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МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ НА
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Original scientific article

THE SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT OF DIGNITARIES AND FACILITIES

Zoran KEKOVIĆ[1]
Slaviša KRSTIĆ[2]

Abstract: *Protective security of dignitary persons and facilities is an integral part of national security. Since the history of security threats to the dignitary persons is full of examples of assassinations, kidnappings and other similar events as a source of endangering national security. Therefore, security risk assessment of dignitary persons and facilities should be recognized as one of the priorities in the normative and practical framework of police and security service activities. This article describes some of the key elements when considering the security risk assessment of dignitary persons and facilities including different practises and legislative frameworks in the Western Balkan region.*

Keywords: *Protective security, dignitary and facilities, security risk assessment;*

Introduction

Today, national security is confronted with multiplication and diversification of threats (terrorism, radicalization, attacks, mass shootings …) which emerge outside traditional threats and face all countries and all people. In this environment (globalization, multiple interactions), politicians, public officials and other dignitary persons are additionally vulnerable. Furthermore, police, security and intelligence services as well as protection units have to demonstrate their high level of performance with respect to protective security measures based on a collaborative approach. In structuring this approach it is essential to develop the methodological tools for consistent security risk assessment in order to reduce risks to protected values.

Since dignitary persons and facilities are considered as people and objects at risk, all protective measures are required to deliver enhanced security. This strengthens the necessity of developing an inter-departmental collaborative approach and implementing protective security standards. To prevent and reduce harmful consequences of different threats to dignitary people and facilities the consistent security risk assessment framework will assist security and protection units in their pursuits to control risks by enhancing security performance outcomes.

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Basic terminology

In the Serbian literature and practice of protective security related to the dignitary persons and facilities there is a distinction between: assessment of the security, security assessment and risk assessment.

The assessment of the security relates, conditionally, to the present time, whereby it is the basis of security assessments. (Subošić, Daničić, 2012) The assessment of the security is based on facts from the past and partially indicates the tendencies in the future. The realized or prevented attempts for atacking dignitary persons and facilities are particulary analyzed, as well as their perpetrators, modus operandi, places of commitment (surrounding environment analysis) and the consequences for the security of dignitary and facilities.[3]

The assessment of security often involves assessing the vulnerability of the unit that deals with the security of dignitary persons and facilities. It should include the assessment of unit occupancy, professional competence, state of morale and equipment, organization and overall readiness to realize the planned tasks in order to undertake all requested security measures. (Krstić, 2016)

By analysis of the available domestic and foreign literature in the field of security of dignitary persons and facilities consistent content related to the assessment of security risks to the persons and facilities has not been identified, but the general rules of security management have been applied by security services.

Unlike the assessment of the security, a security assessment is a document that contains a synthetic overview of the future state of security phenomena, with justification including functional and territorial criteria. A security assessment is a bridge between collecting and processing data and a decision making process. It is a process that consists of six stages: 1) data analysis, 2) prediction, 3) creating of variants, 4) estimating of the acceptability of variants, 5) analyzing of unacceptable *variants, and 6) variants proposal submitting.[4] (Model 1).*

[3] An example of a bad security risk assessment is the assassination of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, in 2003. Despite several assassination attempt, this was not recognized as an indicator the Prime Minister's jeoperdized security.

[4] See more: Milovanović, M, Deciding in Combat Activities, VIZ, Belgrade,2010, pp. 392-450.



Model 1: Security risk assessment process
The source: Milovanović, M. (2010) Decision making in Combat Activities

By data analysis based on known facts, we come across unknown security knowledge relevant for the security of dignitary persons and facilities. The basic task of the security manager is to determine the process of the events, so that they can be foreseen in order to take adequate security protective measures. This is, at the same time, the most important and complex part of the data analysis that should enable the assessment of trends in the development of the phenomenon and changes in the security situation. Prediction of trends provides greater understanding in the development of a security-related scenario.

Based on the prediction of security risks for the dignitary persons and facilities and assessing the capabilities of a protective security unit in relation to time and spatial conditions, variants of the future security situation are created. After identifying of variants, the security manager performs an assessment of the acceptability of variants, i.e. analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each variant. Thus, the consequences that dignitary variants will have in terms of endangering the security of dignitary persons and facilities will be considered. The acceptability of variants will depend on the existence of unknown consequences, or risks associated with them.

Unacceptable variants (risks) are defined as variants which include the security risk of a dignitary to the extent that (s)he is temporarily or permanently denied to performe the dignitary function. That risk is considered as unacceptable since it would result in injuries or even in death. The analysis of the variants is in direct correlation with the goal assignes for the security of dignitary persons and facilities.

The acceptable variant is only one of the possible security scenario where the unit responsible for performing security measures has been pre-prepared, i.e. for performing adequate security measures. Submission of variant proposals is based on the sellection of an optimal variant for decision making in which adequate security measures will be applied. An optimal variant can be obtained by applying the methods of operational research, both single and multi-criteria decision making.[5]

The above-mentioned security assessment stages represent the thought process of the security manager for dignitary persons and facilities as a basis for planning and organizing the security measures.

In most of the normative acts of the national security services dealing with protective security of dignitary persons and facilities the obligation to create a security assessment is prescribed. By structural analysis of various legal acts of state security services and international security institutions, as well as by an analysis of the content of their security assessments, it is determined that security assessments related to dignitary persons and facilities have different content that would be identified below.[6]

When it comes to the risk assessment, it is an integral part of the risk management process as a comprehensive process of identifying potential hazards, risk analyses and estimations. (Keković et all, 2011) The context of risk assessment may vary in relation to the needs of the organization. For example, in the context of the security of dignitary individuals and objects, consideration should be given to dignitary specificities and other relevant factors that ensure the adopted risk assessment approach is adequate to the situation and threats that affect the achievement of objectives, in accordance with acceptable risks. Thus, depending on the nature of the situation, the security risks of a dignitary person would always be considered as unacceptable, determining which variants can be considered as acceptable or not.

Comparative overview of security assessment content

The *Regulation on determining protective security activities related to dignitary persons and facilities in the Republic of Serbia*[7] stipulate that the Military Intelligence Agency, the Security Information Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Military Police, and the Serbian Army units participate in the security assessment, but its content is not specified.

The *Rulebook of the Serbian Armed Forces Service* (Article 151) stipulates that a risk assessment is made prior to making a security decision.

The *Guidelines on Protective Security of Dignitary Persons and Facilities within the Military Police Service of the Serbian Armed Forces* (Article 26) define that the assessment of the physical vulnerability of a particular person and facilities includes: 1) the assessment of the wider area and the microlocation of facilities used by the dignitary depending on its location, place of residence, on a temporal or occasional basis. This assessment includes: a) the position of protected objects in relation to a settlement,

[5] It includes multi-criteria analysis by applying the methods of ELECTRE and PROMETHEE.

[6] See more: Krstić, S. (2016) Managing protective security of dignitary persons and facilities, PhD thesis

[7] Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 72/2010, Articles 1 and 8.

communication infrastructure, natural and artificial barriers; b) the sensitivity of the building to fires, natural disasters, technical and technological accidents, explosions, etc; c) prohibitive measures of using the means of recording; d) the security clearance of the person during their employment in the facilities; and e) regulating access to facilities, warning signs and prohibitions; 2) sources and methods of physical threats; 3) possibility of intervention of the Protective unit in cases of physical threats to a dignitary person; 4) the possibility of intervention by health institutions; 5) the possibility of cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, Security services, local authorities and their influence on the security system; 6) the ability to maintain the connection between the Protective and Intervention units.

According to *the Guidelines on the security of facilities, movables and people in the Serbian Armed Forces,* it has been determined that the vulnerability assessment of the dignitary and facilities implies the same elements as the vulnerability assessment of a dignitary person. It also contains: a) the forces and means by which the facility may be compromised; b) the importance of the protected value, the possible reasons for its endangerment and the need for use of deadly force to protect object; c) the internal service structure; etc. The result of the security assessment of dignitary persons is integrated into the security plan of that person.

The *Guideline on carrying out protective security for dignitary and facilites* prescribed by the Minister of Interior as an integral part of preventive security measures, envisages the preparation of a security assessment of dignitary persons and facilities, but its content is not defined.

The security assessments of dignitary persons and facilities performed by *The Security Information Agency of the Republic of Serbia* includes: a) data obtained by foreign security services; b) the functioning of radical Islamist structures; c) the operation of individuals and organized terrorist groups; d) the operation of individuals and organized radicalized groups (whereby foreign mercenaries with war experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo and Metohia are considered); e) moderate or extreme right organizations; f) the activity of organizations and individuals acting on the international plane with activities based on anti-globalist ideas; g) activities of ultraviolent and anarchist organizations.

The security assessments of dignitary persons and facilities made by the *Military Intelligence Agency of the Republic of Serbia* includes data on: a) the operation of radical Islamists and returnees from the Middle East and North Africa[8]; b) potential members of terrorist groups and organization, and c) members of right-wing organizations in the Republic of Serbia.

The security assessments of dignitary persons and facilities used by the *Criminal Police Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia* do not have specific content, but their data relate to the current knowledge available at that moment.

[8] Migration of citizens of the Republic of Serbia and from the other countries of the Balkan which are registered as members of the so-called ‘Islamic countries’, as well as the transit of such persons through the Republic of Serbia have been particularly assessed.

Legislation of the former Yugoslav countries also stipulates the security assessments of dignitary persons and facilities and their content.

Legislation of the Republic of Slovenia on Protection of Individuals, Areas and Facilities (Article 8) stipulates that the scope of protection measures for dignitary persons and members of their families is determined on the basis of "the threat assessment of protected persons", but the criteria for dignitary persons have not been defined, so it is not possible to determine the content of that assessment.

Regulations of the Republic of Croatia on the determination of dignitary persons, facilities and areas and the implementation of their protection *(Article 2) stipulates that security intelligence agencies shall implement counter-intelligence protection and other measures and actions within their jurisdiction for the purpose of timely data collection on possible vulnerability of the protected persons, from the activities of foreign intelligence services, terrorist or other similar activities. In line with these the level of security assessments of dignitary and facilities is determined.*

In the Republic of Srpska, The Decision on determining the persons and facilities that are under special protective measures with higher regime of protection (Article 9) *requires to make an assessment of the security situation and protected persons and facilities, but its contents are not specified. In the same way, the* Decision on determining persons and facilities to be secured by The Police Directorate of the Republic of Montenegro *stipulates security assessment of dignitary persons and facilities without specifying its content.*

The Macedonian Person and Facility Protection Regulation *regulates an assessment of the current political and security situation in the country, the state of public order and its disturbance on a larger scale, war or emergency state, and natural disasters and epidemics emergencies. Also, Article 19 regulates the collection and processing of information relating to the detection and prevention of illegal activities and activities aimed at endangering the security of persons and facilities.*

Drafting Guidelines for Security Risk Assessments *prescribed by UN***,** *contains the method of risk analysis and threat assessment for the dignitary and facilities the security of which is in the responsibility of the* Directorate for Protection and Security of the UN. *Chapter 4 on the threat analysis states that threat assessment implies an assessment of extremist elements, the state of crime, as well as public condemnation published by media against protected values of the UN. At the same time, it is necessary to analyze the current trends in the security situation, depending on dignitary persons sources of threats to the security of the protected values.*

By analyzing the document of The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe *(OSCE) under the title* Logistical and Administrative Aspects Relating to Ministerial Council Meetings*, we can conclude that, in addition to the standard elements of the security assessment, the OSCE security service devotes special attention to the checks and assessments of persons residing in protected facilities which are in direct contact with the dignitary persons. Article 10 of this document prescribes* *the method of accreditation of participants at meetings (ministers under protective measures, delegates, security officers, journalists, members of non-governmental organizations, drivers and other persons), their placement under a special regime of access to dignitary persons and facilities, as well as possible access prohibitions.*

The American Military Combat Rules, called The Military Police Leader's Handbook*, in the chapter of regulating the threat assessment of dignitary persons, facilities and persons living in them, prescribes the security assessment of persons employed in these facilities, as well as the assessment of people who occasionally visit facilities.*

By analyzing the contents of the Police Briefing and Security Information *document, which is used by the security precursor of the United States Diplomatic Services during the preparation of visits abroad for high US officials, we concluded that the security assessment includes: a) Physical attacks on dignitary persons and staff in their environment; b) Demonstrations (citizens' protests) and c) Threats by using firearms or by the placing of explosives.*

Comprehensive approach to security assessment of dignitary persons and facilities

Using a comparative method of the contents of the security assessments stipulated by the above analyzed regulations and the synthesis of their key elements, it is possible to create a comprehensive approach to security assessment of dignitary persons and facilities. It provides a framework for analysis of the current trends of the security phenomena, which include: 1) the importance of the dignitary rank in state structures; 2) the significance of the protected value; 3) an assessment of the current political and security situation in the country, the state of public order and peace and its possible disruption on a larger scale; 4) the possibility of occurrence of a state of war or emergency, natural disasters and epidemics; 5) possible sources and methods of endangering dignitary pesons and facilities; 6) assessment of persons who have the right to access dignitary persons and facilities; 7) assessment of the macro and micro location of facilities used by a dignitary by location and place of residence; 8) the possibility of intervention of the forces engaged in the protection of dignitary persons and facilities in the case of emergency; 9) the possibility of applying medical protection measures; 10) the possibility of applying technical and counter-protection measures; 11) the possibility of cooperation with other security services, authorities and their influence on the security system; 12) the possibility of maintaining a connection between the protective teams and the intervention forces, and 13) the engineering design of a particular facility.

Article 12 of the Sublegislation on the Determination of Security Affairs of Dignitary Persons and Facilities in the Republic of Serbia *prescribes that security measures are undertaken in accordance with the security assessment of dignitary persons and facilities and the degree of data secrecy of significance for protective security. The au-*

thorities responsible for security protection determine (propose) measures of protective security (type, scope and degree) that will be undertaken in order to protect dignitary persons and facilities. These measures include: a) counter-intelligence protection measures; b) preventive-safety measures; c) preventive-technical protection measures; d) physical protection measures; and e) preventive-medical protection measures.

***Counter-intelligence measures** include:*

- detecting indicators and preventing terrorist, extremist, intelligence and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services, organizations and individuals directed at endangering persons and facilities;
- participation in the assessment, proposition, prescription and implementation of counter-intelligence protection measures, as well as their harmonization with security measures;
- implementation of measures against eavesdropping;
- carrying out security checks at the request of the head of the protective security unit, for persons admitted to work, positioned or assigned to jobs that are under counter-inteligence protection;
- conducting counter-inteligence protection of workplaces and jobs in cooperation with the head of the protective security unit.
- Counter-inteligence protection is directly related to the workplace and tasks marked with a dignitary degree of secrecy on which data of interest for the Republic of Serbia are created, collected, processed, stored, archived and destroyed.

Preventive and safety measures include:

- participation in the security assessment of the protected value, in cooperation with other security services and the head of the protective security unit;
- providing professional assistance in determining ways of storing and using classified information and documents;
- protection of confidential communications.

Preventive-technical protection measures are a set of tasks and activities undertaken for:

- detection and removal of mine-explosive, flammable, radioactive and other dangerous substances;
- establishing and removing technical defects on devices and installations;
- preventing secret or violent entry into facilities; and
- functioning of a secure connection system.

Physical protection measures are a set of tasks and activities undertaken to secure dignitary persons and facilities which include:

- physical protection of dignitary persons;
- physical protection of dignitary persons and facilities used by the person permanently or occasionally;
- physical protection of security sensitive points on the way of movement;
- regulation of traffic and securing the movement of vehicles under escort.

Preventive-medical protection measures are a set of tasks and activities aiming to finding and removing microbiological, chemical and radiological substances harmful to the health and life of a dignitary person and include:

- conducting sanitary-technical inspections of dignitary persons and facilities and personnel working in the facilities;
- control of the health safety and quality of food items, water and air;
- control of the hygiene of transport and storaging of food;
- providing adequate and timely health care.

In addition to the stated measures prescribed by the present regulation, dignitary security services of the Republic of Serbia have additionally defined the content of the proposed security measures. This content includes: a) disposition of protective units and variants of their engagement; b) the use of technical means and the use of official dogs; c) preventing the observation, recording and the application of masking measures, using natural and artificial obstacles and shelters; d) application of desinformation measures; e) the manner of maintaining a connection between the entities involved in the protection, and f) other issues that are important for deciding on the way of organizing the protective security of a dignitary person.[9]

In the Republic of Srpska, *the Decision on determining specially protected persons and facilities* prescribes that measures of special protection (protective security of dignitary persons and facilities), the scope and the method of performing special security of facilities and persons are carried out in accordance with the security assessment of the situation and protected values, the significance of protected values in terms of general safety and the function for which the dignitary persons are responsible. Based on the above-stated, according to the legislation in the Republic of Srpska, the security measures for dignitary persons and facilities do not depend only on the security assessment, but also on the significance of the protected value (the Palace of the Republic, the National Assembly, the Government, the Main Bank and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the state functions the dignitary persons is in charge of (the President of the Republic, the Vice President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the Prime minister).

The by-laws on the determination of protected persons, facilities and locations and the implementation of their protection in the Republic of Croatia envisages the following security measures: a) operational security preventive measures; b) physical security measures; c) motorized escorts measures; d) internal and external security of facilities and locations; d) security measures for the route of movement; f) operational and physical measures in traffic; e) counterexplosion inspection and e) health and hygienic technological measures.

[9] Compare to: Guidelines on security protection of dignitary persons and facilities within the jurisdiction of the Military Police of the Serbian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, the Military Police Directorate, Belgrade, 2012, Article 26.

The Decision on determining persons and facilities to be secured by the Police Directorate of the Republic of Montenegro prescribes the measures for the security of persons and facilities depending on the security assessment and includes the following measures: a) preventive-operational; b) physical; c) technical; d) health; e) biological and sanitary and f) hygienic-epidemiological.

The Regulation on security of persons and facilities in the Republic of Macedonia defines three types of security measures: a) operational-preventive; b) preventive-technical and c) physical and traffic security.

The sublegislation on the protection of individuals, locations and facilities of the Republic of Slovenia does not define specific measures of protective security, but states that the scope of measures and forms of protection is determined on the basis of a threat assessment.

The UN Document: Drafting Guidelines for Security Risk Assessments specifies measures to assess security risks. By analogy, it can be concluded that the measures envisaged for the protective security of dignitary persons and facilities include similar measures applied by the Serbian security services, emphasizing the necessity of time dimension of these measures.

By analyzing the content of *The US Military Rule Leader's Handbook*, in the section describing the Crisis Management Plan, the measures that prevent the threat to the security of dignitary persons and facilities are identified, as follows: a) personal self-protection of dignitary persons; [10] b) physical protection of dignitary persons and facilities; and c) counterattack forces.

By analysing the contents of *The Police Briefing and Security Information document of the United States Diplomatic Services*, based on a threat assessment, the following measures for the protection of dignitary persons are foreseen: a) physical protection measures; b) measures of medical protection, c) measures of anti-diversion protection, d) counter-attack measures (engaging of anti-terrorist and anti-sniper rifle teams), e) technical protection measures, and f) measures for controlling access to dignitary persons and facilities.

Using a comparative method of the above mentioned measures and by the synthesis of their key elements, it is posible to propose a more comprehensive framework for protective security measures of dignitary persons and facilities. Their elements should have a time and space component consisting of: 1) counter-intelligence protection measures, 2) preventive-safety measures; 3) preventive-technical protection measures; 4) physical protection measures; 5) preventive-medical protection measures, 6) measures of traffic safety on the route of movement and in the vicinity of the dignitary person and facilities; 7) measures of self-protection of dignitary persons; 8) desinformation measures; 9) counterterrorism protection measures; 10) measures for controlling access to dignitary persons and facilities.

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[10] More about the content of these measures in: Belić, M., Direct Physical Protection of designated persons, PROOF, Belgrade, 2014, pg. 122-125.

Conclusion

By performing a structural analysis of various legal acts of state security services and international security institutions, as well as an analysis of the content of their security assessments, it has been determined that the security assessments related to dignitary persons and facilities have different content.

Based on the opinions expressed about the assessment of the security situation and the security assessment of dignitary persons and facilities, preconditions for the undertaking of a protective security strategy and measures are created in order to prevent the occurrence of events that could endanger the security of dignitary persons and facilities. By including the risk assessment in the analysis, as an comprehensive process of identifying potential hazards, risk analyses and estimations, it can be concluded that the *security risk assessment* includes the assessment of all elements, that is:

a) an assessment of the state of security, occurrence and events in relation to the potential threats and hazards (political, economic, societal, technological, legal), perpetrators, time and place of possible threat,

b) the assessment of the capability (functional and structural assessment) of a protective unit that takes the security measures,

c) the proposal of strategy and measures in accordance with the above mentioned element of security risk assessment.

The difference between the assessment of security and the security (risk) assessment of dignitary and facilities is reflected in the management measures that lead from the existing to the desired state of security. Such approach to the management function of security of dignitary and facilities is considered as an strategic (dinamic), projective (modern) and desirable (recommended). In this context, it is necessary to consider the possibility of applying modern international and national standards for the security risk assessment arising from the nature of the threat and the need to protect dignitary persons and facilities.

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Original scientific article

GEOPOLITICS OF THE WESTERN BALKANS – AN AREA OF GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION OF THE GREAT POWERS

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Abstract: *In 2003, the EU Council of the Thessaloniki Summit noted that the then 15 EU member states fully and firmly support the countries of the Western Balkans for EU accession. However, at the end of 2014, the new European Commission's management made it clear to the Western Balkans aspirants that the EU doors would not be open until 2020. In the eyes of the Balkan leaders and intellectuals, the balance of enlargement was rather disappointing. In 17 years, only Slovenia and Croatia gained membership status. Such geopolitical sterility of the EU has created a space for manifesting several unfavorable and worrying processes such as: strengthening of authoritarian populism and demagogy, significant deviations from the reforms, organized crime, disobedience and willfulness of local leaders, interest and manifestation of other international subjects for geopolitical presence in the Balkans. Engaged with the events in Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has somehow marginalized the Balkans. For its part, the EU being weakened by brexit issues turned its interest to its own problems. But the newcomers in the Balkans, like Russia, thanks to its energy sources, China, pushing the New Silk Road project, or Turkey, led by neo-Ottomanism, show great vitality for taking relevant geopolitical and geostrategic positions in the region. Alongside, large migrant movements, accompanied by returnees from the wars of the Islamic State in cooperation with local religious extremists, are discretely implanted in the Balkans as a whole new international and dangerous subject. When this is added to the fragile stability and the sensitive interethnic and intercultural relations, it is clear that the countries of the Western Balkans are in a specific geopolitical position, as a kind of stake in the strategic interests of the external actors. There is no doubt that the Balkans and, above all, the Western Balkan countries remain the most vulnerable areas of new/old rivalries between the West and the East, but accompanied by the new internal and external actors of the region.*

Keywords: *geopolitical stakes, hard power, soft power, Russian-American rivalry, Western Balkans.*

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Introduction

Many analysts (*Andrew Korybko*) believe that in the last century and as well as today, *the Balkans is the most important strategic region of Europe.* In one of the most tragic centuries, the 20th century, the Balkans or Southeastern Europe, an otherwise elegant name that does not associate with tragedies and sensitive borders, returns to the center of European geopolitical developments in the early decades of the 21st century. The area called the Balkans is distinguished by numerous security challenges of a diverse character, and the core of instability is comprised of Western Balkans states, that is, former Yugoslav republics without Slovenia, but with Albania. In the focus of this paper, the priority of the analysis will be directed towards the countries of the Western Balkans, otherwise a political rather than a geographical term, which designates the non-EU member countries, and which are more exposed to foreign influences with a special emphasis on the Republic of Macedonia. All Western Balkan countries face the phenomenon of deficient democratic structure, authoritarian populism, organized crime, inter-ethnic dissatisfaction, economic underdevelopment, social misery and high rate of unemployment. To the above unfavorable Balkan metaphors, geographer *Michel Foucher* believes that more than thirty can be added, which aggravate the normal functioning of the Balkan mosaic either internally or externally. Surrounded by old Europe in the west, Central Europe to the north, *close Russian influence* to the north-east, as well as Turkey in the east but also the strong presence of the United States in Kosovo, and the financial and credit presence of China through the *New Silk Road* project, the Western Balkan countries have grown into a true geopolitical stake among the great and middle powers of the West and the East.

After the wars from the '90s, Europe returned to the Balkans and tried to integrate large Pan-European corridors. Faced with the numerous enclaves, the West has realized that most sub-regions are desirable to connect with the more dynamic European cities in order to complete the European identity in the Balkans. After the intervention in Kosovo, US allies established Bondsteel, the most powerful military base in the Balkans, which, according to Brzezinski, represents the geopolitical *gate of the US penetration to the Caspian region, the real Eurasian Rome land, rich in primary energy.* In turn, relying on Serbia, Russia believes that the Balkans represents a zone of traditional influence whose ambitions have often collided with the Anglo-Saxon and German interests. After Russia got stabilized both financially and politically, it enhanced its investments in the field of energy and received a significant strategic argument for greater influence in international relations. For instance, the Moscow-Kiev crisis from 2009 demonstrated that gas can be used as a kind of weapon and thus every move in the field of energy represents a kind of strategy. Indeed, Russian ambitions for the construction of the *South Stream* pipeline, which bypassing Belarus and Ukraine and passing through the Balkans, was to supply Europe with Russian gas. This project in the Balkans would have brought certain economic and strategic advantages, but in its realization several geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economical interests of the United States and the EU have arisen. Since 2002 and especially 2008, Russian diplomacy made it clear that it opposes NATO enlargement in the Balkans. The reaction of Brussels and Washington in response to Russia's energy position was the offer to build Nabucco pipeline, which Bulgaria joined. The remaining states in the Balkans were still burdened by the transition and the remnants of the past.

Analyzing the Balkan context, Slovenia was distinguished by its solid infrastructure and modern electrical, chemical and pharmaceutical industry. Croatia took the biggest trump in tourism and with modest industrial capacities it was mostly oriented to the chemical and textile industry. Albania and Montenegro were trying to imitate Croatia's tourism progress, while in this domain the most serious competitor was Bulgaria with its winter centers and resorts on the

Black Sea coast. Serbia inherited very important industrial complexes from the former federation and possesses significant agricultural capacities, while Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo remain the poorest and politically most problematic states. Through which prism can the international relations of these countries be perceived? Are the traditional interests of former decisive European and Worlds Powers confronted in the Balkans? Is the Balkans a geopolitical and geostrategic stake between the West and the East, that is, between Russia and China, on the one hand, and the United States and the EU on the other?

Ethnic geopolitical kaleidoscope in the Western Balkans

Is it easier to understand the geopolitics of this region through the analysis of the ethnicities that inhabit the Western Balkans region? There is no doubt that in the area of the Western Balkans, *ethnicity* is a leading conception in all countries. If in France, the United Kingdom or the United States, local citizens identify themselves as French, British or Americans regardless of their ethnic or racial origin, citizens in the Balkans are identified by ethnicity. Thus, in Macedonia, regardless of their civil status, they identify themselves as Albanians, Roma, Macedonians, Serbs, Vlachs, etc. In Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens identify themselves as Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats and so on. This logic is a result of the historical evolutions of the state and the nation. In the West, the state was developed first and then the awareness of national affiliation. In the region of the Western Balkans, being a long time under foreign occupation, the national feeling was developed first within other countries, and later people gained their own state. That is why the members of the ethnic communities are recognized more by their ethnic rather than civic identity. (Andre Sellier/Jean Sellier-"Atlas des peuples d'Europe central", Paris: La Decouvert,1991,1992).

Balkan ethnicities, like all ethnic communities, are characterized by several specific characteristics that each group shares. Science understands such stereotypes as elements of identity: common language, tradition, history, folklore, religion, and customs. According to *G-F Dumont* a human group is defined as *a set of people attached to the territory they live in and have common characteristics that distinguish them from the rest.* Therefore, the existence of human groups by itself means performing certain direct or indirect influence on the internal and external states and geopolitical evolutions. All the identities of the former SFRY have their own languages and respectively a Latin or Cyrillic alphabet. Today, both Bosniaks and Montenegrins are distinguished with as separate languages with corresponding alphabet, as well as other ethnicities such as Albanians, Roma, and Turks. Apart from the iconography of language and alphabet, the Balkan peoples also differ in their religious affiliation. Slovenians and Croats were Christianized by the Roman Catholic Church, Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians and Greeks by the Orthodox Byzantine Church, while Albanians, Bosniaks and Roma embraced the Islamic faith. In the Balkans at least three religious components coexisted for centuries: Christians (Catholics, Orthodox), Muslims, and Jews and often Bekteshare mentioned as well as other smaller groups.

Among the Balkan nations, two nations have been or are still disputed. At the time of the Yugoslav Federation in 1971, the Muslims who lived on the territory of the then SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, who did not feel either Serbs or Croats, had been recognized as a separate nation – Muslims. After the dissolution of the SFRY, in 1993, the expression Muslims was replaced by the new term *Bosniaks* and Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sanjak accepted such an ethnic identity. (Derens Jean-Arnault,Geslin Laurent: 6) After the signing of the Dayton Accords (1995) in order to make a distinction regarding Serbian and Croatian languages, the Bosnian (Bosniak) language was officially recognized, which uses both Latin and Cyrillic alphabet, that is Bosančica (Bosnian script) and Arebica (Arabic script). The second contested nation and language is the Macedonian nation. Greece disputes the use of the name, Bulgaria does not recognize the Macedonian nation and the name of the state, while the Serbian Orthodox Church does not recognize the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The most homogeneous and most united nation in the Balkans is the Greek nation. Greek alphabet and language differ from others, and Greece earned independence from the Turkish Empire earliest (1830). Since its existence, Athens has been using a dry Jacobinism and does not allow any regionalism nor recognizes the existence of other ethnic minorities in its territory. (G-F.Dumon-Le: 26). The most heterogeneous nation in the entire Western Balkans are the Albanians, regardless of their ethnic or religious parameters. On ethnic terms, Albanians are traditionally divided into two different geographical groups from both banks of the *Shkumbin River. Gega (Gegerishte)* inhabit the northern part of Albania including Kosovo and Western Macedonia and *Toska (Toskerishte),* inhabit the south of Albania, including certain enclaves in Greece and Macedonia. The first ones that most frequently inhabited the mountain belts are considered as an isolated community, who preferred customary law with a strong tribal organization, while the latter inhabited the highlands and valleys and were inclined to the outside world. Toska's language played the role of the most significant unifying iconography, given that it was accepted by the majority of Albanians. However, since 1999 the Gega-dialect, which was banned in the age of Enver Hoxha, has been experiencing a renaissance and several significant publications have been published.

The second element of the differences within Albania that many Albanologists insist on, like *Gilles de Rapper-("Les Guegues et les Tosques existent-ils?L'opposition Nord/Sud en Albanie et ses interpretations", Espace,Populations, Societe,3, 2004)* consists of different ways of living, cuisine, customs, social organization and practice of religion. The northern part is dominated by Gega-Muslims and a smaller number of Catholics, while Toska-Christians dominate in the south. However, the religious orientation does not follow the division between Gega and Toska, given that both groups have both Christians and Muslims. Although it can be concluded that the two groups live in relative harmony, during the great economic and financial crisis from 1997, certain tensions between the more developed South and less developed North were manifested. At the same time, there are certain differences between Albanians from

Albania and Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia due to the various socio-cultural and historical-political aspects of living. Albania gained its independence in 1912, and since 1945 it had been the most autocratic regime in Europe that fell after the death of Enver Hoxha and the fall of communism in 1989. Kosovo became independent in 2008 following the intervention of NATO forces in 1999 against the Milosevic regime.

The next significant demographic element of geopolitics is the compactness of geographical distribution over the territory of a particular state. Prior to the fall of communism 1989/90, only five nations in the Balkans had a continuity of demographic prevalence, namely: Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians (whose continuity extends to Kosovo and Macedonia), Macedonians and Montenegrins. Least compact are the Serbs who demonstrate geographical and demographic continuity in Krajina and Western Slavonia (Croatia), as well as Western and South-Eastern Bosnia. Similarly to Serbs, Bosniaks as well were dispersed in three more significant concentrations around Sarajevo, then north-west Bosnia to the borders of Croatia and the Sanjak region of Serbia. Croats were also partially dispersed in Central Croatia and Dalmatia-Herzegovina. After the wars that also had a character of ethnic cleansing and ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, the rise of the compactness of nations was observed everywhere. It is certain that Croatia profited most since the rate of Croats from 79% in 1991 increased to 90% in 2001. Bosniaks remained the most dispersed nation divided in Bosnia and Sanjak.

The issue of the prevalence of nationalities in mono-ethnic and plural-ethnic countries is an important geopolitical parameter of the Balkan states. There are three types of division of the nations in the Balkans. Albanians are a nation that has been spread in several states, with only 49% living in Albania. In Kosovo, the Albanian population represents 92% of the total population and in Macedonia around 23%. The biggest increase in the migration dynamics of the Albanians was registered in Greece, nearly 500.000, although no Albanian was registered in 1990. The second plural-ethic nationality are Serbs who are widespread in Serbia at about 76%, approximately 1.4 million or 37% live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Montenegro they are accounted for one-third of the total population, while in Kosovo after the 1999 war scarce 5.3% remained after massive expulsions. Finally, almost 78% Montenegrins live in Montenegro, while the rest are mostly present in Serbia. When it comes to Croats, they represent 90% of the population of Croatia, but 87% live in Croatia while 537.600 in Bosnia and Herzegovina accounting for 14% of the population.

When it comes to mono-ethnic states, the highest concentration was recorded in Greece where 99% of Greeks live, representing 92% of the total population. At the same time, 99% of Bulgarians live in Bulgaria, representing 83% of the population. According to official statistics, 97% of Macedonians live on the territory of present-day Macedonia and account for 65% of the total population of the country. Towards the described ethnic, religious, cultural, historical and territorial segmentation, we can also add economic and social heterogeneity which can explain the centuries-old interethnic clashes, tensions, animosities and tragedies of the Balkan peoples. These factors, inter alia, include the following three:

-The clash of civilizations whose roots are found in the great boot between Rome and Constantinople from 1054. The Balkans was marked by Caesar-papism and the absence of individual rights, that is, with a radically different culture than the one of the Catholic and Protestant West.

-Economic, social and political disparity that does not arise from the cultural diversification of the region, but primarily from the economic-social and political backwardness of the Balkan states. It is about a natural and historical evolution that Western Europe experienced in the 19th century and Central Europe between the two world wars and today it is also experienced by the Western Balkans.

-Specific geopolitical position-the Western Balkans as the crossroads of Europe towards Asia and the Middle-East. The peoples of the Balkans have repeatedly been subjugated by the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires with constant bargaining of the borders. Problems were manifested when it came to national awareness within the great empires. The Balkan entities were fragmented between the German or romantic concept in terms of nation and the French concept of marginalizing ethnicity in favor of the state-nation.

The problem with these concepts is that they partially confirm the thesis that the Balkans is not projected as a compact entity, but as a set of entities with diversified ethnic, cultural and religious structures. Starting from these premises, Samuel Huntington's theses that future conflicts will not be ideological, political or economic, but inter-civilized, interreligious and inter-cultural, especially in the zones where civilizations collide or blend, develops the thesis that inter-ethnic clashes in the Western Balkans were in the same spirit as well. (Samuel P. Huntington- Le choc des civilization, Paris: Odile Jacob,1997).

Geopolitics of the historical and cultural ties of the Balkan peoples

Three nations in the Balkans, Bulgarians, Serbs and Macedonians have traditionally strong ties with Russia. Within the framework of the pan-Slavic logic, these states possess several important common points with the *Third Rome*, such as ethnic Slav origin, linguistic closeness of the Slavic languages, the Cyrillic alphabet, customs, names, common historical destinies, alliances against the Ottoman Empire, belonging to the same communist bloc. In the era of communism, Bulgaria was regarded as the most Soviet country and regardless of its pro-European and pro-NATO orientation and membership, strong links remained between Moscow and Sofia.(G-F. Dumon-Le: 40). Relations between Serbia and Russia are specific, friendly and historical. In 1914, Russia declared war to Austria-Hungary after the aggression against the Kingdom of Serbia. During the Second World War, Russians and Serbs fought together against

Nazi Germany. In 1999, Boris Yeltsin's Russia was unable to oppose NATO's military air raid against targets in FR Yugoslavia, but the Parliament of Serbia (FRY) passed a law on incorporation into Russia in one state. In 2001, Serbs from Kosovo called for Russian citizenship in order to protect themselves from the Kosovars' reprisals. For its part, Moscow systematically blocked Kosovo's membership in the UN and did not recognize Kosovo's independence. In 2013, Serbia gained observer's status within the Collective Defense Treaty Organization, initiated by Russia. At the same time, Russia helped Serbian economy and its defense capacity both financially and in the military sector. Croatia is strongly turned to the Germanophone world, more precisely to Germany and Austria with which it shared abundant historical heritage between the 16th and 20th century. At the same time, Croats are Catholic, and they are even closer to their Western neighbors. The Croatian coast is of great strategic significance for the Austrian sea outlet, and the great Austrian and German capital investments are precisely in that sector. The two nations with a dominant Muslim population, that is, Albanians and Bosniaks are inclined towards Turkey, just like the ones from Kosovo and Sanjak. Turkey never accepted being ousted from the Balkans by the West. After the 1990s wars, Turkey began to increase its influence in the Balkans. Ankara acted in favor of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina dominated by Muslims and was the first to recognize the independence of Kosovo. In the future, Turkey is expected to strengthen the economic and political influence in the Balkans, especially since the doctrine of Erdogan's *new Ottomanism* has ambitions to restore former ties with the nations of the former Ottoman Empire. However, some authors believe that such an ambition of Turkey will be made more difficult by the fact that the Balkan Muslims have a moderate interpretation of Islam while the Turkish one is very conservative. In addition, several anti-Turkish nationalist movements have developed in Albania, including the one of Ismail Kadare, which believes that Islam in Albania is an imported religion. And finally, from an economic and energetic point of view, the Balkans is less interested for Turkey than the Middle East countries. (Chalad Laurent – l'Albanie 2006-2007, Sous l'oeil de Etats Unis, Le Courrier des pays de l'Est,1062, July-August,2007)

Is geopolitics the main factor of instability in the Balkans?

Indeed, for more than 150 years, the Balkans has been the most conflicting zone in the world. Numerous collisions of the neighboring countries, as well as of the great forces, were waged on the Balkan soil. What is paradoxical is that the Balkans is neither an area rich in raw materials and energy resources as the Middle East for example, nor with developed agriculture or advanced industrialization. Is the mystery of the clashes in the number of different peoples who do not mutually abide? Indeed, the Balkans is not the only region with such a rich mosaic of peoples. Perhaps geo-strategy can give the answer given that the Balkans is important for the control of the Eastern Mediterranean region. In the era of intercontinental missiles and electronic wars, this factor falls off as well due to the fact that there were no major military bases or strategic ports in the Balkans. Namely, in the Balkans, Austria fought against the Ottoman Empire, Austria against Russia and also London, Paris, Berlin and Rome conducted various strategic moves, diplomatic games and influences. During the Second World War, the Balkans was occupied by the Axis Powers headed by Germany, then commenced the Cold War era where the Balkans was the border line between the West and the East and finally the nineties, during the implosion of the Yugoslav federation, the region was marked with interethnic wars. One answer to the dilemma of the Balkan wars is evident: the conflicts in the Balkans stem from geopolitics. But which geopolitical aspect creates the long-lasting instability in the Balkans? Why have the territorial ambitions and interethnic conflicts of the Balkan peoples been repeatedly instrumented by the out-of-the-Balkans forces otherwise led by their imperial dreams of domination? Why was the Balkans perceived by the great forces as the starting point of the major geopolitical plans? Is the role of the Balkans as a worldly Rome-land really so significant that it has grown into a centuries-old obsession of the Russian breakthrough to the warm seas? Is the region a starting point or a gateway to the Caspian region as Brzezinski and Hunter regarded the American invasion of rich borderline Asian regions? With the transformation into a zone of reciprocal containment of great world powers, internal Balkan animosities and conflicts were instrumented with the sole purpose of preventing the strengthening of the influence of rival forces. In doing so, the general mechanism of the great powers was cyclical, both offensive and defensive. History repeats itself after the Second World War when the Balkans is a single stake between the West and the East. At the beginning of the 21st century, regardless of the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, the Balkans once again turns into a kind of geopolitical stake between Russia and the United States.

Economic stakes as geopolitical stakes

In the contemporary era, the Balkans has less military potential, but more potential for economic integration, concludes A. Korybko. (Andrew Korybko-"Guerres hybrides: Briser les Balkans (I)- Le sacer Francophon, source Oriental Review, 06.05.2016). From this point of view, the region can be conceptualized as *relatively divided between the major economies of Germany, Russia and Turkey.* The Balkans somehow merges German and Turkish trade, while most of Russia's trade with the other two blocks takes place through Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. Starting from such dichotomy, EU and NATO politics *Drang nach Suden-On the Way to the South,* they create much more than one conceptual maneuver given that it is clear that the US and Germany *aim to consolidate the region, reconstruct the infrastructure and modernize the former corridor connection through the former SFRY.* The great geo-economic significance of the Balkans for Germany and beyond for the EU economy is evident. Europe's largest market and Europe's largest economic force persist to establish full and direct control (EU) and indirect control (NATO with the US) over trade routes across the continent to the Middle East in co-operation with Turkey as one of the most powerful forces in Western Asia (Andrew Korybkoc: 3). If we refer to history, prior to the First World War it was easier to explain the Berlin project for "Berlin-Bagdad Express" and the efforts to disable Russia's influence in the Balkans. Current projects for control over the Balkans contradict the ambitions of Russia and China whose presence in the Balkans is manifested most massively in the center of the region, that is, in Serbia and Republika Srpska.

Republic of Macedonia is located in the region called the Central Balkans. The geopolitical and geophysical position of Macedonia enables it to function as a critical link between the Greek ports and the Central Balkan countries and even further to Hungary and Germany. At the same time, the territory of Macedonia is also a primary passage for the regional trade north-south, but it is also a very accessible corridor for the migrants from the non-European regions. In the current situation, the Republic of Macedonia is officially oriented towards the pro-European and pro-NATO option.

Energy stakes as geopolitical stakes

In the current geopolitical context marked by persistent tensions between the West and contradictory evolutions of the EU member states in relation to Russia, the projects for the flow of Russian gas across the Balkan territory, such as the South Stream project, evolved into a serious geopolitical stake. The economic sanctions of Brussels for Russia over the crisis in Ukraine were also an occasion for imposing new conditions on the member states and aspiring EU candidates, regarding the South Stream, that is, adapting national legislation on the European rules on signing the contracts with Gazprom. As a result of this action, Bulgaria froze the negotiations, and shortly after, at the end of 2014 it announced the abandonment of the South Stream project. At the beginning of 2017, however, Russia and Turkey agreed to animate the Turkish Stream project.

Numerous analysts believe that the EU will never definitely break the ties with Russia given its energy wealth and the EU needs for those resources. Turkey's geopolitics is added to this complex relationship, as Turkey announced in 2013 that it would not oppose to join the Shanghai five - Organisation de Cooperation de Shaghai (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) which consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This strategic game of Ankara is a serious warning to Brussels considering that Turkey could also play with the Turkish Stream and TANAP project in the future (Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline which starts from Azerbaijan, via Georgia and Turkey to Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Italy), which position Turkey as an inescapable entity in gas pipelines transiting. Otherwise, the new Turkish Stream gas pipeline was created to supply Central Europe with Russian gas. The pipeline is bypassing the territory of Ukraine doubling the Blue Stream gas pipeline which flows from Russia to Turkey and under the Black Sea, ends at the Ipsala terminal on the Greek-Turkish border. In such a dynamic situation, the position of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Austria, historical allies and members of the EU and NATO, was found under the scrutiny of the West. Regardless of the gas pipeline record, a real re-composition of geopolitical balance takes place in Europe. Balkan Europe represents a plate where numerous economic and geostrategic interests collide. Thus at the initiative of Russia, Turkey evolves into the vector of the new corridor, resulting in numerous geopolitical advantages in direction of Ankara's affirmation as the main Euro-Asian route of natural gas. However, such novelty was not in favor of Serbia, which, on the one hand, is striving to integrate into the EU and, on the other hand, maintains its alliance with Russia, otherwise the main user of the South Stream.

At the same time, if Turkey continues to play the role of the Eurasian strategy, which would also connect with the new Chinese project the Silk Road, and proceeds with the strategy of its *soft power – neo-Ottomanism*, it remains that its aspiration with Russia and China can cause serious geopolitical and international consequences of Turkey's relations with the United States and NATO. Considering that the annulment of the South Stream project has stricken the leaders of the Western Balkans, it is possible that another alternative corridor would connect the remains of the South Stream and pass through Greece and Macedonia. However, this possibility is conditioned by the sensitivity and the economic and political instability of Greece and Macedonia, and the possible tensions of the actors involved in this project. An additional element that complicates the situation is the significant presence of China, which according to the New Silk Road project is determined to invest in Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje-Thessaloniki Corridor.

The return of Russia to the Balkans

It is common knowledge that Russia's historical ties to the Balkans are very strong. After the end of the Cold War in 1990, when Russia of Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin came out defeated, it was marginalized and humiliated by the West. Moscow was not able to support and protect its own allies from Serbia, nor to put a stop to NATO bombing or prevent the constitution of an independent Kosovo. With Putin's arrival at the helm of Russia and especially after discovering the vast gas fields in Kazakhstan in 1997, Moscow gained the necessary economic capacity to help revamp Gorbachev and the West. (George Marie Chenu-Balkans occidentaux: espace geopolitique convoite, Diploweb.com-La revue geopolitique,09.dec.2012).

At the first Russian-Balkan Energy Summit of 25.06.2007 held in Zagreb, Russia openly made it clear that its strategic goal was to become <u>the most important supplier of gas to the West, while turning the Western Balkans zone into a key transit</u>

zone of the Russian natural gas. At the heart of this project is Serbia as the main hub or platform of contact through which the large South Stream gas pipeline would pass. The South Stream project is otherwise managed by the company which is 50 % controlled by Gazprom and the second half is represented by the consortium between ENI (Italy), EDF (France) and BASF (Germany).

Putin and Medvedev agreed easily with the Serbian authorities, Moscow even publicly supported Serbia's path to the EU. In the meantime, a free trade agreement between Serbia and Russia was signed, while Gazprom with the purchase of NIS and the refinery in Panchevo, became the dominant factor in Serbia's oil industry. At the same time, Russia lent Serbia $ 1 billion to rehabilitate and modernize its railway, hydraulic plants and balance its budget. Friendship has been strengthened through numerous economic, political and cultural co-operations, and Russia is a solid ally of Serbia over non-recognition of Kosovo. The South Stream plan envisioned it to pass through Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary in order to supply the remaining EU member states. As for Bulgaria, Russia is present with numerous raw materials such as gas, oil, gasoline, nuclear waste, while *Lukoil*, the only oil refinery, belongs to Russia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was also interested in joining the South Stream through Croatia, while RepublikaSrpska was the most accommodating one. *Gazprom* bought out the refinery in Banja Luka and signed several agreements for cooperation with Moscow. Slovenia and Croatia also showed interest in the South Stream. Slovenia even signed the contract, while Montenegro was interested in greater economic and technical cooperation over the modernization of hydroelectric power plants. For its part, Macedonia allowed the entrance of *Lukoil* and initiated a number of political moves aimed at improving its bilateral relations with Moscow. In 2012, in the field of energy Russia ensured itself a very favorable position in the Western Balkans zone, thanks in particular to Serbia's pivotal position in this region. However, Gazprom is a non-transparent entity that concentrates its activities on production and supply, and this duality of business activities is contrary to European legal dispositions for competition, which was one of the main official factors for the failure of the South Stream project. Moreover, there are political factors, as well such as energy as a kind of weapon, and the EU did not want to become addicted to the geopolitical abuse of this weapon by Moscow.

Other Actors

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Turkey gradually began to return to the Western Balkans. Moreover, the new Balkan generations also discovered some positive aspects of the rule of the Ottoman Empire: the Gate succeeded in establishing such a system within which several ethnic, religious and cultural groups coexisted. Turkey, which has relations with all countries in the region, has practiced and continues to practice an active, mediating and reconciliating diplomacy. As an important member of the Islamic Conference, Ankara sensitized the other powerful members of this institution to the Balkan problems. As NATO member, it plays a significant role in crisis management as well, with the presence of its contingent in Kosovo, it has mediated in resolving disputes between Skopje and Athens, as well as in political-religious misunderstandings between Sanjak and Belgrade. Turkey is concrete and realistic. Unless it becomes a member of the EU by 2025, Ankara threatened to fully concentrate on the states that were part of the former Turkish Empire. With the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, numerous Muslim missionaries from North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the significant mass of petro-dollars and built mosques, foreign imams failed to radicalize the European character of Bosnian Islam. (George Marie Chenu: 3). For their part, the Emirates and Kuwait are economically active with several significant projects in Serbia.

Among the least expected newcomers in the Western Balkans is the economic and financial presence of China. Thanks to Greece, Chinese transporters have provided themselves with a direct access to the European market. China's first mission is to facilitate its access to Europe due to the export of its own products, establish commercial or industrial enterprises, and provide trade partners in the region in order to penetrate the EU. In a political sense, China is closer to Belgrade and supports the Serbia's right to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity over Kosovo, where it has an identical position along with Russia against the positions of the United States, Great Britain and France. With the continued use of the veto power in the UN Security Council, China shows it is a great power and enjoys great popularity in Serbian public opinion. In the economic sector, China is most present in Serbia (the bridge "Friendship" on Danube, Zemun-Borca Communications, Kostolac Power Plant, participation in the construction of corridor 11, Smederevo Smelter, etc.). China is also present in Montenegro where it competes with Russian investments and in Macedonia with its lending activities in the construction of several complexes such as the Gostivar-Kichevo-Ohrid highway. However, all these projects are surpassed by the great Chinese project The New Silk Road whose integral part is also the Danube-Morava-Vardar-Thessaloniki corridor. (Nano Ruzin-The Geopolitical state of the Balkans and the Danub-Morava-Vardar-Thessaloniki project, 203-213, Danube and the New Silk Road, ed. D. Dimitrijevic, Beograd: IIPE, 2016). If this gigantic undertaking is realized, the geopolitical image of the Western Balkans and beyond would be completely changed.

USA in the Balkans

During the Cold War, the relations between SFRY and the United States were defined within the global concept of East-West relations. In the eyes of Washington, Yugoslavia was perceived as a buffer zone between NATO and the Warsaw Accord in Southern Europe. During this period, the goals of the US foreign policy were limited to restricting or preventing the hegemony of the USSR against Yugoslavia. (Reneeo Lukic/Allen Lynch: 554). It is understandable that at the beginning of the '90s, the preservation of the SFRY's territorial integrity was one of the vital strategic interests of US foreign policy. When the crisis intensified, President Bush was unable to propose valid solutions for the crisis and he therefore gave his lead position over to the EU and the UN. Striving to preserve Yugoslavia, the United States would recognize the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia only in December 1991. After the initial indecisiveness, the Clinton administration promoted the lift and strike concept, which in cooperation with France, the UK and Russia was to indicate a solution to the crisis. However, the latter countries endeavored to resolve the crisis only diplomatically refusing to employ both military and diplomatic mechanisms. Two concepts were imposed before the Western Allies: one involving the use of NATO aviation attack on the Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and the second, placing an arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia for the purpose of establishing military balance. After the military success of Croatian and Bosniak forces, in 1995 the Dayton Agreement was signed. Such indecisiveness would not be demonstrated by US diplomacy during NATO's air campaign against targets in FRY in 1999. According to Serbian interpretations, the US intervention was based on Washington's economic interest in Kosovo, in order to grab the richest deposits of lead and lignite in Europe. According to US interpretations expressed by US Ambassador to NATO Hunter, *Kosovo represents a doorway for entry into the regions of primary importance for the US, such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Afghanistan, the Caspian region and the Trans-Caucasian area…(Washington Post,21.04.1999)*. The geopolitical dimension for Kosovo is also developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his capital work The Great Chessboard. According to the French political scientist Pierre Hassner (Pierre Hassner: 349) …Brzezinski considered that the creation of an imperial or one-polar order based on American supremacy was underway. There is no doubt that the US strategic goal is to prevent any other force from contesting US supremacy. Thus, the main geopolitical stake of the United States is Eurasia. The loss of control over the Balkans following the destabilization of the region is one of the factors for the intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of US hegemony in the region (Camille Dansette:10). Although it could not be concluded in 2000 that the US positions in the Balkans threatened Russia that was close to Serbia, still one could sense the rising US-Russian rivalry in the post-1999 NATO bombing of FRY. What is more, the Serbs became enemies of the Americans, says Paul-Marie de la Gaurce. (Paul-Marie de la Gaurce:10). Such evolution continued in the following years. After the crisis in Ukraine, the Balkans is transforming into a new line of conflict between Russia and the West, concluded John Kerry in the Senate DC in 2015. Along with the American Bondsteel, it seems that Moscow also created a Russian Bondsteel near Nish, called the Russian-Serbian Center for Emergency Situations. (*Jean-Arnault Derens/Laurent Geslin:7*). However, there are few prospects that Russia will succeed to impose in the Balkans, considering that beside energy, there is nothing else to offer to the Western Balkan countries. But this does not mean that Russia cannot occasionally intervene in the Balkan problems, simply to complicate some crisis situation, but also to remind that it is still a great power. In this context, the Balkans welcomed Donald Trump's election as President of the United States. The expectations of the Balkan political elites are diverse, from complete uncertainty and indifference of the new US administration to high expectations that the US will take special care of the reorganization of the Western Balkans, its borders and security.

Conclusion

-The area of Western Balkans has been one of the most unstable regions in the world in the past 150 years. In order to explain the specificity and instability of the Balkans, it is useful to start from the analysis of different peoples, ethnic groups, cultures and civilizations. Historically, the great powers clashed in the region, regardless of the fact that the Balkans is not a rich area with raw materials and energy. It seems that the geopolitical interests of the Balkans are overcoming the economic or energy disadvantages of the region.

-After the end of the Cold War, the US interest in the Western Balkans and the territory of the former Yugoslavia fell. During the bipolar constellation East-West, the SFRY played a significant geopolitical role in favor of the United States, given that it prevented the USSR from gaining access to the Adriatic basin and other warm seas.

-In the eyes of the great US geo-politician S. Huntington, interethnic wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were a confirmation of his theory of the inevitable collision of civilizations.

-When the war in Kosovo was actualized, and B. Yeltsin's Russia showed its geopolitical incompetence and indecisiveness, the influential Z. Brzezinski pointed to the great interest of the United States for the energy riches of the Caspian region, and the former US ambassador to NATO, R. Hunter stated that the door to the vital points of interest of the United States (Middle East, Afghanistan, the Caspian region) are in Kosovo. In this way, one can conclude that by the beginning of the 2000s <u>from the perspective of strategic interests, the US geopolitical significance</u> of the Western Balkans is on the rise.

-With the energy and international-political strengthening of Russia headed by President Putin, Russia's geopolitical interest in the Western Balkans grew. The geo-economic and geo-energy stakes were transformed into a geopolitical stake.

-Apart from the United States, the EU and Russia, other world powers such as China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia are imposing themselves through various soft power or financial projects in the Western Balkans.

-The Western Balkans is again a geopolitical stake in the rivalry between Russia and the West, especially after the crisis in Ukraine. It is transformed into a new line of conflict between the West and Russia.

-Serbia and RepublikaSrpska maintain close relations with Russia, but at the same time, a significant part of Montenegro's, Macedonia's and Bulgaria's public opinion displays certain pro-Russian and pro-Putin sympathies. Part of the political elites of W. Balkans that are disappointed by the reform efforts and from *pax America* or from the implementation of the rule of law, see Moscow as a symbol of pan-Slavic and pan-Orthodox solidarity towards the Balkans, despite the insistence of Brussels and Washington on the implementation of Western democratic values in the region. This group can also include corrupt politicians seeking a possible refuge in Russia on the pretext of being under pressure from the US or Brussels administration. Finally, the Serbian animosity towards the US can be interpreted through the events from 1999 when the air raid on the FYR was carried out, Washington's adherence to Prishtina and the recognition of Kosovo, but also given the traditional good ties between Russia and Serbia in the last 200 years.

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SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE SECURITY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: A NEED FOR STRONGER INTEGRATION

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Abstract : *The post-cold war unipolar world turned to be multipolar, and as a result the West is increasingly struggling to find solutions for dealing with emerging threats and challenges. The European Union, still going through its own crisis, needs to establish and keep good transatlantic connections and to be able to remain or become one of the influencers in the international arena. Today's world is interdependent and not so much concentrated on security issues, threats and challenges like before, since problems of human survival and human security have arisen and are becoming increasingly serious. Theoretical approaches to international relations indicate the changes in the distribution of global power, setting up grounds for changing multipolarity and the questionable functionality of multilateralism. That could lead towards more serious confrontations among the big powers. In these constellations of the international relations, South Eastern Europe (SEE), a geopolitically very sensitive area for transatlantic partners, struggles with old and new challenges and threats, trying to find the best possible solutions to join the transatlantic family. This paper will present what are the steps in that direction, proving why stronger regional integration and cooperation is needed for better safety and security, and what is the contemporary role of NATO and the EU in SEE.*

Keywords*: Security cooperation, security threats and challenges, Western Balkan, NATO, EU, CFSP, CSDP*

Introduction

The major security concerns in Europe today relate mostly to the common concerns of the transatlantic partners, and mostly to terrorism and weapons of mass destructions. Nevertheless, these concerns are also oriented towards the quality of regional cooperation in Europe, especially in maintaining good neighbourly relations. In a multipolar world, multilateralism is important, to show that the countries are willing to cooperate and work together. European Union and NATO present major arenas of exercising the will to cooperate and depend on each other, and the maintenance of peace and security in South-Eastern Europe depends mostly on the role of NATO and the EU. Although the EU has a developed and rather strong Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), nevertheless, NATO remains the dominant institutional foundation for transatlantic security affairs. After the last American presidential elections, the EU has tried to engage more on European territory starting to play an important security role, especially through its enlargement policy,

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with respect to the SEE. That was the main reason for the European Commission to adopt a new enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans countries [2] making a clear notice to the world that the European Union wants more stability in its neighbourhood. The importance of the South Eastern European countries for the EU is constantly growing, and therefore the integration of the Western Balkan countries into the EU presents one of the common foreign policy goals, a goal that will provide the new members benefits in the economic, political, and especially the security field. Euro-Atlantic integration has, therefore, been recognized as the key strategy for achieving peace, stability and prosperity in this part of Europe. These efforts should always be handled by paying attention to the Russian reaction, in times when Russia is actively performing a global active role in the multipolar system of international relations.

This paper does not primarily address the predictions of how the multipolarity will affect the general international relations, and how the relationship between NATO and the EU on the one side, and Russia on the other, will develop, but rather analyzes and suggests how the new possible confrontations could affect the turbulent atmosphere in the region, with the following remarks:

- The paper examines the perception of the role of the new poles in the multipolar system, especially Russia in relation to the West, with the aim of defining the goals, priorities and the means of achieving them in contemporary international relations.
- The paper explores NATO's return and focus on the European area, with Europe becoming again a geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic area for confrontation between the West and Russia.
- The paper looks at the implications of a renewed focus on Europe and the influence on the turbulent relations in the Western Balkans.
- The paper gives a theoretical insight into contemporary international relations related to the SEE region.

Contemporary relations in South Eastern Europe

South Eastern Europe has a very sensitive geopolitical position, which is visible especially through the turbulent relations among the Western Balkan countries that are still striving to create a better atmosphere in the region. Regional cooperation is just a type of behaviour that these countries are expected to practice, to be able to become EU and NATO members, so it is important to stress that without NATO and the EU, which have been and are security guarantors to the Western Balkan countries, the stability in the region would be rather fragile.

The Western Balkans is still viewed as an unstable region in South Eastern Europe, however, despite many challenges and instabilities, it can be called a reform-

[2] European Commission, 6.2.2018., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, Strasbourg

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en driven region, especially as all countries constantly pursue the path of becoming full Euro-Atlantic members. All countries in the region are striving to join the EU family hoping that it will help them to overcome the tensions that are still present among the six countries. During the process of approaching and negotiations, problems occur especially when talking about progress in the areas of the rule of law, fight against corruption and economic development. With the exception of Serbia, the Western Balkan countries are also striving to join NATO, an alliance that acts as a guarantor of peace and security in a region that is still not stable. These two organizations share common values while securing a lasting peace in Europe; individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

In these efforts of the small states in South Eastern Europe, multipolarity puts a new player on the scene, and that is Russia. Russian influence in this part of the world is large, and, first and foremost, Russia opposes these six countries to join NATO, but also the EU in a way, being concerned especially about Serbia falling under the influence of the West. '*Mr. Lavrov also gave a warning; the EU repeated calls for Serbia to align its foreign policies with the bloc as a precursor to membership and to impose sanctions on Russia, he said, are the same "mistake" the West made by pressuring war-torn Ukraine to choose between it and Russia*.' (Stojanovic, The Independent, 2018) The statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of how Europe is facing an unhealthy situation because of NATO's expansion is also stressed. Looking from this perspective, the enlargement process towards SEE could be viewed as something the EU and NATO want to use just to confront Russia, rather than a fact that Western Balkan countries are really welcome to join. Russia has been acting as a new player in the international arena since 2013 and is successfully expanding its global influence. Russia managed to create a multipolar world, while at the same time dividing Western political and security close relations. After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a rather weak Russia, the United States and Europe were not concerned in Russia's spreading its influence in the world. [3] While spreading its influence, South Eastern Europe, and especially the Western Balkans became most important to Russia, as a geostrategic point having access to the Mediterranean Sea, but also an an important region for export of energy, and '*an arena where Russia has attempted to stop NATO and EU expansion'* (Stronski, Sokolsky, 2017), in which the West did

[3] 'Russia's global activism can be divided into four geographic regions… First are Moscow's efforts to retain its influence or counter Western influence in the states of the former Soviet Union… The second category consists of Moscow's efforts to undermine the Western and transatlantic institutions it considers its principal adversaries—the United States, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)… Third, Russia is engaging in a campaign to gain or regain influence in other places where the Soviet Union once held sway. In the Balkans, for example, Russia plays the nationalist and Christian Orthodox cards to complicate Western efforts to integrate these countries into European structures. The final category consists of Russian efforts to gain influence in parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America'. Stronski Paul, Sokolsky Richard, The return of global Russia: An Analytical Framework, 14 December 2017, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (web source)

not accomplish its role of bringing the democracies in these countries in transition. *Moscow has deployed a wide array of soft and hard power instruments in the Balkans, including traditional diplomacy, information and cultural tools, economic levers, and covert means. The Balkans represent a target-rich environment for Russia owing to the region's complicated legacy and diverse cultural, religious, and ethnic ties.* (Stronski, Sokolsky, 2017). Russia has regained its influence in the world, rejecting the idea of the world being unipolar, with the US being a dominant power. With this new position, Russia is able to claim its interests in the world. [4]

The geostrategic importance of the Western Balkans marks priorities that the international community needs to continue to work on, with joint efforts and reinforced cooperation, addressing the specific challenges this region is facing, in order to maintain the existing equilibrium with neighbouring countries. '*Geopolitics has returned to the Balkans'*, said David McAllister, a German MEP and Chair of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, (Rankin, The Guardian, 6.2.2018.) adding that there are different players in the international arena, the EU, NATO, Russia and Turkey, which shows that today's world is a multipolar place.

Maintaining stability and security on its own territory has again become difficult for the European Union, as it is still struggling with internal crisis. But, the partnership with the US, especially through NATO still exists. However due to the new approach in American foreign policy, South Eastern Europe should not be worried about whether Russia presents a threat or not, but rather worried on the future of the Euro-Atlantic integration. How these new conditions affect relations among the allies is implied in the sentence: '*Rather, we here in the United States ought to be worried about Europe and the centrifugal forces that seem to inexorably be pulling apart our closest pool of allies in the world. A weak or fractured European Union is a serious geopolitical setback for the United States.... First, we should strengthen NATO. It is the foundation of security in the Europe, despite its trials and troubles*.' (Stavridis, Foreign Policy, 2016).

The survival of NATO after the Cold War was very important for Euro-Atlantic stability and security. This was proven not only in reality, but also in theoretical approaches, in which NATO was not regarded only as an alliance, but as a military-political organization. Neo-realists claim that if this transformation never happened, the alliance would have no purpose without the opposite side. Kenneth Waltz, as a neorealist, sees the transformation as a possibility for allies to control each other in many ways, while having collective defense as a main task that still specifies NATO as an alliance.[5] These are the main reasons why Europe needs NATO, despite the

[4] 'Mr. Medvedev said: "Russia, like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests. These are regions where countries with which we have friendly relations are located."Kramer Andrew, Russia Claims its Sphere of Influence in the World, *New York Times*, August 31, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/01/world/europe/01russia.html

[5] It can be said, looking from the perspective of neorealism, that states join the alliances to ensure the behavior of other allies, advancing the interests of their foreign policy, trying to reduce the uncertainty

Common Security and Defence Policy. While tackling the issue of new contemporary international relations, theory of neo-realism will be used in describing how NATO has transformed, when it became clear that defence and deterrence are the bedrock of NATO and an indispensable foundation for any activities undertaken by NATO. By adjusting to the national interests of the member states, it attracts new countries to become members and justifies its role of transformed alliance.[6]

Viewing NATO from the perspective of a transatlantic community that plays an important role in the Western Balkans, it can be said that NATO is a community of values shared by all member states and cooperation in defense is an instrument to promote political change. Sloan claims that NATO is not primarily designed to maintain peace among the member countries, but to protect those countries of the world around them. (Sloan 2005: 7). Therefore, although there were different political opinions within NATO when it came to the enlargement process with the countries from Eastern Europe, extending its membership became a useful political move. However, this policy caused certain instability in te South Eastern Europe, especially after Russia started to play a new role in international relations.

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has stated that Western Balkan countries will be ready to join the EU in 2025, stressing that giving the date is *'encouragement for all parties concerned to work hard*', (Rankin, The Guardian, 6.2.2018.). However, so far, only Serbia and Montenegro have started negotiations and membership talks. It is to be expected that the intention of these countries to become EU members is in view of their easier keeping out of political disputes that cause safety and security problems on European territory.

'If we want more stability in our neighbourhood, then we must maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans. It is clear that there will be no further enlargement during the mandate of this Commission and this Parliament. No candidate is ready. But thereafter the European Union will be greater than 27 in number. Accession candidates must give the rule of law, justice and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations.' (Juncker 2017)

It is positive that the European Commission is open to its enlargement process for countries in South Eastern Europe, however, the problem occurs when discussing the reason that stands behind the open door, and is summarised in one Juncker's statement: "If we do not open up to countries in that highly complicated and tragic region, and if we do not open up a European perspective to them, we will see war returning to that area as we saw in the 1990s. I do not want to see war returning to the Balkans and so we need to open up to them," (Juncker in Reuters April 2018).

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of the international system, which neorealists define as international anarchy. Neorealists see states and great powers as central to world politics, that is characterized as anarchy, which additionally makes them to be within an alliance. (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1993, 44-79.)

[6] Neorealistic perspective of NATO's transformation and reasons to exist in: Waltz, 2001, and: Waltz, 1993. International institutions adjust to the needs of the states and theirs national interests, so NATO stopped being an ordinary alliance. On the definition of the alliance, see more in: Walt 1997

Theoretical framework

After the post-Cold War unipolar world with US dominance in international relations, the international system is returning to multipolarity, with the rise of other great powers, called BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and China. The erosion of the US military commitment to Europe presents a big problem for the transatlantic partnership and European strategic environment, especially while the power of Russia and China, interested actors in Europe, is rising. The European Union is therefore in danger of losing its global role as a pole in this multipolar, interdependent international system. The European Union faces a challenge of achieving unity among the member states and adapting its foreign policy approach to match the new international environment.

In the light of a world order that has dramatically changed in the past 10 years and viewed from the perspective of neorealism, it can be said that states join alliances to ensure the behaviour of other allies, advance the interests of their foreign policy and reduce the uncertainty of the international system, which neorealists define as international anarchy.[7] Kenneth Waltz, a representative of neorealism or structural realism, discusses the reasons for NATO's survival after the end of the Cold War, viewed from the perspective of the neorealists who claimed that NATO would cease to exist if the international system were not characterized by the bipolar world. Waltz (2000: 5–41) argues that the changes the international system faced in the 1990s affected the ways in which states ensured their security.[8] In the multipolar system, there was a growth in uncertainty, so that international institutions such as NATO saw the opportunity to stress that their purpose lay in addressing issues of importance for international peace and security in a global context. Although neorealists do not believe in the importance of institutions, the survival of NATO shows how international institutions sometimes serve national goals.

The new position that Russia started to hold in international relations has shown that the tendentious assertion that NATO has become obsolete as a military and as a political alliance on the international scene is dubious. NATO today is not merely a military-political alliance. Common stands expressed by many experts in a book entitled "*NATO after Sixty Years*" (Sperling and Papacosma 2012), claim that NATO

[7] Anarchy is the basic concept of neorealistic theory. For more, see Waltz (1979, 1993), Mearsheimer (1990) and Glaser (1997). It is worth mentioning that neoliberal institutionalists stress the high level of interdependence among member states of the alliance, as well as the promotion of cooperation.

[8] On NATO's role in the New World Order and the reasons for its survival from the neorealistic perspective, see Waltz (1993, 2000). Waltz (2000) mentions that the fact that NATO survived the disappearance of the primary goal that it had when it was founded is one of the instances that shows why neorealists think that international institutions adjust to the needs of the states and their national interests. Therefore, NATO stops being an ordinary alliance, because if the transformation had never happened, the alliance would have no raison d'être without the opposite side. By adjusting to the national interests of the member states, it attracts new countries to become members and justifies its role as a transformed alliance

is positioned as a strong security actor in the international environment, in which the governments of allied countries respect the common values that underpin the Alliance.

Neorealists see the world as international anarchy (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1993, 44-79.) in which states, as the main actors of international relations, need to join the alliances to ensure the behavior of other allies, advancing the interests of their foreign policy, while trying to reduce the uncertainty of the international system. In this paper, this neorealist approach is considered as the main theoretical approach in international relations when explaining the development of new conditions in the international arena. The failure of the European Union member countries in the 1990s to establish peace and stability on European territory, based upon the thoughts of neorealists, showed that the EU countries needed NATO to help them establish peace and security in their own territory. Neorealists also explain it as a form of *balance* to US forces and also former communist Eastern European countries, whereas Eastern European countries *bandwagoned* in joining NATO.[9]

For neorealists, states act according to their national interests in the anarchic international system, in which the *security dilemma* prevails. This shows a lack of trust in the intentions of other states. The rivalry between states is enhanced by the fact that when one state increases its power to be more secure, the fear of other states naturally grows.[10] Neorealists view this competition and uncertainty in international politics as the cause of the need to achieve the highest possible security. According to the security dilemma theory, a state improves its defences to make it safer from potential attacks; the security dilemma arises when many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others (Jervis 1978: 169). Thus, one state actually forces other states to work on their defence capabilities because of the fear of becoming weak. Thus, the safety of the states does not increase, but is rather reduced.

On the other hand, if a state becomes weak, it has no possibility of coercion.

[9] On balancing and bandwagoning, see also: Schweller (1988, 1994). It is believed that the continuation of NATO is in the interests of the US and other member countries as it promotes global security stability. At the same time, NATO's defense planning creates the possibility of the US leading a coalition of states that want to cooperate because NATO has created an environment characterized by 50 years of peace in Europe. Both the US and EU admit NATO this role. Explaining bandwagoning, in some literature it is viewed as the total opposite of balancing – as supporting the stronger state or even a threat in some conflict, and as such is not a name for surrender, but rather joining the stronger coalition. States behave in line with the bandwagon theory because they want to be on the stronger side. Thus, sometimes bandwagoning and balancing simply reflect each other, so it is not possible to prove conclusively which behaviour is the dominant one. For example, when Western European countries joined NATO, they balanced in relation to the Soviet Union and bandwagoned in relation to the US. Without the Soviet threat, NATO becomes a "tool" for bandwagoning. One form of bandwagoning is buck-passing: allowing the unipolar force to bear responsibility for some action from which everybody will benefit.

[10] On the security dilemma, see Jervis (1978), in which he explains two main arguments. The security dilemma is taken as the basis for examining the states' behaviour and it occurs when one state tries to increase its security in a way that decreases the security of other states (Jervis 1978: 169). See also Snyder (1990) and Glaser (1997).

Having power in international politics means exactly having the possibility of coercion because states relate to each other primarily in terms of relative power and each is limited in the use of their power, primarily by opposing the power of others. The distribution of power among a small number of the most powerful states provides the basis for political decision making when considering on which side to stand or whether to be a member of a particular alliance (Waltz 1979: 112).

The reasons for NATO's survival as an international alliance could be also examined through the views of Walt (2004), who claims that NATO must be sustained as it is beneficial for European and US interests.[11] In his work "*The Origin of Alliances*" (Walt 1987), he expresses the opinion that nations do not form alliances only to create a balance of power. The most influential representative of theories of alliances, whose views can be implemented in today's world, Walt thinks that power is indeed important when creating an alliance because states ally with or against some power that represents the greatest threat. When entering an alliance, states may either *balance* (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger), or *bandwagon* (ally with the state that poses the major threat) (Walt 1985: 4). Balancing is alignment with the weaker side, whereas bandwagoning means choosing the stronger. Walt's (1985) conclusion is that the threat determines the choice of an ally, but also how long the alliance will last. The threat theory is based on balancing behaviour and the proposition that states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers. States join alliances to protect themselves from other states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat (Walt 1985: 5). Walt thinks that alliances cease to exist when the threat is gone, further saying that states actually seek security against threats and not influence over other powers. This is the reason Walt offers for NATO initiating its transformation, its goal being to position itself strongly in the international order, taking the initiative to defuse the crisis in the Southeast European region. In addition, the war in Kosovo confirmed the European dependence on US military power projected through NATO.

Both theoretical foundations – neorealism and alliance theory – offer a logical approach to understanding the origins and character of the policy in NATO transformation during the past almost 30 years. This approach very easily reflects NATO's position towards Russia in relation to the Ukraine crisis as the only security guarantor. Neorealists claim that states behave in accordance with their national interests and the national interests of neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine, are lined to this. NATO is needed if such countries are to be safe from threat. The fact is that NATO will exist as long as its member states face a threat to their national security, because alliances are primarily a means of ensuring national security.

[11] For Walt's thoughts on alliances, see Walt (1985, 1997).

Need for stronger integration and cooperation in South Eastern Europe

Major security concerns are regional in scope, and that is the case especially with the region of South Eastern Europe. Peacekeeping and peace-building are an increasingly important component of the international security policy of regional powers, but also of great world powers that express their interests in supporting different approaches in the Western Balkans. EU neighbourhoods are areas of interest for Euro-Atlantic Integration, but also Russia, Turkey and China.

It is always the case that cooperation among states enhances the security and stability in their neighbourhood, and the European Union is the best example of good cooperation among states. Unfortunately, still today the Western Balkan is perceived as a region of rather weak small states that need international support. Interethnic relations, which were the cause of instabilities are still present within countries, and that is a major obstacle for stability, security and democracy in the region. The Regional Cooperation Council [12] promotes cooperation in the region and European and Euro-Atlantic integration of South East Europe, and has promoted a South East Europe (SEE) 2020 Strategy [13] that puts as a prerogative of good neighbourly relations improving living conditions and bringing competitiveness and development back in focus, closely following the vision of EU Strategy Europe 2020. As many sceptics were thinking, this regional approach does not exclude an individual approach, and it is fully consistent with the development of regional cooperation, and could be seen as an impediment to good neighbourly relations. Stronger regional cooperation increases the prospects for the more rapid integration of the region into the EU.

The importance of regional cooperation can be visualized as yielding the following benefits: reducing tension, especially in the region that is famous for heightened interethnic tensions, and strengthening regional stability, which in turn is a key precondition for sustainable development. Therefore, the two main pillars of stability in the Western Balkans are, on the one hand, Euro-Atlantic institutions and, on the other, regional cooperation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, thanks to these key factors the Western Balkans is currently more stable politically and in terms of security than at any point in the last 20 years.

The region is involved in various forms of cooperation with NATO, which as an alliance remains an important source of the region's stability. The European Union plays the effective stabilising role through the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). All countries of the region have Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the European Union, in view of stabilising the area. It is also in the European Union's own strategic interest to continue with the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union. The enlargement process of both the EU and NATO is the most efficient tool that keeps the Western Balkans countries on track and supports regional stability. According to the EU Enlargement Strategy 2009[14], good neighborly relations

[12] https://www.rcc.int/home

[13] South East Europe 2020, Regional Cooperation Council, November 2013

[14] Commission of the European Communities, 14.10.2009., Communication from the Commission

are “essential elements of the Stabilization and Association process …” and, as such, are closely monitored by the Commission at all stages of the accession process. The strategy states that “regional cooperation underpins and enhances reconciliation in a region that suffered major conflicts in the recent past”.

Due to the increased Euroscepticism and worsened relations among the Western Balkan countries, a diplomatic initiative was stipulated in 2014 under the flag called: *Berlin process* that had the aim to keep the dynamics of the EU enlargement process, while keeping good ties among the Western Balkan countries and selected EU member states (Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, France, Germany and Italy). Its intention is to improve regional cooperation for better development of the society. The next Western Balkans Summit will be held in July in London.

Conclusion

The new conditions in the global world and contemporary international relations also create new conditions for the small countries in South Eastern Europe, especially the Western Balkans. The multipolar system shows that international organizations need to put more effort in increasing the security of small states, which also means increasing their influence in the modern world. Depending on domestic and international conditions, small states need to, therefore, choose policies that best reflect their needs, especially in geopolitical context, and thus help themselves to achieve their foreign policy goals.

This paper showed that regional cooperation has been one of the greatest achievements and one of the greatest needs of the Western Balkans as a region, since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Today’s multipolar world makes the shared objectives for the integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions of the small Western Balkan countries their strategic goals that cannot be achieved without high level of regional integration. This paper proved that there is a great need for stronger integration and cooperation in South Eastern Europe, and only stronger regional cooperation increases the prospects for more rapid integration of the region into the EU and NATO.

This is the main reason that the theory of neorealism was used to explain how the multipolar world interferes with the interests and geostrategic interests of the small states. They have no other option but to be incorporated into the international relations in a way to have powerful states or organizations on their sides. This means joining the alliance is the best option to protect themselves from the anarchy that is dominant in the international relations, according to neorealists. Therefore, joining the alliance helps small states in ensuring the behaviour of other countries - allies, which, if not allies, could be a potential danger for the safety and security of small states. When small states join the alliance, it advances their foreign policy interests and reduces the uncertainty that exists in contemporary international relations. In multipolarity, it is even more difficult to feel safe by being alone in the international system, that is anarchic, so states join alliances to either ally with or against some power that represents the greatest threat for their safety, and very often, as claimed by neorealists, states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers.

to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2009/strategy_paper_2009_en.pdf

This theoretical background enabled for the hypothesis of this paper to be proved, as follows: in contemporary multipolar international relations with new poles that have risen in the modern world, especially Russia standing on the opposite side of the West, international organizations and alliance (NATO) need to return their focus on SEE, and especially the Western Balkans, in order to keep the peace and security in the region, geopolitically very sensitive area for transatlantic partners, struggling with old and new challenges and threats. The conclusion is that this region needs continuous international support, along with maintaining good neighbourly relations.

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Scientific article

LIFELONG LEARNING IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract: *The leading motto in modern publications on management is "The Company exists because of the client". In the American association of management this question is answered as follows: "Your success does not account for what you know, but what you do with your knowledge".*

Given the afore-stated, and in view of developing the defense sector in the Republic of Macedonia, there is an existing need for verification of the influence of the organizational studies based on the coordination of the needs of the individuals and the organizations in order to conduct a lifelong study on the employees in the defense sector. Thus, a clear perception of the actual state in the context of lifelong learning in the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia can be achieved, and the results of the research will contribute to the individual and organizational implementation of lifelong learning of defense employees, their personal educational advancement, as well as prompt and facilitated implementation of the acquired knowledge in everyday work.

According to Lisbon Strategy, lifelong learning is defined as "All the conscious activities undertaken with respect to study (formal or informal), with the goal of improving the knowledge, skills and competence" and "All activities in life connected with study, with the objective of improving knowledge, skills and competence, from personal, civil, social perspective or from the perspective of employment.

In view of getting a grip of the real state in the sphere of lifelong learning in the defense sector of Republic of Macedonia, a series of surveys of sample individuals have been conducted (defense employees in Macedonia positioned as managers and non-managers). The study is based on a sample of multiple hundreds of respondents, selected upon the criterion of employees in the defense sector whose activities require lifelong learning (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia and its regional units, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia, the Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" Skopje, etc.). The study analyzes the considerations of the interviewed personnel correlating with the lifelong learning concept, indentifies their needs and important abilities and skills and determines the factors that may influence the choice of the correct form of lifelong learning, under the hypothetical assumption that there is a multitude of factors which influence learning in the process of lifelong learning.

Key words: *lifelong learning, organizational learning, defense sector, Republic of Macedonia*

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Introduction

The relation of the company and the market on which it is presented constitutes the basic characteristic of the economic system. The system of free market economy endeavours to secure the running process of the market by the demand. That means that the needs of the client for a specific type or quality of a product are defined by the relations on the market. This bestowed characteristic produces the basic relation of free market economy, or more specifically the market driven by demand, and that is competition. The market driven by demand defines the place of the company in the environment, more specifically "the company exists because of the environment". This relation is concretized with the definition that "The company exists because of its customers".

However, in practice that is not always the case. A large number of company founders have forgotten how their companies came to life, and an even larger number of managers of already developed companies, are forgetting this relation. This way of thinking of the managers of large companies has led to their collapse. Making a good profit, these companies have forgotten about their customers, disregarding the changes of needs and the competition that offers a higher quality or cheaper products in an effort to retain their own customers on the market. On that note, the leading thought of modern publications on management describes this issue with the following statement: "Your success does not depend on what you know, but what you do with your knowledge".

For young people, the acquisition of knowledge has one of the dominant roles in life, such as the length of every study, or the improvement of what has already been learned: in the same or in another subject, in the same or in a different class and so forth. In professional life, the study is related to the work: what has been learned in previous education, needs to be effectively applied in the exercise of the work duties at the working place. Since the individual and the company environment are ever changing, the once learned information is not always enough for appropriate dealing with new situations. It is necessary to always tend towards acquisition of knowledge and skills. This new knowledge and skills should be applied in the new ever-changing practicum.

Namely, the individual who needs to change his behavior in the organizational environment should first acquire information of what needs to be changed and how to do it. As such, the planned change happens at least twice: mentally and physically. These two elements allow for the change (previous knowledge and experience, new knowledge for the new required behavior, demonstrated new behavior and such) to start and indicate the individual's basic readiness to change. This starting position in the process of change is named a Starting Educational Readiness (SER).[3]

Without a doubt the study, or the education and the management of its basic substance - knowledge, seen as a sociological, personnel and cultural category, in today's conditions is considered as a pre-requirement for the survival and development of modern societies. In the actual living and working environment of quick economic, social, political and science-technological changes, knowledge is exceptional. That is one of the core tools in the socio-economic development of modern societies and in the opening of the wider field for an effective participation of the human factor in resolving social, professional and individual problems. The improvement of education and the intellectual level of human resources in an organized system and the acquisition and implementation of knowledge in practice have become key to

[3] Смилевски Ц, ,,Предизвикот и мајсторството на организациските промени,, Детра, Скопје, 2000: 406

the process of solving the non –important economic, social, group and individual problems in everyday work and life.

Consequently to these findings on the direction of development of the defence sector in the Republic of Macedonia, there is an existing need for verification of the influence of organizational learning on the compliance with the individual and organizational needs in the implementation of lifelong learning by defence employees.

Organizational learning

In the traditional psychological understanding the objective of studying is to increase the independence of the reactions based on the immediate stimulation. Individual study occurs and manifests itself when a person is in a condition to give different answers to the same incentives. But the basic goal of the organization is not study. In relation of its basic goals, study is always a tool. The organization does not exist for it to study, but it studies in order to exist. It is a specific gathering and constellation of people, tools, methods and principles of work, values and norms of behavior, which main goal is to unify and coherently act in order to attain its basic goals. An ideal in the function of every organization is its ability to give a holistic, synchronized and standardized response to different incentives which come from the environment. Going from there as a blueprint, it can be said that individual study occurs when people give different responses to different stimuli, and te organizational learning, when groups of people give the same answers to different stimuli.

To fully understand the term organizational learning, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of the organization which is conducting the study. The organization which is conducting the study is a result of an efficient organizational learning. As such, organizational learning is a result of the organization which is doing the studying, the same way the relation between the organization which is doing the studying and organizational learning can best be defined as a correlation between a structure anda process.

In a practical sense, the idea of an organization which is doing the studying is a result of the need for change, survival, competition and development. Postmodern economy studies are looked upon as the sole stable tool for the maintenance of the competition capabilities for development. The changes to which modern organizations are exposed are seen either as threats or the ability and possibility for survival and development. In order for them to survive in conditions of fast and unexpected changes, organizations are forced to study. However, today's organizations do not simply choose between studying and not studying. Before anything, there are many harder requirements and tasks. First and foremost, the most important role is played by the speed of learning. Learning itself is an imperative, but the survival of the organization depends, furthermore on the state and on the speed of the study compared to the changes which take place in the organization and its environment. In modern organizations, the learning process is not simply a counter effect of the changes, but their anticipatory organization.

In a wider sense, the organization that is learning can be defined according to Piter Senge[4], who talks about an organization that studies and one that cannot and does not do it because studying is integrated in its life. He indentifies a group that studies as "a group of people who increase their capabilities in a continuity to create what they want to create".

Organizations that study are educating their employees in the process of critical thinking due to the need of understanding what they do and why they are doing it. These individuals help the organizations to learn from their mistakes and their successes. As a result, they understand the changes in their environment and accordingly adapt efficiently. The organizations that study can be viewed as a group of employees, which are capable of producing new knowledge, products and services.[5]

Pedler and his associates insist on the fact that studying needs to happen across the entire organization and include all its members, because only that can bring about its transformation and accordingly, its development.[6] The company that studies permanently is a vision of what is possible. It does not create simple training exercises for the individuals, but it simply happens as a result of the studying of the whole organization on a holistic level. A company that studies is a company that allows study for its members and it is in a constant state of transformation.

Huber understands studying as a change of behavior, which is connected with the acquisition of knowledge, distribution of information, interpretation of the information and its organizational memory.[7] A man studies through the processing of content and information, and then the volume and type of his behavior are changed and broadened.

Argiris and Schon say that organizations study through their members. The individual activities of the study are encouraged or are limited through the environmental systemic factor which can be called an organizational system of study. They define organizational learning as a process of "discovering and improvement of the errors".[8]

All afore-stated points of view of the organized learning phenomenon can in their basis be brought to two theoretical different, but not contradictory understandings of the study. They are how studying leads to the acquisition of knowledge, processing of information and change of behavior which takes place from one point of view and studying as a transformation of knowledge, norms and values, from another.[9]

Furthermore, the secret of success in any system, or the key to success is the exercise of the manager's role, as told by Adizes, which lies in the organizational culture

[4] Senge M. Peter, "The Fifth Discipline" Doubleday, New York, 1994: 67

[5] Marquardt and Raynolds, The Global Learning Organisation, Burr Ridge, Irvin, 1994: 22

[6] Pedler et al. The Learning Company: „A Strategy for Sustainable Development„ McGraw-Hill, New York, 1991: 1

[7] Huber„Organizational Learning: the contributing process and the literature, Organization Science„ 1991, 1

[8] Argyris, C. & Schon, D. "Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective, Reading, Massachusetts: Additional-Wesley" 1978, 2

[9] Jarvis, P. "Adult and Continuing Education, Theory and Practice", London: Routledge, 1995

that represents the core of the organizational learning, and that, from its point of view, is the exact place where team work is born.[10]

In modern literature on management, a series of articles and books are devoted to one of the latest management “key words”: organizational learning. The decade of the 90ties of the past century is described as the “decade of corporations that study”. The top managers of world companies who attended seminars for organizational learning and systematic thought in the frames of the Center for Organizational Learning within the Institute of Technology in Massachusetts (USA) indicate that organizational learning is an increasingly global competitive advantage which allow their corporations to continually adapt and react to changes, and become the bearers of change leaving behind the corporations which are still trying to adapt to the changes they have created.

In the working organization the manager is the one who acts as the promoter of the organizational learning as one of the powerful competitive means to improve the success of the organization. For the manager to achieve that he has to build the organizational learning as a vision and a strategy of the organization as a continued or as some call it, lifelong learning.[11]

Organizational learning, as a concept and as a very pragmatic scientific discipline, takes on an important part in lifelong education. Educational update, professional orientation, educational pre-profilation, strengthening of the individual and organizational performance in the employees and management sector, are a wide variety of activities of the mentioned institutional individuals on a world level, but in our businesslike environment. Their business arrangement contributes to the development of the adult education, although more than a decade and a half of law regulations were not met, due to the fact that the Law on education for adults was adopted in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia in the year of 2007.

Concepts of lifelong learning

According to Lisabon Strategy, lifelong learning is defined as such: “All consciously undertaken activities correlating with study (formal or non-formal), with the goal of improvement of the knowledge, skills and competence”[12] and “All activities in life correlating with studying with a goal to improve knowledge, skills and competence, from a personal, civil, social perspective or from a perspective of the employment”.[13]

Although it is not a wholesomely new idea and its practice, lifelong learning appeared in an international context for the first time in 1972, by UNESKO, first with the term o lifelong education.[14]

[10] Adizes, I., 02.12.2005

[11] Broad M. & Newstorm J. “Transfer of Training: Action - Packet Strategies to Ensure High Payoff from Training Investments”. Reading, Mass.: Addison - Wesley Publishing Company. 1992, p. 59-105

[12] European Commission. Memorandum on Lifelong Learning, 2002

[13] European Commission. Making a European Area of Lifelong Learning A Reality. 2003

[14] Faure report, 1972

After almost twenty years since the report of Faure, the term lifelong education was renamed into lifelong learning or study throughout the life, by the recommendations of the report of Delors for UNESKO. The difference between the terms does not only exist in semantics, but in th context as well. The recommendations of Delors report in 1996 are in direction that the lifelong learning concept is the key that allows access to the XXI century. Lifelong learning in its new form is experienced as something much more that it was presented in previous practice. From it, new opportunities for education are expected to be created for everyone, allowing a second or a third chance. Simply put, lifelong learning needs to use all the possibilities which are available to society.

Lifelong learning in the '70s was more associated with the development of individuals and society, in view of dealing with the rapid social changes.The interpretation of lifelong learning in the '90s of the 20th century was related with over-qualification, appropriate qualification and training, aimed at acquiring new skills and abilities to help individuals successfully deal with the needs of the ever changing work environment. The focus of lifelong learning is increasingly oriented towards the student instead of the educator or the system of education. This is one of the main reasons for changing the term from lifelong education to lifelong learning.

In relation to the application of European practices in the Republic of Macedonia, it needs to be noted that key activities in the frames of the implementation of lifelong learning in our country are the Sector programs, Comenus, Erazmus, Leonardo da Vinchi, Grundvig and the transversal programs. The goal is to help in the establishment of a framework for effective utilization of resources within the lifelong learning program and the previous related programs on a sectoral, regional, national and European level.[15]

For effective utilization of the results arising from the lifelong learning program and the previous related programs on a sectoral, regional, national and European level, one sided or national projects, multi layered projects, intertwined program actions are proposed in view of promoting the utilization of the results on a European level by sectoral, thematic and user group, as well as promoting activities through regional European sector networks aimed at establishing a circle in which political and practical experience would be developed.

The actions which are financed in the frames of this key activity have the goal of supporting the utilization of the results of a concrete project, integrated in the framework of the four sectoral programs and other transversal key activities. The projects thereof are financed by systems and mechanisms for support of the dissemination and utilization of the results, as well as for promotion of the utilization of the intertrelated actions on the level of the European Union for utilization of the results.

The main focus is based on the initial education of the working population enabling people to acquire the basic components, eliminating the obstacles and developing a whole spectrum of possibilities for further study, in correlation with formal

[15] http://www.na.org.mk

acknowledgement of the competences, as well as the information system which should help individuals make their choice. Different sides: national, regional and local public figures, social partners, civil society share the financial responsibility for promoting and supporting the culture of lifelong learning in the center of which is the individual.

The European Committee drafted a community referent frame which is consisted of 8 key competences for lifelong learning defined as combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes according to the context: communication in the native language, communication in a foreign language, mathematical competence and basic civil competence in science, feeling of initiative and consciousness for cultural expression. These competences need to be achieved or acquired at the end of the mandatory education and then need to be renewed and improved throughout life.[16]

Otherwise, the law regulations on lifelong learning in the EU determine a strategic frame for four strategic goals: 1) Lifelong learning and its mobility to become a reality, 2) Improvement of study and training quality and efficiency, 3) Promotion of justice, social coherence and active civil population, 4) Strengthening the creative innovations, including business activities on all levels of education and training. Based on these four strategic goals, it was determined that there are more priorities such as the extension of possibilities for mobility in study or strengthening the partnership between education and training institutions in general.

In terms of the present application of the regulations on lifelong learning in the EU there is an advancement in the reforms and modernization of higher education and in the development of common European instruments for promotion of education quality, transparency and mobility.[17]

The collaboration in the field of education with respect to its regulation has resulted in a large number of reference tools and instruments on EU level, which are designed to support national reforms. Recommendations and common principles were made on the quality of higher education and informal study, lifelong learning and the European frame for qualification.

In view of the law regulation of lifelong learning in the Republic of Macedonia, it needs to be noted that the Law on education for adults sets forth the organization, structure, finance and management of the education system.[18]

The Education for adults covers formal and informal study. Formal study covers primary education, high school, expert education, training and education of adults, technical education, special qualification or applied qualification education and higher

[16] Пецаковска С. и Лазаревска С., Македонското образование во светло на реперите и индикаторите за ,,Образование и обука 2010 година,, Програма за работа на европската комисија, Скопје, 2009 година

[17] Council Conclusions on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training

[18] Закон за образование на возрасни, Службен весник бр. 7/08, 17/11, 51/11, 74/12, 41/14, 144/14, 146/15 и 30/16)

education of adults. This formal education is in compliance with the law that regulates this area. Informal study covers organized processes of study for adult training for social and personal development.

The goal of adult education is to provide possibilities for increasing the educational level of individuals from all age groups who acquire certain knowledge, skills and attitudes in accordance with society and market economy.

The task of education is to provide at least mandatory education, on-employment training for those who need expert qualification, overqualification, tailored qualification, training of employees and the unemployed, as well as acquisition of knowledge based on the personal capabilities and acquisition of skills and competences which constitute the basis of lifelong learning.

The competences of the Ministry of Economy and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia include participation in the development of state policy on education, and accordingly, this law offers overqualification and proper qualification of the personnel through market economy. Additionally, the Ministry of Economy and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia participates in the development of the expert qualifications by all standards, in compliance with the Centre for preparation of new expert qualifications according to standards and the list of standards of different tasks and their professional orientation.[19]

The local municipality has the obligation to make an analysis necessary for the market economy on the local level. It can establish municipal institutions for human resource development, to bring forth suggestions to the Ministry and the Centre with respect to the needs for development of adult education, to develop educational programmes financed by the local municipality, to provide tools for the institutions as a founder and make proposals to the Ministry on the adult education enrollment policy.[20]

Social partners in the area of adult education are the chambers, syndicates and educational organizations for adult education. They have the right to organize education, to suggest changes and improvement of the existing programs, as well as to suggest new programs. Their obligation is to implement the education program, to provide conditions, to meet the agreed conditions and to submit a yearly report to the Center on the educational plans and programs they have implemented, the number of participants, the staff involved in the process, etc.

The adult education programs offer basic, high school and higher education adjusted to the possibilities and the needs of the adults to educate and improve, as well as specialized education in institutions licensed for such activities. There are existing programs for becoming literate, native language and foreign languages, overqualification, tailored qualification, business management, information - communication technologies, creative participation in cultural and art based events, preservation and

[19] http://www.mtsp.gov.mk

[20] http://www.zels.org.mk

protection of the environment, active citizenship, knowledge of science and technology and other capabilities.

The financing of the adult education program is made through the Budget of the Republic of Macedonia, the local municipality and other sources of finance in accordance with the law.

Research and research results in the defense sector in the Republic of Macedonia

With the aim of getting a better view of the real state in the sphere of lifelong learning in the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia, in the period from January to March 2017, a survey was conducted on a personnel sample (individuals employed in the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia positioned on managerial and non-managerial working positions). The survey was conducted on a sample of more than a hundred participants, selected according to the criteria of defense employees who participate in activities predisposed towards lifelong learning (Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia and its regional units, the Army of Republic of Macedonia, Military Academy “General Mihailo Apostolski” Skopje, etc.). The interpretation of the survey results included an analysis of the respondents’ thoughts on the concept of lifelong learning, and they indentified the need for important capabilities and skills and determined the factors which influence the choice of a specific form of lifelong learning, under the hypothesis that there is a multitude of factors which influence the process of lifelong learning.

The conclusion that may be derived from the analysis indicates that the defense employees in the Republic of Macedonia believe that the permanent study process is an important factor for the advancement of the process of their work. A large portion of the employed personnel give a positive grade to the existing system of self improvement in the frame of their working organizations. This is highly important because self-improvement of those who study increases the motivation of the employed personnel for a higher quality exercise of the working process. Furthermore, employeec concur that in the frames of their working organizations it is easy to accept the new ways of work and technologies. Hence, it is evident that they are ready to accept innovations in the working process. Moreover, the advancement of the skills and the performance of the employees in this sector gets on a higher level. The same applies for encouraging employees’ self-initiative. The defense sector employees share the attitude that their working organizations are always making analysis of future possibilities and the ability to find new answers. In the frame of the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia, the managers share the work and their knowledge with the employees which helps them learn more.

The analysis implies that within the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia there is a plan in place for training of the employees for their personal, group and organizational advancement. In that direction, it needs to be noted that there is a Budget for implementation of the training. The analysis points out towards a good analytical attitude in the implementation of the organization plans in the sphere of everyday work. Furthermore, the employed personnel in the defense sector share the attitude that their working organizations are motivating people to study. Moreover, the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia is characterized with efficient methods of adaptation of the working team to the assigned obligations, which are based on relatively high creativity, both individual and teamwork-like. When it comes to having visions about the whole process, the employees agree that their working organization shares their point of view.

Respecting the needs of the employees for studying and taking in consideration the lifelong learning process as a form of non formal study which contributes towards strengthening the human resources capacities and their personal and organizational performances in the context of organizational learning, it can be concluded that there is a state of morality and responsibility on the part of the employees in the defense sector of the Republic of Macedonia. Self education, education provided by the leadership, the information oversight, the colleges and the environment are the typical fields for implementation of lifelong learning in the form of informal and cognitive study. Actually, the functional literacy of the employees in this segment is evident, as well as the sharing of knowledge within the working team, team behavior and team equivalence. Relatively high declaratory consciousness for training of the management and non-management teams is expressed by the leadership characteristic of encouraging the employees to study, their openness towards innovations and the demands for help of the non-management personnel to the managers indicate a positive trend in the organizational commitment of the employees towards the process of lifelong learning. Additionally, there is high level of awareness for the achievement of the organizational goals, and hence the goals of the working environment in the context of global thinking for stimulation of development, on an organizational as well as on individual level. We can easily recognize the important European influences for lifelong learning and a brave readiness for participation in market economy. Furthermore, the fact the employees are knowledgeable of the informative-communicative technology is a plus, and it presents an actual trend and a basis for further development and higher quality in everyday's work. Discrimination of any kind: religious, ethical, political, gender or sexual, as well as organizational category of behavior is present at an insignificant percentage in the employees. That reiterates the universal value of lifelong learning.

Conclusion

The participation of adults in lifelong learning is probably the most important challenge that the states of Europe are facing today, in the field of education and training. This is of core importance not just for competition and economic development, but for social inclusion, active citizenship, employment and personal fulfilment of people. The education and training policies of the EU states imply an ever more growing concern for lifelong learning which covers all types of educational structures, in all possible places, with all possible pedagogical approaches, meant for the whole population with an accent on the specific needs of specific groups.

In this regard, the conducted research is a significant contribution towards the identification of the needs and possibilities of lifelong learning of adult employees in the defense sector in the Republic of Macedonia, through the concept of organizational learning of its essence, its strategies, its disciplines and situational types.

The research presents a clear perception of the actual conditions in context of lifelong learning in the defence sector of Republic of Macedonia, and the results of the study will contribute to the individual and organizational implementation of lifelong learning for the defense employees, their personal educational reward, fast and easy implementation of their acquired knowledge in everyday practice and will serve as the basis for further research in this sphere.

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THE SECURITIZATION OF ASYLUM: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES

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Abstract: *Insecurity, as a politically and socially constructed phenomena, refers to threats or dangers to someone. When the threat is existential it depends on the legitimacy of the securitizing actor and on the way and context in which the threat is presented. In this sense, though asylum seekers have been portrayed in a negative light for a variety of reasons, this paper focuses specifically on their designation as a threat to the national security. Actually, the paper analyzes how asylum seekers become a security issue, as well as which instruments and approaches are used from the states regarding this issue. Moreover, the paper focuses specifically on the European Union securitization approach towards this issue.*

Key words: *security, securitization, Copenhagen school, asylum, European Union*

Introduction

As results and consequences of political prosecution, conflict, high level of terror and low living standards, as well as different violations of human rights, people today are being forced to flee their homes. Moreover, recent developments in the world politics, as the revolutionary waves occurring in the Arab world, and especially the Syrian conflict, have shown that human rights violations occur almost every day. It is no doubt that such an unsafe environment contributes to people leaving communities forcibly and seeking protection and normal, human living conditions elsewhere. Very often the need to flee results from a breakdown of the existing bond between citizen and state. The causes of human displacement are closely connected not just with certain oppressive regimes in individual countries, but also with trends in international political and economic systems.

A very concrete example is the civil war and international intervention in Libya. The Libyan revolution produced massive refugee flows, as a result of which the UNHCR estimated that, since February 2011, more than 900.000 people have left the country. Most of them were third-country nationals, but more than 660.000 Libyans have also fled. In addition, around 200.000 people have been internally displaced.[2] This war and the international response by resolving the crisis using military means and fuelling Islamist leaders created not just political effects, but economic and social effects as well created, fist by risking the budget savings due to rises in military expenses, than by creating a refugee crisis which led to an urgent need to reform the Schengen treaty.[3] It means that human displacement has significant implications on global politics – such as conflict, peace and state building, terrorist recruitment, transnational

[1] Institute for Security, Defence and Peace Studies – Skopje, Ph.D

[2] 2012 UNHCR country operations profile-Libya, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html

[3] ”Europe moves to end passport-free travel in migration row”, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/europe-to-end-passport-free-travel.

crime etc. As a result, the responses that states provide when there is a massive refuge crisis are usually highly political. Very often it involves decision on how to weigh the rights of the citizens on one hand, and the rights of the non-citizens on the other. From a protection aspect, those responses can be positive, as well negative – denying that protection. Actually, in the Libya example, many refugees sought protection in Tunisia, Egypt and Chad. Within the EU, Libyan refugees were not welcomed and asylum seekers applications were massively rejected (proving that humanitarian reasons for granting asylum were not the decisive factor).

Actually, this is the reason behind the interdependent relation between the migrants' and asylums seekers' issues with securitization. This is because the securitization in international relations is the process in which state actors transform subjects and issues into matters of security. Actually, it is an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means and instruments to be used in the name of security.

The UNHCR Report on Global Trends for 2016[4] states that 20 people are newly displaced every minute of the day. According to this Report, the global population of forcibly displaced people has grown substantially from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 2016. Actually in the course of 2016, 10.3 million people were newly displaced by conflict or persecution. This included 6.9 million individuals displaced within the borders of their countries and 3.4 million new refugees and new asylum-seekers. Moreover, the growth is concentrated between 2012 and 2015, driven mainly by the Syrian conflict along with other conflicts in the region such as in Iraq and Yemen, as well as sub-Saharan Africa including Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sudan.[5]

On the other hand, developing regions hosted 84 per cent of the world's refugees under the UNHCR's mandate, with about 14.5 million people. The least developed countries provided asylum to a growing proportion with 28 percent of the total number of refugees on a global level. Among the countries, Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide, with 2.9 million people. It was followed by Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1 million), Iran (979.400), Uganda (940.800), and Ethiopia (791.600).

Defining asylum

In the theory and academic literature, as well as in practice, there is a difference between asylum seekers and illegal migrants. In reality, asylum seekers do not travel in isolation, but are part of a vast overall global pattern of migration. However, migration is defined broadly as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence.[6]

Most common distinction between the different types of migration is made between external and internal migration. On the other hand, the distinction between legal and illegal migration is also very well known. In this sense, an illegal migrant is defined as person who entered illegally or/and had legal entry with subsequent illegal residence on the territory of a country, usually expecting to "find" greater economic opportunities and quality of life.

The more important distinction related to the asylum issue is distinguishing

[4] UNHCR Report on Global Trends for 2016, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/

[5] Ibid.

[6] Lee, E.(1966): A Theory of Migration, Demography, Vol.3, No.1,p.49

between forced and voluntary migration. Forced migration is often assumed to have a political basis, being based on flight from persecution or conflict, while voluntary migration is generally assumed to be underpinned by economic motives.[7] In reality, most migration has elements of both the political and economic based migration. Consequently, an asylum seeker is an individual who has sought international protection and whose claim for refugee status has not been determined yet.[8]

Each country of asylum (State Party of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees), as a part of its obligation to protect refugees on its territory, has incorporated in its national legislation the responsibility to determine whether an asylum seeker is a refugee or not. In this sense, a refugee is a person who owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country[9] and therefore seeks protection elsewhere.

The origin of the complex system of international refugee protection stretches back over almost 80 years in the late 1945. Soon after the end of the World War II, the newly –created United Nations approved a convention spelling out specific rights and protections that nations should offer to refugees and asylum seekers. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950 to oversee the process. In this sense, the adoption of the Refugee Convention in 1951 and its 1967 Protocol provides a universal code for the treatment of refugees displaced from their countries as a result of persecution, violent conflict, serious human rights violations or other forms of serious harm.

Parallel developments in direction of refugee protection were established in other areas of international law. Among them, most significant is the international refugee law[10] which is a set of rules and procedures that aim to protect, first, persons seeking asylum from persecution and second, those recognized as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention and other relevant instruments. Its legal framework provides a set of diverse guarantees for these specific groups of persons, although, inevitably, this legal protection overlaps to a certain extent with the international human rights law as well with the legal regime applicable to armed conflicts under the international humanitarian law.

Generally, it could be concluded that the distinction between the category of a refugee and an asylum seeker is more policy, legally and empirically driven, rather than scientifically.

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[7] Alexander, B. (2009): Forced Migration and Global Politics, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, p.4

[8] UNHCR Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, Statistical overview of asylum applications lodged in Europe and selected non-European countries. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4e9beaa19.html

[9] Article 1A of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html

[10] Available at: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/dynamic/guide.php?id=64

Theoretical approach of securitization

Even though security in the modern world is regarded as one of the basic human needs, still under this term a wide range of different understandings can be found. More specifically, from the most traditional understanding of security as a military, followed by the classical national security idea, all the way to the contemporary ideas on comprehensive security. However, it should be noted that any notion of security consists of two basic elements: a threat and a referent object (i.e. something or someone that is vulnerable to that threat). In this sense, except the military aspect it incorporates, there are also political, social, environmental and cultural dimensions. Wolfers A. highlights that:

"security in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, while in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".[11]

According to Barry B. security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. He points out that the bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence.[12]

The securitization concept, which was formulated by Ole Wæver, considers that an issue is "securitizied" when it gets constructed into a threat. According to him, in this sense something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so, and something becomes securitized when it has been declared a security problem and this problem is accepted by the audience.[13] It means that for successfully securitization, the referent object must only perceive that their existence is threatened.

According to the Copenhagen school, the core essence of securitization contains two basic elements, "*the designation of an existential threat (which does not necessarily have to be real) requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience". "The definition of existential is different for every type of referent object of security"*[14].

It means that it cannot be expected that different entities (such as individuals, nations, etc.) will be secure or insecure in the same way. Therefore, Buzan notes that "actual threats, as well as being impossible to measure, may not be perceived, while the threats that dominate perception, may not have much substantive reality".

Going beyond the traditional narrowly defined and state-centric understandings of security as relating to a military threat to the state, the Copenhagen School extended

[11] Wolfers, A. (1962): Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, p.150

[12] Barry, B. (1991): "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century", International Affairs 67.3, p.432-433.

[13] Ole, W. (1998): Securitization and Desecuritization, New York, Columbia University Press, p.6.

[14] Georgieva, L. (2006): Risk Management, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje, p.43

the definition of security 'horizontally' to include political, economic, environmental, military and societal security and 'vertically' to include referent objects such as the individual and the groups. In each sector, a specific threat is articulated as threatening a referent object. For example, in the societal sector, the referent object is identity, while the referent objects in the environmental sector are the ecosystem and endangered species. It is only in the military sector that the referent object remains the state. By 'sectorialising' security, it should be understood that existential threats are not objective but instead relate to the different characteristics of each referent object.

Securitization theory points out that national security policy is not a natural given, but carefully designated by politicians and decision-makers. According to securitisation theory, political issues are constituted as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as 'dangerous', 'menacing', 'threatening', 'alarming' and so on by a 'securitising actor' who has the social and institutional power to move the issue 'beyond politics'. So, security issues are not simply 'out there' but rather must be articulated as problems by securitising actors. Calling immigration a 'threat to national security', for instance, shifts immigration from a low priority political concern to a high priority issue that requires action, such as securing borders. Still, an issue becomes securitised when an audience collectively agrees on the nature of the threat and supports taking extraordinary measures. If the audience rejects the securitising actor's speech act, it only represents a securitising move and the securitisation has failed.

Securitising actors take security threats objectively and seek to solve them by undertaking various missions. In addition, there are also functional actors who can influence the dynamic of the field of security but who do not have the power to move an issue above politics. Examples of functional actors can be the media, academia, non-governmental agencies and think tanks. It can also include individuals, by telling and sharing stories between friends, families and colleagues. For example, extreme claims made in tabloid newspapers across Europe create a narrative in which the Islamic State group is infiltrating society and working to bring on the demise of the democratic state.

Any security issue can be presented on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised (the issue has not reached public debate) to politicised (the issue has raised public concerns and is on the agenda) to securitised (the issue has been framed as an existential threat). When an issue is securitised, actions are often legitimised under the language of 'urgency' and 'existential threats' and are measures that may be deemed undemocratic in normal situations.

Related to the nature of the state, Buzan points out the three points of a triangle – the essence of the state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state.[15] Each of these state components can be discussed as separate security issues, but they are interlinked and the examination of the linkages between

[15] Barry B. (1991): People, States and Fear, p.57

them is a fruitful score of insight into the national security issues. Sovereignty is the condition that allows the state to perform its security tasks. However, the sovereignty of the state rests on a higher assumption, that of the state itself.[16] The state exists, or has its essence, primarily on the socio-political rather than the physical plane. In some important sense, the state is more an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a physical organism. (…) If the hearth of the state resides in the idea of it held in the minds of the population, then that idea itself becomes a major object of national security.[17]

Securitization of asylum

How different an issue is perceived in reality, depends in which concept or perspective this issue will be framed. Whether that will be humanitarian, economic or security? In this sense, if asylum seekers or refugees are perceived or framed as a humanitarian question this introduces rather different relations and feelings, than framing them as a security question. Still, while often conflated with other issues of migration, asylum seekers are often seen as especially suspicious or dangerous due to the possibility that their identity or origin may not be identifiable. The afore-stated, as well as frequent terrorist attacks in European cities, are the dominant reasons why they are very often perceived or framed as a security issue.

In the recent years, asylum has been increasingly linked with security concerns, mostly due to the dramatic increase in the number of registered asylum seekers and the number of mixed migration flows. Many of the asylum seekers have been branded as “illegal” and “bogus“, mostly by the media, so public attitudes towards them have hardened. At the same time, the asylum issue has given rise to intense political debates especially after 9/11 events, and even today, especially after the Arab spring and the massive influx of refugees from North Africa, Libya and Syria.

Following attacks in a range of European cities, the Islamic State group (also known as, ISIS or ISIL), became a high priority on the security agendas from 2015 onwards. The group has been presented as a threat to the security of the states, to the security of individuals in Western Europe and more broadly as a threat to the Western way of life. For example, after the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015, President Francois Hollande declared that ‘France is at war’ against an army of jihadists that ‘has attacked France because France is a country of liberty’.[18] Hence, the focus is again on what and who we are? Actually, in this framing, the French people are ‘a people that is fierce, valiant and courageous’ and are victims of such attacks for simply ‘being alive’. At

[16] Josefina, E.A. (2006): Re-thinking (in)security discourses from a critical perspective, Asteriskos, 1/61-82,p.65

[17] Barry B. (1991): People, States and Fear, p.63

[18] Clara, E. (2018): Securitization theory: An Introduction, E-International Relations Students. Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/

the other end of the spectrum is ‘them’, ‘an army of jihadists’, of ‘coward murderers’ who constitute an ‘abomination’ and ‘vile attack’ that can only be characterised by ‘horror’. A point of no return is invoked when Hollande claims that the Islamic State group is an organisation that ‘threatens the whole world’ and that this ‘is the reason why the destruction of ISIS is a necessity for the international community’. Finally, the solution, lifting the issue ‘above politics’ is offered: ‘immediate border controls and a state of emergency have been commanded’.[19] Related to the previously mentioned it could be concluded that the securitisation of the Islamic State group affects at least three sectors: the societal, the military and the political.

The growing security concerns of States have affected refugees and could undermine the international regime for protection. Security concerns and the fight against terrorism have exacerbated restrictive asylum policies, which have been implemented by many countries in different parts of the world. Similarly, in some cases refugees have been perceived as threats to the security of states and even as potential terrorists based on their nationality, religion or country of origin. Moreover, securitizing actors, run the risk of exacerbating fears of terrorism by associating asylum seekers with terrorists and simultaneously claiming that asylum seekers are present in large numbers in the country.

These events in the international environment influenced the development of both the European Union and domestic policies on asylum and migration in a certain restricted direction. Within the European Union, where there are no internal borders and countries share the same fundamental values, in order for internal and external security to be maintained, the States developed the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).[20] In building this system, the States have invested vast amounts of money into sophisticated technologies in order to increase their control, especially on the border points. On one hand is the example of Spain and Italy, where the increased number of asylum seekers and migrants has led to an expansion of the main military and semi-military bodies in charge of border control. On the other hand, the electronic tagging of asylum seekers in the UK aimed to prevent people from absconding during the processing of their asylum claim.

However, it could be noted that the relaxation of the internal borders among the EU-states, followed by the free movement of people and goods, has produced hard external border controls and restricted check on non-EU citizens. Such developments within EU have prompted number of nongovernmental organisations, journalists and scholars to claim that asylum, as well as migration, have been increasingly seen as a security threat in Europe. Moreover, the securitization of the asylum and migration issues within the EU was also observed by the Office of the United Nations High

[19] Ibid.

[20] The start of the discourse of securitization of asylum in the EU can be traced back to the creation of the Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence (TREVI) group in Rome in 1975, where immigration and asylum seekers where first linked to terrorist threats.

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), according of which:

"The emergence of new security concerns for states, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001, has led to the securitization of asylum practices. Increasingly refugees and asylum seekers are perceived as harbingers of insecurity, rather than victims of it"[21]

The EU developed system and framework of the common asylum policies, should balance, but above all be effective and protect the security of the EU citizens on one hand, and on other to ensure protection and basic human rights of the ones most in need-refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, as a consequence of the new security environmental, as well as of the new terrorist attacks, EU agreed and started practicing the "safe third country" and "concentric circle approach". The aim of the safe third country approach was to reduce the possibility of asylum seeking in the EU, to keep the asylum-seekers out because nationals of those countries who seek protection are thus defined as probable tellers of lies and untruths. The second approach describes the four-circle system. Actually, the inner circle is the EU, the second circle are the neighbours who are expected to have common migration standards with the first circle, the third circle is the buffer zone including Central and Eastern European Countries, Turkey and North Africa, while the fourth circle is where the EU is combating the push factors of immigration.[22] This approach was implemented through stronger border controls in order to prevent flow of immigrants who are potential asylum-seekers. At the same time, in order to deal with third countries where massive refugee influx is possible the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration was created.

The safe third country and concentric circle approaches are the reflections of insider-outsider distinction. The repercussion of it is that Europe that is being threatened from the outside can be only secured by keeping the outsiders as much as possible.[23] Precisely this perception and actions lead towards obvious securitization of asylum seekers and refugees in EU, but at the same time, as such, have a great influence all over Europe.

[21] The State of the World′s Refugees, UNHCR, 2006, p.5

[22] Viena Presidency Conclusions, 1998. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-R1.EN8html

[23] Jakob, G. (2006): Securitization of immigration and asylum: A Critical Look at Security Structure in Europe, University of Lund, p.31

Conclusion

As a result of the above mentioned, it could be concluded that, asylum seekers and refugees have been perceived or framed as a security issue in the past few years. Actually, they have been portrayed in a negative light for a variety of reasons (terrorist attacks in European cities, their identity or origin etc.). In this sense, security concerns amongst states have affected the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees particularly in three specific areas:

access to national territory,

the process for determining refugee status,

the exercise of rights and the search for durable solutions.

With respect to access to national territory, people in need of protection are now subject to the indiscriminate application of stricter immigration controls, which are increasingly applied in countries of origin, transit countries, and on the high seas. Persons are subject to scrutiny based on their nationality, religion, or country or region of origin. These situations represent additional limitations on a refugee's ability to enter a territory in search of protection.

Additionally, administrative detention is used with increasing frequency with those seeking asylum, including, in some countries, the application of automatic detention provisions based on the nationality, origin, or religion of the applicant, which violates the requirement that detention should be exceptional in nature, i.e. the principle of non-discrimination (Article 3, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951), and the requirement that no sanction should be applied for illegal entry (Article 31 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951).

Security considerations are also negatively impacting the interpretation and the definition of refugee status through the use of increasingly restrictive criteria of Inclusion Clauses. Refugees have not been defined by virtue of their nationality since the adoption of the Refugee Convention of 1951, which defines the key element to justify a person seeking refugee status as a "well-founded fear of persecution", in connection with one of the "protected grounds".

However, as a result of above mentioned reasons, in the past few years asylum-seekers and refugees have often been perceived as a security issue, mostly through the securitization approach. An important influence for such a perception and frame has been the naming of this group of people as a threat by leaders of European states. In that sense, securitisation highlights how the political securitising speech act does not merely describe a state of affairs 'out there', but constitutes the attacks (caused by part of asylum seekers or refugees) as an act of war which deserves a serious answer by the state securitization actors. The perception that asylum seekers are both dangerous and unstoppable does much to contribute to a climate of insecurity and fear. In this way, many media outlets appear to facilitate the ideas about asylum seekers put forth in political discourse and the law, and by extension help the securitization of asylum.

It should be noted that the national security and defence concept does not specifically address the asylum or forced migration as a security issue, but does introduce concerns over illegal migration which should be fought regionally and internationally, thus straitening the possibility of labelling the asylum seekers as illegal migrants.

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Scientific article

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE: CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Vasko POPOVSKI[1]

Abstract: *We are witnessing increased number of crises and natural disasters and more frequent new types of risks that are initiating atypical threats. Moreover, climate change is expected to cause unprecedented waves of climate refugees in the near future. Therefore, crisis management is expected to take into consideration all new risks and threats, including resilience as a new element of risk. With this approach, the crisis management system shall be improved and transformed from reactive to proactive. The aim of this research article is to understand the meaning of resilience and crisis management, as well as to research the integration of resilience in the crisis management system in the Republic of Macedonia. For that purpose, the methods of content analysis and comparative analysis have been used. Resilience is defined as the ability of individuals, communities, systems or states to withstand or absorb shocks and stresses, adapting to the new situation with the aim of quick recovery and positively changing themselves in order to better respond to future shocks and stresses. After reviewing the adequate normative and strategic frameworks for crisis management of the country, it can be concluded that the concept of resilience is not included in the crisis management and disaster risk management. With the aim of developing a resilient society to crisis and disasters in the Republic of Macedonia, it is necessary to fully include the concept of resilience in the normative and strategic documents from the crisis management area. Only in that way, can we build a society that would not only absorb the effects from crisis and disasters, but would rather transform the crisis to possibilities, and the temporary shortcomings to long-term consolidation and strengthening of the society.*

Key words: *resilience, resilient society, crisis, crisis management, disaster risk management*

Introduction

We are living in turbulent times and we are witnessing an increased number of crises and crisis situations that are caused by different types of conflicts and security risks, as well as natural disasters, out of which the climate related ones have been dominant during the last decade. Joint characteristics of all of them are frequency of events, increased intensity, as well as increased consequences e.g. damages and losses that are seriously affecting the overall development of the countries.

In this context, it can be emphasized that during 2015, 15 bigger armed conflicts were identified globally (Uppsala Universitet, 2018), with the war conflict in Syria taking the leader-

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ship position, based on the intensity of war actions and the number of victims, as well as the level of destruction of the state. As a direct result of this crisis, more than 1.1 million refugees have overflown the European shores in search of security and protection, out of which approx. 700,000 refugees transited through the territory of our country during the period July – December in the same year. These events have caused strong pressure to the crisis management and defence systems of the country, and therefore even though the transit has significantly decreased, the crisis situation at the northern and southern border of the Republic of Macedonia is still declared. Also, there are more frequent terrorist attacks aimed at different states and state systems, and according to global statistics they are the most frequent crisis events. This has been confirmed with the research on contemporary terrorism which has identified approx. 97,000 terrorist attacks on global level by the end of 2016 (Roser, Nagdy and Ritchie, 2018). The world is facing atypical risks and threats (e.g. financial crisis from 2008, internet and computer systems and networks attacks etc.) that are seriously disturbing the everyday functioning of states. There are also cascading effects from the acts of terrorism and violence to disasters and accidents (e.g. demolition of a dam and flooding as a result). Climate change, as per forecasts for their influence until the end of this century, is expected to cause unprecedented migration of climate refuges in the following decades according to the Cornell University research (2017) that can reach almost 2 billion climate refugees until the 2100.

Furthermore, natural disasters have had the tendency to increase during the last couple of decades. In that context, for example, during the period 1994 – 2013, on a global level there were 6,873 natural disasters that resulted in losses of 1.35 million human lives. With the existing level of degradation of the environment and the projections for climate change effects the number of catastrophic events is expected to increase by double. (Popovski, 2018, 16). This has been initially confirmed with the analysis of the data from the International Disaster Database EM-DAT (2017)2. Namely, during the period from 2000 onwards on average 341 disasters happened as consequences of whether related events on an annual level, which is an increase of 44% in comparison to the previous five years and more than double from the period 1980 – 1989. The latest example is 2017, in the course of which unprecedented number of natural disasters happened, affecting the significant part of the planet (e.g. Super Hurricanes Trio in the Caribbean Sea and the Southern USA, floods in Southeast Asia, wild fires in Western Europe and Australia, as well as the drought in East Africa) causing total damages of more than 300 billion USD. On a national level in the Republic of Macedonia, during the past three years, three disastrous floods have happened with losses of 32 human lives, and damages of approx. 90 million USD. Consequently, in the national natural hazard profile, floods are with highest ranking as hazards with increased number of events and consequences, followed by earthquakes as long-term hazards that can cause losses of a great number of human lives and serious consequences to the economic and overall development of the country, and the fires as hazards with a constant number of events.

Having considered all of this, the crisis management and the disaster risk management as its segment are gaining more importance, predominantly through the changing of the approach from a fragmented set of activities and measures to response and recovery, and down to a structured system for protection, prevention, early warning and preparedness. Only in that way, shall the system be organized and shall take into consideration all elements of risk, including resilience. Accordingly, the aim of this research article is to understand the meaning of resilience and crisis management, as well as to review the inclusion of the resilience in the

[2] http://emdat.be/

crisis management system in the Republic of Macedonia with the use of the research methods for content analysis and comparative analysis.

Resilience - conceptual framework and terminological identification

The word resilience derives from the Latin word *resilire* which means "to leap, to spring back, to recoil".[3] The foundation of the word is from the construction *re + salire* (leap, bounce) and defines the condition of deviation from the normalcy. In 1824, the meaning of the elasticity was added in the notion of the word and the most general term of the word was constructed – "capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness"[4]. The concept of resilience as a new dimension in the crisis management and risk reduction has emerged at the end of the last century, even though as a concept it has been present in other sciences and aspects of society since the middle of the century. For example, in the mechanical science, it identifies the capacity of materials and infrastructure as a whole to withstand external effects, and in psychology, it determines the ability of the individuals to face difficulties and life challenges and to recover from them.

During the 1970s, resilience was introduced in the area of environmental science as longevity of relations within the frameworks of those systems and their capacity for absorption of different influences e.g. changes and their efforts to return in the previous conditions (Holling, 1973, 17). The period of the end of the century and the transfer to the new one has established resilience in social sciences and crisis management and disaster risk reduction and the so called socio-ecological or evolutionary resilience have appeared. According to Davoudi (2012), the world is complex, chaotic and dubious and the evolutionary resilience is a part of the understanding that the conditions can be changed or radicalized, being different than the previous conditions. The change happens because of the external and internal influences and leads to development of the ability for adaptation to the new conditions. Folke et all (2010) defined the adaptability to change as a capacity of transformability and creation of a new system. With this understanding the quality of the improvement of the system is emphasized as a result of the reaction to shocks and stresses. The practical example for this is the "Build-Back-Better" principle in the phases of recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and it is one of the priorities of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.

In parallel to the increase of the meaning of resilience as a new quality in the theory of risk reduction, resilience was more and more included in the concepts of the international organizations and state policies. Even though, different entities have defined it differently, joint foundation is the ability to withstand shocks and stresses. According to DFID (2011, 8) shocks are defined as sudden events that influence to the societal and state systems (e.g. violence, conflicts, financial crisis, natural disasters

[3] http://latin-dictionary.net/definition/33432/resilio-resilire-resilui

[4] English Oxford Living Dictionaries. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/resilience

etc.), depending on whether the stresses are more long-term trends that influence the systems and their vulnerability (e.g. degradation of the environment, poor condition of the infrastructure, political instability, etc.). So, the European Union (2016, 1) defined the resilience as "ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long-term development". The United Nations – UN (2009) are considering resilience to be "the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management". And finally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD (2013) is going further in defining resilience as "the ability of individuals, communities and states and their institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty".

Based on all of these definitions we can understand that resilience has a multidimensional character, it is oriented towards hazards and risks and includes more institutions from different segments of the system, and it is included in all phases of the risk (prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery). Furthermore, crisis management and disaster risk reduction are established on the pillars of a multi-risk, multi-hazard and multi-sector approach, including the hazards and risks analysis and assessments, operational planning and preparedness of the system for response and recovery, and we can conclude that resilience needs to be included in the crisis management and disaster risk reduction. Resilience as a new dimension in crisis management and disaster risk reduction shall contribute to a proactive (prevention) approach instead of a reactive (response) approach to crises and disasters.

The contemporary understanding of the risk includes resilience as its element. Furthermore, this is elaborated by Stefanoski (2015) and he includes resilience as an element of risk (alongside hazard, exposure and vulnerability), equaling it with the capacity of the system for response, since resilience is part of the system. The capacity for response is consisted inter alia in all strategies and measures that directly influence the control of the event, by buffering the hazard impact, using the adapted strategies for response and decreasing the damages. So, resilience can be seen through the prism of the capability for maintenance of the functions of the system for response and recovery.

Having considered all of this, resilience can be defined as *the ability of individuals, communities, systems or states to withstand or absorb shocks and stresses, adapting to the new situation with the aim of their quick recovery and positive change in order better to respond to future shocks and stresses*. In the context of the latter, we should take into consideration the inclusion of the analysis of sudden and insecure events (so called "black swan effects"[5]) through the use of strategic foresight[6] methodologies and tools for prediction of the future.

Society with all its static and dynamic characteristics is related to the concept of resilience and it is considered as a resilient society due to the fact that today societies are facing various types of traditional and non-traditional risks and threats. The concept of a resilient society is part of the academic debates in different sciences, including crisis management and disaster risk reduction, as well as within the practical segments of implementation of different measures and activities. Also, the concept of a resilient society needs to be based on prepared citizens, resilient communities and prepared systems for response and recovery. Shocks are sudden, stresses are long-term and therefore it is necessary to initiate the activities for preparedness timely and efficiently. Therefore, a resilient society is based on the principles that are securing its multidimensionality and are contributing to the sustainable development (e.g. risk and hazard awareness and their integrated analysis and assessment, sustainable management of risks and threats, systematic approach to prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response to crises and disasters, resilient critical infrastructure, efficient and timely early warning and alerting, rapid recovery with the "Build-Back-Better" principle included in the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, analysis and research of the sudden and unpredictable, as well as development of scenarios for multiple possible futures etc. The multidimensional aspect of a resilient society can be best seen in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction adopted at the UN Third World Conference for disaster risk reduction held in Sendai, Japan in March, 2015. It is especially featured through the principles of resilience, "Build-Back-Better" and the whole society approach to disaster risk reduction.

Concept of resilience and the crisis management system: case of the Republic of Macedonia

This article contains research on the inclusion of the concept of resilience within the frameworks of the essential strategic and normative documents from the crisis management system, as well as other key documents of interest of this research. According to Mitrevska (2016, 154) the crisis management system in the Republic of Macedonia is organized with the aim of forming constant consultation, coordination, timely reaction, effective and efficient use of resources, as well as preparation and

[5] So called "Black Swan" metaphor is formulated by Nasim Nicholas Thaleb in his book "The Black Swan – impact of the unpredictable" and it is rare, sudden and unpredictable and can event have extreme consequences to certain system (e.g. financial crisis from 2008, or dissolution of the USSR). It is formulated upon the precondition that all the swans are white and the existence of the black swan is unbelievable (even though the black swan actually exists).

[6] Methodologies and tools that are directed to the understanding of the future, its analysis and prediction, research of the alternative futures, as well as development of scenarios and plans for response.

adoption of the assessment on the endangerment and security of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards. The crisis management area is normatively regulated with the Law on Crisis Management and based on it (2005, 1) the crisis management system is organized for the purposes of prevention, early warning and response to crises that are a risks for the assets, health and lives of people and animals resulting from natural disasters, epidemics or other risks and hazards that are endangering the constitutional order and security of the Republic of Macedonia as a whole or in part. Furthermore, the crisis management system also incorporates collection of information, assessment, situation analysis, determination of aims and tasks, development and implementation of requested actions for prevention, early warning and response to crisis.

The national framework for crisis management is consisted of the following documents and acts: National Concept for Security and Defence, Strategy for National Security of the Republic of Macedonia, Law on Crisis Management, Law on Protection and Rescue, as well as the National Platform of the Republic of Macedonia for Disaster Risk Reduction (Mitrevska, 2016, 160). Moreover, other key documents that are of relevance for this research have been taken into consideration and they are following: National Strategy for Protection and Rescue and the Regulation on the methodology for preparation of the assessment on the endangerment of the security of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards, its content and structure, modality of keeping and update, and the declaration of the entities from the crisis management system to which it is provided as a whole or partially (in the text: Regulation on the methodology for preparation of the assessment of the endangerment of the security of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards). Furthermore, if we in the wider understanding of the disaster risk reduction are considering climate change and mitigation and adaptation measures, then within this corpus of identified documents, we should include the Third National Communication on Climate Change and the “Resilient Skopje” – Climate Change Strategy.

In the context of the inclusion of the concept of resilience in the abovementioned documents, according to terminological determination, and the integration of the risk element or the basis for recommendations and practical measures and activities for achievement of the resilience of the society and the communities, we can divide these documents in three groups: documents that do not identify or integrate resilience, documents that identify resilience without essential integration and group of documents that recognize and integrate resilience in its structure in the wider or narrower scope.

In the **first group of documents** the key strategic and normative documents that are determining and managing the crisis management system are grouped as follows: National Concept for Security and Defence, Strategy for National Security of the Republic of Macedonia, Law on Crisis Management, and Law on Protection and Rescue. Even though they are foundations of the crisis management system, the concept of resilience is not recognized and integrated in its content. One of the basic reasons for this is the fact that the documents have been adopted during the first decade of this century, a period when the broad framework of resilience was not included in the crisis management and disaster risk reduction frameworks. On the other side, the crisis management system, including the sub-system for protection and rescue as per their definitions are still considered to be reactive systems that are mainly oriented to disaster response and not to the prevention and preparedness for crises and disasters. Also, the relevant normative solutions are oriented more towards hazards, instead towards risks, and therefore the risk is not understood in its completeness including its multidimensionality, integrating resilience as its element.

In the second group of documents, we are considering the National Platform of the Republic of Macedonia for disaster risk reduction, National Strategy for Protection and Rescue and the Third National Action Plan on Climate Change. ***The National Platform of the Republic of Macedonia for disaster risk reduction*** is the national mechanism for disaster risk reduction on all levels (national, regional, local) and provides coordination, analysis and expertise for priority areas and activities. Resilience is not directly integrated in this document, but it is included within the foundations for adoption of the Platform as part of the global strategic documents for disaster risk reduction (e.g. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015, International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction). Based on this approach that is recalled as a part of the international basis, the resilience is included as one of the objectives to be achieved within the disaster risk reduction. Moreover, this is emphasized and determined with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, dated March 2015, especially in the principles of resilience, "Build-Back-Better", and the whole society approach to disaster risk reduction. ***The National Strategy for Protection and Rescue*** is the basic strategic document that is managing the framework of the protection and rescue area as part of the crisis management system. Resilience is considered only in context of the critical infrastructure and measures for protection and rescue, and it is referred to as "taking measures for increasing the resilience of infrastructure facilities from natural disaster". Understanding resilience is within the framework of the so-called static resilience or resilience of infrastructure for withstanding the external influences. ***The Third National Communication on Climate Change*** prepared in accordance with the obligations from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and referring to the measures and policies that the state is implementing with regards to the climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the context of resilience, it is important to emphasize that it is not terminologically determined, but it is practically implemented in the water sector as measures and activities for floods (restriction of urbanization in the areas prone to flooding, measures for improvement of the safety of dams and accumulations, forestation, improved management of water bodies, sustainable housing, migration to the safer areas, etc.). Resilience, accordingly, is considered mainly in the phase of prevention with the aim not to allow the hazard to develop to a disastrous event. It is expected that the proposed set of measures and activities would decrease the effects of such events.

In the third and last group, following strategic and normative documents that are recognizing and integrating resilience in its content, the following are included: Regulation on the methodology for preparation of the assessment of the endangerment of the security of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards and the "Resilient Skopje" – Climate Change Strategy. ***The Regulation on the methodology for preparation of the assessment of the endangerment of the security of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards*** is the first normative document that has recognized defined and integrated resilience in its structure. Namely, this by-law is methodologically determining the framework for assessment of all types of risks and hazards and it is based on the assessment which is multi-risk, multi-hazard and multi-sector oriented. Based on this, its formulation and relation to the contemporary methodological frameworks and approaches to the risk and hazard assessment can be identified, especially the EU Guidelines for risk assessment and hazard mapping. In the Regulation, the resilience is defined as "the ability of the crisis management system, local community and the society that is exposed to hazards, to withstand, to absorb negative influences, to adapt to the changes and to initiate the process of recovery from effects of the hazards, timely and efficiently, through maintenance and recovery of their essential structures and functions". In this definition we can identify segments of proactive approach of resilience through absorption of effects and adaptations to the hazards with the aim of recovering and establishing the essential functions and systems. Conceptually, it is the closest to the UN definition of resilience. Despite the fact that it is not mentioned further in the text, the concept of resilience is integrated through the multidimensional aspect of the risk elements and especially through the inclusion in the capacities of the system (national, local) for prevention, early warning and response to assessed risks, including the early recovery and management of the rehabilitation after the elimination of the crisis. The concept of resilience is partially integrated in ***the "Resilient Skopje" – Climate Change Strategy***, prepared by the City of Skopje. Namely, here the concept of urban resilience e.g. resilience of the city and citizens is developed and is aiming to develop capacities for urban resilience for effective and efficient climate change mitigation and adaptation in the next ten year period. Resilience is not defined, but it is equaled to the urban resilience/resilience of the city and is integrated in different aspects of climate change, including the vulnerable sectors (water, health and disaster risk reduction). Practical measures and activities for strengthening urban resilience are created based on the defining of the challenges and priorities. For example, in the disaster risk reduction sector all challenges for disaster risk reduction have been identified (e.g. insufficient inclusion of the area in departmental strategies, programs and priorities on national and local levels, insufficient coordination, increased urbanization and built environment, insufficient financing of the area, as well as lack of the culture of prevention). Accordingly, recommendations with measures and activities for strengthening of the urban resilience have been defined: strengthening of the local capacities, capabilities and resources, adoption of the Integrated Action

Plan of the City of Skopje for urban resilience, implementation of tactical drills for preparedness and response to natural disasters and accidents, building of a culture of resilience through targeted activities of the citizens, establishment of public-private partnerships and innovative models for cooperation with citizens etc.

Conclusion

We are witnessing an increased number of crises and natural disasters and more frequent new types of risks that are initiating atypical threats. Taking into consideration the rate of the climate change the number of climate related disasters is expected to significantly increase in intensity, frequency and caused damages. Furthermore, climate change is expected to cause unprecedented waves of climate refugees in near future. Therefore, crisis management is expected to take into consideration all new risks and threats, including resilience as a new element of risk. With this approach, the crisis management system shall be improved and transformed from a reactive to a proactive system, predominantly through changing the approach from fragmented set of activities and measures for response and recovery from crisis and disasters, to a structured system for protection, prevention, early warning and preparedness. Accordingly, this organized system shall take into consideration all newly emerged risks and threats. Resilience is defined as the ability of individuals, communities, system or states to withstand or absorb shocks and stresses, adapting to the new situation with the aim to their quick recovery and positive change in order to better respond to future shocks and stresses. The concept of a resilient society shall be based upon prepared citizens, resilient communities and prepared systems for response and recovery.

After reviewing the adequate normative and strategic frameworks for crisis management of the country, we can conclude that the concept of resilience is not included in the crisis management and disaster risk management, even though there are several exceptions where in certain documents the importance of resilience can be identified, it is terminologically defined and/or practically referred to through recommendations, measures and activities for its strengthening. With the aim of developing a resilient society to crisis and disasters in the Republic of Macedonia, it is necessary to fully include the concept of resilience in the normative and strategic documents from the crisis management area. Only in that way, can we develop a society that would not only absorb the effects from crisis and disasters, but would transform the crisis to possibilities, and the temporary shortcomings to long-term consolidation and strengthening of the society.

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Review

CULTURAL EXCLUSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Continuous debates about the meaning and essence of culture in sociological literature, in philosophy, as well as in many other social and human sciences have great significance, but also cause dubiousness.*
In social reality and in science and philosophy, things are excluded in principle mainly because of the inability to avoid redundancy and the hierarchy of meanings that are part of a whole, especially complex, lively and susceptible to changes in the social setting, which must be inherent of man, such as culture.
In an attempt to overcome this initial epistemological-heuristic particularization in cultural determinations, unusually, precisely through the redundancy of the approaches to culture, I applied the same questionable methodological approach, trying to explain how exclusivity is created in the very tissue of sciences when culture is seen through the positions of separation incited by reality. Every position of absence of an existentially and essentially relaxed, equitable and therefore potentially proactive position of the individual or social group in terms of a specific social and cultural design generates an enormous number of possibilities of exclusion from the whole of life, undermines the social action safety and consequently the societal security.
Cultural exclusion in conditions of different opportunities for building "cultural and social capital" and postulating an open / emancipated value system is a common place in today's cultural universe. It is intensified both in welfare societies and in emphasized poor societies on the periphery of Europe and the world, as is the case with Macedonia.
The connection between cultural exclusion in a total sense is, of course, inevitably related to economic/class, political, ideological, religious, ethnic, professional, local, institutional, media, gender, generational, educational, health and scientific exclusion.
On the other hand the disruption in the social interaction and the lack of intercultural dialogue has profound consequences on the trust in people and in institutions and it generates a set of situations that weaken the societal security.

Key words: *cultural exclusion, social integration, societal security*

Introduction

Long and continuous debate on the being and the meaning of culture, the scope of significance of the culture for the thinking, justification, criticism or redefinition of society and the exclusiveness of humanity in sociological literature; in philosophy as well as in many other social and humanistic sciences has a significant aura, but it is susceptible to banality as well. Ideological discourses, the efforts for the new reading of the world and its explicit or implicit dynamics of the change in the heuristic and epistemological perspectives that will succeed in

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grabbing the spirit of modern society, often have several similar, convergent and unconvincing outcomes. About this topic, of course, one must inevitably think through the prism of the historical as well as the scientific-philosophical implications of the concept, which as a phenomenon, from the perspective of the knowledge acquired in the last two centuries, can be identified from the origin of man to this day. However, the structure of their significance is institutionalized, both in the society and in the context of studying the society. Moreover, some key features in studying culture, such as: divergent forms of phenomena that include spirituality, intelligibility, creativity, erudition, entertainment, spectacle, remained dominant (both in the modern and postmodern or post-postmodern variants); and comprehensive, existential, organizational forms of the entire scope of life in society and in the human environment in general (a complete notion of culture or societal culture). In fact, it has long been acknowledged that the cultural symbolic universe includes active, pragmatic, just as much as reckless and dynamically creative and extremely curious "software" with endless possibilities for "upgrading." The main dilemma and division within the intellectual discourses is notoriously concentrating, unfortunately, no matter how noble and methodologically interesting the intentions are, on the question of the "obsolescence" of the elite dimension of culture and on the supposedly "brutal", objective, deconstructive and para-critical (and why, for example, it would not be radical, unconventional, non-canonical, revolutionary) treatment of the key perspective of the phenomenon - modus vivendi. The discrepancy, of course not among all authors, is basically false and inconsistent precisely because of the whole of life in all its practices, reason and meanings without which the survival of society is uncertain and impossible. In fact, in reality, as in science and philosophy, things are excluded in principle, precisely because of the inability to avoid redundancy and the hierarchy of meanings that are part of a whole, especially complex, lively and susceptible to changes in the social environment, which must be inherent to man beyond all boundaries of divisions generated by separate, imposed directions of historical development.

In an attempt to overcome this initial epistemological-heuristic exclusion inside the theoretical positioning of the very structure and dynamics of the phenomenon of culture, probably unusual, I will try precisely through the redundancy of the approaches to culture, to make the same questionable methodological approach, trying to explain why something is conventionally referred to as spiritual culture, that is, art, cultural heritage, education and their "audience" or recipients as much as the productive subjects (artists, creators of cultural policy, intelligence in the field of social sciences and humanistic sciences, and even from other fields of science and education) reproduce or produce social exclusion in the comprehensive dimension of social reality.

Accordingly, any position of absence of an existentially and essentially relaxed, equal and therefore potentially proactive position of the individual or social group in terms of a specific social and cultural design and in all differentiated forms and institutionalized frameworks of sociability, generates an enormous number of opportunities for exclusion from the whole of life. This directly undermines the social action safety, and further the security of the society as a whole. This exclusion refers not only to "consuming" individual values produced by man, but, even worse, exclusion from knowledge, meaning, which are necessary for enabling involvement in the reality and the vitality of life. The ability to awaken awareness of the exclusion of certain private and social activities is equally important, on a local, national and global level. The exclusion is the most alarming signal of alienation, violence in the distribution of power, social differentiation and hierarchisation, whose manifestation forms can obviously be hidden in the pathological hypocrisy of the spectacular performances of the corporate neoliberal logic of modern capitalism, in all its variants. Thus, if the frustrations of the statuses and the recognition of the meritorious context of social production and reproduction, as well as the false notions of the congruence of the contemporary way of life, grab us in their value matrices without the possibility of meta-narration and meta-access to socializing, exclusion and less or more radical, destructive or simply resigned, opportunistic reactions to this condition, also exclude us from the possibility to create new universes cleared of ballasts of the historical narratives that have proved unsuccessful. The gravity and the complexity of the historical narrative and the controversy of the collective memory emerging from the interpretation of those narratives, as well as the development of discourses that act in a manipulative and selective manner in regard to the historical "memory", are undeniably factors that affect directly the "statics" of the social fabric architecture. Hence, by creating misbalance in the treatment of the inclusion of certain identity formations in social life and in distribution of power, the security of the social fabric either slowly or quickly but definitely is disrupted.

Cultural exclusion in the Republic of Macedonia: state of affair and consequences

The initial assumption of exclusion of the Macedonian culture is based on what is commonly referred to as transitional culture. According to some authors, the societies that changed their ideological-political matrix and thus changed the focus of basic value paradigms, from socialism to capitalism, from etatism and totalitarianism to democracy and free market (Nealon 2012), that is, they were subjected to "cultural trauma"(Alexander 2012; Sztompka 1991) are treated as complex cultural systems that face nationalism, poverty, anti-Marxist tendencies, traditional irreconcilable discourses, reconsideration of cultural heritage and identity, conformist fit into the culture of globalization and on the other hand, influence on changes in trends of that global galimatias of existences. For other authors, it is a transition to a richer, freer world, with an emphasized better civilization performance. However, the very connotation of a transitional culture favours or excludes some of those societies in occupying an equal place on the map of dynamic contemporary processes. In Macedonia, the frustrations of cultural trauma are not the same as in Poland or Russia, and they differ even from the transitional processes and products of the countries that were part of the same common former state (SFRY) (Kennedy 2002).

Cultural exclusion in the context of various possibilities for creating "cultural and social capital" and appropriate building of an open/emancipated system of values (knowledge, information, traditionalism) is a common place in today's cultural universe, but it is intensified as in welfare societies even more so in poor societies positioned on the periphery of Europe and the world, as is the case with Macedonia. The connection between cultural exclusion in a total sense is, of course, notoriously related to economic/class exclusion, political, ideological, religious, ethnic, professional, local, institutional, media, gender, generational, educational, health, scientific exclusion (Bourdieu 1984 , Kennedy 2002).

In a social context that technically, lucratively and superficially re-evaluates its perceptions of what in fact constitutes the tissue and power of corporate capitalism, still in the trap of authoritarianism and treatment of historical identity frustrations, which are a good excuse or "spin" for supporting the institutions in power; it is difficult to expect consistency and openness towards building cultural values and systems that do not calculate or are not based exclusively on the culture of poverty, fear and mediocrity (Petkovska, 2009). This, which is sociologically more intriguing, is felt in those social groups and subcultures that are not necessarily at the lowest place of social stratification and as a rule excluded, but also in groups in which citizens have more opportunities for building cultural capital as well as social capital (those with higher social status).

The mass versus the elite cultural matrix in Macedonia stems from the "philosophy of the small town" and offers countless strategic opportunities for manipulation to power centres (Fuko, 2012). It is interesting that in Macedonia the forms of mass culture are imposed with a much stronger intensity than in the socialist period when the emphasis was on the national folklore and the elite culture and art, both national and international (Petkovska, 2009)!

The power of the market, the vulgar commercialization of art, assisted by the power of the media, imposes the discourses of popular or mass art and its interference with the concept of high, elite art. As in other global spaces, especially in the Balkans, in the Republic of Macedonia it is also created(although its beginnings date back to the period of socialism!) a rather trivial popular culture, which is usually called the "pop-folk", "neo- folk "or" turbo-folk"(that can be compared to some global trends, such as "ethno-pop", "World music" etc.). In essence, this is about the old struggle for marking the true taste, cultural needs, standards and redundant practices of human life and actions, especially burdened with the transformation of the system from socialist to civil (capitalist). Often, in the literature treating this phenomenon, characteristic for the post-cultural trauma of the former countries of the Balkans, it is associated with the new type of stratification of transitional societies (Dragicevic-Sesic, 1994)

In fact, the formation of the taste in relation to the cultural heritage, the artistic reception, the position and status of the art institutions of public and other character, reproduces the exclusion on class bases, on the social status bases and also the cultural exclusion in the society. Mass art, popular art erode the natural positioning of the elite, high arts in the former stages of Macedonia's cultural and artistic history. Namely, Macedonia is a product of a vibrant and conflicting historical past, otherwise quite characteristic of Southeast Europe, where the actions of conflict and convergence of cultures postulate the possibility of syncretism between the East and the West, the North and the South. The basic matrix of this discourse of identity/identities building, integrative and disintegrative processes in Macedonia is built from the interaction of: ancient and classical Mediterranean cultures, Byzantine civilization, pagan and later Christianized variant of Old Slavic culture, Ottoman civilization, aspects of Western European cultural tradition, as well as, of course, shared and autochthonous Balkan and autochthonous national cultural basis. It is necessary to note that for a profound, evident social history of art in Macedonia, according to the conventional understanding of the phenomenon in European spirit, it can be spoken only from the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (that is, after the end of the five century rule of the Ottoman Empire in the territory of present-day Macedonia and wider in the region) (Petkovska, 2009).

Exclusion also exists at the level of hierarchisation within the artistic work among different types of art, which most often stems from the interests and value priorities of the government, as well as from clientelism, unfortunately inherent in the artistic profession. A special struggle is waged between those who have transformed themselves into a new era of technology and favour digital art and the possibilities of the Internet and the media in general (both at the level of production and affirmation, as well as at the level of criticism) and suppress, exclude the classic approach to artistic practice from the "game of the prestige".

The role of the institutions in the field of culture, that is art and cultural heritage, including educational institutions, do not have a developed strategy for the involvement of productive and receptive subjects in the processes of development of cultural and artistic practice. There is a pronounced hypocrisy in the conceptual matrix that manipulates the cultural heritage and artistic creativity in accordance with the narrow and often brutal and primitive interests of the government, regardless of the consequences on the identity and taste of the citizens that have to be developed and encouraged, not to be reduced down to propaganda machinery of the most brutal kind. The snobbery, the apparent commitment to engaged art in the name of protecting national identity or the alleged following of artistic narratives derived from global artistic practices only intensify the cultural exclusion of citizens and follow the practice of achieving apparent involvement. Corporate culture, corporate art and the art market are reminiscences of corporate capitalism and economy (Nealon, 2012), which in Macedonia are manifested as a consequence and not as a reason for the degree of development of social relations in which there are issues of identity, creativity and openness to global tendencies, fear of hybridization, globalization, etc. On the other hand, resistance to cosmopolitanism or the "blind" following of mainstream movements in artistic practice is manifested. In the context of the idea of the market for artistic postulated work, the hybrid phenomenon of creative/cultural industries (Frankfurt School, Postmodernists, Birmingham School) emerges.

Today's views of creative practices, the design of reality and the construction of "formulas" for diverse life styles incorporated and modelled through diversified framework of activities, materialized or delivered in "conceptual" packages that should have the function of developing and building a new culture of living, adequate for today, manifests itself in the phenomenon of creative industries (which of course also imply the cultural industries). Several years ago they were recognized as a contemporary form of art practice and institutionalization of the same in the Republic of Macedonia. The cultural industries contain the immanent forms of the phenomenon of selling ideas, whose nature and purpose is basically economically and ideologically commercial and tendentious in the context of postulating and effectuating the path for public policies, whose main intention is to achieve influence in the public sphere. This means creating a public opinion through the perspective of the taste for life, changing value systems and life orientations, implementing new forms of interaction and communication, and so on. The emphasized needs of the "creativity market" (design, craft, spectacle, information technologies, media content, advertising, even cultural tourism etc.) emanate practices that define and suppress technocratic-economic-aesthetic logic and practice of the modern consumer and virtually postulated society ...In Macedonia, the process of sensitizing the public and the authorities for the "lucrative nature" of these creative practices has found its way into the adoption of the National Strategy for Creative Industries (2008), which has recently been operationalized through action plans (2012).

But this cultural-economic phenomenon neither democratizes the right to create, nor the possibility of reception/consumption of cultural creation, even in the most appropriate conditions of aesthetics of the life practices.

If we look at the structure for the use of free time among the citizens of Macedonia (Petkovska at all, 2017;Petkovska, 2009), we will get a clear picture of the role and significance of the artistic / cultural creation in their lives that is open consequence of their exclusion from the intellectual and creative practices. Except when they are related to the ideology that either promises them to be loyal and proud subjects of a fluid and arbitrarily read cultural history and identity or will develop their illusion that we are part of the world regardless of how much the world's artistic processes and trends mean to us or in which we can fit via the bureaucratic and clientelistic mechanisms of our cultural policy and institutions of culture. The outcome is the creation of a public space and public opinion which is primarily closed within the borders of its exclusion from the freedom of opinion, action. It is a direct reminiscence of social exclusion and thus the inability to acquire the characteristics of the development of the culture of living. Thus, the world of artistic and cultural creativity is generally excluded from everyday social processes, except, perhaps, in their utilitarian variant.

Audience or potential audience is thus divided on class, professional, ethnic, religious and to a certain extent on gender basis, and on the basis of age as well. We would say that this is an expected condition in a divided, stratified contemporary society and that the stated perceptions about the behaviour of the auditorium in the public sphere, including that of cultural production and reproduction are expected (sic?).The established in this way, constellations of relations, thus, can not signify an acceptable condition from the point of view of an ideological system postulated as a credo in the contemporary global social and civilization cycle. Traumatic processes that degenerate or regenerate the essential ontic and cognate code in the reality of the inhabitants of Macedonia, point to a serious problem that is not tied only to the tradition of a poor (which is fact) and "not recognized" (at the level of statehood and identity) country, but also the country experienced a transfiguring, violent epopee of plunging into a new, neoliberal capitalism directly from the position of one more or less bureaucratic, but also humanistic oriented socialism. Already, mainly, the basic directions of thinking of that system/process/completed section of the contemporary history of Macedonia are scientifically accepted. They point to constant efforts (and failures in those efforts) for concentrated and creative arrangement and integration of the tissue of the Macedonian society, which is still directly influenced by the tradition of power abuse by the elites, helped by the corporate power of the narrowed trajectory of globalization.

The conflict of values inside the social fabric, as well as the feeling of threat from the "other" civilizationally powerful and geopolitically dominating socio-cultural communities create an additional feeling of insecurity within a "small" country like Macedonia. The security i.e. the lack of security is felt as a traumatic experience that has been generated for decades, and which has been reinforced with the recent constellation of international relations.

The question follows, whether cultural production is possible in conditions of a continuously inconsistent, incoherent and unprofessional shaped cultural policy that cannot proceed with continuity inherent in the needs, conditions and changes in the tissue of the Macedonian culture.

The choice placed before any cultural creation or before the "interpretation" of cultural heritage depends on a number of variables: information, education, knowledge, the minacity of collecting and processing (art) facts, quantity and quality of financing, human resource management, organizational culture, marketing (national and international), providing methods for good intercultural communication, providing ambience and space for freedom of speech and creativity, reference to high criteria of quality and responsibility, a skill to use the rules of the "new world order" and simultaneously avoiding the traps that the "new world order" assumes as the intricate characteristics of global capitalism and (un)democratic governance.

The immediate consequence of the lack of consistency in the implementation of these notorious elements of cultural (educational, scientific, artistic) politics is the formation (and expectation) of an audience in Macedonia, which has no real predispositions and even fewer motives to behave openly, critically and curiously to any kind of cultural values (from the past, but also from contemporary production) is the direct exclusion from quality, new and varied (technical, technological, intellectual, aesthetic) practices of a dynamic and open culture living. Even the media culture (or non-culture!) does not get the opportunity to be understood, read, criticized in an appropriate way, for the simple reason that the "culture of satisfaction and consumption" is a necessary preparation and skill as one of the paradoxes of the world today. This type of culture is felt either in the most trivial way as an "unbearable lightness of being" or as a "monstrous" mechanism that due to its nature erodes the psycho-social body of the society, attacking the privacy, and thus making the citizen feel powerless and exposed to every kind of structural violence.

Only a small part of intelligence and intellectual elites in Macedonia (with opportunities or ambitions for acquiring cultural capital on a national or global level) deviate from the last observations. The wide audience is composed of: galimatias of potential snobs ("newly rich" and similar classes of citizens), completely uncritical and laic-minded citizens with virtually no cultural capital (living on the borders of the existential minimum) or without access to institutions (people with disability, etc.), citizens who, for ethnic and religious reasons or exclusion, do not find themselves in the area of the repertoire of cultural production, or self-ghettoize themselves, as in the field of creation - from here stems institutional parallelism that cannot always be justified by cultural pluralism or multiculturalism.

The lack of conditions and opportunities for developing cultural needs and the way of their fulfilment, the great obstacles to realization of artistic-cultural practice, the rule of culture of poverty and the culture of fear, the great gap between opportunities and aspirations (which we mainly learn from the world of the popular culture and the media, that is, the world "outside of us") are a direct path to exclusion from the creation of values and criteria that evaluate their hierarchy, both socially and individually. This outcome of the fierce and comprehensive exclusion of the majority of citizens in Macedonia, in spite of the small number of elites (who are also insufficiently equipped to follow the path of cultural creativity, but unfortunately can aggressively and negligibly influence it), disclose one of the key reasons for the alienation of the Macedonian citizens and the state of social anomy.

Conclusion

The structure of exclusion in the social and cultural pyramid (Bourdieu, 1984) implies generating conditions and processes of influence from the bottom to the top and vice versa. If the fundamental systemic solutions are ineffective, with the absence of acceptable and possible normative institutes inadequate for practicing, then the nature of the exclusion of citizens with widely differentiated statuses becomes more pronounced. The share in production and reproduction, as well as the consumption of cultural goods (knowledge, information, art, ideology) automatically turns into inequality arising from the distribution of power, but also from the inconsistency, inability and corruption of the ruling elites. Consequently, conflicts with no productive way out are reproduced and a state of tension among social strata is generated, which has direct impact on the security and the functioning of the society in general.

On the other hand, the habitus (Bourdieu, 1984) of individuals and institutions involved in culture loose the necessary equipment to accelerate the processes of adopting new, modern solutions and decisions that would result in a cultural mentality and collective memory deprived of quasi-social, chauvinistic, homophobic, xenophobic, sexist and related prejudices. The social capital of individuals, groups and institutions is reduced to primordial forms of communication and (non)cooperation, only the types of integration within certain subcultures and cultures marked by a culture of distrust in people and institutions ghettoize and mystify (Petkovska at all, 2017). Hence, due to the disruption in the social interaction and the lack of intercultural dialogue as well as the negative consequences on the trust in the people and in the institutions a set of situations that weaken the societal security is generated.

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Review

CYBER THREATS AND POSSIBLE CYBER DEFENCE MEASURES IN DEFENCE COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

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Abstract: *Cyber information led to cyber revolution and the appearance of the information society, which dominated the race for information and communication technologies. There are various cyber threats in the cyber space that can affect the communication and information systems. Defence uses cyberspace to exchange information of interest for the defence of the country. Defence communication and information systems are often a target of different cyber threats; therefore it is necessary to take adequate measures for cyber defence. NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan to maintain robust cyber defence. The US, as well as the NATO countries and Australia, plus countries that are closely working with NATO, developed practices for implementing effective cyber defence. NATO steps toward robust cyber defence, as well as the US's and Australia's best practices can be used as guidance for building Macedonian cyber defence in defence communication and information systems.*

Keywords: *cyber threats, cyber terrorism, cyber defence, defence, management.*

Introduction

The industrial and technological revolution as part of the continuous human evolution have brought a remarkable change in the way the contemporary world operates and one of its most significant results was the creation of the Internet."The Internet is a global system of interconnected computer networks that use a specific protocol for connecting devices and communicating worldwide. It has an extensive network of networks that consists of private, public, academic, business and government networks of local to global scope associated with a wide range of electronic, wireless and optical networking technologies"(Wikipedia). The rapid development of urbanization and technological improvement enables access to the Internet to every individual, organization and state institution. The availability of the technology provides assistance in carrying out various transactions and transfers of large amounts of information that some individuals, organizations and state institutions consider particularly of interest to them.

Unfortunately, as in many other instances when a particular technology is developed for improving people's lives, some individuals and groups found a way to abuse the Internet, using it as a perfect tool to cause harm and wreak havoc. This resulted in the appearance of cyber space threats, as well as cyber terrorism, as a specific form of terrorism which takes advantage of the opportunities for global networking. Therefore, it was necessary to undertake adequate measures for suitable protection.

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Cyber threats

"The tremendous achievements and the development of leading-edge technology, sophisticated computer systems opened new "cyberspace" that constantly destroys the old traditional forms of organization, behaviour, and belief. Cyber information led to cyber revolution and the appearance of the information society, which dominated the race for information and communication technologies, in parallel with the global liberalization and free circulation of people, goods, and ideas" (Stern J. 1999).

"The term "cyberspace" implies a theoretical space, in which data can be stored, transferred and reconfigured. Cyberspace interpreted as a virtual world marked with computers, computer networks, information events and information content in digital form." (Achkovski J. 2012). Modern and flexible communication systems enable transmission of information over the world with almost instant speed, delivering all events in a new, realistic dimension of communication, called cyberspace. Cyberspace is the fourth dimension of warfare, as an outcome of the technological and industrial revolution – joining the list of land, sea and air warfare. Protecting and preserving the national goals and interest are part of every country's national security strategy. Therefore, intelligence services and military structures use cyberspace for conducting various operations.

There are varying cyber threats in the cyber space, most of them coming from: hacktivists, criminals, spies, terrorists and insiders. Hacktivists, guided by their ideological background, resentment and rebellion against government establishments as well as carrying out what they consider fair and righteous -penetrate networks, disrupt services, deface websites, and steal information. Cyber criminals, as their motivation is primarily material in nature, are focused on profiting from violating the law and their means of execution/performing is destruction of information and unauthorized data adaptation. Cyber spies use the cyberspace to conduct their espionage operational activities being motivated by competitive advantage and economic espionage. Insiders are mainly poorly trained, disgruntled, careless, dishonest, or terminated employees and their motivation is curiosity, ego, monetary gain, revenge and unintentional errors. Cyber terrorists use the cyber space as part of their strategic and operational goals, using blackmail, destruction, exploitation and revenge for wreaking havoc or acquiring finances to conduct their other operations. Increase in global power competition, economic and political crisis, as well as regional conflicts, will make the threat of cyber terrorism increase dramatically in mid to long term.

"Cyber terrorism is a development of terrorist capabilities provided by new technologies and networked organizations, which allows terrorists to conduct their operations with little or no physical risk to themselves." (US Army 2015). "Cyber terrorism is a considerate politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data that result in violence against targets that are not military by sub national groups or secret agents." (Achkovski J. 2012)."Cyber terrorism is an important subsystem of cyber warfare and is much harder to detect and counter because it is almost impossible to determine the political affiliation or the sponsors of its perpetrators" (Kalac J. 2017). The boundaries of cyber terrorism are blurred between information warfare, cyber crime and online social activism. Cyber terrorist can target clearly defined objectives that are of critical importance in certain countries – while achieving the previously set out goals does not necessarily mean using large scale attacks. From a terrorist organization perspective, the use of cyberspace is very attractive, because it is asymmetric. They can cause substantial damage with a small number of talented individuals. Furthermore, attacks can be launched from a location that is remote i.e. far away from the target and does not require having personnel across the border or in the country – victim of the attack where certain actions should take place. It may be understood that the information network for the cyber terrorists is a medium through which the attack is conducted. The fact that determining the source of attack or origin is highly improbable is the most important for the terrorist organizations. The problem of determining the source of attack was emphasised by Donald J. Trump, at that time candidate for President of the USA, during the presidential debate, while discussing the hacking of the Democratic National Committee, in which he said: "Maybe it was. It could be Russia, could also be China, could also be a lot of other people. Could also be someone sitting on their bed who weighs 400 pounds, okay?" (Brill, Smolanoff 2017).

Terrorists have used the Internet for more than a decade to achieve their own goals and promote their ideals. However, they have never used the Internet as a weapon, but it could be changed. Terrorists use more sophisticated technologies in cyberspace where they can disable or disrupt national critical infrastructure or use the cyber attack as a secondary attack after the primary mass kinetic attack. Terrorist groups are working with limited resources, while the price of cyber operations is low- for some terrorist groups, cyber attacks do not reach their desired strategic objective. This is especially true for terrorist groups that want to cause physical death and destruction. Taking into consideration the fact that cyberspace is an uncertain area, the results of a cyber attack are not guaranteed.

"However, cyber terrorism in the future will be a new "fatal attraction" for a number of terrorists and terrorist organizations." (Kalac J. 2017).

Statistics and examples of different cyber attacks

Since the early nineties, the terrorist organizations have been using the Internet for communication purposes. Especially during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the organization "Hamas" was known for blocking access to Israeli websites. The terrorist group "Al Qaeda" used the Internet to share best practices and lessons learned with other militant groups. In order to increase their financial power, operating through cyberspace Spain's "Al-Qaeda" cell used stolen credit cards in fabricated fraud sales and conducted numerous purchases for the cell.

"Estonian case represents one of the biggest cyber attacks that ever occurred in the history. This event includes a series of cyber attacks that started on 27.04.2007. Those attacks were carried out on the communication and information systems of the Estonian parliament, banks, ministries, and the media, which caused the destabilization of their national security. The attack took place at a time of tense relations after a diplomatic quarrel between Estonia and Russia for relocating the military monument of the Soviet Union in Tallinn, when Estonian journalists blamed the Russian government for launching the attack. Following the wave of attacks on vital institutions of Estonia, Estonia requested NATO assistance in order to develop a common strategy against 'cyber terrorists'" (Achkovski J. 2012).

Among recent examples of cyber attacks is the use of the virus "Stuxnet" designed to sabotage Iran's nuclear facilities in September 2010. "The target was Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant; the sabotage was deliberately subtle so that the human operators would be mystified about the cause. According to the control systems security firm "Langner Communications", the payload in "Stuxnet" also attempted to disrupt turbine control systems. If this theory is valid, it would suggest that "Stuxnet" could have been created for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant as well as the Natanz uranium-enrichment plant." (Chen T. 2014).

The National Response Centre of Computer Incidents in the Republic of Macedonia presented statistics that are not official and are not comparable because they are made by using different methodologies. However, they give an orientation overview of the challenges in the field of cyber security that are expected in the future.

The following statistic have been presented: since 2017, every 39 seconds there is one hacker attack; in 2016 one in three Americans suffered attacks by hackers; 70% of oil and gas companies had been hacked; in 2016, 95% of cyber security breaches happened in the public sector, technology industries and trade markets; 43% of cyber attacks were on small businesses; 64% of companies suffered web-based attacks; 99% of computers are at risk to software vulnerabilities; in 2016, about a billion user accounts were compromised; 75% of health and medical industry have been infected by malicious software; in March 2016, 56,000 ransomware infections were detected; since the beginning of 2016, more than 4,000 ransomware attacks have occurred every day; phishing and social engineering rank as top threats from 66% of cyber professionals; in 2016, social engineering, insider threats and advanced persistent threats were the biggest cyber threats; the median number of days when the attackers manage to remain hidden in the network before being discovered are over 200 days; median time to detection of malicious or cyber attack is 170 days; in 2017, over 8.4 billion interconnected devices are expected to exist, and in 2020, this number is expected to reach from 50 to 200 billion connected devices; by 2020, 4 billion people will be online, more than double the number online today; by 2019, the cyber crime will damage businesses by more than 2 trillion dollars; in 2020, businesses will spend over 100 billion dollars on cyber security globally; the USA will spend 31 billion dollars on tools and services for cyber security and Western Europe 19 billion dollars; the proposed federal budget for cyber security in the USA for 2017 is 11 billion dollars; 52% of the organizations that have been victims of a successful cyber attack in 2016, did not make any changes to improve safety in 2017.

The Republic of Macedonia as a country that uses the resources and benefits of the Internet, and thus it is linked in cyberspace. is vulnerable to cyber attacks and different cyber threats. "In 2008, the official website of the former President Branko Crvenkovski was attacked by a group of hackers from Kosovo, Albania, and Greece" (Achkovski J. 2012). "The findings of the Agency for Electronic Communications and statistics on cyber attacks in 2017, from January to October, shows that 328 Macedonian web pages were attacked" (Makfax 2017). "In 2016, 294 websites suffered successful cyber attacks, and from them 15 were with domain .gov.mk and 7 were with domain .edu.mk. Figure 1 shows the number of successful cyber attacks on web pages of top-level domain .mk for each month in 2016" (Станоевиќ Х. 2017).

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
77	16	18	42	16	32	10	19	12	30	4	18	294

Figure 1 – Number of successful cyber attacks in 2016 on web pages of the top-level domain .mk

Possible cyber defence measures in Defence Communication and Information Systems

Defence Communication and Information Systems (DCIS) use cyberspace (commercial telephone lines, Internet, commercial services, etc.) for exchange of information that is of interest to the defence and security of the country. Dependence on the possibilities of mutual commercial connection which the cyberspace gives rise to the concerns that critical vulnerabilities in the cyber security could be used by different types of cyber threats.

Cyberspace enables greater efficiency of modern armed forces by using fewer resources, therefore making it practical. The main distinction between commercial communication and information systems and DCIS is that the DCIS have a rigid discipline and a strictly structured approach to design and development, as well as interconnections between communication and information nodes. Unlike the private sector, in DCIS there are certain levels of networks that are based on the requirements of the classification of information ranging in several security domains from "Top secret" to "Unclassified". DCIS are often a fruitful target and are affected by different cyber threats. Cyber attacks intended to destroy, disable or take control of the DCIS can be carried out from outside or inside the country.

"To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber defences, NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which were endorsed by Allies at the Wales Summit in September 2014. Allies pledged at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority" (NATO 2017). In order to implement a better cyber defence, as a first step NATO launched a plan to modernize the communication and information systems with the implementation of a private communication and information infrastructure based on the "cloud" as a service."Communication and information infrastructure based on the "cloud" as a service is defined as a large-scale distributed computing paradigm that is driven by economies of scale, in which a pool of abstracted, virtualized, dynamically scalable, managed computing power, storage, platforms, and services are delivered on demand to external customers over the Internet" (Foster, Zhao, Raicu, Lu 2008). "Also, cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction" (NIST 2011).The second step is implementation of cyber defence measures in the new communication and information infrastructure of NATO. "Modernization will fundamentally change the way the NATO Communication and Information Agency provides services: centralization of management, centralization of information technology infrastructure, and provision of services in according with standard service-level agreements" (Lenk P. 2014). According to these commitments of NATO for the migration of communications and information networks to private information infrastructure based on the "cloud" as a service with implemented cyber defence measures, it is logical to conclude that this concept is the guidance for the future development of the Republic of Macedonia's cyber defence in DCIS.

There are many robust practices in the world for implementing effective cyber defence measures in communication information systems (CIS) but two are incredibly noteworthy as they are coming from countries that have well developed DCIS. One is developed in the USA and the second in Australia –a country that is working closely with NATO countries.

The US solution of implementing effective measures for cyber defence in CIS is the "SANS Technology Institute" model of best practices called "20 Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence in CIS."

Critical security controls for effective cyber defence according to the "SANS Technology Institute" model of best practices (SANS 2014) include the following:

1. Inventory of authorized and unauthorized devices. Administer all hardware devices on the network and determine authorized and unauthorized.
2. Inventory of authorized and unauthorized software. Administer all software on the network and determine authorized and unauthorized software.

3. Secure configurations for hardware and software on laptops, workstations, and servers. Supervise the security configuration of all devices on the network.
4. Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation of weaknesses. Supervise all new information in the network.
5. Protection against malicious software. Control the all activities of malicious codes in the network.
6. Application software security. Control the security lifecycle of all software in the network.
7. Wireless access control. Control the security use of wireless local area networks.
8. Data recovery capability. Back up the critical information from the network.
9. Security skills assessment and appropriate training to fill gaps. Identify the specific knowledge, training and policies needed to support the network.
10. Secure configurations for network devices. Administer the security configuration of network infrastructure devices.
11. Limitation and control of network ports. Supervise the operational use of ports, protocols, and services on networked devices.
12. Controlled use of administrative privileges. Supervise the administrative privileges on computers, networks, and applications.
13. Boundary defence. Control the flow of information between different trust network levels.
14. Maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of audit logs. Inspect all logs of events in the network.
15. Controlled access based on a “need to know”. Supervise the secure access to critical assets.
16. Account monitoring and control. Control the life-cycle of the system and application accounts.
17. Data protection. Control the data security and integrity of sensitive information.
18. Incident response and management. Implement an incident response infrastructure for quickly discovering an attack and restoring the integrity of the network and systems.
19. Secure network engineering. Develop features that allow high confidence systems operations.
20. Penetration tests and red team exercises. Test the overall strength of an organization’s defence.

The Australian solution of implementing effective measures for cyber defence to assist organisations in protecting their CIS against a range of cyber threats as strategic baseline is “The Essential Eight” (ACSC 2018) developed by The Australian Cyber

Security Centre which includes the following:

1. Application whitelisting. Control the execution of unauthorised software that runs on the network.
2. Patching applications. Correct security vulnerabilities and determine patching procedures for the applications.
3. Configuring Microsoft Office macro settings Block untrusted macros and check current macro policies.
4. Application hardening. Protect and ensure utilisation of unauthorized applications.
5. Restricting administrative privileges. Limit and review the admin privileges in the network.
6. Patching operating systems. Correct security vulnerabilities and determine patching procedures for the servers and workstations.
7. Multi-factor authentication. Protect against risky activities and review remote accessibilities to the network and systems.
8. Daily backups. Maintain the availability of critical data on backups.

Even though the US model is more comprehensive and more detailed than the Australian model that is more as a strategic baseline for implementing effective measures for cyber defence, some US experts think that is not covering all areas. They suggest in addition to the "SANS Technology Institute" model of best practices to implement "general guidelines that govern an organization's processes and procedures for cyber security incident response and customer data privacy as important for effective preparation for an incident. Furthermore, processes for employee security clearance, non-disclosure guidelines, employee safety, and applicable safety regulations regarding physical protection systems require attention as risk control measures". (Monken et al 2018).

Conclusion

In mid to long term, cyberspace will become an even more increased area of confrontation between various non-state and state actors with different interests and goals. DCIS will largely continue to use cyberspace to exchange information of interest to the defence and security of the country. DCIS will continue to be a legitimate target of different cyber threats, including cyber terrorists, therefore it is necessary to take adequate measures for comprehensive cyber defence.

From the above mentioned several proposals can be put forward to improve the cyber defence in DCIS including the following:

- to develop a Defence Cyber Strategy which will be in line with the National Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia;
- to define and assess the defence critical infrastructure that can be a target of cyber attacks;
- to develop a plan for migration to private defence communication and information infrastructure based on the "cloud" as a service;

- to implement a combination of The Australian Cyber Security Centre strategic baseline "The Essential Eight" and the "SANS Technology Institute" model of best practice;
- to develop general guidelines that govern an organization's processes and procedures for cyber security incident response and customer data privacy;
- to enhance the process of employee security clearance, employee safety, and applicable safety regulations regarding physical protection systems.

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Review

SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACKS – THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL COMPONENT

Sasho TASEVSKI[3]
Sasho PANCHEVSKI[4]

Abstract: *The complexity of the issue we are facing, in the attempt to clarify the reasons why a human being would decide to commit a destructive act of such an immense scale, points to the influence of several aspects, part of which shall be elaborated in more detail herein further.*
This paper focuses on suicide terrorist attacks, as the most extreme form of terrorism, through the prism of the social and educational component of society. Nevertheless, these are not the sole principles based on which recruiting of perpetrators of suicide attacks is carried out, but only parts of the mosaic that are craftily used by terrorist organizations. The aim of this approach is to understand the influence of terrorist organizations and their manipulation with man's existential needs. Therefore, the need for active participation of government mechanisms is strongly emphasized, in direction of minimizing the social circumstances and providing fertile ground for demonstration of extremist ideologies. To the contrary, the vacuum created as a result of weak efficiency of a social regime leads to misuse and imposing of influence of terrorist organizations and their ideologies. This situation enables the recruitment of perpetrators of suicide attacks, and at the same time presents the terrorist cause and the goals for which the self-sacrifice is committed.
The authors of this paper conclude in the closing remarks that the combat against suicide terrorist attacks includes several measures. They cannot be analyzed only through the prism of repressive measures (punishment) issued by the institutions of the system or the military analogy, but they also require undertaking of activities from preventive perspective in the direction of annulment of the conditions and circumstances that lead to these forms of terrorism.
The following scientific and research methods have been applied in this paper: the descriptive method, deduction and induction method, analysis and synthesis method, statistical method and content analysis.

Keywords: *terrorism, terrorist organizations, suicide terrorist attacks, ideology, social and educational component.*

Introduction

In the endeavor to demystify the process in which an individual accepts certain ideology (secular or religious) on the road to destroying his/her own life, we shall attempt to analyze from

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a scientific point of view the influence of a number of conditions that provide fertile ground for performing suicide terrorist attacks. The subject matter that this paper deals with is the influence of the social situation and education in the process of taking the decision on self-sacrificing one's own life in the name of certain higher ideological aims.

The use of the term suicide terrorism, that is, suicide terrorist attacks, as acts of terrorism in this paper, is because these actions are qualified as such with certain norms in the legislation of the countries affected by these acts. Also, the organizations that stand behind these actions are with the same classification-terrorist organizations. However, it should be underscored that the notion of terrorism, suicide terrorism and the concept of a suicide attack is still the subject of discussion in the scientific community.

The term suicide terrorist attacks primarily refers to the manner of practicing these attacks by terrorist organizations, or "A suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator - this is a unique situation in which the terrorist is fully aware that if he does not kill himself, the planned attack will not be carried out, or he cannot fulfill his mission and stay alive at the same time" (Ganor, 2007). Suicide terrorist attacks represent modus operandi of suicide terrorism, i.e. they are the principal method to achieve the goals of terrorist organizations.

In order to examine the influence of the social situation and education, as elements that contribute to the decision of an individual to commit a suicide terrorist attack, we shall conduct an analysis of the available data and information from several sources that treat these phenomena.

Social situation

The elementary conditions for decent life have their influence with respect to the decisions related to human behavior. The unequal GDB distribution in the world is one more reason for the dissatisfaction of the underprivileged population groups. Nevertheless, this situation also represents one of the main preconditions for development of the ideology matrix of terrorist organizations, which in their efforts will fight for change of the circumstances or the situation.

According to Matovic's findings, (Matovic, 2006: 90), it is noted that even the US State Department, as well as President George W. Bush, agree that the social position of the individual in society is a factor related to terrorism, which is actually reflected in the following report: "With the belief that poverty provides a basis for upbringing terrorism (based on a development assistance program). The 11 September terrorist attacks reaffirm this conviction "- Report of the US Department of State), as well as in the President's statement:"We are fighting poverty because we hope it is the answer to terror "- US President George W. Bush addressing the United Nations Conference in Monterrey, Mexico (Matovic, 2006: 90).

There are announcements of the U.S. State Department and one of the former American presidents – George Bush, that speak in this regard.

"On the belief that poverty provides a breeding ground for terrorism (development aid is based). The terrorist attacks of September 11 reaffirmed this conviction " -U.S. State Department report.

"We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror." -American President George Bush declared at a UN conference in Monterrey, Mexico (Matovic, 2006: 90).

The information on financial rewards of the perpetrators of suicide terrorist attacks, which were generally used by the members of their families, point out to the following. The former leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, paid the Palestinian suicide bombers compensations in amounts of 25000$ per martyr, while from Saudi Arabia were received compensations in amounts of 5000$ per martyr (Berman, 2005). The terrorist organization Hamas, in the period between 2000-2001, paid financial compensations ranging from 3000 to 5000$ to each suicide bomber, while later, in 2002 this amount was increased to the level of 10.000$, and therefore, as a result of the increase in financial compensation the number of suicide attacks varied from 0-14 (Sobek, Rohrer, 2016).

In this context, we shall present the Graph below (Graph 1) that shows the suicide terrorist attacks committed in Israel in the period from 2000 to 2007.

Graph 1



Source: Panchevski, S. (2014) Suicide terrorism and its personification in the new wave of religious terrorism.

Evidently, the number of suicide attacks increased in 2002, exactly in the period noting an increase in the financial benefits. The following Graph (Graph 2) presents the number of foiled suicide terrorist attacks by the Israeli security forces in the period 2000-2006. It is apparent that there was an increase in the terrorist activities in the period 2002-2004, which, for its part, could indicate an increase in the financial compensations.

Graph 2



Source: Panchevski, S. (2014) Suicide terrorism and its personification in the new wave of religious terrorism.

In 2000, 4 suicide attacks were performed, while the Israeli security forces foiled 4 suicide attacks, or a total of 8 terrorist activities took place. In 2001 35 suicide attacks were performed, while the Israeli security forces foiled 56 suicide attacks, or there were a total of 91 terrorist activities. In 2002, 60 suicide attacks were performed, while the Israeli security forces foiled 171 suicide attacks, or there were a total of 231 terrorist activities. In 2003, 26 suicide attacks were performed and the Israeli security forces foiled 209 suicide attacks, which equals a total of 235 terrorist activities. In 2004, 15 suicide attacks were performed, while the Israeli security forces foiled 367 suicide attacks, or there were a total of 382 terrorist activities. In 2005 5 suicide attacks were performed, while the Israeli security forces foiled 96 suicide attacks, or there were a total of 101 terrorist activities. In 2006 there was 1 suicide attack committed, while the Israeli security forces foiled 187 suicide attacks, which points to a total of 188 terrorist activities (Panchevski, 2014). Out of the total number of 1235 performed terrorist activities in the period 2000-2006, 68.66% took place in the period between the years 2002-2004. On the basis of these indicators it could be concluded that in the period between the years 2002-2004, from the perspective of economic benefits of the performers of suicide terrorist attacks, the situation is at the "worst" case identical or the economic benefits were increased.

Other sources (Bakken, 2007:5), which refer to the Near East state that following a successfully performed suicide attack, the situation of the family of the suicide bomber improves both from the aspect of its social status and from the aspect of its material (economic) standing. The family generally receives monetary compensation in the amount from 1000 to 25 000 dollars (Bakken, 2007). This information is supported by other research papers that are dealing with the economic and psychological aspects in the process of making a decision to perform a suicide terrorist attack by the persons – performers of the attacks. They mention financial rewards in amounts from 3000-25000 dollars received by the families of suicide bombers (Pittel, Rübbelke, 2009:5).

A research team from Louisiana State University – USA, examining the economic benefits of suicide terrorism in Afghanistan, points to the fact that in Afghanistan, based on financial compensations, the Taliban movement had successfully raised the number of performers of suicide attacks. The results from this research are presented in the Graph below (Graph 3).

Graph 3



Source: Sobek, D. Rohrer, S. (2016) Name Your Price: Economic Compensation and suicide terrorism

In the period from 2000-2005, the Taliban movement paid 250 dollars to the families of suicide bombers, and in a period of 5 years, a total of 13 suicide attacks were performed. Nevertheless, when the financial compensation was increased to 15 000 dollars in 2006, the number of suicide attacks increased to 23 or in 2006 more suicide attacks were performed than in the previous 5 years when the financial compensation was lower. The number of suicide attacks continues to be rather high, with 37 attacks in 2007, and 27 attacks in 2008, that is to say, whenever the financial compensation is higher, the number of performers of suicide attacks is on the increase (Sobek, Rohrer, 2016:78).

The data on recruitment of representatives of female population in Chechnya by the "Black Widows" also points out to the economic benefits from the recruitment. The sisters Koku and Aiman Hadjiyevi were sold by their mother for 20 000 dollars. Khadizhat Ganiyeva, born 1986, was sold by her father for 20 000 dollars. Marina Bisultanova, born 1983, was attempting to return to her home but was not allowed by her husband and her father, her father having received a monetary reward. The mother of Zaira Julayeva, born 1978, was rewarded with 30 000 dollars. All these girls were married to Wahhabis and were killed in the Dubrovka Theater hostage crisis, in Moscow, on 22nd of October 2002 (Matovic, 2006).

The former leader of TTP (Student Movement of Pakistan or TTP), Baitullah *Mehsud,* was paying families up to 1.000.000 Pakistani rupees (approximately 14, 000 US dollars) for "purchasing" of children as young as seven to serve as suicide bombers for the TTP or its subsidiaries (Lanche, 2009). The links with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan were continually strengthened, and a number of Pakistani children were arrested by the security forces in Afghanistan immediately before the performance of the suicide attacks. It is evident that the TTP leader had developed child trafficking channels and the children could been used by other terrorist organizations for their aims based on monetary compensations. Economic incentives, in the last several years, have become a powerful factor for recruitment of representatives of the lower layer of TTP supporters for performing suicide missions. This terrorist organization, in the period from November 2007 to May 2009, from multiple sources (mostly criminal activities, extortions, violence etc), managed to accumulate funds in amount from 7.34 million to 8.49 million US dollars (Feyyaz, 2013). Without doubt, a share of these funds is used for recruitment of performers of suicide attacks.

The sole survivor from the suicide terrorist campaign in Mumbai (India, 2008), Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, testified in the court proceedings that his father was promised a reward of 2000 British pounds by the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pittel, Rübbelke, 2009:5). The condition for the receipt of the monetary compensation was Mohammad to participate in a suicide mission in Mumbai and sacrifice his life in the name of the organization.

Professor Barry Horowitz and Dr. Linton Wells III from the University of Virginia – USA, have developed a model (Diagram 1.) on the manner in which terrorist organizations recruit suicide bombers. The model presents culture and economy as factors that contribute to the recruitment of suicide bombers.[1]

1 Suicide Bombers-Profiles, Methods and Techniques, p.7 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a464077.pdf

Diagram 1



Source: Suicide Bombers-Profiles, Methods and Techniques

As it can be noted from Diagram 1 presented above, in addition to other parameters that have certain influence on the creation of suicide bombers, the economic factors are also mentioned. This category includes poverty, poor employment prospects and financial reward for the family, as some of the reasons for recruitment of suicide bombers. The model clearly points to the influence of economic factors in the overall process of recruitment of suicide bombers.

Education

Education level and type of education gained by suicide bombers, also determine, in a certain sense, the level of ideology in the consciousness of suicide bombers.

The example of Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides useful information in this direction. The author of the book "Suicide terrorism: How one becomes a *martyr*", Violeta Matovic, presents information based on the research of suicide bombers in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Namely, one research conducted in Israel and covering the period from 1993 to 2003, includes an analysis in relation to the education and ideology of the representatives of terrorist organizations that perform suicide attacks and the representatives of terrorist organizations that do not perform suicide attacks, that is, whose terrorist acts do not include suicide attacks. The database includes 80 suicide bombers and 663 performers of terrorist acts without elements of a suicide attack (Matovic, 2006:88). The research, apart from suicide bombers (as individuals), also includes other structures of terrorist organizations (cell leaders, recruiters, and other representatives of higher hierarchical levels), who for the reasons of achieving the aims of the terrorist organization conduct suicide missions, and structures of terrorist organizations that do not perform suicide attacks, that is, do not use suicide bombers in the performance of their terrorist acts.

Table 1

	Primary school	Secondary school	Partly academic	Academic
Education level of suicide bombers	12.7%	52.5%	27.1%	7.6%

Type of education	Secular	Religious
In percentage	17%	83%

Ideology of suicide terrorist	Religious	Nationalist	Left nationalist
In percentage	72%	26%	2%

Source: Matovic, V. (2006) Suicide terrorism: How one becomes a “martyr”.

The data presented in Table 1 point out to the following conclusions. The majority of suicide bombers have completed secondary education (52.5%), and have a religious nature (83%). The suicide bombers for the greatest part have emphasized their religious ideology (72%). Education of religious character, that is, the manner in which the it is perceived in Palestinian society, has a major influence on individual level (in direction of creating suicide bombers). Similarly to suicide bombers, the data on the remaining structures of terrorist organizations (Table 2) that conduct suicide missions, point out to the following conclusions.

Table 2

Type of education	Secular	Religious
Suicide	17%	83%
Non-suicide	36%	64%

Ideology	Religious	Nationalist	Left nationalist
Suicide	76%	9%	1%
Non-suicide	21%	32%	36%

Source: Matovic, V. (2006) Suicide terrorism: How one becomes a “martyr”.

The structures of terrorist organizations that use suicide terrorist tactics have most frequently completed religious education (83%) and ideologically present their viewpoints on religious grounds (76%). The share of religious education in non-suicide terrorist structures equals 64% and ideologically they present nationalist (32%) and left-nationalist viewpoints (36%). The presence of religious elements in the education and viewpoints that are presented by terrorist organizations, practicing suicide terrorism, point out to the high share of religion and religious education in the politics of terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, another question is inevitably imposed in relation to education, or specifically to its quality. One possible answer to this question is not in the document issued by a certain institution about the education level, but in the type of education. When one mentions type of education, it does not simply refer only to secular or religious education, but also to the information received during the education process. Insisting on curricula that include a narrow approach to science and having been oriented only towards scientific achievements in the Muslim community results in fulfilling all the responsibilities envisaged in the program that a student is supposed to fulfill, but the student leaves the education institution lacking information that can change his/her views on life and the world. In addition, the criteria established in the education institutions are also debatable, particularly in the Palestinian conditions of permanent clashes, as is the individual interest for acquiring education. One deficiency of this statistical data is that the level of knowledge specified in the diploma cannot be compared, neither can it be compared with the cases observed inside the system, nor comparison can be made with a control group of some other education system in the world (Matovic, 2006:92).

Education (secular or religious) and the ideology for which one sacrifices one’s own life can stand in correlation, yet, the presence of other elements in the society is also evident in order the required conditions to be created for such a destructive act of self-sacrifice in the name of a certain cause. The research paper titled "Economic conditions and the quality of suicide terrorism" (2010), also points out to the strong correlation among education, economic conditions and suicide bombers in the Near East (Palestine). Specifically, higher unemployment rate and weak economy enable terrorist organizations to recruit more educated, mature, and experienced suicide terrorists who, in turn, attack more important targets (Benmelech, Berrebi, Esteban, 2010). In the context of religious education, we shall mention the Pakistan example. Namely, at the time of independence of Pakistan (1947), there were a total of 245 religious schools (Madressah) in the country. They were seats of religious education, but also they were the home of many orphans from the country. Religion in the Madressah was taught in the spirit of high moral behaviours and righteous living. During the conflict in Afghanistan (2001), the number of Madressah in Pakistan increased 28 times, from 245, at the time of independence, to 6870 in 2001. The same situation occurred in the free Islamic education system that existed in parallel to the state sector (Naqvi, Kazim, Huma, 2011). The reasons for such development were the poor condition of the government schools and the education system in the country, specifically, 15% of the schools were without a proper building, 52% of schoolrooms lacked a boundary wall, 40% were without water, 71% had no electricity, there was frequent absenteeism of teachers and many of the schools existed only on paper. These conditions resulted in politicization of religious education and promotion of hard-line Wahhabism, particularly in the northwest parts of Pakistan, following which, as the final product in 2002, apart from other factors, a fertile ground for suicide terrorist attacks in the country was created (Naqvi, Kazim, Huma, 2011).

The researchers M. Najeeb Shafiq and Abdulkader H. Sinno from the Indiana University – USA examined the effect of educational attainment and income on public support for performance of suicide bombing attacks. The study includes six predominantly Muslim countries: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey, which have all experienced suicide bombings. In addition, the study includes two contributions, the first related to the presentation of a conceptual model, and the second related to the attitudes towards the two different targets of suicide bombings: civilians within the respondents' country and the West with its military and political personnel in Iraq at the time (Najeeb, Sinno, 2009). The findings of the study show that the higher level of educational attainment has the effect of decreasing the public support for suicide attacks on civilians in Indonesia and Pakistan, but, nevertheless increases such support in Jordan. The higher level of educational attainment in Indonesia and Jordan is related to increased public support for suicide attacks on Westerners in Iraq. The higher income in Jordan and Pakistan is related to a decrease in public support for suicide attacks on civilian targets. In Morocco, the situation is reverse, higher income increases the public support for suicide bombings against civilians. In Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan the support is dependent upon income, that is, higher income decreases public support for suicide bombings against Western targets in Iraq. In Lebanon, higher income is related to greater support for suicide attacks on Western targets in Iraq. (Najeeb, M. S. Sinno, 2009)

Based on the different findings of the study, the authors' conclusion is that making generalizations about the relationship between educational attainment, income, and support for suicide bombing across Muslim countries would be an extremely complex operation. The reasons for this are the differences in findings across countries in terms of education, income and bombing targets. In addition, the type, i.e. content of education attained by an individual is emphasized as it differs among individual countries. In this regard, M. Najeeb Shafiq says "Each country is different, and the attitudes differ depending on the goals" (Najeeb, Sinno, 2009). The general conclusion of the study is that people with higher educational attainment are strongly against suicide bombings aimed at civilians in their countries.

Conclusion

On the basis of this research it can be concluded that when modern social gains – education and social status, in a certain sense do not contribute to the individual's wellbeing in society, they tend to have an effect on the decisions for radicalization of certain states. The situation is made even more complex by the presence of certain organized forms, or terrorist organizations that perceive this situation as an opportunity for their establishment on the political scene, where the performance of a suicide attack occurs as the final product of the process.

In relation to education, it has to be clarified that the type of education represents one of the factors for voluntary acceptance of the self-sacrifice act, and persons with religious education are more susceptible to religious indoctrination and most frequently appear as suicide bombers. The term religious education refers to education that involves political indoctrination in circumstances of constant pressure (social, economic etc.) on the individual and his struggle for better life, which produces radical forms of religion acceptance. In addition, the secular education criteria are also doubtful, in circumstances of repeated clashes, as is the quality of information (knowledge and skills) acquired by the individuals during the education process, particularly when the government does not invest sufficient funds in the education sector.

Regarding social status, the available information shows that economic compensation has its effect in relation to the increase in the number of suicide bombers (Afghanistan, Palestine etc.). The low standard of living and the continuous struggle for survival in combination with the future without perspective in certain environments contribute to the acceptance of the "benefit" related to the "status of a martyr". Terrorist organizations skillfully manipulate with these facts in the regions where the situation is to their benefit. Moreover, it can be said that in certain environments such circumstances are "maintained" on the level acceptable to the cause of the terrorist organization.

Nevertheless, the conclusions about the social status (income) and education cannot be generalized in relation to the performed suicide attacks on a global level. They can rather be accepted as partial ascertainments that refer to certain geographic regions. The reason is related to the complex parameters regarding the perception of income and education in different geographic areas. Nevertheless, based on the findings of this paper it can be concluded that social status and education as elements of a mosaic have effect on the decision for radicalization of certain social situations and at the same time provide fertile ground for extreme forms of human behavior – self-destruction and destruction of other human beings.

The conclusions about the measures and activities that need to be undertaken in the direction of elimination of social status and education as components of the mosaic and prerequisites for undertaking of suicide terrorist attacks, point out to systemic problems in the society. The solution of this problem requires a holistic approach involving several entities (government and non-government) and, in addition to the repressive measures for elimination of terrorist organizations that perform suicide attacks, it also requires undertaking of prevention measures.

In this case we shall elaborate prevention measures in greater detail in order to call attention to the well known saying – "better safe than sorry". In this specific situation the institutions responsible for the education process need to invest in development programs and education improvement. In this way, based on the curricula every individual could acquire education that will enable him/her to enter the labor market and valorize it, regardless whether in the domicile country or abroad. In this context, the obligations of the institutions responsible for the control over the manner in which educational programs are implemented also need to be mentioned, as well as the quality of the educational staff. Religious authorities could also contribute with their influence or actions to the proper interpretation of religious values, as it is an evident fact that a large number of terrorist organizations exploit religious motives for recruitment and implementation of suicide terrorist attacks.

Social status, i.e. income is a specific category on a global level. Every country in the world individually creates its social policy depending on its capacities. In this case the institutions of the system come out on the stage. They should be oriented towards provision of a decent income that will satisfy the existential needs of the individual and the family. Here are also included the mechanisms that are used by the governments in their endeavors to protect the system, as the prevention of bribe, corruption, organized crime etc. These negative phenomena in society are the driving forces of insecure environment and in this way a reason for stagnation of a certain area, susceptible to manipulation by individuals or the population.

Finally, we would conclude that suicide terrorist attacks portray the state of the individual within the frames of social environment and at the same time it portrays the weaknesses of the system.

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