hundreds of participants. "Neither side wants to fight for an issue so zealously for fear that its support for that issue will be used against it by others. If I want something so much, and you know it, you might be clever and use that

information to ask for a lot more from me than you might normally get - after all, that's the way most people think when negotiating (Саскинд, 2008).

When negotiating global environmental agreements, key factors in establishing satisfactory mutual relations should be considered, which include:

- Acceptance (dealing with them seriously, scorning all differences),
- Persuasion (trust in persuasion, not in coercion, balancing emotions rationally),
- Trust (to be completely worthy of trust, but not to have complete trust),
- Communication (always consult before deciding something),
- Understanding (learn how they see things),
- Identity (use the above elements in such a way that they are in mutual harmony).

These factors should be considered by the participants to build good negotiating relations and reach an environmental agreement.

### **Implementation and monitoring of international agreements and conventions**

After the conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of the global environmental agreements, the process of implementation of the agreements follows. In doing so, the application of monitoring and the rules for the application of force should be considered. The purpose of monitoring is to catch and punish violators. To successfully apply monitoring and force, it is necessary to set control and rules in advance, including more education about threats, determination, and regulation of standards and goals, as well as building institutional capacity.

Monitoring is necessary to collect data needed to punish violators and take action for non-fulfillment of the contract. But here the issue of sovereignty inevitably arises. Since international laws respect the rights of sovereignty, the implementation of monitoring, proving the truth of the violation of the agreement, punishing the violators, or imposing intervention procedures, must be voluntarily accepted by all participants of the agreement.

Failure to define the rules for monitoring and application of force can be illustrated by the application of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. The Convention does not stipulate when, where, and how violence or an offense should be reported. It is noted that there are violations that are reported, but there is justification for the "mistakes", and the violators are never punished. The International Observatory has also set up observers for whaling by ships and for the countries where it takes place. The observatory had the right to manage all operations and installed facilities, but the standards it used did not work at all. There was no mechanism in the International Whaling Commission to respond to allegations of violations, as the countries self-reported themselves.

In the majority of cases, the agreements provide for the country itself to file a report for a committed violation. If the country refuses to submit a report or refuses to prove its correctness, force may be used. However, the verification of the reports itself is again related to the issue of sovereignty. Namely, if the satellites are used to check the reports from the national monitoring, then a violation of the national sovereignty is caused. If the suspected offense cannot be proven in a way that does not violate the sovereignty of a state, then the offenders cannot be located. It makes it completely impossible to collect the necessary evidence against the question of violation of sovereignty.

Solving global environmental problems without seriously violating the sovereignty of national states can be realized by collective management of common goods, instead of focusing activity on "privatization" in the use of resources. However, there is no world government with the power or authority to impose rules on using the common goods. Because of that, transnational environmental problems represent a serious problem for establishing basic notions about the nature and limits of the sovereignty of states (Baylis, Smith 2005).

The cross-border flow of economic decisions also has a significant influence on the treatment of global environmental threats. Namely, the powerful economic institutions from Europe, and later from the USA, led strategies for making profit, but to the detriment of people and the environment in less developed countries. These actions were often carried out with the help of military and political forces. This trend was saturated during the colonization of Africa, India, and other countries. During that period of colonization, the resources of the subordinate people were used to advance the economic interests of the colonizers. The cross-border flow of economic decisions continues with the new flows of economic dominance, namely neocolonialism, neoliberalism, or globalization, that is, with direct foreign investments from transnational corporations. With the increased penetration of these corporations in the less developed countries, the economic interests outside these subordinate countries are guaranteed, which are in favor of the economic development and the use of resources in those countries, often with harmful consequences for the environment (Бродли, 2009).

As a result of the clash between external economic interests and local needs, conflicts occur between the local population and foreign investors, for example in South America, the mountains of Tibet, certain states in India, and elsewhere. After World War II, there has been an increased transfer of industrial capacity from developed countries, such as the United States and others, to less developed countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Malaysia, and Singapore. With the expansion of transnational corporations' industry into developing countries, much of the environmental hazard associated with industrial production has been transferred to less developed countries. In cases where there is a lack of environmental controls in certain countries, those countries become attractive places for industrial relocation. In some cases, entire industries dealing with highly toxic substances such as asbestos, mercury, and benzene paints have been relocated to developing countries such as Korea, Mexico, Brazil, India, and Ireland. In that way, the costs of meeting American environmental regulations were avoided (Пејкељ, 2009).

The monitoring systems themselves also have certain weaknesses. Namely, even in the most detailed monitoring system, the actions that should be taken after damage are not precisely specified. Also, monitoring cannot force or enable the countries that violated the agreement to undo the harmful effects they caused. If a country recognizes that a certain area has become contaminated with toxic waste, thereby violating the Basel Convention, cleaning up the area does not mean that one needs to have a lot of funds or possess cutting-edge technology. So, for example, the USA has spent more than 15 billion dollars and has been trying to clean up contaminated areas for 13 years, only to find that they do not have enough knowledge or the will to complete the task. What are the chances of the poor countries when such damage is ascertained when the USA is not able to realize it to the end?

The application of the provisions of international agreements and conventions in the field of the environment is difficult to achieve, primarily due to the unequal development and uneven distribution of wealth and income in the world, which creates different interests and goals. Thus, poorer countries want to realize their plans for economic development, while not paying much attention to environmental protection. Although rich countries enjoy an unequal distribution of resources, the high levels of production they maintain contribute to resource depletion and environmental destruction.

Regarding the application of force as a secondary solution for repairing the damage and punishing the violators, after the successful application of the monitoring system, some new issues and contents are imposed. The Hague Declaration proposes the following:

- Development of new principles of international law,
- It envisages new solutions for the creation of mechanisms for the application of force,

- It also foresees the expansion of the institutional authority of the UN,
- Unanimity should not be required for decision-making
- The International Court of Justice should have jurisdiction over the consenting countries, along with the guaranteed treaties of the United Nations. Such solutions imply the reduction of the sovereignty of a state and the transfer of certain powers to the international level.

Some participants even went a step further by proposing the “Declaration on Planetary Rights and Obligations of Future Generations”, as well as the “Proposal Law on the Rights of Future Generations”.

To overcome all the obstacles related to the negotiation of global environmental agreements, the application of monitoring, and the application of force in an adequate manner, the Salzburg initiative of certain diplomats, scientists, experts, and activists emerged at the beginning of the 90s. This initiative includes the following recommendations:

1. Building decentralized alliances,
2. Assistance in negotiations for individual countries,
3. Adoption of new approaches in allying,
4. Expanding the roles of non-governmental interests,
5. Recategorization of countries to determine the direction of action,
6. Strengthening a better balance between science and politics,
7. Encouraging the connection of problems,
8. Removal of penalties for constructive unilateral action,
9. Encouraging the media to accept a more educational role,
10. Changes in the structure of the United Nations are not needed.

With the application of these recommendations and with the full implementation of international conventions and agreements for the protection of the environment, it is possible to solve the current global environmental problems. However, it is also proposed to create an academy for environmental diplomacy, where government and non-government representatives will be trained in building their negotiation skills, and it can also serve as a center for relevant academic work. (Виоти, Каупи, 2009).

A special case of threats to ecological systems is related to the impact of transboundary power projection in the form of military force. Environmental damage as a result of military actions amounts to 20 to 30% of the total ecological degradation of the planet. A large percentage of environmental pollution occurs due to the use of military equipment and military industry. Namely, much more fuel is needed for military machinery, and the military industry includes toxic materials that are difficult to refine and use safely, such as titanium, beryllium, germanium, and depleted uranium. A special danger to the environment is also posed by military nuclear weapons. Certain research related to nuclear weapons testing is secret, thus increasing the likelihood of environmental violations.

However environmental damage is not only a consequence of the use of military force during military operations, but environmental damage can be used as a military strategy (Пажел, 2009). The protection of ecological systems in cases of war is made more difficult because treaties and agreements between enemies are traditionally considered void upon the outbreak of hostilities. However, certain theorists believe that there is precedent within international law to support the application of environmental treaties and their accompanying sanctions even in times of war, because environmental laws exist for the benefit of the world community. According to them, environmental law is comparable to treaties and agreements that regulate human rights and humanitarian issues, and as they apply in wartime, so should environmental agreements.

Thus, the First Protocol of the Geneva Convention, adopted in 1977, regulates the illegal

nature of environmental warfare. In Article 35, paragraph 3, it is stated that “it is forbidden to apply methods or means of warfare that are intended or can be expected to cause general, long-term and serious damage to the natural environment”.

### **New concepts and solutions**

Environmental protection is an integral part of the new concept of human security. Namely, the new security and strategy agenda covers, among other things, the direct environmental damage caused by military activities or the production of military weapons. Also, as part of the new security concepts, the security of nature, the ecosystem, global sustainability, ecological destruction, natural disasters, and other threats in the area of the environment are foreseen (Митревска, 2012).

Human security is no longer interpreted only in a military sense, but it includes several elements, including the protection of nature, according to the United Nations Development Program, the list of threats to human security includes food, health security, the environment, personal security that are in direct relation with threats in the area of the environment.

Also, in the area of new development dimensions of international environmental law, it can be stated that the matter of environmental protection is constantly changing and being modernized. Thus, with the latest amendments to the Directive on environmental protection through criminal law, this area is improved, and new criminal acts are introduced. Among others, the crime of Ecocide is introduced, which is provided for in the latest amendments to the Criminal Code in the Republic of North Macedonia. In our national legislation, Ecocide means long-term and widespread pollution of the environment, with a prison sentence of at least 10 years or life.

### **Conclusion**

Worldwide, in the area of security threats and responses to them, it is necessary to pay attention to the aspects related to the protection of the environment. This becomes an imperative of modern living, from the aspect of global security and sustainable development, especially considering the needs of future generations.

International environmental law also has a significant role in environmental protection, which, although with certain challenges in its implementation, represents an opportunity to solve pressing environmental problems on a global scale.

In the next period, it is necessary to seriously approach the signatory countries of the international documents in this area, towards the transposition and implementation of the legal provisions in the national legislations of the signatory states.

It is also necessary to strengthen the possibility of monitoring, to create conditions for the application of specific measures and activities provided for in international environmental law.



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## PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE – A STRATEGIC STAKE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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**Abstract:** *The perturbations that have occurred in recent history regarding critical infrastructure have highlighted two essential features. Firstly, critical infrastructure was exposed to unexpected incidents of a wide variety, mostly natural disasters, and secondly, the dysfunctionality and local damages due to the phenomenon of interaction and cross-border logics of functioning of the systems has created a domino effect in the security dimensions. On the other hand, the risks have evolved, extreme meteorological incidents have been observed, threats to health security, such as the pandemic have become widespread, cyber-attacks have appeared as a result of technological progress, the technical-technological and economic interdependence has been emphasized, as the evolution of the economic environment and the market have also affirmed that there is a need for international legal regulation.*

*In the last twenty years, especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 in New York, the issue of critical infrastructure protection has caused particular attention in the majority of industrialized countries, with the USA, the EU, Australia, Japan, Russia in the forefront, but also in a number of countries aspiring to join the EU. The war in Ukraine demonstrated the strategic importance of critical infrastructure. Between October 2022 and April 2023, Russia carried out 1.200 attacks on Ukraine's energy system. These attacks damaged 45% of the high-voltage grid and half of Ukraine's power generation, leaving more than 12 million people without electricity. According to an estimate by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the damage to Ukraine's electricity, gas, and heating infrastructure exceeds \$ 10 billion. Furthermore, according to Marie Struthers, Director for Eastern Europe and Asia at Amnesty International, the morale of the civilian population is not a legitimate target; however, carrying out attacks on critical infrastructure to terrorize civilians is a war crime. That is why this paper makes a brief interpretation of the need for critical infrastructure protection at the EU level, including a brief analysis of the methodology of establishing critical infrastructure protection.*

**Keywords:** *critical infrastructure, EU, risks, protection*

### Introduction

The interest for protection of vital infrastructures in the United States began to develop more seriously between the two World Wars. In more recent times, in 1996, President Clinton constituted the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection–PCCIP, even

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before the terrorist attacks in 2001. In 1998, the White House Presidential Directive established that one of the strategic state goals of the United States was the obligation to protect national critical infrastructure. Global terrorism, asymmetric threats and natural disasters have imposed the need to protect critical infrastructure as a primary strategic goal for every country, a union of states, regional integrations, international organizations, etc.

Due to its own strategic interest, as well as a NATO member and an EU aspirant, the Republic of North Macedonia is also obliged to build an appropriate methodology, following the provisions of Directives 2008/114/EC and 2016/1148 of the EU and Directive 2022 on strengthening resilience of critical facilities, which includes the critical entities in a number of sectors, such as energy, transport, health, water, waste water, etc. It is equally important to highlight other relevant provisions of other multilateral organizations, stipulating to build an efficient protection of national critical infrastructure, as well as an efficient legal framework for this issue. Risk and crisis management for critical infrastructure protection represents an elementary expression of planning, risk analysis, prevention, crisis management and evaluation in risk and crisis management.

The research on the sensitivity of vital points to natural disasters in the United States began under the pressure of geopoliticians from the University of Chicago between the two World Wars. Later, between 1950 and 1970, research was intensified by the Natural Hazard Research School. Essentially, research was focused on unpredictable physical phenomena (floods, earthquakes, fires) that could cause great human and material losses. The contribution of the American geopoliticians and geographers is also expressed in the statement that the research of the physical processes is not sufficient to understand the natural disaster and its meaning. On the one hand, the population density in the crisis zones is a significant factor for the consequences of the crisis in terms of lives and goods. Moreover, when comparing disasters with similar dimensions and population density, the number of victims and material damages differ. All this leads to an increase in the interest of population and property protection.<sup>3</sup>

These pioneering works increase the interest in the “risk cost analysis”, the vulnerability of the population and their protection. In recent years, topics related to critical infrastructure have been the subject of special attention in many industrialized countries. Initially, the governments in the United States and EU Member States, but also in other countries, constituted working groups, programs and ad hoc institutions that are in charge of identifying their critical infrastructures and finding the most effective models of protection. On the other hand, the academic circles, in the foreground the Anglo-Saxon specialists, progressively took up the subject and published a number of scientific papers dedicated to critical infrastructure protection.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, numerous countries led by the United States have traditionally paid attention to vital infrastructures, which are today called “vital or critical infrastructures.” This term first appeared in the mid-nineties. Due to a series of unexpected events, the interpretation of critical infrastructure is about to change. First, there was the first attack on the World Trade Center in New York (1993), then the attack in Oklahoma City (1995), the attacks with the poisonous gas sarin in the Tokyo subway (1995), which led to the Presidential Decision Directive aimed at organizing the anti-terrorist strategy on US ground. It was in this document that the term national critical infrastructure (NCI) appeared for the first time, despite the fact that the text does not define what the term covers<sup>4</sup>. However, the allusions in the text are clear that it means vital points such as, airports, railway stations, highways, places where

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<sup>3</sup> Burton I., Kates R.W., White G.F., *The Environment as Hazard*, New York, Guilford Press, 1978, p.10)

<sup>4</sup> Clinton W.J., “US Policy on Counter Terrorism”, *Presidential Decision Directive 39*, June 21, 1995.

masses circulate, nuclear installations and energy distribution networks. The content began to be specified after the establishment of the specific commission in charge of addressing these issues – the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996. The first definition of critical infrastructure, that is, the first list of infrastructures that attract the attention of experts appears in the Executive Order -13010<sup>5</sup>, which established the Commission. By definition, the infrastructures targeted by the Executive Order are so vital that “their disabling would significantly weaken the defense and economic security of the United States.”<sup>6</sup> Possible critical infrastructure is also explicitly cited to include: telecommunications, electricity generation systems, oil and gas storage and transport systems, banks and finance, citizen transport, water supply and distribution, emergency services such as health care, police and firefighting, as well as those that ensure the continuity of the functioning of the government. According to Jean Pierre Galland, the potential weaknesses of these infrastructures are of two types: “physical weaknesses” and “cyber weaknesses” in case of radio, electronic or computer attacks on information systems and communications related to these infrastructures.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the Executive Order states that due to the very fact that a large part of critical infrastructure belongs to the private sector, “it is necessary for the government and the private sector to cooperate to develop a joint protection strategy.”

Based on the Presidential Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and in line with a prepared report, the second Presidential Directive followed, setting forth the creation of a coordination center within the FBI (National Infrastructure Protection Center) which was assigned to the ministerial departments and the corresponding agencies. They were tasked with preparing critical infrastructure vulnerability studies. At the same time, in 1999-2000 the White House encouraged a partnership between the private and public sectors. It was in such a context in 2001 that two disasters of different nature took place, which together would influence the stronger affirmation of the need to protect critical infrastructures. The first one occurred in March known as the “California energy crisis”, which resulted in a power cut to more than a million homes. The second black-out occurred in the following months. This event was much more dramatic and surprising and partly changed the history of the United States. It was the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001, the most impressive being the one on the World Trade Center. A few days after the event, President Bush established the Office of Homeland Security of the White House.<sup>8</sup> One of the missions of this institution is “coordinating efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure in the aftermath of terrorist attacks.” At the same time, the list of critical infrastructure in the USA was expanded with nuclear centers, the agricultural sector and events of special importance such as the Olympic Games, World Championships, etc. In 2003, the list of critical infrastructures was expanded with some sensitive facilities, such as historical and cultural monuments, national symbols, as well as industrial complexes and stadiums. What was the effect of these events on other industrialized countries? What is the methodology that the contemporary international community can use to protect critical infrastructure around the world?

<sup>5</sup> Executive Order 13010)

<sup>6</sup> Lopez B., “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States since 1993” in Auerswald P.E. and al. (eds) *Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response, How private action can reduce public vulnerability*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.37-50

<sup>7</sup> Galland, J.P.-Critique de la notion d'infrastructure critique, *Metropolis*, « Flux » 2010/3 no.81 pp..6-18, ISSN 1154-2721, <https://www.cairn.info/revue-flux1-2010-3-page-6.htm>

<sup>8</sup> „Establishing the Office of Homeland Security“, Executive Order 13 228, 8 October 2001

### 1. Effects of 09/11 on Critical Infrastructure in Europe

The concept of critical infrastructure in other industrialized countries was quickly developed after the events in the USA. Europe intensively started dealing with this issue, especially after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (train station in 2004) and London (subway and bus station in 2005). Some countries, each from their own angle, updated their strategy and thinking on critical infrastructure. Moreover, the EU as a multilateral integration through its institutions tried to find a certain place and role in relation to these issues. Thus, at the request of the European Council, in 2006 the Commission published the *Green Paper on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection*.<sup>9</sup> The Green Paper aimed at gathering in one place the reactions to the various scenarios that can be envisaged for EPCIP. At the same time, a debate was initiated about the role of the actors involved in the critical infrastructure protection. The EU Commission has proposed three possible answers to the dilemma “against what EPCIP must protect”, namely: an approach that is considered global and is designed to respond to protection against all risks, regardless of whether they are risks of natural or technological origin; the second approach refers to all risks, but with the priority of protection against terrorist attacks; the third risk is focused exclusively on protection against terrorist risks.<sup>10</sup>

On another level, starting from the premise that “any damage or breakdown of a certain critical infrastructure of a Member State can cause negative consequences for several Member States and in general for the entire EU economy,” the logic of interconnected vessels is due to the connection with new technologies due to the liberalization of the natural gas and electricity market, which would threaten the wider EU critical infrastructure network. The Green Paper proposes to separate, on the one hand, EU critical infrastructure whose dysfunctionality would create severe cross-border consequences, and on the other hand, the national critical infrastructure available to each state. For this purpose, the Green Paper suggests drawing up a list of critical infrastructure.

According to Olinger, in developed industrial countries, critical infrastructure “grosso modo”, is defined in roughly the same way with identical or slightly modified terms.<sup>11</sup> In the EU, in the early 2000s, the term critical infrastructure included: “property or elements of property that are necessary to maintain critical societal functions, especially the supply chain, health, safety, economic and social well-being.” The United States define critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, physical or virtual, that are so vital to the United States that their damage or failure would create debilitating effects on the security of the national economy, public health and safety or any combination of these issues.” In Canada critical infrastructures are called “essential infrastructure” and are defined as “physical and information installations, networks, services and tangible assets whose breakdown or destruction would create serious consequences for the health, safety and economic well-being of Canadians, or disrupt the efficient functioning of the Government of Canada.”<sup>12</sup> In France, critical infrastructures are designated as “a point of vital importance” and are defined as “an establishment, work or installation whose damage, malfunction or destruction due to negligence, sabotage or terrorism, directly or indirectly, risks seriously hampering the military or economic potential, the security or ability for survival of the nation, or create grave consequences for the health or life of the people.”

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<sup>9</sup> *Programme Europeen de Protection des infrastructures Critiques (EPCIP)*

<sup>10</sup> Galland, J.P. *Ibid.* p.8

<sup>11</sup> Olinger E., *Infrastructure critiques; construction d'une method d'identification, these professionnelle, Master d'action publique, Ecole des Pont ParisTech. MEDAD, 2007, pp.19-20,*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* Olinger E. p.19

Germany, similarly to the United States, calls them “critical infrastructure (Kritische Infrastruktur)” and defines them as “organizations or installations that have special significance for the national community and whose disabling or disruption would create bottlenecks in supply, would cause dysfunction for public safety and other dramatic consequences.” According to the working group K. Kristisod of the Ministry of Interior, “...when it comes to infrastructure that are of special importance to the community and whose failure or disruption would create significant dysfunctions for public safety or other dramatic consequences, they are called critical infrastructure.”<sup>13</sup>

Great Britain defines critical infrastructure as “critical national infrastructure” which means “goods, services and systems that serve to support the economic, political and social life of the United Kingdom, and the importance of which could cause loss of numerous human lives, a serious impact on the national economy, other serious consequences for the national community, or directly affect the functioning of the government.” Finally, in Council Directive 2008/114/CE of 08.12.2008, six definitions of critical infrastructure are highlighted which are mutually exclusive, and one of them reads that critical infrastructure means “an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions”<sup>14</sup>

The question remains “how to protect critical infrastructure and how to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure?” Regardless of the colorfulness of the critical infrastructure concept, the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure are imposed as the most important imperative for the safety of citizens. However, what is confusing is the permanent increase in the number of security challenges. When analyzing the current challenges that threaten critical infrastructure and the interdependence that reigns in the world, if the causes of all predictable and unpredictable disasters are sought, there is almost no domain that cannot be qualified as critical infrastructure. It is enough that through the unpredictability of the “domino effect” or due to carelessness, an incident may be triggered in a simple sensitive energy point that can further affect the entire network. The critical infrastructure problem is part of the family of “pernicious” problems in the sense that some authors, such as Rittel and Webber (1973) cited by La Porte (2006) describe that it never has a definite formula and is very hard to predict when it will be regulated.<sup>15</sup>

In their research on critical infrastructure sensitivity, a good number of analysts are more oriented towards researching the interdependence between tangible and intangible factors with an attempt to quantify and sequence the possible consequences of the “domino effect.” At the same time, analysts often investigate the underlying factors of the outbreak of unpredictable events, such as natural disasters, accidental interruptions of supply networks to vital points, such as water supply or electricity, terrorist attacks, in order to try to qualify the interdependencies between networks, as well as the resulting consequences from damage to critical infrastructure.

<sup>13</sup> Bundesministerium des Innern-BMI, 17.03.2003

<sup>14</sup> Directive 2008/114/CE du Conseil, 23.12.2008, *Journal officiel de l'UE*, L 345/75, Art.2, p.5)

<sup>15</sup> La Porte T.M., 2006, “Organizational Strategies for Complex System Resilience, Reliability and Adaptation” in: Auerswald P.E. and al. (eds) *Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response, How private action can reduce public vulnerability*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.11-16

## 2. Critical Infrastructure Protection at EU level

The EU Commission's proposals from December 2006 aimed at promoting the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), such as energy supply. This enabled the Justice and Home Affairs Council to adopt the conclusions in April 2007, which emphasized the importance of critical infrastructure protection. It was also the first step of the Council in relation to the proposal of the Commission.

The purpose of the Commission is to determine common procedures for designating and classifying critical infrastructure located on the territory of the Member States. European critical infrastructures are defined as "vital infrastructures whose damage or destruction would cause severe consequences for one, two or more Member States."<sup>16</sup>

This Directive included a provisional list of 11 critical infrastructure sectors, divided into 29 sub-sectors. The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection identifies the following domains: Energy, Nuclear Installations, Information and Communication Technology, Water, Food, Health, Finance, Transport, Chemical Industry, Research Laboratories, Air Space. At the same time, the Green Paper on Energy of the European Commission establishes the security of supply as one of the objectives of the EU strategy in the field of energy. The content of the Green Paper for critical infrastructure from 2004 focuses on critical infrastructure protection through the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. EPCIP also includes the Directive of the Council on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. The Directive also establishes a procedure for identifying and designating these critical infrastructures, as well as a common approach to improving critical infrastructure protection. EPCIP also contains measures aimed at facilitating its implementation, including the action plan for EPCIP, followed by the Information Network for Alertness regarding critical infrastructure of Member States (CIVIN). Financial measures, the war against terrorism, preparations and management of consequences and other security risks are also integrated in EPCIP. The overall problem also imposes certain political activities for their acceptance by all Member States. It is understandable, given the specificity of the critical infrastructure, that the absence of nuclear facilities in some countries creates disunity among Member States.<sup>17</sup>

There is no doubt, as stated by Robert Mikac,<sup>18</sup> that the Council Directive 2008/114/EC is not limited only to threats from terrorism, but also to other critical infrastructures. It aims at establishing a comprehensive process at the level of individual Member States and of the entire EU.<sup>19</sup>

The further evolution of critical infrastructure protection focuses on the security of network and information systems and services (NISS). The security of network and information systems and services is of vital importance for economic and social activities and especially for the internal market. It is for the protection of the protection of the stated critical infrastructure

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<sup>16</sup> Daguzan, J.F. – « La Protection des infrastuctures critiques, l'enjeu strategique du XXI siecle, Centre Thucydide, AFRI Vol.11. 2015, p.4 »

<sup>17</sup> (Lutte contre terrorisme :prevention, preparation et reponse, EUR-Lex-133219 /Lutte contre le terrorisme: preparation et gestion des consequences, Sumarie of EU Legislation, 133220 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=LEGISSU>, 2007)

<sup>18</sup> Mitrevska, M., Milevski, T., Mikac, R., (2019) *Kritichna infrastruktura, concept I bezbednosni predizvici* – Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Skopje, p.72.

<sup>19</sup> Подетално за Директивата 2008/114/E3, - (Directive 2008/114/CE du Conseil, 23.12.2008, Journal official de l UE, L 345/7 )

that the European Council and Parliament in 2016 adopted Directive 2016/1148 on security on network and information systems across the Union. The purpose of this Directive is to ensure a common level of security of network and information systems. Unlike Directive 2008/114/EC, which was focused on critical infrastructure protection in the area of energy and transport, Directive 2016/1148 fills the gap for critical infrastructure protection in the area of information and communication technology.

In December 2022, the EU Council adopted the Directive on strengthening the resilience of critical entities. It is equally important to emphasize that the Council also adopted recommendations in order to remove the weak points and strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure, determining the critical entities and those that provide basic conditions that are essential for maintaining vital social functions, economic activities, public health and environmental safety.

### **3. Other International Organizations**

Almost all international organizations, be it NATO, UN, OECD, World Bank, and others, became interested in critical infrastructure protection. At the 2006 Riga Summit, the Alliance Heads of State or Government committed to increasing “international efforts, launching consultations on the evaluation of the risks faced by critical infrastructure and promoting critical infrastructure security.” For this purpose, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to define the domains in which the Alliance can contribute an added value in terms of protecting Allies in the security domain. This interest in critical infrastructure from the energy domain was also expressed in the Political Global Directive adopted at the Riga Summit (2006). This document indicates “instability that can result from the disruption of the supply of vital resources” as one of the main risks that the Alliance will engage with. Following this Summit, the North Atlantic Council prepared the report “NATO’s role in the field of energy security.” Pursuant to this report, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance, adopted a list of domains at the Bucharest Summit (April 2008) in which NATO will have to invest, especially in “the fusion and practice of information and intelligence, the projection of security, promotion of international and regional cooperation, support in managing the consequences and support in the protection of essential energy infrastructures.” The Council prepared a synthesis report on the achieved progress in the field of energy security. Critical infrastructure protection remains at the center of safe living well into the future. Thus, in the CIA Report “The World in 2040 – a Highly Contested World”, it is predicted that “technological progress, especially artificial intelligence, biotechnology and the connectivity of objects, will provide terrorists with the opportunity to cause attacks of a wider domain, using new methods from a distance and cross-border cooperation.”<sup>20</sup> However, it would be wrong to consider that only terrorism and crime can threaten critical infrastructure. On the contrary, statistical data show that natural disasters, climate changes, floods, fires, earthquakes, etc., are much more massive and everyday hazards towards critical infrastructure around the world.

### **4. Methodology of Establishing Critical Infrastructure Protection**

More recent experiences have shown that critical infrastructure can be significantly threatened or damaged and it can create severe social and economic consequences. In essence, natural disasters, technical failures, human errors, criminal acts or armed conflicts can endanger

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<sup>20</sup> *National Intelligence Council –NIC: Global Trends: A More Contested World, March 2021, ISBN 978-1-929667-8, Copyright, 2021 National Intelligence Council » [https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Global\\_Trends\\_2040.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Global_Trends_2040.pdf), 2021, p. 248*



critical infrastructure. In this sense, the main stake is, first of all, to identify the sources of the caused damages and to reduce, at the same time, the threats to the minimum with preventive activities. The added value of these activities is that the imperative to respect legal obligations in the field of security is imposed on critical entities. The numerous perturbations in recent history associated with critical infrastructure have distinguished two essential features. First, critical infrastructures were liable to unexpected incidents of a wide spectrum, mostly originating from natural disaster and secondly, the dysfunctionality and local damages due to the phenomenon of interaction and cross-border logics of functioning of the systems, created a domino effect in the security dimensions. Furthermore, risks have evolved, extreme meteorological incidents have manifested themselves, threats to health security, such as the pandemic have become widespread, cyber-attacks have appeared as a result of technological progress, the technical-technological and economic interdependence has been emphasized, and the evolution of the economic environment and the market have also affirmed that international legal regulation is necessary. The Risk and Crisis Management Strategy is mainly composed of at least five phases: planning, analysis, measures and strategies, crisis management and evaluation.

#### **4.1. Phase 1: Pre-planning**

The successful establishing of risk and crisis management goes through very precise planning. As an example, we will cite the Manual of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior “Critical infrastructure protection – risk and crisis management – A manual intended for enterprises and the administration”<sup>21</sup> where it is stated that “before approaching this stage, it is necessary to address more precisely several issues”, namely: the way in which the Directorate of the institution will set up the risk and crisis management (RCM), acceptance of the adopted methodology, division of responsibilities, distribution of the necessary sources and identification of the strategic protection objectives. The Directorate is responsible for the implementation and consolidation of RCM, which will include the entire personnel. The personnel must be accurately informed and motivated to engage in the operation. The division of responsibilities in RCM presupposes designating a specialized head of the project, who will consult with the Directorate that makes the most important decisions related to RCM. In addition, it is necessary to plan essential financial means for RCM in the company. One of the important points of the first phase is the clarification of the legal obligations and especially the RCM strategic goals. The objectives are significantly influenced by ethical, operational, technical, financial, legal, social and environmental aspects. The RCM objectives describe the thresholds that are necessary to reach; contribute to finding solutions for the establishment of various measures; goals are specific, measureable, achievable, realistic and time-bound.<sup>22</sup> The last part of this first phase presupposes communications about risks and that communication refers to all processes related to risk identification, analysis, evaluation and management, as well as interaction. Internal communication refers to all communicative interactions, especially following them closer and further within the same institution. External risk communications are not limited only to informing or instructing the media or individuals, but they also seek to establish a personalized dialogue with each interlocutor.

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<sup>21</sup> *Ministere federal de l’Interieur – “Protection des infrastructures critiques-gestion des risques et des crises”-Manuel destine aux entreprises et aux admmiistrations, www.bmi.bund.de, ed. Ministere federal de l’interieur, 2017, p. 15*

<sup>22</sup> *Ministere federal de l’Interieur –Ibid. pp. 15-16*

#### 4.2. Phase 2: Risk analysis

Objective risk analysis structures the collected information about hazards and risks, for example, in the enterprise and administration. The risk analysis should answer several questions: What types of threats can be manifested? What is the probability for them to be manifested in the institution? What are the institution's vulnerabilities to these risks? This cluster of questions points to a conclusion that the analysis represents a type of process that is divided into key and supporting processes. The starting point of the RCM analysis consists of dividing the enterprise (factory) or administration into a process and a sub-process. The greater the sub-division into more sub-processes, the more expensive the analysis will be in terms of time and money, but it will also be of higher quality. The constitutive elements of a sub-process are the factors that contribute to the good functioning of the process. The risk elements include: a) human lives, i.e. the employees who would be exposed to the risk, b) the grounds that include all premises, including parking lots, green and air spaces, c) buildings, d) installation and equipment i.e. everything that enables the functioning of the facility (electricity, gas supply, water, IT and communication technologies, transport, as well as other installations and devices), e) data and documents, means of functioning.

Critical analysis includes identification of the critical process that relies on the following criteria: people's life and health; the time factor, that is, how much time it takes to disrupt the production or operation process; volume or what volume of goods and services would be affected by the damage; consequences to agreements, decrees and legislation and economic damages and consequences.<sup>23</sup>

Successful risk identification involves identifying and documenting all relevant hazards. The first stage of the analysis assumes a list of all the hazards and possible scenarios that could be manifested. According to the Report of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, each scenario would have to include the following complementary information: degree of expected exposure; degree of expected intensity; the expected duration; preventive alert; secondary effects; reference incidents and the probability of occurrence of the event. It is clear that it is not possible to predict most accurately the probability of events, intensity, duration, geographical latitude, etc. However, it is desirable to control the scenarios all the time. The vulnerability of the sub-processes and elements of risks is essential to determine the magnitude of damages that can occur. The analysis of the vulnerability of the sub-processes and various elements of risks is prescribed in a catalog of criteria. The following list of criteria helps the institutions to prepare a catalog that is adapted to the respective situation: dependence on the risk elements; dependency against internal infrastructures; physical robustness that determines the extent of damage; level of protection achieved; surplus and replacement that are significant to overcome the damages of the risk; cost of repairs; ability to adapt; ability to tolerate; transparency; dependency on the specific conditions of the environment.

Within the risk costing calculation, the assessments and results emerging from the scenarios and the vulnerability analysis can be combined with each other to produce the values and results related to the risks. They are calculated in three different ways: 1) qualitative risk calculation, 2) semi-qualitative risk calculation, 3) quantitative risk calculation. At this stage, the values or description of the risks can be compared and a

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<sup>23</sup> *Office fédérale de la protection de la population, Suisse – Revue « Protection de la population », Bern 27 Mars 2017, p.5*

risk evaluation can be carried out. The risk evaluation must show whether the previously defined strategic objectives have been reached.<sup>24</sup>

#### **4.3. Phase 3 – Preventive measures and strategies**

Within the institutions (enterprises), preventive measures contribute to risk reduction, and affect critical processes. They enable the operational goals of protection and raise the threshold of the crisis. Thus, these measures allow to minimize the number of crisis situations. Risk reduction measures are of two types: they either reduce the vulnerability of the risk elements against incidents of certain hazards, or they aim to guarantee the operational continuity of critical processes by establishing replacement elements or redundancy systems. This phase consists of: risk prevention, risk transfer, risk acceptance and the experience of insured damages.<sup>25</sup>

Preventive measures include preventive strategies and actions that increase the company's global security. It is clear that some risks cannot be completely eliminated. For this purpose, it is desirable for the company to document the residual risks, as well as preserve and record them. Finally, an important element of this phase is the experience of insurance companies in the field of damage assessment.

#### **4.4. Phase 4: Crisis management**

Every crisis in relation to the normal situation represents a gap that cannot be overcome only with normal operational structures. Critical infrastructure crises can make it difficult for the company to function and can create unfavorable consequences for the normal functioning of the people and their life and safety. The key elements of the crisis can originate from within due to poor management, malfeasance, financial mistakes, but they can also be of an external nature. Stock market crashes, adverse economic crises, delivery difficulties, natural disasters, technical weaknesses, human errors, terrorist and criminal acts and military conflicts are of an external nature. Crisis management is aimed at protecting the enterprise and the administration, that is, the critical infrastructure and the population. It is not distinct from risk management. In essence, crisis preparations on a conceptual, organizational, procedural and material level rely on the crisis management results. Crisis management aims to overcome crises by maintaining the maximum functionality of the enterprise and will enable the restart of the critical process as soon as possible.<sup>26</sup>

The main missions of crisis management are establishment of previous conceptual, organizational and practical procedures that will enable optimal management of an extreme event and establishment of specific structures, including a crisis cell.

The main characteristics of crisis management are: crisis management, a process that includes the organization, establishment and evaluation of the plan with the deriving activities; the measures are mainly aimed at the available sources and information; the support of services or external sources is necessary and decisions are undertaken on an urgent basis without having complete information.

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<sup>24</sup> *Protection des infrastructures critique en Suisse*, <https://admin.ch/fr/aufgabenbabs/ski.Html>, 2017, pp.2-20

<sup>25</sup> *Atlas de la vulnérabilité et de résilience, Protection de la population*, ed. Office fédérale de la protection de la population OFPP, 27.03.2017, p.10

<sup>26</sup> *Protection de la population – analyse et prévention des risques, planification, instruction, conduit et intervention*, Confédération Suisse, 5 Novembre 2009 pp.3-31

#### 4.5. Crisis management organization

Crisis management organization contains two elementary contents: on the one hand, there is the specific structural and functional organization during the entire period of the crisis, and on the other hand, partial planning adapted to various scenarios and aimed at guaranteeing the continuity of activities.

The crisis plan includes all organizational structures and all measures that can be planned in the event of a crisis, and they are mandatory. A good plan assumes conciseness and precision. The crisis plan contains the following elements: aim; legal framework; establishment of a structural organization (crisis cell), definition of tasks, responsibility, competence followed by redistribution among the relevant entities; specific activities and competences in order to overcome the crisis; establishment of a functional organization in terms of control over the crisis, to normalize the situation and its monitoring; establishment of various aspects of the plan, which must be constantly updated along with conducting regular exercises.<sup>27</sup>

While crisis situations require constitution of a specific organization, each institution represents critical infrastructure with an organization adapted to its nature and needs. The crisis cell is a central instrument for reacting to crises. It is a specific structural organization which is in charge of managing specific situations and covers cross-sectoral responsibilities under one administration. It is a coordinating, informational, advisory institution headed by a director and his team. All members of the cell must know their role at all times. Regardless of the missions that are part of the critical entity, each crisis cell must provide headquarters with the following functions: arranging the set of personnel related aspects; inventory of the situation and regular updating of information; distribution of missions aimed at overcoming the crisis and coordination of the interventions carried out by the staff; relations with the media and journalists; regulating aggregate aspects dealing with information and communication; support of the crisis management staff.

In the framework of the functional structures, the cell encompasses the following functions: legal, financial/budget, marketing, logistics, quality management, distribution, environmental protection, installation safety, toxicology, fire service, security services. For each of these functions, there is a detailed description of the tasks they perform during a crisis. The entire anti-crisis network is rounded off by the description of the management functions of the crisis cell director, team, consultants and its functional organization.

#### Conclusion

From this brief overview, it can be concluded that critical infrastructures have been present in the literature for almost a century, thanks to American geopoliticians and geographers. Natural disasters, climate change, the Cold War, globalization, the development of information technology, terrorism and crime, have contributed to increasing the need for critical infrastructure protection.

It is a mistake to think that the most massive threat to critical infrastructure protection comes from terrorism. Perhaps it is the most impressive, difficult to predict and a result of careful planning with a strong technological potential of organized groups, inspired by religious blindness, ideological and geostrategic rivalry, criminal motives, economic competition, but practice shows that natural disasters, climate change, earthquakes, fires

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<sup>27</sup> *La strategie nationale de protection des infrastructures critiques-PIC, 2018-2022, Confederation Suisse, Office federal de la protection de la population OFPP, 2017, pp.2-20.*

and floods or human errors and mistakes, are the most massive and frequent forms of threat to critical infrastructure.

Regardless of the fact that the intense interest in the critical infrastructure protection began at the beginning of the 21st century, when more definitions were in circulation, it is clear that vital infrastructures are of exclusive importance to a certain state or an integration of states whose failure or damage would have created permanent supply blockages, as well as a significant public safety dysfunction and other dramatic effects. Regardless of the various lists of critical infrastructure facilities, the author argues that it is not possible to find a definitive, predictable and fully regulated list and it is constantly open to new critical infrastructures. Finally, one gets the impression that every aspect of security represents critical infrastructure. That is why critical entities must be able to respond to, prevent, manage, protect against, and recover from hybrid attacks, natural disasters, terrorist threats and public health emergencies. Preparedness, endurance and resilience are a joint effort. We must ensure that our societies and industries are prepared to face disruptions to security and economies and that we can respond quickly to threats. And the key recommendation should cover three priority areas: preparedness, response and international cooperation. After all, the danger is greater than ever before because there is a combination of old and new security threats.

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UDK 305.5-055.2:[341.24:341.14-055.2(100)]

## APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

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**Abstract:** *The new security architecture and ongoing world dynamics does affect women and girls in different ways, as they are struggling with inherited forms and structures of power. That is why some states decided to move towards the concept of Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) ensuring both equal engagement of women in diplomacy, defense and security as well as gender responsive activities in an agenda that is wider than the WPS ( Women, Peace and Security). Those foreign policy activities engage with concepts such as environmental justice, trade and investments, migration etc. The paper aims to examine the origin of the concept and the extent of acceptance and development of the general idea, as well as the understanding beyond the introduction of the concept so far. Although launched a decade ago, the concept breaks through slowly but systematically, and there are states adhering to it on each continent so far. The added transformative value behind the concept and the familiarization of the traditionally masculine sectors with the notion of feminism is challenging, but certainly more than necessary.*

**Keywords:** *women, security, feminist foreign policy*

### Introduction

Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) is a specific approach to foreign policy that explicitly integrates gender equality and women's rights. It goes beyond merely considering gender as an add-on; instead, it places gender at the center of foreign policy decision-making. FFP is a contested idea with a broad range of interpretations by academics, states and civil society. Yet, across all iterations, it sets out three key priorities: (1) protect women's rights; (2) promote gender equality; (3) increase women's participation and representation in global politics (The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, 2023).

When Sweden introduced the concept of FFP a decade ago, many sceptics argued that it won't bring anything that hasn't been seen so far. However, the new way security concerns affect women and girls in the last decade, starting with the Syrian escalation and ISIS battlefield, Haitian crisis, pandemic and war in Ukraine, Feminist Foreign Policy showed that it is the approach of the future, since it directly affects the effects on the field. War does not affect

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women and men in the same way, although everyone suffers on their own. Thus, addressing the specific needs of each can make the situation at least little more bearable. Feminist foreign policies aspire to transform foreign relations for the greater benefit of women and girls worldwide, fostering a more equal, stable, and peaceful world.

From Ukraine to Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Myanmar, Iran and the Middle East, resilience against acts of deprivation of liberty and revolts against human rights attacks have had “a female face” (UN, 2022). Thompson and Clement define the feminist foreign policy as “the policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states and movements in a manner that prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups, allocates significant resources to achieve that vision and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated power structures across all of its levers of influence (aid, trade, defense, diplomacy), informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups and movements” (ICRW, 2019). By this definition, feminist foreign policy requires a nonbinary, gendered lens, in an effort to show and change historical patriarchal imbalances. It requires tools as aid, trade, and defense policies along with diplomacy and international assistance (Damla Unlu et al, 2020).

While there’s no universally agreed-upon definition, feminist foreign policies aim to: promote gender equality and empower women globally, provide a unifying framework for gender-related strategies, enhance coordination, effectiveness, and accountability. FFP advocate for the protection of human rights, including those of women and marginalized groups. They address issues such as violence against women, human trafficking, and sexual exploitation, focusing on inclusive economic growth, ensuring that women have equal access to resources, education, and labor market opportunities.

These policies can impact various aspects of foreign relations such as diplomacy, defense and security, state aid and trade, climate, immigration, etc.

Implementing a feminist foreign policy essentially involves building a bridge between the global and local political realities in such a way that power imbalances can be diminished. This begins with the identification of global and local goals and their integration into a common workable framework. However, the method in which these goals are identified and classified are important as well. The method must be democratic and inclusive so that the ultimate objective of the process is the preservation of international security (Das P, 2023).

What feminist foreign policy looks like in practice varies from country to country. Germany, the largest country in the group has pledged to almost double its donations geared toward gender equality in terms of foreign aid. Canada and Slovenia have met or exceeded gender parity in their diplomatic or ambassador corps, while France, Spain and Colombia have set up boards of feminist activists to advise their governments. Argentina has put trans feminism at the center of both its foreign and domestic policies, creating the position of special representative for sexual orientation and gender identity (Thompson, 2023).

### **Origin and development of the concept**

While gender mainstreaming would be the first association towards gender equality today, the traditional understanding of foreign policy urges for a concept with the added value. Feminist Foreign Policy distinguishes itself from traditional approaches to foreign policy by its attempt to be more inclusive and change existing inequalities, taking the bottom-up approach to foreign policy-making. This means that foreign policy is created in collaboration and consultation with actors outside the government, including civil society and those affected

by such policies. When countries choose to adopt the label feminist to their foreign policy, they indicate that they want to increase their efforts to be more inclusive and contribute to resolving existing inequalities (Stienstra, 2022).

In 2014, Sweden pioneered the world's first feminist foreign policy. In 2014, Sweden's Foreign Minister Margot Wallström announced the world's first explicitly "feminist" foreign policy (FFP). It was an effort that, by Wallström's own admission, was met with "giggles" and suspicion at the time. Sweden introduced a framework of implementing the FFP through the "three 'R's" – rights, recourses and representation." Though not a comprehensive action plan, this was a readily-communicated way of structuring the work around key concepts that can easily be exemplified and made concrete (The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation 2023). The new policy has led to an institutional culture shift which has enabled action across Sweden's foreign policy portfolio. In the Security Council, Sweden has advanced women's participation in peace efforts and conflict prevention. In trade, Sweden has promoted the gender focus of EU trade agreements. It has also increased official development assistance (ODA) for reproductive health to counter the declines in other countries' spending (OECD, 2021). It would be three years before another country would be brave enough to continue the idea, with a considerably more narrowly-focused- Canada in 2017. Canada has applied gender framing to security (with the Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations) and trade (with a new gender chapter within the Canada-Chile free trade agreement). The aim of the Elsie Initiative is to work with the UN and interested member states to overcome barriers to women's participation in peace operations, with Canada leading these approaches with other states that share its ambitions. The initiative includes \$6 million in assistance to designated UN missions, and \$15 million towards a global fund to support the increased deployment of women peacekeepers. Other significant examples of Canada's feminist foreign policy articulated by the current Liberal government in the last year are the proposed gender chapter in the revised North American Free Trade Agreement, the G7 Gender Equality Advisory Council, and the many gender references in the new defence policy, Strong Secure Engaged, including emphasis on diversity, GBA+ and an established target of twenty-five percent women in the Canadian Armed Forces. And, most recently, they announced the creation of a gender equity advisory council to ensure gender equality is integrated across all themes of the G7 (openCanada, 2023). The FIAP was tossed by the liberal government in 2017 as a move to reduce poverty and gender inequality across the globe. It is based on the six thematic areas of the UN Agenda 2030 with a focus on: Gender Equality and Empowerment; Human Dignity; Growth for Everybody; Environment and Climate Change; Inclusive Growth; and Peace and Security. FIAP argues that the feminist approach to international development through the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls can lead to the alteration of social norms and power relations. It seeks to eliminate poverty and develop a more serene, inclusive, and prosperous world. The government directed 95% of its bilateral international development assistance towards gender equality projects in 2021-2022. Within the inclusive gender equality projects, \$150 million over five years was provided for Women's Voice and Leadership, and \$300 million was dedicated to the 15-year Equality Fund initiative to strengthen women's organizations and movements, especially in conflict-affected countries (Wilson, 2023).

France updated their International Strategy on Gender Equality in 2018, referring to their approach as "feminist diplomacy", and a year later, shifted their messaging in an op-ed penned on International Women's Day of 2019, explicitly declaring theirs a feminist foreign policy (Thompson and Clement, 2019). In 2018, more than half of the projects financed worldwide by the French Development Agency (AFD) included a component focused on gender equality,

showing France's strong commitment to this issue. Now we need to do even more, in line with the United Nations 2030 Agenda. This is why the government has tasked the AFD with reaching a total of €700 million annually in funding by 2022, aimed primarily at reducing gender inequality. In 2018, France was voted champion of the "She Decides" initiative for the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women and girls (PMFUN, 2020).

In 2021, the Spanish government launched its Strategy for Foreign Action 2021-2024 and the Guideline for a Feminist Foreign Policy. Spain committed to a feminist foreign policy covering various sectors such as security, health, climate, political representation, trade and the fight against gender-based violence. Spain has adopted significant national measures against gender-based violence and laws to promote parity (FOCUS2030). Spain has incorporated gender equality as a distinctive element of its foreign policy. Predominating inequalities between men and women point to a need to step up efforts to close the gender gap and move towards real and effective equality on the international front. To achieve these goals, the ministry has drawn up a Guide that defines the main lines of action that set out Spain's contribution to make the target of a fairer world a reality where men and women enjoy equal rights and opportunities. This proposal is based on five principles: a transformative approach; committed leadership; ownership; inclusive participation and boosting national and international alliances, and diversity and intersectionality (MFA Spain, 2024).

Mexico was the first country in the Global South to adopt a feminist foreign policy in 2020. On the Feminist Foreign Policy Index, Mexico ranks in the top three countries, along with Sweden and Norway. Foreign Secretary Marcelo Ebrard announced that Mexico would adopt a feminist foreign policy during the 74th UN General Assembly in September 2019, and it was presented at the 31st Meeting of Ambassadors and Consuls in January 2020. Mexico's feminist foreign policy is based on a set of five principles that seek to guide the government's actions to reduce and eliminate structural differences, gender gaps and inequalities, in order to build a more just and prosperous society: feminist foreign policy with a gender perspective and a feminist agenda abroad, parity within the Foreign Ministry, a Foreign Ministry free of violence that is safe for all, visible equality, and feminism in all areas of the Foreign Ministry (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2023).

Consistent with these principles, the country is a strong advocate of gender equality at the international level. It has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women. In 2020, Mexico co-hosted the Generation Equality Forum, the first international forum to address gender equality since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. During its two-year tenure as a non-permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which began in January 2021, Mexico co-chaired the informal expert group on Women, Peace and Security with Ireland and Kenya (Garcia, 2023).

In June 2021, the Luxembourg government pledged to establish an Action Plan on Feminist Foreign Policy, in order to mainstream gender equality across all its activities, at the Generation Equality Forum. Luxembourg's Feminist Foreign Policy prioritizes three Ds, namely diplomacy, development, and defence. It aims to systematically include the principles of feminist foreign policy in the implementation of all dimensions of its external action (The gender security project, 2023).

On 1 March 2023, German Foreign Minister launched the new Feminist Foreign Policy guidelines that seek to make gender equality and women's rights central objectives of Germany's external relations. At the same time, the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development

also announced a new strategy on feminist development assistance (RECHENMACHER, 2023). Ten guidelines provide both context and impetus for action to Foreign Office staff – both within and outside the organization. Feminist Foreign Policy, with its focus on women and marginalized groups' rights, representation and adequate resources, cuts across all areas of activity of the Federal Foreign Office. In the sphere of peace and security policy, for example, the focus is on participation in peace processes; for humanitarian assistance and crisis management, it is about placing more emphasis on intersectional and gender-specific risks; and in the area of cultural and societal diplomacy it aims to promote, and give greater visibility to marginalized individuals in art and culture, research and science, education and the media (Amt, 2024). The German FFP considers gender as a cross-sectional issue which should guide German foreign policy in all its areas in the future. Trade policy is one of six thematic areas identified in the FFP. The trade policy guidelines are further divided into six selected objectives and project areas (Klimke and Tietje, 2023).

The same year the Slovenian MFA launched the idea of adopting FFP stating that “In the organizational structure of the Ministry, feminist foreign policy is already reflected in the gender balance of the heads of directorates; the work of diplomats is supervised by a female diplomatic supervisor and the secretariat is headed by a female Secretary General. Furthermore, Slovenia ranks high among EU member states in terms of the number of female ambassadors” (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2023).

Similar initiatives by the end of 2023 were adopted by Mongolia, Lybia, Liberia, Chile, Columbia and Argentina (Green, Kozielska, Smith, 2023).

This approach has been indirectly adopted by the European Parliament (EP) as well, approving a report calling for a minimum of 50% women in all decision-making positions and 85% of European Union (EU) development assistance to be set aside for programs specifically supporting gender equality. The report was presented by German deputy Hannah Neumann, who has long pushed for a feminist foreign policy in Europe. “The Gender Action Plan III will take effect in 2021 and run through 2025 (CFR, 2020). Speaking of concrete actions, on 7 March 2023, the EU decided to impose sanctions on individuals and entities deemed to be responsible for violence and rights abuses against women. Those include nine individuals, including high-ranking officials of the Russian Army involved in the brutal invasion of Ukraine, two Taliban ministers, and three entities accused of perpetrating violations of women's rights on a large and systematic scale. The move, adopted unanimously by the bloc's 27 member states, was deliberately timed to land ahead of International Women's Day (Brzozowski, 2023). In the case of the EU, the demand to adopt a FFP has emerged in parallel to the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) (Guerrina, R., Haastrup, T. and Katharine (2023).

### **Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) and the UN Agenda for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)**

While both FFP and the UN agenda share common goals, they operate in distinct contexts and have varying scopes. FFP seeks to transform foreign policy holistically, while the UN agenda specifically addresses women's roles in peace and security contexts. FFP is an approach to foreign policy that explicitly integrates feminist principles and gender equality. It aims to transform traditional foreign policy by centering on women's rights, gender equality, and social justice. FFP recognizes that gender intersects with other identities (such as race, class, and sexuality) and seeks to address these intersections in policy. FFP emphasizes coherence across different policy areas to promote gender equality through engaging diverse stakeholders, including civil society, in policy development and implementation. It is focused on increased

women's participation, tracking the number of women in diplomatic roles, peace negotiations, and decision-making positions, but it goes far beyond women's representation in foreign policy, adopting gender sensitive budgeting and introducing the concept of Gender-Responsive Aid through evaluating the impact of development assistance on women's empowerment. The UN WPS agenda on the other side, focuses on prevention (through addressing root causes of conflict and preventing violence against women), protection (ensuring women's safety during conflict and post-conflict situations), participation (promoting women's meaningful participation in peace negotiations, decision-making, and peacebuilding) and relief and recovery: (supporting women's recovery from conflict and rebuilding communities). The consistency with WPS agenda is ensured through National Action Plans (NAPs) developed by the states for implementing the agenda at the national level. Both emphasize gender equality, women's rights, and participation, and recognize the importance of policy coherence. The UN agenda specifically focuses on peace and security contexts. While FFP is broader, encompassing all aspects of foreign policy. Some countries have both a feminist foreign policy and a national action plan on women, peace, and security and probably the best way is to have them both as instruments that reinforce each other and amplify the effects of joint efforts and endeavors.

Representation and inclusion are recurrent features in feminist political theory and activism, dating back to the early suffrage movements and women's struggle for involvement as political actors in the public sphere. However, within the spheres of foreign policy and diplomacy, the underrepresentation of women continues to be strikingly high. These new patterns of foreign policy practice and discourse are seen through a feminist lens, in particular by drawing on scholarships on ethical foreign policy, feminist theory and the ethics of care. A key contention is that feminist foreign policy is in itself ethical since it places at the centre of the analysis such things as gendered discrimination, inequalities and violence as well as the lack of inclusion and representation of women and other marginalized groups. A foreign policy, which builds on the ethics of care as its foundation, rests on the idea of inclusive and ethical dialogues as well as acts of listening across borders and intersectional confines (Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond, and Kronsell, 2018).

FFP and WPS are two equally important concepts that reinforce and empower each other in the direction of ensuring lasting peace.

### **FFP effects on war in Ukraine**

Countries with feminist foreign policies play a vital role in addressing the war in Ukraine. These policies emphasize gender-responsive approaches throughout foreign relations. By forestalling inequities and mitigating consequences, such policies can contribute to positive gender outcomes in conflict-affected regions.

Feminist foreign policies intersect with the ongoing Ukraine crisis, revealing both the urgency and the gendered impact of armed conflicts. Ukraine has become a dangerous arena for great powers, with Russia amassing troops near its borders. Amid this geopolitical tension, the true costs of war are often overlooked. Women disproportionately bear the burden associated with armed conflict. Human insecurity prevails, exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and existing inequalities. As part of its FFP commitment aligned with the UN's Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, Canada should actively consult, listen to, and collaborate with Ukrainian women who are directly affected on the ground. Canada will provide \$3.02 billion in critical financial and military support to Ukraine in 2024 (Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, 2024).

The Dutch government, together with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court

and the European Commission, organized the Ukraine Accountability Conference. One of the key themes of the conference was addressing the issue of sexual violence in conflict. At the conference a number of major steps were taken to ensure that war crimes, including sexual and gender-related violence, do not go unpunished. One of the outcomes of the conference was the establishment of a Dialogue Group on Accountability for Ukraine (Zaken, M. van B. 2023).

### **Conclusion**

We live in an increasingly complicated and volatile global environment. The feminist foreign policy model allows for a promotion of values and good practices to achieve gender equality, to potentially influence the wellbeing of millions of people through a reconsideration of diplomatic relations. That is the transformative value of FFP, advancing gender equality and promoting women's rights on a global scale, slowly but surely moving toward progress. While some countries have already incorporated this gender perspective into their foreign policy, there is still a considerable capacity for advancement. On the other hand, facing the rise of the radical right and anti-gender movement will probably lead the world struggling for concepts and values that are considered to be achieved. For example, Sweden's conservative Prime Minister stated that Sweden is withdrawing from the FFP concept since "the label obscures the fact the Swedish foreign policy must be based on Swedish values and Swedish interests" (Walfridsson, 2022).

Although it may not look like FFP has provided answers for all the world's ongoing problems, the logic behind the policy is extremely strong- ensuring women's meaningful inclusion in shaping peace and security is not yet viewed throughout organizations as a key strategic priority, although that is starting to change. When an issue is not a strategic priority, it often doesn't receive the needed resources (O'Neill, 2020).

From the moment a government adopts a feminist foreign policy, a feminist analysis should underpin every foreign policy decision that is taken. This indicates a willingness to transform how peace processes, and the subsequent structures they give rise to, unfold, to acknowledge and transform unequal power relations, and to preface gender equality as a marker of peace and security. FFP potentially allows for alternative ideas of co-existence to emerge. It is built on trust and respect between partners and promotes more enabling peacebuilding to occur, since peace is not a project that is embedded in logframes (Hendricks, 2023).

In a dangerous world marked by rising authoritarianism and shrinking freedoms, NATO has an opportunity to double down on its values by adopting FFP. In doing so, the Alliance would confidently demonstrate that democratic ideals are a source of strength rather than an Achilles heel and achieve a more resilient and secure transatlantic community (Walla, 2021).

Feminist foreign policy and feminist peace are long processes that depend on the existence of strong networks of transnational solidarity. It takes an effort to break cycles of crises – but it is fundamental to understand that equality must be the disruptive element to stop cascading crises. This does not make feminist foreign policy an unrealistic utopia for crisis-ridden regions; instead, it offers a valuable alternative to long-failed traditional approaches (Kirchner, 2022).

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## TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF MIGRATION

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“Freedom is what we do with what is done to us.”

Jean-Paul Sartre

**Abstract:** *Migration has been a constant phenomenon in human history. Throughout centuries the European continent has been a theatre of migratory movements that have contributed to shape the continent as we know it today. Growing levels of mobility nowadays are influenced by many factors, some being recurring conflicts, numerous crises, constant instability, economic imbalances, demographic developments, climate change as well as labor force demands and supplies. All these trigger a migration environment characterized by movements of people both voluntary and forced, both legal and illegal. However, the benefits of migration should be seen from the perspective of what migrants can bring to the destination country as well as the benefits in form of remittances for the country of origin. Some of the significant benefits migration brings to the destination countries are skilled workforce and cultural diversity, as well as improvements in the lives of communities in their countries of origin through the transfer of skills and financial resources. Although in general migration has always been perceived in a negative light, this paper contemplates to shed a new light on migration proposing a notion for its empowering transformation to societies and countries.*

**Keywords:** *migration, skills, labor migration, workforce, third-country nationals*

### Introduction

Due to interchangeability of the terms migrant and refugee, migration is mostly perceived in a negative light. So, is there a difference between migrants and refugees? The main difference is choice. Simply speaking, a migrant is someone who chooses to move, and a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee from their home. An analysis of glossaries of definitions revealed no universally accepted definition at an international level. The terms migrant and refugee are just two of the many terms that are used to describe people who leave their homes in quest for better future. The UNHCR distinguishes between the causes of migration and refers to migrants only in the context of those who choose to move and are not forced to move because of a direct threat of persecution or death<sup>3</sup>. According to the UNCHR

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<sup>2</sup> Director of Migration, Asylum, Refugee Regional Initiative Regional Centre (MARRI-RC)

<sup>3</sup> Edwards A. (2015), UNHCR viewpoint: “refugee” or “migrant” – which is right? Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, <http://www.unhcr.org/55df0e556.html>,

Glossary [2022], Migrant is a person [...] “who leaves their country of origin purely for economic reasons, in order to seek material improvements in their livelihood.”<sup>4</sup> The definition of a Migrant is not in any way related to the Refugee definition [...] “a person in need for international protection because of feared persecution, armed conflict, violence or serious public disorder.” Within organizations such as the United Nations, definitions have changed over time. In 1953, the United Nations Recommendations on statistics of international migration defined permanent immigrants as “non-residents (both nationals and aliens) arriving with the intention to remain for a period exceeding one year”; the revised Recommendations in 1998 removed the reference to length of stay and defined an international migrant as “any person who changes his/her country of usual residence”<sup>5</sup>. At a European level, the European Migration Network (EMN) refers to residency and length of stay, defining a migrant in the EU context either as someone who establishes their usual residence in an EU Member State for at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or non-EU country, or as someone having previously been usually resident in a Member State who ceases to have their usual residence in that State for a period of at least 12 months<sup>6</sup>.

Truth be told, “a growing number – now perhaps 10% of the total migrant pool – move involuntarily, fleeing social or environmental stresses such as conflict and climate change.” (Adger et. al, 2024). The migration crisis from 2015 introduced some changes in the EU policy such as the “hotspot approach to migration management” as a response to the 2015–16 spike in arrivals of third country nationals and stateless persons at the EU’s external borders, many of them with international protection needs, for example, fleeing persecution or generalized violence (Tsourdi et al, 2022). Unfortunately, this is one of the reasons why most of the time migration is perceived as a threat to stability and security, while the positive effects or the benefits for host country and the region are often overlooked.

Therefore, it is high time for resetting the stereotypes of migration being discussed only as a threat to societies, without taking into consideration the largest reasons why the vast majority of people move (Czaika, 2022) and that is the quest for finding new economic and life opportunities, or simply in search of a better life (Esipova, 2018). As Professor Neil Adger from the University of Exeter points out “Migrants can be a transformative force in their new locations, bringing energy and ideas that can boost economies – including the green transition”.

Well-managed migration can enable migrants to boost sustainable development and the governments to direct their thinking to creating policies that manage migration for the people both for present and future (Danzer et. al, 2014). Contrary to popular belief, migrants do play a vital role in the global economy. They contribute to the society through their knowledge, networks and skills and build stronger and more resilient communities. Studies have shown that migrants bring growth and innovation in both the countries of origin and the destination countries (Nikoloski, 2018). In that sense, migration in this paper is analyzed from two aspects, namely, the impact it has on the country of origin and the impact it has on the destination country. Through comparative analysis of the current policies of the EU

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<sup>4</sup> UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms (2022), <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary>

<sup>5</sup> Recommendations on statistics of international migration, 1998, revision 1. New York: United Nations, [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/seriesm\\_58rev1e.pdf](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/seriesm_58rev1e.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> Asylum and migration glossary 3.0. (2014), Brussels: DG Migration and Home Affairs European Migration Network. [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/docs/emn-glossary-en-version.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/docs/emn-glossary-en-version.pdf)

countries and specifically countries from the Balkan region, an overview is presented of the current trends in the area of migration and the positive aspects the new policies bring.

Increasingly more EU countries rely on migrants to boost and sustain economic growth considering the demographic transitions and the changes in the age structure of the population. Furthermore, advanced and dynamic economies need migrant workers to fill jobs that cannot be outsourced or executed by local workers who are not willing to accept them.

### **Labor shortages in European Union context**

Labor migration is a complex issue. The shortages on labor markets continue to pose a scorching issue for practically all the EU countries since almost all of them reported a lack of skilled workers and labor shortages across most sectors. Therefore, labor migration issues will be high on the agenda of the European countries and very much present in the years to come. Governments are well aware of the situation and are dedicated to finding suitable solutions.

The European continent is faced with demographic ageing and low birth rates. Moreover, the working age population is dropping drastically. According to McKinsey Global Institute<sup>7</sup> forecast, the Europe's working age population is expected to drop by more than 13 million (or 4%) by 2030. Even now, many vacancies cannot be filled by domestic workers or intra-EU workforce, making the lack of labor shortages evident. This shortcoming was already reported in 2022 when almost all EU countries complained of labor shortages in most sectors and a lack of skilled workers in general. Furthermore, in its recent study, the European Labour Authority<sup>8</sup> reported shortages in a total of 28 occupations, some of them being health and care professionals, science, technology, engineering, IT and communication experts, transport and hospitality personnel as well as deficiencies in retail, manufacturing and construction sectors. All this impacts the socio-economic situation in general.

Taking this into account, the EU countries should think of comprehensive strategies which could include enhanced intra-EU mobility, later retirement, upskilling and qualification of workers, since migration cannot compensate for the ageing of the continent. Many European governments acknowledge the need to promote targeted immigration from third countries as a central pillar for successful economic transition and it should be further promoted as well. Furthermore, in terms of finding viable solutions for the growing labor supply needs of skilled workers, the European countries have started looking into targeted migration from third countries. In that direction, the European countries are willing to make changes in their immigration policies so that they make admission policies for third-country nationals more receptive and welcoming based on the needs of the labor market. Also, they are willing to make changes in the policies so they attract more skilled workers as well as expand entry opportunities and facilitate the application process for work-related residence permits.

Furthermore, the increasing demands made the European countries go a step further and enter into comprehensive migration and mobility partnerships to actively recruit workers in countries of origin. For instance, Portugal concluded Agreements on employment and residence of workers with India and Morocco, while Germany and India signed an Agreement on Migration and Mobility, intended as a model for further agreements in this field. India has concluded similar Agreements with Finland, France and the United Kingdom and will sign one with Austria as

<sup>7</sup> *The Future of Work in Europe*. (2020). McKinsey Global Institute. Discussion Papers, <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-in-europe>

<sup>8</sup> *Posting of Workers*. (2024). European Labour Authority. <https://www.ela.europa.eu/en/topics/posting-workers>

well.<sup>9</sup> The benefits of such agreements are not solely focusing on the labor market needs of the destination countries, on the contrary, they will contribute to combatting illegal migration as well, and ensure the return procedures of illegally staying migrants are at place.

Some of the developments made by the European countries in order to tackle the shortages of labor market include: passing of new legislation to facilitate labor migration; adopting higher quotas for non-EU country workers; extension of occupation shortage lists; special permits to fill specific occupations, for instance the health sector and to attract in-demand skills or experience; introduction of job search visas; fast-track avenues for specialists; streamlining and simplification of skills recognition; opening of (limited) labor market access for asylum seekers during procedure or migrants with a long-term “tolerated” status; regularization programmes for certain previously undocumented groups; further conclusion of migration and mobility agreements with non-EU partner countries; and establishment of new institutional frameworks to encourage the employment of foreign workers at the domestic level and to actively support recruitment in countries of origin.

Furthermore, in its efforts to tackle the shortages of labor workforce, the EU Commission presented a new Skills and Mobility Package<sup>10</sup> in November last year, with recommendations for “recognition of qualifications of third country nationals” and Europe on the Move Initiative<sup>11</sup> to enhance intra-EU mobility and the establishment of EU Talent Pool. This includes the further development of concrete legal pathways for migrants to the EU, which can contribute to address the demographic challenges and support the economic development of the European countries.<sup>12</sup> The EU Talent Pool mechanism is intended for third-country nationals to register their qualifications, skills and experience, leave contact details and then be matched with an existing vacancy. One of the aims of this mechanism is to assist small and medium-sized companies which lack networks and international links, to be able to recruit third-country nationals. Whether this proposal will have positive effects, it will be observed in the years to come.

According to the latest trends in labor migration, and the global distribution of migrants worldwide, it has been noted that most migrants come from Asia, and the number one destination of the migrants are the European countries. As it is outlined in the Report on Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, “migration is a multi-dimensional reality that cannot be addressed by one government policy sector alone.”<sup>13</sup>

In simplified terms, European governments have five principal fields of action at their disposal to meet the demand for migrant workers: First, the opening of labour markets and lowering of legal thresholds for the access of qualified candidates. Second, contractual and practical cooperation with countries of origin to facilitate and manage labour flows. Third, and linked to point two, active recruitment policies and programmes in countries of origin. Fourth, the creation of skills, training or talent partnerships with countries of origin to enhance the pool

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<sup>9</sup> *Ten Migration Issues to Look out for in 2023*. (2023). ICMPD Migration Outlook 2023. [https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/58952/file/ICMPD\\_Migration\\_Outlook\\_2023.pdf](https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/58952/file/ICMPD_Migration_Outlook_2023.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> *Commission proposes new measures on skills and talent to help address critical labour shortages*. (2023). Press Release. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/EN/ip\\_23\\_5740](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/EN/ip_23_5740)

<sup>11</sup> *‘Europe on the Move’ – learning mobility opportunities for everyone*, (2023). Council Recommendation-COM\_2023\_719\_1\_EN.pdf

<sup>12</sup> *Focusing on the transformational power of migration*. (2021). The Diplomatic Service of the European Union. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/focusing-transformational-power-migration\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/focusing-transformational-power-migration_en)

<sup>13</sup> *Migration, Sustainable Development and the 2030 Agenda*. (2024). <https://www.iom.int/migration-sustainable-development-and-2030-agenda>

of skilled labour that has obtained the necessary formal and practical qualifications to perform on European labour markets. And fifth, a further mobilisation of available potentials, i.e. facilitating and promoting the access of resident migrant populations or their further qualification with regard to required skills.<sup>14</sup>

Key national elections in 2024 will dictate whether immigration policy will create a path out of the worker and skills shortage, or if governments will instead choose to protect the domestic workforce due to political pressure or nationalistic positions.

### **Regular pathways of migration**

As previously argued, migration has always been seen in negative light due to mostly how it was presented in the media. The very movement of people does not and cannot signify illegal migration as C. Dauvergne (2016) states.<sup>15</sup> The migration crisis from 2015 and the media coverage has created a perception that many migrants enter and reside in the EU illegally. On the contrary, the majority of migrants enter the EU through legitimate legal channels and there are significantly more legal migrants than irregular migrants in the EU. So contrary to popular belief, the majority of third-country nationals enter and stay in the EU lawfully. For example, the number of those third-country nationals who come to the EU through regular pathways is higher than those who attempt to enter the EU irregularly. For example, the numbers for 2020 show that for each irregular entry detected, 12 migrants entered the EU lawfully.

Regular pathways are essential to provide alternatives to tackle irregular migration. They bring benefits for the country as through the frameworks of regular migration the country can exercise effective and selective processes and at the same time respect the rights of the persons and advocating the best interest of the country of destination.

Nowadays the distinction in Europe between member and non-member countries is eroding. For Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and others, opening the labor market led to millions leaving. On the other hand, Germany and others have been opening up to skilled labor from non-EU countries too. And if a few years ago, the issue was illegal migration and people trying their luck as bogus asylum seekers, nowadays people seek work permits to enter the EU and these are often sponsored by EU companies.

According to Eurostat<sup>16</sup> the number of non-EU citizens residing in the EU rose from 17 million to 24 million between 2014 and 2022. The share of non-EU citizens in the EU population grew from 3.9% to 5.3%. In fact, the number of EU citizens declined during this period, so the slight EU population growth recorded is due to immigration. The EU hosted 7.9% of all international migrants in 2020, as counted in the UN migration stock database. Regarding migration flow, every year on average between 2 and 3 million new third-country nationals are received by the EU. During the pandemic, the numbers have slightly decreased, but the numbers of new migrants are on the rise again. In 2021, there were 2.6 million new immigrants to the EU, which surpassed the number from 2020, but still below the peak of 2.7 million reached in 2019. In 2022, EU countries issued almost 3.5 million first residence permits to third-country

<sup>14</sup> *Ten Migration Issues to Look out for in 2024. (2024). ICMPD Migration Outlook 2024. <https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/60599/file/ICMPD%2520Migration%2520Outlook%25202024.pdf>*

<sup>15</sup> *Dauvergne, C. (2016). The New Politics of Immigration and the End of Settler Societies. Cambridge University Press: New York.*

<sup>16</sup> *Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship. (2024). [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr\\_pop1ctz/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=1ba29ef0-a9e9-4cca-b736-bfb478d32e9c](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_pop1ctz/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=1ba29ef0-a9e9-4cca-b736-bfb478d32e9c)*

nationals, which has been a slight increase in the number of issued permits in the last decade (up from 1.6 million in 2013). Namely, the share of residence permits issued for employment purposes has surpassed that of the residence permits issued for family reasons. In addition, the number of permits

for skilled workers, including blue cards for skilled workers, authorizations to study or do research and intra-corporate transfers, increased significantly, from under 200.000 in 2019 to more than half a million in 2022.

Eurostat's population projections are that the EU population is expected to fall by 6 % by 2100. Reducing or stopping migration would lead to an even more drastic population decline by 2100 (17 % or 33 %, respectively). Furthermore, it is expected that the old-age dependency ratio to further deteriorate in the EU, rising from 33% in 2022 to almost 60% by 2100, and reducing migration would lead to a higher old-age dependency ratio by 2100 (70 % and 62 % respectively).

It is believed that legal immigration can help alleviate some of the EU's demographic challenges, though this contribution should not be overstated<sup>17</sup>.

Another aspect when it comes to regular migration that needs to be considered are the administrative procedures that often pose barriers and thus hinder recruitment of workers. Therefore, a number of measures should be adopted and implemented in order to address labor market needs through regular pathways. One should expect a shift in migration dynamics provided certain actions are being undertaken: primarily the key stakeholders should advance their knowledge on labor migration schemes and gaps in the procedures. Furthermore, they need to define and adopt measures so as to be attractive for the stakeholders and retain them.

### **Western Balkan countries and labor migration issues**

Migration process implies complex challenges in terms of governance, migrant workers' protection, migration and development linkages, and international cooperation.<sup>18</sup> It can lead to political consequences, and in this sense, the demographic issue across the region is becoming a political issue. Emigration and demography are issues leading to labor shortages not just in the Western Balkan region but worldwide as well. Migration immensely alleviates the issues and expense of unemployment and brings in remittances. Nonetheless, it is also scraping out the labor force, meaning that foreign investment is discouraged or, in some cases, even leaving. Emigration has always been a burning issue for the Western Balkan countries, and the region has seen significant emigration flows in both past and present times.

Historically, all countries in the region, as well as most European countries as well, had periods of intense emigration. In the case of the Balkan countries, hundreds of thousands went abroad from the 1960s, not necessarily with the intention to stay away but many of whom did due to personal circumstances. In the generation before that, Muslims, Albanians and Turks from Bosnia and the broader Balkans left in different periods during the 19th and 20th centuries. People from Croatia, parts of Montenegro and Macedonia went to the United States, while Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria exchanged populations. But in terms of numbers, this did not matter so much because the demographics was not disturbed due to high birth rates. Emigration alleviated the burden on land and resources and the number of population continued to increase. That is

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<sup>17</sup> *EU Migration and Borders. (2024). Key Facts and Figures. European Parliament.* [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/760361/EPRS\\_BRI\(2024\)760361\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/760361/EPRS_BRI(2024)760361_EN.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> *Labour Migration. (2024). International Labour Organization.* <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm>

one of the main reasons why what is happening today is so different from what was happening in the past. For example, Western countries compensate for falling birth rates and emigration with immigration, while on the other hand, rather a handful of people immigrate to Balkan countries.

Labour migration waves from the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) over the past decades have led to significant international diasporas in Europe and North America. Since 1990, the number of migrants from the Western Balkan region has roughly doubled: today, 4.8 million people born in the region, or about one-fifth of the Western Balkan population, live abroad. These migrants live mainly in the European countries such as Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria, and Switzerland, but emigration to neighbouring EU countries Croatia and Slovenia has been increasing in recent years as well.<sup>19</sup> A number of push and pull factors contribute to emigration from the Western Balkan countries. Although over the past decade the countries are striving to bring progress in improving economic and social prospects, socio-economic hardships and structural challenges continue to be the main factors for emigration from the region. To mention a few, these include high unemployment rates, relatively low wages, weak education outcomes, low to none social security as well as high levels of corruption. At the same time, labor demands from the EU countries and migration policy schemes that specifically target labor migrants from the Western Balkan countries have lowered the barriers for emigration to many EU countries. However, these labor migrants are mostly overqualified, and as it has been reported, as close to half of all labor migrants from the Western Balkan region with a tertiary education degree worked in a low- or mid-skilled job in 2015/16. Moreover, only about one-fifth of them were employed in low-skilled and about one-fifth in high-skilled jobs.<sup>20</sup> And while emigrants most of the time are considered a loss for their country of origin, with a new thinking paradigm, they can also play a very important role when it comes to boosting economic development in their countries of origin. For example, remittances constitute an important source of income to support economic and social development of the countries of origin. Remittances alone, sent to their countries of origin, represent more than three times the volume of official development aid provided to developing countries.<sup>21</sup> On average, the Western Balkan countries received an estimated equivalent of 10% of their gross domestic product (GDP) in remittances in 2019, ranging from 16% of GDP in Kosovo to 2.5% in North Macedonia.<sup>22</sup>

Despite these numbers, there are barriers to remittance investments in most Western Balkan countries, such as dedicated policies and support mechanisms which would ensure the diaspora investment and knowledge transfers that offer development potential to be utilized accordingly. Nevertheless, almost all Western Balkan countries have explicit objectives in their migration strategies to encourage skills and knowledge transfers from their diasporas, to map their diasporas more comprehensively, and to create networks of (mostly highly skilled) diaspora members. Diaspora involvement and return migration can convey important financial and knowledge transfers, produce innovative ideas and entrepreneurship, and invigorate economies

<sup>19</sup> *Labour Migration in the Western Balkans: Mapping Patterns, Addressing Challenges and Reaping Benefits.* (2022). *Global Relations Policy Insights.* <https://www.oecd.org/south-east-europe/programme/Labour-Migration-report.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>21</sup> *Focusing on the transformational power of migration.* (2021). *The Diplomatic Service of the European Union.* [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/focusing-transformational-power-migration\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/focusing-transformational-power-migration_en)

<sup>22</sup> *Labour Migration in the Western Balkans: Mapping Patterns, Addressing Challenges and Reaping Benefits.* (2022). *Global Relations Policy Insights.* <https://www.oecd.org/south-east-europe/programme/Labour-Migration-report.pdf>



and societies. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have also implemented dedicated policies to facilitate knowledge transfers through temporary return, engagement of diaspora or incentives for research collaborations with the diaspora. All Western Balkan countries also aim to increase co-operation with diaspora businesses and facilitate investment, but there is often a lack of economy-wide frameworks and mechanisms to exploit their full investment potential.<sup>23</sup>

On the other hand, knowledge about return migrants is limited due to data gaps, while policies to actively attract migrants back are lacking. Return and reintegration support in the Western Balkan countries currently mainly focuses on the return of migrants from EU Member States under readmission agreements. However, concrete measures to actively attract migrants back beyond readmission agreements and to facilitate their socio-economic reintegration are only planned in the adopted strategies of Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia.<sup>24</sup>

The extent to which migrants can contribute to development is directly linked to their ability to access services, integrate into society and stay connected to with their communities of origin<sup>25</sup>.

### Conclusion

International migration has the potential to contribute to sustainable development through transfer of skills, circulation of intellectual power and ties with the diaspora. The extent to which migrants can contribute to development is directly linked to their ability to access services, integrate into society and stay connected to their communities of origin<sup>26</sup>. Migrant workers, in their capacity, add to advancement and development of the economy in the destination countries. Furthermore, countries of origin also benefit immensely from the remittances migrants send home and the skills and experiences they acquire during their time spent abroad.

Regular migration can significantly help harness the benefits of migration and address challenges when it comes to irregular movements and human mobility. In that direction, the governments of the Western Balkan countries have developed migration policies with varying priorities and adopted holistic multi-annual migration strategies. Furthermore, in order to ensure coherent migration policy implementation, they have established policy co-ordination bodies. While most of the strategies include objectives relating to addressing irregular migration and reintegration of returnees, the only countries that focus on reducing the push factors of emigration are Serbia and North Macedonia.

As the Ministers of the Western Balkan countries committed during the Ministerial Conference on Sustainable Immigration Governance in the Western Balkans in 2022, they will be working towards increasing access to legal pathways for migrants in protracted transit situation in line with relevant competencies and among other things, "Increasingly adopt a comprehensive approach, as critical for cooperation to promote pathways to harness the benefits of migration for the development of the sub-region."<sup>27</sup> They also committed to work

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>25</sup> *Migration: a solution, not a problem. (2023). <https://rosanjose.iom.int/en/news/migration-solution-not-problem>*

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>27</sup> *Skopje Declaration on Sustainable Migration Governance in the Western Balkans, Ministerial Conference on Sustainable Immigration Governance in the Western Balkans, Skopje, 15-16 November 2022*

towards a logistic return management approach and among other things to increase circular labor migration and accelerate other areas of cooperation.

Transformation of potential migration into real will depend on future developmental processes in the countries, changes in personal assessments of the persons who want to go abroad and in great deal of immigration policies of potential countries of destination. Migration policies dealing with migration development can include assisted voluntary return and reintegration, temporary or permanent, especially of highly-qualified persons, as well as encouraging investments in the country from its diaspora.

The complexity of the issues related to the management of migration flows, in the context of the benefits that the countries may have in terms of attracting and retaining the qualified labor force, impose a synchronized undertaking of adequate measures, which can significantly compensate for the lack of labor force and consequently, to strengthen economic development. At the same time, the effects of this unstoppable process should be perceived from several aspects. Therefore, for reducing the enormous scope of emigration and potential migration, and give boosting transformation to the country, priority should be given to:

- overcoming the social and economic crises
- improving the conditions for those choosing to leave
- addressing the push factors that force people to leave
- reducing unemployment
- creating conditions for intensifying return flows
- enhancing the positive development impacts that the diaspora and return migrants can

bring.

In order to avoid possible consequences a number of countries, including Macedonia, face a significant challenge so as to improve their internal economic and social condition and thus reduce migration pressure, especially from the younger generations.

The governments should consider designing policies and institutional mechanisms in order to attract back return migrants since they have very important and largely unexploited developmental potential. There should be more structured efforts to attract back diaspora members, particularly those with expertise in sectors that suffer from skills shortages. They represent unexploited potential to support development of the countries of origin. Moreover, implementation of a comprehensive and coherent national migration policy, conceptualized and based on relevant notions, with participation of all governmental institutions and in close cooperation of all stakeholders, as well as involvement of relevant partners at national, regional and international level (governmental agencies, scientific institutions, NGOs, associations, migrant organizations, etc), add to addressing socio-economic needs.

Migration is too serious to leave it to the “market”. Migration should produce winners:

1) The country of origin, 2) The country of destination, and 3) The prospects of migrants. Only fair agreements and rules for migration can make winners and contribute to transformation of the perception of migration and migrant workers in the destination countries.

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## THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

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**Abstract:** *Peace is the trigger of sustainable development. Every societal segment is based on security and stability. The role of the government is to produce a stable platform for future prospect and development for each part of the society. Peace and sustainable development in a fundamental sense are related to processes of globalization and socio-economic development. Nowadays, as technology becomes more and more important part of the state, it is primarily important for the government to establish comfort for opportunities and terrain for longstanding investments. Stability should and must be obtained by the security system that is the core of every state. Ensuring stability and security for every citizen is responsibility that must be assured by the security system. While peace and stability are essential ingredients for development and an ordered social life, security and justice are the critical ingredients for the smooth functioning of all sectors within the social system.*

**Keywords:** *challenges, sustain, peace, development*

### Introduction

The end of the Cold War is often considered a turning point for an increasing engagement of the international community on preventing and resolving armed conflicts worldwide. The period also highlights the strengthening of UN efforts to organize multilateral efforts to sustain peace in turbulent regions, mostly through the development of more complex peacekeeping operations that would tackle not only the war violence, but also its causes and consequences (Valenca, 2011:637-646).

It is well recognised all over the world that peace and security of life and property are the primary conditions for progress and development of any society for development to take place in any society requires sustainable peace. Scholars are in agreement that for there to be sustainable peace, society must evolve ways of addressing the root causes of conflicts by helping to foster participatory democracy, just and accountable governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a balance and equitable distribution of resources, among a host of others- all issues the neglect of which often results in instability within states (Igbuzor, 2011:1-7).

The term 'sustaining peace' is becoming increasingly familiar not only in the UN settings where it originated but also in civil society usage. The term serves to harmonise the understanding of peacebuilding and prevention held by the majority of academic and civil society peace workers for many years with the policy and practice in the United Nations. Since UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced his 1992 report "An Agenda for Peace", peacebuilding

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has been understood within the UN as a set of exclusively post-conflict activities. Prevention of destructive conflict has struggled to find a home within the UN system despite periodic calls for a change of emphasis, away from reactive policies and actions, acknowledged as far more costly in terms of human suffering as well as finance, towards preventive approaches. The coining of this new term represents an opportunity, within and beyond the UN, for those engaged in the work of peace to reflect, reconsider and reform their modes of analysis, strategy development, partnerships, operations, (as well as monitoring and evaluation), to be more appropriate, responsive and, hopefully thereby, effective in their peace work (Cahill-Ripley and Hendric, 2018: 8-47).

The concept of sustaining peace calls for better linkages between the UN's three foundational pillars of peace and security, development, and human rights, in addition to humanitarian action. It replaces what until now has been a sequential approach to conflict that often resulted in silos—notably silos of prevention, humanitarian action, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development—and calls for better linkages and sharing of instruments across these different sets of responses (Caparini and Milante, 2017:220).

### **Sustainable peace and development**

In our globalized world, building sustainable peace has become imperative. If we do not improve the human climate or handle conflicts more constructively, we will not be able to deal with the interlocking global crises successfully. Sustainable peace is an old dream that has become an indispensable precondition for the survival of humanity. The opportunity costs of the unresolved violent conflicts and military interventions are too high. Too many opportunities to deal more effectively with the global crises are lost (Reychler, 2015:19-41).

The sustaining peace approach is a comprehensive project that is aimed at prioritising prevention by changing the way the UN has managed conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The sustaining peace approach unfolds simultaneously across four dimensions: First, it shifts the primary agency for sustaining peace from the international to the national and local level; second, it leverages all functional areas of the UN – human rights, humanitarian, women, development, peacebuilding, peace operations and political – to generate sustaining peace outcomes; third, it broadens the institutional responsibility for peace from the UN secretariat to the whole UN system, i.e. for the first time, the whole system contributes to one overarching goal – to sustain peace; and fourth, it broadens the instrumental focus of the UN beyond its current emphasis on a just in time capacity to respond rapidly to emerging violent conflict. It adds a new focus on supporting national actors to develop the resilient national capacities they need to address structural inequalities, exclusion and other drivers that undermine social cohesion, and if neglected, may over time lead to violent conflict (De Coning, 2018:1-4).

As states continue to discuss what sustaining peace means in practice, it is important to examine how peace operations can be designed and implemented to help build self-sustaining peace rather than just prevent relapse into conflict (Mahmoud and Mechoulam, 2018:45-51).

Sustaining peace is defined as “a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development” (Connolly and Mincieli, 2019:3). The preamble of Security Council Resolution 22823 defines sustaining peace as including “activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities,

ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development". According to the resolutions, sustaining peace is "a goal and a process to build a common vision of society" (Cahill-Ripley and Hendric, 2018: 8-47).

In sustaining peace, the imperative for a long-term vision of building a common, inclusive vision of society should be considered at all points within the conflict cycle—not only in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, but also and no less importantly in early prevention efforts of addressing the 'root causes of conflict' as well as in 'prevention of the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict'. Sustaining peace thus encompasses an array of interventions, including strengthening the rule of law, promoting sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development and national reconciliation. Some of the means and principles by which these interventions are pursued are inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, respect for human rights and gender equality. Built on principles of human security, integrating an understanding of the root causes of conflict, and the protection of human rights, sustaining peace is inextricably linked with sustainable development. The recognition that sustaining peace is 'the primary responsibility of national governments and authorities in identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies and activities and an emphasis on 'inclusivity in national peacebuilding processes and objectives' are reinforced by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which stresses the key role of national ownership in achieving sustainable development, and which aspires to 'peaceful, just and inclusive societies (Caparini and Milante, 2017:220-221).

Sustainable development includes the compatibility of economic development policies not only for the preservation of the environment but its recovery and the protection of the natural resources with a view to meeting the needs of present generation while the needs of future generations are adequately protected (Nweke, 2018:105-121).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) created a global framework, a common language, and shared that we can all rally around to transform our world. The implementation of these goals in today's terms for countries from Global South is challenge, but the result will promote sustainable peace Governments are integrating these goals into national plans and policies.

Ever since the sustaining peace approach was first introduced via the twin resolutions, it faced criticisms that it was not specific enough to be operationalized. The Secretary-General's January 2018 report has also been criticized for the same reason. The Secretary-General should resist these pressures and give member states, the UN system and the international peacebuilding community more time to collectively take ownership and develop the concept further. Member states should be encouraged to make use of the mechanisms designed to coordinate and track the Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 17 that deals with international partnerships, to collaboratively develop the structural prevention elements of the sustaining peace concept, and to align it closely with the larger SDG agenda.

Conceptually, the main tension in the sustaining peace approach is between the degree to which the emphasis should be on investing in imminent risk prevention tools, such as those in the preventive diplomacy toolbox, versus investing in structural prevention. Some argue that the success of sustaining peace will depend on it being able to demonstrate tangible results in the reduction of conflict in the short-to-medium term. It thus requires significant investment in scaling up the UN's preventive diplomacy efforts. Others argue that prevention cannot be sustainable unless the emphasis lies on strengthening the resilience of national capacities for sustaining peace. (De Coning, 2018:1-4).



### **Peacebuilding blocks**

Sustainable peace requires the installation of five peacebuilding blocks plus one, which is called the peacebuilding pentagon. The first building block focuses on the establishment of an effective communication, consultation, and negotiation system at different levels between the conflicting parties or party members. In contrast to the negotiation styles used in most international organizations, the European Union's negotiation style, for example, is predominantly integrative. Ample time and creativity are invested in generating mutually beneficial agreements. Without win-win agreements, the Union could disintegrate and become a dis-union. In order to achieve this block we think that it is first necessary to get to know the other party or party members and to identify the problem.

The second building block consists of peacebuilding structures. In order to achieve a sustainable peace, (conflict) countries have to install political, economic, and security structures and institutions that sustain peace. These structures and institutions should and must provide and ensure security, rule of law, democracy and human rights and good governance, decentralization, economic growth and development and well-being.

The third necessary building block for establishing a sustainable peace process is an integrative climate, which is the software of peacebuilding. This peacebuilding block highlights the importance of a favorable social-psychological environment.

The fourth building block consists of systems supporting the development and installation of the other peacebuilding blocks: (1) an effective and legitimate legal system, (2) an empowering educational system, (3) peace media, (4) a well-functioning health system, and (5) humanitarian aid in the immediate post-war phase.

The fifth building block is a supportive regional and international environment. The stability of a peace process is often dependent on the behavior and interests of neighboring countries or regional powers. They can have a positive influence on the peace process by providing political legitimacy or support, by assisting with the demobilization and demilitarization process, or by facilitating and stimulating regional trade and economic integration (Reychler, 2020: 327-328).

The installation of all these building blocks requires a critical mass of peacebuilding leadership in different domains (politics, diplomacy, defense, economics, education, media, religion, health, etc.) and at different levels: the elite, mid-level, and grassroots. Peacebuilding leadership envisions a shared, clear, and mutually attractive peaceful future for all who want to cooperate; these leaders do everything to identify and gain a full understanding of the challenge confronting them; they frame the conflict in a reflexive way; their change behavior is adaptive, integrative, and flexible; they are well acquainted with nonviolent methods; they use a mix of intentional and consequential ethics and objectives; and they are courageous men and women with high levels of integrity (Reychler, 2015:19-41).

### **Big data and new technologies- tools for fostering sustainable peace**

Big data and new technologies have been increasingly acknowledged as critical tools to foster sustainable peace. For the peace and security context, big data bears the potential to enhance empirical and evidencedriven approaches to conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. A major benefit of technology-focused efforts is the ability to expand situational awareness particularly in settings without political presence or limited access, for instance, by mining social media, using machine learning to analyses public news sources, or carry out digital focus groups.

Artificial intelligence (AI), for example, can help to detect patterns and political trends, monitor incidents, and track changing community perceptions. Both big data and technology combined offer the opportunity to triangulate information and filter out misinformation.

Despite the benefits, putting data and technology to work for peace process and crisis management continues to face technical and operational challenges. Limited Internet access and restrictions in conflict zones can be impeding digital sentiment analysis or opinion mining. Data privacy and data sensitivities need to be also carefully considered, including ethical dilemmas. Insufficient data and manipulated data can distort analytical conclusions. Another point to be mindful of is the management of expectations as big data, and new technologies cannot be a panacea for any analytical question in conflict prevention or any operational challenge in peacemaking. Part of tempering hopes for quick and unique solutions needs to be the understanding that the greater use of technology comes at a cost. This includes transaction costs for training staff in new technologies and the use of big data, apart from actual purchasing costs of licenses or budget to acquire and maintain internal programming talent. Digital tools can also only leverage conflict prevention forecasts and diplomatic efforts to a certain extent: Personal experience and gut feeling for political nuances cannot be replaced by machines, yet (Wa'hlich, 2020:122-126).

### **Towards to the absence of conflict and lasting peace**

Something is fundamentally wrong with the way we deal with conflicts. Instead of contributing to sustainable peacebuilding, the foreign policy of the West has led to more insecurity abroad and at home (Reychler, 2015:19-41). It is believed that once a state is born out of a conflict, then it should have less obstacles in developing functioning institutions since it is expected to forge a way of not having a repeat of former legacies of conflict. This assertion advances from a belief that after conflict there are lessons to be learned and that the actors in state formation would be keen to draw from experience and put in place strategies that not only mitigate the impact of conflict on the young state but also to avoid relapse into conflict (Egwali, 2016:1-13).

The obsession with military supremacy has transformed diplomacy into coercive diplomacy. Characteristic of the latter is the absence of proactive conflict prevention, a high level of temporal inadequacies, and the enormous waste of time, especially the time of others and of nature. Without a more adaptive "temporament" (the manner of thinking, feeling and behaving towards time) we will not be able to deal successfully with global challenges or achieve sustainable development and peace (Reychler, 2015:19-41).

Sustaining peace requires an understanding of the underlying structural drivers of conflict beyond the immediate triggers. Thus, a clear distinction between the "absence of conflict" and "durable peace" must be underscored. An absence of conflict does not necessarily imply that a society is operating at the frontier of peaceful conditions. While conflicts may be concentrated in a few countries the underlying risk factors are widespread. The latency of conflict suggests that it is critical to address these structural drivers of conflict even in the absence of conflict. Thus, assessment of conflicts must "go beyond the dichotomy on fragility, and look for dimensions of fragility that may be present even in supposedly non-fragile countries" (Uwa et al., 2022: 88-103).

One of the essential conditions for global security and wellbeing is achievement of relative peace. Peace is pursued through the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts and the conditions that give rise to these, and support for the attitudes, institutions and structures that can sustain peaceful societies. There is a globalised imperative towards security through increasing

efforts to prevent violent conflicts and support positive peace; and recognition that this is achieved through political rather than military means (Langmore et al., 2020:6-47) Evidently, countries that can sustain peace and mitigate the risks of conflict tend to achieve higher levels of human development, while more fragile countries tend to have lower levels. Peace and security are key, if underappreciated, pre-requisites for sustainable development (Uwa et al., 2022: 88-103).

Ideally, strategic coordination should establish clear lead actors in the mediation and implementation of peace agreements. It should allow those lead actors to set priorities, to ensure that those priorities are pursued by all the third-party actors involved, and to provide consistency across phases of a political process, such that implementation efforts are grounded in the realities of the negotiating process. Neither the UN nor any other actor is currently equipped to fulfil this idealized version of strategic coordination (Jones, 2001:2-23).

The concept of positive peace represents the absence of structural violence. Such violence can arise from structural inequalities in society. Sometimes the situation of structural violence should be treated as a social injustice. Positive peace is achieved only when the barrier between human potential and what man actually achieves is bridged—the size of the barrier is a measure of the level of violence.

### **Challenges of sustainable peace and development**

The challenges associated with peacebuilding in conflict-affected states and societies are rarely straightforward and the indirect, long-term effects of war compound them further. Beyond dramatically reducing violence and preventing a rekindling of relapse into violent conflict, peacebuilding efforts seek to help societies and governments in post-conflict states reset their internal relations on a path to a more sustainable peace. The long-term effects of violent conflict have political, economic and social aspects: lasting impressions of human rights abuses committed during wars continue to shape relations among members of postconflict societies for decades to come. Both socioeconomic and political impacts challenge the stability and development of conflict-affected states for many years. (Krampe et al., 2021:105508-105515)

The risks to public health are especially profound and disproportionately affect the civilian population. Lack of sanitation and inadequate access to potable water are examples of major sources of such harms and risks. These environmental infrastructures are frequent casualties of contemporary violence. Environmental and climate change expose both post-war populations and peace operations to further risks, thereby exacerbating the impacts of conflict even after active combat has long since concluded (Krampe et al., 2021:105508-105515).

The international community, which includes peacebuilding and development agencies, increasingly acknowledges this complexity and the related challenges. For instance, Achim Steiner, Administrator at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), emphasizes the need to connect our understanding of these complex, disparate drivers of conflicts and the need to address the broader developmental failures that often underpin insecurity and conflict. The UNDP, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and other UN agencies are increasingly searching for better pathways to conflict-sensitive programming, that is, ways to minimize the negative impacts of their work in the field.

The critical factors for sustainable peace in any society are: justice, just and accountable governance, protection of human rights, equitable distribution of resources and peace and security education/culture of peace. The absence of any or all of the above factors will lead to violence and absence of sustainable peace. Peace and security education is a critical factor in producing sustainable peace (Igbuzor, 2011:1-7).

In response to this increasing complexity and volatility, policymakers are calling for more systemic approaches to peace and development. Approaches that are based on peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding principles and the five principles of peaceful co-existence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence). Today, the international community's efforts to build, make, and sustain peace are largely focused on the important task of identifying the factors that contribute to peace: the primary conditions and policies for promoting peace, and the target goals and indices for measuring and evaluating sustainably peaceful nations (Coleman et al, 2019:84-91).

### **Environment, education, social and political factors**

Peace, poverty alleviation, and global environmental sustainability – people and the planet – are deeply linked. Geopolitics are fundamentally rooted in biophysical processes, however, deeper biophysical systemic drivers are often overlooked as contributors to socio-political instability (Downing et al., 2020:1-6).

Today, a growing global population demands the allocation of ever more natural resources to meet a seemingly insatiable desire for consumption. This demand strains the availability of natural resources and increases competition over their use. As a result, humanity may face a future of irreversible environmental damage and continuing conflict over access to dwindling environmental resources (Yanniris, 2021: 1-17).

The concept of environmental sustainability is one major factor that gave birth to the new development narrative - sustainable development. Environmental sustainability is, therefore, one indispensable component of sustainable development. To adequately measure sustainable development, environmental sustainability is a sine qua non to achieving that. Peace building is an important element in achieving sustainable development. Peace building is often used to include preventive diplomacy and peacemaking (Nweke, 2018:105-121).

Peace and security education is a multi-disciplinary enterprise involving political science, sociology, philosophy, psychology, law, history, economics, international relations and development studies. It is ironic that the African continent have been faced with different forms of conflict, yet peace and security education and research have languished behind, irrespective of the progress recorded in other parts of the world. Peace and security education should challenge the dominant paradigm where decisions on peace and security are monopolized by the state and its institutions such as the arms industry, security agencies and politicians (Igbuzor, 2011:1-7).

There is growing recognition that peace and security are fundamental for socio-political and economic development of any country in the world. Yet violent conflicts, whether social, political, or environmental, has significantly contributed to the crisis of sustainable development and security challenges in terms of loss of human and material resources (Uwa et al., 2022: 88-103).

The need for linking human rights, peace and development has been reiterated across several forums in the UN especially since the publication of the UN peace reviews in 2015 and in the context of the SDGs. Why then focus particularly on economic, social and cultural rights? Two of the key points in the concept of sustaining peace are the need to focus on root causes and to become more effective in prevention of destructive conflicts. In these two areas particularly, economic, social and cultural rights are important as they encompass the foundations for security as desired by millions of people – food, water, health, housing, work, education (Cahill-Ripley and Hendric, 2018: 8-47).

### **Geopolitical uncertainty**

The geopolitical world is becoming increasingly more complex, volatile, and unpredictable. According to former head of UN Peacekeeping Jean Marie Guehenno, today there are seismic shifts in world order from one of hegemony and bilateralism, through multilateralism, to a new crisis of complexity. In this highly interconnected new order, nonstate actors such as corporations, billionaires, nongovernmental organizations, terrorists, and computer hackers wield more power in the political realm than ever before (Coleman et al, 2019:84-91).

The sustaining peace project is being initiated during a turbulent period in global governance. A phase-shift is underway from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. Some have responded by turning their backs on multilateralism and by reverting to nationalism and populism, such as right wing oriented parties and politicians in some European countries (Italy, Germany, Spain, Poland, Austria, France and others). Most rely on the UN that, despite its imperfections, is the only globally representative body where international disputes can be settled peacefully, and common agendas like climate change can be negotiated and pursued. Organizations like the UN are often more open to change during periods of disruption than they are during periods of stability. States are, however, likely to be more cautious and reforms can thus be expected to unfold gradually, rather than rapidly.

Some states from the Global South have expressed concern that the sustaining peace agenda, and especially its conflict prevention elements, can be used by the Global North as an entry point for interfering in their domestic affairs. Some have also expressed concern that it represents a politicisation and securitisation of development, and that it may re-direct development funding away from long-term development towards short-term prevention initiatives. Some in the Global North are concerned that if they support the sustaining peace initiative, they are going to be under pressure to contribute more to multilateral institutions, and especially the UN.

Although the sustaining peace resolutions were a member state initiative, there is now growing unease among some member states about how such an approach may affect their interests. The Secretary-General, with the support of like-minded member states, needs to maintain momentum and expand support among key member states in the North and South. He needs to invest more time in listening too, and taking confidence building steps to address the concerns of both blocs. Member states need to show more strategic patience, accept that reforms will need to be introduced gradually so that they can be integrated with minimum negative disruption, and keep their eye on the medium- to longer-term benefits of making the UN more fit for the challenges of the 21st century (De Coning, 2018:1-4).

The world today faces additional and serious geopolitical challenges that, among other things, directly threaten the project of sustainable peace. Among them are the war in Ukraine, tensions in Middle East, China's structural "slower-for-longer" growth conditions, Earth climate changes, usages of AI and development of new technologies, energy crisis and many more. All of the above challenges will shape the geopolitical reality and therefore the concept for sustainable peace and development.

### **Conclusion**

Peace and development are continuous processes that require constant cultivation and may necessitate decades of effort before their benefits are realized. Sustainable peace will not be achieved if it is relegated to technical development projects. Political leadership in governments and societies will be the key driver of change. Putting people at the center of achieving sus-

tainable peace will require every country to devise its own plans based on an understanding of root causes and solutions in each context. Whole societies and communities must be involved in advocating for and formulating people-centered approaches (Hearn, 2016:3).

This new international approach to conflict resolution bases itself on the premise that a peaceful international environment has its foundations on stable, fully functional states that would allow political freedom and economic development to its citizens. In other words, international stability is linked to the Western, liberal model of states, whether target states are culturally and socially fit for such model or not (Valenca, 2011:637-646).

Modern war has caused so much destruction of the life on this planet, but it also may be possible that crave for peace at the expense of principle can result in destroying much of the human spirit on this planet. Peace gotten at this price could lead to a degradation of the human race and subjection of human beings to a form of mental decay which pilfers the capacity for moral and intellectual judgment. In many international situations today, there is a threat to fundamental human values and good international relations are in jeopardy. Men thus frequently face a serious dilemma in choosing between action to preserve peace and action to defend values which will make peace worthwhile (Jelilov and Aleshinlove, 2017:1-7).

Development action requires a continuous investment, whether in education, the environment, infrastructure, or institutions and governance. Indeed, while it has been claimed that there can be 'no development without security and no security without development', this tells only half the story. Security and peace are necessary, but not sufficient for development, as the quality of the security (peace) itself can affect whether development succeeds and if it is sustainable (Milante, 2017:219).

We believe that the geopolitical future and thus geopolitical challenges and trends will continue to shape sustainable peace and development. Key aspects, principles and pillars of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding will continue to deliver results but there should be changes in their architecture and mechanisms because of the reduced influence and outcome. This is most visible and striking when the interests of great and regional powers countries directly interfere with the development of countries and theirs sustainable peace. The diminished role and influence of the United Nations and other international organizations are evident when it comes to non-compliant countries and that is one of the most biggest and dangerous challenges that modern society will face.

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Scientific article

UDK 005.334:[616.98:578.834-036.21(497.7)

UDK 355.45:[616.98:578.834-036.21(497.7)

## THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INSTITUTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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**Abstract:** *The interests of states in the field of national security do not differ much. They are the following: the protection of sovereignty, independence, territory, population, natural resources, basic principles, and values, which constitute the basis for future development and enhancement of well-being and contribution to harmonious relations with other countries. What differentiates them is the extent to and the manner in which the afore-stated interests are realized.*

*Starting from the complexity of the interests and values that the state builds and develops, and for the purpose of national security, we will tackle the part of achieving and preserving the stated interests during crises, specifically the emergence and management of pandemic situations and the protection of national security in certain institutions (police, army, judiciary), whose work is directly and indirectly related to the security of citizens.*

*The nature of COVID-19 had a tendency of threatening national security in all areas of life: the political system, human rights, the judiciary, the media, the economy, health, education, the security sector itself, including the police, the military, and the overall security intelligence community. This paper will cover the second and third years of the pandemic.*

*The paper used quantitative and qualitative methods, which when applied gave us different numbers and facts complemented by the actions of different institutions, as key elements of national security, and we expect the paper to be instructive for the academic community, state authorities, society, and individuals about how to better prepare for future pandemics*

**Keywords:** *pandemic, COVID-19, national security, police, army, human rights.*

### Introduction

The concept of national security and defense is rooted in the national values and proclaimed interests of the Republic of North Macedonia, respect for the Constitution and laws, the equality of all citizens regardless of their ethnicity, the democratic basis of the state, the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, the market economy, social justice, and respect for international law and international treaties and agreements. The strategic determination and goal of the Republic of North Macedonia and its national concept of security and defense is the permanent determination of the Republic of North Macedonia to realize its future as part of the European family and a member of NATO and the EU<sup>3</sup>. North Macedonia achieved its goal and became a member of NATO during the COVID-19 pandemic, on 27 March 2020, after 27 years.

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**The functioning of institutions from the security and judicial system of the Republic of North Macedonia during the COVID-19 pandemic**

**- The Police of North Macedonia –**

The struggle to deal with COVID-19 caused the need for an urgent restructuring of the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which, as the holder of the function of performing internal affairs, by the established competencies, worked with great dedication and cooperated with all the institutions competent to act in this domain. The main priority for action was the implementation of decisions and measures on the entire territory of the state, and the available capacities of the Ministry were strategically aimed at implementing national measures and decisions, as well as providing the necessary support to the health system. The Ministry of Internal Affairs actively participated in the work of the Coordinating Body established on 28 February 2020, by the Ministry of Health for the collection and exchange of information for the implementation of measures to prevent the occurrence, early detection, prevention of the spread and handling of the infection with COVID-19.

On 21 March 2020, the Operational Headquarters was formed with representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense - the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia, for timely coordination of the activities of the Ministry, the forces and assets of the Army, which during this period was engaged in physically securing the facilities of particular importance and conducting patrols and checkpoints for securing the state border. In 2020, the activities of the Ministry were mainly aimed at implementing the measures related to the ban on the gathering and movement of citizens, including the measures of isolation and self-isolation, followed by the mandatory wearing of protective masks, limiting the operation of business facilities, etc.

About the established measures of isolation and self-isolation, the Ministry conducted a total of 1,091,657 controls, during which 469 violations were determined. Due to non-compliance with the measures of isolation and self-isolation, 276 criminal charges were filed against 344 perpetrators, for 325 crimes committed, as well as 27 misdemeanors, against 27 persons. Within this offense, 949 persons were warned in writing, and two criminal acts committed by 28 persons were recorded for gathering in groups. The departments of internal affairs, independently or in cooperation with the State Market Inspectorate, carried out 43,132 inspections of catering establishments, cafeterias, bars, restaurants, clubs, casinos, and sports betting shops by the measures of the Government, and for the entire period, irregularities were determined in 258 establishments, for which 56 criminal charges were filed against 75 individuals and 18 legal entities. According to the Decree on wearing personal protective equipment on the person, 127,391 violations were detected, of which 127,059 violations were recorded against natural persons, 328 violations were recorded against legal entities, and four responsible persons were reported.

For persons coming from countries with a medium and high degree of risk, state quarantine facilities were designated, which were secured by members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and members of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia. A total of 7,588 people covered by the state quarantine measure were housed in the mentioned facilities. For non-compliance with this measure, 25 criminal charges were filed against 32 perpetrators, for 29 committed crimes. With the government's decisions to restrict the movement of the population by police

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*Собрание на Република Македонија, No.07- 2824-1, Скопје, 11 Јуни 2003, <https://www.mod.gov.mk/inc/uploads/2021/06/Nacionalna-koncepcija-za-bezbednost-i-odbrana-1.pdf> (accessed on 29 May 2022).*

officers, people who did not comply with the prohibition of the movement measure totaled 5,414 people, of which 3,629 people were detained, 399 people were warned, and 1,386 people were documented on the spot. A total of 3,581 criminal reports, 75 misdemeanors, and 359 reports for committed crimes were submitted. During 2020, 1,042 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were infected with COVID-19, 1,521 people were in self-isolation due to contact with a sick person, and five employees died of this disease during this period.

The regional centers for border affairs took 13,811 self-isolation statements, a total of 8,115 people were returned, and 14,928 left the country for more than three months. In the area of criminal matters from this area, 5,463 criminal charges were filed against the perpetrators for 4,494 crimes committed, most of which referred to non-compliance with health regulations during the pandemic, and a smaller number referred to the transmission of an infectious disease. In 2020, 2,325 written requests from journalists and media were processed, and the most common way of informing the public was the meeting with journalists and the daily telephone communication that took place through spokespersons who are in charge of informing the public, both at the central and local level.

The activities of criminal groups related to the smuggling of migrants show an increasing trend. The discovered cases of migrant smuggling have increased by 17.3%, and the measures for criminal prosecution have also increased. During 2020, 95 cases were detected, or 14 more cases compared to 2019, when 81 cases were detected. Measures for criminal prosecution have been taken against 91 people for committing 65 crimes of “migrant smuggling”. With these cases, the smuggling of a total of 2,723 migrants was prevented, whose number shows a positive growth trend of 78% compared to 2019. 32,100 attempts to enter North Macedonia illegally were prevented, and over 85% were prevented from entering the country, mostly at the border with the Republic of Greece<sup>4</sup>. According to the annual human rights report for 2020 of the U.S. Embassy in Skopje, in North Macedonia, in the first year of the pandemic, the number of refugees and migrants in the transit centers in the first eight months amounted to a total of 1,799 people, of which 1,448 people are located in Tabanovce, near the border with Serbia, and in the Vinojug transit center, near the border with Greece, 351<sup>5</sup>.

#### **- Army of Republic of North Macedonia –**

The first year of the COVID-19 pandemic marked the official accession of the Republic of North Macedonia to NATO, as its thirtieth full member, thus achieving the strategic goal of joining the Alliance. The activities of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia referred primarily to the engagement of members of the Army to help institutions and citizens in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic from the first day of the declaration of the state of emergency. Due to the situation, other activities such as conferences and international visits have been reduced to the necessary framework by the current situation. On 14 March, based on the decision of the President of the Republic of North Macedonia and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Stevo Pendarovski, following the Government's decision to declare a state of emergency to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in the municipalities of Debar and Centar Zhupa, the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia was involved in supporting these units of local self-government according to the mission of the Army to assist the population in case of major diseases and epidemics.

<sup>4</sup> *Годишен извештај 2020 година.pdf (mvr.gov.mk) (accessed on 29 May 2022).*

<sup>5</sup> *U.S. EMBASSY in North Macedonia, NORTH-MACEDONIA-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT-MKD-FINAL.pdf, pg. 24., <https://mk.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/249/NORTH-MACEDONIA-2020-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT-MKD-Final.pdf> (accessed on 29 May 2022).*

Part of the military formations participated in joint patrols with the police to secure facilities of vital importance for the state, as well as control points for entry and exit from populated areas, with coordination and guidance from the Government. The members of the Army were involved in the support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to secure parts of the state border, secure vital facilities of state importance, control points in crisis regions, quarantine facilities, provide assistance to the Red Cross in delivering humanitarian aid, provide assistance to local authorities in disinfecting the facilities and ensure the participation of medical teams in public health<sup>6</sup>.

The Army of the Republic of North Macedonia, in the second year of the pandemic in 2021, carried out the planned activities while the protective measures against COVID-19 were still in effect, during which all the planned inter-army exercises and activities were carried out. During this period, two international trainings were carried out as part of the largest field exercise in Europe “Defender Europe 21”, namely the exercises of the special forces “Trojan Print” and “Decided Strike 21”. In February, a promotion was held for the first generation of non-commissioned officers after attaining the full-fledged membership in NATO. The members of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia, who completed the three-month basic non-commissioned officer course (the first group of 65 non-commissioned officers), were ceremoniously promoted to the first rank of non-commissioned officer in a military ceremony, which took place in the “Ilinden” barracks in Skopje.

According to the plan for bilateral military cooperation between the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Greece in the period from 30 August to 8 September 2021, at the Special Forces Training Center of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Greece in Nea Paramos, part of the Special Forces Battalion command completed basic and advanced diving training. In September, members of the Army participated in a crisis management exercise organized by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Center (EADRCC) and the Crisis Management Center, which took place in the Ohrid and Struga area from 20 to 24 September under the name “North Macedonia 2021”. In the period from 18 to 28 October 2021, members of the Army participated in the Disaster Relief Military Mobility Exercise 21, which took place in several regions of Slovenia. The exercise was led by the Joint Command (JC) of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Slovenia with 20 participating countries<sup>7</sup>.

During 2022 and in the course of the third year of the pandemic in which the epidemiological situation was better than the previous two years, the Army of North Macedonia continued holding military exercises. In the “Pepelishte” training camp, the beginning of the field exercise “Blesok 22” was marked, which was performed in the period from 3 to 11 April. The main goal of the exercise was to evaluate the combat readiness of the Light Infantry Battalion according to the Standards for the Evaluation of Ground Commands and Units of the NATO Joint Operational Command – CREVAL (Combat Readiness Evaluation). About 1,100 members of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia, as well as a certain number of evaluators and observers from NATO, participated in the exercise<sup>8</sup>.

On 2 May, the largest multinational exercise ever in the Republic of North Macedonia, called “Swift Response 22” was held at the Krivolak military training area. The multinational exercise covered three regions: the Arctic, the Balkans, and the Baltic. About 9,000 members

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<sup>6</sup> <https://mil.mk/istorija/#1644573431320-d9037b6f-4ced> (accessed on 29 May 2022).

<sup>7</sup> <https://mil.mk/istorija/#1495112694743-e609e9d9-bc05> (accessed on 29 May 2022).

<sup>8</sup> <https://mil.mk/komanda-za-operacii/otvoranje-na-vezhbata-blesok-22/> (accessed on 29 May 2022).

of the armed forces of 17 allied and partner countries were involved in the exercise, which was simultaneously carried out in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, and North Macedonia. The purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the ability to rapidly deploy U.S. ground forces to Europe and Africa alongside multinational air forces from Europe without extensive preparation anywhere in the world. About 4,600 soldiers from eight NATO countries participated in North Macedonia: North Macedonia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Montenegro, Albania and Greece. 45 aircraft, combat, and transport aircraft, and helicopters were involved in the exercise at the Krivolak army training area, and over 700 parachute jumps were performed during the exercise<sup>9</sup>.

Of the international cooperation, that is, the operations of the Army of North Macedonia (ARNM), the most significant for this paper is the presence of the ARNM in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. The agreement between the Republic of North Macedonia and the European Union for the participation of the Republic of North Macedonia in the “ALTHEA” operation in BiH, was signed on 3 July 2006, in Brussels. The first contribution of the Republic of North Macedonia to the operation led by the European Union began in July 2006 with the declaration of the helicopter detachment of the ARNM, which consisted of two Mi-8/17 helicopters and a staff of 21 people. The number of staff in 2007 reached 32 people. In 2008, the number of employees decreased to 24. Only the medical team and the legal advisor made up a total of 11 people in 2012, which continued until 2014. With the new transformation of operation “ALTHEA” and the rebalanced mission, the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia has a new contribution to the mission from December 2018 with one position: deputy officer for relations with law enforcement institutions, in the J-2 section. The contribution to the operation “ALTHEA” is a confirmation of the firm determination of the Republic of North Macedonia for a strong contribution to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union, as well as a confirmation of the overall efforts of the Republic of North Macedonia to the integration in the European Union<sup>10</sup>.

Based on the Decision of the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia in October 2020, the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia participated for the first time in the KFOR mission in Kosovo. The participation was from November 2020 to April 2021, and the Macedonian contingent was made up of 44 military personnel, consisting of staff officers and a security unit. They were deployed in the base of the Regional Command of KFOR - West. In the next rotation, April 2021–September 2021, the participation was increased by 21 members or a total of 65 members, while in July 2021 an additional 115 members were sent to the multinational brigade “East” (one rotation of 9 months) together with the National Guard of Vermont<sup>11</sup>.

### **- The judiciary of the Republic of North Macedonia-**

The health crisis and the state of emergency undoubtedly influenced the actions of the judiciary and the implementation of judicial protection. In the absence of any legal act, that would regulate the work and actions of the courts and judicial authorities during a state of emergency, the work of the courts was regulated by the Decision on the work of the courts in the Republic of North Macedonia in conditions of increased risk of COVID-19, which was

<sup>9</sup> <https://mil.mk/vezhbi/otpochnaa-aktivnostite-za-vezhbata-swift-response-22/> (accessed on 29 May 2022).

<sup>10</sup> <https://mil.mk/megjunarodni-operacii/altea/> (accessed on 29 May 2022).

<sup>11</sup> <https://mil.mk/megjunarodni-operacii/kfor/> (accessed on 29 May 2022).

adopted by the Judicial Council of the Republic of North Macedonia on 17 March 2020. The provisions of the Decision refer to conducting court cases (determining urgent and priority cases for action) and determining measures to protect the judicial service, the parties, and other participants in the procedure.

The functioning of the judiciary in a state of emergency is not provided for by any legal act. The Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, by decree with legal force on the deadlines in court proceedings during a state of emergency and the actions of the Courts and the Public Prosecutors' Offices, suspended the validity of the legal and pre-clause deadlines for filing lawsuits in civil and criminal proceedings, as well as administrative disputes, and suspended the deadlines for declaring regular and extraordinary legal remedies during the state of emergency. The courts were faced with the challenge of ensuring effective judicial protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens by applying different methods of organization in response to measures for protection against COVID-19. The decrees passed during this period regulate a wide range of issues of importance for crisis management, and with respect to the proceedings of the courts, there is a Decree with legal force, which regulates the deadlines in court proceedings during the state of emergency and the proceedings of the courts and Public Prosecutor's Offices. The regulation prescribes legal and preclusion deadlines for filing a lawsuit in civil proceedings, private lawsuits in criminal proceedings, a proposal for criminal prosecution, a proposal for initiating non-litigation proceedings, submitting an enforcement request, a procedure for securing claims, a lawsuit for initiating an administrative dispute, initiating a procedure before the Constitutional Court proceedings or the initiation of any other court proceedings that cease to be valid with the lifting of the state of emergency. The decree stipulates that the legal and preclusion deadlines for declaring legal remedies or taking procedural actions from these procedures cease to apply.

Courts, applying the indications and guidelines of the Judicial Council of the Republic of North Macedonia, 23% of the country's courts (the percentage is made up of first-instance courts) continued to work at full capacity during the state of emergency, while respecting the protective measures. On the other hand, 77% of the courts, including the Supreme Court, Administrative Court, the Court of Appeals, and part of the Basic Courts reorganized the work in the system in shifts and official duties. At the same time, it is important to note that most often the judges themselves determined the priority and urgent cases for action. Out of a total of 6,594 scheduled hearings in civil proceedings, a total of 2,989 were held, while 3,605 or 54.6% of the hearings were postponed. As for the criminal procedure, out of a total of 4,979 scheduled hearings, 2,889 were held, and 2,090 hearings, that is 41.9%, were postponed.

Based on the collected and processed data, it was determined that the Basic Criminal Court Skopje during the state of emergency passed a verdict on a total of 1,320 cases, of which 1,191 cases were in the Department of Criminal Responsibility of Adults and 129 cases in the Department for Organized Crime and Corruption. The other courts of the country from which the data were obtained handled a total of 2,088 cases, while the majority of these cases refer to articles 205 and 206 of the Criminal Code, i.e. of crimes that are the subject of a procedure for issuing a criminal warrant. From this, it can be seen that the attention of the work of the courts was also directed towards sanctioning the acts of disrespect and violation of the mandatory measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, which fulfills the legal nature of the criminal acts "transmission of an infectious disease" from Article 205 of the Criminal Code and "disregard for health regulations during an epidemic" under Article 206 of the Criminal Code<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> <https://fosc.mk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/pravni-implikaczii-vrz-sudskite-postapki-vo->

### Conclusion and recommendations

- The beginning of the pandemic hit the country when the institutions did not function fully, because the parliament dissolved itself. For the first time in the country's history, a state of emergency was introduced. During the pandemic, North Macedonia opened accession negotiations with the EU;

- Human rights were limited, and as time passed, the restrictive measures received more and more criticism from the citizens, who considered them disproportionate;

- The state provided economic aid to the economy, which some experts and the public perceived as weak and inconsistent. Of the economic branches, the textile industry suffered the most damage;

- The health system faced critical challenges even before the start of the pandemic. Providing financial resources and modernizing the provision of health services represent long-term challenges. In addition, health worker migration and labor shortages have also made the health system even more vulnerable during the pandemic;

- The police were strategically focused on implementing national measures and decisions, as well as providing the necessary support to the health system. The activities of criminal groups related to migrant smuggling have shown an increasing trend. The army and representatives of the Ministry of Interior established an Operational Headquarters for the timely coordination of activities related to the pandemic. The first year of the pandemic marked the official accession of the Republic of North Macedonia to NATO, as its thirtieth full-fledged member;

- In the three years since the pandemic, the Republic of North Macedonia had friendly relations with all countries in the neighboring area.

Based on the data presented in the paper, we can give certain recommendations about pandemic situation and ways of dealing with the following adverse events:

- The opposition, the non-governmental sector, and the media should be included in the crisis headquarters. This would avoid unnecessary criticism of using the situation for party interests or personal promotion of civil servants. On the other hand, citizens would have more trust in institutions, they would respect epidemiological measures, and believe less in conspiracy theories;

- The health system should regulate the legal framework that enables cooperation between the private and public sectors in future pandemics so as to free the public sector from overload;

- The educational system should be connected in one national platform, with further training of teachers and children from schools;

- The judicial system should be legally improved to enable online trials in future pandemics for those crimes that are foreseen or can be processed online;

- The National Security Council, in addition to the highest state officials and security services, should also include experts from the non-governmental sector, the academic community, as well as individuals engaged in research in this area. Such a composition would enable a social consensus on the most important topics of national importance;

- To continue with the further construction of quality public services, health, educational, economic, political, and security systems with precise legal regulations, protocols, and procedures, which would enable a faster and more efficient response to future pandemics;

- The security intelligence community should develop strategic steps on how to function

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*vonredna-sostojba.pdf (accessed on 29 May 2022).-(Петровска, Натали, Хаџи-Зафиров, Жарко, Правни импликации на судските постапки во вонредна состојба, Центар за правни истражувања и анализи, Скопје, 2021, стр. 4-13)*

in future pandemics and how to achieve a favorable security situation in the country from the risks and threats that would be realized directly or indirectly using the pandemic, all for the well-being of the citizens and the achievement of full personal and collective security.

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## OPERATIONAL DESIGN OF THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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Dejan MITROV<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract:** *The background of the conflict originates from the end of the XIXth century when the Zionist movement (Israeli) promoted the idea of building an independent state for the Jews in the geographical territory of Palestine. Zionism was fiercely met and attacked by the Arab population of the country and resulted in a clash between the two movements for the possession of Palestine. There are two peoples and one territory, hence the reason for the conflict. Both communities consider Jerusalem their capital. In just 6 days of war, Israel conquered 26,000 km<sup>2</sup> of Arab territory on 3 fronts. It managed to defeat the superior Arab forces with offensive operations, inflicting great losses on the infantry and equipment. Israel's goals were achieved: the Gulf of Tiran was opened to navigation, terrorist attacks were minimized, and the territory was preserved from the Arab threat.*

**Keywords:** *Palestine, Arab population, conflict, offensive operations, attack*

### Introduction

The subject of this paper is an analysis of the operational design and application of the principles of warfare in the 1967 six-day Arab - Israeli war between Israel on the one hand and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, on the other.

Through the analysis of the operational design and the perceived application of the principles of warfare, I will emphasize the importance of the correct application of the principles of warfare, where through an operational design supported by appropriate doctrine and tactics of the use of units, victory over a numerically superior enemy is achieved as the ultimate goal of the war.

The background of the conflict originates from the end of the 19th century when the Zionist movement promoted the idea of building an independent state for the Jews in the geographical territory of Palestine. Zionism was fiercely met by the Arab population and resulted in a clash between the two movements for the possession of Palestine. There are two nations and one territory, hence the reason for the conflict. Both communities consider Jerusalem their capital. Broadly speaking, there are two competing narratives regarding historical and religious ties to the land: the Jewish-Zionist-Israeli and the Palestinian-Arab. The questions "who was there first", who is the victim and who is the aggressor, whose country it is, have since been

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contested by historians, political elites, diasporas, casual observers of the conflict, and of course, the communities themselves.<sup>3</sup>

In 1947, the UN adopted a Resolution proposing the establishment of two states on the territory of Palestine<sup>4</sup>, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jews accepted the resolution, while the Palestinians and the Arab states, represented by the Arab League<sup>5</sup> rejected it and went to war to prevent the creation of an Israeli state.



In that case, Israel has the right to self-defense and to respond to the Israeli challenges.<sup>6</sup>

This is probably the main reason for all the conflicts that later occurred in the Middle East. The borders in which the territories extended in the following years changed almost with every new war.<sup>7</sup>

In May 1967, Egypt received an intelligence report from the Soviet Union that Israel was deploying massive forces on the border with Syria. Egypt took three steps that could not stop the war: first, it deployed forces in the Sinai Peninsula close to the Israeli border, second: it expelled the UN forces from the Sinai Peninsula that were deployed under a UN mandate, and third: it blocked the Straits of Tiran in the Red Sea for Israeli ships (the only exit for Israel to the Red Sea). For Israel, this was an occasion for war. On 5 June, two weeks after this act, Israel took the initiative and began a short and fierce 6-day war that ended with victory over Egypt,

<sup>3</sup> Asaf Siniver, University of Birmingham. *Arab Israeli Conflict*, UK 2018, strain 2-3

<sup>4</sup> United Nations. *Palestine Plan of partition with economic union – General Assembly resolution 181, Part II. Arab State. Israel State. November 1947.*

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Arab-League>

(A regional organization of Arab states that was established in the Middle East and parts of Africa with the aim of promoting Pan-Arabism)

<sup>6</sup> Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: Free Press, 1977)

<sup>7</sup> Lauren Tierney, Laris Karklis and Daniel Wolfe. *Six maps explain the boundaries of Israel and Palestinian territories.* Article. *Washington Post*, November 2023. *Six maps explain the boundaries of Israel and Palestinian territories.* *Washington Post*, November 2023.

Syria and Jordan.<sup>8</sup> According to Albert Kerr<sup>9</sup>, the Arab states were defeated more because of their mutual confrontation than their confrontation with Israel, i.e. they shifted the blame to each other for the defeat and calvary of the Palestinian people.

### **Main events of the war**

Israel first launched a surprise airstrike that destroyed the critical infrastructure of the Egyptian and Jordanian air forces. The air attack was coordinated simultaneously with the ground attack. Almost the entire aviation of the Egyptian Air Force was found on the ground. The only aircraft that were in the air were 4 unarmed aircraft belonging to training flight.<sup>10</sup>

Simultaneously, on 5 June, the eastern front opened as the Jordanian forces launched an artillery strike to shell West Jerusalem - disregarding Israel's warning to King Hussein not to involve Jordan in the war. On 7 June, the Israeli forces drove the Jordanian forces out of East Jerusalem and most part of the West Bank. The result was taking control of the Old City of Jerusalem-East Jerusalem.<sup>11</sup> In the next step, an air attack was carried out to disable the Syrian air force.

### **Egypt and the Sinai operations**

The time of the attack was decided to be 07.45 in the morning according to the estimate that the pilots would be at breakfast, and at the same time dawn was deliberately skipped to avoid the best visibility for the attack due to the expected air defense of Egypt. By doing so, surprise was achieved as a principle of warfare, and the pilots had enough time to rest, which made them more effective in combat. The relief of the land was used, that is, a very low flight altitude of about 100 meters above the ground, which allowed invisibility for radars. In about 3 hours, almost 300 planes were destroyed and almost the entire air force and air defense of Egypt.

On the part of Egypt, 7 divisions with about 90,000 men and about 1,000 tanks were stationed on the Sinai Peninsula. These forces were in a defensive-offensive arrangement, blocking the possible main and secondary routes of approach with readiness to move into a counter-offensive, with strictly fortified arrangement positions that were prepared in the last 20 years. Israel attacked these forces with 3 divisions and two brigades with a total of 45 thousand men and 650 tanks<sup>12</sup>.

The forces were concentrated on a front with a width of 80 km in a dense attack arrangement in order to: first destroy two of their strongest points; second: to make a breakthrough with an armored division to the eastern mountains of the Suez Canal, which would hinder the recovery of Egyptian forces to the interior of the territory, and third: to destroy the cut off and captured forces.

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<sup>8</sup> Ami Gluska. *The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War Government, Armed forces and defense policy 1963–1967*, 2007, strain 255.

<sup>9</sup> Malcolm Kerr; *The Arab Cold War 1958-1964*, Oxford University Press, 1977, strain 126.

<sup>10</sup> Charles B. Long, major; *Analysis of the six day war*, Air Command and Staff College Air University Maxwell ALB, June 1967, strain 5.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Israeli-wars>

<sup>12</sup> Charles B. Long, major; *Analysis of the six-day war*, Air Command and Staff College Air University Maxwell ALB, June 1967 strain 8-9.

TABLE 1 (29:9)  
ISRAELI AIR FORCE LOSSES AGAINST EGYPT ON 5 JUNE 1967

Aircraft	Cause
2	Air-to-air
13	AAA
0	SAM
1	Flew into the ground
2	Own ordnance or target explosion
3	Unknown
19 TOTAL	

TABLE 2 (38:75)

AIRCRAFT LOST ON 5-6 JUNE 1967			
EGYPT: Fighters		JORDAN: Fighters	21
MIG-21	95	Bombers	5
MIG-19	20	Transports	2
MIG-15/17	82	Helicopters	28
SU-7	10	TOTAL	28
Bombers		IRAQ: Fighters	
IL-28	27	MIG-21	9
TU-16	30	Bombers	7
Transports		Bombers	
IL-14	24	TU-16	17
AN-12	8	TOTAL	17
MI 4 Helo	1	LEBANON: Fighters	
MI 6 Helo	8	Bomber	1
Other Helo	4	TOTAL	1
TOTAL	309		
SYRIA: Fighters			
MIG-21	32		
MIG-15/17	23		
Bombers			
IL-28	2		
Transports			
MI 4 Helo	3		
TOTAL	60		
		GRAND ARAB TOTAL LOSSES	615
		ISRAEL TOTAL LOSSES	26

### Review of Israeli and Arab aircraft losses on 5 and 6 June, 1967.

Parallel to the air attack on the morning of 5 June, the ground offensive began at 08:15 with an elite Israeli armored corps of about 300 tanks in order to capture the Main Logistics Base of the Egyptian army in Sinai, El Arish, 50 km to the west. Through intense direct fire and no air support and heavy losses of 35 tank commanders and one battalion commander, the Israelis entered Rafah (under the Gaza Strip) avoiding minefields and using Egypt's internal communication routes which were not mined and destroyed an entire division of Egypt, thus allowing the paratroopers that were planned for Egypt to be directed to the Jordanian front.

Israel's 2nd division led by General Sharon makes a breakthrough towards Abu Agelia where the enemy was well fortified with multi-layer concrete parallel trenches 5 km long, minefields and strong armored and infantry wing support. Night was chosen for the attack due to the fact that the Egyptians were not inclined to war at night, so a bold, complex, but effective plan was implemented.<sup>13</sup>


The attack was first carried out by the infiltration of paratroopers in the enemy background, who destroyed the fire support of the artillery, infantry with armored units were used in the main direction of attack, while from the north the flanks were protected by tanks and infantry units. A breakthrough was achieved on these two routes, opening the way for Israeli forces to attack into the interior of Sinai.

Israel's 3rd Division operated between the 1st and 2nd and broke through the desert where it encountered less resistance and reached the Suez Canal and thus the Egyptian forces were blocked, cut off and isolated in the Sinai. Then, via aviation support, the two Israeli divisions massacred the Egyptian forces who suffered huge losses. On 9 June, the Egyptian representative at the UN unconditionally accepted a ceasefire.

The epilogue was as follows: 90000 Egyptian army was destroyed, about 12 thousand soldiers were killed, about 700 tanks destroyed and about 80% of material assets, while on the Israeli side the losses were 300 people and 61 tanks.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Capt. W. J. Kotsch, *USN, the Six-Day War of 1967*, US Naval Institute, Article, June 1968.

<sup>14</sup> Charles B. Long, major, *Analysis of the six-day war*, Air Command and Staff College Air University Maxwell ALB, June 1967 strain 12.



**Israel's operations and overview of losses in the operations in the Sinai Peninsula**

### Jordan and West Bank operations

On the eve of the war before 5 June, Jordan concentrated 9 of its 11 brigades in the West Bank with a strength of about 45,000 men deployed in 2 defensive sectors: the Northern in Samaria and the Judean sector stretching south from Ramallah through East Jerusalem to Hebron (please see image below). Although initially representing defensive sectors, offensive actions were gradually taken targeting Israel. The intention was to firmly hold the zones around Jerusalem and Jenin, and to defend more easily the rest of the front. On the Israeli side, 6 brigades were deployed in a completely defensive position with the aim of defending the territory of Israel.




Figure 3

TABLE 4 (5:315)

JORDANIAN/ISRAELI CASUALTIES IN THE WEST BANK CAMPAIGN

<b>JORDAN:</b>	
Killed in action	696
Wounded in action	421
Missing in action	2,000+
(Note: Most of these were West Bank inhabitants who simply went home after defeat.)	
<b>ISRAEL:</b>	
Killed in action	550
Wounded in action	2,400

The plan of the Israeli offensive consisted of two phases: first, to secure three initial objectives before the ceasefire, and second, to exploit the success of the first phase. The objectives were to move the border line south towards Jenin in order to protect the airfields and the Jezreel Valley from Jordanian artillery; to protect and expand the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv corridor and to provide a link to the Mount Scopus enclave that had been separated from Israel since 1948. The accomplishment of these 3 objectives would enable the second phase of the operation, which was to destroy the Jordanian army in the West Bank and conquer it.

Israel attacked with two brigades in order to cut off the northern and eastern approaches to the city of Jerusalem and with the third brigade attacked from the southern side in order to capture the hills and cut off the Jordanian forces from the Bethlehem-Hebron area. These attacks with the support of artillery, armored units and Air force were successful. The Parachute Brigade carried out a very risky raid operation on East Jerusalem, attacking in the north and cutting the link of forces that had surrounded the city of Jerusalem. Fighting mostly at night, without artillery and air force support, the paratroopers slowly advanced and joined forces from the East and captured East Jerusalem.

The Israeli penetration from the north began with a strong aerial preparation of the battlefield in advance and the attack of the Jordanian convoys by the Air force, which triggered the Jordanian collapse. On 7 June, Israel and Jordan accepted the truce proposed by the UN whereby Israel conquered Jerusalem in its entirety, Hebron and the entire West Bank.

Syria and the operations on the Golan Heights

In the period between 1948 and 1967, Syria turned the Golan Heights into a large fortified area with arranged positions for weapons and systems, bunkers, dug-in tanks and artillery pieces, roads, etc. It was a completely arranged position that allowed a good overview of Israel's Huley Valley and the Sea of Galilee. Syria deployed about 40 thousand soldiers in 8 brigades. From this position, Syria was able to fire more than 10 tons of shells per minute from 265 guns located along the length of the ridge with good visibility towards Israel. Israel opposed these forces with 20000 soldiers and 250 tanks. Up to 8 June during the war, the Syrian front was the least active. Apart from the penetration of three reconnaissance companies on the Israeli side, the activities of the Syrian army was mostly artillery fire on targets in Israel from the Golan Heights.




TABLE 5 (4:180; 13:257; 5:326)

*SYRIAN/ISRAELI LOSSES IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS CAMPAIGN	
SYRIA:	
Killed in action	1,000
Wounded in action	2,000+
Prisoners captured/missing	560
Tanks destroyed	33
Tanks captured intact	40
100mm self-propelled guns lost	13
Other artillery destroyed/captured	130+
ISRAEL:	
Killed in action	127
Wounded in action	625
Tanks knocked out	160
(Note: All but 30 were repaired)	

\*Figures varied somewhat among the sources.

During this time the Israeli forces were on the defense and were awaiting for the results of the fronts towards Egypt and Jordan. On 8 June, the Israeli Air Force diverted the operations to attack Syrian positions, first destroying the anti-aircraft artillery and then the artillery guns. On 9 June, the ground offensive began. The goal was to capture the Golan Heights. The task was to breach the Syrian defenses in the northern sector of the Banias-Quneitra line of communication, allowing the armored forces to attack the enemy's rear in order to threaten the Syrian reinforcement and withdrawal. The primary strike was carried out north towards Tel Fakhra, and

several secondary breakthroughs were made on the defense line, which created conditions for advancement. The attack was carried out with two brigades under heavy enemy fire. The Israeli Air Force provided strong Air Force Support and Close Air Combat (CAS)<sup>15</sup>. On 10 June, fresh forces from the north were engaged in the actions where, supported by a massive air strike of the VV, they broke the Syrian forces, driving them to leave their positions and start fleeing to the east. Key events were the capture of the Bania-Kunetra communication and Kunetra. The result was complete conquest of the Golan Heights.

### Outcome of the 6-day war

In just 6 days, Israel conquered 26,000 km<sup>2</sup> of Arab territory on three fronts<sup>16</sup>, managing to defeat the superior Arab forces with offensive operations, and inflicting great losses on the infantry and equipment. The objectives were achieved: the Gulf of Tiran was opened to navigation, terrorist attacks were minimized and the territory was preserved from the trilateral threat.




TABLE 6 (28:7)

APPROXIMATE FORCE STRENGTHS, SIX DAY WAR, 1967						
Available	Israel	Total Arabs	Egypt	Jordan	Syria	Iraq
Mobilized Manpower	210,000	309,000	200,000	46,000	63,000	--
Tanks	1,000	2,337	1,300	287	750	--
APC	1,500	1,845	1,350	210	585	--
Artillery Pieces	203	962	575	72	315	--
SAMs	50	160	160	0	0	--
AA Guns	550	2,050+	950	?	1,100	--
Combat Aircraft	286	682	431	18	127	106

### The territory of Israel before and after the 1967 Six Day War and an overview of the balance of power

#### Operational design<sup>17</sup> of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and Elements of Operational Design

##### End State of Israel

For the Israeli forces, the end state was to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country and prevent the humiliation of the Israeli people by the Arabs. Arab countries

<sup>15</sup> JP-3-09.3.Joint publication. Close Air Support, November 2014, US ARMY, strain 26-35.

<sup>16</sup> Ian J. Bickerton, Carla L.Klausner; *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 7th edition, 2015, strain 170.

<sup>17</sup> AJP 3.2-Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Edition B, version 1. Operations design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art. Operations design establishes the sequence and purpose of critical actions, assigning missions and priorities to subordinates and supporting commands. February 2022, strain 58.



aimed to destroy the Israeli state.

Israel's strategic goals were securing the state border, freedom of movement in the Gulf of Tiran on the Red Sea and unblocking Israeli maritime traffic, further deterring the threat of bombing through the state border, preventing cross-border terrorist attacks and removing the threat of invasion.<sup>18</sup>

The main operational objective in the Sinai operation was the destruction of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Tactical objectives were: destroying the aviation infrastructure of the Sinai Peninsula first, then breaking through the Egyptian defenses at Rafah, capturing the main logistics point of the Egyptian army for Sinai 50 km west of Rafah, cutting off the Egyptian forces across the desert to the Suez Canal and closing the routes for curing and destroying the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula.

The operational objective in the West Bank was to isolate and destroy the Jordanian forces and prevent their line of communication and supply;

The operational objective in the Golan Heights operation was to destroy the Jordanian forces in the Golan Heights. The tactical objectives were to break through the Syrian defenses towards Bania and Qunetra first by conquering Tell Fakhar, thus opening the way for bypassing, destroying and expelling them from the Golan Heights.

### Tasks

The Israeli forces set to conduct the following tasks: defeat the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula and expel them outside the borders of Israel, deterring and preventing an attack from the north by Syria, and preventing an attack by Jordan.

### Center of gravity<sup>19</sup>

Before launching an attack on Sinai, the Israeli forces determined the Egyptian air force, being a critical capability, as the center of gravity. Egypt had aircraft that had the capacity (critical capability)<sup>20</sup> to carry out bombing raids on Israeli cities, they also had MiG-21 fighter-bombers for air combat, and that air superiority later turned out to be decisive for the outcome of the war. Hence, the center of gravity for the Israeli forces was the Egyptian Air Force. The destruction of the center of gravity further proved to be decisive for the operations in the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

During the entire time of carrying out the operations, Israel used a direct approach, i.e. high-intensity military operations with the use of phases in the operations, sequencing, synchronization in the attacks without reaching a culmination. On the other hand, the culmination was reached very quickly by the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces. They lacked a concrete and decisive plan of action. Considering the rhetoric, they used an indirect approach, i.e. non-military operations, namely, psychological action against Israel.

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<sup>18</sup> Charles A. Sternberg, *Arab-Israeli Six Day War of 1967: Essential Elements of Operational Art*, June 1996, US NAVY.

<sup>19</sup> ADRP 3-0 Operations, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication*, US ARMY, November 2016, p. 26-27.

<sup>20</sup> JP-5-0, *Joint Publication*, US NAVY, *Center of Gravity Analysis*, December 2020, p.-177-181.

**Decisive factors****Decisive factors in the Sinai Peninsula operation were as follows:**

- the destruction of the enemy's aviation infrastructure in Sinai and partly in Egypt and gaining superiority in the air space;
- the breakthrough at the city of Rafa;
- the occupation of the Main Logistics Command Post near El Arish;
- the breakthrough at Abu Agelia;
- the crossing of the desert closing the routes for the enemy's withdrawal at the Mitla Passes and the Suez Canal;
- excellent training and self-confidence of soldiers and commanders;
- detailed familiarization with the mission and tasks at all levels, which enabled replacement of personnel and continuation of the mission until the goal was accomplished;
- excellent application of the combat operational system INTELLIGENCE<sup>21</sup> in the preparation and execution of operations, Israeli intelligence provided real information from the field even when the information was not favourable for its own forces; they provided a realistic picture of the situation on the ground that enabled objective decision-making. The Israeli forces obtained information about the plans of the Egyptian defense forces and the plans for the use of units (defense and contingency planning) of Egypt and later Syria. They got timely information on the movement of forces, through the study of the MiG-21 aircraft by a defected pilot from the Iraqi Air Force, they unraveled the techniques, tactics and procedures for the use of the aircraft that later made them superior in air battles, an excellent intelligence assessment of the Egyptian army that no is ready for war by 1969-1970 at the earliest, solid use of the IMINT discipline from airspace and locating Egyptian forces in the Sinai. An excellent assessment of the morale and readiness of the Egyptian army, well-developed lines of action for aviation through an attack on the Sinai from the Mediterranean. The greatest factor used here was the agency networks and the use of the HUMINT<sup>22</sup> discipline. The element SIGINT (signal intelligence) and COMINT (communication intelligence) - which are part of EW (electronic reconnaissance and counter-electronic actions) - would be added here. They misinformed the enemy by breaking the code marks/intercoms and issuing false orders and create confusion in the Egyptian ranks, etc.
- excellent combat service support of the units in the field;
- ensuring the operations and cooperation with the Air Force;

**Decisive factors in the West Bank operation were as follows:**

- the success of the operation in Sinai was exploited in such a way that a special parachute brigade planned for the Sinai Peninsula was used for an assault in East Jerusalem;
- the military aviation was completely diverted to attack the targets on the West Bank;
- the Jordanian forces were cut off in the West Bank near Ramallah, the connection between the sectors, that is, the zones of responsibility, was lost;
- decisive battles of the special parachute forces in East Jerusalem;

**Decisive factors in the operation in Syria were as follows:**

- exploitation of the successful operations towards Egypt and Jordan by redirecting the WV operations towards Syria;

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/intelligence-during-the-six-day-war-1967-2>

<sup>22</sup> ADRP 2-0. Army Doctrine Reference Publication. INTELLIGENCE. The Intelligence Disciplines. US ARMY, August 2012, strain 4-4, 4-5.

- a truce was concluded with Egypt on June 7;
- the capitulation of Jordan on 7 June;
- destruction of the Syrian Air Defense and Air Force on the Golan Heights;
- breakthrough from the north of the Syrian defense on the Bania and Qunetra routes;
- bypassing the Syrian defense in the central part of the Golan Heights;
- cutting the reinforcement of the Syrian forces from inside Syria and the capital Damascus;

### **Effects that were achieved in the six-day war**

In the Sinai Peninsula operation, several effects were achieved that led to a complete success in the war:

- supremacy was established in the air space;
- the morale of the Egyptian army in the Sinai Peninsula was destroyed;
- Egypt was neutralized as the leader of the Arabs;
- the forces deployed in Sinai were disintegrating;
- the enemy was paralyzed in breaking through the desert and their escape routes through the Suez Canal was blocked;

- the enemy was deterred from carrying out a decisive attack on the Israeli forces;

The following effects were achieved in the West Bank operation:

- almost the entire Air Force of Jordan was destroyed;
- the Jordanian forces were deterred from offensive actions after the initial success on the Sinai front;

- supremacy was established in the air space;

The following effects were achieved in the Golan Heights operation:

- deceiving the enemy by attacking them on the steepest parts in the north which were less defended.
- there was pressure on the Syrian forces not to send reinforcements to the Golan Heights by blocking the access routes and destroying their military aviation;

**Lines of operations**<sup>23</sup> link a series of successive operational and tactical objectives leading to the achievement of the ultimate objective. In all three fronts opened by the Israeli army, out large-scale offensive actions were carried out. In the first phase of the operations, the offensive actions were aimed only at Egypt, while Syria and Jordan were on the defensive. The operations were planned in phases, where the Air Force performedoperated in synchronization with the ground attacks. The operational and tactical objectives were determined by stages: first, the destruction of the air defense and air defense infrastructure, then ground operations on precisely determined routes with sequencing and planned introduction into combat of the three divisions attacking Sinai. While the operation with Syria continued, the transition phase was carried out in the conquered territories of the West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula.<sup>24</sup>

**Sequencing** is the arrangement of actions in order to achieve the effects that generate decisive conditions. In that sense, Israel used a limited air force and ground army to achieve the planned operational objectives with maximum concentration of the forces available at the moment to defeat a numerically stronger enemy. It must be noted here that the ground forces did

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
<sup>23</sup> ADP 5-0, *Army Doctrine Publication. The Operational Process. US ARMY, June 2019, strain 2-13.*

<sup>24</sup> ATP 5-0.1, *Army Techniques Publication, Army Design Methodology, Operational Art. US ARMY, July 2015. Strain 1-5.*

not always have air support, but due to the huge initial success, a large number of forces were aimed at precisely designated targets in a precisely determined time, which multiplied the effect.

**Synchronization** represents the organization of military operations in time and space in order to achieve the maximum effect of combat power at a decisive place and time.<sup>25</sup> After successfully conquering the airspace resulting from superior intelligence, planning and training, the Israeli Air Force focused on the ground support of forces primarily against armored artillery, force movement and fortified facilities.<sup>26</sup> Throughout the operations, the air force was controlled by one main command and was integrated for combat and ground operations, which confirmed the high level of synchronization of Israel's forces.

**Operational breaks** were made through echeloning, that is, the introduction of new fresh forces on all 3 fronts, and the most pronounced was on the Syrian Front. After the successful execution of operations and cease-fire on 8 June with Egypt and Jordan, Israel was moving towards Syria again by conducting large-scale offensive operations while using the maneuver as a form of offensive actions.



## Operational design of the 1967 Six-Day War

### Principles of warfare in the Israeli Arab six day war

#### Principle of Objectives

Israel's objective in the six-day war is to preserve the integrity of the territory and the nation. The Six Day War is a war of survival that initially developed two national strategic military objectives and one implied political objective. The two strategic goals were to firstly open the

<sup>25</sup> NATO STANDARD, AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Planning Of Operations Edition A, Version 2. May 2019, strain 3-10.

<sup>26</sup> Ronald D.Jones LTC, Israeli Air Superiority in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: An Analysis of Operational Art, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, June 1996, strain 12.

Gulf of Tiran and to destroy the forces of Egypt from the Sinai Peninsula, which would deter the Jordanian and Syrian forces from their borders, while the political goal was achieved with the victory after which the Arab countries would recognize Israel as a state that would exist on the territory of Palestine forever.

The achievement of the strategic military objectives was achieved through the accomplishment of several operational objectives that were very skillfully fulfilled. The strongest blow was inflicted first on Egypt as the strongest opponent and it was not by chance that it was chosen for that, thus opening the way for a positive outcome on the other two fronts.

With this war, the military balance shifted dramatically in favor of Israel (military dominance in the region)<sup>27</sup>, and Pan-Arabism suffered a significant defeat.

### **Principle of Offensive**

Israel's entire Six-day war can be defined as offensive. Israel in all operations acted decisively first with well-prepared plans and sequencing of operations, as well as excellent selection of targets and centers of gravity in individual battles. The Israelis took and maintained the offensive in the air, but the same applied on the ground<sup>28</sup>.

### **Principle of Surprise**

The Israeli morning attacks were a textbook example of the application of the principle of surprise in warfare. An excellent RPBP allowed the principle to be fully applied. Courage, deception, and timeliness of actions were all present, which enabled a high degree of surprise.

### **Principle of Security**

This principle was also successfully applied by Israel, not only during the war but also before, with respect to keeping data and information security at the highest level. Even the citizens of Israel who lived near some of the airports from where the attack was carried out did not know what was happening. The excellent intelligence network allowed the pilots a detailed preparation of the operations, including data on the locations of the Egyptian squadrons and forces, radar positions and missile positions, as well as data on the habits of the soldiers, personalities, etc.

### **Principle of Mass and Economy of Forces**

The entire Israeli Air Force was engaged in the attack on Egypt. The principle of mass was perfectly applied through the selection of the 10 most important attack locations, airports that were attacked in simulation. 391 aircraft were destroyed on the ground, and 60 in air battles. Only 12 aircraft were left to defend the territory<sup>29</sup>. Israeli ground forces were also deployed massively on two points (Rafa and Abu Agelia) in Sinai where armored and infantry units were concentrated on the attack. The economy of forces was also reflected in the use of the parachute brigade, which, after the initial success in Sinai, was diverted to attack the West Bank and East Jerusalem, thus achieving massiveness and economy at the same time with a small number of forces.

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<sup>27</sup> Roger Louis, Avi Shlaim. Cambridge University Press .Excerpt: *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, 2012.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas E. Glazer LtCol, USMC, *The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War: An Analysis Using The Principles Of War*, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, May 2001

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-air-force-in-the-six-day-war>

### **Principle of Maneuver**

The Israelis made an excellent use of the maneuver in several cases: in the Sinai Peninsula, they first crossed the deserts with one division, which Egypt considered impossible, and cut off the Egyptian forces, blocking them and encircling them in a trap. Also, before they reached the end point, they set up an ambush which they exploited to the maximum and in close support with the air force inflicted huge losses on them in the air and on the ground. Another example of an excellent maneuver was in Syria, directing the forces to the most difficult points of the terrain that was the least defended as a direction of action, instead of the easier terrain which was expected to be defended by a larger number of forces, thus achieving a surprise element by attacking from the rear instead from the front.

### **Principle of Timeliness and Tempo**

The principle of timeliness was successfully applied by timely planning and choosing the right time to carry out the Sinai operation. The Tempo(pace)<sup>30</sup> was quite high, several dams / (8 in total) were a sign of the high pace of operations, when in 170 minutes the entire Air Force of Egypt was destroyed. On the other hand, the Egyptian General Amer, after Israel's breakthrough at Rafa and Abu Agelia, without consulting the headquarters, called for a retreat, which resulted in the Egyptian forces beginning to disintegrate. Badly made and untimely decisions that produce inadequate force activities neither achieve any effect nor dictate the pace of a planned operation.

### **Principle Unity of Command**

Israel's forces were organized into 3 separate commands under the leadership of the CHOD. South in charge of the operations in Egypt, Central in charge of the operations in Jordan and North in charge of the operations in Syria. All three commands had a different role in a different phase of the Six-day war. While the Southern Command was active and leading the operations, the other two commands were on the defensive expecting a simultaneous attack from Jordan and Syria, which did not happen. They became active after the operation in Sinai was successful, when the Central Command first went on the offensive towards the West Bank and then the Northern Command was also engaged towards the Golan Heights.

### **Principle of Simplicity**

In terms of this principle, the Israelis showed effective and poor application. Simplicity is demonstrated by giving clear and precise orders to achieve a goal that is realistic and achievable. General Tal, who was commanding the ground operation towards Rafah in Sinai, gave clear instructions for the overall operation to succeed; the condition was to win the first objective. This was how the focus was defined. Sand maps were made, the plan as a whole was worked out and each of the senior officers knew his task. On the other hand, in the operations for Abu Agelia, General Sharon's plan was complex and had to be carried out at night. It was a relief that the plan was already known as it was being worked out each year of the Command Staff Academy of Israel and it was well known what was required and which objective was to be achieved at which stage during a possible implementation.

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<sup>30</sup> NATO STANDARD AJP-3.2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERATIONS Edition B, version 1, Chapter 3 – The fundamentals. Tempo, FEBRUARY 2022, strain 38.

### Conclusion

Considering Israel's geostrategic position as a state and the wars it has fought since 1947, it can be concluded that it represents an example of a small and modern army is able to defeat a superior enemy by applying the principles of warfare and operational art<sup>31</sup>. Israel, knowing the operational environment, the limited resources, given the top training of its soldiers managed to achieve a great historical victory. The Israeli forces demonstrated superior operational capability which, through appropriate doctrine and national combat strategy<sup>32</sup>, brought them success over a numerically superior enemy. The excellent application of the battle operational systems and their synchronization allowed them to always achieve superiority over the enemy in a given space and time, who, although had the quantity and quality of armaments, equipment and manpower, failed to oppose them in its entirety.

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## DETERMINATION OF DAILY INTAKE OF COPPER AND ZINC THROUGH FOOD BY TWO METHODS

Nadica TODOROVSKA<sup>1</sup>

Ljupcho SHOSHOLOVSKI<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract:** *The quantities of the essential elements copper and zinc through food were determined by two methods: 1. examination of 54 food products from the groups in one "consumer basket", and calculation according to their representation in a meal; and 2. examination of a full-day meal. No difference has been observed in the determined daily intake for copper 1.388 (1.352) mg Cu/day, in relation to the recommended 1.3 mg Cu/day, and an insignificant difference has been observed in relation to a reduced daily intake for zinc 9.496 (10.248) mg Zn/day regarding the recommended 10.0-11.0 mg Zn/day; however, all this was within the limits of the reference data. The results obtained with the two methods for determining the daily intake of the elements of interest thorough food in the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia are equal. Hence, the choice of a method for determining the daily intake could be reduced to the selection of the second method (analysis of duplicate meals from a full-day meal) as a cheaper and faster method in contrast to the first method, which is very detailed, but takes a long time and is incomparably more expensive because it examines each food represented in the recipe for preparing all meals during the examination.*

**Keywords:** *Copper, zinc, AAS, food products, full-day meal*

### Introduction

According to the current regulations in our country, these elements are often examined in food products and in drinking water, and are of great importance for monitoring their hygienic conformity, and consequently the health condition of the population. Biomonitoring of the possible increase in the quantities of some of the examined essential elements in the environment and in food products above the maximum allowable standard can be an indicator of contamination, and the examination of the biological material can contribute to the prevention, timely diagnosis and appropriate treatment of certain diseases.

Food of plant and animal origin, which is used daily in the full-day meals of a certain population, can be contaminated by the environment (water, air and soil), during production, storage, transportation, during industrial processing and packaging, as well as during the preparation of the meal. The quality of the meal, expressed through the amount of elements copper and

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zinc, varies the most depending on the type of food from which it is prepared, as well as their representation in the meal in relation to the dietary habits of the consumers. A balanced full-day meal composed according to modern norms should correspond to the regulations drawn up for planning and controlling the diet within the population for which it is intended.

### **Material and methods**

Samples of food products, groceries, are analyzed regularly after each purchase of a separate product, and the amount of the elements of interest is examined in the afore-stated. From each food item in the “consumer basket” three different units from different producers or suppliers were examined. In parallel, three samples of the prepared food in the form of a full-day meal (as a duplicate of the meal with one portion of breakfast, snack, lunch and dinner) were examined in the course of five days from the same kitchen of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia. The quantity of elements zinc and copper was determined by flame AAS (FAAS).

With respect to the calculations in the determination of toxic elements in a full-day meal, two methods were used in this paper (WHO, 1996):

1. examining each food product from the “consumer basket” individually and calculating an average daily intake through meal recipes (table 1.), and
2. examination of a full-day meal as a duplicate meal in the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia (table 2).

### **Research and results**

According to the Joint guidance of EFSA, FAO and WHO (WHO, 2011), the basic principles for determining a total meal Total Diet Study (TDS) are the following: the samples should be representative, the foods should be combined, the food should be analyzed in the form as it is consumed. The results presented in Table 1. were obtained by examining samples of three combined food products from different producers (or suppliers) and determining a mean value that is multiplied by the number of grams of food products used in the meals for five days according to the recipes in the Nutrition Plan of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia (Alzahrani et al., 2016). In all the food samples analyzed, the measured presence of copper and zinc was below the maximum allowable concentration MAC limits, and they are considered safe to use.

Table 1. Results from the examination of the quantity of copper and zinc in the food products used to prepare a full-day meal for five days (method 1)

Food products used to prepare a full-day meal for five days	g/5 days	Cu µg	Zn µg
Rice	100	98.07	1311.67
Flour	506	398.73	2231.46
Bread	1500	925.50	5339.00
Pasta	60	24.20	267.44
Tea cookie/biscuit	750	272.80	2380.00

Beans	100	397.37	925.60
Carrot	195	74.43	122.85
Potato	1160	479.47	951.20
Onion	578	46.05	299.60
Cabbage	300	16.80	262.50
Spinach – fresh	200	165.67	1390.67
Canned green beans (can)	400	469.87	2161.33
Canned peas (can)	110	149.05	615.08
Pasteurized peppers (glass container)	120	76.80	174.80
Pasteurized beets (glass container)	400	224.00	1213.33
Pickles (glass container)	200	84.33	149.67
Tomato paste	16	23.89	103.23
Mushrooms – champignons	20	17.40	71.10
Ground paprika	2.1	21.26	32.87
Black pepper	2	12.99	23.21
Parsley	48	17.31	385.76
Mixed spices	13.5	6.66	10.60
Herbal tea (mix)	6	18.89	35.18
Rosehip tea	8	16.92	32.85
Cocoa powder	4	61.31	53.07
Salt	24	10.48	2.15
Soup – beef	9	0.75	3.12
Soup – chicken	7	0.84	2.85
Apple	800	71.47	830.13
Orange juice	200	38.47	55.13
Peach juice	200	64.87	79.20
Apricot juice	200	57.80	86.53
Apple juice	200	30.53	33.87
Cocktail juice	200	39.07	71.13
Plum compote	200	113.93	460.67
Vinegar	24	25.88	27.99
Meat – beef	1100	704.00	7703.67
Meat – chicken	300	139.30	803.80
Pork sausage	160	185.60	1005.33

Beef sausage	150	190.25	876.25
Canned meat cut	450	274.50	3363.00
Eggs – chicken	182	80.69	1995.93
Mayonnaise	20	1.30	7.63
Canned sardines	500	467.83	3502.50
Sterilized milk 3,2% m.f.	1100	42.17	1463.00
Yoghurt	1010	79.45	1545.64
White cheese	500	66.17	1383.50
Spreadable cheese	66	4.20	231.44
Yellow cheese	150	9.10	235.75
Butter	80	4.29	12.80
Sunflower oil	240	6.88	343.20
Mustard	4	0.36	6.84
Honey	100	41.17	174.00
Sugar	170.5	19.59	34.44
Five-day total		6938.88	47480.55

Average daily intake through food		1387.78	9496.11
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The results presented in Table 2. were obtained by examining representative samples of duplicate portions of the meal as consumed by the members of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia.

Table 2. Results from the examination of a full-day meal as a duplicate of the meal (method 2)

Sample of a full-day meal homogenized	Cu µg	Zn µg
Day 1	1355	9798
Day 2	1286	9894
Day 3	1397	10686
Day 4	1289	9988
Day 5	1435	10876
Five-day total	6762	51242
Average daily intake	1352,4	10248,4

Table 3. Comparison of results obtained by the two methods for determining the average daily intake of copper and zinc through food

Performed examinations	Cu mg	Zn mg
Average daily intake method 1	1,388	9,496
Average daily intake method 2	1,352	10,248
Difference	0,036	-0,752

Table 3. presents the differences between the results obtained with the two methods resulting from using the mean value of the combined three food products in the first method, whereas with the second method, only one of the three food products was used during the preparation of the meal. There are also possible influences of the process of preparing the meal for consumption, which were not the subject of this research.

From Table 2, according to the results of the Pearson correlation, it can be concluded that there is a significantly strong positive correlation between relative humidity and carbon monoxide, with a value of  $0.7603$  ( $r(1415) = 0.7603$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $p\text{-value } 0.4794$ ). Additionally, the Pearson correlation shows a significantly strong negative correlation between temperature and carbon monoxide, with a value of  $-0.7789$ , and between temperature and relative humidity, with a value of  $-0.87681$ . Carbon dioxide does not exhibit a significant correlation with any other parameter.

## Conclusion

The obtained results of this research presented in Table 2. and Table 3. show that no difference was observed in the essential elements in the daily intake for copper  $1.388 \text{ mg Cu/day}$ , by the first method, and  $1.352 \text{ mg Cu/day}$ , by the second method, in relation to the recommended  $1.3 \text{ mg Cu/day}$  (WHO, 1998b), which is within the limits of reference data and below the set upper limits (National Academy Press, 2001; EFSA, 2006; EFSA, 2017). An insignificant difference in terms of reduced daily intake for zinc  $9.496 \text{ mg Zn/day}$ , by the first method, and  $10.248 \text{ mg Zn/day}$ , by the second method, compared to the recommended  $11.0 \text{ mg Zn/day}$  (for men) was observed (National Academy Press, 2001; EFSA, 2006; EFSA, 2017), but it was within the limits of the reference data (Tsalev and Zaprianov, 1983; Milacic and Kralj, 2003). It is worth noting that the results obtained with the two methods for determining the daily intake of the elements of interest through food are completely identical.

Hence, the choice of method could be reduced to the selection of the second method (analysis of duplicate meals from a full-day meal) as cheaper (samples analyzed are as many as the number of days the examination lasts, in this research three samples of a homogenized full-day meal for 5 days) and faster unlike the first method, which takes a very long time and is incomparably more expensive, since each food product is tested separately (at least three samples each from different manufacturers) from different groups of food products (different preparation methods, calibrations, modifiers, etc.) represented in the recipe for preparing all meals for five days.

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## ASCRPTIVE ASPECTS OF ROMA IDENTIFICATION IN NORTH MACEDONIA

David BERAT<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** *This paper summarizes the ascriptive aspects of the identification of Roma in North Macedonia. It tends to provide a shorter review of the national movement and ascriptive identity references important for Roma People, as well as it relays upon data from the doctoral dissertation research, "Ethnic minority politics and conflict management: The political participation of Roma in the Republic of North Macedonia" defended on February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024, at the Philosophy Faculty in Skopje.*

**Key words:** *North Macedonia, Roma, identity, national movement.*

### Introduction

The term identity refers to qualities, beliefs, personality traits, appearance, as well as expressions that characterize a certain person or a whole group of people (Leary, 2003). When it comes to identity, sociology as a science emphasizes the collective identity, in which the identity of the individual is strongly related to the behavior of the roles or the set of memberships in the group that defines them. According to Peter Burke, "Identities tell us who we are, and explain to others who we are". At the individual level, identities are created through internal definitions, or independent merits of how a person sees himself through dimensions such as selfishness, humanity, gender, etc. According to Karlsen there are two aspects of identity, nominal and virtual. The superficial or nominal aspect of identity is perceived by the label or name that the individual can assign to his identity, the name can change over time. The virtual aspect of identity is a deep-seated, consequential dimension of identity that is grounded in experience and remains within the individual (Karlsen, 2004).

In accordance with Jenkins' order of interaction, identity should also be confirmed by those with whom the person cooperates, and through the interaction itself, people carry the associated collective identity that follows the line of groups or categories. The internal definition of ethnic identity is the signaling of one's self-identity to other people as a personal or collective process. From here we mean that group identification is that which has meaning to the members of the group, a common association with which they are satisfied as a representation of their identity. The external definition of the ethnic identity represents an oppositely directed process, sometimes imposed outside the group. In some cases, this can be a consensual affirmation of inner identity, but it can also be a conflictual definition by which different names, threats or characteristics are overwritten. Here we can emphasize the following two terms "Gypsies"

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and “Roma”. Blasco emphasizes that the term “Gypsies” is often used as an imposed category, which is increasingly seen as a term of prejudice that reflects the world views and practices of oppression of the dominant population (Blasco, 2002).

The same author emphasizes that the name “Roma” highlights a positive self-association of the group, which reflects a rich origin and cultural dignity, resistance, as well as a common history and interesting identities. In the Roma community, both terms are used and both have meaning. They are used daily by dominant social actors, powerful groups that control social resources such as the media, education systems, and the labor market. These same social actors also have authority, their views and policies are widely accepted and legitimized both by the general public and by the Roma population itself. These terms, once accepted as such and in this way, can have a great impact on the way Roma interpret themselves, experience themselves and finally how Roma choose to participate in society.

Roma around the world are known and called by various names, in English they are known as “gypsy”, “gipsy”, while in Greek they are called “γύφτοι” (gíftoi) or “τσιγγάνοι” (tsiggánoi). In Central and Eastern Europe they are called “Tsingani”, in France “gitans”, “bohémiens” and “manouches”, in Italy “rom”, “zingari” and “sinti”. In Spain they are called “gitanos”, while in Portugal they are called “ciganos”.

The way, that is, the terms with which the Roma identify themselves also varies. In Central and Eastern Europe, they are identified with the term “Roma”. Roma from England call themselves “Romanichal”, Roma from Scandinavian countries identify and name themselves as “Romanisål”. In countries across Europe where the German language is spoken, Roma identify as “Sinti”, while in Spain, Wales and Finland, Roma self-identify as “Kalo” and “Kale”. There are other subgroups with their own self-identification such as “Kalderash”, “Machvaya”, “Boyash”, “Lovari”, “Modyar”, “Xoraxai”, “Lăutari” and others. Since the Roma are identified and identified mostly around the world with the terms gypsies and Roma, I will pay some attention to the origin of both terms.

### **Methodological Framework**

The main empirical basis of this research is qualitative interviews. Qualitative interviews as a method of data collection in research have several features that are common to most interviews. The interviews are based on an interactive exchange dialogue, which means that the same interviews are conducted by face-to-face conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee. Another feature is the thematic focus of the interviews, where identification topics were covered by the questions.

The interviews have a semi-structured form, which is composed of key questions. Semi-structured interviews are characterized by the fact that they are composed of a certain method or structure, but at the same time the conduct of the interview takes place in a flexible way. This means that the interviews from this research are considered semi-controlled, with the questions used being considered as a guide with a strict aim to maintain the focus on the areas needed to cover the topic. Although the questions in the interview are in a specific order, the same order does not have to be followed in the absolute sense of the word. But at the same time, I used an inductive approach in the interview, using the open-ended interview method, because I wanted to give space for research and development of existing theories.

Although my initial idea about the number of respondents was to be twenty respondents, after addressing the interviewees, the number of respondents was reduced to fifteen due to the refusal of five people to be part of the survey due to various reasons. I selected interviewees

who had the appropriate knowledge and experience about the phenomena I was researching. I approached the respondents based on previous knowledge about their involvement and expertise in Romani identification in the country and history expertise.

### Origin of the name gypsy

The term that has been used for centuries for the Roma population around the world, especially around the Balkans and Europe, is gypsy. Roma people have been called by this name for more than 10 centuries, outside the borders of India. Historically, the name gypsies has been known for a long time when the old tribes from the Caspian region were resettled. Among them there were tribes called Sigii and Medii (Middles), who associate the name Gypsies. According to science, their origin is Indo-Iranian. Ever since the occupation of Darius I in the 5th century BC before the tribes left India, the Persians occupied India and became familiar with the culture, language and religion of the tribes. The Persians penetrated into India before the migration of the Roma to the west, they called them Cindi instead of Sindhi. They got their name from the territory they lived in, Sindh. The Persians called them Cindi because of their language pronunciation which was pre-palatal and the same instead of pronouncing Sindhi they pronounced Cindi. Later, the name for the Roma in the Persian Pahlavi language changed from Cindi to Tsangi, so that the Roma who emigrated from India were called Cindik. Then, with the settlement of the Roma in the areas of Asia Minor where Islam was already established, the Muslims adopted the name Cindik from the Pahlavi language and named the Roma with the same term. The use of this word meant a person with liberal views, ie. a free spirited man. The word Cindic has been explained by E.G.Browne (1902) as well as by Philip Hitti (1937).

Today in northwestern Persia there are certain tribes they call Chegens or Chigens. According to Sherif Khan, that name has the same meaning as Roma or Sint and the same people were treated as Roma/Gypsies. Later, the name Chegeni/Gypsies in Europe in the 10th century in Greece changed from Athzingani to Gypsies/Zigoyner in German. Later in the 18th century in Europe, most countries adopted the term Zigeuner, meaning gypsy, which meant a resident of the Indian territory of Sindh. The term migrates from Asia to Europe, first in present-day Greece. In Phrygia and Laconia in 800 AD. Teofan the Confessor (Continuum) mentions them under the name "Atzingani". Giorgi Hutsesmonazoni mentioned "Atsinkani" in 1068 in the records of the Iveron Monastery on Athos. Under that name, the Roma in Greece and on the islands formed living communities that remained recorded in history. On the island of Corfu, in the 13th century there was a so-called "foedum Azingarium", which was later called the Atsingani feudal estate, under the administration of the Angevins from 1386 and it lasted until the 19th century, until the collapse of feudalism. In that possession, they mention the Roma as permanently inhabited "Atsingani". Over time, this term in the Balkans passed from Atzingans to Gypsies.

On the territory of the Balkans, the Roma population were called and are still called by the non-Roma with the name gypsies. In the Romani language, the word gypsy does not exist and it has no use and meaning. Roma people call themselves Roma and thus express their ethnicity. Me sijum **Rom** – (I am Roma), oj tani **Romani** – (she is Roma), on tane **Roma** – (they are Roma). Today, the term gypsy is used as an insulting word in everyday life, and it is associated with stereotypes and prejudices against the Roma. The term is also used by non-Roma, but also towards non-Roma in everyday Macedonian slang. For example, look at the gypsy - if someone has darker skin, don't be a gypsy - where it is pointed out that you are stingy like a gypsy, then gypsy work, steal like a gypsy, lie like a gypsy, the gypsy died that cleans at my home, there

is no one to praise me now, etc. However, the author Ramo Rushidovski (2015) says that the name gypsy should not arouse negative feelings among the Roma because it is an original word from India for their religious and ethnic affiliation. The name was used by the Persians of that time, and it should be treated and accepted correctly, that is, the people from the Sindh area of India were named that way.


### **Origin of the name Roma**

The name that is accepted as their ethnic mark by the Roma and with which they identify is the name Roma. That name is accepted by the Roma from Byzantium and the Balkans, while in recent times almost all Roma in the world have accepted to name themselves with that term, especially after the First World Congress of Roma held in London in 1971. After the Congress, all Roma self-identify with the term Roma, except for the German Sinti and the French Romanichelli.

There are several theories about the origin of the name Roma. Friedrich Pott (2013), believed that the name originates, that is, it is derived from the word Rom, which means man, husband. Dr. S. Sashi and Vir Vahendra Rishi believe that the Roma took the name of the avatar of the god Rama, who was very popular during the period when the Roma left India. Even today, the main gods in Hinduism are Shiva and Vishnu, and Vishnu's avatars are Krishna and Rama, the heroes of the Ramayana epic. Sashi and Rishi explain that by that name Roma are followers and religious of God Rama. Another theory is that the name Rom signifies and derives from one who speaks an incomprehensible Romany language "Argo Romani Chhib". Vukanović (1983), informed that according to linguistics, the term Roma denoted a person who speaks the Roma language, an incomprehensible language. This theory is refuted by Rushidovski (2015), who believes that "this claim has no truth with the ethnic name of the Roma and the Romani language. The language is not an argo, but a protolanguage with grammatical-morphological units, with roots in Sanskrit, from which the Indo-European group of languages arose. It became the largest group of spoken languages in the world through dialectological separation. The language of the Roma is still alive thanks to the establishment and legalization of the lexical and grammatical forms from prehistory until the time of the displacement of the Roma". Rushidovski emphasizes that the issue of language has been discussed since the end of the 18th century.

There is another theory by Jan Kohanowski, which says that the word Roma comes from the word of Indian origin for the Dom caste that changed to Roma. The name of the caste is also mentioned in Arabic sources, which later changed to another word. From the beginning they were called Dom, then Jat, in Arabia it changed from Jat to Zot. The dictionaries of Baranikov and Tournor contain an explanation of Dom and say that members of Dom are migrating musicians, basket weavers, iron workers, etc. Another theory is that the origin of the word Roma is from Byzantium, which denoted people, citizens of the Roma kingdom - Romans. With the disintegration of Byzantium among the Arabs and among the Roma, the name Rumi remained due to the long stay of the Roma in the Byzantine territory. The Roma who live in the territory of the front Asia, especially in Turkey, use this name today.

The most important historical event that contributed to the universal identification of Roma with the name Roma is without a doubt the **First World Congress of Roma**. This congress was held on April 6, 1971 at the suggestion of Slobodan Berberski. The Congress was attended by delegates from 14 countries. They accepted the name Roma, determined an official flag and anthem with which all Roma in the world identify themselves.



**Picture 1: Romani flag**

### **Romani anthem - Gelem, Gelem**

Gelem, gelem, lungone dromensa  
 Maladilem bakhtale Romensa  
 A Romale katar tumen aven,  
 E tsarensa bahktale dromensa?  
 A Romale, A Chavale  
 Vi man sas ek bari familiya,  
 Murdadas la e kali legiya  
 Aven mansa sa lumniake Roma,  
 Kai putaile e romane droma  
 Ake vriama, usti Rom akana,  
 Men khutasa misto kai kerasa  
 A Romale, A Chavale  
 Puter Dewla le parne wudara  
 Te sai dikhaw kai si me manusha  
 Pale ka gav lungone dromencar  
 Ta ka phirav bachtale Romensa  
 A Rromalen, A chavalen  
 Opre Rroma isi vaxt akana  
 Ajde mançar sa lumáqe Rroma  
 O kalo muj ta e kale jakha  
 Kamáva len sar e kale drakha  
 A Rromalen, A chavalen.

At the First World Congress of the Roma, five commissions were established, which dealt with social problems, education, war crimes, language and culture. A permanent Secretariat of the Congress and an Executive Body of the Congress were established. Slobodan Berberski was elected as the first president. The first contact of the Roma with their ancestral homeland India was also established through the Indian embassy in London. Since making the first contact, the connection with mother India will be constantly strengthened. In Chandigarh, the capital of Punjab, Vahendra Rishi founded the Institute of Romological Studies and started publishing the magazine Roma. In 1976, the First World Roma Culture Festival was held in Chandigarh. This festival was actually the first encounter that the Roma had with the ancestral homeland of India. At the festival, the Roma delegation was received by the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi.

In 1977, at the behest of the Indian Mission, the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva adopted a resolution confirming that the Roma are India's historical, cultural, national and linguistic minority and accordingly enjoy the protection and rights that are confirmed by the documents of the United Nations. Since then, the International Organization of the Roma began to address its requests to the UN and its bodies, requesting as a non-governmental organization to become a member of the international community, requesting protection for members of the Roma nationality in all countries where they live and requests for the right to their own national and cultural identity.

### **Identity and the national movement of Roma**

In the middle of the 19th century, the national awakening of the Roma began. Namely, after the passing of the law to end the slavery of 200,000 Roma in Romania, priests and boyars who were holders of the highest aristocratic title at that time put up a great resistance against it. Against that resistance, there was an uprising of the Roma, but it was brutally suppressed. The first attempt at national organization of the Roma originated in 1878. In the same year, Josef Reinhart called to Konstadt, near Stuttgart, the Roma from Italy, Spain and Russia to form an organization that would protect the interests of the Roma and ask the states to allow unhindered travel and trade for members of the Roma people. But after the publication of this news, the German authorities condemned this gathering and forbade the Roma to hold similar gatherings. The following year, in September 1879, the Roma held a meeting in the Hungarian village of Kisfal, but this attempt was also condemned by the Austro-Hungarian state and made it impossible to organize further such gatherings.

In May 1891, George Smith addressed the English Parliament with a request to the government to solve the problems of the Roma in this country. The manifesto of the Roma from Bulgaria, sent to the government of Sofia, originated from that time, in which the government was requested to ensure the civil rights and religious freedoms of the Roma population in Bulgaria. Some time later, the first Roma school was opened in Sofia in 1900, which was closed after a short period. After the end of the October Revolution, in which the Roma took an active part, in 1921 and 1922, attempts were made to establish Roma Councils, but the same idea was successfully realized in the middle and end of the 20th century. At that time, Roma organizations were founded in many places, the Serus Union of Roma, kolkhozes were founded, newspapers and shows in the Roma language were launched, a school was opened in Uzhhorod, books and textbooks in the Roma language were published, and a theater was founded. This period is considered to be the period when the first attempt was made for national awakening and identification and emancipation of the Roma, but the same attempt was again suppressed by the state authorities.

Unlike the Roma movement in the USSR, which had a broad program and heralded a true national awakening, the Roma organizations in Poland had a more traditionalist, national-political character. But the movement in Romania, which appeared in the thirties of the 20th century, had a broader basis and program. Grigoriye Nicolescu called a congress to establish an international organization of the Roma. The Congress was held in November 1933 in Bucharest. At that congress, the idea of returning to the old homeland and establishing a Roma state on the banks of the Ganges or in North Africa appeared. For the realization of the same idea, a visit to the English king was planned as well as a request for support from other world statesmen. But already in 1936, the Romanian authorities banned the Roma organization, while General Antonescu demanded the "cleansing of the country" of all national minorities, and mostly of the Roma and Jews.

In the United States of America, there was a Roma movement in the thirties of the 20th century, when a Roma organization was formed, whose president was Stevo Kozlov. The organization's work included the construction of a Roma settlement near New York, the opening of a school and a workshop for making boilers and other copper and metal objects. Since the same request was denied, Kozlov turned to Franklin D. Roosevelt, who at that time was the governor of New York, who after the meeting provided protection to the Roma, and immediately after that a workshop was opened for the production of copper and metal objects. Initiatives have also appeared in many other countries. In Belgrade, Svetomir Simic, a student at the Faculty of Law, founded the newspaper "Romano lil" (Roma newspaper), which, according to Simic, would be the basis for the formation of Roma organizations. But due to lack of financial resources, the newspaper stopped printing after the third issue.

The strengthening of fascist ideas and the dangers of war stifled the idea of national revival, movement and identification. The Roma were once again faced with the question of their survival. The Roma already knew that being a Roma who publicly identified as Roma often meant being sentenced to death throughout history.


The Roma Holocaust should never be forgotten. Historians César Jablonski, Stanisław Zabierowski, Antoni Galinski, Konrad Ciechanowski, Jacek Wilkur and romologist Lech Mroz announced at the Warsaw symposium that the number of Roma who suffered in the German camps was about 500,000, which represented more than 30% of the Roma population, considering the then numerous population in European countries. According to the estimate of Vajda Vojevoda and Jan Rotaru, the total number of Roma victims in the Second World War was 3,500,000. But if we take into account that many Roma were taken to the camps, killed and shot without any records, then we arrive at a number that is at least 2-3 times higher than the official data. Suffice it to say, according to the latest research, that in Croatia alone, around 80,000 Roma were killed in the Jasenovac camp. Today, 78 years after the Holocaust, the exact number of Roma killed is still unknown, while the exact number of those killed by other peoples and groups is known. Proof that scientific history does not deal with this issue is the fact that at the Nuremberg trials not a single Nazi soldier or officer was convicted for the horrors and mass murder they committed against the Roma.

The mass destruction of the Roma during the Second World War, as well as the unchanged attitude of the majority towards the Roma in the period after the war, stimulated again the desire to strengthen their origin and self-identification, which again led to the opening of Roma organizations in the sixties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, in 1958, the Union of Roma was founded in Hungary, while other Roma organizations were registered in Germany, Spain, France, Finland, Sweden, etc. These organizations did not have their own programs and worked only in their countries. In 1969, the action for the Roma from Yugoslavia was encouraged, and then there was an interconnection of the Roma from different countries, and a more serious international cooperation of the Roma around the world was established. As I indicated earlier, the greatest significance for strengthening the collective identity of the Roma is the world congresses of the Roma, ten held so far, the last of which was held in 2016 in Skopje, while the first, which is both founding and historically most important, was held in 1971 year in London.

### **Identity of Roma in Republic of North Macedonia**


The Roma in the Republic North Macedonia represent citizens who identify with the state identity but also with their ethnic identity. Most of the Roma population identifies as Macedonian Roma and each one identifies with the Republic of North Macedonia, which they

considers to be their one and only country. But not all Roma who live on the territory of Macedonia identify themselves as Roma. There are also those who declare and identify themselves as Albanians, Turks, Egyptians. The largest number of Roma who identify themselves and publicly declare themselves as Roma are those who live in Skopje, Kumanovo, Bitola, Kriva Palanka, Kratovo, Prilep, Delchevo, Berovo, Vinica. Part of the Roma population in Veles, Shtip, Kavadarci, Strumica identifies themselves as Turks. The Roma population in Gostivar, Tetovo are identified as Albanians, while in Ohrid, Struga and Kichevo part of the Roma population are identified as Egyptians.



Source: Research protocol with questions, 2020

In general, the mother tongue of most Roma is the Romani language. The Roma language is mostly spoken in Roma families in Skopje, Kumanovo, Bitola, Kriva Palanka, Kratovo, Prilep, Delchevo, Berovo, Vinica. The Roma in Veles, Shtip, Kavadarci, Strumica speak the Roma language, but Turkish is the mother tongue of most families. The Macedonian language is the mother tongue of most Roma families in Kicevo, while the Roma in Struga and Ohrid speak the Romani language, but the Albanian language is the mother tongue of most families. The Roma in Tetovo and Gostivar speak Romani, Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish, and different families speak differently, but mostly in Romani and Albanian.



Source: Research protocol with questions, 2020


Although the national identification of the Roma in North Macedonia is not universal, with a certain number not identifying themselves as Roma, there is still an improvement in this trend in the last ten years, with the national awareness of the ethnic identification of the Roma developing more and more. Proof of this is the experience of the Roma population with the last

and especially the penultimate failed census in 2011. The census was stopped and condemned as a failure due to major irregularities in the census process. The experiences with the census recorded a large number of cases where attempts were made to bribe the Roma population by offering 100-200 euros per person so that the Roma would declare themselves as Albanians and Turks. In the last two censuses, bribery attempts proved unsuccessful even though they were carried out among the poorest Roma families in the cities.

In the Republic of North Macedonia, there have been recorded cases where the identification of Roma is misused, that is, non-Roma are publicly and in writing declared as Roma in order to receive a certain benefit. The most common cases are those during employment in the public administration, but there are also cases when non-Roma are registered as Roma to acquire scholarships intended for high school and Roma students. These abuses are difficult to prove because the legal provisions in the country allow each person to declare how he feels at the moment. So far, it has not been recorded that an advertisement was canceled or that any employment was not carried out due to such an allegation. In connection with the misuse of scholarships, in the last few years several cases have been reported for the same, which have been resolved and the parties who damaged the donor funds from the Republic of North Macedonia, as well as external funds, have been asked to refund the financial resources received.

Among the respondents, when we asked them about the identification of the Roma, especially during the performance of work activities, the process of employment and promotion in the institutions, we encountered relatively similar results. Out of a total of 15 respondents, as many as 80% say that identification plays a very large role in the employment and work of Roma. As many as 87% of respondents say that due to their identification as Roma, they have great difficulties during the job recruitment process and especially how non-Roma treat them, inside and outside the institutions.

Respondent 10 points out on this issue: "Without a doubt, I believe that the Roma identity and the very appearance of the Roma plays a big role in how colleagues treat the Roma. Roma are always given those responsibilities that are less attractive, many of my Roma friends complain that their superiors do not give them tasks that match their capacities. That due to the fact that they are Roma, from the beginning, there is an opinion that they must be uneducated, that they don't know how to work, so they wonder how they speak more foreign languages, how they know how to work in Excel, etc."



Source: Research protocol with question, 2020



“Many of my fellow Roma friends who are employed in the public administration have more experience and knowledge than their superiors, but none of them have managerial positions. Let's not forget the stereotypical comments of their everyday work, such as “wow, how beautifully you speak Macedonian”, “how come you're Roma and not black”, “you must be mixed”, “you live in Shutka, right”.

Respondent 5 says that: “Roma identity certainly plays a role, especially the darker color of our skin as a community, which initially creates mistrust on the part of the other party, in the sense of questioning the expertise, competence and that person's knowledge. In that sense, specifically, I think that the Roma have a more difficult access to work, especially the highly educated Roma, not giving them room for promotion, while the Roma with dark skin have a more difficult access”.

Respondent 3 believes that: “Roma identity has a very important role in getting jobs, there are many Roma with higher education who are employed in jobs with secondary education. But it is their fault, because sometimes the Roma themselves are satisfied with lower positions even though they have the capacity and education to get a higher position”.

Respondent 8 says that: “Identity often plays a decisive role in the employment of Roma. Past work, knowledge, experience are not respected, it is important that the person who is employed is preferably Macedonian or Albanian. If it is about an unattractive place and it is not desired by someone else, then the job position can be offered to a Roma”. He emphasizes that there is fear, mistrust, and contempt that “others” take the jobs of “theirs”. At the same time, both religious and political affiliation contribute to inadequate recruiting of Roma during employment.

Respondent 10 emphasizes: “Roma are not treated equally during recruitment in the workplace, we had cases when we had to lobby for our sympathizers and fellow party members so that the officials of the institutions would agree to sign so that the same persons would be taken over with agreements in their institutions. A large number of officials from the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, with whom our party was in a coalition, did not want to have Roma working in their institution. As a positive example, I must mention Dr. Filip Petrovski who was the director of the State Archives of the Republic of North Macedonia and without any problems opened the doors and accepted Roma public servants in the State Archives”. Employees often went to interviews for recruitment in various institutions where it was not important what they know and what education they have acquired, here it was important what was the color their skin, whether they live in Shuto Orizari and what their parents do for a living. He says that this was one of the biggest challenges that they successfully overcame as a political entity in the country.

### **Conclusion**

The identification of Roma in the Republic of North Macedonia is complex. Most of the Roma identify with the country (Macedonia) as their one and only. Roma living in different cities throughout the country are identifying differently. The primary language used in the Romani households has a key role in the identification of Roma. The knowledge of the history of Roma has improved the national awareness of the ethnic identification of the Roma in the Republic of Macedonia.

There are still challenges that Roma are facing, especially the misuse of identification and non-Roma declaring themselves as Roma to receive scholarships, to enter public administration job positions, to enter minority quotas at universities, etc.

Roma are still facing discrimination, stereotypes, and prejudice at their workplaces due to the expression of their Romani heritage.

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The ethical policy of "Contemporary Macedonian Defence" is based on references from various international boards. For this purpose, a Code of Ethics for the editors and authors has been developed.

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The text of the paper can be written directly on this document, which is made as a template for writing the paper. The entire text of the paper should be prepared in camera-ready format, in one column, (justified, Times New Roman 11 pt on A4 format. Margins should be: top and bottom margin – 5 cm, left and right margin – 4 cm . The first line of each paragraph with main headings or subtitles parts of the text, should be 1 cm from the left margin. Paragraphs should be: justified, single spacing (0 pt for "after" and "before").

The structure of the paper should contain the following parts: Introduction, Main part, Conclusion and Literature.

The paper should present unpublished research, professional experiences, results or information according to the proposed thematic areas. The paper should contain a maximum of 5000 words.

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All subheadings should be in upper/lower case, 1 line blank before and after the paragraph.

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Below are some examples:

\*books:

Coetzee, JM (2000) *Disgrace*. London: Vintage.

\*papers from conference proceedings:

Maceachen, DB (1950) 'Wilkie Collins and British law', *Nineteenth-Century Fiction*, 5(2), pp. 121–139.\*

\*papers in the journal:

Butler, S. (2020) 'Women's fashion manufacturer to make reusable gowns for NHS', *The Guardian*, 28 April. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/apr/28/womens-fashion-manufacturer-to-make-reusable-gowns-for-nhs> (Accessed: 29 April 2020).

\*papers from the internet:

Google (2019) Google terms of service. Available at: <https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US> (Accessed: 29 April 2020).

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*Skopje, 26.06.2024*

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