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
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РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА



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SOCIETAL SECURITY NEEDS AS A REASON FOR THE CONFLICT: THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

Prof. Dr. Marina MITREVSKA¹

Abstract: *It is instrumental to seek the causes of tensions between the Albanian and the Macedonian communities in the Republic of Macedonia, not only among the immediate contentious issues and trigger events, but also among the structural factors that frame a conflict. Such structural factors, to name a few, include political discrimination and both economic and social inequalities. These elements that generate peoples' dissatisfaction were of great importance in the Republic of Macedonia. The elaboration contained in this text moves along two key axes. The first one reveals an analysis that is made regarding the origin of tensions between Albanian and Macedonian community, in order to point out to the structural reasons as direct ones for the conflict. The second line of analysis refers to demystification of all preconditions for escalation of the "action and reaction" dynamics, observed through the frames of the concept for societal security dilemma.*

Kew words: *societal security, conflict, Macedonia.*

Introduction

Like many post-communist societies, the Republic of Macedonia had to contend with structurally embedded conflict potentials that stemmed from limited economic opportunity as well as specific social, political, and ethnic conditions. Inside the Republic of Macedonia, inter-ethnic conditions turned into a struggle for a "balance of power" between the two largest ethnic groups. The efforts to balance of power" were social inequality and raising rates of poverty. The structural problems that supported the conflict process were also reflected in the ethnically defined political parties. Ethno- political mobilization became the simplest and most divisive means for acquiring public support and votes.

The second set of structural factors resided within the new political system introduced by the 1991 Constitution. The Constitution contained several flaws, which turned out to have several negative effects. The governmental structure was envisaged as a parliamentary democracy with a liberal orientation as its politico-philosophical basis. However, at the same time it embodied the idea of a nation-state, i.e. it was considered to be the realization of the right for self-determination of the

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Macedonian people. Keeping in mind the historical circumstances of the formation of the independent Macedonian state, the Constitution left unsettled the nationalistic (Macedonian, ethnic) aspects of the civic character of the political system. In the years that followed, these inconsistencies increasingly becoming a stumbling block in the development of democracy within a multiethnic society. The problems could have been anticipated even during the process of preparing the Constitution, particularly due to the fact that the members of parliament of Albanian origin had boycotted its adoption as they believed that it did not guarantee the collective rights of the Albanian community. (Vankovska, 2007:198)

Escalating Conflict between the Macedonian Majority and the Albanian Minority

The above described situation created preconditions for an escalating dynamic of action and reaction, observed through the framework of a societal security dilemma. The adoption of the first Constitution of the independent the Republic of Macedonia on behalf of only the ethnic Macedonians and without any support by the Macedonian Albanians became a motive for the Albanian reaction. The main Albanian reaction came in the form of a referendum for partition and the creation of an autonomous “*Republic of Ilirida*”. Under those conditions, the societal security needs of the Albanians, as the second largest ethnic group in the Republic of Macedonia, were much more far reaching than the demands of other ethnic groups. More precisely, their demands focused on the group status, the use of the Albanian language in state institutions, the right to higher education in their mother (Albanian) tongue, and appropriate representation in state bodies. Albanians considered it essential that their societal security needs had to be met to allow for the continuous development of their ethnic identity. Unmet societal needs regarding higher education, for example, manifested themselves in the establishment of the University of Tetovo in 1994, which was not sanctioned by national authorities. Such actions were considered by ethnic Macedonians as acts of disloyalty towards the Republic on the part of the Albanian Community, leading the government to use force to close down the university. At the same time, attempts by the Macedonian government to meet the demands for higher education of the Macedonian Albanians within the framework of the Pedagogical Academy within the State University led to riotous protests by students of ethnic Macedonian origin, who considered such steps to be a jeopardy to the Macedonians’ societal identity. (Slaveski 2004, 162). Ultimately, both sides misperceived what the other side had felt was required to protect their own identity. Thus, what Macedonian Albanians considered essential for preserving their societal identity and continuous development, ethnic Macedonians considered as a threat to their national identity. In addition, the ethnic Macedonians’ identity was threatened in different forms by the neighboring countries, making this issue even more sensitive. Moreover, while the international community tried to mediate in finding a mutually satisfactory solution, it often did so heedlessly. (Slaveski 2004, 163). Despite misinterpretations of the societal security needs of the Albanian population, the government of the Republic of Macedonia undertook gradual steps to satisfy the Albanian demands.

Preventive Pre-conflict Deployment of the United Nations

It is also important to note that the Republic of Macedonia avoided the violent fate of other areas in the Balkans, where ethnic conflict had escalated immensely in the first years after the FRY's dissolution. After the dissolution of the FRY, the Republic of Macedonia was perceived as a peaceful country based on a model of multiethnic coexistence. In such circumstances, the Republic of Macedonia was not the focus of any explicit international attention or aid. Regardless of the perceived peace, two developments quickly spurred the RM's top political elites into action. The first call to action was due to the terrifying developments in the multiethnic and multireligious area of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the second development was Greece's vocal ethno-nationalistic reaction to the newly independent Republic of Macedonia, whose name was considered an inseparable part of Greek national history.

For these reasons, the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, formally asked for the preventive deployment of United Nations monitors to Macedonia.² This request for a United Nations presence in Macedonia emerged from several key factors. First, the urgent need to fill the defense vacuum after the independence. Second, the possibility of the war spilling over from the north represented a reality that had to be anticipated. Third, the situation in Kosovo increased the concerns regarding inter-ethnic relations in the country. Fourth, ideas such as "Greater Albania", "Greater Serbia" and possibly a "Greater Bulgaria" were gaining currency among politicians in the region. And, fifth, the unstable economic situation in the country continued to have a negative effect, especially on inter-ethnic relations.

In December 1992 a UNSC Resolution No. 795 marked the beginning³ of what eventually became a preventive deployment of the UN forces (UNPREDEP) in 1995. In other words, a so-called thin blue line was drawn "to help prevent conflicts through confidence building in the areas where there is tension or between belligerent polarized communities."⁴

The newly designed preventive peace mission in the Republic of Macedonia was modeled on the 1992 UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces) mission. The mandate of UNPROFOR had been for the UN to act as a preventive military force to protect the peace in the broader region on the territory of former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR had a positive impact in the Republic of Macedonia, firstly, by preserving peace and security inside the Republic of Macedonia itself and, secondly, through its stabilizing effect on the broader region. Following reports by the UNSG on the preventive mission in the Republic of Macedonia, the emphasis of UNPROFOR gradually shifted from preventing external aggression (the main when the mission started in November 1992) towards the growing concerns with internal developments. (Georgieva 1999, 458). The UNSG, in 1995, issued the following report addressing the shift towards internal intervention: In this context, it is stated that:

² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Security Council reacted positively and the operation of preventive deployment was decided under the paragraphs 28-32 from the Agenda for Peace.

³ See more: Resolution of the Security Council No. 795 from 11 December 1992

⁴ See more: "Report of the Secretary General" UN Document a/54/1, paragraph 41

“the condition in the Republic of Macedonia is determined by the complex frame of external and internal factors that contribute to the economic and political instability and growing social tension. UNPROFOR, acting according to the mandate and good services given to my Special Representative with the Resolution 908 (1994) and in full cooperation with the authorities of the Republic of Macedonia, /... / made a humble but significant contribution in the assistance of the authorities and different ethnic groups to keep peace and stability and build a common future. It is encouraging to notice, in this first preventive mission for peacekeeping, that both the Government and the leaders of the ethnic Albanians expressed acknowledgement to UNPROFOR for the clear, objective and useful action.”⁵

Following the UNSG report there was an increased emphasis on humanitarian issues and a dialogue in terms of human rights. The expanded dialogues looked to include ethnic communities and national minorities. This shift of focus and the subsequent momentum initiated a series of projects that referred to the needs of the population in the area of development and social integration. Such projects primarily focused on building national capacities and strengthening the structure of state authorities.

Moreover, the Security Council, according to Resolutions 981, 982, and 983, modified operations in former Yugoslavia by establishing three separate but complementary missions, which would function under the absolute authority of the UN Peacekeeping Forces. The Resolutions led to the establishment of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN Nations Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCOR) in Croatia and UNPREDEP in Macedonia.

As of March 31, 1995 Resolution 983 established UNPREDEP as a distinctive operative entity within the UNPROFOR in the Republic of Macedonia. The UNPREDEP mission was conducted by a civilian Chief of mission, Henryk Sokalski and the military commandant Bent Sohneman. The UNPREDEP mandate was based on three main tasks. First, monitoring, especially of the northern and western border areas, and subsequently reporting to the UN Secretary-General on any activities that could present a threat to stability. Second, with its presence discouraging threats from any source as well as preventing potential clashes between external elements and the Macedonian forces. Third, the Resolution was to encourage the cooperation with the authorities in the Republic that would contribute to sustaining peace and security. (Sokalski 2004, 62).

In accordance with its mandate to contribute to peace and stability in the Macedonia, the mission was to focus on different aspects of the internal and external condition of the state. These tasks incorporated preventive deployment, good services, confidence building measures, early warning, monitoring and reporting, and the development of as well as certain social projects.⁶ In addition, the mission included tracing indicators for possible national crises, usurpation of the established democratic institutions or other non-military external and internal pressures. Furthermore, the mission took an interest in institutional reforms, improvement of the police and judicial system, human rights, reforms of the election system and social and economic development. Therefore, UNPREDEP represented a

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General S/XX of 22 March 1995

⁶ Resolution 1046 13 February 1996

comprehensive operation of preventive diplomacy founded on a multi-functional strategy, which recognized that the practical use of early preventive action cannot rely on isolated instruments. (Sokalski 2004, 62).

As a result of the Security Council's assessments of the requirements of stabilization after the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the mission reduced the number of military personnel to 750 soldiers, while the number of UN observers was reduced from nineteen to eight.⁷ The same year,⁸ the Security Council extended the UNPREDEP mandate until August 31, 1998 and providing for the withdrawal of the military component after that date.

However, events in Albania, the slow progress in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, the escalating problem with Kosovo, and the open question of the unmarked border with the FR Yugoslavia, led to an alteration of the initial decision for a departure of the military component of the UN mission. In that period, especially the events in Kosovo and the presence of open violence resulted in increased concerns of the international community in terms of preserving peace and stability in the whole region. Thus, these events affected the Security Council decision to extend the mandate and enlarge the number of forces.⁹ According to the new mandate, the mission was tasked to deter threats and prevent clashes, monitor the borders, and report on illegal trafficking of arms and other activities, in line with the resolutions. The analysis of the mission's activities shows that during this long period, the UNPREDEP mission became a paradigm of preventive peacekeeping and a source of great pride for the international community.

Pre-conflict Political Dynamism: from Action to Reaction

The roots of conflict have always been present in the RM, but the international community failed to understand that Macedonia has always been part of the triangle of conflict within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In that sense, the illusion of peace was based on the wrong interpretation that it would be possible to prevent the spillover of regional problems (especially from bordering states) into the new Macedonian state. The dominant assumption that Macedonia would be able to survive despite the regional context in which it was positioned was rather short-sighted (Vankovska 2002,12).

Albanian Political Demands

Several events took place in the RM that escalated the ethnic conflicts between Albanians and Macedonians. First, the contested use of the flag of the Republic of Albania by local authorities in Tetovo and Gostivar, and the complete abandonment of the state flag of the Republic of Macedonia triggered violent clashes with the police. Second, the parliamentary elections in 1998 were lost by the coalition led by the Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM) of Macedonia, a party with reconciliatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Albanians, frustrated by the slow progress in efforts to gain equal rights, turned their political support towards the more radically driven Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA). The

⁷ Resolution 1110, 28 May, 1997

⁸ 4 December 1997

⁹ The number of forces was 1050, Resolution 1186, 21 July, 1998

elections brought to power the most improbable coalition of nationalistic parties of both ethnic groups. For a certain period of time, the coalition VMRO- DPMNE and the DPA succeeded to meet the demands of the Albanian electorate. Some analysts argued that the coalition of VMRO-DPMNE with DPA was not based on a consistent policy, as the coalition response to the question for interethnic understanding was again resolved as “a result of compromises”. For that reason, after the first moves of the new government, the public started to suspect that the ruling parties had agreed to divide Macedonia along ethnic lines.

Third, in addition to the above, several bombings took place in the Republic of Macedonia in the spring of 1998. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) claimed responsibility for several of the bombings, particularly for the explosions in Gostivar, Kumanovo and Prilep.

NATO Intervention, Spillover Effect and the Refugee Crisis

In addition to the escalation of armed conflict, NATO intervention had the perverse effect of accelerating “*ethnic cleansing*” in Kosovo. The spillover resulted in the “Kosovo Refugee Crisis” during which 379.523 refugees sought shelter on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. In total, 287,423 refugees stayed in Macedonian for the entire duration of the crisis, while 92.100 refugees were transported to third countries via the established air bridge. As a consequence the overall population of the RM increased for 14.77 % (Mitrevska, 2001:65)

With large population increases, the Macedonia’s demographic layout was transformed along with its social and economic structure. Hence, it is important to take into consideration that the exile of one’s own citizens to a foreign territory, whether Albanians or another population (citizens of the then FRY), changes the ethnic structure of the other territory.

Supported by the international community, a great number of refugees have returned to their countries of origin. However, some refugees have stayed in the RM on the grounds of marriages and others have stayed illegally. Exact refugee numbers could not be recorded reliably or accurately, and ultimately large numbers of refugees would stay on Macedonian soil for good. Two such developments took place with the increase of refugees in the RM. Firstly, the Albanians attempted to legalize the new ethnic composition in order to support certain Albanian goals, such as increasing the population percentage of Albanians, enhancing their electoral support, and supporting logistically armed interventions from Kosovo. (Nacev and Načevski 2000, 418) And secondly, the Kosovo crisis effectively slowed down the Macedonian economy, effecting sectors such as industrial manufacturing, agriculture, and civil engineering etc.

Ultimately, the NATO intervention, undertaken to protect human rights and lives, ended up jeopardizing the entire region and Macedonia became a collateral damage. The decade-long effort by the citizens of the RM to establish effective inter-ethnic dialogue failed overnight. It was a major turning point in the dynamics of the Macedonian conflict. The Kosovo crisis was directly felt in this fragile and vulnerable country.

NATO’s inability to properly assess the possible consequences of a “humanitarian intervention” in Yugoslavia led to a deepening of both, economic and social problems in the

region. Overnight Macedonia was transformed from an *oasis of peace* to a *place d'armee*; inter-ethnic relations suffered immensely and the fragile identities of the main ethnic groups rose to the surface. (Vankovska 2002, 18).

Sources of Frustration-from identity to Economic Hardship

In addition to the pressures felt elsewhere, the Macedonian police undertook searches in villages inhabited by ethnic Albanians close to the northern border and discovered vast quantities of ammunition. Given the location, the police suspected that they were secret KLA warehouses. In addition to the discovery of ammunition, several parallel developments exacerbated the situation.

The first development was that in places populated mainly by ethnic Albanians, the youth of the region were recruited and sent to fight in Kosovo.

The second development was the announcement by the leader of the ruling DPA, Arben Xhaferi, that the Albanians in Macedonia would not respond to the call for mobilization, if Macedonian authorities should ask for their involvement.

The third was that the Albanian community in Macedonia petitioned the state for all the refugees to stay in Macedonia. In addition, members of the Parliament of Albanian nationality declared themselves "legitimate representatives of the refugees". This led to an increased sense of internal cohesion within the Albanian community in Macedonia and between Macedonian and Kosovo Albanians. Albanians on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, both civilians and politicians, perceived their ethnic community as a united whole. Albanians showed unseen compassion and solidarity with their Kosovo brothers, while, for the Macedonians, the sentiments were more complex.

With the above developments the level of ethnic identification and homogeneity among the two major ethnic groups in Macedonia achieved their highest peak since independence in 1991. As tensions increased, Albanians blamed Macedonians for their lack of compassion for the refugees, while many Macedonians began to see potential KLA fighters in the refugees and in the members of the Albanian minority. This later turned out to be true.

Also in this context, difficult social and economic situation served to deepen the divide between Macedonians and Albanians. Prior to the conflict there were more than 300,000 unemployed in the Republic of Macedonia, 50% of whom had not received any salary for several months. During this period the rate of economic growth decreased by more than 10%. Under those circumstances, the number of poor and socially endangered people was continually increasing.

In those circumstances, the fears of the Macedonian state and political elites that the country could be drawn into a conflict were justified. A number of indicators pointed to that conclusion, starting with the fact that the KLA had moved its headquarters and resources into Macedonian territory; subsequently the political crisis escalated. The surprisingly rapid escalation of violence at the end of February shocked the public, as well as several parts of the political establishment.

Interpreting the Outburst of the Conflict

There are competing interpretations of the outburst of violent conflict in Macedonia, beginning as of 2001. A range of explanations for the conflict in the RM have been offered. One explanation is that the conflict was arranged and manipulated by the political parties VMRO-DPMNE and DPA, based on party interests or the personal interests of the leaders. Another possible explanation could be the power sharing agreement, brokered between SDSM and NLA (National Liberation Army). In both cases, it was a matter of mutual accusations, where statements on both sides confirmed the aim; providing explanation to the conflict. In that context, it is worth mentioning that the leader of DPA, Arben Xhaferi, wanted his party to achieve its goals through an evolutionary political process over time, while the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) attempted to pursue its goals through force and in a very short period. The Vice President of the same party, Menduh Tachi, argued that the conflict from 2001 on was a fight for power, and not a fight for realization of the Albanian rights. Contrary to his claims, the Secretary General of DUI, Gzim Ostreni (Chief of the Headquarters of the paramilitary NLA) argued that the conflict in 2001 was not an aggression from Kosovo, rather led by the Albanian uprisings in response to the infringement on their elementary rights. All of which was a result of one long-lasting politics frustrations held by ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Luckily, the peace agreement between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, the Ohrid Framework Agreement, was signed and civil war was prevented. In contrast, another NLA commandant, Fazli Veliy, explained in 2001 that the NLA had been motivated to fight primarily within the Republic of Macedonia. However, over time and under pressure of the international community the scope of their efforts changed.

Another interpretation is that the Albanians started the conflict and used violence to encourage dialogue for the final political status of Kosovo.

Yet another interpretation is that the conflict was an instance of controlled chaos, in order to accelerate the process of federalization of the state.

Others hold that violence was generated by problems connected to human rights issues and minority rights i.e. a fight for human rights. The Albanian interpretation of the conflict and its causes is quite simplistic. At one time it was the unjust Constitution that served as a point of frustration; another time, it was the lasting repression of the Albanians by the Macedonians; while the third time it was the deprivation of the right to study in Albanian language in higher education.

Finally, when seen through a security matrix, the conflict in 2001 represented a politico-security crisis for the RM. According to all parameters, it met the criteria for political crisis, which represent a threat to the basic interests and basic values, with the use of armed violence. Furthermore, in line with the criteria for a security crisis, it was the highest peak of conflict, which comprised the use of armed violence.

Conclusion

From the genesis of events and overall analysis of the possible causes for the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, we will try to draw an ex post assessment of what happened

or what was happening in Macedonia in 2001.

First, the analysis of possible causes for the conflict in the RM reveals a number of paradoxes. While several facts point to soured inter-ethnic relations as the cause of conflict, this was not the case. Before the onset of the conflict, public opinion polls were showing a high degree of content among ethnic Albanians in terms of inter-ethnic relations. While ethnic Macedonians held different feelings toward inter-ethnic relations, they did not generally consider inter-ethnic relations the biggest problems facing the country. Macedonians found themselves preoccupied with problems such as poverty, unemployment, poor economy, corruption, crime and so on. (Mitrevska 2009, 102).

For example, the transition shock, experienced by the Macedonian economy, was extremely impactful and resulted in a rapid decrease of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). The GDP decreasing tendency was especially evident in the first four years of the transition (1990-1993), continuing its slide until 1995. Since 1996 onwards the Macedonian economy has been accomplishing positive GDP growth rates, which, however, have been relatively low and unstable. If 1989 (1989=100) is taken as the basis, the percentage level of the real BDP of Macedonia in 2002 equals 77 (EBRD 2002, 58). Macedonia, much as it is for many counties in transition, has yet to achieve the pre-transition GDP levels.

The economic concerns held by Macedonians were completely justified. If the percentage of the unemployment and the high inflation rate are compounded with the slow GDP growth, it is evident that the Macedonian economy remained troublesome as a whole up to 2001.

The following further shows the economic hardship in the RM:

- Macedonia is still a country with high unemployment rate. It is more than clear that economy, with the unemployment rate higher than 30%, will be faced with enormous economic, social and governmental pressures, tending to lead to socio-political tensions.
- In addition to high unemployment and a declining GDP, from 1990 to 1994 the Macedonian economy was strapped with a three digit inflation rate. Credited to a successfully implemented disinflation policy in the period from 1993 to 1995, as of 1996 the Macedonian economy began to see single digit inflation rates.

Additional reasons for the poor economic performances of the Macedonian economy can be seen in the following:

- The strong effect of non-economic factors (embargos and the Kosovo crisis)
- The large social expenditures that the country bore due to its disinflation policy in the period from 1993 to 1995
- The quality of the conducted governmental reforms. (Fiti 2004, 72-73) Moreover, the risks and threats that the country faced were not linear, but the result of a number of interdependent and dynamic structural factors, such as:
 - Historical background
 - Presence of armed conflict at home and abroad
 - Political stability and capacity for effective ruling (put into question);

- The level of militarization (large quantities of weapons found in the village of Radolishte);
- Heterogeneity of the population, demographic stress (Kosovo refugee crisis); index of human development, etc.

All these factors influenced the Republic of Macedonia's exposure to risk and later contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Thus, one can justifiably conclude that the reasons for the conflict in 2001 were in many ways interconnected and emerged from the structural aspects within Macedonian society; the enhancement of risks which continually emerged from regional security dynamics and, specifically, the resolution of the Kosovo crisis; and the presence of instigators who sought to escalate the conflict.

In the context of the numerous analyses of causes of the conflict, it is completely justifiable to ask the whether the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 faced a real crisis which, was imposed on it with the basis goal of disintegration of the stat, or the conflict started in an effort to gain human rights.

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SECURITY CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES IN THE BALKANS

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Abstract: *European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, as key threats facing the European Union identifies terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime.*

Maintaining the security situation poses challenges to combat these threats. Due to security and defense promote the values of the European Union (freedom, democracy, respect of human rights and basic freedom and the rule of law), there is a need to develop a strong international society with international institutions and well-functioning international order based on mutually accepted rules. The global nature of the threats facing the European Union and therefore the Balkans reflects the global nature of interests.

Strong international society, necessitated as a result of permanent and unstoppable process of globalization by promoting and implementation of European values becomes an illusion at the door of the European Union. Promoting European values should contribute to the equitable division of benefits, rights and obligations in order to bring up a new world order in the globalized world. The benefit of globalization is the privilege of the rich and developed countries which are ready for global action that is not the case with developing countries that are on the margins of this process and can be included only for highlighted interest. Illusionary world of the poor Balkan countries has encouraged his achievement despite clear indications that globalization is based on unequal grounds, in which rich countries still have the lead with United States as a leader.

Keywords: *actors, entities, processes, geopolitical position, interests.*

Introduction

The paradigm of present time is contained in the security challenges, threats, problems, processes and institutions. At the beginning of this century compared to the previous period, security has acquired different sizes and features. The result of the global processes are significantly modified objective factors which determine the security in some countries, what constitutes reality and security of the international community and thus in the Balkans. Visibly altered security, military and political, geostrategic, economic, environmental and other factors give serious impetus for the need of a different understanding of security which includes founding the complex phenomena that were

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not typical of the past. Contemporary social and security flows raised wider dimensions in understanding security. The nature and dimensions of modern threats and challenges besides war require a much wider range of measures and engaging in many social, national and international entities for the inevitable inclusion of social and cultural civilization dimension. process of globalization in general represented in contemporary light through internationalization of societies, countries and the international community put before new challenges and problems in securing and maintaining own and international security.

Where is the Balkans placed in the turbulent relations between different actors, desirable or inevitable imposed entities and processes?

The social currents in the Balkans, and thus the states under the influence of global processes inevitably before selecting orient direction to establish, and the ultimate necessity and impose certain rules on the established relationships. The recent developments in the Balkan countries imply grabs on the same fundamental or necessary, which could impose selection process to predetermined existence of societies under precisely defined conditions, whether they are created, desired or imposed. As an alternative to the preservation of diversity remains the question of dependence on sources of diversity. Unified diversity of Balkan countries opposed to the controversial process of globalization by protecting against erosion of the nation-state and the establishment of new mechanisms for maintaining national and social interests which countries protect their legality and legitimacy.

What is conditioned by geopolitical position of the Balkan states? Are there granted efforts in the context of a more secure future?

The Balkans has always been a very important geo-strategic zone, which is characterized by a prominent diversity of geopolitical orientation. The geopolitics led to the fragmentation of this important part of Europe. The position of states was determined by two opposing blocks. Therefore the geopolitical structure led to this region during the period of Cold War conditions of formula 2 + 2 + 2³, Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952, Romania and Bulgaria were part of the Warsaw Pact, while Yugoslavia and Albania at that time remained outside the two blocks.

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, new states were created which sought to secure their future by their integration in the Euro Atlantic structures. Almost all Balkan countries have expressed their interest to join the EU and NATO which turned the "principle of their foreign and security policies".⁴ These priorities of the countries in transition coincide with the goals of these organizations in order to expand their protection zones, or "to increase the security and stability of the Euro

³ Lisen Bashkurti. *International law and international organizations*, Tirana 2006, p. 168.

⁴ NATO looks East, edited by Robert J. Jackson and Piotr Dutkiewicz, London: 1998. p.13. И Македонија како стратешки приоритет во нејзината надворешна политика се определи за интегрирање во НАТО и ЕУ. Годишна национална програма за подготовки за членство на РМ во НАТО 2006-2007, http://www.vlada.mk/files/doc/programa_clenstvo_NATO.pdf.

Atlantic area”.⁵ This determination of the Balkan countries in that period was desirable and appreciated because of the perception that the alliance can no longer function in the same way as in the previous bipolar world and now in the 21st century. Therefore it announced broad changes to internal restructuring in favor of greater functionality and large external reforms to promote the principle “doors open” to emerging democracies.⁶ In that way “by opening the door to new NATO members, the Clinton administration realizes the vision of President Harry Truman for mutual sharing of democratic heritage and defense of common values”.⁷ In the context of alliance commitments “open door” expansion with new members from the Balkans intensively began after the announcement of the former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States Brzezinski in the meeting of NATO forum in Sofia in 2001, naming the candidates in B-10 as the “de facto member of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, will be invited next 2002, while the other three members of the B-10, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia invitation to await the next Summit expansion”.⁸ The next summit of NATO enlargement took place in Bucharest, but the Republic of Macedonia failed to be a member of a large family of NATO Alliance. Reason the opposition of Greece expressed disagreement over the constitutional name of Macedonia which is predetermined by a geostrategic position.

The experiences from the end of 90s after the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO, which caused huge damage to all surrounding states, compelled the European Union, then led by the Federal Republic of Germany, to push for a comprehensive political and economic recovery for the whole region of Southeastern Europe and its transformation into a prosperous place to live. This initiative is called the “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and was launched at an international conference in Cologne on June 10, 1999”.⁹ That founding pact is of particular importance for the countries of Southeast Europe and shows solidarity with countries in the region who support NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia, and the citizens of Serbia to encourage political change has undoubtedly confirmed participation in the founding summit Sarajevo on July 30, 1999, representatives of the Balkan countries, the Balkan states of the European Union, G8, OSCE, Council of Europe, UN, NATO, IMF, World Bank, European Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other. Covenant was to be a “turning point” after a decade of reactive crisis management, “in too many failures, too many shattered hopes and lives, too unresolved tensions”.¹⁰

⁵ Study on NATO Enlargement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Глава I, точка 2.

⁶ Н.Ружин, *НАТО пред новите предизвици и перспективите на Република Македонија*, „Фридрих Еберт“, Скопје 2005, стр.7.

⁷ Ronald D. Asmus “Opening NATO’s Door” New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 294.

⁸ Н.Ружин, *НАТО пред новите предизвици и перспективите на Република Македонија*, „Фридрих Еберт“, Скопје 2005, стр.10.

⁹ Текстот е превземен од С. Пенев, соработник на Проектот за евро-атлантски интеграции на МО на РМ, *Пактот за стабилност на Југоисточна Европа - меѓу желбите и реалноста*, стр.175.

¹⁰ Democracy, Security and The Future Of The Stability Pact For South Eastern Europe, A Framework for Debate by the EastWest Institute in partnership with the European Stability Initiative, Berlin, April 4, 2001.

European Union in 1997 has set a regional approach as the basic framework for relations with the countries of the Western Balkans on the principle of conditionality, which means that the progress of each country in its relations with the European Union depends on the fulfillment of the conditions, and each country's progress towards the European Union and will be priced according to their individual achievements. The efforts of the Republic of Macedonia for a more peaceful and stable Balkans are reflected in the promotion of European integration relationships across organizations and initiatives as instruments of the European Union serve to soften the frustrations of the past. The creation of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, in May 1999, established the basic framework of relations between the European Union and the Western Balkans - the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Macedonia continues, given its positive contribution to regional cooperation, expressing its interest in full membership in the European Union. From the Western Balkan countries (Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina) Macedonia is the first country to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union (on April 9, 2001 and ratified by all member states of EU and it came into force on April 1, 2004). Macedonia is the first country to sign a free trade agreement with all the countries of Southeast Europe.¹¹

Balkan reality of internationalization of states adopted a Complexity in their mutual relations and opened up a new dimension of threat to security. The new dimension is reflected in consistency and heavier ability to separate the security threats on internal and external. Intra state problems quickly received international dimensions and vice versa.¹² Internal problems and endangering the safety of a country become reflex interstate problems and endangering the safety of a neighboring state or region or the Balkans. The unforgettable "Balkan syndrome" does not allow a clear identification of the non-traditional security risks and threats and overflow them as security facilities across the borders of neighboring countries. This again reflects the geostrategic position, the similarity in culture and customs, and the ability of understanding the contemporary not mixing the traditional.

"Balkan syndrome" or "European disposition"?

Living in the turbulent Balkans in the process of globalization, and the internationalization of the candidate states still pulling the burden of the past often meeting old safety problems. The burdens of the past that can never ever be left brings threats of new risks and threats to the security of the Balkan countries before putting new and perhaps insufficiently clear challenges. The imaginary notion of security, first national, and then international hinders real environment in terms of understanding the new forms of security threat. Modern society complexity recognizing the emergence of threats and risks, greater attention to the social, cultural and civilization dimension which changed the understanding of the term

¹¹ Влада на РМ, Секретаријат за Европски прашања, *И Сонцетото е сvezда Македонија во ЕУ*, трето дополнето издание, Скопје, септември 2006, стр.24-26.

¹² Baylis, John. "International and Global security in the post-cold war era", New York: Oxford University Press. 2001. Превземено од Т. Милошевска, *Нееднаквоста во ерата на глобализацијата*, Филозофски факултет, Институт за одбранбени и мировни студии, Скопје, стр.2.

security. What is a typical today's neglect of the study of the root causes of problems that are occurring? Perception of problems must transform and adapt to new interpretations that will give us answers. Different phenomena ("instruments"), such as terrorism, nationalism, religious radicalism and others, can also be used by some states to exercise and enforce their political goals and interests to poor countries. The new era brought transition symmetry in asymmetry, multilateral conventional wars in hostilities with lower intensity of global and regional wars to local and internal conflicts but new traumatic military methods that have meant the destruction of psychological health. Radical religious and ethnic groups through a form of terrorism VA countries whose economic and military power has weakened, particularly for long-term occurrence and economic crisis may lead to the paralysis of society and achieve their goals, even through them and targets to be met in some third countries. The conditions in which terrorism brings into question the hegemonic relations globalized world, when people are more dissatisfied raise their voice against injustice and long situation unchanged, an observation that violence becomes a unique style of expression and communication.

Globalized process perceived as spreading, deepening and acceleration of global interdependence in all aspects of contemporary social life should contribute to a safer and more secure future for the Balkan countries. This should contribute to the efforts and the Balkan countries to join NATO and the European Union. But is it so?

Whose interests are intertwined in the Balkans?

New York expert on Balkan politics and security Gordon N. Bardos, has the following view: Balkans passes through unstable transition from a well-defined security zone in one for now ambiguous story, where the swells "new" important players, former "stars" losing their interest and influence lose their shine. The period from the signing of the Dayton Accord, 1995 to 2008, when Kosovo declared independence is defined as the "Pax Americana", because all the important actors in the European Union adopted the "Washington as guardian of Balkan security". Kosovo's independence has split the European Union. Five of its members refuse to recognize the existence of a new state in the Balkans. With the disintegration of the international consensus around Washington Balkans rapidly losing influence in the Balkans, U.S. diplomacy, economic or military means more loss of value. Losing interest in promoting positive values in the Balkans, in South East Europe Americans receive the epithet of someone that more creates problems than solutions. The loss of American leadership in the Balkans coincided with the crisis in the euro zone that resulted in weakening the forces that Brussels had more opportunity for the region to provide a clear path for future integration or to give encouragement for major structural reforms in politics so and economy. The field ran in fear that the admission of Croatia to the European Union in 2013 any further expansion will be terminated.

Like it or not the withdrawal from the Balkan scene of Americans and Europeans created vacuum that other "actors" rushed to fill it out. Over the past few years the influence of Russia, Turkey and even Israel is growing. Although several rounds of free elections give the local politicians and institutions immeasurably more legitimacy, which means defiance to international arbitrators and their dictation.

Vacuum that was created by Western nations fill primarily by Turkey and Russia. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan decided to intensify the presence “to regain” former parts of the Ottoman Empire, to the detriment of ambitions for EU membership (If they ever had ambitions realistic basis given that Turkey is a country with questionable human rights that persecute their minorities Christians or Kurds, and still holds under occupation part of Cyprus). Turkey encourages Muslims religion considered as a legacy of the former empire. That being said Erdoan after winning the elections in 2011: “Sarajevo today is a winner just like Istanbul!” Even found that Alija Izetbegovic in a hospital bed as he left Bosnia in “legacy”.¹³ In light of these interests is the constant support, also the recent announcement by the Turkish Prime Minister that “Turkey will not allow to change the name of Republic of Macedonia”.

“Meanwhile Russian influence in the Balkans has strengthened to. Besides financial assistance which gave Cyprus, Greece or offer to use the port of Piraeus, Russia became a major financier in Bosnia and Serbia. The cornerstone of Russian influence in the Balkans will be the South Stream pipeline, which will expand in more countries in Southeast Europe.

But one of the most interesting changes though is the active role of Israel. Military cooperation with Greece is enhanced as well as the cooperation of both countries in the investigation finds of gas in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel also began to develop a close relationship with the Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is expected in the near future Israel to awaken their ties with Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia.

Besides all this, the situation greatly complicates the security structure of the Balkans and the rise of Wahhabi movement. Washington and Brussels stubbornly refuse to recognize the seriousness of these problems. U.S. turned to the Middle East and the challenges along the Pacific, European Union struggles with his existential crisis. If the situation remains so, Balkan problems will remain and will be much harder to resolve them than in the period from 1995 to 2008.”¹⁴

The efforts of the Balkan countries and the Republic of Macedonia valuable for membership in NATO and the EU remain unchanged. Temptations posed transition in global society are increasingly announcing security problems. The social dimension of the threat to safety is reflected in more unpredictable when trying to disclosure and knowledge of security risks and threats. Inevitable globalization brings a wide range of new, unrecognizable stated objectives in the interest of achieving the primary target. Under the guise of democracy, social justice and equality, religious right, religious and national affiliation, the rights to choose, etc., are given the intense level of relations between the Balkan countries. At what level and how long you keep tense degree does not depend on the actors themselves and aspiring to join the global community whether the issue is equality of states in the era of globalization marked by specificity of establishing relations with the “big family”?

This changed picture, often described as a new security environment in which threats or risks and uncertainties arising from more than military security sphere. The new secu-

¹³ Достапно на [www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/SAD i EU prepustile Balkan Turskoj i Rusiji](http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/SAD_i_EU_prepustile_Balkan_Turskoj_i_Rusiji), 02.10.2012, превземено 31.05.2013.

¹⁴ Исто.

rity environment describes as much more dynamic and uncertain filled with dangers that traditional security systems can not offer a comprehensive response.¹⁵ New social life still requires creating new mechanisms for maintaining the fragile security situation. The growing diversity of threats increases their effectiveness as a product of the increase in scientific knowledge, the dissemination of advanced technology and greater communication power. Inevitable economic dimension of developing countries establish new interactions among them, but also complements the list of issues that are underlying security threats. In modern society there are more profound connections and interdependence of economic, political, social, environmental, military defense and other areas. These trends are also characteristic of the relation of global society; it is the globalization is the political future of the world.¹⁶

All these aspects have important safety implications. Their expression is especially distinctive for the Balkan states. Classical sources of threat largely enriched with new and more dangerous threats and economic crises, ethnic conflicts, massive migration, international terrorism, international organized crime, global pollution and environmental destruction.¹⁷ Coupled into a specific form of separatism, national, religious and other forms of extremism, drug trafficking and organized crime, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, more and more complicate the security situation. The dispersion of threats is enhanced through the formation of ethnic parties and political movements to achieve their political ambitions in the power struggle refer to "protect" the rights of the ethnic group that leads exclusively to nationalism. Paved political commitments in their implementation leads to the denial of other civilized cultures and religious commitments are giving it exclusivity or appropriation of foreign law, and identity to achieve their interests. This undoubtedly leads to extremism, and for reasons of national diversity and the reference to "protect" the religious existence appears extreme religious radicalism that can easily evolve into violence in the country, with high probability to be shed outside its borders. The attainment of such non-state actors, who are certainly factors in the security situation, it is often directed towards the institutional framework. Trying to meet institutional interests are "attacked" bureaucratized governments or retention in an effort to expand its interest are vulnerable to corruption. Corruption requires the provision of new capital needed to finance the activities undertaken can safely say, automatically leads to organized crime, illicit trade and smuggling, proliferation of weapons etc. This list of security threats is further extended and puts Balkan countries in front of new challenges.

But the list of the threats does not end up here. Fear caused by someone's claim, whether justified or meaningful forces and so poor and indebted Balkan countries to participate in a race without end. When purchasing weapons in a high amount of money one gains

¹⁵ Л. Георгиева, *Менаџирање на ризици*, Скопје, Филозофски факултет, 2006. Превземено од Т. Милошевска, *Нееднаквоста во ерата на глобализацијата*, Филозофски факултет, Институт за одбранбени и мировни студии, Скопје, стр.3.

¹⁶ Види пошироко: М. Котовчевски, *Национална безбедност на Република Македонија I прв дел*, Скопје, Македонска цивилизација, 2000.

¹⁷ Т. Милошевска, *Нееднаквоста во ерата на глобализацијата*, Филозофски факултет, Институт за одбранбени и мировни студии, Скопје, стр.5.

military and political leanings from the country that sells. Bidding for economic dimension is a natural blend the long run binds both parties. This establishes a framework for greater cooperation and trust between countries.¹⁸ To illustrate the height of the financial crisis in Greece spent billions of dollars on fighter jets from France, according to some analysts, to buy the affections of France's support for open security issues, including the contest for the name with Macedonia.

It is obvious that the Balkans in the literal sense of the word crossroads challenging problems, open and unresolved issues. Oriented towards the West increasingly loses immunity to the east. If globalization really "promote openness encourages economic and political reforms, strengthens the application of the rule of law and foster the integration based on norms¹⁹, then real safe condition should look far different from what it is.

Conclusion

It is evident and clear that the positive effects of globalization society hardly reaches the Balkans if we take as parameters the spread of democracy and open market economies. Likely to create dangerous and unpredictable Balkans is growing, especially taking into account the expressed interests of the West and East, whose collision point is determined precisely by geostrategic position of the Balkans. The challenges of finding appropriate responses to the safety issues in the Balkan turbulence may need to be looking at the Spinoza's saying "The biggest task of man is to know and understand the objective world and its laws". Or seek answers to the thought of Marcel Proust: "The real discoveries are not finding new landscapes, but discovered to see otherwise."

It is our choice.

¹⁸ Nova Makedonia, Na Balkanot ima dovolno oruzje za nova svetska vojna, 17.05.2013.

¹⁹ Frost, E, F. „Globalisation and National Security: *A Strategic Agenda*, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 1997.

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SOCIAL SUPPORT TO THE WOMEN'S CAREER DEVELOPMENT IN THE SERBIAN ARMY

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Abstract: *The research presented in this paper has the aim to respond to three main questions: (1) What are the liable aspects, according to the opinion of the Serbian Army officers, for the lower percentage (in comparison to men) of women being present on the higher positions of hierarchy?; (2) What importance do officers attach to the social support to the women in the system for the development of their career and (3) How much are officers ready to provide social support to the women in the system. The research has been carried out on the sample of 69 officers being prepared for managing positions and commanding duties in the Serbian Army. The results show that the officers are in high percentage aware of the significance of the support they can provide for the women in their career advancement and that they are generally ready to give that support in terms of giving information and advice. Half of the examined (53.6%) does not know a woman in the managing positions who successfully complements her professional and family roles and 29% of them think that woman's career advancement is threatening for her partner's status. The examined of the higher rank (Lieutenant colonels), based on their attitude, express less resistance in accepting women managers compared to the examined ranks of Majors and Captains. The answers to the question related to the smaller number of women in the managing positions are categorized in this paper so that four aspects are obtained: profile (character traits of the women), conative (motivation to advance in career), social (social and cultural heritage) and family aspect (complementing work and family). It has been indicated that there is a requirement and possibility for further research and carrying out various activities in relation to efficient integration of women in the army system.*

Key words: *social support, woman officer, career, managing position*

Introduction

Armies with longer tradition of professional engagement of women contribute by their collection of versatile and useful research in finding scientific answers with practical implication on dilemmas and questions that are specifically defined in relation to the phase of integration of women into the military system.

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Early research on women in armed forces during 1970's focused on economic consequences, both for women and military system, attitudes on military organization (inside the system and out) and on combat effectiveness (Binkin&Bach, 1977). As practice brought new dilemmas, questions and problems the field of research broadened in time. The researchers focused on military specialties from ergonomics aspect (Holm, 1992),³ frequency of absenteeism in the workplace and finding mechanisms that would facilitate the family role and work obligations as well as ensure adequate replacement for women on maternity leave (Kelly&Hock, 2001, Allen, 2001, Tucker& Kelley, 2009),⁴ women health in the army and specific treatment of women which have returned from missions (Lindstrom, Smith, Wells and others 2006, Carlton, Manos, VanSlyke and others 2005, Warner, Matuszak, Rachal and others 2007), sexual harassment (Culbertson&Rosenfeld, 1994), career development and the possibilities for reaching managing positions in the army (Stone, 2008). Subjects of available research, from the armies with longer tradition of having women officers, are helpful in prediction of questions that could be opened in our own armed forces with further development of the process of integration of women in the system, such as larger number of marriages between male and female officers inside the system (this opens new questions, such as requests for serving in the same garrison, specifics of divorce consequences) or for example education and training for woman returning from maternity leave. The reforms directed toward achieving gender equality in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) are in progress. The readiness of members of MoD and SAF to reform the system in order to make integration of women in the army ranks more efficient was operationalized through different activities arising from UN Security Council Resolution 1325 – Women, Peace and Security, that was adopted on 23rd October 2000.

Representation of women on leadership positions in MoD and SAF

There is an increase in the percentage of women in the system of defense since 2009, still a small number of women are occupying managing and command positions. Out of total number of women employed in MoD and SAF only 1.37% is holding managing and command positions (Table 1).

Table 1. Percentage of women and men in relation to the position which they have in MoD and SAF

Level of management/command	Sex	
	% Women	% Men
Management positions	1.37%	17.79%
Without management/command duties	17.74%	63.12%
In total	19.097%	80.891%

(category: highest, higher, medium and lower levels of command are combined in one category "Management positions")⁵

³ Topic considered due to need for wider approach to analysis of certain work places in the military with respect to gender psycho-physiological differences.

⁴ 4-5% of women in the military are on maternity leave at each point in time.

⁵ Source: Personal Department of the Ministry of Defense, January 2013.

On the basis of available data it can be said that every 14th woman employed in MoD and SAF is holding managing position, on the other hand these positions are being held by every 4th or 5th (4.5) man. Therefore, it is three times more likely to find a man on a leadership position than a woman in the system of defense. This data can be understood in the light of the fact that women are not employed in the system of defense for adequate amount of time to have an opportunity for career advancement, as well as the fact that only recently they are able to perform operational duties (Petrovic, Stojanovic, Odanovic, Bjelos 2010). As Saranovic and Kilibarda (2011) conclude that under the provisions of the law regulating appointment of military personnel on formation positions in SAF in the first decade of 21st century there are no impediments for involvement of women in any military activity, providing they have appropriate professional degree and appropriate military occupational specialty. However, bearing in mind that women did not have compulsory military service they lacked training for specific military duties. The only exceptions are those women that served voluntarily in the Yugoslav People Army or finished the Faculty of People's Defense (today Faculty of Security Studies). On the other hand, almost half of all civilians in military service (in the period 2000-2010) were women, so the question of their advancement and taking managing positions stands.

These data are not specific for the Serbian system of defense. The statistics point to global and national trend that women occupy less managing positions than men. The phenomenon that qualified woman in the business hierarchy cannot advance to highest managing positions was in 1986 defined as "Glass ceiling". This term is sometimes used to describe not only gender discrimination but also discrimination based on age, race, ethnicity or sexual orientation (Smiljanic, 2004). By theory and model systematization (Weyer, 2007) we came to the conclusion that different opportunities for advancement and other gender sensitive forms of behaviour in an organisation can be explained by: differences based on genetic material (today less used biological theory), development processes associated with different life cycle phases, such as education or entry to the labour market (theory of socialisation) and social systems that channel and define gender differences through role, status and power discrepancies (structural-cultural model which include social learning theory and theory of planned behaviour).

In appropriate theoretical framework in the light of aforementioned research, this article will point out the importance of social support for woman in the context of her career development, as well as support through the prism of gender roles and the support of partner and work environment as factor that can assist in finding balance in work-family relation. We will also present the answers of officers of MoD and SAF to the questionnaire, out of which we can learn the reasons why women, by our own opinion, occupy less managing position in relation to men and out of which we can conclude on degree of their preparedness to recognise the importance and offer social support to women in defense system.

The importance of social support

The choice of a career that is not considered to be traditional female (those that historically have been chosen by a small number of women, such as military profession) is highly dependent from the support that a female receive from her own environment (Ariyamuni, Aminah, Zoharah, Roziah, 2012). Furthermore, when a woman begins her career, self-assessment in relation to professional success is different than the male perception of the factors that contributed to success in their profession. Men are more likely to see the factors of their success from the perspective of their own efforts, skills and knowledge, while women are more likely to attribute their success to the external factors and luck and to estimate their work through evaluation by her “Significant Others” (family, colleagues, and manager). Research has shown that most women (Gordon & Whelan-Berry, 2004; Nath, 2000) explain their professional success by the simultaneous action of organisational and family support, coupled with the desire to succeed. This knowledge helps us to understand why the support from the social environment and perception of that supports is one of the most important factors when it comes to occupational choice, self-assessment and fostering the achievement motive in women. In addition to this strong influence on career development as a valuable supplement, social support is also shown as a factor negatively correlated with symptoms of anxiety and depression in a sample of working mothers in the civilian sector (Polasky & Holahan, 1998). When it comes to women in uniform it has been shown (Tucker & Kelly, 2009) that this kind of support reduce “maternal guilt” that can occur in women as a result of feeling that she does not care enough for the children (due to the periodic absences: duty officer assignments, sailing, missions that does not leave room for spending more time with children) and sometimes because of the feeling that this care is inadequate (because of fatigue that occurs after many hours of hard work).

Social support refers to the perceived quality of relationships between people, its function and benefits brought by the social bond. It was asserted that social support affects the sense of acceptance, self-evaluation and on the reduction of stress by encouraging the person to the proper understanding of the situation and the activation of coping mechanisms (Fielden & Davidson, 1998). Of course, not all social supports are incentive in the same manner, so it's not just about the number of active social ties, but also about their quality. Well-developed social network is a structural predisposition for social integrity and emotional acceptance. Social support comes from mutual trust and intimacy incurred in relation which brings more gains than losses. The origins of this relationship, whose psychological gain is easily recognized (status, loyalty and approval) are explained by theory of social exchange and the concept of reciprocity. The general hypothesis of the theory of social exchange is that the built “give and take” relationship inside the organization will evolve through a form of reciprocity in a relation in which the balance of social exchange will be perceived in a manner that further contributes to building mutual thrust, long term commitment and identification with the organization. Since the employees value the principle of reciprocity, they are more likely to show higher level of dedication and have a strong wish to stay in the organization. The perception of given support, as researches has shown

(Jawahar, Hemmasi 2006), is negatively correlated with intention to quit a job. Awareness of the existence of support is also important to overcome certain barriers which person can encounter during his/her career.

Support through the prism of gender roles

Various factors can facilitate / hamper a woman's career; therefore not all issues in this respect should automatically be considered as gender sensitive issues. However, it should not be ignored that the woman's active role in various social activities including considering occupation of higher level positions at work is under the influence of stereotypes about gender and work roles as well as patriarchal family and working conditions. It could be presumed that this attitude is more pronounced with traditionally male jobs (as profession of military officer) than in those professions which throughout history employ workers regardless of gender. Changeable social position of women and men can be understood through the prescribed norms and expectations of the role of gender in a particular social community. Colleagues attitudes about career track of a woman and the role that she is supposed to have at work, can depend on the perception of her position at home and the possibility that by occupying senior management position she can endanger the status of her partner / husband in their relationship / marriage. (Ariyamuni, Aminah, Zoharah, & Roziah, 2012).

The positive attitude of the male members of the military about a woman in uniform is affected by their perception of woman's ability to adapt to military organisational culture without losing her femininity (Gruber, Kilcullen, Iso-Ahola, 2009). There is a noticeable tendency that negative experiences which are related to the women in the military are characterized through stories of women who become "too much" adapted, becoming masculine without adding femininity in the way they are doing their work.

Partner support and social environment support

- factors of balancing between work and family

Advancement of women in their career and the possibility of reaching the highest positions are directly linked to their ability to find a solution for the work-family conflict, willingness of their partners to take part in this endeavour⁶ as well as support from their work environment to persist in those efforts.

The results of other studies (Allen, 2001) show that employee who perceive his or hers organization as an environment that supports family care, is less likely to have work-family conflict, he/she shows greater job satisfaction, is more dedicated to the organization and is not prone in thinking about leaving a job. Organization of work environment that supports employees through a variety of benefits such as flexible working hours, organized child care or the ability to have leave of absence for personal reasons, creates benefits for employees and organization itself. However, it has been proven that benefits themselves

⁶ According to the Serbian Statistical Office (2011) in average men have more spare time then women (more than one hour per day), albeit spending more time on the paid work. On the other hand women spend two hours more on unpaid work.

have little effect because of the suspicion that using these essential benefits is not supported by the management staff and that they are provided only as a formality. Employees also think that their use of these advantages can lead to negative comments regarding the lack of commitment to the organization and that their commitment to family and private life could endanger their career. More important than these advantages is the perception of employees that they have support from the organization in the context of the entire organizational culture which in its policies and its value system is aimed at the welfare of its employees. Beside the fact that this concept of working environment helps coordination of multiple life roles and it generates bigger satisfaction with the employee and his or her dedication to their work. Survey results show that employees care more about support from their superiors than that from the organization. Gilbreath and Benson (2004) showed that support from the direct supervisor contributes to the general good condition of the employee. It was also found that the benefits which are obtained from providing flexible working hours are greater than providing child care during working hours. Flexible working hours gives the employee more control over his/her work dynamic, makes it easy to harmonise his/her working time with activities that are not work-related, thus achieving a balance between these types of activities.

Method

Starting point and research questions

Possibilities of scientific and practical consideration issues of integration of women into the military system are almost limitless and all aspects (family, training, career, women in combat, health and sexual harassment) are equally important, current and insufficiently researched. The visibility of the complexity and sensitivity of a coherent mechanism which should be implemented in order to improve the integration of women into the system is evident. One of the necessary preconditions for putting it in full operation is the implementation of empirical research (recording of cognitive, emotional and conative set of the members of MoD and SAF) whose results would contribute to marking the fields in which it is necessary to direct all activities. The justification for this approach is found in the latest recommendations⁷ in which, for the conduct of education for collective and individual training related to gender issues, it's emphasised the necessity of previous research and analysis of system parts needs and their members, to focus objectives on the specifics of particular organisational units in order to modify more efficiently the organisational culture. As a contribution to responding to these requests, research was conducted whose subject was the willingness of MoD and SAF members to provide social support to women in the system of defense. Three research questions were asked:

- What are the liable aspects, according to the opinion of the Serbian Army officers, for the lower percentage (in comparison to men) of women being

⁷ Recommendation from the conference held on 25-28 March 2013. in Bulgaria: Workshop on "Human Resources Diversity and Usability: Challenges and Best Practices" (part of the project "Female Leaders in Security and Defense", in NATO's Initiative for SMART Defense).

- present on the higher positions of hierarchy?
- What importance do officers attach to the social support to the women in the system for the development of their career?
- How much are officers ready to provide social support to the women in the system?

Research on social support for women in the system of defense is part of the project of Strategic Research Institute, financed by MoD. The project "Gender aspect in the military profession" is designed for the survey results, conducted as a part of this project, to assist in designing training programs for employees towards the achievement of gender equality, providing material for a better understanding of the nature of the origin of gender stereotypes and finding solutions to redefine the working conditions which will be equal for all. Another goal is to obtain new knowledge about the working conditions and employment opportunities, advancement and retention of women in traditionally male professions and addition to the fund of scientific knowledge, which is helpful to the more efficient integration of women in the military system.

Research instruments

The first part of the survey consists of eight items which test respondents willingness to provide social support to women in the system of defense (through assistance in the form of mentoring and counseling, for example: *I am ready to provide assistance in the form of information and advice to my female colleague if that would be of help for her career advancement*, by increasing the sensitivity and understanding of issues relating to work-family relation, for example: *I think it is harder for women than men to reconcile their career advancement and family responsibilities*, and through the lack of resistance for a woman to hold managing position, for example: *I do not have a problem to follow orders at my workplace given by woman manager*). Level of agreement with these items respondents expressed on a five-point scale. Inter-item correlation of 0.82 indicates that all items correlate positively, so there is no need for changing scale. In the second part of the survey, which consists of open and closed questions, we are getting answers that provide a broad framework for understanding attitudes of officers on women in the army with a focus on attitudes about the possibility of advancement of women in the military career⁸.

Respondent's answers were analysed by descriptive statistics, Student's t-test in SPSS Statistics 20 program and qualitative analysis of the opened answers.

The study sample

The survey was completed by 69 SAF officers who were attended the National Defence College (at the time of survey).⁹ Out of that number, 21 officers had the rank

⁸ There is a large contribution to the final version of the survey by the colleagues from the Strategic Research Institute. They had been consulted in relation with clarity, unambiguity and discriminatory value of items and questions of the survey.

⁹ Survey was conducted in February 2013. and there was no refusal to participate in the research.

of lieutenant colonel, with an average of 23 years in the service, they all are married and are currently in training aimed at developing leadership skills in strategic thinking and effective command and management across a wide spectrum of national and international security challenges. The second sub-sample (48 respondents) were officers of the rank of captain and major, they have an average of 14 years in service and they are trained to command tactical units of the battalion level, performing staff duties at brigade level commands and other functions in the higher commands of SAF and organisational units of MoD.

Research results

On the open question: *“What is the reason, by your opinion, for the lower percentage (in comparison to men) of women being present on the higher positions of hierarchy”*, respondents state the reasons which, for interpretation, we can conditionally divide into four categories: profile, cognitive, social and family aspect (Table 2).

Table 2. Reasons for smaller percentage of women in higher hierarchical positions.

<p><u>profile aspect</u></p> <p>Emotional in critical situation</p> <p>Insufficiently resolute and firm in particular stress situation</p> <p>Gentle and more sensitive</p> <p>Weaker organisers</p> <p>Less capable, not in their nature to command</p> <p>Lack of strength to cope with the pressure and strain</p>	<p><u>conative aspect</u></p> <p>Lack of will and desire with large number of women</p> <p>Lack of ambition in women</p> <p>Personal attitude of women towards advancement, they believe that they should not advance</p> <p>Disinterest</p>
<p><u>family aspect</u></p> <p>Difficult harmonisation of work and family</p> <p>Motherhood and family commitment</p> <p>Family problems</p> <p>Additional family obligations</p> <p>Absence from work, sick leave, parental leave</p>	<p><u>social aspect</u></p> <p>Traditionalism</p> <p>Prejudices</p> <p>Lack of tolerance</p> <p>Patriarchal legacy</p> <p>Perceptions of male-female relations in which woman is subdued</p> <p>Lack of colleagues support</p> <p>Underdeveloped awareness on gender equality</p> <p>Consequence of tradition of mainly educating the male children</p>

In the profile aspect category we classified those answers that direct the responsibility for lack of women in managing position on attributes of personality defined as typically female (emotionality, indecision, tenderness and sensitivity). There are numerous answers, classified as cognitive aspect, that direct to perceived lack of motivation in women to take leadership positions. In the next category the selected answers point to respondent's sensitivity for the topic of harmonising family and work related obligations and the awareness of

multidimensionality of the roles of women. In the fourth category included responses reflect the respondent's perception of the influence of wider social context, namely traditionalism, prejudice and lack of tolerance as modeling aspects of understanding male-female relations and positions.

When respondents of the rank of lieutenant colonel are considered, no separation and domination tendency of one of the aforementioned category was observed, rather equal distribution of answers in all four categories. Analysing the answers of officers of the rank of captain and major we can identify higher frequency of answers relating to the family-work relation problems (8 participants gave the answers in the group named "difficult harmonization of work and family" and 6 of them gave the answers named "additional family obligation"). Higher sensitivity for this problem can be explained by life phase in which most of the junior officers (captains and majors) are, which implies the life in marital union with children up to 10 years old. Also, amongst junior officers the percentage of answers relating to character and personality traits of women are higher in regard to the frequency of the same answers among the higher rank officers (among the answers named "less capable, not in their nature of command" there are 9 answers of junior officers and only one of higher ranked officer). Stereotypes in the answers are more pronounced and the attitudes more harsh with the captains and majors then with lieutenant colonels ("gentle and more sensitive" and "weaker organizers" are answers of captain and majors but not found among answers of lieutenant colonels; in the answers named "patriarchal legacy" there are 8 answers of junior officers and 3 of higher ranked officer). It could be assumed that junior officers engaged in operational assignments had more opportunity to come in contact with women in SAF, and if their answers are based on their experiences with women in uniform, then all the more necessary it is to underline and work on them. On the basis of the research from 2003 (Boyce and Herd) it was concluded that the existence of previous experiences with women commanders did not beneficially affect existing prejudices. Even those cadets that had experiences with more than one woman commander, as well as those that had none, state the same stereotypical male oriented characteristics for successful officer on managing positions. The possibilities for action are not one-dimensional. On the contrary, beside required lectures, workshops and all other forms of education in order to raise awareness to the problem of women integration into system of defense, it is necessary to take all measures so that gender behavior of women can be representative and appropriate in relations to the task that has been trusted upon them (strict selection, adequate motivation, career tracking, sensibility of the system for the problems that occur and readiness to find adequate solution).

It is essential to take measures for securing gender free perception of potential and work effectiveness of subordinates, because only with this kind of understanding will an officer on managing position be able to treat his/her subordinates equally and that they will be subject to the same criteria for selection and promotion, regardless of their gender.

In the search for adequate interpretation of answers of the respondents that perceive insufficient motivation by women, we find the data from the Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia (2011), that in 2009 there were equal number of women and men PhD's and that

a larger percentage of women entered (55%) and finished schools or faculties (61%) than men. These facts can be interpreted in a way that women have sufficient motivation to advance and invest in their knowledge, however it is obvious that after the end of formal education the motivation of women is being affected by factors that lack strong intervening character as men have. These “modifying variables” are: assigned social role, internalisation of gender stereotypical views about the lack of women capacity for leadership position (Eagly Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001), messages that women receive from their primary family that frequently write a script in which is not expected for woman to be particularly successful in work, rather to be successful wife and mother, and the creation of a family where the role of motherhood is unquestionable. One of the more powerful ways to “upgrade” the role, write success into the script and to reduce the sense of guilt on the family-work relation is the social support from family and work environment.

In the research done for the purpose of this study we examined the readiness of officers that will hold the highest positions from which they will be able to provide social support for women (assistance in the form of mentoring, informing and counseling on career development, assistance in the form of care, empathy and understanding for the difficulties in harmonising home and work obligations, and in the form of lack of resistance towards the idea of a woman holding managing position). We conclude that the respondents are aware of the importance of the support they can provide for a woman to advance in her career. 30.4% is of the opinion that the support is of great significance, while 60.9% is thinking that support is important but not decisive factor. By further analysing the available data we get the profile of an officer that is ready to assist (95.7%) by giving information and counsel to a colleague if it would be of help in her career development. Officers, regardless of rank, are equally ready to give this kind of social support (from captain to lieutenant colonel). However, when items of accepting a woman on managing position are concerned, there is a significant difference in arithmetic means of answers of this two subsamples of respondents (Table 3). While officers of higher rank (older respondents) almost completely (80.95%) agree that a woman colleague with adequate knowledge, capabilities and skills can have a hierarchically higher position and that they do not mind taking orders from a woman commander/manager (66.67% + 23.81%) at the same time. With respondents of the rank of captain and major this readiness is much less pronounced.

Table 3. Statistically significant difference among senior officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and junior officers of the rank of captain and major (Group Statistics and Independent Samples Test)

sample N			Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
item number 5 “woman colleague can get a position that is hierarchically above.”	higher rank	21	4.71	.717	.156
	lower rank	48	3.96	1.110	.160
item number 6 “I do not mind... following orders from a woman commanding officer”	higher rank	21	4.48	.981	.214
	lower rank	48	3.85	1.072	.155

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
item num 5	Equal variances assumed	2.72	.104	2.86	67	.006	.756	.264	.229	1.283
	not assumed			3.37	57.1	.001	.756	.224	.307	1.204
item num 6	Equal variances assumed	.29	.594	2.27	67	.026	.622	.274	.076	1.168
	not assumed			2.35	41.53	.023	.622	.264	.089	1.155

On the whole sample, the readiness of respondents to justify the usefulness of legislation that provides the possibility of paternity leave is predominant. With this question 42% of respondents completely agree and 21.7% agree, which makes 2/3 of all respondents (63.7%) (Table 4).

Table 4. Readiness of the respondent to take parental leave instead of his wife

Readiness of the respondent to take parental leave instead of his wife					
		Freq.	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumul. Percent
SAF Officers	strongly disagree	11	15.9	15.9	15.9
	disagree	8	11.6	11.6	27.5
	undecided	6	8.7	8.7	36.2
	agree	15	21.7	21.7	58.0
	completely agree	29	42.0	42.0	100.0
	In total	69	100.0	100.0	

Those respondents that doesn't agree with the statement that it is beneficial to have paternity leave, at the same time express less readiness to perform certain tasks instead of their women colleagues (Pearson Correlation 0.54, Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01), as well as less readiness to take parental leave instead of their wife (Pearson Correlation 0.69, Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006). Out of total 69 respondents, 29 completely agreed to take parental leave instead of their wife. Generally there are problems with doing the work of those that took parental leave. The solution to divide the obligations of absentee amongst present employees, instead of hiring part-time employee, is easier for the employer, but not at all best. That is the main reason why employees (men and women) are not at all looking forward to their colleague's parental leave, since it means more work without compensation. It is only natural that there are more of them among younger people since they usually have to perform the duties of the absentees. This is way there exist seemingly peculiar "generosity" and "modernity" among older respondents in contrast to the younger.

Secondly, those who oppose paternity leave by also showing unwillingness to use this right instead of their spouses are only being consistent in their attitude aware of the negative reactions of the environment.

Half of the respondents (49.3%) of our research (Table 5) think that positioning of women on higher managing positions would not endanger the status of their spouse in their personal relation, while the other half is divided into those that are undecided (21.7%) and those that consider that woman's career advancement is endangering the status of her spouse (29%).

Table 5. The distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think that positioning of women on higher managing position would threaten the status of her partner (husband) in their private (family) life.

Positioning of women threatens the status of her husband					
		Freq.	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumul.Percent
SAF Officers	strongly disagree	15	21.7	21.7	21.7
	disagree	19	27.5	27.5	49.3
	undecided	15	21.7	21.7	71.0
	agree	11	15.9	15.9	87.0
	completely agree	9	13.0	13.0	100.0
	In total	69	100.0	100.0	

Half (53.6%) of the respondents doesn't know any woman holding managing position that can successfully harmonise her work and family roles. The research shows that women, in the case of difficulties harmonising work and family obligations will be more prone to sacrifice their career for success in her family role, much more than male population. The need to be accomplished and to be successful in the role of wife and mother diminishes aspirational tendencies (need to advance) in women of higher education. With the respondents of this research there is developed awareness (63.8% agree) that it is much more difficult to harmonise obligations at work and at home for a woman than a man. However, 27.5% of respondents don't see any difference in position between men and women in this respect. Although it is common and frequent for family members to give help and support to working parents, in the case of active military personnel this kind of help is not so easily achieved considering usual locational separation from their wider family. Consequently, friends can be very helpful to single mothers working in the armed forces, not only by offering emotional support but also for organising child care and finding solutions for work-family obligation problems (Tucker&Kelly, 2009).

In the Ministry of Defense and Serbian Armed Forces there is a possibility of regulating redistribution of working hours, but it is completely in the hands of the head of the organisational unit. Considering all mentioned benefits that all employees have, regardless of gender, from the support of colleagues and system, we propose launching the initiative for forming formal and legal conditions for implementation of measures that would enable better harmonisation of professional and family life for men and women alike.

Conclusion

Daily harmonisation of family and work obligations and social expectations from the roles assigned to her can modify woman's need and desire for career advancement as well as her faith that she can be successful. For them to advance in career and take higher positions women must be properly motivated. This motivation can be strengthened through educational patterns, development of individual need for change, strengthening of self-confidence and offering social support in family and work environment. Women in predominantly male occupations, such as military profession, are facing multiple stress situations that come with that line of work, much more than women working in less male dominated professions (Swanson, 2000). We thought that the insight into the attitudes of officers on this subject can be of help in understanding the emotional context and referent framework in which the information about women in system of defense will be interpreted, as well as understanding their motivation to take certain action for implementation of women in military ranks such as readiness to provide social support to women. This research was conducted on 69 respondents and its results show that officers are largely aware of importance of support they can provide for women's career advancement and that the readiness to operationalise this support is highest when giving information and counsel. Respondents of higher rank (lieutenant colonel) through their views express less resistance in accepting women managers in relations to the respondents of the rank of captain and major. A number of respondents (15.9%) completely disagree with the fact that legal regulation of paternal leave is a good thing, while 29 respondents stated that they would use this possibility. For the fact that there are fewer women than men on managing positions, the respondents say it is due to professional (personal and character traits of women), cognitive (motivation for advancement), social (social-cultural heritage) and family (harmonising work and family) reasons. Half (53.6%) of the respondents of this research doesn't know any woman on managing position which can successfully harmonise her work and family roles and 29% is considering that woman's career advancement is threatening her partner's status.

The basis of male motivation to provide support to woman for her advancement in the system is his positive view on the presence of women in the system. In the literature we find all sorts of recommendation when attitudes on women in the military system are concerned: from the officer selection of those candidates whose attitudes direct toward cognitive flexibility and wideness in the respect of lacking stereotypical images and prejudices, to sending them to joint trainings that would, through interpersonal experiences, enable increase in acceptance of women in the system, shatter stereotypes and point out to significant roles by which women can contribute on different positions and tasks in the system. The behavior of women already in the system (at school or at work) will affect the formation of attitudes; therefore a number of practical recommendations must be about this population in regard to enhanced attention in the process of recognition of adequate motivation for military calling for women, their mental and physical abilities and profile eligibility to perform certain duties. A step further is systematical monitoring of the integra-

tion of women into the military system through showing willingness to hear about problems about this issue in practice on all levels and timely finding the mechanisms for their solving. Every member of the system can encounter dilemmas, questions and problems; they should be encouraged to speak of them openly.

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NEW ERA OF COMPROMISE OF VALUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OR PHASE OF GLOBAL DOMINATION ENDS

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Abstract: *The beginning of the second decade of the new millennium was marked by events in the Middle East and the MAGREB countries known as the “Arab Spring.” These changes, in addition to the existing security dilemmas and long year’s unsolved issues on the surface fielded and new security dilemmas, whose figure out is a challenge for the next period. Unsolved issues and security dilemmas associated by the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East, stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions, growing Islamic radical fundamentalism, the demand for energy resources and other remains a major challenge around which “fought” for domination in the Region.*

Key words: *Security dilemmas, interests, Arab spring, energy resources.*

Introduction

After the collapse of the bipolar system in the last decade of the XX century, new rules have been introduced in international organizations - NATO, the EU and the UN. Changes have taken place under the strong influence of economic developed countries, and regarding the manner of making and functioning of these international organizations, especially in applying political and economic sanctions and military interventions primarily against a particular country. In this period, the tendency of the United States as a global player was to exploit the weakness of his own ideological and political rival and was promote as the flagship of globalization and to keep the leading position in front of their opponents, Europe, China and above Russia, as long they can do that. That position would allow nearly two decades domination of the U.S. and Western allies on the global political, economic and military scene.

However, in this “vacuum period”, other great countries with powerful natural resources turned to fixing the situation at home and consolidating their political, economic and military potential. After nearly two decades of consolidation of these (old new) centers of power, with the signing of The Collective Security Organization Treaty and Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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by Russia, China, India and Brazil, multipolarism was formed as counterweight to globalization led by U.S. through its mega project European Union.

Being in this situation, Washington strengthened its political, economic and military cooperation with the EU through NATO and other allies in order to keep and to maintain its dominance. At the last NATO summit in Chicago in 2012, policy of building closer relations with the United States and among its allies and partners was established through closer political, economic and especially military cooperation.

In addition, the policy of the “open door” for admission of new members into the zone of “free democracies” was emphasizing. The U.S. is aware that without a good logistic and other support from European countries will not be able fully to realize their interests in the Middle East and Central Asia, and thus will not be able to maintain the primacy of global power (Chicago Summit Declaration, 2012). This strengthening of cooperation between the U.S. and these countries should contribute to the alleviation of the political, economic and military influence of Russia, slowing the rapid economic growth of China and establish full control and dominance over energy resources in the Middle East.

In this region, all involved parties have their own interests. Every country calculates how to come as a winner. In this situation, the biggest losers are the Arab countries.

The situation in the countries of the Middle East after the Arab Spring

The beginning of 2011 was marked by mass protests of the population against long autocratic rule in the Arab countries and the MAGHREB countries. Social and political movements of thousands of residents of Arab countries are not even close to an end. They brought some changes in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya and began to shake the internal stability of Yemen and to assuage a different extent and authoritarian regimes in Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, and Algeria, some from Iraq, Kuwait and Morocco.

The changes that occurred in the Arab Spring led to the replacement of the dominant Arab national identity with strength Islamic identity. However, the main issue is that these countries took and lost by a violent change of yearlong autocratic regimes. The practice demonstrated that it is easier to break down autocratic regimes than to establish western democratic values.

The background of the events lies in the past of these countries, mismanaging demographic policy, bad economics set, the lack of animal resources, the large impact of the security structures on politics, lack of democracy and the like. Namely, during the fifties of 20th century nationalism emerged as the dominant political philosophy in the Arab countries after the withdrawal of European colonial powers. At that time, the Arabs through the Arab nationalism failed to strengthen their identity.

After a humiliating defeat by Israel in the Arab - Israeli war of 1967, the public began to turn against the Arab national movement. Their approach and philosophy were more attractive, and autocratic regimes have further complicated the situation. The new governments in the Middle East today are less Arabic, national and secular and Islamic oriented. All suffer from the consequences.

The lessons learned and experience from Iraq show that Christians and other minorities lived better under Saddam Hussein's regime than today. In Lebanon and Egypt,

strong national identity suppresses the tendency of people to identify themselves as Muslims. In Libya, after the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, this state does not function as a unified country; it is civil war and gradually breaks down the parts as Somalia.

The most dramatic is the situation in Syria where nearly two years there is a bloody civil war between pro-government forces and various opposition clans. According, Thierry Meyssan (2012), “discord and division of the various Syrian opposition factions reflects the clash between different countries who want change in Syria.” Especially famous is “National Council” (NC) known as “Istanbul council” funded by Qatar, which is in a tight coupling of the French intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure.

The Syrian Local Coordination Committee is comprised of local residents who opted for armed struggle. While the most populous Free Syrian Army that includes Brigades of Al Qaeda was influenced by Turkey. These situations did not accompany the United States. U.S. through the Arab League tried to liquidate NC and other factions and placed under the auspices of The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), which were affected by the U.S. (Meyssan 2012).

For that purpose, Obama appointed Robert S. Ford as ambassador to Syria, who is considered as one of the best experts on the Middle East with extensive experience in conducting and playing the “secret diplomatic games” of Iraq and Honduras. For the leader of NCSROF in 2012, the U.S. put Sheikh Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib, aimed to be able to negotiate for the future of the Syrian gas.

With these moves of the U.S., the biggest loser on the distribution of the Syrian resources was again the French and France’s Total (Filip Balunović, 2012). However, the development of events in Syria led to the situation that Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib cannot negotiate for resources in Syria. Or that reason in March 2013, Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib resigned under the pretext that “the destruction of infrastructure in Syria, the unlawful detention of tens of thousands, forced flight of hundreds of thousands and other forms of suffering Syrians were not enough for the international community to allow the Syrians to defend themselves against government forces” (Ahmed. A, & Elwazer. S., 24 March 2013). Thus, the U.S. plans did not realize completely.

Despite the unfolding of events in the Gulf States and North Africa, the Arab Spring brought very different perception of the countries of the MAGHREB and the Middle East, because the Western opinion on these Islamic countries was that the replacement of longtime rulers would be the in “monarchical lines”. However, suddenly the traditional conception of these countries complicated and changed with the emergence of “civil movements” in these countries, demanded more democracy and freedoms from the European countries and the United States.

According to the Director of the Center for International Studies and Research in Paris, Luis Martinez (2012), “The problem with the Gulf States is that they are (in the mind of Americans) strategic partners of the USA”, but it seems that it is not opinion of Washington. The events in these countries were “strategic surprise” for the EU, but not the U.S.

However, despite all events that occurred in these countries, once again “the rule” that there are no eternal friendships, but there are eternal interests of the powerful and strong have been proved. It has been shown by “Arab Spring” and change of the longstanding autocratic secular regimes in these countries by the new Islamic-oriented political elites led by the “Muslim Brotherhood”. The development of events by use of political, economic and military mechanisms, by the great powers, actualize dilemmas in the Middle East, or there is a redefinition of strategic interests between the U.S. and the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other hand. Does the United States would fail to deter Iran from its nuclear ambitions? Do replacement of the longstanding and proven allied autocratic secular regimes by new pro-Islamic-minded leaders of the Muslim Brothers organization will bring peace, democracy and respect for human rights in this region or not? Does bloody civil war in Syria is actually a reflection of the political and economic struggle between the U.S. and the West on the one hand and Russia, China, India, on the other hand to control oil and gas reserves? Is this the U.S. struggle to maintain their dominant position as global power, especially in the control of production and distribution of crude oil and gas? Is this one of the United States mechanisms to slow down the political, economic and military growth of China as well as increasing Russia’s growing political and economic power? Development of events and the high price of crude oil and gas are in favor of Russia, as the largest producer and exporter of these energy resources, and for China oil resources of Iran are more than necessary to extend its economic and political expansion. Those are long time actual dilemmas, not only on regional basis, but also in the world, and these events were cause by Arab spring get a new dimension which unraveling has followed yet.

The main dilemma that arises with the Arab Spring was whether to support autocratic regimes or support requirements change. The U.S. and the EU surprisingly “sacrificed” their long-term secular allies and widely opened the door for the Islamists, led by the Muslim Brotherhood. With this decision of the U.S., the U.S., Saudi Arabia was most surprised, because the Muslim Brotherhood has opposing views with the Washbasin of Saudi Arabia.

The role of the great powers in the struggle of interests and resources in the Middle East after the Arab Spring

Oil and gas are the central issue to the positioning of the U.S. Middle East. Currently, the U.S. military is present or influenced by their strong influence in almost all countries of the Persian Gulf, with the exception of Iran and Syria to some extend. This means that the natural resources in these countries are under U.S. control. In addition, the exploitation of their oil giants is in charge of the United States and Europe. The only country where the U.S. has no control over the natural resources is Iran, and while U.S. along with Israel seek for a solution how to establish control over these resources, not rejected the opportunity and the use of military force.

However, what is still deters military action by these two countries is highly developed nuclear program of Iran (which unofficially is among the nuclear powers)

and intensive influence of Russia and China. According to the U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, "The U.S. did not decide on a military intervention against Iran because Obama is trying with peaceful means to deter Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons ... and the most difficult decision for a president is to plunge the country into war" (Susanne Rice, personal communication, September 16, 2012).

At this moment the U.S., does not want to confront Russia, because an eventual confrontation would have catastrophic consequences for the multinational force led by the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. is looking for other methods to change the regime in Iran, a media campaign against Tehran last for several years. Opposition demonstrations against President Ahmadinejad, according the Iranian authorities are well supported from outside, so it is possible to "cause internal instability", similar to the operation "AJAX" (IRAN 1953, Hrvatski vojnik, vol. 234 issued April 2009) in the early fifties of the 20th century when the legitimately elected president of Iran, Mohammad Mosadik, was overthrown.

The way to resolve the issue with Iran cause silent conflict between the United States and Israel, which resulted in open Netanyahu announcement that "Israel alone will shoot Iran's nuclear facilities if the U.S. went ahead with concessions regarding this issue." Further, the Israeli Prime Minister added, "With each passing day, Iran is very close (about 90%) to create a nuclear bomb ... and for that we need to pass the red line before them, before it is too late" (Benjamin Netanyahu, personal communication, September 16, 2012). Such Netanyahu's announcements remained declarative. President Obama, in the midst of the election campaign in the United States was not prepared to risk a new long war against Iran. However, this question remains open and for the U.S. and Israel, Russia and China. It is highly unlikely that Russia and China will allow new bypassing of the UN Security Council when is a matter of Iran.

Another dilemma arises in the case of Iran - who gets and who loses from the current position and whether the U.S. really want to start a new long and uncertain war in the Persian Gulf? So far, Iran has half of its energy export to Japan, about one-third of China and one fifth of the EU. The potential crisis in Iran, the price of oil and gas on the world market will grow enormously, and Japan, China and the EU have to buy such expensive oil. According to the analysis of experts, the U.S. the intervention against Tehran automatically means extra profits for new Russian giant Gazprom and also means reducing the competitiveness of Chinese manufacturers

U.S. in the Middle East, in Central Asia and in Africa face even a bigger security dilemma which can significantly disrupt their plans for control of energy resources in these regions, and it's growing economic, political and military power of China and its stronger impact on the third world. If the U.S. wants to prevent further strengthen and influence of China as a new superpower, with complex political, economic and military power, now is the time to take steps in that direction.

The Chinese authorities quickly and efficiently crushed attempts to internal destabilization of China stimulated under the banner of human rights in the eighties of the last century. We can hardly think for the foreign destabilization of China. There is

no country from its neighbors (with the exception of Russia and to some extent India) powerful enough to afford this luxury as to thirty years ago.

On the other hand, today, no one wants to confront China, nor political, nor military, at least economically. The conflict between Japan and China in 2012 over disputed islands in the Pacific tossed to light the fact that large and powerful economies such as Japan are too sensitive to any conflict with geopolitical interests with China. An attempt to demonstrate the political and military power by Japan, in this case caused a double-digit decline in Japan's trade with China and a decline in industrial production, especially in the automotive industry. The smaller economies in the region are almost entirely dependent on the Chinese market and investments.

If we compare the economic power of China 30 years ago and today, we will see a drastic difference in that regard. Today, economic growth has made China the center of world production of consumer goods and the world's first exporter of the same. Back in 1994, Lee Kwan Yu, who was more than 30 years prime minister of Singapore, like prophecy noted that "the size of the Chinese moving the world is such that the world must find a new balance. It is impossible to pretend that China is just another great player. It is the greatest player in human history. "However, China is not still a politically and military super power. China is dependent on Iranian and Russian oil and gas. In the last ten years, the Chinese economy is a generator of military, political and diplomatic strengthening of China in the world.

The role and influence of the EU in the events related to the Arab Spring is not very evident, because the EU is not yet a political compact and foremost military power, as it is economically. It is a burden still with many internal problems and a lack of common foreign - policy objectives and independent military and politically weak to pose, as a country should to balance the other forces. However, its economic primate as superpower is a challenge that should be answer in the future, especially when some of the biggest EU economies are bring to the brink of collapse because of the economic crisis three years ago.

In this period reality showed that Germany has the healthiest economy of all EU member states, which carries the largest burden of the financial assistance package to rescue the Euro zone. On the other hand, Germany pitted like a hard opponent in further positioning the U.S. to Europe. Washington has long faced the challenge of how to reconcile the geopolitical interests of Germany, on the other hand shows disagreement about the support and funding of military operations led by the United States in that it does not directly participate. It brings Germany to build closer partnership with Russia by which is energy dependent and required other strong and independent partners that will allow political power to resist the impact of intensified U.S..

The Arab Spring was strongly supported by the EU without a deep analysis of new problems for the EU that emerged from it. The hope of the EU leaders was that these countries will implement democratic and fair elections in the Western template and previous systems will begin to function without any problems. However, there is always a difference between the predictions and preferences vs. realities and possibilities.

During the Arab Spring, and after, the EU embraced a strong wave of illegal migrants (Italy, France, Spain, and Greece). These illegal migrants on the one hand make it easier to overcome the economic crisis, but on the other hand refuse to replace their traditional values and customs with those of the recipient. It is a challenge that was not foresaw by the EU. It is necessary as soon as possible to resolve before it becomes deeper.

After the events in the Middle East and Central Asia, and the issue of global security, Russia and the United States are referred to common cooperation. Russia has long developed and nurtured relationships with the countries of these regions and has more than successful political, economic and military-technical cooperation with India and China. In the economic field, it is a member of multilaterals - BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which brings together four economies with the most potential and has a special partnership status with the EU.

The bilateral agreement on military-technical cooperation with Iran and energy-economic cooperation with Turkey is defined framework for peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the two largest Muslim countries in the region, and significantly restored the positions and interests of Russian influence in Serbia, Greece, Armenia, Syria, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan (Oliver Bakreski, B. Avramoska and Z. Nikoloski, 2012).

When it is clear that other countries need to cooperate with Russia, the question is what is the need of Russia's cooperation with others. At this point, it seems that Moscow will pay more attention to domestic policy and that will continue for at least another ten years. On the one hand, it is understandable. Economic rehabilitation of land, recovery of huge infrastructure, solving the problems of population outflow and negative demographic trends, especially in the eastern parts of the country, are priority problems that the current administration should be dealt. However, on the other hand, the question is when Russia will again find a situation like today, to decide how the world's future will look like. Tomorrow, that opportunity could disappear.

Obviously, Russia is looking for one or more partners who can most effectively help on the field of modernization of production capacity and diversification of the national economy, which would be less dependent on the exploitation of natural resources and the production of more consumer goods. Perhaps the choice of partners depends on political things that will happen in the future.

Conclusion

After the events of the Arab Spring more effort are investing in studying the situation in countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, to not repeat the mistakes that led to the Arab Spring. In countries affected by the Arab Spring, "new era of compromise of values" is coming where Islam is a fundamental value, while the government is under the control of political institutions.

Which side to step, U.S. meet with Russia and China, and it is more than clear wish of Washington to "reset the relationship" with Moscow and set up a new way. The question is whether it is in the interests of Moscow, what it gets and loses. In addition,

unless Moscow did not support future U.S. action in Iran, and energy, economic and military environment of China and isolation of Germany, Washington must choose:

- together with voluntary and involuntary collected partners will be able to go in realizing the geopolitical plans which probably would be turned into “raping solution” as the military occupation of Iraq:
- the establishment of civil administration in Afghanistan, or
- To accept the fact that the phase of global domination ends and that the world is entering into a new period of multiple centers of economic, political and military power.

The open issues in the future will be settle by negotiation, and in such circumstances, potential conflicts can arise only at the local level. In that case, of course, it would open dilemma, which country is eligible to be a regional power and as such, powers may exist in the world, and the system to be functional. Yet for a long time regional and global powers will be countries with powerful resources, strong economies and strong political influence of the military apparatus of coercion “unruly”.

In a world like that, the U.S. would remain militarily dominant, China would be the first world economic power and the largest manufacturer of goods in the world, India would be the largest provider of services, and Europe may focus on the development of innovation and technology. However, only Russia and its position can play a role of balancer and thus does the total balance in international relations.

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ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS- TYPE OF ORGANIZED CRIME AS A DESTABILIZATION FACTOR FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

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Abstract: *Security represents the main goal of state politics as a condition for the existence of the state and its framework includes the requirements for the achievement of its internal and external security. Since fast changes are one of the main characteristics of the modern world, the need arises for security to be understood as a dynamic category. In the era of globalization and the attempt for survival in today's turbulent world, the states act in accordance with their national interest and at the same time they are trying to ensure security for themselves and their citizens, as well as for entire regions.*

Although today there are fewer risks of military threats, most of the experts agree that currently attention should be paid on the wide range of non-military and asymmetrical threats. One of these non-military threats, which stands out with its hazards and severity for the security of the states is the organized crime. This type of crime became dominant after the end of the "Cold War" under the influence of the new social flows. Although organized crime has a wide range of activity, among its illegal activities several types of illicit trafficking are dominant in the region of Southeast Europe, through which the organized crime provides legal and illegal deficit goods for the legal and illegal so called "black" markets.

In this context, although illicit trafficking in firearms represents the least visible type of organized crime, potentially it is a very dangerous criminal activity due to the reason that it represents real threat for the national, regional and international security.

Along with the conventional and unconventional firearms, objects of illicit trafficking are military equipment and military technologies, which have great impact on crisis hotspots, and during war conflicts in certain regions. At the same time, this type of trafficking directly stimulates the occurrence of terrorism.

Key words: *security, non-military threats, organized crime, illicit trafficking in firearms*

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Introduction

The term security is in close correlation with the state, which has obligation to secure and guarantee the security for its citizens. Regardless whether it refers to the individual, the state or the international community, the security is constantly one of the urgent problems of humanity, and represents area that initiates multidisciplinary interest.³ Hence, as one of the basic human needs, the security correlates with the political, social, cultural and other social values and conditions. If the state fails to synchronize them, it will face disorganization of the established ruling system, leading to meeting of political-partisan, group or individual interest, which tends towards destruction that primarily has negative impact on the citizens. The security is necessary for successful and continuous functioning of the states and their institutions, providing and guaranteeing citizens with basic living functions and healthy environment.

However, no society can establish full security, or absolute freedom. The reason lies in the need for ensuring balance between the activities for protection of the basic rights and freedoms of citizens and taking measures for protection of the vital state interests. Therefore, the freedom and security are variables, given the diverse, conflicting and irreconcilable interests of individuals and groups in every society.⁴

According to some authors, security, in the broadest sense, represents state of stability in nature and state, aimed at carrying out preventive preparations for defense and protection from various sources of endangerment, in order for imbalance not to occur in the nature and society, which will jeopardize the physical, social and spiritual integrity of individuals.⁵

The globalization trend made for security to be less dependent on the military component. That was the reason that from the end of the eighties of the last century until now, the political, sociological, cultural, health, ecological and other social factors influence the security segment.

Considering the fact that today the military threats have secondary influence on the security, the negative effect on the economy, the political stability, social harmony and the environment is caused mostly from the asymmetrical threats typical for the time we live in. Mutual cohesion exists between these types of threats that additionally complicate the solutions for their prevention, and the response of the state towards them becomes more complex.

One of the most typical non-military threats is organized crime, which as a negative security phenomenon makes the best use of the globalization trends. If in the middle of the XX century the organized crime was characterized as a specific phenomenon for certain geographical areas, after the fall of the Berlin wall it rapidly spread in dimensions that currently identify it as one of the most serious international security problems. Even the states with developed security – institutional systems are not immune to this negative occurrence, and the consequences from the organized crime are felt on national, regional and international grounds.

Illicit trafficking in firearms as a segment of organized crime is connected mostly with groups and organizations that use armed conflicts on national and regional level for illegal gaining of financial benefits. The scope of illicit trafficking in firearms in a proximate dependence with the size of the geographic area affected by the armed conflict, or with the range of activities carried out by criminal and terrorist groups or organizations.

³ Georgieva L., *“Tvorenje na mirot – Mirot, bezbednost i konfliktite po Studenata vojna”* (Creation of peace – Peace, security and conflicts after the Cold war), Viladorf, Skopje, 2004, p.87, *Personal translation*.

⁴ Masleša R., *“Teorije i sistemi sigurnosti”* (Theories and systems of security), Magistrat, Sarajevo, 2001, *Personal translation*.

⁵ Nacev Z., Nachevski R., *“Bezbednost i nacionalnata odbrana”* (Security and national defense), Makedonska riznica, Kumanovo, 2001, *Personal translation*.

The purpose of this article is to pinpoint organized crime as destabilizing factor in the states of Southeast Europe, through one of its types – illicit trafficking in firearms.

Organized crime

Organized crime absorbs wide and different illegal activities and contents on national or transnational level, as trafficking in human beings, in narcotics, etc., for gaining certain benefit (mostly money). The illicit trafficking in firearms is part of the range of activities of the organized crime, as an activity that provides big profit, but that is mostly associated with terrorist activities. Generally, organized crime means committing crimes by organized group, which has three or more members, carrying out activities that are considered as crime, in order to gain financial or other benefit.

The occurrence and development of organized crime represents complex socio-political and security process, that appears during radical changes in one state. The organized crime is regularly present throughout unjust redistribution of the national wealth, the existence of corruption, and with the occurrence of the so called gray economy, or “black market” that exist parallel with the legal economy and commerce in one state. After the Cold war, the influence of the new social flows made organized crime to become priority threat for the security of large number of states. Besides the impact on preselected groups of financial institutions or regional areas, the organized crime posed strong influence over national, regional and international financial-economic systems. Its dynamics and adaptability towards the social processes, defined it as security threat that easily changes shapes. This makes organized crime complex for identification and detection, and also difficult to prevent.

Organized crime is not a new threat that occurs under the influence of globalization, however, the contemporary social circumstances affected this negative phenomenon to get the proportions that will reduce the possibilities of its tracking, prevention and elimination. Considering the fact that organized crime spreads proportionally with the influence from the global economy and trade, its activities transform in a type of so called production crime. Namely, in the states where organized crime is carried out as corporative and high profit commercial activity, a collision of two structures appears: the state and the criminal. Under the circumstances imposed by the globalization, the criminal structure can have the same, even stronger power than the state. In such conditions, organized crime exists and operates camouflaged as enterprises or corporations engaged in all forms of illegal conduct. Thereby, the illicit trafficking is particularly expressed, which besides illegal, allows trading of legal goods, especially when it comes to goods that are considered deficient.

Through illicit trafficking the structure of the organized crime stimulates the illegal industry, the illegal manufacturing and trafficking in drugs, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in consumer goods, and also illicit trafficking in firearms. Thus, this structure obtains great income that is untaxed and that can be even greater than the gross national product of some states. There are examples for the indicated in the geographic area of Southeast Europe, and the reasons lay primarily in the social erosion of the states caused

by wars, corruption of the state authorities and the adverse economic situation.

Organized crime as a phenomenon that jeopardizes contemporary societies does not recognize state's borders, or racial, ethnic or religious difference. This bridging of differences is the main generator of organized crime, whose main interest is making profit and gaining power. Additionally, the waste range of trading creates even more space for the activities of the criminally organized structures. That is the reason for the interconnection of different structures of criminal organizations and their profitable cooperation, regardless of the factors that burden the states towards where these activities are directed or their interests. Because of that, when it comes to organized crime, we have to bear in mind that it is its complex composition whose symbiosis is conditioned only by making and distributing of the profits.

According to V. Stojarova, Czech professor of political sciences, no strictly specified specialty of the structures of organized crime exists based on their "country of origin". In all SEE region counties the structures of organized crime apply all its forms, but what matters the most is that they are not organized by strictly ethnic rules, which means in one criminal structure more entities can be included. In this context, organized crime in the SEE region should be perceived from the disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the military actions that followed. According to the author, the structures of organized crime on the territory of former Yugoslavia successfully collaborate regardless of the embroidered ethnic animosity, ironically continuing the maxim of "brotherhood and equality", which paradoxically continued to exist only when it comes to criminal collaboration.⁶ Hence the fact that the end of the conflicts did not discontinue the collaboration between the structures of the criminally organized groups in the newly founded states. On a contrary, by adapting to the new occurrences, the criminal activities transited towards other forms of activities, much easier than the official political relations between the authorities in this states.

The Southeast Europe (SEE) region is of great importance not only because of the connecting geographical factor on the European continent, but primarily because of the strategic dimension of the node that in which the trade – economical interests of the East and the West are crossed. At the same time, it means that throughout this region the interests of the criminally organized structures on international level are crossed, meaning their routs for illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, military equipment and explosives. Final beneficiaries of these activities are the criminal – terroristic organizations and guerrilla groups that occasionally act in these areas, but also the structures of organized crime.

Illicit trafficking in firearms as a destabilizing factor in Southeast Europe

Unlike other forms of illicit trafficking (in drugs, human beings, art, etc.) the research of illicit trafficking in firearms represents methodological problem because the cases are mostly closely related to other affairs. Namely, the correlation with any of the other forms

⁶ Stojarová V. "Organized crime in Western Balkans", HUMSEC Journal, Issue 1, 91-114, p.108.

of illicit trafficking is often the cause for inefficiency in suppressing the illicit trafficking in firearms and the inability for identification of the origin of such firearms.⁷ Moreover, contributing to this is the lack of unified classification of arms on international level. Illicit trafficking is: import, export, acquisition, selling, delivery or transfer of firearms, its parts, components and ammunition from or through one state on the territory of other state, if none of the affected states has an agreement for such activity.⁸

If we take into consideration the active and yearning conflicts in the world, it is clear that the firearms are one of the most competitive goods on the market regardless whether it comes to its legal or illegal trade. Because firearms represent goods whose trading is limited, but not forbidden, the traffickers in firearms place it on the black market every time when the conditions allow it, using illegal, and often legal channels and procedures. This way the trafficked firearms arrive on its final destination. Final beneficiaries are often terrorist organizations, liberation movements and guerrilla groups in states affected by riots and military conflicts. Furthermore, the illicit trafficking in firearms is most prevalent in the regions where there is an embargo imposed by the international community. Firearms, despite its use in armed conflicts, promote the culture of violence, which produces unsecured situation in urban areas that became the place for battles between criminal groups that often end up in innocent victims. However, it is important to mention that illicit trafficking represents very small portion of the whole trafficking in firearms on international level.⁹

According to Savić¹⁰, illicit trafficking in firearms, especially its import, can trigger direct and indirect threat for the security of the states. Namely, he says that direct threat for the security of the state exists when the amount of the illegal firearms is increased as a result of illicit trafficking. Indirect threat from the illicit trafficking in firearms occurs when it is carried out by the criminal structures. The activities that enable the profit of the structures of organized crime produce negative influence on the degree of security in the states.

The biggest problem of the illicit trafficking in firearms is the relatively weak and unorganized control of the deliveries, and the trafficking that takes place in crisis areas, or areas inflicted by armed activities.¹¹

Especially interesting part is the realization of the illicit trafficking in firearms, meaning the delivery of the illegally obtained firearms to the final beneficiary. Thus, the most used method is the corruption of state officials by the criminal structures for successful and continuous realization of this type of illegal activities. Namely, the established symbiosis between organized crime and the highly established officials of current governments in one

⁷ For example, during detection and suppression of other form of illicit trafficking, an arsenal of firearms with unfamiliar origin is seized.

⁸ Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 3, Use of terms, (e), p.2

⁹ Stohl R., Grillot S., "The International Arms Trade", Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, source: <http://books.google.mk/books?id=uvGRBE1QxBUC&pg=PP82&dq=illegal+arm+trade&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9bPeUe-gNMKkO5bjghAF&ved=0CDEQ6wEwAQ>

¹⁰ Savić D., "Ilegalno trgovanje oružjem", (Illicit trafficking in firearms), Naučni rad, Zagreb, 2012. Personal translation.

¹¹ Source: <http://www.hrvatski-vojniki.hr/hrvatski-vojniki/0272005/salw.asp>

or more states is a result of the need for personal enrichment. However, there are examples when the states under international embargo planned out the illegal procurement of firearms, with indication that it was done for protection of vital interests. By trying to prevent this situation, on 02.04.2013 the General assembly of the UN adopted an International arms trade treaty, in order to prevent arms procurement in areas affected by armed conflict. This treaty provides for member states of the UN to establish effective and transparent system for control of the firearms trade.¹²

Objects of illicit trafficking are conventional and unconventional arms, military equipment and military technologies. Their procurement can have significant influence for the developments in the states or the regions where armed conflicts exist, and influences the activity planning by terrorist groups or organizations. The illicit trafficking in firearms covers all world's areas where wars are waged between states, but also internal conflicts and civil wars within the states, armed revolutions or clashes of paramilitary formations with state institutions, as well as regular arming of the permanent armed formations of the states.¹³ The increased market demand for firearms, ammunition and military equipment mobilizes the structures of organized crime towards this situation where they see the opportunity for profit. Their permanent interests are the military hotspots and conflict regions, where they can expand their illegal, but lucrative activities.

Trafficking in firearms and military equipment became highly profitable activity especially after the Second World War, when on international level the capacities for production were expanded. The war industry reached a climax during the Cold War, when significant resources in many states were invested for development of modern weaponry and military technology. The ongoing propaganda, which constructed state of permanent threat from outbreak of an armed conflict between the two blocks, further stimulated the unreasonable arms race between the polarized sides. Such situation imposed race for placement of the produced arms on the international market, which directly or indirectly contributed for flaring up the yearning conflicts in different regions in the world.¹⁴

The roots of the large quantities of firearms lay here, which after the fall of the Berlin wall are located in the states of Southeast Europe, and that in great amount were part of the "Warsaw pact". In the period between the sixties and seventies of the last century, significant number of states in the region, now known as SEE, became exporters of firearms, ammunition and military equipment. This activity represented one of the main sources of finance in convertible currencies. This period was characterized with massive production of popular models of arms, of which most familiar version is the Automatic rifle with 7.62 mm caliber, known as "Kalashnikov" in the east, or "AK47" in the west hemisphere. In addition, increased production and selling of other types of arms, ammunition and explosive devices was made. The created image of an armed aggression contributed for these states to produce firearms with which large number of citizen outside the military sector were entrusted.

¹² More on: http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_info_kit.pdf

¹³ Kambovski V., „Organiziran kriminal“ (Organized crime), 2-ri Avgust S – Shtip, Skopje, 2005. *Personal translation.*

¹⁴ Some of these conflicts are still active, and the illicit trafficking in these regions is intensified.

The nineties of the last century in the Southeast Europe region were marked by the clashes on the Balkans, primarily among the states created after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Additionally, the collapse of the one-party political system in Albania opened the space for the structures of organized crime in realization of their illegal activities through the sale of firearms. The collapse of the state in 1997, arose the massive and uncontrolled plunder of state property in Albania, which most negatively reflected with plundering of military and police warehouses with firearms. This occasion provided for significant number of firearms and military equipment to cross over in the hands of the citizens and than in the hands of the structures of organized crime. Significant number of these firearms, through illegal channels was distributed in the neighboring countries, among which Republic of Macedonia.¹⁵ The end of the armed conflicts in the region, was supposed to mean that the region will no longer be interesting destination for placement of illegal firearms. Instead, the circulation of illegal firearms continued, and the surplus arms from the hitherto warring sides begun to be redirected towards other illegal markets and conflict regions.

Thus, the region of Southeast Europe, especially the Balkans, from place where illegal firearms were placed, became region from which large arsenal of illegal firearms was send to regions caught up in armed conflicts. These quantities of illegal firearms that were partially outside the control of state authorities were placed on the international criminal market for arms, ammunition and military equipment. According to EUROPOL's report from 2011¹⁶, the region of Southeast Europe, especially the Balkans, even in the future may be region where illicit trafficking in firearms will be done. General argument for this assumption is the large arsenal of illegal firearms that is presumably stored on locations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. The report indicates that Serbia and BIH have the greatest potential for arming the criminal-terrorist structures that operate within the EU. At the same time, the firearms from this region are illegally distributed to unstable post-conflict states and crisis regions on the Asian, African and South American continents. The structures that carry out the illicit trafficking in firearms belong to the so called universal structures of organized crime. Namely, these structures are also active in all other forms of illicit trafficking like trafficking in drugs, vehicles and consumer goods, and also trafficking in human beings.

Because the illegal firearms are transported through already established channels for other forms of illicit trafficking, the illegal flow of firearms can be carried out independently or in combination with other illegal forms. One of the most practiced ways of illegal transport is by abusing the legal organizations that transport goods. It is a question of forced collaboration between the legal organizations and the structures of organized crime, established with coercion, use of force and blackmail. This way, the arsenal illegal firearms is hidden in deliveries for legal international transport. The small quantities illegal firearms are mostly transported by individual carriage, which is harder to suppress.

Furthermore, the transport and illicit trafficking in firearms is concealed by using invalid documents so the real recipient of the illegal package is hidden. Obtaining of

¹⁵ According to unofficial calculations, approximately 300.000 pieces of these arms was delivered to R. Macedonia.

¹⁶ Europol: *EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment, OCTA 2011*

licenses (often in question are fallacious i.e. forged licenses) is part of the process of trade and transport, which contributes for the illegal transactions in firearms to be perceived as legal. As far as the transaction seems legal, the structures of organized crime can arrange the payment in any of the typical legal ways and to use usual methods for transport of the illegal firearms, worth millions in convertible currencies.¹⁷

On the other hand, the rapidly accumulated profit obtained on illegal way, is transformed into legal by the criminal structures, including it into already existing or setting up personal legal organizations in the economical – industrial, production or hospitality – touristic area. This transformation represents the best way for legalization of the illegally obtained profit, which is popularly called “money laundering”. However, even during this redirection of the activities, the security is jeopardized with smaller implications on the total national or regional states. Namely, depending on the available power of the criminal structure, it is subjected to lesser or greater influence by the competitive structures that tend to take the priority, in order to undertake certain profitable activity. When it comes to illicit trafficking in firearms, often armed battles occur between rival structures, which negatively reflects over the security on specific micro area.

Contributing factors for occurrence and activities of illicit trafficking in firearms in the Southeast Europe region

Contributing factors for the occurrence and implementation of the activities of illicit trafficking in firearms in SEE region are mainly classified in three groups. The first group is consisted of the social, social-economical factors, the second group includes conceptually-political factors¹⁸, while the third factor represents the geographical positioning (the external factors that influence the society and the individual as its part). In Southeast Europe the uncontrolled proliferation, illicit trafficking and possession of firearms still represents one of the key threats for the socially-political, social and economic development, also for trust building between states.

The unfavorable **socially-economical factors** are characteristic for the weak and nonfunctional states where the disrespect of the legislative-legal system is expressed. Mostly, it comes to post-conflict societies, with fully unsolved matters that come from certain moral norms that are based on the ethnic, religious or cultural differences among citizens. The social disorganization can be triggered by a problem with urban character as overpopulation from the migration trends, or by the poor environment (pollution of agricultural land or drinking water, lack of natural resources etc.). The direct influence of the general economic state (developed infrastructure, degree of industrial development and social differences) is very important, as a reflection of the conditions for development of the society, the degree of the national GDP and the living standard of the population. If there is great declination between the above mentioned parameters, than these group of factors have solid ground for “cultivation” of deviant social occurrences, among which the emergence of structures

¹⁷ Lajman M., Poter G. “*Organiziran kriminal*” (Organized crime), Magor, Skopje, 2009. *Personal translation.*

¹⁸ Dimovski Z., “*Ilegalna trgovija so oruzje i terorizmot vo Republika Makedonija*” (Illicit trafficking in firearms and terrorism in Republic of Macedonia), Grafotrans, Skopje, 2005, p.43, *Personal translation.*

that will plan and carry out illegal criminal activities. The unfavorable economical factor is often present in transitional societies, where in conditions of economic crisis the percentage of increase of criminal activities takes on concerning proportions.

The conceptually – political factors that stimulate crime occurrence, and by that the conduction of illicit trafficking in firearms, are result of the influence of war, the influence of the regional and international processes (globalization and the threats of environmental nature), the influence of the media and ethno-religious or political differences in or among states.

The war is the most dominant factor that influences the unwinding of illicit trafficking in firearms and is carried out in three stages. The first stage significant for the commencement of such criminal form is the prewar period, which is characterized with military preparations of the state for the anticipated armed conflicts and military psychosis that affects its population. This period often is characterized by increasing the prices of basic nutrients, which subsequently stimulates the rest of the forms of organized crime. The second stage is the conduct of military operations, where the opposing sides involve their whole military and human potential. Often, besides regular, paramilitary units are involved in the military operations, closely connected with the organized criminal structures, which apart from the regular units, main goal is carrying out of criminal activities for obtaining financial and material benefit. This is the most profitable stage for the structures of organized crime oriented towards conducting illicit trafficking in firearms. The last stage is what comes after the end of the armed conflict, but with significant increase of other forms of organized crime.

The other above mentioned factors further stimulate the other forms of organized crime, instead of trafficking in firearms, therefore they will not be elaborated in this article.

Geo-strategic positioning of the states broadly affects the occurrence of illicit trafficking in firearms. The location of the states that are in important transit routs, through which the paths of whole illicit trafficking pass, influences their citizens to be actively involved in the structures of organized crime bound by the motivation for easy money. However, the impact of globalization already exceeded this conception, because the possibility of quick transportation from one to another destination allowed organized crime to combine the global benefits with the access to the regions of its interest. Hence, organized crime successfully overcame the national and regional areas, getting transnational dimension¹⁹, where the geographical positioning is only a problem from relief aspect. The relief of the states in the Southeast European region, especially the Balkans, in the past period allowed for relatively secure transportation of trafficked firearms across poorly accessible areas, by using the help of locals.

Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons

The difficulties in defining small arms and light weapons²⁰ come from the different approach for the group in which these arms belong. The lack of

¹⁹ Ruggiero V., South N., Taylor I., "New European Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe", Hobbs D., Dunnighan C., "Global Organized Crime: Context and Pretext", Routledge, London, 1998, p. 298-299.

²⁰ SALW – small arms and light weapons is universally accepted term within the international organizations.

internationally agreed and accepted definition hinders the monitoring of the illegal transporting of these categories of firearms. Usually, firearms that can be carried and used by one person, made and adopted according to military specification as lethal instrument is considered as small arms and light weapons.²¹ For clarification, it is useful to know is that the group of small arms includes semiautomatic and automatic pistols, revolvers, shot-guns and guns, semiautomatic rifles, attack guns and machineguns. The group of light weapons includes machineguns, hand grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft weaponry, recoilless guns, portable grenade launchers and mortars under 82 calibers.

The easy access to light weapons and small arms represents one of the factors for jeopardizing the security of the citizens, which can induce instability of the states. Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is current within the last twenty five years. The end of the Cold War and the block separation of the world opened new perspective for armed conflicts, regardless whether they were between or within the states. Until the fall of the Berlin wall, the problem of proliferation of firearms was perceived as a segment with ideological sign. Today, this problem is approached through the light of humanitarian issues and the efforts of the international community for putting an end of the armed conflicts in the crisis regions. The attention turned towards proliferation of weaponry, is caused by the damages suffered by such activities, however, mostly because of the jeopardized security of the people.

The uncontrolled spread and trafficking in SALW represents serious problem for the SEE region, which stimulates the crime and insecurity, undermining the efforts for prevention of conflicts and creating of positive secure scene. The expansion of SALW among the population from the region represents security threat due to: lack of control on the borders, developed organized crime network, inconsistent enforcement of existing legislation on production and export of firearms, lack of transparency and weak capacity of states and civil structures to effectively counter this problem. According to official statistics from the SEE states, the illegal possession of such firearms is the main reason for murders and committing other crimes. Namely, according to official data for Serbia, 64% percent of those convicted of murder used this exactly kind of firearms²², which is sufficient evidence that this illicit trafficking in SALW makes additional negative contribution to the endangerment of the security.

Small arms and light weapons are also the most accessible to the illegal market in the SEE region. These firearms are left by armed conflicts, active from 1991 to 2001. The inability to determine the exact amount of such firearms should not be sought only in the ability and capacity of the security institutions and civil organizations from the states in the region, but also in the lack of awareness among citizens of the dangers of this security threat. The coordinated action of MOI and the civil organization in

²¹ OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OSCE, November 2000, p. 1.

²² Source: <http://www.seesac.org/project.php?l1=141&l2=170>

Republic of Macedonia implemented in 2003 can be set as an example, when nearly 7.500 pieces of illegally possessed SALW was confiscated, although according to the estimations of the security structures the number of handed firearms was supposed to be far higher. The case with KFOR and UNMIK's action in Kosovo was the same, implemented at the end of 1999, when 9.978 pieces of SALW and 5 million bullets of ammunition were collected, and in the three following amnesty periods additional 1.428 pieces SALW and 90.200 bullets of ammunition were collected.²³ In contrast to these figures, in Croatia in the period from 2007 to 2011 58.818 pieces of SALW and explosive devices, 2 million bullets of ammunition and nearly two tons of explosives were collected from civilians.²⁴

Regional cooperation for control of illicit trafficking in firearms

Although there is potentially great risk for jeopardizing the security of the states in the SEE region, illicit trafficking in firearms is actually the least visible of all forms of organized crime.²⁵ However, the illicit trafficking in firearms, regardless of the type of weapons, ammunition, explosives or military equipment in question, is not a serious threat only for the security of the states of this region, because the firearms from these region (in most cases SALW) is directed towards the illegal market of the states of Western Europe. The biggest problem in preventing this phenomenon is the relatively weak and disorganized control of the deliveries and trafficking in firearms, especially in the former conflict, or areas affected by war.²⁶

No armed conflict in local or regional frames is possible unless the parties to the conflict are not provided with firearms, and very often, the procurement is done illegally. That is the reason for the need of finding a model for coordinated action by the states in the SEE region in the efforts for prevention of conduction of illicit trafficking in firearms within their territories. Such a model implies inclusion of instruments that will improve the coordination among security structures, and the introduction of mechanisms for intelligence and security cooperation in the exchange of confidential information. This model implies harmonization of the national strategies and action plans for the prevention and punishment of this type of crime, whose basis are in the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The significant arsenal of firearms that is still stored in different locations is perceived as a serious security challenge for the states of the SEE region. The establishment of

²³ *Strategija i nacionalni akcioni plan Republike Kosoco za kontrolu i prikupljanje malokalibarskog i lakog naoružanja* (Strategy and national action plan of Republic of Kosovo for control and collection of small caliber and light weaponry), Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, October, 2009. *Personal translation.*

²⁴ http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/08/08/feature-01

²⁵ Anastasijević D. "Organized Crimes in the Western Balkans", HUMSEC, Working papers, p.10, source:

http://www.humsec.eu/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Anastasijevic.pdf

²⁶ <http://www.hrvatski-vojnik.hr/hrvatski-vojnik/0272005/salw.asp>

effective cooperation for suppression of illicit trafficking in firearms would mean contribution not only for the stabilization of the region, but also for creation of a positive security climate away from that area. The basis for starting this kind of cooperation is possible if the states harmonize their national strategies in respect to the Council's Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, adopted in December 2008, which defines the rules for trade of military equipment and firearms. The document provides measures that need to be taken for prevention of the illegal transport of firearms, and strategy for combating against scaling and illicit trafficking in firearms and ammunition, which is of primary interest for EU member states.²⁷

In accordance with the guidelines and decisions delivered by the UN, laid out in the Program for preventing and suppression of illicit trafficking in firearms, its illegal production and storage, the states of the SEE region implemented series of actions for adopting and implementing of legislation in line with the existing legislation of the UN and the EU. It involved development of national strategic documents²⁸ and signing agreements for bilateral and regional cooperation in dealing with such a destabilizing factor for the security of the region. The main goal of all these activities is establishment of an effective system for control of illicit trafficking in firearms²⁹ and reduction of the total amount of illegal firearms in the states of the SEE region, and also control of the legal firearms in the hands of the state, legal entities and citizens. The successful implementation of these efforts should result in raising public awareness for the threat that the illicit trafficking in firearms and the illegal possession and usage of the same has on the personal, public and regional security. In addition to the security dimension, the control of the organized crime with arms opens conditions for improvement of the overall economic and social conditions in the states from the region. In that way, the cooperation with the Center for Control of small arms and light weapons in Southeast and East Europe (SEESAC) should be emphasized, started in July 2011, with opening of capacity for storage of SALW and ammunition. This is an integral part of the implementation of the EU Council decision from 11.03.2010 (EU Council Decision 2010/179/CFSP), which provides full support of the activities of SEESAC on the territory of Western Balkans, as a way to implement the EU strategy for combat of storage and illicit trafficking in SLAW and ammunition.³⁰

This is also worth mentioning: Republic of Macedonia is engaged in improving the system for control of firearms and combating of illicit trafficking in firearms. Holders of such engagement are the institutional segments of the security sector, which on bilateral and multilateral cooperation exercise the security policy, designed to protect the fundamental national interests, actively contributes in creating positive security scene in the region. Implementer of the national strategy for arms control and the combat against

²⁷ More in: Official journal of European Union, Council Common Position, 2008/944/CFSP, 8 December 2008.

²⁸ Periodical strategies and action plans for control and suppression of organized crime with firearms are made by all states in the SEE region.

²⁹ In March 2013 Kosovo, as one of the states from the region inflicted by this form of organized crime, signed memorandum for cooperation with the Bureau for monitoring of the illicit trafficking in alcohol, firearms and explosives of USA (ATF). With this, Kosovo gained access to the Itrace system, which collects, stores and distributes information for tracking of the illicit trafficking in firearms.

³⁰ More on: <http://www.seesac.org>

illicit trafficking in firearms is the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, as an institution responsible for fighting crime and handling of (especially when it comes to organized crime), trafficking in human beings, drugs, firearms and terrorist threats. Hence, this competent Ministry has continuous cooperation with related ministries of Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (as well as with the UNMIK mission in Kosovo. The cooperation was realized through ministerial and expert meetings, mutual submission of information and data, operational investigations, etc.), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, etc. The cooperation with the states from the region is conducted through various working bodies (such as the SECI the center for combating cross-border crime).³¹

Conclusion

Although the illicit trafficking in firearms in the SEE region notes significant decrease in the last decade, it cannot be discussed about full elimination of the threat that it has over security. The lack of control of this phenomenon on national, regional and global level, contributes towards creating unfavorable security scene, which can result in opening new crisis regional conditions, or increase of the crime on broader geographical area.

Due to the fact that illicit trafficking in firearms still representing a security threat over wider geographical area, the problem remains within the focus of the states and the military-political alliances on international arena. Among other, the threat of this kind of organized criminal is related to terrorism, the creation of conditions for regional instability with threat of starting an armed conflict of major proportions, but also as a threat for normal conduct of the trade or the prevention of the delivery of humanitarian aid for the civilians in the regions affected by conflicts. At the same time, the uncontrolled production that preceded the illicit trafficking in firearms, can prevent or delay the restoration and development of the states after the end of the conflicts, or to contribute for the occurrence and spread of other forms of the organized crime.

Despite this, the illicit trafficking in firearms represents serious threat to the economy of the states and the regions³², because it is relatively easy, but extremely dangerous way, for making profit, especially if it is organized form of crime where segments or whole structures of the institutional subjects are included. Illicit trafficking with small arms and light weapons represent especially big threat, which statistically is the most typical form of this type of crime worldwide. Defeating are the estimates that show that only within the borders of the states in the SEE region even after a decade from the end of the armed conflicts, several thousand pieces of SALW and ammunition are still stored, while with the amnesty actions and the collection of this type of weapon far smaller number was collected. These firearms, because of the possibility for fast and easy transport from one crisis region in to another and because of the stimulation it offers to the other forms of crime, represents permanent threat for security of any aspect of its use. By that, this type of organized crime represents constant threat to the peace and stability as for the states and regions, also for

³¹ Source: <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=114>

³² Because of these reasons the EU conducted coordinated actions of the national defense and intelligence-security structures in the Gulf of Aden, from where 90% of its total trade by sea was carried out.

the wider international community. This clearly points out that the potential armed conflicts easily can jeopardize the security more than the case of establishment of adequate national control, combined with coordinated regional activities for detection and suppression of this criminal occurrence.

By identifying that the threat from this type of organized crime represents a challenge for the official international efforts for control of arms and the combat of its illegal distribution, the national, regional and international security structures amplifies and interconnect their capacities in order to successfully deal with this phenomenon. Thereby, not only the available intelligence-security and defense structures are included, but the national and regional initiatives that operate outside the institutions of the system have their place in the coordinated activities.

The open approach towards his problem and the intensification of the bilateral, especially the regionally coordinated cooperation of the states in SEE, will provide positive results in dealing with the illicit trafficking in firearms, and thus contributing towards the stabilization of the security state in the region.

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WESTERN BALKANS: BETWEEN EUROPE AND BALKANIZATION

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Abstract: *Western Balkans IS an area relieving continuous fluidity inside the layers of histories and their respective products.*

Always in between East and West, following up the proper vocations, some of them visible and some other hidden, which in every moment in history have been translated in simple words: “Where to go?!”

Today’s reality in Western Balkans testify how the area has become an mobile arena, once again in search of identity, by making its flag of battle the European Union, as a final destination, aiming the unification of the geographic principle with the administrative and political one, and above all, the spiritual dimension incorporated in a common values system.

This last one, has been and continues to evolve under strong strains for all Western Balkans countries. The culmination of this pressure has been the expression of the will to integrate in EU, which is measured with the readiness from the countries of the area to make all necessary sacrifices it takes to achieve the conformity and standardization with EU, considering the specific situations which alter the mutual will to integration and enlargement from both EU and countries of the region, under the pressure of economic crises.

By following and developing an integrated social, political and economic analysis of the surrounding events and phenomena, the article aims to enlighten the real basic challenge of the countries of Western Balkans in the process of shaping their future: the one expressed through what is considered to be the real inspiration of countries of the area, separately or in a “state of integration”, by projecting alliances and realities and by investigating on the effects of the established security level on human development in the area.

Key words: *Western Balkans, integration, EU, political assessment, economic integration, stability, security, development*

Introduction

Western Balkans area has continuously experienced the destiny of being an arena of the rise and declines of empires. It has been often in the central line of the battle field because of circumstances or due to administrative or ethnic definitions, facing the dilemma of making instant

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pragmatic choices or identify, articulate and be inspired by following up the proper vocations, leaded by cultural and spiritual layers.

The 20th century and the two first decades of the 21st once again testified that the cultural and social processes enhanced by the “imperialism” processes, had initiated and influenced deeply the positions that the countries of the region were going to follow. This mainly referring to the after second world war, where the West and East camps, the communist and capitalist one, challenged and faced each other, as they did delineate their borders exactly in this area.

This has been developed following a cyclic model, which has been demonstrated in the recent history of the last 20 years for the Western Balkans countries, which one more time found themselves in the conditions of re- articulation of their identities, now in logics of globalization, dealing with a social and economic system totally to be renewed. These titanic efforts are held in a global background, characterized by a mobile economic and social environment. This situation always forced the Western Balkans countries to consider the integration and global challenges when they evaluate their achievements of self re-construction.

Economic growth, political and social transformations in this region are always to be referred to the necessary standardization to be achieved due to EU membership and integration agendas, and this is valid for members and aspirant members. They have been preceded from considerable achievements, thanks to reforms undertaken, which guarantee conformity and continuity in the articulated aspiration the countries of the region to be member of NATO, the political and military alliance which today mostly affect the destiny of the world.

Actually, the growth in such indicators as GDP and FDI's, the administrative and legal reforms, which evolved with great speed in this region for the two last decades, have been affected by the trembling of the financial crises showing their effects in the EU and NATO agendas of the countries in the region. In any case this is not an uniform behavior, because this is a strong reading for differentiating the conviction of these countries in following those agendas.

It is definitively one of those historic moments for the countries of the region in inducing their future behavior. The dilemma of continuing with determination the above mentioned agendas or establishing economic, social and politic alliance of the kind: “Good morning, Balkans”.

Balkan's past, present and future in sublimation

A lot of time has passed since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003.

Time, beside reinforcing behaviors and courses followed by countries of the area, in different occasions, posed significant question marks in different specific moments of those transitions from those countries, regarding the validity of this set of purposes and this prospected future as well.

Following up this agenda, the area is shaped as a set of member countries, candidate and aspirant countries, engaged to be part of the European Union reality.

All these countries facing a promising and strongly important geo-political area, that of Mediterranean Sea.

While pursuing these long-run objectives, the compounding countries of the area have showed different levels of state and institutional settlement, by accelerating or delaying their agenda toward EU.

For instance, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia have showed a greater stability on their institutional system.

There are still pending issues which are a strong impediment for the general climate on an EU prospective for the South West Balkan countries.

Belgrade has to face and solve its problems with some national strategic issues (old alliances and new partnerships) and its attitude toward Kosovo.

Enlarging this discussion seems that Balkan countries have lost their potential for national reconstruction.

Referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina, we merely see a mechanical compendium instead of a nation; the ethnic division presses strongly on the weak national concept for the country in accordance with political and administrative boundaries.

Kosovo, the youngest country in the map of this region, faces often the risk to lack the institutional rule of law which can be overlapped by a clan based system undermining the social, political and economic development of this young state.

At the same time, more efforts are required from Albania and Monte Negro to enhance their institutional development in order to achieve EU membership standards.

In comparing today's panorama in South West Balkan on its EU agenda with that of 10 years ago, obviously strong advancements on their standardization toward EU²

Crisis??? In bad or worst?!

How does the Balkan panorama look under the strains of European and worldwide economic crises?

Following up main developments and dialectics on Balkan countries, a general tendency to follow European trends can be easily identified, particularly in such generalist indicators as economic growth, unemployment, GDP per capita, as well as they show a general deterioration in such indicators deeply important for those countries such as remittances.

This means that when it comes to recovery for their economies, they will undoubtedly follow similar recovery curves as those of EU countries, but in the case of Balkan countries the shape of this recovery will be "slightly" different, considering the limited capacity to reinforce positive trends due to the unstructured economy and state consolidation.

Even if in some cases optimistic figures of DGP growth in those countries appear, they are still far behind the levels they must achieve to fulfill EU agenda.

Referring developments during the last 20 years in this region, unemployment has been the major cause for emigration particularly toward EU countries. Derived situation due to crisis in unemployment in EU countries resulted in increased unemployment in Balkan area as well.

Increased prices particularly in the primary sector in EU resulted in a improved current account balance and trade deficit. It is not the case to be optimist then, since it obviously shows that this improvement is not the result of effectiveness of the undertaken reforms.

The governmental debt initially showed an improvement in general, beside Greece, but in the last months, increasing the public and governmental debt has become an option for budgeting in most of the countries.

² EU enlargement: Priorities for 2014, EU Commission, Press releases Database

This economic trends and features are sponsored by the level of economic interdependency among Balkan countries and a restricted group of EU countries (such as Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, France, Spain, Netherlands and UK).

Trade flows are a very good reading in this regard.

This reinforces the fact that the economic recovery of Balkan countries has a strong inner-correlation as well as it depends from developments in such economic sectors in EU countries which are object of trade and exchange between EU and Balkan countries.

A historical view of GDP indicators is also a good tool for analysis and reaching up to some conclusions regarding Balkan development.

The economic panorama before 2008 testifies for a visible supremacy on GDP growth of Balkan countries over EU countries, by registering an annual economic growth from 6.7% to 10.7%. The cold financial wind that blew over EU dramatically affected Balkan economies in general.

This inertia in reaction showed to be substantial since it affected trends and drops in annual growth such as the case of Croatia (from 2.4 up to -5.8) or Serbia (from 5.5% up to -3%), diminished the chances for most of Balkan countries to achieve the same growth levels as they did have before crisis.³

Under an EU integration optics, this missions becomes important and hard to fulfill at the same time, considering that Balkan countries must conform themselves to EU in this economic indicator, and they are far behind in doing this.

Two very important readings to be considered are unemployment levels and remittances, both very incisive for the social and economic development of this area.

Balkan countries in general did previously have problems with their unemployment levels, Crisis, by shooting down and downsizing investment in some core sectors with a high employment rate, increased visibly the levels of unemployment. While facing the same situation EU countries trust in solid stabilizers, the lack of these last one due to the poor level of state and law rule in general in Balkan countries, add more drama to the unemployment situation in this area.

Peak figures for this have been registered in Serbia, Macedonia, BiH and Kosovo by reaching from 1/3 to 1/2 of the active population.

Migration flows has been for the last 23 years a typical characteristic for Balkan countries. At the same time, the earnings of migration represented a standing column for their domestic economies.

Now the situation of migration and its financial effect is totally different.

Due to crisis in EU countries, unemployment, reduced earnings from the migration population from Balkan in EU, dialectics with emigrant families, have caused a great reduction of remittances affecting directly SME-s which has been feed by them, investments in rural areas and other sectors which access in the financial market for crediting is limited.

³ Data and forecast by Eurostat and ECFIN, releases 2009, 2011 by DG Economic and Financial Affairs, updated in spring 2012.

The trade balance testify for the great discrepancy between imports and exports and the final result of this is the negative balance those countries have, such as in the case of BiH, Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo reaches an average of 37%. Due to inflation in the primary sector prices in EU an improvement in the trade balance has been observed, but it is not still the case to be enthusiastic since this does not show an improvement of the price/quality ration of the product and services those country offer. Only the last one gives hope for a stability trend in the economic development and once again in this significant indicator Balkan countries are behind the EU average.

Even countries actually member of EU such as Greece and Bulgaria are net debtors and this has affected investment drastically.⁴

South East Balkan, economic scenarios, security and NATO

The recent story of this area, with countries coming out from the communist camp at the beginning of the '90-s, can be characterized by continuous striving to rebuild themselves to face a new world, in the middle of a overall race, fighting for gaining an important and guaranteeing "organ" or "limb" in the "globalization entity".

Considering the priority of building the market economy and the rule of law, most of the countries part of South West Balkan, had to rebuild their economies, markets and finances. Adding some complexity to this, the total lack of stabilizers and supporters in achieving those major objectives, places those countries in positions of total weakness and incapability to find domestic resources necessary for state, economy and society building.

In simple word, capacity building needs funding and building of the market economy needs Foreign direct investments. It means that in the case of Western Balkan they are vital, considering that due to their EU agenda they still need to adopt their economic structure with that of the EU member countries.

The increasing number of FDI-s in the region testifies that the outcomes of risk evaluation indicate a prosperity projected future which incents FDI-s. Making a comparative analysis before and after crisis among FDI curve and that of the above mentioned indicators, it is clear that the level in which crisis affected the last ones, is different from FDI's dialectics. For instance, before 2008 the most attractive countries for FDI-s in the region were Bulgaria and Montenegro having a share of 30% and 20% of their overall investments from FDI's.

Actually good figures of this indicator show that countries as Montenegro and Albania are experiencing a fertile situation with FDI's while others show a diminishment but still not the ame they experienced for the other indicators.

The attractiveness of the resources of this area are still strong, as they have been even 20 years ago. What did change here comparing with the past, is that from a region with an elevated business risk due to low political stability and rule of law, now the consideration are drastically changed.

The strong will those countries have been and are still showing toward EU integration and NATO membership, are a valid indicator for the expectations and

⁴ Data by UN Statistic Division 2012

values of their societies, as well as they are a vivid demonstration of social evolution toward a new established and reinforced agreement between their citizens, the state, perception of human rights and social responsibilities.

The increased presence of NATO in the region and the deep commitment of region's countries to be fully integrated in the alliance, indicate for a status of equilibrium and stability referring domestic political behavior, the adopted of good neighborhood principle and in setting up regional project and collaboration in fulfilling the proper responsibilities toward NATO, by creating a wide basin of collaboration in the prospective of a common future inside EU.

Still, referring to this prospective future, the way to EU is long to do and the imperative for growth and stability are strongly imposed over the governments of the countries of the area. In economic terms two objectives to be achieved in managing public finances are the lowering of governmental deficit to a level of less than 3% and not exceeding the public debt more than 60%.

In both cases, the region will need to increase the financing of their investments and have a leverage for their economies by attracting more FDI's through an established system that guaranties them and decreases the economic, political and social risk perception.

This means to demonstrate continuously a stronger integration will while demonstrating a stronger readiness to support and achieve what's necessary to fulfill standards.

Synopsis on South West Balkan

Energy is for sure the main subject in all sentences articulated to describe and forecast the economic and geo-politics future of Balkan, as it is also one of the main affecting factors in all economic and political scenarios in Europe and worldwide.

The map of energy resources provision in Western Balkan before the starting of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project, showed to be an accumulation of countries, which soak to provide energy resources based on a national plan, trying to gain the maximal profitability from chances and structures that used to operate in this area. They were still far behind of setting up a long run strategy in increasing their independence for energy resources or at list in diversifying their energy portfolio by decreasing the ultimate price of energy and assuring for long periods ahead their energy sources. Considering the factors mentioned above, the lack of internal subsidiaries and the need of gaining more and more FDI-s to leverage the strategic sector of their economies, the chances to have a long run solution for domestic energy need for a single country as an independent entity, are definitively low.

For instance, most of those countries, referring gas resources provision, depended on Russian gas (BiH, Macedonia 100% of dependence, Serbia 88%, Croatia 39).

Albania, Monte Negro and Kosovo dot not have yet connection with the gas distribution network depending actually from coal, oil and renewable energies as well as other resources.

The huge economic growth the Eastern Europe countries showed on the two last decades (5%) generates demand for gas energy. In this way, while aspiring and being EU members, those countries will have fulfilled their energy needs by protecting the environment.

TAP actually will bring energy from the Kaspik Sea and the capacity of physical flow in opposite sense of the natural gas that can be fastly activated in case of emergency is such that it may fulfill EU needs.

This will make the region get connected with other new gas resources such as North Africa as well as other diversified sources of liquid gas such as in Italy.

Another attraction of this project is the ability to get connected and make use of different existing pipeline systems of the region by integrating TAP as part of the energy ring in Western Balkan, by fulfilling energy needs of this area.

Actually, the MOU signed between TAP and the Ionian Adriatic Project will strongly widen the TAP gas distribution network by making use of the distribution capacities and terminals through IAP into Northern Albania, BiH and Croatia.⁵

At the same time, it is expected to cause a significant decrease in energy prices and no public money from the involved countries will be spent for this purpose since the project is a private investment.

Another very important outcome of this project will be the increased level of independence in energy resources provision in EU, as it is expected to improve the ultimate portfolio price on energy as well.

This represents a very important and drastic evolution in the perception and planning of the future of Western Balkan, since it is a scenario that integrates instead of increasing worthless competition and division.

By considering it as an outcome of the projection of a common future in EU for the countries of the area and considering the engagement to maintain and reinforce the core values, vision and mission that members or aspiring members of NATO share referring collaboration and integration in the region, positive forecast for this area can be projected.

Maybe it is the case that the phrase “Let us hope so”, now, in the most instable area on the historical point of view, means “We are working together to make it happen”.

⁵ Good will on TAP- IAP signed in Tirana, Natural Gas Europe White Paper, May 2013

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THE IMPORTANCE OF GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Xhemal GJUNKSHI¹

Abstract: *In the last decade there has been a geo-strategic change associated with technological achievements which thus require a conceptually new use of military force. Technological progresses are actually changing the rules on how military operations will take place, and the way the Armed Forces will be organized.*

Strategic and operational environment for the next 10-20 years will be complex and constantly changing, and it has to bring a new dynamic to future operations and the use of the joint force, making obviously difference from classical military operations to peacekeeping and humanitarian ones.

This developing environment will be crucial in the strategy, doctrine, organization, equipment, leadership, training, personnel, infrastructure and standards of the future force. The new strategic orientation of NATO, confronted to the challenges and opportunities of the future has hereto created a perspective and comprehensive reference framework for the adaption of national strategies. Albania has not only the chance but even the mere obligation to adapt strategic character documents that predate the NATO membership to the actual documents of the Alliance. This is thereby a very important process which has now arrived in the final stage.

Geo-political and strategic trends

The development of the Great Powers capacities will therefore continue even though the trend is the consolidation of a multi-power and globalized world. The stability and security of energy and raw material resources will therefore remain a central issue for the Great Powers for the forthcoming future. A main objective for the future will be the guarantees in the security of supply through strategic corridors. It is thereby a well-known fact that the term “geo-strategy” is most often used, in the global context, as examination and global distribution of land and sea, distances and approach among other geographic factors in the strategic planning and action.

In a more narrow aspect, the definition of geo-strategy is used in a more limited framework, where the sum of geographic factors interact to influence or give priority to

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an opponent, or to intervene in order to modify strategic planning and even political and military undertakings².

The geo-political, strategic and geo-strategic expressions are used to convey the following meanings: *Geo-politics* reflects the combination of geographic and political factors that determine the position of a country or region, highlighting the impact of geography on politics; *Strategy* refers to the full and planned application of measures to achieve a central aim of military importance; *Geo-strategy* merges geo-strategic and geo-political considerations³.

Geo-strategy describes the action of a state's foreign policy and does not deal with motivation or decision-making processes. A state's geo-strategy, therefore, is not necessarily motivated by geographic or geo-political factors. A country can project power in another country for ideological reasons, interest groups, minorities, ethnic or religious ties or simply by the caprice of its leader. Regional, European or global cooperation will be seen exactly in this kind of geo-strategic environment, where geographic boundaries as they come promptly disappear.

Geo-strategy is the geographical direction of a country's foreign policy⁴. More precisely, geo-strategy describes the efforts of a state to project military power and to steer the diplomatic activity. The main uncertainty is that states have limited resources and are not able, even if they are willing, to perform any act or incitement in the foreign policy. Instead they should focus politically and militarily on specific areas of the world. In this regard it is worthwhile to study the future of the world on a global scale.

The United States will remain the paramount strategic actor globally in the coming decades, although this will be a growing challenge. NATO the Alliance led by US will continue to be an organization promoting peace and international stability, while operations in accordance to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will be increasingly scarce.

China is expected to emerge as the biggest Asian military power and world power. The relationship between U.S. and China will be of great importance for global strategic stability, as it will be affected by the emergence of other powers such as India or Brazil, which will require a greater impact.

Russia as a major dominant country of important resources of energy and as a great military power, will continue to be an important and crucial factor and moreover it will determine the european and world policy in the years 2020-2030.

Europe will continue to enhance its role where France and Germany will continue to be the key economic and military factors. United Kingdom and Italy will therefore be other economic and military important factors, that will meet the strategic european interest, as well as NATO's. Europe has hereto started a substantial debate on the construction of a security community which represents a further step in developing a new security relationship in the OSCE area, taking into account the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Euro-Mediterranean dimension.

² Joo Lim-Jock, Geo-Strategy and the basin of the South China Sea.

³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan (emphassis in original) [12].

⁴ Jakub J. Grygiel, Powers and geopolitical change (emphassis in original) (14)

Complexity and interstate character of these phenomena highlight the importance of collective action and the necessity of mutual confidence measures building. The presence of risk by these phenomena has made necessary a comprehensive approach to security and stability policies, taking into consideration all aspects: political, military, economic, human, social, environmental, informational, etc. Asymmetric risks of non-military nature (non-classical military) constitute major challenges for all countries of the world as well as for the Republic of Albania.

Regional cooperation plays an important role in the development of trust and open policies in the region. Stability, security and cooperation that characterize the Alliance states are gradually exported to the Balkan states, creating favourable conditions for a safe region with premises for development in the entire region. Despite the progress made in the recent years, Eastern Europe continues to face challenges from the historical factors, as well as from the fragility of democracy of countries in the region.

Historical developments have identified Balkans as an area of frequent conflicts and tension. The reasons of numerous crises that have characterized this part of Europe are explained by ethnic divisions, fusion of different cultures and religious communities, underdevelopment in economy, culture and democracy. After almost more than two decades of war, instability and insecurity, yet with the independence of the Republic of Kosovo, the Balkan region seems to have entered the phase of stability, development of democratic institutions, economic development and Euro-Atlantic integrations. Becoming an integral part of the West, Balkan region loses somewhat its unfortunate condition of the doubt between east and west. Often in the past, due to the geo-strategic position, this region has been involved in the configuration of influences and interests of various world powers, which many times have influenced its transformation to an area of confrontations and conflicts.

Albania is part of a geo-strategic environment which is considered, on the one hand, as a Balkan environment with all the inherited historical problems and, on the other hand, as a European one, which the western democratic countries influence positively for stability, democratization and integration. Albania has no animosity towards countries in the region, furthermore as it is a member of NATO it aims to promote peace and stability. With its protective capacity building, it does not intend to harm others, but to contribute to security and peace in the region and beyond borders, and to be able to deal with the inflowing threats. Its military doctrine is defensive and not offensive in character⁵.

The Republic of Albania (RoA) has taken and is taking continuous measures in order to strengthen internal security. In addition, Albania with its contribution to peacekeeping operations under UN, NATO, and EU has become a country that contributes to improving the security situation at global level.

NATO, in the coming years, will increase its ambitions for security cooperation plans, playing a key role as the centre of global security. Establishing close links with global partners in Asia, Africa and other countries will be crucial for ensuring security in the future in the Euro-Atlantic area⁶.

⁵ DP-01 2013 (Albanian Military Doctrine)

⁶ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO during an important political speech, July 4th, 2012.

The correct balance between the allies is the essential element for NATO's continued success for 2020 and far beyond. This can only be achieved by focusing on goals, liabilities and shared leadership between European and North American Allies.

Development trends of the environment for the future

Population growth and migration related to high levels of urbanization will affect on important aspects of the operating environment, as well as of the conflicts that occur within it. Trends in these conditions would probably lead to an escalation of existing tensions, as well as recall that some operations will likely take place in a large and dense urban environment, consisting of a variety of people, interests, aptitudes and various alliances.

Severe weather effects - possibly related to climate change and environmental degradation are likely to have significant impacts on the population, especially in low-lying coastal and highland areas. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in these circumstances may require the development of new efforts by air and sea.

Intersection of the physical and virtual worlds will become increasingly important, with different segments of the population, perhaps acting as elements of “**virtual communities**”, with many interests and capable of quick impact throughout the world, as well as the translation of geographically-remote problems to local problems. Technological advances will lead to new types of network and applications architectures, which will be implemented by the Armed Forces, but also by the neutral and even opponents. On 2030, military personnel and their opponents are likely to be the most sophisticated users of virtual environments, as well as the growth of communication will provide the means to integrate the capability of all military capacities, thereby increasing the rate of force generation and application of military power.

Trends of skills and new technologies development

Significant technological developments in the next 20-30 years will likely occur in the areas of information and communication technology, sensor/network technology, biotechnology, materials, and manufacturing, storage and distribution of energy. Led developments in the application of energy, **nanotechnology**, high-speed, artificial intelligence and robots will continue to be areas of interest for the defence.

Creating the most advanced tools of armed struggle based on “cutting-edge” technology, inevitably leads to a return or a change in the nature of armed conflict and in the forms and its popular methods⁷.

Changes in technology will affect the future operating environment. Increasingly cheaper technology will allow the replacement of systems to ensure a high cooperation of military capacities, as well as the most effective supply systems, which will be on high alert. Despite the ongoing global trends towards a smaller number of victims, the environments

⁷ Maj. Gen. Pertti Salminen, “Finland's Comprehensive and Military Defence doctrines responding to Emerging threats and new technologies”, High Level Seminar on military Doctrine, Vienna, May 2011.

Dr. Andrea Nativi, Military Expert, Italy on “New technologies, new requirements, new doctrines: how defense technology is adapting to and affecting changes in military doctrines and operations”.

in which are performed individual tasks, missions and operations will become increasingly lethal, therefore trade and smuggling of weapons will continue to be an important centre of efforts.

The future asymmetric threats to national and international security are already becoming more frequent.

In the military campus, they are displayed in a wider use of forms of indirect methods of warfare, such as: the war of information, misinformation of public opinion both in individual countries and in countries of the international community as a whole, the opposition of governance systems and participation in conflicts of quite irregular armies.

“Network Fight” has begun to emerge as a result of the emergence of asymmetric threats in today’s world. Its main features are: the lack of a clear boundary line between the opposing parties, with the objective of transforming the awareness of the public where the information and psychological dimension is therefore added to the previous traditions.

As a modern war option, the information itself will be a primary target in future conflicts. Today there are being developed, and are likely to be developed weapons designed to destroy or downgrade information, sensors, networks and communication systems, including anti-satellite microwaves and laser weapons. These advances might have a positive development, but they can also reduce the basic aspects of information for the RoA and its AF. RoA, with its modest efforts in several directions, as that of digitalized control of air and sea space, but also the process of modernization of the Coast Guard, through the construction of new patrol vessels, is an example showing that the efforts in this direction should continue to walk along with the pace of time, and thus becoming one of the most effective AF in the region and an example for the others.

The proliferation of distant range and great precision weapons, as well as weapons of mass destruction, along with new forms of cyber and space war, will lead to interweaving and distribution of state and non-state actors with interest groups on assets, future conflict escalation and extension beyond traditional battle space. Advances in information technology will create new synergies by combining the accuracy of weapons, increase of the level of intelligence and a wider use of artificial and robotic intelligence will provide the enhance of command-control capabilities. This will require even the increase of readiness concerning space (air and sea) surveillance systems, by continuously modernizing and adapting them to the changes.

War in the future and implications (entanglements) for future joint force

Common security is one of the three core tasks of NATO. In an unpredictable world, which is rapidly changing and becoming increasingly interconnected, it is essential for the Alliance to invest in strong partnerships with countries and organizations around the globe. “Partnerships are key to meeting the challenges of the coming decades”.

Success in future conflicts will see the approach between fighting with complementary activities on the increase of influence. “Soft power”⁸ is always going to affect the relief

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor - “Soft power is a concept developed to describe the ability to withdraw and replace in lieu of forced violence, th utilization of money as a persuasion means”;

and achievement of political goals. The degree to which a state or group of states can combine “hard and soft power”⁹ will determine the achievement of strategic objectives.

According to Joseph Nye, the concept “hard and soft power” is the ability to use the stick and carrot, therefore, economic and military power might make others to follow your will.” Here, “carrots” are incentives such as reduction of trade barriers, an alliance offer or promise of military defence. Conversely, “sticks” are threats involving the use of coercive diplomacy, the risk of military intervention or economic sanctions implementation.

A sophisticated understanding of conflict, i.e. the actors involved in it, the mosaic of interests, expectations and its supportive alliances is desperately needed as it plays out of environments generated by the proliferation and rapid evolution of information and communication technologies. By developing this skill, there may be required new approaches in the collection and processing of information, cultural attitudes, individual and collective training education. Integration will continue to provide an efficient way to generate strategic advantage and superiority.

The ability to create, adapt and manage an effective strategic decision-making, and ensuring good governance will be vital for success. This will require the joint force integration in national planning in the context of crisis management. The desired outcome is achieved through a structured system aiming to support executive decision-making in a complex abundant-with-information environment.

Joint force will continue to operate as a component of institutional partnership and international coalitions focused on conflict prevention and inhibition rather than war, while the ability to fight effectively will remain an essential element. Joint force will be involved in complex conflicts that may occur in a “conflict” distributed space which affects both physical and virtual operating environments. Operations will likely require very different actions being performed simultaneously by units scattered throughout the area of operations. Operational planning approaches that come in following stages may not be sufficient for operations in 2030 environment.

Technical networks (integrated communication and information systems) provide increased the AF interaction with a wide range of actors or organisms and other organizations, formal and informal, providing access to the resources and necessary expertise to manage the complex challenges of security. The ability to distribute forces within the areas of operation may increase the possibility of the joint force to gather information, expanding its capacities to exert influence and to achieve the intended objectives.

The ability to generate a deep understanding between the social and technical networks and the proficiency to establish consensus among decision-making hierarchical structures characteristic of military organizations with the public sector, will be essential for military operations by 2030. The information will include the 2030 operating environment. Ability to create awareness and understanding between the joint force and military - civilian partners under defence framework, will definitely help operational success¹⁰.

⁹ Ernest J. Wilson (March 2008) - “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power” - The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

¹⁰ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, August 2005.

The concept of joint operations for the future

The main assumption on which this concept is relied upon is that, in future times to the years 2020-2030, the competition will continue to characterize the relations between states and peoples, and normally, this competition will take place within a broadly accepted framework of international laws and conventions, and when this framework is going to be violated, then chances are it will possibly trigger a conflict. In this context, the AF will meet auxiliary tasks during the competition (peacetime) and primary tasks in times of conflict. Because the conflict and competition can occur at the same time, then these tasks can be performed simultaneously.

In times of conflict AF will conduct combat operations in the country's security function, where prevention and engagement will be primary tasks. Humanitarian assistance and encouragement in disasters will be necessary and will be carried out at any time. In difficult situations, the joint forces will need to be able to operate and integrate in the entire environment of operations: land, sea and air. War will remain the most complex and dangerous task of AF. It will remain a totally human effort. The nature of the conflict, for which a joint force will be prepared cannot be predicted in details.

Prevention remains the main task of military strategy. In accordance to military strategy, the joint force must be able to demonstrate combat skills and defeat the opponent's attacks in a relatively short time. Joint force will operate within a political context described by legitimate authorities of the Republic of Albania. Military operations must be adapted to national security plans to establish relations between the military and civilian tasks, which allocate resources and impose restrictions. This situation will determine the role of the joint force over a designated uncertainty, and the extent to which it will function as a supporting force to a broader view.

The Concept of Joint Operations Development (JOpsDC) will make it possible to identify future military problems and propose innovative solutions and brand new ways to perform the operations. The vision of future operations through the development of new concepts will describe how a commander, by using military art and science, can use the necessary skills to meet the challenges of the future¹¹.

The conflicts can develop into an international political context and that because of the number and range of organizations that may be involved in. Interdependence of states and peoples, as well as the proliferation of communication technologies development, will conduct a global dimension to many conflicts. As a result, military forces must maintain its capacities to provide the necessary assistance to multinational and coalition operations in support of global security and rules based on international order. The nature of war and violent human competition, which is a fusion of risk, chance and policy has not changed over the centuries. But its nature makes it unpredictable, so, inevitably and constantly changing. Defence evolves as a result of new security challenges related to security, as well as that of future operating environment leads to a conflict, if this is likely to happen.

¹¹ General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA "The Concept of Joint Operations", The 12th Annual International Conference for the Concept Development and Experiment on Vilnius, Lituani, 6-8 November 2012.

Armed Forces of RoA have sufficient capacities to apply military force on time

The progressive opening of Albania to global developments, its integration in economic, political and cultural structures, regional and global, inevitably brings in a set of complex challenges, opportunities and risks, with various opportunities to influence the security and defence of the country. In contrast to the Cold War period, when the significant and relatively predictable and casted risks, constituted the major problem for the security and defence of the country, the fundamental problem today is represented by those kind of risks that cannot be easily identified, cannot be easily predicted, nor can be easily met. Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania, after the country's full membership in NATO, are conceived, built and used as strength of the Alliance. NATO membership has established strategic and political preconditions for the creation of a modern AF, efficient and modest in sizes and in cost.


Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania can be used to support and boost the RoA policy goals, but its use will continue to require a clear assessment of long-term consequences. The force should not be used in a way that creates a hostile environment to the interests of the Republic of Albania after the conflict.

Therefore, the joint force must exercise military power making the necessary distinctions, in accordance to the principles set by the political leadership, international laws and obligations, and RoA interests, to minimize casualties and collateral damage, as a strand to improve international relations, as positively in the future.

The relatively small size of the joint force means that it will not be able to apply the stability and great power of fire in combat. Precision will continue to replace the amount and exact calculation of the operations and will continue to be on redeemed operations acting in a manner that will ensure coherence loss of enemy's efforts. At the same time, the accuracy in the application of military force to be a normative value in international operations and a value that the military forces of RoA have to share with other co-participants.

As forces of a NATO member country, the Armed Forces of RoA must be fully compliant with the corresponding ones, providing the required level of standardization and interoperability. RoA with its AF is keen to ensure the defence and security of the country and to expand and strengthen its role in contributing to a more secure regional and international environment. Being a member of NATO, but also of other international organizations, such as obtaining the candidate status for EU membership, as well as the successful bilateral and multilateral relations with different countries in the region and beyond, make it possible the RoA interests and the achievement of the objectives set out in the NSS (National Security Strategy).

In the newly created conditions, security and defence of Albania is no longer considered not only as a nationally isolated obligation, but as a complex national and international commitment. For the defence of Albania, there are already calculated even the capacities of NATO, which are activated in addition to the obligations fulfilment of all member countries, under the Washington Treaty.



The main purpose for which there are being maintained and prepared the Armed Forces is their engagement to fulfil the constitutional mission to protect the country. To achieve this goal, the AF build maximum capacity in qualitative terms, but also optimal in quantitative ones¹².

Armed Forces remain a powerful and effective tool to cope with the threats and challenges in the defence and security field. The first function which is fulfilled by the AF is the defence of national sovereignty, in conjunction with NATO forces. They also serve as an operational reserve, ready to engage in emergencies. AF are involved in carrying out missions for the fulfilment of obligations as a member of NATO (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) or in carrying out missions in the service of peace in multinational operations led by NATO, EU, UN or other international structures. In this context, the key thing for the future remains the review of the required military capacities (RoA AF structures), procedures, organization, planning in order to meet the requirements of “force capability” in facing new strategic challenges of security and defence. In this section, reinforcement should be placed on the development of human factor mainly through institutional development, for the education-training and further improvement of C2.

The efficient use of defence resources and providence of full support to the activities of RoA AF, by logistic systems and equipment, with modern infrastructure and more

¹¹ DP-01 2013 (Albanian Military Doctrine)

¹² AJP-1(D) Joint Allied, 2010, page 38.

qualitative services, must get the necessary place and thus be a top priority for the future force development.

New Military Strategy which is currently under preparation will establish conceptual basis for the transformation and development mode of operations of the Armed Forces of RA and of those with participation from individual defence concepts, relying on national resources and transition to the concepts and principles of collective defence.

In this context, Albania's defence capacities are calculated to be engaged in the service of the Alliance's security and defence, respectively of the allied countries, based on the same principles and obligations. Lack of proper identification and forecasting of future risks forces obliges the security and defence structures to be oriented towards a multi-value capacity building, which should be able to, in the shortest time possible, react with effectiveness and success against unknown risks. The upcoming profile of AF should take into account these new strategic factors.

Armed Forces of RoA, conceived as part of a military alliance in peacetime, do not plan the creation of the whole spectrum of operational capabilities that are necessary to achieve unilateral military success. Taking into account the fact that, at the national level and under the framework of international commitments, the Armed Forces will operate as part of the allied forces, the operational capacity planning is oriented in the direction of these forces profiling. The nature of the threats and risks that need to be faced by the Armed Forces requires them to be capable and ready for military defence (or fight), to support civil authorities (or to help the Albanian people), as well as to serve to the general peace (or to assist other peoples).

CONCLUSIONS:

- Security environment, as well as technology developments, requires an integrated developing manner of strategy and operations, a way of treatment that combines conceptually war levels expressed in the National Security Strategy. For the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces will remain a key factor in international issues.
- The high possibility of using asymmetric tactics in the military field requires appropriate measures to respond to threats on time. Furthermore, steps should be taken not only at national level but also at the level of interstate cooperation, including military domain too.
- In forecasting the development of the military-political situation in our region, is therefore essential to assess factors such as: low level of economy and energy resources constraints, ethnic war, national or religious extremism, uncontrolled migration, as well as the existence of weapons under the possession of uncontrolled individuals and groups. RoA is and will continue to be active in the cooperation and support of regional initiatives by playing an important positive role in the security in the region and beyond.

- Threats and risks to RoA pose challenges that require new ways of response. The nature of the challenges and national interests demand that the Armed Forces operate fully integrated across the range of future joint operations. These operations can be done in conjunction with the military forces of allies and coalition partners of RoA, state agencies, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
- Future military operations will be integrated more closely with political, diplomatic, informational and economic activities in such a manner that through the application of national power in its entirety to enable the achievement of competition management, even if it has therefore taken the form of armed conflict. Military operations will continue to occur in the political framework and by growing demands in order to provide resources at strategic, operational and tactical level.
- Future operations will continue to include sea, land, air and space. The battle will continue to include the social space of the political, economic, intelligence and cultural activity. However, information technologies arch simultaneously in an integrated manner and to share traditional battlefields, in environmental properties and social spaces, are emerging as key areas on which is fought to ensure priority.
- Very few military operations will be limited by geography. Global information networks, the expansion of cyber and electronic war and the importance of international public opinion will affect on by undermining the efforts to establish sustainable limits in the theatre of operations, but it will not bring the end of the collision force by force.
- War in 2030 will be less characterized by physical strain and suffering than previous conflicts, but we can expect that the collision force with force boost expected violence commitments.
- In this environment, the war concepts that address war fighting capabilities as a priority to achieve key operational objectives of control and influence will provide only a part, although it still remains the most important, in the context exercising the operational art. Instead, operational planners and commanders will need to coordinate military activities in physical environments with activities in “virtual” ones.
- Battle space created by information technology will be a domain from which can be generated kinetic effects. In 2030, commanders will need to understand the interdependence of economic and financial exchange networks, networks that describe the ownership of resources, energy and services, and social networking engagement spaces that could be used for military purposes. Understanding this difference and correct positioning of AF, in this new battle space, it will be essential to success.
- Similarly, movements of population and urban growth create combinations that generate other trends of interest and loyalty within the community, while the increasing access to technical networks will create ways for the social factions

to form transcontinental “virtual communities” able to translate the problem of remote into local action. The future Force must have a deep understanding of human evolution if it deems to be successful.

- The response to conflict will seek to engage a lot of organisms even multinational ones besides military force, and the trend towards cooperation with numerous agencies and organizations will continue to the extent that the force of the future will be more and more a composite strength. The ability to combine and recombine structures, organizations and systems, in the operational level, fluid processes, within the composed Task Force, will be one of the main problems of the exercise of national power.

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CONCEPTUAL AND CATEGORICAL APPARATUS IN THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY: INTRODUCTION OF NEW CONCEPTS AND DILEMMAS

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Abstract: *Concepts of international security are not recent concepts, meaning that the terminology that follows the theoretical treatment of this subject has already been largely developed. However, only to some extent does this refer to global security, as it is the youngest security concept. That said, as this is a very dynamic field of science, there is a demonstrable need to clearly define and make a distinction in relation to the meanings of terms used in the theory and practice of international and global security. In this regard, it is necessary to improve the traditional terminology and construct a new one, which will take into account all the current events of contemporary international relations. Therefore, this paper represents an effort to contribute to the creation of the language of international and global security studies. It should be noted that references given in this paper are not quoted literally, but were instead seen as an inspiration to the authors with regard to defining concepts and, consequently, represent guidelines for a further study of this topic.*

Keywords: *security studies, international security, the international community, science vocabulary, scientific research, the methodology of international and global security research.*

Introduction

The current international order containing sovereign states was created by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, when the religious war that had been ravaging Europe for thirty years was finally terminated. It was a symbolic ending to the supreme reign of the Holy See and the Roman Pope, and saw the state becoming secular, its governance independent and separate from the church. Simultaneously, rulers became independent from the Holy See, with their governance being set up in such a manner that it held supreme power within their reigns. Therefore, it is a historical fact that this was when the first (i.e. Westphalian) state was created, characterised as it was by territoriality (integral territory) and stable population, both aspects being under the unique, independent and sovereign governance (political independence) (Mijalkovic, 2011:62)

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For almost half a millennium, the international community contained sovereign states, equal members of the international order. From the beginning of the XX century, aside from states, non-state international actors entered the international scene, primarily being international organizations and different aspects of international cooperation. Not long afterwards, multinational companies became another subject of international relations. Such a status, albeit often contested and questioned, has been attained by international non-government organizations and intelligence services, which have widely influenced the contemporary international situation.

Finally, on the brink of the third millennium, some informal subjects are considered to be active subjects of international relations and global security, such as transnational organized crime groups, terrorist organizations, as well as particular individuals whom have proven themselves in the role of international subjects (e.g. convicts at international war crimes courts). Therefore, the post-Westphalia world of heterogeneous (state and non-state) subjects is radically different from the so-called Westphalia order dominated by independent states.

International security studies are based on the need to stabilize, control and harmonize (otherwise anarchical) international relations, which are products of the impossibility to control the development of power and the use of force, i.e. due to regulatory weaknesses of international institutions. It is caused by states with asymmetric political, economic and military power that intend to achieve mutually conflictive interests (Mijalkovic, 2011:67).

At the same time, in the second half of the 20th century, the concept of 'world interests' was developed, 'as a compromise between the inherited sovereign state system and the growing interdependence of people in the protection from the destruction of conditions for civilized life on the planet, as well as the control and arbitration of national, sub-national and transnational conflicts that threaten the security of humanity.' This also conditioned the development of the concept of global security as a problem of the security of humanity and the planet from growing threats with global outreach (Mijalkovic, 2011: 81).

Therefore, in order to better comprehend and more easily understand the aforementioned security concepts, it is necessary to differentiate particular conceptual-categorical apparatuses which would serve to provide 'order' in the study of international and global security.

A review of basic concepts of international and global security

It would be overambitious and technically almost impossible to comprehensively and in detail present a conceptual-categorical apparatus of international security in just one paper. Therefore, only a brief terms and review of the concepts of basic categories of international and global security will be given. This will hopefully serve as an inspiration for the further development of the conceptual-categorical apparatus of this subject. First of all, the following concepts should be mentioned:

- *International security*, by which we understand the security of international order and community, i.e. security in the relations between states and international regions. It can be observed on planetary (planetary, world security), continental (continental security) and regional (regional security) levels (conf. Keohane, 2002);

- *International values* are a characteristic of the international order and system, and are protected within the scope of traditional and contemporary concepts of international security. They are proclaimed by the states within the international community framework,

i.e. through international organizations and alliances. Individual, group and national values are simultaneously the values of the international community because the international community, by various international documents and acts, promotes them, gives guarantees and intervenes in the case of them being endangered. The most important international values are the following: international peace and security, survival of humankind; international friendship, i.e. sincere cooperation and (complete) amicable international and interethnic political, economic, cultural, social, humanitarian, military and other relations; sincere international help to endangered countries and peoples; international and interethnic tolerance and respect for differences, law, honour, reputation, dignity and other values of the other; international law, standards and principles by which the values of individuals, states and the international community are defined, as well as the ways for their preservation and improvement; international justice that protects the international legal order from any possible threat, by which the realization of international and other values is guaranteed; international order, based on the system of aforementioned values etc (Mijalkovic, 2011:34).

- *International relations* are relations between subjects of international law, i.e. between subjects of international relations, namely: states, international organizations (including all types of civilian and military alliances), multinational companies, non-governmental organizations, intelligence services, international informal social groups (terrorist and criminal organizations) and individuals that have international legal subjectivity.

- *Types of international relations* are various, and go from neutrality (non-existent relations, disinterest and passivity towards certain international issues), via cooperation, to enforcement and conflicts. Therefore, generally speaking, international relations can be: neutral, interested, competitive, cooperative and conflictive (compare with: Tatalovic, 2006:228).

- *The use of force in international relations* is the abuse of state power for the sake of achievement, enjoyment, development and protection of personal or allied interests on the international scene, on the part of other subjects of international relations. The use of force is based on the capability of states to enforce certain behaviour from the other state or subjects towards which the power is aimed. It can be *open* or *hidden*; *military*, *political* or *economic*; *direct* or *indirect* – through third actors or on the territory of third countries; *legitimate* or *illegitimate*, i.e. *legal* or *illegal* etc. Governed by the idea of achieving their own interests at any price or being afraid for their own survival, states often disregard the importance of non-violent methods of international communication. Finally, the use of force as an *ultima ratio* tool for the defence of national interests from endangerment is legal and legitimate. Therefore, the ‘state power’ can have hegemonist (*conquering*, *subversive*, *aggressive*), but also preventive (*detering*), reactive (*defensive*, *protective*) and repressive (*punishing*) character;

- *Common security* is a concept based on the appropriateness of replacing competing states for the sake of their own national security with a practice that promotes the security of all states. Security is achieved more efficiently in community than with

one's own power. The acceptance of common security as an organizational principle in the efforts of decreasing the risk of war, limits of armament and disarmament means that, in general terms, cooperation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interest. That does not require the disappearance of differences between nations. The aim is to prevent conflict situations developing into war or preparation for war. Therefore, nations must understand the significance of world peace and give it a higher priority than a defence of their own ideological or political positions. Concepts of collective security and defence, but also concepts of security community, regime, complex and cooperation in security are based on this idea (conf. Baylis, 2006: 80, Buzan, Hansen, 2009: 102–103 и 176–182; Johansen, 1998: 387).

– *Force equilibrium (balance of power)* is a traditional concept of international security according to which world peace and the security of humanity are provided by establishment of approximately equal balance of power between competing states or groups of states. According to this formula, the lack of a dominating subject in the underlying international relationship and uncertainty about the winner in an assumed conflict is the most efficient 'brake' for a potential conflict. The concept is based on calculation according to which the power of one state or alliance cannot be restrained by anything else but the power of another state or alliance. Therefore, superiority of one side is prevented by creation of corresponding balance. An example of balance of power is the bipolar Cold War world (conf. Mala politička enciklopedija, 1966: 1 022; Giplin, 1981; Holsti, 1991);

– *Balance of fear* – is a form of the balance of power characteristic for the Cold War period, when the bipolar equilibrium of forces of the two blocs was based on mutual fear on both sides from the possible consequences of the (ab)use of weapons of mass destruction in the event of radicalization of international conflicts (the so-called 'nuclear security dilemma', marking the senselessness of the nuclear arms race for improving one's own security, which in fact creates an environment of general insecurity as a consequence). This order was also called the 'equilibrium of threats', as its goal was not to make one state or alliance equally as powerful as their opponents, but rather that their power would provide a response, i.e. deter the threats (conf. Tatalović, 2006: 232–233)

– *Equilibrium of interests* is a contemporary form of equilibrium of forces within whose framework, by using certain security regimes, the efforts of overcoming the nuclear security dilemma are made. These efforts are reflected in the consensual limiting of military nuclear capacities of separate states with the aim of establishing durable world peace (Mijalković, 2011: 70);

– *Collective security* is a traditional concept of international security based on the civil contractual association of a number of states with the aim of protection of peace and security of contracting states by peaceful solution of conflicts, collective (supranational) response to military attacks of particular member states on others, by deterring the aggressor state and defending the victim state, as well as by collective response to other security problems that member states would not be able to address on their own. It is based on the

principle of organized, institutionalized reaction of 'all against one', with which a higher level of peace and stability is provided, rather than the disorganized balance of power resulting from the 'each for himself' attitude. Essentially, it is every joint, bilateral or multilateral action of member states with the aim of defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more member states against the common enemy, with the elimination of war as a tool for resolving international conflicts. Examples of this concept of international security are the: European Treaty, League of Nations, United Nations, and multilateral diplomacy institutionalized in regional organizations (Organization of Nations of South-eastern Asia, African Unity Organization, Organization for European Security and Cooperation) (conf. Kupchan, C. A., Kupchan, C. A., 1995: 52–53; Viotti, P. R., Kauppi, M. V. 1997: 186–195);

– *Collective defence* is an international security mechanism comprising a military alliance of sovereign states allied with the aim of defence of their members from external military attacks (armed aggression). Member states participate in collective military response to an armed threat or an attack aimed at any alliance member. It differs from the collective security mechanism by having a military character; it resolves conflicts between member and non-member states through a military response. The best known collective defence mechanisms are NATO and Organization of American States (conf. Mijalković, 2009: 69-83);

– *The World Government* is the traditional idea of the international security according to which international conflicts cannot be resolved or overcome so long as the international community is comprised of a large number of sovereign states that dispose of their own independent power and between whom anarchical relations exist. According to this idea the key to international security would be the establishment of a powerful central institution that would have the right to make necessary decisions and to put them into practice. This would be the government of the whole world organized as a single state – the World Government. According to one model, this could be achieved by the creation of a global federation of existing states in which would be preserved a certain level of independence, yet would acknowledge the supremacy of supranational institutions. According to another model, a single world state would be created that would substitute and overcome all existing states and thus bring the whole world's population in direct connection with the central government. That could be achieved by imperialistic spreading of power of one existing state to the entire world by subjugation or the voluntary unification of states. Such a concept of international security has remained utopia and has not yet been realized (conf. Dimitrijević, Stojanović, 1977: 326-327);

– *Security community* is a contemporary international security concept based on the need of independent states for the establishment of a stable, peaceful cooperation and association. In other words, it is an idea of integration of states into a community which would, through honest, tolerant, peaceful and constructive international cooperation, eliminate the problems of the 'security dilemma' and wars as a way of resolving disputes and conflictive interests. One's own security is not achieved through the increase of military

power and the prioritisation of one's own interests, but rather by joint problem solving, the removal of security threats and achieving common interests. The essence is in the feeling of community, mutual sympathy between nations, loyalty to institutions and practice that are widely enough accepted in order to enable long-term 'peaceful exchange' between nations. The security community does not require the existence of formal alliances and the accompanying institutional frameworks. It can be: amalgamated, where states associate and create common institutions, and pluralistic, which presents a looser association between states whose value systems are not mutually excluded, and whose common identity enables a high level of connection and cooperation, exchange of opinions and close relationships. The consequence of security community is increased security cooperation. Examples of security community can be seen through the Nordic states and relations between EU members that have relinquished a part of their sovereignty in favour of the EU institutions (one economy and a single currency); relations between the USA, Canada and Australia, relations between the USA and western Europe, between the USA and Japan, as well as between the ASEAN members (Association of South East Asian Nations) (conf. Simić, 2002: 45, Adler, Barnet, 2006: 204-212)

– *Security regimes* are rules of engagement of states in the areas important for national and international security, in a manner in which achievement of particular national interests does not collide with values and interests of other states, alliances or international organizations. It is a common definition of certain norms, rules, procedures and principles in a particular area of international security (military, economic, ecological, police, legal etc), normally through international bilateral or multilateral agreements, that are to be respected by all sides that participated in their conception or that later voluntarily accepted them as their duty. The regime most often comes into existence when a group of states cooperates in the management of controversial issues with the aim of avoiding war, intending to decrease a security dilemma in a manner that, apart from independent acting, simultaneously takes into account the behaviour of other participants. Examples of security regimes are numerous, for instance the Schengen Agreement and a series of agreements on decreasing of strategic offensive (nuclear) armament, better known as SALT and START (conf. Baylis, 2006: 80, Kegli, Vitkof, 2006: 787);

– *Security complex* is a contemporary international security concept representing an arrangement of several states of one international region for the overcoming of exclusive interests of their national securities and the creation of a certain level of security harmony with the states in their immediate surroundings. It is a mechanism of so-called 'regional security', which intends to overcome the stereotypes of historical hostilities between neighbours (territorial aspirations, problems of delineating state borders, 'payback from earlier conflicts', problems and separatist appetites of ethnic minorities; problems of traffic, economy, ecological security etc.) and to create security interdependence. It comprises a group of states whose primary security concerns are so closely interlinked that the national security of one of them cannot be observed separately from others. Generally, a security complex is the reign of economic factors in which the military, political and societal

dimensions of regional security are based. This is the case because contemporary security threats (first of all, the security dilemma) often act on a wider, regional level, so security interactions with neighbouring states need to have the highest priority. States are thus stimulated to organize joint solutions to common security problems. That way, existing (and even traditional) rivalries are overcome, some smaller states can accomplish interests they would not be capable of achieving on their own, whilst bigger states, for the sake of peace in the region, accept concessions 'at the expense of efficiency of independent accomplishment of national interests'. The actors of regional security are states linked by geography and destiny in a given international region (e.g. Sweden and Finland; Arab League members; Maghreb states, etc). A security complex can be of a lower level when it is comprised of local states whose power does not extend further than their local surroundings, or when it does not extend over their borders at all, and of a higher level when it includes major powers whose power can extend much further than the borders of their immediate neighbours (e.g. USA, Russian Federation), or when they are powerful enough to influence several other regions, which, due to their big geographical area, then represent a 'local surrounding' (e.g. RF, China) (conf. Buzan, 1991: 187-190);

– *cooperative security concept, or cooperative security* is the most recent approach in relation to the achievement, preservation and improvement of international security by or through cooperation, at the expense of traditional competition between states for the sake of the increase of their own power and action in the manner of the 'security dilemma'. Although cooperation in security is not a new concept, it is used in order to distinguish this approach from the known forms of cooperation between states (alliances, pacts, balance of power, collective security, and collective defence). Its foundations are value-interest closeness and the awareness of the common future of interested parties, the development of a culture of mutual trust and long-term and voluntary cooperation, good faith and transparency between states. It is the policy of developing mutual trust on the basis of reciprocity or on the establishment of mutual identity, i.e. the avoidance of violence or threats, active support for negotiations, the search for new practical solutions and commitment to preventive measures. The structure of this concept is created by 'four rings': *individual security, collective security, collective defence and the improvement and promotion of stability* (so-called *Cohen rings*). At the core of this concept is the need for respect of human security in the member states as well as in the non-members. Endangering the individual security in one country is understood as a threat to security in other countries of the globalized world, which stimulates countries to intervene in order to protect victims and punish those who threaten them. In such situations the member states resort to the mechanisms of collective defence and security. Finally, the last ring points at the fact that preservation and improvement of inner security of a member state are not enough, but that an active relationship toward neighbouring and wider surroundings is needed in order to enhance and spread stability. This is necessary as a security threat in the surrounding societies can be reflected on the security of security cooperation member states; hence any violence should be prevented and suppressed, with respect to principles of non-intervention

in the domestic policies of independent countries and under the observance of competent international organizations. NATO is the most functional cooperative model in security in which military (defence) components and principles of collective security and defence are dominant, together with alleged promotion of individual, societal and national security. At the same time, the Organization for European Security and Cooperation functions partly on the principle of cooperation in security, mainly in the area of preventive diplomacy, preservation of peace and peace-building (conf. Bajagić, 2004: 85-86; Cohen, Mihalka, 2005: 3-17);

– *International security threats* are those phenomena that prevent the achievement, use and development of international values. Namely, those are phenomena of human origin and military character (war, military pressures, armed interventions), but also of non-military character (intelligence subversions, destructive propaganda, political and economic pressures and sanctions etc.);

– *Global security* is a concept of security of humanity from the ever more destructive challenges, risks and threats of planetary dimensions to which it is continuously exposed, and which can be overcome only by constructive cooperation of countries that will subordinate their national interests to the interests of humanity, i.e. to planetary interests. It is a concept that is still not completely developed and shaped, but which puts the needs, values and interests of humanity at the centre of its interest through the synthesis of international security and the universal level of human security, with the stress on contemporary economic problems, quality of life, environmental issues and weapons of mass destruction. A global system of global security protection is still not established, meaning that it is the states, national and international organizations (governmental and non-governmental) and numerous international professional and expert bodies, as well as individuals and social groups who address this issue. Therefore, the notion of the security of humanity excludes or limits actions of separate states from the position of power for the sake of selfish accomplishment of national interests, and requires national tolerance, respect of international law and regime, honest political will, responsibility, self-control and concessions for the sake of welfare of humanity, as well as for the development of a global security culture and ethics (Mijalković, 2011: 83)

– *Global (human, worldwide) values* are protected within the global security concept. Besides individual, societal, human, national and international values, they also include the: survival of human kind, demographic stability and rejuvenation of humanity; quality of life and health of the world population, which is increasingly threatened by the lack of food and water and new diseases (AIDS, bird flu, anthrax, SARS, swine flu); healthy environment and new, alternative energy sources; security of cosmic space, primarily from non-rational use, abuse for military purposes and pollution; stable and progressive world economy, based on non-discrimination, non-exploitation and even geographic development and representation; control of proliferation of WMD and phenomena that threaten human security on a large scale (NHB terrorism); global security culture and ethics based on

universal values, peaceful coexistence and tolerance defined by compromise (Mijalković, 2011: 34-35);

– *Global security endangerment* is a consequence of the internationalization and globalization of problems of individual, social and national security. Namely, it is the consequence of the internalization of particular carriers of security threats (e.g. organized crime, terrorism, high-tech criminal). Furthermore, the nature of some security problems is international, and even global (regional conflicts and wars, global terrorism and transnational organized crime, mass endangerment of human liberties and rights of a part of world population, environment degradation, impoverishment of the world population, expansion of the global health security hazards, modern illnesses and diseases, technological accidents and natural disasters, opposing problems of demographic development (demographic implosions and explosions), weapons of mass destruction etc.) Therefore, the fact is that the globalization of the modern world is followed by the tendency for globalizing security, as well as by the obvious globalization of insecurity etc. (Mijalković, 2011: 81-82)

– *Integrative approach to security* defines the structure of elements through which particular activities of the system are realized. We are aware that a narrower definition of the security system treats security as a state function realized by the action of state organs. However, even though threats act partially, the effect of their action is one and only – threat to the society as a whole, due to which integral function of security becomes more important, and materialized through the system of integrative security. In the structural sense, this means that structural stability is the key for prevention of endangerment in a society that is open to economic and social development (Keković, 2009:88).

– *The concept of international system* can be used as a synonym for international order, and is contrary to the existence of independent states. According to ‘Western thought’, the prevailing opinion is that there is not merely one international system, but that there are several international systems, whilst the Soviet theory argues that there is, in fact, the system of states, i.e. the system of international relations (Vukadinović, 2005:86).

Conclusion

Concepts and terms for describing categories of international and global security are partly taken from related scientific disciplines and areas, such as international public law, international relations, military sciences, ecological sciences etc, and partly construed for the need of the international and global security science. The development of science requires the development of the conceptual and categorical apparatus, while the development of language is also a precondition for the development of science. Nevertheless, both international and global security are young sciences and have yet to develop their own language, as well as other scientific constituents.

On the other hand, the language is a dynamic constituent, meaning that many new terms will appear whilst the existing ones might undergo changes and even become extinct. In that sense, the responsibility of all security theorists and practitioners is to preserve the

possessions and range of the scientific language, keep it from falling into oblivion, but also to work on its improvement and development. Therefore, we hope that this paper will be a modest contribution to the preservation of international and global security language, but also a stimulus for conceptual and linguistic innovations.

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EU VS. NATO BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CLASH ON SECURITY ISSUES

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Abstract: *After World War II, all the North Hemisphere became an arena where the winner of the war took the role of a supervisor. This meant that the superpowers tried to control the entire Europe. On the other side, the dilemma of this control in a way caused a clash between the two main powers, the USA and the Soviet Union. But Europe and the international community did not want to be an arena of a frozen conflict between them. The Formation of the UN and some other international and regional organizations was a solid base for avoiding the influence into Europe. The main problem lies here because the main missions of these two organizations were totally opposite. With the different policy, structure and goals of the two organizations, they became at same time partners, but also opponents about many issues and policies of their interest. It is very important to analyze the role of the EU and NATO through the crises and conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and many challenges, such as the open bilateral disputes and the last events related to the conflicts, crises and interventions in Mali, Libya, Egypt and Syria.*

Key words: EU, NATO, international relations, cooperation, conflicts, disputes etc.

Introduction

Many of the issues associated to the international relations, with a special emphasis on the relations between the international organizations and institutions (including the regional ones), share the same views with the leaders and representatives of the developed countries from the old continent but also from the transatlantic states, that the relations between the two main protagonists – the European Union and NATO have gone through different stages being challenged by more issues.

Particular importance in this research is attached to the answer to the question what really the cooperation between the European Union and NATO represents.

We are sure that there are different answers to this question and many of them are elaborated in specific ways by many researchers in various fields ranging from international relations, to the security and cooperation as separate spheres. For a more precise and detailed research, we definitely have to briefly elaborate the reasons for the establishment of these two international organizations.

The failure of the organization of the League of Nations and the new developments in the international arena (World War II) brought the need for revision of some earlier initiatives which forced the development of several international organizations, which in the end were not able to guarantee peace and international security.

The destruction and the massive killings that World War II brought were the reasons for forming new initiatives that had the task of preventing the issues exactly of this kind of humanity

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destruction. These initiatives which were abused by the World Powers before and those that emerged from World War II, harmonized their attitudes and on 26 June 1945 the United Nations were formed.

From the first moments of the establishment of the UN, some major states which were the winners of the Second World War had certain displayed and hidden ambitions. The adoption of the UN Charter and the establishment of some legal aspects of unprecedented and untested nature in the international relations, left the door open for the creation of regional organizations and institutions (which would later develop into international dimensions) which in some way they should have been the UN assistance on testing on a wide variety of challenges such as conflicts and balances of power.

Collective security would be the most appropriate instrument used by the U.S. and its allies to devise the problem of security and personal peace (the Confederate States) proclaiming peace and international security.

In the following titles we will focus on the formation and the beginnings of the European Union and NATO and on their relations through various stages of development.

I. THE CHALLENGES OF THE FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO: A reply or a need?

To have a clearer approach to the problems associated with international relations, besides a comparative study of the different theories of their own we are also required to analyze the regional and international organizations and institutions such as the European Union and NATO. At the very beginning, we will concretely discuss the causes and challenges that specifically led to the formation and creation of NATO as an organization which was formed shortly after World War II and then later we will discuss the formation of the European Union.

Stretching post-conflict relations between the U.S. and the USSR led to the creation of a bi-polarity in the international arena. The capitalist countries felt the threat of danger by the superpower (the USSR) that emerged from World War II stronger than ever, coordinated their national interests and created a politico-military alliance which would be in charge of the assignment for finding a solution about the issue of peace and national security of these countries. Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter were proof of the idea for forming a military alliance or a political treaty. After a series of coordination between the countries in Western Europe and the United States on April 4, 1949 NATO was formed.

If we analyze the researchers of international relations such as Holst, Hopman, Sullivan, Feder, Galvin and others we will see that they took apart to give the defining concepts and terminology of alliance, pact, treaty, federation, connection and block them deal with the causes that affected their formation.

Analyzing the causes that brought about the birth of NATO, they represented it as “this organization can be understood as a returned shock that the UN gives to the New World Order.” It will not be wrong even if we agree with the opinion that the creation of NATO in addition to other causes (if not mistaken hidden causes of the great powers) politically and security were the duality of activities in the field of peace and security, based on the principle of collective security.

The causes with the most influence in the creation of NATO can be determined from three aspects as follows: security, economic and political. To all three of these causes or reasons we can add the notion of geo creating this way a broader understanding of the

concept and shaping NATO as a regional organization with international dimensions. The numerous operations conducted on the territory of the old continent during World War II created the sense that although the conflict was over, the interests of the super powers had not set the boundaries and they stretched beyond their national borders.

Great Britain and France strained by national interests (the loss of a number of their colonies around the world), will feel their need as never before to be safe, at least in terms of security that will not be threatened by conflicts. One thing they will achieve through their connection to an organization which will primarily reflect the interests of their safety but also because it will deliver to them the— hegemony (which will be review later) outside the UN.

If we take a brief retrospective of the events at the time when NATO was still shaping, we must bear in mind the review of the Truman Doctrine which displayed the U.S. interests towards the European continent. This evidence is more than sufficient for NATO conceptualization of the union interests among its founding members as political, economic and security.

The European political arena from the creation of NATO to the creation of the European Union will be characterized by various initiatives in a way that they will reflect the need of creating a different international organization which will differ significantly from NATO.

If fighting the causes for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were purely from a political nature of security or (at least the ones that dominated economically), causes the reasons for the formation of the European Union were manifestly from an economic aspect although later attempts to develop the processes of expansion and integration will also come on stage manifestly with hidden political interests or security. Perhaps the best comparison dualism (cooperation or rivalry) between the European Union and NATO is seen in the period after the establishment of this international organization.

II.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION - NATO THROUGH TIME

To have a precise approach to these issues relating to the relations between these two international organizations such as NATO and the European Union, we must first take into account the development of their relations through different periods of time. For a more concise timeframe for the review of the relationship between these two international organizations, we will divide them into periods as follows:

- The period of their formation until the end of the Cold War,
- The period of the Cold War (1990) up to 9/11,
- The contemporary period (after 9/11) –

Even though we have the opportunity to divide them in closer periods within these timeframes, we will still stick to this because the outcome will remain the same that this division will be the answer to the questions set out in this research.

A. European Union – NATO relations from their establishment to the end of the Cold War

The perception of the formation of NATO, which in a way initiated the formation of the European Union will provide a clearer reflection of the interests of the member states of one or another organization. As an example, if we make a distinction between the formative members of these two organizations, we will see that four of them (France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium) and later including (Germany and Italy) that founded the European Union are also the founding members of NATO.

The formation of the European Union or the union of the European countries is somewhat different from NATO, it had a little harass of the American interests and in particular the British were a close ally of the U.S. But even though from the very beginning it was clear that the countries of the old continent will gather, respectively will be integrated into a union there were initially highly symbolic signs, that the U.S. and UK will accept this more as a challenge that originated from the Marshall Plan, which had an entirely economic aspect. This aspect is further evidenced by the clash of the ideas on the formation and the development of NATO and the European Union as two regional organizations (international) with different approaches in the international arena.

The bipolar division after the World War II was seen with different connotations of various factors. While Great Britain was under the influence of the opinion that the European Union will not only be disordered by the bipolarity of forces, but it will also be the bone of contention for the European countries by reducing the impact from the one side of U.S. to various countries of Europe, increasing in this way the influence of the Soviet Union to some countries that already envied this disorder of bipolarity.

NATO French Connection (as a founding member) and later a promotion as a key to the establishment of the originators of the European Union, it brought up strategic (political and economic) comparing with Germany which we already know about reasons why it was not still a member of NATO, but was on the same level with France in establishing the European Union.

Disputes between the two different policies and attitudes about NATO - European Union will emerge from the inception of the existence of these two organizations. The UK's involvement in the EU had numerous implications on international relations, in particular between these two organizations which were then regarded each other as opponents. The commitments that somehow UK took in order on the impact of amortization the economic organization established in the old continent, many of them were fabricated without any success. The signed statements for cooperation in many areas of Commonwealth countries outside and in, the achievement of the agreement about the Zone of the European Free Trade were the only two steps that UK took outside the EU in order to reduce the economic impact of the organization on to.

A dualism between NATO and the EU will also appear with the formation of the European Defense Community initiative, agreement that was signed by the six member states of the European Union in a way that was intended to be a response to NATO.

This institution within the European Union was managing the politically, military and security relations between its members. The main idea was that this institution to be a copy of NATO and then later to be attached to it. But the functioning of this institution was forbidden precisely from France which somehow was afraid of German armor. Even though France will start pushing this idea it would be thrown out exactly by them. This fact somehow represents the non compliance of interests between member states of one or another international organization.

France will soon see that was wrong about the abolition of the Agreement of European Defense Community. After wrangling and friction on the ground as well as on the table and not receiving some of the conditions of NATO regarding military assistance and the issues with nuclear weapons, in 1966 it will issue Pat NATO and its troops and a year later will come out officially.

During the culmination of the Cold War (as were the Cuban crisis, the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia), somehow France decided to put its on undesirable position toward NATO (even though it was in The U.S. side in the Cuban Missile Crisis). If we accept the fact that France was a founding member of the EU and originators, we will have to conclude that this collision can be understood as NATO-EU clash.

NATO - EU relations will go through various challenges such as the involvement of Germany in NATO which in some way "smashed the myth" that only countries that won the Second World War can become a member, Cyprus crisis's, Soviet interventions to the borders of the international organization NATO - EU (Czechoslovakia and Hungary) and many other conflicts with smaller dimensions that were not on the land of Europe but the member countries of both organizations were engaged, escalating in this way the relations between them.

B. Relations between European Union and NATO from 1990 to 9/11

We all agree that the fall of the Berlin wall is the symbol of the end of the Cold War, although the roots of this process emerged much earlier. The dissolution of the Soviet Union that included along wide-ranging unrest, military intervention, hidden agreements and others were part of much more important process in the international relations.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany and the end of apartheid in Africa (end of the decolonization process), resulted with the destruction of balances and the destruction of bipolarity.

If anyone wonders why this period is one of the most important in international relations, we are confirming that the positive responses are numerous and various. Firstly, what we are interested in is in fact the object of the study in this research, namely the relations between NATO and the European Union, they significantly improved and brought up a mutual cooperation which was not seen until then. Although the fall of the Berlin Wall brought hope that a new stage is approaching in international relations, reunification and the involvement of the Eastern part directly in the European Union, brought this country in the first position by the number of people and by the economic power, France and Great Britain did not accept this fact very kindly. On the other hand Germany will try to impose

as the most influential country within the European Union. All this will overcome with signing the Treaty of Amsterdam and Maastricht.

Secondly, the major changes that came out from the end of the Cold War were sent to unleash NATO and the European Union towards the East and South of the old continent. These processes somehow were not accepted well by Russia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia emerged the creation of new states, which did not hesitate in any way on throwing the waste of the communism system and began the process of transformation and reform their state systems toward the West. The assistance in many areas of NATO and the European Union towards these countries and the negotiations on becoming a member will inspire the fear of expansion of these two organizations towards Russia's borders. This process will be examined in details in the next lecture.

Thirdly - Coming together NATO and the European Union on the prevention of conflict resolution on European land and abroad (for example, the Middle East, the Gulf War, etc.). The Chronic region which was destabilized in the Middle East will be the arena outside the Europe where the European Union will be extending its influence and activity. Even in this area there will not be a lack of cooperation between these two organizations. Gulf War would actually involve more NATO and the European Union. Although France had interests (special agreement for selling weapons and petroleum products from Iraq), again for the sake of cooperation and unanimity will be supporting the deployment of military forces in position and the in aircraft carrier. Even though Germany despite constitutional restriction of involvement in combat operations out of the ground of its own will help NATO forces with considerable military equipment.

Even though these processes had numerous attempts of the European Union leaders to led Saddam Hussein to accept the conditions, at the end they had to intervene military because the attempts failed.

Fourth, setting common goals between NATO and the European Union towards setting common policies where that each organization will assist in other peacekeeping missions in other areas.

The fight against organized crime, the problems of migration, proliferation of weapons and many other problems were common goals of NATO and European Union. Signing multiple agreements in this direction led to the establishment of joint bodies to combat these problems.

The models of NATO and European Union countries were envied by the new states that came out from Soviet Union. Seeing the success and the growth of the European Union the member states and NATO countries made the new states without hesitation to want to be part in one of these democratization processes of their societies and their preparation for joining them.

The politically, economic and security vacuum established in Central and Eastern Europe, will make NATO and the Union European to cooperate as ever before in joint to utilize helping in various fields of those places. But despite all these efforts, the process of adjustment the transforming from a state to another will not go through without problems.

Czechoslovakia achieved the dissolution without problems smoothly and peace-

fully, the Soviet Union surpassed by their interventions and by the massive demonstrations where there were casualties, Yugoslavia took the bloodiest suppression of communism at the end of the Cold War in this region. The issues in this country had deep roots through years, but came out exactly when it started to break. Slovenia was the first republic that declared independence and where armed conflict began. Germany's clout as a NATO and European Union member brought the implications in the field which was the first country to recognize the independence and openly helped economically (and secretly militarily).

Expansion of clashes in Croatia and the conflict in Bosnia raised the alarm in the international circles and brought up the prevention and the cooperation about the conflict and its hostilities.

Maastricht Treaty as the Single European Act opened avenues of institutional European Union not only to transform it into an organization with different policies but also to deepen its cooperation with NATO as a military force. The pillar creation of the Common European Foreign Affairs soon will be challenged in agreeing between NATO and the European Union's first military action against Serb forces in Croatia and than Bosnia and Herzegovina. All these aspects will be examined in the details below.

The creation of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1998 will open the way for even wider cooperation between NATO and the EU. There will be other challenges rotating in relations between NATO and the European Union, especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001. These processes will be followed by other sign such as the terrorist attacks against American warship, in New York in 1995, the attacks on U.S. embassies in several African countries and so on.

Union policy attitudes in the fight against organized crime and global terrorism will be the major steps that have been taken ever from NATO and the EU in cooperation with U.S.

Cooperation between NATO and the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia was present with the first military intervention of NATO forces widely supported by the EU. EU envoys commitment and NATO jointly talks with parties in the conflict under UN auspices will be crucial to the conclusions to undertake further steps.

C. NATO -European Union relations in the Balkans.

In the premises of the former Yugoslavia respectively in the Balkans clearly can be seen the relations between NATO and the European Union which are the domain and in what ways these relations had been.

Some operations were undertaken under the "Berlin Plus": the Balkans in particular have been a site that tries to military deployments EU in coordination with NATO. The first operation which EU-led in crisis management was a military operation under the name "Operation Concordia" with approximately 300 EU troops stationed in the Republic of Macedonia to protect personnel EU and OSCE in monitoring the "Framework Agreement" of Ohrid, which itself had been formalized under the auspices of the Secretary General of NATO and the High Representative of the EU. "Concordia" took over these responsibilities in March 2003 by NATO operation "Allied Harmony". In accordance with the recommendations of the "Berlin Plus", the EU operation was headed by the Deputy

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), with a new commander on the ground. The Treaty of Lisbon in 1991, later known as the “Carrington-Cutileiro Plan”, will pave the way for elections and plans to ban immersion of the Bosnian conflict of unpredictable proportions. The plan of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vensit as international representatives and mediators will be just one of the many efforts of the international organizations. Arms embargo, humanitarian aid, admission of refugees, were part of a concurrent process between these two organizations. Probably it was not thought about the success in this area (even the failures) without mutual cooperation between them.

The prohibition of hostilities and conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the installation of various peacekeeping missions had begun a new phase of NATO-EU relations. Operation Althea, the EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, began as a NATO operation. Delivery from NATO to the EU, based on the recommendations - “Berlin Plus” was successfully held in December 2004, NATO’s continued to contribute to the operation to provide planning, logistics and command support. The EU took over the NATO mission with the commitment of its 7,000 troops similar to those in Concordia. Continuing communication NATO - EU Military Committees carried through which NATO has maintained an office in Bosnia to carry out a number of specific tasks related to specific way to assist the government in reforming its defense structures and support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Operation Althea remains ambitious to the EU military operation to date. A special importance in the relations between NATO and the EU occupies the case of Kosovo. Since the beginning of the events that attracted international attention, these two international organizations had very close relations of cooperation. Despite clashes in some interests of NATO and the EU, in their commitments to the prevention of the conflict were unanimous. The military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 by NATO was one of the biggest challenges for the international organization but also for the EU, also because its representatives had the highest main tasks in negotiations between the parties in conflict. The NATO Secretary that time and later the EU High Representative Javier Solana, along with other Western leaders will have a crucial role in decision making and on the events of the Kosovo conflict.

After the completion of the intervention and the installation of its peacekeeping mission KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo created a greater space for expansion of cooperation in other areas between NATO and the EU. The aim of the cooperation will be establishing the European forces (military and police) as to replace those of NATO and finally the declaration of independence and the expiration of the mandate of UNMIK and the replacement of the mission the mission with EULEX mission which is exclusively by EU, in many areas will closely remain the forces of NATO.

D. The Contemporary relations between European Union and NATO

This period of the international relations is characterized by several events of the international arena which in many areas as far as it concerning affecting relations between NATO and the EU. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 at the World Trade center in New York, the world was involved in a stalemate risks and the threats that didn’t come from

traditional way such as threatening nuclear forces or bipolarity states “axis of evil”. These threats have a residence address named as Al-Qaeda.

Thrill of the different manifestations of the 9/11 attacks and later the attacks in London and Madrid (although this occurred later) will be a turning point in international relations and for the first time in the history of the organization’s international agenda will be acceptable for all in the fight against this terrible crime.

The intervention in Afghanistan by NATO led by the U.S. and UK will be the next test for support from the EU and other countries. There will be a similar fate of intervention in Iraq under the pretext of pursuing members of al-Qaeda and its support program for weapons and mass extinction. This intervention will be particularly strongly opposed by Germany and France, and for the first time in the history of international relations of these two international organizations NATO - EU. This non-support between them will be manifested in protests and demonstrations in major metropolises of Europe against this intervention. But to commit to the cooperation between the two organizations.

The two organizations closely will show that a level of complementarities may be possible to address the security challenges facing different countries during membership in both organizations. The Riga Summit of NATO Declaration, issued on 29 November 2006, reaffirms the principles for the development of the relations between the EU and NATO, “NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests We will try to improve NATO’s strategic partnership - EU as agreed by our two organizations, to achieve closer and more efficient cooperation and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of these two organizations. A stronger EU will contribute to our common security. “Koy was part of the Riga declaration.

European Security Strategy of 2003 describes the relationship between these two bodies: “Agreements that NATO and EU permanent will influence in increasing the operational capacity of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between these two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our determination common to tackle the challenges of the new century. “.

On 13 June 2007, the European Union officially opened its Operations Center (OpCentre) in Brussels. In response to concerns that the Operations Center will replicate the center of NATO planning and command operational elements, and thus pose unnecessary costs and wasteful of resources, Javier Solana, High Representative of the EU, stressed that the center of duplication is not new, but the division of labor. Force Operations Center, where Mr. Solana argued to conduct integrated operations that included civil-military coordination with civil assets of the EU, such as the police or the assistance of the Development Committee. According the opponents this institution is an “empty room” of European forces. These are just some reoccurrences in reforming the EU’s interest in collaborative approach between the EU and NATO.

Conclusion

The cooperation between NATO and the EU has been different through various stages. Until the period of the formation of these two very different organizations many different researchers treated the issues in the context of the international relations clashes, rivalry and dualism.

The reasons for this conclusion are numerous and widely elaborated. The second phase of the relations between NATO and the EU can be characterized as the approach of these two organizations and respectively as an unification talk's attitudes to many problems in different fields.

The third phase in the international relations even though the cooperation for many different reasons about decision makings on specific situations is the most delicate fence off with a backup dose it can be said that the EU has the opportunity to have a better cooperation intensified due to the different interests of the state members of NATO and EU, which are contrary to each other in some questions. The best demonstration of this conclusion is the difference of the opinion about the commitment of NATO troops in Afghanistan and expanding the influence of the EU in this area equally with the American influence.

The relations between NATO and EU can be very successfully. From the report of the NATO summit in Prague, Riga and the Action Plan we can clearly see that some key principles in building the relations between NATO and the EU, are:

- The role of NATO is essential and primary forum for strategic discussion on the transatlantic arena,
- The vital role of the EU in the field of transatlantic security,
- The relations between NATO and the EU should not seek to be the domain of the separation of civil-military work.

Currently the relations between the EU and NATO can be characterized as excellent trend of improvement in various areas, but there are pessimists too which think that these relations in the future will present a rivalry not only in the economic sphere but also in terms of security (in the import-lock security in peacekeeping missions outside Europe, for example. in various African countries). We remain to see how this relationship will continue in the future despite trends.

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THE ROMAN MILITARY LAW IMPERIUM MILITIAE

MSc. Dimitar APASIEV¹

Abstract: *The most common idea in Romance studies is that Romans, as practical people, didn't conduct theoretical research on their country or their army, but they gradually built them both. In meanwhile they reformed and upgraded it, so that they can respond to the challenges of their age. Moreover, the bases of their research were not explicit doctrines, or prior concepts, in fact they used their own or the experience of others, to find concrete solutions to daily problems. Just as the Hellenic romanophile Polibius (200-120 B.C), in his work Historia, asks the crucial question: "Is it possible to have such an unreliable man who is not interested in how the Romans, with their municipal structure, managed to conquer the whole world"? - in the same way the author of this work, as much as its contents allows, humbly and unpretentiously tries to answer the crucial question: "What kind of military structure had created and defended one of the biggest and most enduring empires in world's history, and what rules it governed"?*

Key-words: *army, war, commander, military mentality, Comitia centuriata, priests-fetiales, military morale.*

About the military mentality of the Romans

*Honesta mors, turpi vita potior.
Better honorable death, than a shameful life.
Agricola (1st century)*

The history of rhetoric records a military speech held by the British leader **Calgacus** in the first century (around ?-84 AD), who on the battlefield in Britain fought

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back the Romans led by General Agricola. Among other things, in his speech that motivated his fellow fighters, he describes the Roman enemies as in following:

*...World outlaws! After they destroyed everything and left no more land to plunder, they lowered the boom on the sea! If their enemy is rich – they are greedy; if their enemy is poor – they are cruel. Neither East, nor the West satisfied them. They simply crave for fortune and need, with equal passion. Their deceptive talk named the loot, murders and slaughters an authority!? Places they had destroyed, they consider peace!? ...Do you believe that Romans' virtue in war resembles the lack of their immorality in peace? ...The errors of their enemies they use as glory for their army. For such an army, composed of mixed folks is united by success – but divided by defeat...*²

Many prominent law historians say that the Roman Empire has built a government system which, by its diversity, complexity and precision, was far more advanced than any other governments in the countries of that time.³ Since “the founding of the City” (*ab urbe condita*) the Roman society was structured as a **military state**, which makes it similar to the Hellenic city Sparta, ruled by discipline, more than ancient Athens – where democracy ruled. Owning and carrying weapons (*arma*) in Rome was considered as a basic trait of man's pride, and the pacifistic proverb “peace is the best of all things” (*Pax optima rerum*) unfortunately didn't exist in the Roman era.⁴

Since the 6th century B.C., the basic election and legislative body in Rome where the Centurion's commissions i.e. Assembly of the Centuries (*Comitia centuriata*) which, in last instance and with special act, decided on war or peace, and had power to select the military officers in the army. This ‘commissions’ had a military background and represent remnants of the so called ‘military democracy’ in Rome, when the City was still under the dominance of the Etruscan kings of Rome. They were officially introduced during the reign of the sixth king, the reformer Servius Tullius (ruled around the 579–534 BC). This commissions usually held councils on the Mars field (*Campus Martius*), outdoors, and the voting system designed, used two basic criteria's – military assignment and estate size. There were a total of 194 centurions (80+18+20+20+20+30+5+1): out of them 70 were classified as “first class centurions”⁵, because they were composed of the wealthiest and most prominent citizens (*nobiles*) with property that valued at

² Tacitus, *Agricola*, XXX–XXXII sq.: *Raptores orbis, postquam cuncta vastantibus defuere terrae, mare scrutantur: si locuples hostis est, avari, si pauper, ambitiosi, quos non Oriens, non Occidens satiaverit: soli omnium opes atque inopiam pari adfectu concupiscunt. Auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. [...] An eandem Romanis in bello virtutem quam in pace lasciviam adesse creditis? Nostris illi dissensionibus ac discordiis clari vitia hostium in gloriam exercitus sui vertunt...*

³ Публиј Корнелиј Такит, *Агрикола*, Скопје, Култура, 1999, 83–85.

⁴ Алберт Вајс и Лубица Кандић, *Општа историја државе и права*, Београд, Савремена администрација, 1971, 64.

⁵ This proverb, known as “Kiel slogan”, was located on the seal of the North-German University of Kiel (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel / founded 1665). See: Густав Радбрух, *Филозофија на правото*, Скопје, Правен факултет „Јустинијан Први“, 2008, 232.

least 100.000 *ases*.⁶ This first class centurions were also added 18 noble ‘centurion knights’ or cavalryman (*equestres*), who were officially separated from the first class centurions, but they were still connected with the most prominent first class – so that their number totaled 98 [80+18].⁷ Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1788), one of the most famous French democratic luminaries, expert on the subject of Roman democracy and political history, in the fourth chapter of the fourth volume of his capital work Societal Contract or Guidelines on State law (*Du contract social – ou Principes du Droit Politique*, 1762/1763), lucidly states:

...Because votes were counted per centuria [and not per capita], only the first class had the majority of votes against the rest. So, when all their centurias vote unanimously, they wouldn't even count the remaining votes – so, it happens to what the least amount of votes decided to be considered the decision of the majority. Therefore, among Centurion's commissions, things were described more with the 'majority of talirs' than the 'majority of votes'.⁸

We can see that voting was successive and ordered by hierarchy, starting with the highest ranking centurias. When the required majority of votes was achieved, the magistrate-president ended the voting process – so it was a common thing that the lower class centurias (poorer citizens) weren't even given a chance to declare themselves! The lower second, third and fourth group/class was composed of 20 centurias, and the fifth class numbered 30 centurias. There also existed 5 so called ‘assisting/technical centurions’, and all the remaining citizens, the poorest of them, were grouped in only one centuria – the so called “Worker / Proletarian Centuria”⁹, which was the biggest in terms of its number of people, but had the lowest amount of jurisdiction. Namely, this lowest last class lacked the division of people in juniors and seniors, because the people of which this class was composed were put in an inferior position, and their honor to serve and fight for their homeland has not been recognized. The logical starting point was that everyone must have his own home, to gain the right to defend it (*ius defensionis*). General Gaius Marius (167–86 BC) was the first who drafted part of the workers into military service.¹⁰

⁶ At the beginning there were 80, but later their number decreased to 70. Half of them [meaning 35] was a Centurias of the juniors (*iuniores*) – persons younger than 45 years who could be regularly mobilized; and the other half [remaining 35] was a Centurias of the seniors (*seniores*) – persons over 45 years, which could be mobilized only as reserves.

⁷ *Asis* is a heavy copper coin i.e. Roman coin which weighed one ‘Libra’ (327,45 grams).

⁸ See my paper: „Скриеното *Ius publicum* во македонското уставно право - Конституционални елементи на современите правни системи реципирани од Римското јавно право“, *Зборник во чест на Тодор Цунов*, Скопје, Правен факултет „Јустинијан Први“, 2009, 788–789.

⁹ *Talir* or *talar* is a kind of Roman tunic that was long to the ankles and usually worn by wealthier citizens. Read more: Жан Жак Русо, *Општествениот договор*, Скопје, Мисла, 1978, 146–147.

¹⁰ The word ‘proletarian’, etymologically, comes from *prole* = *child*, which suggests that these poor peasants without land or urban “smallholder” did not own property, and the only real ‘treasure’ which handled these pauperized people are their born children. See also: Titus Livius, *Ab urbe condita*, I, 42, 4–5 и I, 43.

The military spirit, or the atmosphere of military status, was deeply enrooted into the religious calendar (*fasti*) of the Romans, by which the *time for warfare* was appointed from March to October. Then the legions were active outside the City (*urbs*), before they were garrisoned in winter. In the Roman Pantheon, the **god of war** Mars took quite important position: before the battles the Romans would commit sacrifices and he was more respected and worshiped than any other gods, which was based on the belief that the founders of Rome, the twin-brothers Romulus and Remus (VIII c. BC) are the legendary children of Mars and the vestal Rea Silvia. From this point even though the Romans are known as ‘children of the wolf’ (*lupus*) they are also known as ‘children of Mars’ – which in turn shows that Romans were military people in ancient times. It’s also interesting that the Roman New Year in fact began in March – which as the first month of the year was dedicated to the god Mars, from which the name “March” has its origins. Just as spring started in March, Romans performed rituals of purification (*lustratio*) of cavalry, before it was sent into battle; and in October - when the military activities ended - the annual weapon purification was also performed (*armilustrum*). In time period from October to March, also called ‘the time of peace’, the door of the temple, dedicated to the two-faced divinity Janus was closed.¹¹ In fact, an ancient Roman tradition existed that after the war (*bellum*) was declared, the main gate of his temple was wide open, until all the conflicts were over. After the legions came out of the city gates of Rome, i.e. out of the ‘holy grounds’ (*pomerium*), they needed his support as the ‘Father of gods’ (*Ianus Pater*), from which the name of the month January originates.¹²

According to the words of Marcus Tullius Cicero, the famous orator (106–43), beginning from VII c. BC, the third Roman emperor Tullius Hostillius (ruled around 673–642) “crated a law, strengthened by the **fetial rituals**, which was used for declaring wars – so that every war that was not declared and announced was considered unlawful and godless”.¹³ The procedure or more exactly the ceremony of declaring war, (in this sense we regard to “righteous war” or *bellum iustum*), involves three phases:

a) The first phase was called *Denuntiatio* or *rerum repetitio* – in fact, whenever an incident happened, caused by some enemy peoples (for example: the siege of some Roman estate, capturing Romans, stealing cattle etc.), the head priest of the fetials (*fetiales*) was sent on his own diplomatic mission – also called *Pater patratus*, together with three more delegates called *oratores*, with the goal of achieving return of what was taken, and sent a warning and threat that an act of revenge will be undertaken.

b) The second phase was called *Testatio* or *testatio deorum* – this phase began when the previously given ultimatum remained fruitless even after the expiration of

¹¹ Compare with: Ж. Ж. Рысо, *Општествениот договор*, Скопје, Мисла, 1978, 143–144.

¹² The God Janus, according to the ancient Roman mythology, was the *god of time* which is often represented with two faces: one that is turned in the past, and the other in the future. This god is also celebrated as the god of “beginnings and endings” i.e. of transitions, gates, doors and entrances.

¹³ Žika Bujuklić, *Forum Romanum - Rimska država, pravo, religija i mitologija*, Beograd, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu & JP „Službeni glasnik“, 2005, 276–278.

30 days. Then, the priest-fetials would return to the enemy to enact a ceremonial summoning of the gods for ‘witnesses’, that in fact an act of injustice has been caused, and the Roman demand was legitimate. After this, the Roman Senate (*Senatus*) met and brought the decision to start a war which had to be confirmed by the *Comitia centuriata* – in the shape of a special law (*lex de bello indicendo*).

c) The last third phase when declaring war was the so called *Indictio* or *invocation* – so, on the 33rd day, the Senate sent a special courier (*verbenarius*) who on the combat border (*limes*) carried out the symbolical act of throwing a bloodstained spear (*iaculum*) on the enemy’s territory – which was assumed to humiliate the opponent and mark as unworthy, so after this act, the war was officially declared (*indictio belli*).¹⁴ At the beginning, this military-missionary function was carried out by the head-priest *Pater patratus*, but from the middle of the existence of the Republic it was performed by special missionaries, called *legati populi Romani*. Then this ritual became a legal fiction because it was symbolically enacted in Rome instead of the country’s border, near the temple dedicated to the goddess Bellona (*Aedes Bellona*). This temple was built on the Field of Mars, where a piece of land for ceremonial needs was declared as ‘enemy’s land’ (*hostile soli*). Next to the temple stood a military column (*columna bellica*) from where the ceremonial spear was thrown.¹⁵

Speaking of ceremonies, symbols and insignias i.e. “banners” – it is worth to mention one of the most striking features of the Roman army, the high *masts* who had their heads decorated with all kinds of symbols and markings, with depictions of many types of brave wild animals and predators.¹⁶ Also every Roman legion had its own *flag* that acted as a holy relic and the banner was carried by special flag bearers (*signiferae*). All these decorations had psychological effects on the soldiers and helped keep the morale and the legion’s unity, because they could see the masts even during battle, which gave them a certain amount of security. And the most characteristic symbol was the displayed silver Roman *eagle* (*aquila*), a depiction of the power of Rome and the honor of the legion, It was protected by a special soldier, wearing a hide of a lion on his head, called an *aquilifer*. This ‘holy bird’ hung on a long wooden handle, sharpened at the lower end – so that during the clash it could be stabbed on the ground.

¹⁴ Cicero, *De republica*, II, 17, 31: [Tullus] constituit ius, quo bella indicerentur, quod sanxit fetiali religione, ut omnem bellum quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset, id iniustum esse atque impium iudicaretur.

¹⁵ This special courier, called *varbenarius*, got his name by the “holy plant” *verbenae* which grew on the holy Roman plateau Capitol (*Capitolina*), and was thought of as a symbol of Roman power and dominance.

¹⁶ Ž. Bujuklić, *Forum Romanum...*, Београд, 2005, 410–411. About the role of the priestly order of fetials see the excellent work of Н. Г. Майорова: „Фециалы – религия и дипломатия в Древнейшем Риме (VII в. до н. э.)“, published in Chapter IV of chrestomathy *Религия и община в Древне Риме*, Москва, Российская Ассоциация Антикведов & Российская Академия Наук - Институт всеобщей истории, 1994, 97–124.

About the Roman system of command

Veni, vidi, vici – I came, I saw, I conquered!

Gaius Iulius Caesar (I c. BC)

Speech in front of the Senate, after the victory over the Franks

The military control gained by the highest Roman magistrates (praetors, consuls and dictators) on battlefield was called the *Imperium militiae*, and the



Picture 1: Roman dictators bear the insignia *fasces*

opposite regime, which was valid only in peacetime, was called the *Imperium domi*. The boundary line (*limes*) of the magistrates' activities in peacetime was determined by city walls (*pomerium*) – approximately in radius of 1.5 km around the city of Rome. This border also had his religious significance because up to that distance, the area was considered a 'holy ground' on which temples could be built (*templum*) and sacred activities, led by priests and their collegiums (*collegium*), to be held. Everything, undertaken out of the first milestone, (*milliarium*) fell under 'military regime's control.¹⁷ Outside the city *pomerium* the magistrates became *milites*, but not automatically elected, because its military imperium had to be of-

ficially assigned by the people (*populus*) gathered in Centuria's commissions. Even after this ceremonial procedure, which for the truth's sake in practice hadn't been always consistently respected, civil magistrate became a *military commander* in true sense of the word, because since then, he could uninterruptedly use all military powers: to appoint and dismiss commanders; to draft; to punish and reward soldiers; to lead military, expeditions, campaigns, operations, etc. Before leaving the city, the army leader followed by a huge crowd, took a solemn oath to Jupiter, the chief deity (Iuppiter Optimus Maximus) in his temple situated on the hill of Capitol (*Aedae Capitolineae*), with complete military equipment, wearing his cloak (*paludamentum*). The people from his entourage, or *lictores*, wore the cult sign called *fasces cum*

¹⁷ Bujuklić, op. cit., 279–281.

securi on their left shoulder.¹⁸ He had too much power, for example he could even give capital punishments (*poena capitales*) without giving the citizen-soldier a right to appeal, and it was impossible for him to claim *provocatio ad populum*, which required the magistrate to wait for a tribune to intervene, a common legal way for peaceful legal conditions; then the army leader was able to declare armistice (*indutiae*), peace agreements and alliances with other tribes and peoples (*foedera*); and in the newly conquered territories he could even pass laws with which their legal status was regulated – as separate general acts of constitutional nature (*lex data*).

In Rome, as the practice shows, it was possible to have several wars at the same time, till the time of the Empire - when actually the *Imperator* had even undertook the function of the highest military commander. There was no single appointed military leader, in terms of today's Supreme commander, but every war was conducted by a definite military commander (*dux*), appointed by the Senate, with a special mandate only for the given military mission, and who *in concreto* stood on top of the Roman military. Because the Roman military commanders were not professionals but civil magistrates, who had military duties as well – the Romans lacked such genius generals as Alexander of Macedon or Hannibal, although speaking of Scipion or Caesar for example, we cannot call in question his talent for military commands. At war, Romans more often had won their battles thanks to their persistence, good organization and 'military engineering', than their fearless offensives and heroism. For example, the Battle of Alesia (*oppidum Alesia*/September 56 BC), where the resistance of the Gauls was broken, was successful thanks to the blistered hands in digging trenches and lifting defensive ramparts, than angry and courageous rush of the Romans.¹⁹ The profile of an average Roman general mostly looked like the following: he comes from a wealthy aristocratic family, represented in the Senate as current or former consul. In case of both colleagues-*consules* are being sent in the same war, the mutual supreme command changed daily, according to the so-called *principle of rotation* – the first day the command is in one's counsel hands and the next day in the other's, alternately until the end of the campaign. On that day, the leader wears a purple cloak (*lacerna*) fastened on his shoulder with a brooch, which distinguished him from lower commanders and elders of the hierarchy. His commands to the legions on the battlefield were in Latin, but on the head of each separate legion stood commander-legate, so-called 'chosen-legate' (*legatus*). However, six military tribune (*tribuni militares*) were under his command, mainly young people who took care of administrative tasks – because, in principle, they had no military experience,

¹⁸ That is actually a "bundle of sticks" or sack of elm branches which were tied with red ribbon (*fascia*), which was anchored in iron ax (*securis*) – in that way symbolizing the supremacy of magistrates (*insignia imperii*). This symbol led background from Etruscan times, and from it, etymologically, its origins today word a *fascist*. See: *Picture 1*.

¹⁹ Обрад Станојевић и Милена Јовановић, *Латински за правнике*, Београд, Правни факултет - Универзитета у Београду и ЈП „Службени гласник“, 2008, 43.

because this position was considered as starting point in the building of their future political career. Initially they were named by the consuls, but later they began to be elected by the Roman people's assemblies (*comitia*).

One of the revolutionary changes or **reforms** in the system of command and [re]organization of the Roman military was made by the famous general Scipio the African (Publius Cornelius Scipio - Africanus / 236–183), the Roman who defeated Hannibal and who has never lost a single battle! His reform actually consisted of the following: (1) he appointed the cavalry a top position in the army, because lately the focus was primarily placed on the Roman infantry; (2) reduced the weight of the armour and breastplate to provide easier mobility of the troops; (3) left the old tradition of building large camps and provided military camps in order to accelerate the progress of the legion; (4) due to difficulties in maneuvering, shied away from the usual military formation battle line into three lines [*triplex acies*]; (5) introduced the military tribunes with a strategy before the battle, so that they can give commands in case of death of the commander; (6) set a new *system of signalization*, so instead of the old system composed of 38 different signals, which were given with trumpets (*tubi*), Scipio introduced a system of only nine signals. Old and dysfunctional system of sound signalization provoked jokes among the soldiers themselves: because of its extraordinary complexity, one can find out that the exemption of his long military service is coming soon when he finally begins to differentiate all these special alerts!? Therefore the new signals were given by so called whistles, emitting a shrill sound that could easily be heard during the roar on the battlefield, and the trumpet remained only to be used for the first signal. Besides signaling 'attack' (*impetus*), the following signals were: 'In pairs! Split in depth! Split in width! Stop! Go! Return! [*regressus*] and so on; (7) finally, Scipio divided the 21 letter of the Roman alphabet in five groups – four groups of four characters, plus a group of five characters ($4 \times 4 + 5 = 21$). Then he ordered the letters in five plates, numbered with Roman numbers from I to V, giving each letter appropriate number and asking those who signalize to learn them by heart as codes. Each centurion had under his command two groups of soldiers giving the signals, who stood beyond a screen – the first team on the left and the second on the right side. Each of these 'communication groups' had to have prepared at least six burned torches at any time, and the role of the screen was to hide the light when they were not used for signalization. This inevitably imposed dismemberment of every word in letters – so that the number of torches from the left screen showed the number of the plate, and the number of torches from the right screen showed the letter from that plate. When the soldier was ready to send the signal, he raised two torches; and the one who supposed to receive the signals also matched with raising two torches – with which the beginning of the next signalization was signalized. Then they sent the necessary message, after which they conceal the torches.²⁰

²⁰ Рос Леки, *Сципион*, Скопје, Клуб Матица, 2007, 405–406 и 418–419.

Strong **military discipline** (*disciplinam militiae*), which provided impeccable work of Roman military machine, has been regularly maintained by a strict *system of punishments* and rewards. The military commander at his own initiative and if it was considered appropriate and expedient, could sentence the guilty soldier even to death (*poena capitalis*), and, as we have said before, without the right to appeal! And if a particular military unit escape cowardly from the battlefield, then the famous sentence ‘decimation’ (*decimatio*) was applied, which is often inappropriately interpreted: actually, the act of sentencing was performed in a way that the names of all cowards were put in a bowl or pot from which later the names of one tenth (1/10 or 10%) of the soldiers were pulled out. The names of those who had been ‘lucky’ were read, and they stepped out from the line and killed immediately in front of their comrades.²¹ For every committed crime, the centurions could punish soldiers who were subordinate to them, mostly in the way of flogging i.e. physical punishment - because, according to the Italian humanist Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) written in his less exposed work *The Art of War* (*Dell’arte della Guerra*, 1519/1520), through which he shows himself as an exceptional military writer – the Romans:

*...strictly cared about the punishments and rewards for those who deserved compliment or reproach for their good or bad behavior
...Military discipline was based on the fear of the laws, the people or God...[for] people, weapons, bread and money are the power of the war!
...Military discipline is not anything else but a well trained military; for it was impossible to defeat those well disciplined in our time!*

However, in terms of **military awards** and benefits, in addition to the regular military *salary* (*stipendium*) the soldier received a part of the war booty. In fact, at the beginning of the creation of the empire, *booty* of the military occupation (*occupatio bellica*) was the only satisfaction for those who went to war and this was a kind of ‘soldier salary’ – although, in a certain way, it was illegitimate because *de iure* all the booty belonged to the Roman empire. Because of this, since the oldest times, alongside the military there were people called ‘enumerators/appraisers’ who collected the loot from defeated enemies, carefully recording and sending it to the Roman treasury (*aerarium*), to be used in the service for the needs of the empire.²² In terms of the question about sharing the booty, Machiavelli is completely right when he says that “the Roman practice was far superior in contrast to the contemporary, because it bridles the burglary and the quarrels over the booty”.²³ Soldiers and officers, who have distinguished themselves in the battles and who have shown exceptional courage and sacrifice, could get different *medals* – for example, to receive a wreath of oak leaf (*corona civica*) or

²¹ Because it happened even in the bad detachments to have a good soldier; often the names of these soldiers were secretly taken out of cup, so they cannot accidentally be victims of the ‘decimation’. See also: O. Станојевић и М. Јовановић, op. cit., 44.

²² Станојевић и Јовановић, op. cit., 42.

²³ Referenced in: Наум Гризо и Крсте Ристески, *Од историјата на воените идеи*, Скопје, Култура, 1992, 49–51.

gold wreath (*corona muralis*) which can get any soldier who will be the first to climb up the walls of the enemy's city etc. Also, among other privileges which the Roman soldiers had was the right to make a specific type of oral will i.e. testimonial in front of their colleagues before the battle (*testamentum in procintu*). And war veterans, before demobilization, additionally received compensation i.e. severance payment and, as a token of gratitude for their service they were given land parcels (*ager*), or estates across the Roman provinces.

In context of high **military morale** and maintenance, Machiavelli believes that what the old soldiers kept loyal was "faith and oath"! For example, the military reformer, the first Principe Augustus (Octavianus Augustus / 63 BC–14 AD) among other, introduced a special oath (*sacramenti*) for personal loyalty - something that was typical for countries of the former so called Eastern Bloc – although the Romans were familiar with this *military oath* institute since oldest times.²⁴ Furthermore, as a good motive for battle, the *instinct of self-preservation* is also mentioned, or what Machiavelli called "need", because it increases the heroic endurance during battle. Then, the *patriotism* or "love for Fatherland" (*patria*) as an important stimulus is also mentioned, which Machiavelli regarded it as healthy and natural.²⁵

But, finally, we should not forget that the military morale of the legionaries, was often supported by giving effective so called "*epideictic*" [*combat*] *speeches*, full of emotional charge which usually held just before the battle and had extremely strong encouraging influence on feelings, mood and spirit of the troops. Machiavelli also considered oratory very useful in those critical times, because it "frees soldiers from fear, inflames the spirit, strengthens persistence, reveals frauds, promises awards, shows the dangers and how to avoid them; criticizes, begs, threatens, fills with hope, commends and does everything what calms or inflames human passions". Therefore, it seems suitably to add a brilliant example of such a team military speech at the end. The battle speech that follows below dates from the first century and is proclaimed by the aforementioned Roman general Agricola (Gnaeus Iulius Agricola / 40–93), who finished the conquest of Britain before the battle with the British rebel Calgacus, mentioned in the very beginning of this paper. The description of the atmosphere is given by the chronicler and Agricola's biographer – Tacitus (Publius Cornelius Tacitus / 56–117) who, by the way, was also his son-in-law:

...Although the soldiers had a strong spirit and barely surmount the obstacles, Agricola believed they should be encouraged more and more, so addressed them as follows:²⁶

²⁴ For military oath in Rome see and the excellent work of Russian professor B. H. Токамов: „Воинская присяга и ‘Священные законы’ в военной организации Раннеримской Республики“, published in Chapter V of chrestomathy: *Религия и община в Древне Риме*, Москва, Российская Ассоциация Антикведов & Российская Академия Наук - Институт всеобщей истории, 1994, 125–147.

²⁵ Cited by: Н. Гризо и К. Ристески, op. cit., 49.

²⁶ Tacitus, *Agricola*, XXXIII–XXXIV sq.: Septimus annus est, commilitones, ex quo virtute et auspiciis imperii Romani, fide atque opera vestra Britanniam vicistis. Tot expeditionibus, tot proeliis, seu fortitudine adversus hostis seu patientia ac labore paene adversus ipsam rerum naturam opus fuit, neque me militum neque vos ducis paenituit.

„For seven years, we are capturing Britain (Britannia), you my fellow soldiers, together with the virtues and flags of the Roman Empire, and with our loyalty and hardship. In the quests and battles - either because of the courage with which we had fought against the enemies or because of the durability and efforts - I would dare to point out something almost unnatural: Neither I can be dissatisfied with my soldiers, nor you from your leader! The fact that we already came here, I overcame the previous [Roman] governors, and you – previous armies. We met the borders of Britain not through rumors and narratives, but through setting camps. Britain is discovered and defeated!

While we were trooping, the wetlands, mountains and rivers exhausted you. I often hear the voice of the bravest of you: ‘When the enemy is finally going to show up himself? When do we attack him?’ There they are, coming banished from their sanctuaries: the faith and the courage shall come to be revealed now. For the winners everything goes well, and for the defeated nothing goes out of hand!

Just as passing so much roads, crossing forests and outfalls and trooping as leader - beautiful and glorious is, that much, - today’s favorable occasions will become dangerous for those who run away. These areas are really unknown to us and we don’t have abundance of food, but we have our hands and our weapons – so we have everything we need!

As for me, long ago I have convinced myself that turning back on someone is not safe neither for the leader, nor for the troop. Honorable death is much better than shameful life, and salvation and glory go together! It will not be infamous to die at the end of the world and at the end of the nature.

Ergo egressi, ego veterum legatorum, vos priorum exercituum terminos, finem Britanniae non fama nec rumore, sed castris et armis tenemus: inventa Britannia et subacta. Equidem saepe in agmine, cum vos paludes montesque et flumina fatigarent, fortissimi cuiusque voces audiebam: ‘quando dabitur hostis, quando in manus [veniet]?’ Veniunt, e latebris suis extrusi, et vota virtusque in aperto, omniaque prona victoribus atque eadem victis adversa. Nam ut superasse tantum itineris, evasisse silvas, transisse aestuaria pulchrum ac decorum in frontem, ita fugientibus periculosissima quae hodie prosperrima sunt; neque enim nobis aut locorum eadem notitia aut commeatuum eadem abundantia, sed manus et arma et in his omnia. Quod ad me attinet, iam pridem mihi decretum est neque exercitus neque ducis terga tuta esse. Proinde et honesta mors turpi vita potior, et incolumitas ac decus eodem loco sita sunt; nec inglorius fuerit in ipso terrarum ac naturae fine cecidisse. Si novae gentes atque ignota acies constitisset, aliorum exercituum exemplis vos hortarer: nunc vestra decora recensete, vestros oculos interrogate. Hi sunt, quos proximo anno unam legionem furto noctis adgressos clamore debellastis; hi ceterorum Britannorum fugacissimi ideoque tam diu superstites. Quo modo silvas saltusque penetrantibus fortissimum quodque animal contra ruere, pavida et inertia ipso agminis sono pellebantur, sic acerrimi Britannorum iam pridem ceciderunt, reliquus est numerus ignavorum et metuentium. Quos quod tandem invenistis, non restiterunt, sed deprehensi sunt; novissimae res et extremus metus torpore defixere aciem in his vestigiis, in quibus pulchram et spectabilem victoriam ederetis. Transigite cum expeditionibus, imponite quinquaginta annis magnum diem, adprobate rei publicae numquam exercitui imputari potuisse aut moras belli aut causas rebellandi.

If in front of you stood new people and unknown troops, I would encouraged you using examples of others armies; but now remember your courage and ask your eyes. Here are the same ones who last year attacked a legion and you defended them with shouting; so that they fled first from all Britons, which is the reason they are live till today! While we crossed through forests and pastures, the strongest animals pounced on you, and the scared ones were running away from the noise you had made. That was how the bravest Britons have died long ago, and what was left is only a handful of useless cowards! Finally we've found them because they were swooped. Hopelessness and obsession with terrible fear had put them in this place, in which we will achieve beautiful and noticeable victory.

Put an end on the invasions; lock 50 years with one great day, prove to the state that the military could neither be blamed for prolonging the wars, nor was the reason for uprisings!"

In this way Agricola had spoken as flames burst in soldiers; the end of the speech had enchanted all. Immediately after, the soldiers ran for their weapons...²⁷

Conclusion

Peace in the Roman tradition, as a typical old Mediterranean culture, was understood in the so-called *negative sense*, i.e. as the "absence of war" (*absentia belli*) – similar as among the Jews, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Helens and the ancient Macedonians. In fact, ancient Romans considered peace primarily as a social condition in which the rule of law and the hierarchy of values in the Roman state, defined by laws (*leges*) were respected.²⁸ Their ideal was a well-organized state that internally provides order (*ordo*) and **peace** (*pax*), and internationally inspires awe among its neighbors and enemies (*hostis*). According to the perceptions of that time, peace always comes as a consequence of the previous-war (*bellum iustum*), and it is imposed by the winner (*victor*) – with the power of his weapon (*vis arma*), from where the famous real-political maxim originates: "History is written by the victors"! The ancient Romans' key-maxim was: *Si vis pacem, para bellum* = "If you want peace, prepare for war", and this thought was a guiding light, as some military historians note, is fully respected in the entire Roman history – including the glorious era of the famous Roman republic (*Respublica Romana*).

²⁷ See and the Macedonian translation of Tacitus scripture *Agricola*: Такит, *Агрикола*, Скопје, Култура, 1999, 86–88.

²⁸ Светомир Шкарик [уредник], *Теории за мирот и конфликтите (читанка)*, Скопје, Правен факултет „Јустинијан Први“, 2007, 51.

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TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. WARFARE

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Abstract: *Since the end of the cold war, the major Western forces are facing the modern need for reorganization of its armed forces. As significant achievement was considered an appearance of collaboration between departments and services. Issues that the informatics development and its application in the military sphere rise is whether attempts aims very far ahead the technology. The transformation in the military sphere is profound and undeniable, based on group activities related to informatics technology, sensors, computerization and telecommunications. Today, we can speak of a third transformation art of warfare. Initial application of General system technology was quite logical sequence of possible schematics and a systemic analyze of air and naval battles in USA. Transformation of warfare will reflected range in three spheres: the professionalization of western armed powers, intolerance towards the loss of soldiers and intolerance towards collateral damage. Missiles technology according to Western doctrine was initially to help in the nuclear war to turn in search of a significant victory. The transformation of the U.S. art of warfare will be taken seriously only in the last two decades. For long time the U.S. allies with skepticism has seen proposals to modernize U.S. conventional capabilities through the method of multiplication. Proposals for introduction of new technologies will not pass best neither to military reformers. Eastern Bloc aware of their own weaknesses in the military sphere in terms of modern technology, especially of the U.S. electronic development will consider it as qualitative advance. Until the Gulf war there was a lack of a real test for the effectiveness of the new technology.*

The dominance of firepower on the western coalition in Desert storm was demonstrated by accurately guide of the "smart bombs". Desert Storm was named for first information war. There should be no dispute on the importance of the electronically sophisticated Air Force. The conclusion is that cyber technology has played a vital role in the victory of the coalition partners.

Keywords: *Art of warfare, Cold War, multiplication, conventional systems, interoperability, General system.*

INTRODUCTION

After the end of the block division, the major Western forces facing the modern need for additional peace dividend in response to the sudden disappearance of the threat of nuclear holocaust has reorganized its armed forces. Political discussion about peace dividend resulted at the end of the Cold War included a debate on whether states to reduce military spending. The

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new world has proved that the armed forces are still needed although some reduction in finances was done. In the leading Western countries forces and budgets were reduced by at least one third of the total number during the Cold War. The armed forces were faced with drastic reorganization that although it was large one it was not radical, so the basic features of armed forces were preserved. Collaboration between departments and services at the beginning of its appearance was considered a significant achievement. Usually the new equipment always strive to improve the previous development and it is never a complete disconnect with the past. Changing society results with change of the power culture and changes in organizational structures. The transformation that occurred in the armed forces provides a number of targets to be exposed to attacks by "smart" weapons (Hellion, 1995). Factors of warfare such as space factor and time factor has lost in its importance because of the strong influence of information technology. People became very little involved in the flow of information by which an activity is based on. The flow of data is so frequent and extensive that people are unable to cope with the information, causing that data it has to be processed by autonomous processors.

Issues that the informatics development and its application in the military sphere rise is whether attempts aims very far ahead the technology (McConnell, 1989). Although the need for software development and integration of systems may have been underestimated, however the fact is that modern computer supported weapons are more likely to strike at the targets if they have the right coordinates in real time.

The transformation of warfare skill covers many domains. As a term, according to some opinions is focused on keeping the big wars, according to others opinions it affects all armed conflicts and changes the nature of conflict by opening new points of vulnerability and ways of attacks. The biggest advocates for this transformation saw the gap between the capacity of new technologies and capabilities of governments to use these technologies. For most of them, the change in the military sphere does not lie in changing the type of war or at the base of the strategy, but in excessive hierarchical and differentiated nature of combat forces.

The transformation in the military sphere is profound and undeniable, based on group activities related to informatics technology, sensors, computerization and telecommunications. Such activities have dynamic impact on decision-making and efficient use of resources. This in turn leads to transformation in business affairs by encouraging companies to become more adaptable, less hierarchical and willing to think globally. Even a superficial analysis might show that the transformation in military skill goes schematic, through interaction between technological change, evolution of systems, functional inventively and organizational adaptation (Nielsen, 2010). This development leads to a mix which fundamentally changes the shape and ways of waging the war. Yet it must not be forgotten that is difficult to conclude any sense of trends without having to pay attention to the impact of political change on military thought. Hence, the transformation in military skills as an expression refers to major changes in military assets or political objectives, or a combination of both. This process is tolerant to the test and has the virtue to raise more questions about the impact of political, rather than technical change in the conduction of war. With the political structure after the Cold War, it was very unlikely that the two forces will go to war against each other. As Admiral Charles R Browhas said: "I have no faith in the so-called controlled use of atomic weapons. There is no dependable distinction between tactical and strategic situations. I would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon, no matter how small, when both sides have the power to destroy the world" (Jalahudin at all, 1998, p.1). It was more likely that the great powers would find an opportunity to intervene in conflicts that affects only small states.

Basically, we can advocate for a time of the third transformation in military skill. The first transformation is related to the major changes that occurred in the war in the sixteenth and seventeenth

century while the second transformation emphasizes the impact of nuclear weapons (Jalahudin at all, 1998). The latter transformation involves much more than just a change in greater variety. By a certain terminology it is raised to the level of revolution. The real value that had transformation in the military sphere that currently is in its conception, yet going to be evaluated. It is a vision which has developed in the last 20 years. Much of the technical advances associated with transformation in the military sphere, will be applied in other situations, but however, in a purest form it would be typical only for specific circumstances of war. It remains some philosophical considerations if this transformation inevitably was going to happen or should be pushed for political purposes?! Whether the change will continue in continuity?! Can be limited to one country and survive or will it be necessary to be overall accepted and applied worldwide?!

1. The essence of warfare transformation

The transformation of the military skill is conditioned by the coherence between the collection, processing, merging and transfer of the information and those that apply military power. We are talking about the unity of the most different systems with the aim at a general system that enables seamless and continuous communication. That results of a timely (and faster than the enemy) force engagement which would bring quick and categorical victory in war achieved with minimum risk to own troops, civilians and territory.

Discussions on the transformation of the art of war in the nineties years of the last century were focused on the importance of timely and the precise information within the battle area in which military leader operates with capacity at his disposal. The goal is to achieve better (than the enemy) knowledge of the area and battle space and respectively the best possible deployment of forces and application of precise violence. The importance of the flow of information in relation to the transformation of the art of war is reflected in the change of the used terminology. Thus, if in the beginning the discussion was on the command and control, later discussion were related to Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence and in the last two decade, we speak of a unique system that includes command, control, communications, computers, intelligence and management in battle (C4I/BM).

The concept of general system is initially conceived and developed for the needs of the ability of the U.S. navy in joint attacks with the incorporation of radars that provide common information. Such initial application in this area is quite logical sequence of possible schematics and a systemic analyze of air and naval battles. However, despite the complexity of the subject and the possibility of many different influences in land battle, the main idea was right here to be finding application of the General system (Schilling & Christopher, 2005). The realization of such vision, land forces will be one to suffer the biggest change with the implementation of the transformation of the art of warfare. Hence, the role of hostile units is counted in before they enter into battle space. Armed systems are becoming cleverer and less dependent on human entice. With increased possibility to act on more objectives simultaneously, it is shuttered the whole concept of an attack according to a certain priority. Enemy will be tracked electronically and destroyed from large

distance. The units will move only with the necessary equipment for the firepower with the additional power support summoned from the outside when needed. All this means that in future conflicts the factors of space and time will play fewer roles.

The good side of timely warfare is less consumption of ammunition and thus lower transport structure. That in turn, entails less dependence on ports, logistics bases and broader support from allies. Timeliness requires forces not to be grouped before the attack by with inability of the enemy to predict where the attack will come takes away all of its initiatives.

2. Warfare of the western powers

The passionately loss of soldiers in the First World War will be the inspiration for the military theorists to develop an alternative way to war conduction. At that time the new model of the army will be based on engagements of the professional armies investing in new types of weapons (such as e tank) which will provide resolute campaign and will confirm the old principles of indirect strategic approach that aims to avoids the bloodiest battle (McConnell, 1989).

The World War II will show itself as more comprehensive than the first one. The manner in which Japan will be forced to capitulate will point out the illogicality of resuming war in conditions of unlimited aims and methods of action. The new weapon presented as fully capable of erasing the border between frontline and backlines, again will qualified the transformation of the war from a struggle in to the process of total annihilation (Jalahudin at all, 1998). Such a tendency to flip and war again to become the fight will be the main topics of strategic theory in the nuclear era. Culmination of such efforts is actually the transformation of the art of warfare.

Efforts to transform the military skills at western powers will reflect range in three spheres: the professionalization of western armed powers, intolerance towards the loss of soldiers and intolerance towards collateral damage.

The discussions in a political sense of the professionalization of armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom will not be very visible because the two countries have already previously given up the recruitment of the army. On behalf of a number of soldiers, the stress was put on their quality and of course high quality weapons. The level of conduct of war is so modernized that recruits can't be sufficiently trained, unless it is a case of society which is continuously in high degree of mobilization, and moreover, involvement of non-professional soldiers is always worrisome in terms of turnout to the call for war. (The rise of professional army).

If during the past existed attitudes and beliefs that death in war is a heroic act, the expectations for tolerance towards the human losses already long time ago is not present. Among the factors that contribute for such none / tolerance is certainly low rate of growth in Western countries and the lack of strong nationalism in the wide open, democratic societies. In this sense, the military forces of the powerful Western countries had to be able to quickly launch operations with successful ending and minimal losses in the human force.

The civilized way of warfare that pushed the responsibility of the state government for the war, and not its citizens who as civilians are presumed innocent until proven guilty. This moral premise leads to the trend of development weapons that will be accurate even those weapons that aren't lethal. The new concept of non lethal weapons must meet the requirement of disabling/retaining causing minimal damage to the environment (Watts, B. D, 2007). This concept is proof of evolution of soldier's humanity and restraint. The use of such weapons has transformed the way the war is applied to the so-called smoother operations.

Such activities of transformation of the art of warfare in to civilians' separation from soldiers, are in order to minimize losses in the human force and material and technical resources, and are in total contrast to the other alternative of war where innocent blood is shed and budget reserves are emptied, industry is pressed and societies destabilized.

3. Roots of the radical transformation of the art of warfare

3.1. Transformation of the art of warfare in the nuclear era.

In military theory impact of nuclear weapons is considered a revolution in military-technical terms. One step further is the new technology for missiles and missile defense that according to Western doctrine was to help in the nuclear war to turn in search of a significant victory, instead of engaging in aimless exchange of mega tonic atomic weapons. In a situation of this nonsense of such search in the sixties of the last century has been declared a state of mutually assured destruction. Later, in a state of strategic balance due to unattractiveness of ways to nuclear victory, the two opposing sides will seek a ways to legitimize symmetry in acceptable form of weapon control. But, because of always potential opportunity for fail of deterrence, the current needs demanded a more restrained form of warfare in which was not excluded the possibility of using nuclear weapons in a limited war. Because of the danger of possible escalation of the situation from limited into full nuclear war, such schemes of more restrained warfare would not be very convincing. These ideas will revive again in the seventies with the new technologies that made weapons to be more accurate over long distances, the miniaturization technologies and propulsion technologies (Watts, 2007).

Exactly from these efforts will be developed systems of conventional transformation of military skill. What would blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities are cruise missiles and infrastructure into space consisting of special satellites equipped for intelligence, geodesy, meteorology and data delivery (Butler & Barrie, 2006). Thus, at the horizon appeared a new opportunity in which systems of space will prevent ballistic missiles in their launch. This possibility will be alternative to search to ways to extend the conventional phase of the war by creating the conditions for diplomatic prevent of further escalation. The conventional strategy to gain greater importance in both blocks, but because of quantitative dominance of the Eastern block in terms of conventional forces, the Western block will be in constant pursuit of quality improvement as a form of multiplication of forces through the development of technologies in support of conventional operations.

3.2. Development of technology

Most of the technologies that are the essence of the transformation of military skill as improved munitions, precision targeting, remote steering and control, target recognition, command, control, communications and electronic warfare emerged in the 1970s. In this sense we can't talk about some sudden transformation of military skill but the continuous evolution of technology trends. In 1980 Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger will talk about how technology revolutionized the conventional battlefield, while Seymour Discman, then vice president of programs at the Institute for Defense Analysis, finds that the United States are in a period of revolutionary change of technology in military forces that be in the next decade or two will radically transformed in their doctrines, operation and capabilities, whereby is pointed the information warfare as a primary part of direct conflict (French, 1999).

The transformation of the U.S. art of warfare will be taken seriously in the last two decades. If prior vision of conventional forces was implied by the possibility of a central collision between two blocks that despite its remarkable conventional capabilities were supported also by a nuclear arsenal, since the nineties, the analysis of the application of new technologies will be part of the ongoing effort to maintain the military balance (Diakov & Miasnikov, 2007). So, in a situation where you can not determine the qualitative difference of potentially conflicting blocks, then you can assess the quantitative potential. Needs of Alliance assessments noted the growing importance of knowledge of visibility and location of troops. These analyzes were done on three levels: the U.S. military, at their allies and at the military reformers.

According to critics of military, combat systems that were previously used to support slowly start has become expensive. For these combat systems on land, sea and air military had industrial and legal support. In the new conditions of warfare, combat systems function will require integration between services. In this sense, the military recognizes the importance of advanced weapons and appropriate intensive investigative activities (Grigoriev A., 1992). In this thinking, combat systems will continue to be a central base for forces multiplication. Under existing danger that integration or multiplication forces proves it vulnerable to enemy countermeasures and until they show new smart weapons practice, the basis for ejecting the missile - combat systems- will retain priority in the defense budgets.

The U.S. allies with skepticism have seen proposals to modernize U.S. conventional capabilities through the method of multiplication. According to them the doctrine of nuclear deterrence works perfectly and instead investment in new and expensive systems, they will even start with some cuts in their defense budgets. Pressure on military budgets will limit room for maneuver on the proposed U.S. initiative for future military technology in the period of the developed counter nuclear world movement in the early eighty years. Imposed debate on denuclearization will reassure politicians in Europe in their belief that short-term, technical revolution can drastically change the military balance between the two blocks.

Proposals for introduction of new technologies will not pass best neither to military reformers. Although considered most creative strategists, this time they will accuse that with

such reform proposals is lost strategic imagination of preservation in the war with massive losses. Instead, they will try to revive the traditional skills of war leader to quickly move forces as a means of determining outcome in the ground war. This philosophy is manifested in the movement toward greater reliance on maneuver, which requires greater operational needs, but gives better results and is cost-effective in terms of victims. According to reformers, technical reinforcements should be only appropriate alternative of doctrine inventions. Since the reduced budget for the development of equipment supported less progressive systems, in general are less troops. With the acquisition of new capabilities, equipment will become more complicated and more difficult to maintain and as such less suitable for the movement of military than equipment of Soviets which is earlier purchased cheaper and yet simpler, and more accessible. In their discussions, reformers indicated that although the values at war offered new systems are larger, still, in practice, is less accomplished, as conditions on the ground make the new technology to be quite vulnerable and as such represent a further complicate the life of the soldier. According to them, the transformation in the military sphere should not be marginalized, but should reflect the development of the art of war. According to Steven Canby, the new technologies will obviously change the techniques by which things are carried out in time of war, but will not change the nature of these things (e.g. gathering information, command, attacking, protecting and moving), nor the principles by they are working out as a surprise, concentration, spare of forces, security etc. (Canby S. L., 1973).

3.3. The views of Eastern Bloc

Institutional and strategic alliance adjustments to the application of modern technology will get more attention in the east. Eastern Bloc aware of own weaknesses in the military sphere in terms of modern technology, especially of the U.S. electronic development will consider it as qualitative advance. The Soviet military leadership, wanting to warn his political leadership of their own technological lags, since the early eighties has declare new military- technical revolution. Of particular concern were developmental capabilities of U.S. intelligence and attack system which enabled identification of goals and attacking them from a large distance. An important motive against strategic defense initiative in the U.S. at Soviets will be fear inspiring reaction of expensive technological competition in which U.S. has already accomplished advantage in electronics sphere.

4. The new technologies test in practice

Until 1990 there was a lack of a real test for the functioning of the new technology. One reason for this was that technology was very expensive to be spent on major exercises. At that time there were only indications on what can be achieved with the use of such technologies. Another reason was that despite in the eighties being led to many armed conflicts, however, the warring sides in them have had limited access to the most modern types of weapons. And so, neither the U.S. had any enemies appropriate to check the latest practical theories of unification of combat systems.

With the dissolution of Warsaw block addition of nuclear threats will be reduced and the U.S. will become the dominant superpower, with the potential to further enhance the existing technological advantage of U.S. military sphere. Thus, the military strategists will create a new opportunity for visioning the future armed conflict. In this will rather help Iraqi crisis in which diplomacy would prove unworkable solutions versus general war. If by then, there was some doubt about the ability of the U.S. to conduct effective warfare, the outcome of the war in the Gulf will prove otherwise. Operation Desert Storm will be a real test of advanced U.S. military technology against a well established classical equipped Iraqi defense. Certain predictions spoke that because of desert unfavorable condition, many of the U.S. systems will drop and that will result with many of the so-called Friendly fire dead, that will make U.S. President to conclude a truce with Iraq. Exactly on this card has played the Iraqi President risked war with the U.S. But the way is conducted operation Desert Storm in the best light showed the potential of new military systems. The result was not only "appropriate environment for successful application of air power in the West", but "circumstances ... so perfect you can not expect better access in any other impending conflict" (Watts, B., 1993, pp. 363). The strength of Iraq was pretty overrated because of success in previous conflicts as well as large quantities of physical force with sufficient quality. But on the other hand Iraqi forces were weakened by frequent filter of military leadership caused by fear of expressing political aspirations, and deployment of a large number of recruits on positions of elite Iraqi forces who opposite were concentrated on protecting the regime.

The dominance of firepower on the western coalition in air and sea, used in conventional campaign led to quick and decisive end of the war with few casualties on the coalition side, was demonstrated by accurately guide of the "smart bombs". Although intelligence was not the highest, but because the quality of telecommunications was impressive. Desert Storm was named for first information war. According to the Italian military magazine *Rivista militare*, multinational forces in Desert storm were using U.S. reconnaissance and information gathering satellites (KX-11 and KX-12) which from altitudes greater than 36000 km has gathered data on schedule the activities of the armed forces of Iraq and submit it that data to the command of the multinational forces. Information from satellites, not only warn of changing weather conditions and attack the enemy, but also provided seamlessly to take action against their targets by locating and determining the coordinates, choice of weapons for action and its positioning in the most appropriate position, transferring orders to attack and leading missiles to the target. Satellite terminals were moving along with the armed forces, playing the role of media camp that constantly monitors and provides unification of units. There should be no dispute on the importance of the Air Force. The conclusion is that they played a vital role in the victory of the coalition partners.

Aside general impression, coalition systems hadn't functioned perfectly. Not always have been find appropriate targets, nor could be avoided collateral damage. Information warfare in no case was complete and often had to improvise. Yet, seen was enough to set a new goal: raising this form of warfare of a higher degree. If Iraqis could not resist the military power of the United States, the prediction is that regardless of the quality of the physical force of some new future adversaries, the United States will be more successful

because they have yet to develop electronic surveillance, command, control, communication and supervision (Mahnken, 1997). This is the moment when benchmarked glittering future of the U.S. armed forces.

Conclusion

Proponents of strategic air power and mechanized warfare after World War One offered a strategy capable of bringing decisive and relatively painless victory. WWII showed how many such attitudes were exaggerated. Further confirmation of the apparent hopelessness of attempts to keep the war in acceptable limits, was provided by the appearance of nuclear weapons in 1945. This implies that the search for decisive battle ended here. If relentless tendency toward total war can be prevented by preparation for running a limited combat, perhaps the strike can be countered back by turning its own inevitable logic. Preparation for war that is likely to end in absolute disaster will push logic to the extreme limits, so, the domain of rational policy will result in a new initiative. Initiative for a radical transformation of military affairs.

The Gulf War would lead to a start of the transformation of the U.S. warfare skills through the process of what the Russians have called military technical revolution. But in order of avoidance the emphasizing technology as the center of all that, the terminology will change in emphasis on the transformation of art of warfare. In any case, the battle in the Gulf will dramatically demonstrate the benefits of technical innovation in the armed forces. Although the changes were expressed in technical and organizational terms, the most critical was the change in the political domain. The end of the period of division between blocks meant that the boundaries of the old conventional garments are not functional and are not limited to scenarios driven by a strong opponent in the conflict that can escalate into a total nuclear destruction. In front of the military planners who were in the Gulf now stood task of preparation for battle what they want to lead -based on high level of doctrines and technological development. Patterns of wars that followed later simply confirmed the already announced transformation of U.S. art of warfare.

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EMERGENCY REGIONAL CAPABILITIES, IN THE SPIRIT OF „SMART DEFENSE“

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Abstract: *The military involvement in Civil Emergencies (CE) and different natural disasters is a part of their institutional mission. The practical application through out the years has revealed that the Armed Forces have fulfilled this mission successfully, despite the fact that this is not their primary concern/mission.*

The evaluation and the assessment of the Civil Emergency involvement of the military is a new trend that occurred with the last years thus assisting to other Governmental agencies through the implementation of “Smart Defense” initiatives. The derived tasks from Struga Meeting in June 2012 outline some priorities that are dedicated to strengthen regional collaboration based on a common interest.

As history implies, the Balkan region is prone to natural disaster of all sorts. For this reason it must not be excluded in the future. Besides the fact that these natural disasters are hard or even more impossible to predict, we have to take into consideration that they are not known and don't have any limitations that can reach outside the region, even beyond.

Harvesting the knowledge and study of the Allied army practices, including those of the region, the results imply that each country in region has taken its precautions in facing different emergencies and catastrophes.

Regardless of this fact, in order to face variety of emergencies or catastrophes, it is necessary to implement a high level of regional collaboration of all structures and actors that are engaged in this field, including the increase of collaboration between regional militaries.

Keywords: *Smart defense, regional cooperation, reciprocal support*

Smart defense

Smart defence is based on capability areas, build on success through the Connected Forces Initiative. It's necessary to expand education and training of personnel, to enhance

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exercises. As much as possible, NATO should also step up its connections with Partners, in order to act together. Smart Defense makes the most of our national investment—promoting security through transparent and cost effective ways of doing business.

For the purposes of smart defence, the Alliance country must give priority, specialize in what they do best, and look for multinational solutions to shared problems. NATO can act as intermediary, helping the nations to establish what they can do together at lower cost, more efficiently and with less risk.

Six Principles of Smart Defense

1. Openness by facilitating a dialogue with the people about the role of defense as part of a broad security framework that positions the country to avoid conflict.

2. Access by creating opportunities so that every sector of the national economy can participate in the nation's defense.

3. Empowerment of entrepreneurs, edgefighters, and individual citizens to create a vital defense ecosystem that is a reflection of the values that matter to the people.

4. Efficiency or doing more with less by harvesting the best ideas from unexpected sources to create better, cheaper, and faster solutions to the “wicked” problems in security.

5. Insight from the edges of innovation, discovery, and experience to capitalize on the opportunities and challenges of a changing world.

6. Sustainability by optimizing the defense economy to protect and preserve liberty without overwhelming citizens with unnecessary costs.

Implementation a high level of regional collaboration of all structures and actors that are engaged in Civil Emergency is necessary in order to face variety of emergencies or catastrophes. Besides civilian structures and actors “*the new era*” also needs to include and increase of collaboration among regional militaries structures.

This is dictated from factors as outlined bellow:

- No place, rich or poor, cannot have enough operational capabilities in case of disasters or for all types of emergencies;
- Implementation of “Smart Defense” concept means taking precautions and determine tasks in building common capabilities to face civilian emergencies;
- Some of the frequent phenomena of flooding, roads blocked from snow, earthquakes, fires and other phenomena, have happened and might happen in border areas. Therefore, the same catastrophe and emergency and its effect might affect not only one country, but even the neighboring country. In a situation like this, is necessary to have effective collaboration and common regional contribution.

In the Final Declaration of Chicago Summit, is highlighted “*In the important strategic region of West Balkan, regional collaboration and the relations of good neighboring, are important for its peace and stability.*”

Is with interest of facing the civilian emergencies and its consequences that every country or military structures are to be more specialized and improve their capacity for grasping the challenges of Civil Emergencies. This enables not only a help and a contribution to another country, but is with lower cost, due to the reduction of forces and equipment provided to be used in these sorts of operations.

Even though the region have stepped up and improved their capabilities, one of the priority tasks of governmental institutions, active operational structures, including those military, to find forms and new operational methods to enhance the efficiency and the performance in facing the emergencies and catastrophes that might occur, thus improving the regional collaboration.

The evaluation of the current trend of the military structures in facing the emergencies that have happened last years, the contribution and reciprocal assistance provided by neighboring structures, the implementation of “Smart Defense” initiative and its tasks derived from Struga Meeting in June 2012, it needs to be stressed the need of regional collaboration with common interest, as below:

- Coordination and fast reciprocal information of expected catastrophes and emergencies;
- Knowledge on natural disasters, studies and scientific planning to avoid the consequences;
- Development of common trainings and experience exchange;
- Creation of common capacities and reciprocal support with forces and technique, based on plans of reciprocal help and collaboration.

Coordination and fast reciprocal information.

Coordination is rather important in all stages of a civilian emergency. The importance of coordination shows especially in the stage of immediate reaction, where effective coordination to minimize the gaps is needed, avoid duplications, an assistance and non appropriate interventions, delays and obstacles especially in decision making. The weak coordination brings unsatisfactory responses to emergency situations and might dissatisfy the civilian population.

An important element that precedes taking preventive measures is *information*. Mutual information exchange should be assessed not only in an internal plan (inside a place or a country). It is important that urgent information exchange is operational through Civilian Emergency Management Centers with neighbor countries as well. This enhances the efficiency within a country, and the coordination of actions among military structures on a regional level.

The citizen’s awareness is often associated with a certain level of risks, especially those that come for wild fire, earthquakes, flooding, mudslides or environment pollution etc. is one of the primary tasks that should be taken from responsible structures for civilian emergencies on central or local level. Through implementation of all the forms of seminars, leaflets, information through media, lessons in schools etc. should be given information for

the consequences that might be created in different emergencies and the way the people should act to avoid consequences and to counter act with efficiency in these cases.

Knowledge of risk and scientific planning to avoid consequences.

Another important aspect in the field of civilian emergencies is the knowledge of the risks that might threat a country or a region. When the risks are familiar, you can oppose successfully. In Albania, in collaboration with PNUD, educational and scientific institutions and Non Governmental organizations, a time framed assessment of risk is done, and based on this, a National Plan of Planning and facing the Civilian Emergencies is prepared and approved. It is combined to operate with the law of Civilian Emergencies and other helpful laws that fix the work of managing structures of central and local government, to face the Civilian Emergencies.

On the basis of these major documents, every institution and each operative structure has developed an action plan for different types of emergencies and has tried different courses of actions. These action plans, are reviewed and improved periodically to respond appropriately to emerge situations in all phases of emergency management.

Scientific research. In some educational institutions, including the Defense Academy are defined some major fields of scientific research for the future. Along problems of other fields, are provided issues of future security environment and its impact in the life of population, in training and nowadays operations of Armed Forces.

Regardless of the gained experience listed above, it is very important to know the experience of our neighbors, should be commonly studied especially for issues and problems that concern two or more countries, in the aspect of Civilian Emergencies.

Common training as experience exchange.

In circumstances when the number of disasters globally growing and consequences of that, casualties and enormous material damage, cooperation between countries is no longer needed, it is now necessary. In this sense, connecting the countries today takes place on several levels and across a wide range of activities.

Common training and qualifications are an insurance to enhance the effectiveness of operational structures. The "*Smart Defense*" initiative requires well studied programs for each structure, with a specific structure and mission, requires a qualitative training for each kind of emergencies and realized in an area near to reality.

In the Armed Forces of R. Albania, the Regional Support Brigade is created as a specialized unit to cope with Civilian Emergencies thus to develop training for flooding, earthquakes, fire fighting, and search and rescue (SAR) etc.

In this frame, some training has been developed in the R. Albania:

- Participation of military structures in institutional activities for CE in collaboration with Ministry of Interior in Tirana.
- Training "*Gjinari*", in 2010 for fire fighting.
- Training "*Drini*", in 2010, to face flooding and other natural disasters
- Training "*Common Reaction*" in 2011, to face flooding disasters.

Also, R. Albania has experience in preparing and equipping training areas, necessary materials for training, and respective specialists for each domain.

In the Republic of Macedonia in 2005 by law was established the protection and rescue Directorate. Directorate is an independent state body. Is caused by the merger of civil protection by the Ministry of Defense and inspection of fire protection from the Ministry of Interior, consists of 4 sections with 11 departments, 4 independent departments and 35 local offices for protection and rescue.

Directorate for Protection and Rescue of the Republic of Macedonia as an institution is responsible for protection and rescue of people, environment, material goods, natural resources, flora and fauna and cultural heritage from natural disasters and other accidents in peace, emergency and martial law.

Republic of Macedonia signing of bilateral agreements, active participation in regional initiatives and cooperation with leading international organizations, is actively working to strengthen the national system for the protection and rescue of people and property from natural disasters and other accidents and contributes to greater interoperability of the region and beyond. So far, Republic of Macedonia has established bilateral, regional cooperation, as well as cooperation with international organizations such as: UN, Council of Europe, NATO, EU, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Bilateral and international agreements in the field of protection and rescue are the establishment of a legal framework for cooperation in the field of prevention, preparedness, giving and receiving of aid and elimination of consequences of major disasters. In addition to that agreements are an opportunity to exchange knowledge and experiences, participation in joint projects, organization of courses, seminars and tutorials and encouraging the development of material and technical resources and equipment.

Until now the Republic of Macedonia has signed bilateral agreements with the following countries:

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed on 20.03.2008 in Skopje
2. Montenegro - signed on 12.12.2008 in Podgorica
3. Hungary - signed on 10.09.2009 in Skopje
4. Slovenia - signed on 14.10.2010 in Zagreb
5. Croatia - signed on 14.10.2010 in Zagreb
6. Albania - signed in June 2012 in Struga.

There are ongoing negotiations with Bulgaria, Serbia and Italy to determine the final version of the text of the agreement and its signing.

There are some experiences in field of bilateral cooperation, in 2011 special teams (with 43 members, 21 water pump depletion, 8 tents, 10 units and five boats) of the Directorate for Protection and Rescue from Republic of Macedonia were actively involved in the actions of rescue and evacuation in devastating floods in Shkodra, Albania.

Regional cooperation is realized through the participation of the Republic of Macedonia in several regional initiatives

- Initiative for Preparedness and Disaster Prevention for South Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE) meeting in Zagreb in September 2007, eight countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Croatia) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding,
- Council for Civil-Military Planning in Southeast Europe (SEE CMEP) was established with the signing of the agreement in April 2001 in Sofia, Bulgaria.
 - o The Council of the CMEP SEE operate several working groups:
 - Working Group for planning and exercises,
 - Working Group on Standards and procedures,
 - Working Group on IT and information management.

In the field of regional collaboration, a good experience is provided by executing common training and exercises which had the aim of coping with Civilian Emergencies,

- Training "SEESIM (2009-2010) for CE, in the frame of bilateral collaboration between Albanian Armed Forces and US Armed Forces
- CE trainings with Italian Army developed in Tirana, in June 2011
- Exchanging the experience with German Specialists, using the firefighting trucks, developed in Tirana 2011.
- Training for earthquakes, developed in Slovenia in October 2011.
- Training "Civil Protection in UN and South East Europe", developed in Zagreb, Croatia in May 2011 in the frame of activities with UN.
- Training with scenario "flooding", developed in Croatia in May 2012
- Training planned in the frame of Adriatic Charter (A-5) in Albania, in 2013.
- Directorate for Protection and Rescue of the Republic of Macedonia organized a computer-assisted exercise (CAX) held in Ohrid in August 2005. The main objective of the exercise was to train procedures and possibilities of the CMEP Council and NATO to offer and receive help during natural disasters.
- Directorate for Protection and Rescue, under the CMEP was re-organized computer assisted exercise (CAX) in 2008. During The CMEP TTH-08 CAX, participate 97 participants, 49 representatives of national institutions in Macedonia and 48 were from 8 countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Croatia and Montenegro) and representatives of international organizations in Macedonia (UN and NATO).
- Exercise organized by the Euro-Atlantic Coordination Centre for Disaster Response in NATO:
 - o IDASSA 2007 in Croatia,
 - o ZETUSU 2009 in Kazakhstan,
 - o IZMIR in Turkey in 2010.
- Exercise "Shared Resilience 2013" organized as Situational/Field training Exercise (S/FTX) in TA "Krivolak" in Republic of Macedonia. This exercise

is based on a fictitious scenario and designed to build participating nations capability and interoperability between different Government Agencies and international response from intergovernmental participants. On the exercise took participation around 300 personnel from 6 countries (USA, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia and Republic of Macedonia as Host Nation). Participants were from different institutions, Crisis Management Centre, Protection and Rescue Directorate, Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of health (MoH), Macedonian Red Cross.

In my opinion not only specialized unit, but also all Armed Forces have to be ready to offer experience and expertise in developing trainings, preparation of different operative groups, in different kind of emergencies.

Common capacities and improvement of active contingents.

The support of each others in civilian emergency cases must be the main filed of collaboration in common national capacity development, bilateral or regional. In the last meeting of Ministers of Defense of Adriatic Charter (A-5) in the frame of "Smart Defense" initiative, Albanian Minister of Defense Mr. Arben IMAMI gave the idea of: *"finding new ways to reach the goal in actual conditions"*.

Emergencies that happened in past two years such as flooding and snowfalls in Shkodra and Lezha, different teams from Turkey, Italy, Macedonia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia, etc. offered their help in food, clothing, troops and technique directly in the areas covered with emergencies.

In the most critical time of fires, Greek specialized firefighting teams gave their contribution with helicopters, firefighters and firefighting trucks. Also a helicopter that came from Turkey, gave a great contribution in facing the emergencies during firefighting. These actions, seemingly modest, have served strengthening the reciprocal trust in the field of security and have brought our countries closer. Also we can say that the involvement of Armed Forces in these cases has served to enhance the trust of civilians toward Armed Forces.

It will be better for this endeavor to be supported with prepared plans, studied in details and aimed at the reciprocal assistance that may be utilized in proper momentum on a required location. Preparing the collaboration and coordination plans in advance is a necessity due to the fact that nature emergencies seek immediate and well organized response. In function of this, time has come to materialize the proposal of the Minister of Defense to build up a team of regional experts, team which will review common regional capacities, based in the principle of specialization, to face the Civilian Emergencies.

The creation of common capacities and **reciprocal support** with troops and equipment that is based on reciprocal collaboration is the proper way towards fruitful regional collaboration. The development of the concept of UN *"sharing and pooling"* (exchange and joint of capacities) on a regional level is highly applicable. Two or more parallel structures can be united, or we can build common capacities by complementing each other, to cope with a specific emergency.

In this frame, it is important to have available regional capacities as are Training Area “Krivolak” in Macedonia. I have the opinion that even we have to accelerate the work and promotion of the TA Krivolak to become modern, regional and capable centre, which can be used from all the region nations not only by military but also to be used by intergovernmental institutions. We have programmed and organized a wide participation of national actors. This gained experience has to be seen in the bigger picture, aiming at the development of common training with neighboring countries, choosing those places or terrains that are threatened from common emergencies like fires, flooding, earthquakes etc. this would help exchanging the experiences and expertise’s, will enhance reciprocal trust, the degree of interaction and the familiarization with created situations and the ways of actions to face with success the emergencies.

Regional collaboration has been diverse in the frame of Adriatic Charter –A5 and is crowned with successful projects, common missions in Afghanistan (ISAF), experience exchange for the plan of membership in NATO, and common trainings between Armed Forces of these countries. This good experience should be used in the future even in the field of civilian emergencies, in regional level. Our country promotes the collaboration even to our regional countries, in the frame of different regional initiatives, especially that of Adriatic Charter –A5 and SEEDM. In this frame, General Staff of Armed Forces of Albania has seen and should see with interest the development of common training “*Joint Reaction*”, focused in facing Civilian Emergencies, planed in 2013, where the planning process started in 2012.

“The perfection and empowerment of emergency active special structures in support of civilian populations, remains the secret of facing different emergencies”.

Acting active structures in Albania are: the Armed Forces, structures of Firefighting, Emergency Services, State Police, and other Policies and the general Directory of State reserve, specialized teams of mining, petrol etc., as monitoring and support structures. These structures have roles, tasks and special responsibilities for all the phases of management of emergencies and this is essential. Positive is the fact that these structures collaborate closed with each other, to ensure possible effective responses.

Beside active Governmental structures even Non Profit Organizations like PNUD, UNHCR, etc., are cooperating closely with governmental structures (even with Armed Forces) in coping with the emerging natural disasters. No contribution is redundant to face a civilian emergency, because unity is strength. Therefore, together the tasks are fulfilled better and with low cost.

Is a fact that in the emergencies of last year, the structures of our Armed Forces have been the main actors in the effort to eliminate the consequences and saving people lives? So, Air Force with the technique and the equipment that owns has conducted and can conduct air transport which is very necessary when the ground transport is impossible. Naval Forces has conducted and can conduct naval transport in case of necessity. Thus, with the individuality that they have, the units meet each other and are an important link.

Regional Support Brigade, designated as a unit with the mission to face civilian emergencies, performs a variety of tasks in facing the emergencies in case of earthquake,

flooding, fire, chemical and bacteriological contamination, different accidents etc., while other units, with the features that they have and the equipments and the technique that they own, can fulfill the frame of action types and emergencies.

As said above, in facing the civilian emergencies or natural disasters a lot of governmental structures have specific tasks. Operational Civilian Emergencies present comprehensive non combative actions that even in peace times and war time these are a priority. An important part of this engagement is Armed Forces of other nations. But those are not the major instrument facing different natural and human disasters. Those are *a direct help and support for civilian structures*. This because with the sources that they own, the high degree of organization, readiness and the ability for immediate deployment, Armed Forces are able to give a great contribution since the first moments.

In the frame of National Plan of facing the Civilian Emergencies in our country is a annual task of all national actors (and every time when there are changes in structure) to declare their capacities in General Headquarter of Armed Forces (data that go even in the General Directorate of Planning and Facing CE).

Identification of operational capacities in each unit of Armed Forces and the knowledge of opportunities that units have, is the first step to contribute in facing the most typical civilian emergencies, like earthquake, flooding, roads blocked from snow, evacuation of population, distribution of relief, fires etc.

As in every field of civilian emergencies, with a great importance is: *priority, specialization and collaboration between structures*. In the frame of implementing “*Smart Defense*” is necessary that identified capabilities confirmed in “the battle field” to improve their quality, to restructure and be more professional in the field of action.

As the General Secretary of NATO Rasmussen has emphasized, we should “*reduce fat and strength the muscles*”. This should not be seen just in numeric aspect, but is important to be conceived in a qualitative way, in enhancing the affectivity of teams, subunits and individuals, to act with maximal intensity even in the hardest conditions.

In this context, one of the major tasks of units and sub units of Armed Forces is constant identification of critical capacities, retention of operational skills and creation of other necessary capacities to face a kind of emergency, by eliminating in the same time excess capacities, not active or that are use rarely.

Conclusions:

Especially in the field of emergencies, our region countries have common challenges. They face with same regional dangers and threats, which can be well faced with policies, capacities and common solutions.

The concept of facing civilian emergencies and to be protected from different disasters won't be complete if that is conceived as exclusive competence of just one nation or country. Because, possible emergencies and disasters can happen not only inside the territory of one country, but they can have a regional extend and beyond.

We need a "*Smart Defense*" in the field of each other support and for the case of civilian emergencies. Civilian Emergencies should be the main domain of collaboration and development of common bilateral or regional capacities.

Regional collaboration in the field of CE and according the "Smart Defense" concept, seeks political support. It is necessary to make new legal regulations to sanction and make possible the common engagement in facing this kind of emergencies, aiming the preparation of legislation in accordance with NATO standards.

In facing possible emergencies and catastrophes with low cost is important the development of critical national capacities, by eliminating excess capacities, old and those that are not in use.

Is very important to be predictive, to collaborate closely when we act together, and to develop common capacities, which are necessary to face common regional threats and dangers. Is a fact that in critical situations is necessary the regionalization of capacities to face the Civilian Emergencies? In this frame should be the knowledge and the declaration of the capacities of our country for all possible emergencies. And not only this, but should be declared that for *what kind of emergency is offered the most qualitative and specialized help in the regional frame*.

Is of great importance the identification of experience of emergencies happened last years in each region and declaring these experiences in training manuals, scenarios and programs. In this frame should be aimed completing a full set of tactical and technical doctrines and manuals in relation with civilian emergencies.

Is very important and with great interest for all, the knowledge of experience that each country has in organizing and performing operations to face Civilian Emergencies. Here is place for experience exchange of our Military Forces with those of the region and beyond.

Study with attention of homologues army practices for all the emergencies. Review of all CE system in the territory of our countries, by analyzing possible dangers and scenarios, the resources and capacities and the plan made from all institutions of all levels.

Design and implementation of training plans and programs in interest to enhance the professionalism and preparation of military personnel, to face Civilian Emergencies. Achievement of NATO standards for this kind of operations seeks the exchange of experience and development of common trainings for Civilian Emergencies.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S APPROACH TO ENERGY SECURITY

MA Dejan TASHKOVSKI

Abstract: *The diversification of energy supplies is a fundamental principle in the planning process of the energy security, and it implies ensuring access to diverse sources of supply, so it is evident that the activities related to energy security in Europe and the world in future will gain momentum. The main political and economic efforts of the European Union are canalized towards the creation of functional sustainability which in future could be provided only through the energy stability and timely delivery and cost-efficient supply of energy and resources to its economy. That is why the European Union is intensively improving its own energy security, the production, the transport and the development of alternative energy sources at the expense of fossil fuels.*

The main determinants of the European energy policy actually relate to reducing energy dependence, better utilization and regular supply of natural gas and other fuels.

Key words: *Energy security, European Union, Energy, Natural gas.*

The EU Approach to Energy Security

Europe is heavily dependent on energy imports. Today oil, natural gas and coal account for 80 % of the total energy consumed in the EU and up to 50 % of energy sources come from imports. These figures are expected to rise to a level of 65 % by 2030.¹ The interpretation of what energy security means in European context and how the European Union institutions are trying to cope with it follows below.

The approach of the European Union to the broad and complex issue of energy security involves three separate but interrelated policies: internal mechanisms to ensure sustainability of energy supply, external mechanisms by which energy is integrated into the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, internal and foreign policies to achieve protection of the critical infrastructure.²

All these policies together address the problems that the 27 EU member countries are facing in the global environment.

¹ Luft, Gal., Korin Anne: "Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook (Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues)", Praeger Security International, 2009, p.160

² Ibid p.161

Internal Mechanisms

The EU Heads of states and governments broadly endorsed the proposal of the European Commission presented at the EU summit in 2006, which is the European strategy for a secure energy future, which includes all three previously mentioned priorities. This Summit set the following milestones for improvement of the internal measures to be taken to improve the energy security of the European Union member states:

- Diversification of the energy sources and review of the use of nuclear energy.
- A common approach to solving crises “in the spirit of solidarity”
- Development of regional energy markets for gas and electricity in the EU
- Plans for raising the share of renewable energy up to 15 % and increasing the share of bio-fuels to 8 % by 2015.³

The European Commission is at a loss regarding the issue of European energy diversity. Namely, it would be too much to regulate the right of states to decide by themselves on the type of energy that will be used in their countries. The primary reason for this are the differences in the energy infrastructure that the states have built over the years, as well as the use of nuclear energy, but also the various energy sources that can be found on the territory of the states. Europe is committed to saving the energy mix and diversity, but also to the guarantee for the existence of clean energy sources that will successfully cope with the European energy needs in the future.

The question is how nuclear energy could affect the European energy mix. Nearly 60% of Europe's energy is obtained by the use of coal, as well as nuclear reactors. In 2005, the nuclear power plants produced 31% of the total electricity produced in the EU and 30% was produced by using coal. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear energy will remain dominant in Europe in the next decade despite the indecisiveness as to the direction it should take in future. Europe has a total of 166 active nuclear reactors and 6 are under construction. However, the distribution of electricity production from the nuclear power plants varies between Member States. In France, over 80% of electricity comes from nuclear power plants, followed by Germany (31%) and the UK (around 15%). Some countries, such as Germany, Belgium and Spain are committed to phasing out their reactors despite the fact that their nuclear power plants play a key role in electricity production. Other countries, such as Great Britain, Finland and Lithuania are working on introducing a new generation of reactors. The revival of nuclear power in these countries is the result of the political will in these countries for its use. They say that nuclear energy covers all three aspects of the EC's strategy: security of supply, competitiveness and impact on climate changes. The protagonists of the use of nuclear energy in Europe emphasize that the cost for producing electricity from nuclear plants and coal is almost the same, since as they say, in addition to the rising price of uranium, the price of coal is also on the rise on world markets. Another argument in favour

³ *European Commission, Green Paper: Toward a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply*, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/green_paper_energy_supply_en.pdf (visited on 15.01.2013)

of the use of nuclear energy is the Kyoto Treaty of 1997, under which the EU is obligated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 8% by 2012. Europe's dependence on fossil fuels is again in favour of nuclear energy because we have seen a steady increase in their price and numerous problems associated with their import. However, these views are not shared by all EU member states. In 2000, Germany became the first major economic power that committed itself to putting a stop to the use of nuclear energy by 2012. This decision was taken despite the fact that 31% of the country's energy is generated by nuclear plants (thus without emission of carbon dioxide). Austria shares similar views on this issue. In 1978, Austria blocked the development of nuclear power plants despite the massive dependence on imported energy sources from the former Russian Federation. The European Union also opposes the production of electricity from coal, as it is called "Dirty energy" and it is contrary to the commitment of Europe to respect the conditions set out in the Kyoto Protocol to limit the green house emissions. However, the EU decision is rather subtle, since today, although costly, there is a pure combustion technology for coal and the placing of filters allows for prevention of 80-90 % of carbon emission during the combustion of coal. Although currently several states that rely on coal in electricity generation, such as Spain 22%, Germany 52 %, UK 35 % and the Czech Republic 62 %, announced that they would introduce these new technologies, none has yet realized these announcements. Renewable energy causes less controversy. The EU sees itself as the world's leading promoter of the use of renewable energy sources. But the utilization of bio-fuels, solar energy and hydrogen is still too low or barely covers 7 % of the total energy use in Europe.

In March 2007, the European heads of states and governments accepted a responsibility, which is actually a legal agreement that obliges the states to increase the level of utilization of renewable energy sources up to 20 % by 2020. The EU countries also agreed to reduce the emission of GHG emissions by 20 percent by 2020 compared with the 1990 levels and moreover, to reduce the overall energy demand by 20 %. Without the use of nuclear energy, it seems that these goals are difficult to achieve, especially without harming the economy and the consumers themselves.

Briefly, the program 20-20-20 by 2020 is much more a program to protect the environment, rather than an EU strategy for energy security. The situation in Europe is not at all naive. The exploitation of oil from the North Sea peaked in 1999 and to date has declined steadily. European coal production has fallen significantly over the last 25 years (mainly because of political decision) and the high demand and reduced offer of this energy source has made the major European countries to import coal from Colombia, Indonesia and Australia.

From 1990 to 2004, the greenhouse gas emissions in the EU decreased in almost all sectors, except the transport sector where the emissions increased by almost 35% compared to the 1990 levels.

Domestic Energy Market of the European Union

The essence of the EU energy policy lies in the successful implementation of the common domestic energy market of all 27 EU member states. The reasons for the need of the common market are clear: there are enormous difficulties faced by the new members

when they first appear on the EU energy market. Furthermore, the market is highly concentrated, vertically integrated and uncompetitive. The lack of interconnections between national systems for power transmission is just one example of the problems, especially for new EU member states coming from Central and Eastern Europe. The construction of the European energy network will significantly facilitate the supply of electricity to all EU countries. The Baltic States are like islands in the world of energy, as their energy dependence on Russia is huge and they themselves have very little capacity to respond to the needs. The strengthening of the internal energy market of the EU is a key step towards reducing energy vulnerability of all 27 member states. The interconnection of energy networks of countries is also essential. Initially, these networks were built exclusively for the needs of the state and were unable to connect with the neighbouring countries, however, today this is a necessary activity, due to the diversification of sources of energy supply, especially if there is a collapse of the power grid in a certain member state.

External Mechanisms

Europe is becoming more dependent on imported hydrocarbons. It imports over 80 % of its oil, nearly 55 % of natural gas, and the percentage of imported coal⁴ is steadily growing. By 2030, only 93 % of oil and 84 % of natural gas will be imported.⁵ These figures do not apply equally to all 27 EU member states, because the dependence on Russian energy sources in the new member states is far greater. Thirty percent of the imported natural gas in the EU comes from Russia, followed by Algeria and Norway. However, certain EU Member States (Finland and Estonia) are completely dependent on the Russian natural gas (see Table). In 2030, 85 % of gas imports in the EU will come from Russia.

Gas import dependency in 2006

Country	Gas import dependency	Russian gas dependency
Austria	88%	74%
The Czech Republic	98%	70%
Estonia	100%	100%
France	98%	26%
Finland	100%	100%
Germany	81%	39%
Italy	85%	30%
Poland	70%	50%

There are several major issues relating to security of energy supply. In terms of oil supply in Europe, the Middle East once again assumes the central position, and with all

⁴ Ibid p.165

⁵ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224-re01.en07.pdf> (visited on 15.12.2012)

the shocks that occur in the region, the problem is more than obvious. In terms of gas imports, Europe is inevitably dependent on Russia, and in the next 25 years, the Russian gas imports are expected to grow more than twice which will increase its impact on European energy security.

However, Europe simultaneously directs its interest to other regions rich in oil and gas. This primarily applies to all African countries i.e. Angola and Nigeria, and talks about creating a Euro-African energy partnership have already been in place.

Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure

The European security policy for the protection of critical infrastructure and security of the pipelines is led by the Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security of the European Union. The Energy issues on European soil remain the responsibility of the Directorate General for Transport and Energy (DGTREN)⁶. Together, these two bodies move the energy and security policy towards the creation of a European program for critical infrastructure protection (EPCIP). The beginnings of this program lie in the so-called Green Paper⁷, dated November 2005. The Green Paper itself was an answer to the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The initiative for its creation was initiated by the Council of the European Union in June 2004 and it builds on previous documents and policies adopted after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. of 11 September 2001. With the adoption of the so-called Green Paper, the European Union adopted a package of measures for the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe. The package includes:

- Proposal for a Directive on the identification and designation of the European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve its protection, which in fact it is the basis of the main objectives of the Directorate General for Transport and Energy (EPCIP);
- (Non-binding) release of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, which contains non-binding measures to facilitate the implementation of EPCIP, including Action Plan.⁸

These steps resulted in the Council Directive of the EU (2008/114/EC) adopted in December 2008 aimed at identifying and labelling of the European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve its protection.⁹ This Directive is significant due to a number of reasons: it is the first step in identifying and pointing out the European critical infrastructure and it assess the need to improve its protection. The main emphasis is on the transport and energy sectors, however the need for emphasis on other sectors is stressed as well, especially the sector for Information and Communication

⁶ Mobility and Transport in the European Union http://ec.europa.eu/transport/index_en.htm (visited on 11.12.2012)

⁷ Green Paper on Energy Security of the European Union http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy-supply/doc/green_paper_energy_supply_en.pdf (visited on 14.12.2012)

⁸ Luft, Gal., Korin Anne: "Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook (Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues)", Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 168

⁹ Directive of the EU Council <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF> (visited on 15.12.2012)

Technology. The section containing the directives is particularly important. The adoption of the Directive in Brussels means that states need to translate this directive into their national legislation, which will harmonize the policies of all countries on this issue. Article 2 goes on further defining the European critical infrastructure and identifying those areas that could have an impact on at least two Member States. The European critical infrastructure basically covers the sectors of electricity, oil and gas, as well as almost all sectors of transport (road, rail, air and sea transport). The assessment of whether the critical national infrastructure meets the criteria specified in the definition of the European critical infrastructure depends on many other factors, i.e.: risk assessment, the level of criticism and others. Ignoring or failure of implementation of the articles of these directives by member states will result in significant implications for the European energy security. It is sufficient for only a few countries not to take the necessary actions in order to influence the European energy security as a whole. The Directive covers all types of risks, i.e. it takes into account human factors (accidents), technological factors, natural disasters, and asymmetric threats or terrorist attacks on critical energy infrastructure. When it comes to the security of critical infrastructure and pipelines, we should distinguish between national and European critical infrastructure. The message of the European program for critical infrastructure protection from 2004 states that the responsibility to protect the national critical infrastructure is in the hands of the member states. The European Commission is committed to support the member states in their efforts, but without specifying where and how that would be accomplished. It should be noted that the risk assessment and vulnerability analysis of the pipelines lies in the hands of the member states, under the auspices of the National Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Although the Commission adopts the framework for the organization of these programs, its final functionality depends on the commitment of states. In contrast lays the fact that pipelines in Europe often are transnational in nature. The European countries are much smaller than states or provinces in the U.S. and Canada, and oil and gas pipelines often cross national borders on very short distances and are subject to various laws and ownership, at different levels of security and with various regulatory policies which is the foundation of the distinction between the national and European critical infrastructure.¹⁰

Pipelines

Pipelines are the basis for protection of critical infrastructure. They are big, long, and in general heavy for security (unless they go underground). Addressing risks to critical energy infrastructure must be above the legal obstacles deriving from the principle of subsidiarity, which was established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Basically, subsidiarity means regulating the relationship between the EU and member states. Subsidiarity is a fundamental principle of European law, which emphasizes that the EU can adopt laws only when member states agree that the action of individual countries will not be efficient enough.

¹⁰ European program for the protection of the critical infrastructure http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/133260_en.htm (visited on 17.01.2013)

A key component in the protection of European oil and gas pipelines is the development of a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). Industrial confederations, especially the European Confederation of Fuel Distributors, have been talking for years about the need to develop such an early warning network. CIWIN will set the framework for the protection of critical infrastructure and will lead to increased capabilities and identification of weaknesses in the European critical infrastructure. CIWIN was also followed up by the Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO), which was formed in May 2007 and is composed of representatives of the European Commission, the member states, as well as the Council Secretariat. Tasks in NESCO include monitoring and exchange of information. Its purpose is to serve as a new tool that will strengthen the capacities of the Union to collect information and provide early warning of potential threats to security of energy supply. In 2006 the Joint Research Centre of the EU, located in Ispra, Italy, began a monitoring program (globally) of possible attacks directed at critical infrastructure. A number of human, technical and intellectual resources have been put into operation, which will achieve protection to European oil and gas pipelines, but the final step will be the implementation of an agreement from the program for the protection of European critical infrastructure. The development of NESCO is a reflection of the foreign policy of EU for energy security and as such goes hand in hand with the so-called EU Neighbour Policy, which includes the states through which the energy passes on its way to Europe, such as Ukraine and Turkey.

There is another complementary step for strengthening European energy security, and that is the creation of a European Energy Community, which will connect EU member states with the countries from South-eastern Europe that are not members of the Union. This energy community aims to create compatibility of the EU energy legislation with that of countries that are not members, joint development of markets, which will facilitate access to foreign investments, but also the construction of cross-border interconnections for transmission of electricity easier cross-border trade with energies.

Here, Turkey plays a key role and it has an observer status within the European security community. A major challenge to protect the pipeline network of Europe is the adopted regulation thus far and problems of its integration within the broader concept of creating a Common Security and Defence Policy.

Common Foreign Policy and Energy Security

Discussion on the development of a common European foreign energy policy is overshadowed by the effort of the Commission to create a common and competitive internally driven energy market. At the same time, the focus of the European public is set to the external dimensions of EU's energy security, particularly in the energy dialogue between Russia-EU. The delusion that the completion of the internal market must be completed before the consolidation of the common foreign policy enabled favourable conditions for investment for the foreign companies and approach to the strategic European energy market. Actually, the consolidation of EU's foreign policy could help regulate the access to the internal European energy sector and thus enhance overall energy security of the EU. The

issue of reciprocity of asset ownership provides access to them by foreign (non-European) companies.¹¹ Another step towards the consolidation of the foreign energy security policy will be placing emphasis on certain energy funds, and indication of their strategic importance. If certain energy elements really perform as strategic, control of them could be completely banned or at least restricted, by imposing certain legal restrictions, mainly in the form of licenses to foreign companies. In this case foreign owners would be subject to EU regulations on ownership, operation and having available energy resources within the EU.

Energy Security Challenges for the European Union

European approach to energy security is under constant pressure in the realization of the set objectives (security of supply, competitiveness and climate change) and faces the problem of simultaneously targeting them. European efforts to provide alternative sources of imported oil and gas from Central Asia are constantly resisted by Russia and its energy policy and it is at the expense of diversification of the energy supply for EU member states. There is insufficient competition, which occurs mainly due to the lack of comprehensive mechanisms linking European energy networks and markets through a robust system of interconnections, and in circumstances where the construction of a single European electricity grid is not even in sight. Climate Change and European commitment to providing leadership in reducing the effects of greenhouse gases on the environment is certainly commendable, but deadlines for achieving these goals are slowly going away and need new policies for environmental protection. Thus, we are witnesses to an ever-increasing European import of liquid hydrocarbons, without any indication of its decline in the future. At the same time, energy becomes a tool of foreign policy, especially in countries outside the EU, or Russia, Venezuela and the countries of the Middle East, and the EU remains without a comprehensive response to these policies. If the EU wants to face and successfully fight their own internal challenges related to energy issues, but also to distinguish the external dimensions of energy from traditional national and international aspects of security, a comprehensive and continuous evaluation and adjustment of EU energy policy is needed.

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AIR COMMANDERS (D-r John Andreas Olsen)

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In November 2012, the book “Air Commanders” was released by the author Dr. John Andreas Olsen. Publisher of the book is Potomac Books, Inc. from Dulles, Virginia, United States.

In the book through case studies, short military biographies of Air commanders are combined and operational analyzes are made to reveal how personal characteristics, attitudes and life experiences of twelve excellent American pilots shape the most significant air campaigns in American history. Starting with Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, who started his career in the First World War, and finishing with the recently retired general T. Michael “Buzz” Moselle.

Dr. John Olsen consistently appears as one of the best historians of air force globally. Relatively few experts in the field of Air Force dedicated extensive and serious effort to describe the life and achievements of prominent aviation leaders. Up to now several major books have been published, but good, complete biographies of the great leaders of the Air Force lag behind those of the commanders of the ground forces.

Colonel Dr. John Andreas Olsen this time looks at twelve case studies of high-ranking pilots of the Air Force of the United States who commanded the Air Force in fighting.

The case studies are not rigid, because there is no magic formula for developing outstanding aviation generals and therefore every conflict has its own unique conditions and limitations. Perfection may be required, but we all can fall for a small lack of it.

These twelve (12) case studies of senior officers of the U.S. Air Force shortly offer possible lessons for future leaders of the Air Force or for anyone who is interested in command, leadership and the history of the air warfare. Some readers may not agree with the choice but the writer hopes that future historians will upgrade this book with additional analysis that will give great rounding of the presented leaders and those who are not presented in the book and will devote the attention that they deserves.

The book "Air Commanders" is divided into three parts, each part has four chapters.

In the first chapters of the book are covered command duties for four pilots Carl A. Spaatz, George C. Kenney, Otto P. Weyland and E. LeMay who were in the theater of operations in Europe and the Pacific without overlaps and discharges arising from describing the same period of the campaign. Moreover, all these pilots appreciate the diversity of air power and so represent a wide range of experiences. While their experiences in World War I have strong influence to Spaatz and Kenney younger Weyland and LeMay were a greater influenced by events in the beginning of the World War II. All of them were "generalists" in the proper sense of the word, and as well as generals with great appreciation of both, strengths and weaknesses of the Air Force in their various roles and missions. In addition, the duration and scope of their service and their vast experience across the full spectrum of air power, at a time when it is rapidly transformed quickly made especially relevant in the case of Spaatz and Kenney, from the West Front to the jet age, and in case of Weyland and LeMay from the late biplane era to the era of supersonic jets, bombers with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Although they were with very different characters, they were contemporaries who, to some extent, influenced each other, they also experienced many of the same challenges in general, remain in principle relevant today. Although some may not take into account those people among the first four aircraft commander during the Second World War, they represent the greatest features of Air Forces in that period.

In the second part of the book, Dr. John Olsen in four chapters describes William H. Tunner, George E. Stratemeyer, William W. Momyer and John W. Vogt who were representatives of the Cold War era. At that time, there were fewer generals particularly notable, especially given the focus of the largest operations in which United States took the lead as the Berlin Airlift, Korea and Vietnam. Dr. Olsen first includes William H. Tunner who played a leading role in planning and implementing the airlift to Berlin during one of the first major international crises of the Cold War. George E. Stratemeyer was commander subordinate to Douglas MacArthur in the first and very important year of the Korean War, during the initial response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. Exceptionally knowledgeable about tactical air power William W. Momyer served as the air commander in Vietnam from July 1966 to August 1968 during the infamous „Rolling Thunder“ campaign. Finally, John W. Vogt Jr., directly appointed by President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, held command of U.S. air forces during the more successful Linebacker campaigns. Momyer's and Vogt's experiences present an interesting contrast of strategies in the same conflict.

The last part of the book, Dr. John Olsen writes for Charles A. Horner, Michael E. Ryan, Michael C. Short and T. Michael Moseley. The last part of the book is the easiest choice for Dr. Olsen because in that period were the commanders of major air campaigns in the post - Cold War. Charles A. Horner was commander of the air component of Operation Desert Storm (1991), Michael E. Ryan was in charge of air operations during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Michael C. Short commanded the air campaign of the Allied Forces (1999), and the end of this chapter ends with T. Michael Moseley who commanded the Air Force component of two operations: Enduring Freedom

(2001) and Iraqi Freedom (2003). In this third part readers will notice that these campaigns were conducted under different geographical and political circumstances.

The case studies presented in this book focus specifically on how these twelve air commanders deal with an array of leadership challenges- all with the goal of carefully assessing mission, utility and effectiveness of air power that was applied in the unique organizational and operational settings . Different pilots who face different levels and combinations of issues related to command and control, personal relationships with superiors and subordinates; dynamics of the four levels of war (political, military strategic, operational and tactical); interactions between political guidelines and operations proper, including constraints and restraints, technological innovation and human aspects of fog and friction and media relations.

Through this interesting and informative collection of case studies are emphasize characters of these pilots, the challenges faced in many different armed conflicts, and the solutions that they find and implemented. Their achievements proved decisive not only in campaigns they headed, but also in shaping the U.S. Air Force and the dominant role of the air force in modern warfare.

Dr. John Olsen uses a unique and interesting way to approach the reviewing the elected leaders of the Air Force offering a rich insight into the integration of technology, concepts, and leadership. In addition, the review of the very important subject for commanding the Air Force makes this book very useful for all readers who want to improve their knowledge of Air warfare and that what is needed to create and maintain the air campaign. The book should be read and serve as a foundation for the next generation of potential leaders of the Air Force.

This book will probably be used in any military college in the United States and many other countries. It is destined to become a classic to which the future historians will look back. Also this book can be used in the training of the pilots of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia.

“SOVREMENA MAKEDONSKA ODBRANA”
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