


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CHINA'S SOFT POWER TOOLS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Sıla Turaç BAYKARA¹

Abstract: *China has recently spent more efforts to use the soft power tools in its diplomacy and foreign policy. Since hard power is not enough to become a global power, China realized the need for soft power to become influential in the world politics. This study envisages to demonstrate the extent to which China's soft power tools work in the Western Balkans and help rise China's positive image among the countries of Western Balkans. It also claims that China's presence in the Western Balkans is related with its aim to apply its own economic development strategy which China has also applied in Asia. To this end, although China does not have geographical proximity with the Western Balkans, it has spent efforts to increase its soft power tools such as Chinese culture, language, loans, trades and investments in the region.*

Keywords: *China, Soft Power, Western Balkans, 17+1 Initiative, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)*

Introduction

China has recently spent more efforts to use the soft power tools in its diplomacy and foreign policy. Since hard power is not enough to become a global power, China recognized the need for soft power to become influential in the world politics. This study envisages to demonstrate the extent to which China's soft power tools work in the Western Balkans and help rise China's positive image among the countries of the Western Balkans. It also claims that China's presence in the Western Balkans is related with its aim to apply its own economic development strategy which China has also applied in Asia. To this end, although China does not have geographical proximity with the Western Balkans, it has spent efforts to increase its soft power tools such as Chinese culture, language, loans, trades and investments in the region. The outline of the essay is as follows. First section will give the brief summary of the essay's theoretical background. Second section will discuss China's soft power tools based on Nye's opinion on China's soft power strategy. Third section will examine China's presence in the Western Balkans based on multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Fourth section will try to make an evaluation to the extent in which China could apply its soft power tools in the Western Balkans.

¹ Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Izmir Demokrasi University, Turkey

Definition of Soft Power

Nye defines power as ‘the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be done by coercion, payment or attraction’. While conceptualizing this definition, Nye finds that economy and military could explain outcomes to be got through coercion and payment, but not the ones to be gained through attraction and persuasion. Then, Nye conceptualized soft power (Nye 2012).

Making soft power a part of a government strategy is not so easy since governments prefer prompt results, although return of soft power could take long time. Moreover, governments could control the policy for applying soft power; however, there is also the question of culture and values which the civil society needs to reveal. Furthermore, governments assume that hard power is more risky than soft power; however, ‘soft power is often hard to use, easy to lose and costly to re-establish’. Finally, if governments do not become credible, they damage the soft power since they are manipulative and the information they give is seen as propaganda (Nye 2012).

Basically, states could build their soft power upon three resources: culture, political values and foreign policies. Economic resources could be used as soft power as well. However, since economic resources could be considered as a source of soft power through attraction and hard power through coercion, it could be obscure as to whether economic relations would be based on hard or soft power between countries (Nye 2012).

In addition, Nye claims that military resources could also be used as soft power application by governments. For instance, well- equipped military or military cooperation and military training programs could contribute to the soft power of countries by increasing the networks between countries. Conversely, if the military power is misused, the effect of soft power could also decrease (Nye 2012).

Finally, Nye also claims that public diplomacy and/or cultural diplomacy is a very important tool for increasing soft power. Therefore, public diplomacy and/or cultural diplomacy is considered to be a significant part of smart power; however, smart public diplomacy/cultural diplomacy should include credibility, self-criticism, and civil society (Nye 2008).

While Nye defines soft power as the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one aims via attraction instead of coercion or payment, he asserts that a country’s soft power comes from its culture, values, and policies. Then, Nye combines hard and soft power under the smart power strategy. He developed the smart power concept in 2003 in order to change the misunderstanding about having soft power as sufficient for a successful foreign policy (Nye 2012).

China’s Soft Power Tools

Soft Power as a term has being seen in the official language of China since 15 October 2007, when preceding President Hu Jintao mentioned it in his keynote speech

in the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. In 2014, Xi Jinping re-mentioned soft power as a tool in the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and said that China's soft power should be increased (Wilson Center 2020). China's aim at using soft power as a strategy is to hold it under its smart strategy along with its hard power. The reason why China is searching for the combination of hard power and soft power is that China's hard power is increasing rapidly; however, China does not prefer to frighten its neighbors and rivals since they could come together to damage its rapid growth. Therefore, China aims to combine its hard power with the soft power (Nye 2012).

First, China's traditional culture of Confucian values is very attractive for other cultures (Gill and Huang 2006). 'Confucian values of social harmony, ritual, filial piety and compassionate rule spread to influence much of East Asia'. As part of its soft power strategy, China founded Confucius Institutes in different countries for teaching its language and culture to the rest of the world. The rationale behind the Confucius Institutes is to use them as a part of cultural diplomacy (Tin-yau Lo and Pan 2016).

Basically, the Confucius Institutes are the so-called teaching points, which offer free language classes to civil servants and provide languages course starting after working hours for people who want to learn Chinese language. The Confucius Institutes are like other foreign language providers, such as l'Institut Français, the Goethe Institut, the Instituto Cervantes and the British Council (Tonchev 2020).

Besides, China has used the global popular culture. All these efforts have resulted in that many foreign students and tourists prefer to come to China. Moreover, China Radio International (CRI) increased its broadcast in English and many other languages; and Xinhua Tongxunshe, cable news channel of China, was intended to become like Al Jazeera International (Nye 2012).

Therefore, China, which tries to integrate into the neoliberal system within the framework of the Peaceful Coexistence doctrine, became a member of the World Trade Organization in the Jiang Zemin period (Köksoy, 2019).

Furthermore, China has made soft power a part of its diplomacy. The country started with participating in activities of international organizations. First, China became a member of the World Trade Organization. Second, China sent troops to the peacekeeping operations of the UN (Gill and Huang 2006). Moreover, China has become more active in non-proliferation issues and 'hosted the six-power talks on North Korea'. Besides international organizations, China also participated in regional organizations such as the East Asian Summit. As a part of the soft power initiative, this new diplomacy prevents others from establishing coalitions against the rise of China (Nye 2012).

Nonetheless, there is also a limit to soft power for China as well. Although China has spent efforts to influence others without force or coercion, nationalism and party control make China's soft power limited (Nye 2015).

As stated above, a country's soft power comes from the civil society mostly not

from the government; however, the Chinese government is not willing to support civil society, and this determines the limits of China's soft power, especially human rights issues relating to China which prevent the government from building a real positive image in the rest of the world (Nye 2012).

Furthermore, China's existing soft power tools mostly refer to traditional culture, not popular culture, since China sees its cultural tradition as the best resource to attract others and increase the positive image of China in the world. However, several Chinese analysts have underlined the deficit in exchange of cultural products like books as a lack of China's soft power tool (Edney 2012).

Although China is not at the same point with the West, based on the usage of soft power, it makes efforts to increase this. The extent to which China prefers to increase its soft power will result in the extent of the positive gain for the rest of the world (Nye 2012).

Finally, China aims to use economic growth and prosperity for attracting others (Nye, 2004). China's rapid economic growth model is taking attention of developing countries. The problem of Chinese soft power is that Chinese governing elites take soft power as a controlled state strategy (Zanardi 2016). After China demonstrated rapid increase in hard power tools, Chinese leaders understood that they also need soft power to make hard power more acceptable (Nye 2017).

China's Presence in the Western Balkans

Western Balkans, located in the southeastern part of Europe and surrounded by EU member countries, is the name of the region composed of six countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. Western Balkans has become a region, which China aims to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Based on BRI, China targets to build the new Silk Road through intercontinental land and maritime routes in the world by funding many infrastructure projects. Therefore, China is going to achieve its global target, increasing its economic, political and cultural ties with the countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Tirana 2020).

China has been present in the Western Balkans with projects for the public sector and supports the countries of the region through grants and preferential loans. The projects in the region are mostly directed by Chinese state entities not private companies as a result of China's traditional preference to choose state representatives instead of non-governmental organizations (Krstinovska 2019).

China's influence in the Western Balkans could be categorized in three areas: foreign policy, infrastructure and network, and investment. Regarding foreign policy, China is successful in the Western Balkans since the region supports China's BRI for establishing deeper bilateral relations with China and is willing to partake in multilateral arrangements initiated by China such as the 17+1 initiative. In terms of infrastructure and network, China supports the region for increasing not only regional infrastructure

connectivity, but also various infrastructure projects. Finally, China finances the Western Balkans through increasing loans given based on bilateral agreements (Pavlicevic 2019).

Despite the fact that the Western Balkans has a smaller population and economic volume than its neighbors, the reason China has special interest in the Western Balkans is that the region has a strategic location for China in developing BRI. Despite its relatively small size in terms of total population and economic output, Western Balkans is one of the gates to the EU and its very big market (Tirana 2020). However, due to geopolitical distance to the Western Balkans, China's policy towards the region is not direct like its neighbors - the EU and Turkey. Instead, China uses its commercial activities in the region and aims to create a network between Europe and China through investments (Warsaw Institute 2018).

Moreover, unlike the EU, the Western Balkans has not well-developed yet in terms of structural reforms such as democratic procedures and transparency. Therefore, since China does not posit the democracy clause while deciding on new investments in a country, it has converted this into an advantage. Therefore, for starting the commercial activities and making new investments, China especially prefers to choose the countries whose financial aids made by the EU were ceased due to their failure to implement democratic principles (Warsaw Institute 2018).

To sum up, China takes the Western Balkans as a starting point for infrastructural projects connecting Europe to China. Moreover, China aims to demonstrate that the Chinese economic model is an alternative to the Western liberal order. 17+1 initiative and BRI are examples for the application of this aim in the Western Balkans (Krstinovska 2019). In addition to multilateral initiatives, China also establishes bilateral relations with the Western Balkans. In both ways, China's increasing presence in the regions is also increasing Europe's concerns about the Western Balkans becoming a new area of 'great power competition' (Warsaw Institute 2018).

17+1 Initiative (Former 16+1)

The 16+1 initiative was the China-CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) summit and announced by China in 2012 in order to enhance the cooperation with 11 EU member states and 5 countries of Western Balkans namely Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia (Hillman and McCalpin 2019). Greece joined the initiative in 2019 and now, the China-CEEC summit is called as 17+1 initiative (Kampouris 2019). China has determined three main fields in 17+1 initiative: infrastructure, advanced technology and green technology (Hillman and McCalpin 2019).

China sees the 17+1 initiative as a part of the China-EU cooperation since China not only wants to use CEEC and Western Balkans for transit trade, but also aims

to realize industrial development of these countries for creating a market for its high volume of production capacity. Since Western Balkans are composed of small states located in the connection points of China and the EU, China finds the Western Balkans appropriate for developing its internet and smart city projects (Yivei 2020).

The 17+1 initiative has both bilateral and multilateral sides. It is multilateral because China is in the center of the system and other countries are around it. It is also bilateral since political, economic, or societal issues are evaluated on a country basis between China and one of other members (Karaskova 2020).

Besides, the 17+1 initiative aims to cover not only political issues but also economics, youth cooperation, academic exchanges, sport, health and media cooperation (Karaskova 2020). The 17+1 initiative is regarded as an extension of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Yivei 2020). The significant geographical location of the Western Balkans makes them appropriate choices for the connection of the BRI to Europe. In other words, this Balkan Silk Road is aimed to reach to the Western European market via Chinese infrastructure networks and logistical corridors over the Port of Piraeus, which belongs to the Chinese Cosco Group. Therefore, for China, the Western Balkans is going to become a trade transit route and gate to Western Europe (Zeneli 2020).

In general, China's economic presence in the region is through BRI related projects and in the fields of transportation and energy (Zeneli 2020). Along with the 17+1 Initiative, the BRI is envisaged to enhance China's presence as a global super-power signing various international agreements with peaceful aims (Warsaw Institute 2019).

Although China announces the 17+ 1 initiative as a cooperation initiative with the EU, there are several criticisms towards China on the 17+1 initiative. First and foremost, the 17+1 is criticized by the EU side claiming that China uses the initiative for dividing and conquering Europe (Karaskova 2020).

China's Bilateral Relations with Western Balkans

In addition to the multilateral initiatives, China's main preference for its presence in the Western Balkans are the bilateral relations with those countries. It is obvious that the Western Balkans is significantly less developed than the EU in terms of infrastructure and economy. Therefore, economic development of the states in the Western Balkans is needed as an investment. Although the Western Balkans is so close to one of the most important markets of the global economy - the EU market -, the region could not attract enough foreign direct investment (Zeneli 2020).

Although China claims that BRI projects are win-win projects for both sides, contrary is proved by economic data. According to data of 2018, 40 per cent of Montenegro's total debt is to China. This percentage is 20 for North Macedonia, 14 for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 12 for Serbia (Zeneli 2020).

Countries of the Western Balkans have increased their diplomatic and people-to-people exchange with China on bilateral basis. One of these countries, Serbia has also signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China (Pavlicevic 2019).

Serbia is China's strategic partner in the Western Balkans. One of the most important investments of China in the Western Balkans is the Belgrade-Budapest railway project. Besides, Serbia makes economic and military purchases from China. Serbia's main goal is to become not only the center in the region, but also a hub globally in the digital Silk Road of China (Zeneli 2020).

Therefore, Serbia serves China's Huawei commercial activities. For instance, Huawei and Serbian government agreed on fixing 1000 high-definition cameras in Belgrade to turn it into a 'Safe City'. Besides, Huawei founded the 'Innovation Center for Digital Transformation' (Zeneli 2020). Although US President Donald Trump decided to impose sanctions to Huawei in May 2019, Serbia has been one of the centers in which Huawei could continue its activities (Xambazi 2020).

China – Serbia relations are not only based on public contracts, which are the Corridor X railway and highway sections, Corridor XI highway, Mihajlo Pupin bridge, Kostolac thermo power plant, but also have several mergers and acquisitions, such as the Smederevo steel mill, RTB Bor, Sever, Johnson Electric and Linglong tire factory (Krstinovska 2019).

The close relationship between China and Serbia could also be seen in the recent COVID 19 Pandemic, which expanded to the world from China. The President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić asked for China's help during the pandemic and said that China is 'the only one who can help Serbia' (Burazer 2020).

China's most important project in Montenegro is the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway, which led to several debates within the country. One side supported the project since it would make a huge contribution to the economic development of the country. The other side criticized the project since the country increased its debt percentage to 80 and this would make the country dependent on China (Doehler, 2019). The China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) constructed Bar-Boljare highway, which was financed by Exim Bank (Zeneli 2020). EU also criticized Montenegro due to its debt level since Montenegro is a NATO member and aims to become an EU member, and this economic dependency could increase political dependency of Montenegro on China (Pavlicevic 2019).

Diplomatic relations between China and North Macedonia began in 1999. North Macedonia is the first country of the 17+1 initiative and the first European country China has applied the development cooperation model of Asia and Africa. Based on this cooperation model, China built a primary school, constructed the Kozjak hydropower plant, implemented the E-education project through Huawei and the construction of the highways between Kichevo and Ohrid, and Miladinovci and Shtip. In all these cases, China selected, fully funded and constructed everything (Krstinovska 2019).

Moreover, China supports North Macedonia in developing common scientific projects. Besides, the Ministry of Education and Science of North Macedonia publishes annual calls for scholarships for students at bachelor, master or doctoral level (Tonchev 2020).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, China financed Elektroprivreda, which is the national electric power company for the construction of the thermal power plant in Tuzla (Zeneli 2020). Besides, China funded the construction of the thermo power plant (TPP) in Stanari. Both were also criticized by the EU since they do not match EU's environmental standards (Krstinovska 2019). China-Bosnia and Herzegovina bilateral relations are also active under the Association of Bosnian-Chinese Friendship and a Center of the Promotion and Development of the Belt and Road Initiative (Tonchev 2020).

Albania-China relations are not based on public contracts but the acquisition of foreign-owned shares almost 100 Albanian companies. There are several vital areas in 100 companies like copper mining, oil fields management and airport management (Krstinovska 2019). In Albania, China also made investments in Tirana National Airport and an oil producer refiner (Zeneli 2020). Based on Chinese-Albanian relations, the Albanian-Chinese Friendship Association was founded in 2011 and an Albanian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce was founded in 2012 (Tonchev 2020).

To sum up, Western Balkans is going to continue receiving Chinese investments since countries in the region are convinced that China is a reliable partner for infrastructure investments. Another reason governments of the Western Balkans are welcome to Chinese projects is that China is not looking for transparent and market-driven procurement decisions (Zeneli 2020).

China's Soft Power Tools in the Western Balkans

China is a very attractive actor for the Western Balkans since this country uses its economic development model to show itself as a good example and leads to an increase in expectations of the Western Balkans (Zeneli 2020).

While Russia and Turkey are using religion in the Western Balkans to ensure their influence, China uses the capital investment which is the tool China needs. Therefore, China provides loans to the Western Balkans, where it is not so attractive for foreign investments which makes the region more dependent on China and enhances China's presence as neutral power in the region (Xambazi 2020).

Political choices of Governments from Western Balkans also affect the public behavior. Therefore, peoples of these countries also have a positive opinion towards China. Besides, most of these people do not have any idea as to what is happening in China. It means that since China is geographically distant from the Western Balkans, this distance becomes an advantage for China (Zeneli 2020). According to results of 2017 and 2018 Eurobarometer surveys, Western Balkans is the region in Europe where

China is more popular than other regions in Europe (Tonchev 2020).

China gives an importance to cultural diplomacy as a part of its global strategy to have friendly countries around the world. The best examples of Chinese cultural diplomacy are the Confucius Institutes. For instance, teaching points in the Confucius Institutes in North Macedonia provide Chinese courses to government officials. Besides, Confucius Institute Scholarships are provided to those learning Chinese language. China also supports the Western Balkans in establishing Confucius classrooms at primary and secondary schools. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro opened those classrooms in their schools (Tonchev 2020). Furthermore, Chinese embassies in the Western Balkans support cultural activities, such as celebrations of the Chinese New Year, Spring Festival and a summer camp of Chinese language and culture for students in Sarajevo and Montenegro.

China's efforts to affect the Western Balkans culturally are not limited to Confucius Institutes, which aim to promote Mandarin language and culture. China also uses social and traditional media, which are soft power tools to increase its influence in the region.

The Western Balkans country China has become relatively more successful than other ones in promoting its soft power is obviously Serbia. Although young citizens of Serbia are still dreaming to find a job in the EU, China is attractive for these people to some extent (Tonchev 2020).

Although China has a relatively more positive image in the Western Balkans than other parts of Europe, there are also concerns about China due to the economic development model it aims to extend in the Western Balkans. For instance, North Macedonia has a negative image on the Chinese model regarding air pollution, poor living conditions and long working hours (Tonchev 2020).

Since China realizes that think tanks have significant importance in international relations and should be used for developing a positive image for China in the world, China founded the 17+1 Initiative's Think-Tank Network; however, in the countries of Western Balkans, there is a lack of awareness of the 17+1 initiative of China. Albania is the country having an idea most about the 17+1 initiative with 50% (Tonchev 2020).

Even EU's critics demonstrate that China is using similar ways with the EU. China starts to work with government institutions then includes other stakeholders in the country like universities, research institutes, think tanks and chambers of commerce etc. Moreover, China establishes its own multilateral network such as 17+1 initiative and BRI. All these initiatives are envisaged to manipulate policies of countries in the Western Balkans, change their perceptions towards China, build a positive public opinion in those countries, increase the support to its economic development model and finally rise as a soft power in the Western Balkans (Krstinovska 2019).

Conclusion

Nye builds soft power upon three resources: culture, political values and foreign policies. Economic resources could be used as soft power as well. However, since economic resources could be considered as the source of soft power through attraction and hard power through coercion, it could be obscure whether economic relations would be based on hard or soft power between countries (Nye 2012). Nye's argument fits well into China's presence in the Western Balkans. Since China has realized the need for soft power tools to become a global power, it tries to put these tools in its diplomacy and foreign policy boxes. Western Balkans is the region China could test to what extent it is successful to increase its positive image in the other parts of the world. China's most significant soft power tool in the Western Balkans is its own economic development strategy. Based on this strategy, China gives loans, increases trade and investments in the region.

While Nye defines soft power as the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one aims via attraction instead of coercion or payment, he asserts that a country's soft power comes from its culture, values, and policies. Then, Nye combines hard and soft power under the smart power strategy. He developed the smart power concept in 2003 to change the misunderstanding about having soft power as sufficient for a successful foreign policy (Nye 2012). This essay aims to evaluate China's soft power tools in the Western Balkans. The essay does not refer to smart power; however, it could contribute to further studies covering China's smart power strategy in the Western Balkans since the essay does not reject the importance of hard power tools China also uses in the Western Balkans.

Finally, although sometimes China is criticized, especially by the EU, for not being clear if it is using soft power or hard power tools in the region, China tries to build a positive public opinion in the Western Balkans, increase the support to its economic development model and finally rise as a soft power in the Western Balkans via its own multilateral network such as the 17+1 initiative and BRI; and cultural diplomacy.

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Nedžad KORAJLIC¹**Amer SMAILBEGOVIC²**

Abstract: *The complex political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the failure of implementation of laws, regulations and protocols hamper the functioning of the crisis management and crisis response systems. The lack of coordination, communication and cooperation among the administrative entities further undermines the successful response within a disaster scenario resulting in an unnecessary loss of life and material damage. The Ministry of Security and Ministry of Defense on a state-level and various Civil Defense and Emergency Services on the lower administrative levels are stagnating because of loss of focus, excess bureaucracy, as well as continued undermining of the joint functionality of the state by the various ethno-nationalist political factions. The recent natural disaster consequences emphasize the need for the implementation and successful integration of the crisis management and response networks on a countrywide level to reduce the response time and minimize other corruptive or even criminal activities taking advantage of the crisis.*

Keywords: *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crisis Management, Civil Defense, Emergency*

Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina is constructed as a loose union of semi-autonomous administrative bodies sharing limited common functionalities, but operating as a *de-facto* poorly-implemented *consociational* power-sharing agreement among the former belligerents. The entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains in the state of a frozen conflict between the competing nationalistic ideologies, where the return to hostilities, although unlikely, is always possible and that overall situation is overprinted upon the general situation in the realm of crisis-management.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is by many key indicators a “failed-state” with a barely functioning central government and sluggish legal system, mired in a patchwork of ethno-political fiefdoms, where handful of “leaders” try to preserve their carved out possessions in a country of devolved governance. Twenty-five years after the cessation of hostilities, the central government still does not have a “complete” control and governance even over the crucial elements (e.g. borders, for-

¹ Faculty of Criminalistics, Criminal Justice and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

² Faculty of Criminalistics, Criminal Justice and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

eign policy, law enforcement etc.). For many years, the EU and countries comprising the Peace Implementation Commission (an advisory group of the Dayton Peace Accord guarantors) were pushing for a mission of local ownership and local solution for the myriad of problems, however this focus on the local level led to the further consolidation of corrupt or entrenched political clans.

Background

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and its administrative entities: Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBIH), Republic of Srpska (RS) and District of Brcko (DB) have ratified certain crisis management and crisis response laws, but implemented them mainly within their corresponding jurisdictions. The countrywide emergency framework law was implemented by the Assembly in 2008 (Parliamentary Assembly No. 198/08 – 15/05/2008) establishing the public interest and the procedures for its implementation and naming of the coordinating body to oversee it, however it was never implemented resulting in loss of life and considerable material damage (upwards of 3 billion EUR) (Korajlic & Smailbegovic, 2020 and references within). There was a certain impetus to improve the interoperability and cooperation of the emergency services in BH as a result of the flooding in 2014 (and the subsequent flooding in 2019) and agency cooperation, primarily between FBIH and RS entities (European Commission, 2016), however the opportunity was squandered because of the lack of local political vision or other obstructions aimed towards continued decentralization of BH (Sijercic, 2018). Even though the post-conflict organization of BH intended and provisioned for a close cooperation of the administrative units, such practice has not been realized due to the competing visions and motives about the organization of the country. With the lack of clear hierarchy on a state-level, lack of consensus on the integrating factors (language, state symbols, educational programs) and continued secessionist tendencies (IFIMES, 2010), lately encouraged by the various types of hybrid actions (Kuczyński, 2019), it is obvious why even in a time of crisis, it is difficult to overcome these challenges. As part of a EU candidacy requirement, BH had to ratify and implement several important elements. The foremost task was to adopt the recommendations of the 2003/2004 European Commission Feasibility Study (European Commission 2010; European Commission 2019-A) taking into account, in particular, the readiness of BH institutions to meet political, economic, and, especially, democratic conditions required for consideration. The basis for any current security policy of the EU countries, including BH as a candidate country, is the orientation and commitment to the philosophy of European integration and collective security, equality and territorial integrity and the protection of fundamental values such as: life, liberty, rights etc. Besides these fundamental values, there are common interests and principles upon which the larger European (and Euro-Atlantic) security policy is built: economic, political and military integration and strengthening of reliability and interoperability, development of democracy, market economy, social justice, protection of constitutional order and strengthening of the joint political system (European Commission, 2019-B).

Crisis management challenges in BH

Until 2006, BH was seriously lagging in even basic concepts of a countrywide emergency response, but relayed on the annexes and provisos set forth in the transitional framework of the Dayton Peace Accords (Ahic et al. 2013). However, the emergence of potential threats that supersede the local problems, coupled with a continued pressure of the EU and USA upon the Council of Ministers of BH to implement the required reforms resulted in the formation of the new structure for crisis and emergency management (particularly in regards to the natural calamities). Some of the main stumbling blocks were how to divide the jurisdictions and roles of the Civil Defense organizations and the newly-unified Armed Forces of BH (Stojarova, 2019). A considerable push was made by the RS entity to abolish the armed forces (in 2008, 2012 and in 2020) and shift any emergency (and defense) to the entities, in contradiction to the ratified EU framework recommendations (Ahic et al. 2013); the existence of unified armed forces, disbanding of the ethnic armies and definition of a mission (assistance in emergencies) have greatly contributed to the stability and viability of BH (Chadwick, 2012).

The organization of Civil Defense had largely followed the former-Yugoslav organization and the civil defense was organized under the newly formed (2006) Ministry of Security and then divided between the three administrative entities. The Ministry of Security retained only minor overseeing function while the bulk of the organization, budgeting and execution was transferred over to the entities. The result was the formation of three parallel crisis / emergency management systems and in the FBiH entity, ten additional subsystems (one for each of the ten cantons comprising the FBiH). The system, as it is, suffers from redundancy, overstaffing, lack of mission focus and is barely functional to provide the required services (as the recent crises have demonstrated). Furthermore, there is a continued lack of communication, coordination and cooperation between the Civil Defense organization on the state-level, as well as on the cantonal level.




Figure 1 – Civil Defense Organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina; adapted from: (Federal administration of civil protection, 2014)

For the purpose of notification, data collection and analysis of all types of occurrences and hazards that may result in natural disasters or other emergencies, BH had to implement and integrate the communications system; the system of the single European emergency number – 112. This requirement was mandated by the European Commission, introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Operational - Communication Center of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 112 was inaugurated in 2008 (Garaplija, 2018). In accordance with the Framework Law, the Council of Ministers of BiH, with the mandate given to the Ministry of Security of BiH, and with the assistance of the Danish Crisis Management Agency (DEMA), established the Center - 112, with nodes in each of the three entities. It should be emphasized that although the Center - 112 has been established, it is still not functionally connected within and among the entity centers, because a unified crisis communication program for crisis management has not been established, which would also be compatible with lower response centers in BiH (Garaplija, 2018).

The reaction at the onset of a crisis and the implementation of the response protocol(s) are particularly important for the decisions and directions taken then are bound to set the overall tone of its successful resolution (Kesetovic, Korajlic, & Toth, 2013). The current natural disaster risk plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federal administration of civil protection, 2014) is outlining a majority of risks that could be encountered in the Federation Entity, however it fails to address certain realities on the ground, namely the issues of interoperability and communication and the situation of being overly reliant on the “resources of the international community” to cover the shortcomings. More-or-less similar situation is encountered in the Republic of Srpska entity of Bosnia- Herzegovina and very little attention is given to interoperability and cooperation, with the majority of responsibilities ending at the administrative border of RS (Zoric & Culibrk, 2017).

Crisis management during Covid-19

The first recorded case of SARS-COV2 infection in Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred on 5 March (Bajramovic, 2020) and a state of emergency was declared by both entity governments on 16 March 2020 and a day later on the State level, applying a set of measures, including closures of service and recreation establishments, non-essential shops and other non-essential public spaces (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No.18/20). On 17 March 2020, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed the UN and International Community with a request for support in the governments’ response to the disease outbreak, particularly regarding urgent needs for medical protective equipment, equipment for sample testing, respirators and mobile x-ray machines (COVID-19 Health Response Monitor, 2020).

The legal framework for implementing these measures was made in accordance to the Law on the Protection and Rescue of Populace and Material Property from Natural or Other Disasters in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 50/08) and entity (RS and FBiH) laws aimed against radiological, chemical and biological agents (Huseinbašić, 2007; Official Gazette of RS). The capacities and resources of all public health institutions and a number of private health care facilities were allocated and readied to prevent the spread of SARS-COV2. Within the security and emergency services system, the greatest effort and emphasis was initially placed upon the Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Despite the measures taken to curb the number of infections, the population of BH has considerably lost confidence in the institutions of the government system at all levels after the corrupt affairs with the sourcing and purchasing of medical respirators, which reached the highest echelons of the government of FBiH, but also in RS with the purchase of a non-functional mobile hospital under very strange circumstances. Coupled with a non-transparent and overpriced purchases and availability of basic personal protective equipment, the result is the culmination of citizens' distrust of the legislature, the executive branch and the judiciary (Sarajevo Times, 2020).

Even though a particular accent was placed on the countrywide entities (Border Police, Armed Forces), a troubling element quickly emerged: a continued subversion of the Country-level institutions, particularly the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The deployment of Armed Forces was not authorized on the borders, but it was relegated to supportive roles in building shelters and quarantine facilities (COVID-19 Health Response Monitor, 2020). Albeit properly trained and equipped to handle decontamination, disinfection and emergency-assistance duties, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were relegated to the secondary status, primarily within RS, but also in certain regions of FBiH, where help was solicited from Russian and Chinese (PRC) sources (TASS, 2020; REUTERS, 2020; Simic, 2020), in an almost flagrant violation of the adopted policies and procedures ratified on national level.

Crisis management during the migrant crisis

The Western Balkans migration route was and still remains as an only semi-viable pathway for the massive influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa. According to the United Nations, 80% of the almost one million refugees that found shelter in Germany in 2015 passed through this route by either registering at the Presevo Refugee Center in Serbia (600,000) or bypassing it and moving on through BH, into Croatia and beyond. The issue was further complicated by Serbia's liberal visa regime with several developing nations including Iran resulting in significant numbers (est. 23,000 since 2018) of migrants seeking to enter the EU via BH and Croatia. The influx

of people has overwhelmed the capabilities of BH in both protecting its own porous border with Serbia and Montenegro, but also in stopping migrants from crossing over to Croatia and/or providing them with viable settlement and shelters during the transit or adjudication process. The illicit activities that enable migrations (smuggling) or seek to undermine the thin veneer of system in an otherwise heavily paralyzed country such as BH, have increased considerably in the last 24 months .

ORIGIN	2017	2018	2019	TOTAL
Pakistan	66	7,820	9,806	17,692
Afghanistan	26	2,777	4,093	6,896
Syria	32	3,034	2,131	5,197
Iran*	28	3,607	1,180	4,815
Iraq	4	2,187	2,471	4,662
Bangladesh	2	452	2,144	2,598
Morocco	19	269	2,221	2,509
Algeria	91	477	1,601	2,169
Libya	7	883	354	1,244
Palestine **	--	743	362	1,105
Other	36	1,653	2,939	4,628
			TOTAL	53,515
* During 2017-18, Republic of Serbia had a visa-free arrangement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, resulting in an influx of Iranian nationals using Serbia as a jump-off point for entering EU via Bosnia-Herzegovina .				
** Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina recognizes "Palestine" as a nation, based on the bilateral agreement dated May 27, 1992.				

Table 1 – Unofficial field reports of migrants encountered in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2017 – 2019 by the countries of origin, ranked in a descending order.

Migrants	2017	2018	2019	TOTAL
Registered	311	23,902	29,302	53,515
Asylum	311	22,499	27,769	50,579
Applicants*				
* Many migrants register and formally seek asylum in order to receive basic aid, legal status and medical assistance in the transit countries				

Table 2 – Unofficial field reports of migrant asylum applications in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2017 – 2019 .

The continued migrant crisis within the described COVID-19 pandemic presents a compound crisis effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly on the Federation entity where the majority of the migrant population is concentrated. An emergency decree to remove the migrants and sequester them within the migration centers was one of the implemented mechanisms from the available options of current crisis management.

According to the recent data from the Service for Foreigners' Affairs, there are

approximately 51,000 migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH-SPS, 2020), mostly located at the temporary shelters/centers and symptoms of COVID-19 have not been recorded thus far (Smajic, 2020).

Discussion

Bosnia and Herzegovina has ratified or is in the process of ratification, *de jure*, of a full complement of crisis management and civil-defense requirements in accordance with the ongoing EU requirements. The situation *de facto* is entirely different in a myriad of competing local and regional visions, priorities and narratives. Neither of the major crises (flood, migrant, COVID-19) that have affected BH has been handled particularly well; the response was slow and barely adequate, primarily hampered by the lack of coordination, communication and cooperation. These inadequacies are not there because of the poor planning or lack of legislative framework, but intentionally reinforced to further the narrative that BH is a non-viable country and enable continued corruption that reaches even up to the highest levels of the country.

Although official announcements from the Ministries of Health (at various levels of government), from the state that the number of infections / mortality in BH is moderate-to-light, they warn that it is too early to assess that the end of the crisis is in sight. The overall sentiment is that the region must prepare for a new wave by September-October, 2020. However, there is still very little testing taking place, and few tests have been made available to the populace in general. A continued problem is that the facilities are still unprepared to accept the larger volume of patients and that there is little information sharing between the entities. Especially in the rural areas, the residents are squeamish about visiting medical institutions for any treatment/evaluation for the fear of infection, sequestration or stigmatization. This gives a wrong picture of the actual data and distribution of the contagion in the country, stemming from the unprofessional treatment of the citizenry by the medical system, lack of unified response and procedure and entrenched communal stigmatization of the infected (both within community and from the employers).

According to the current situation on the ground in BH, emergency and security services are currently bracing for a new wave of migrants expected during the Summer of 2020. The migrant crisis still poses a considerable challenge to BH. There are no official answers or recommendations as to where the new wave of migrants will be housed. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) states that BH has viable capacities to house approximately 6,000 migrants, and those capacities have been overfilled (IOM, 2020; IFRC 2018). These are currently the four migrant centers in Una-Sana Canton, two in Sarajevo and one center in Salakovac (South) and are all located in areas with predominantly Bosniak ethnic group. Many migrants live outdoors in several locations in BH, primarily in Tuzla (NE) and Bihac (NW). For these migrants, the IOM is currently awaiting instructions from the BiH Ministry of Security,

however, with the recent resignation of the Minister of Security of BH, the situation became quagmire as the Government of FBiH got involved in resolving the migrant crisis. In the meantime, the Government of RS entity still refuses any active participation in this issue and forcibly removes any migrants encountered within its territory. It is expected that the new wave of migrants, coupled with the effects of COVID-19 will further stretch the limits of the crisis management / response system in BH.

Conclusion

Resulting from twenty-five years of decentralization and intentional disregard for the required national assets, Bosnia-Herzegovina has managed to put their best effort forward to handle two crises occurring contemporaneously. Some of the legacy institutions and procedures inherited from Yugoslavia (civil defense, communal organizations) have shown their continued benefit during the time of emergency. There is still a considerable level of institutional paralysis, where the levels of cross-coordination between the different administrative entities, agencies or municipalities are significantly lacking. In order to tackle the next crisis, or respond to the relapse of the current crises (COVID-19 and global migration), the administrative entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have to establish a joint nexus to re-start the cooperation and communication on even, non-political terms. The country does not have the luxury to squander yet another opportunity like it did during the floods of 2014 to form a coherent, unified emergency response service. The ongoing crises illustrate that more transparency, more communication and accountability are required to return the faith of the populace into their system of governance. Acting on the contrary may expedite the demise of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a functional state and result in a wide-reaching instability in the Western Balkans, not excluding even a regional armed conflict with unforeseen consequences.

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ENCOUNTERING THE MACEDONIAN DEMOCRATIC DISCONTINUITY: POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Ana CHUPESKA-STANISHKOVSKA¹

Abstract: *This article reflects on recent Macedonian political history (2014-2017). During this period of time Macedonia was experiencing its hardest political, institutional and legal crisis since its independence. Moreover, twice it was even dithering on the edge of a security crisis. In other words, the degenerative Macedonian democratic discontinuity, for which the country got the attribute as a captured state, at one point, was revealed in a form of severe systemic distortion. On the other hand, the prolonged crisis [3 years] had its functional component as well, as it left enough room for provoking, mobilizing and articulating a genuine supra-religious, supra-partisan, supra-ethnic civil resistance movement against the democratic discontinuity. That is in essence related to the massive student protests [Students Plenum] which will be conjoined with other resisting groups building together a common political subjectivity via The Colorful Revolution. As a new element in the Macedonian political culture, the contestatory engagements, have not only helped in overthrowing the government, but have led to serious interventions in the Macedonian political system, as the Przino Agreement, stipulates the institutional novelties: The Special Prosecutor's Office and The Pre-Electoral Technical Government.*

Key words: *Macedonian Crisis 2014-2017, democratic discontinuity, political subjectivity, Colorful Revolution, systemic novelties*

Introduction

The Republic of Macedonia was the only one, out of the six successor counties of SFR Yugoslavia, which had gained peaceful independence without being engaged in an armed conflict. Although the war avoidance in highly tense regional circumstances typical for the period of 90s, could be legitimately justified as a major political success, the country's transition to democracy however did not go smoothly, given the serious security risks present, and having in mind the legacies of the socialist etatistic past and related "egalitarian syndrome" (Bernik, 2000) that left solemn consequences on the political culture in Macedonian society. As indeed Pendarovski underlines some post-communist countries have been less successful in building the "moral infrastructure of democracy" due to the resilient democratic values deficit, based partially upon the political and economic attitudes from the past (Pendarovski, 2016:127). Namely, the submissive culture and a lack of civil virtue did not resist authoritarian tendencies present in the weak democratic institutions. In addition the fragile civil society and nonresponsive citizens were a great determinant in this respect. As indeed, Pendarovski reminds us on Klicperova-Baker's ideas about the "postcomunist syndrome" (Klicperova-Baker,

¹ Associated Professor, dr. Sci. / Head of Political Theory Cathedra at the Political Science Department, Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus" UKIM-Skopje, RNM

1999:6), which is basically related to suppressed individuality, lack of initiative and lack of personal responsibility, hopelessness, passivity and pessimism. That is a kind of mental legacy from the past that still persists in citizens of post-communist societies (Pendarovski, 2016: 131). In that respect, the communist legacy is actually inhibiting the emergence of democratic processes in the transitional countries (Ibid.). For the reader, it should be clear by now, why indeed Macedonia failed to carry out its substantive democratic tasks in full capacity. Even more, as a deeply divided society, ideologically and culturally, the Macedonian society often complicated the democratic processes, especially taking into account the “sultan and nondemocratic” and “exclusively ethnic” attributions of the political parties that have participated in all of the governments so far. In other words, the transition towards democracy went bit by bit, facing serious difficulties, both economically and politically, while at the same time trying to keep the democratic continuity at least vivid. Nevertheless, the fact is that Macedonia was not skillfully escaping the authoritarian shadow of democracy, while power authorities were often being associated with corruption scandals, for which there were not proper investigations and consequent responsibilities². The culture of impunity and untouchability in conjunction with the submissive culture in one particular time period, consequently, helped in the completion of a genuine system of authoritarian populism. The latest regime was fully established and encircled under the rule of the VMRO DPMNE-DUI coalition (2006-2017), since instead of developing and continuing with the democratization of the already weak institutions, this coalition succeeded in effectuating a hybrid regime. That intervention was systematically induced via series of moves mainly done through few interpolative clusters: via partisanship and capturing of the state apparatus; via eradication the independence of the threefold power sharing; via corporatization of the media sphere and money laundering through advertisements in public services, censorship and self-censorship; via political persecutions and public lynchings of the progressive and democratically-minded intelligence; via formation of para-military units; via brutal electoral bribery and falsification of electoral results; via conducting early elections every two years and many others. Slowly over the years, to be sure, the state was appropriated, step by step, and according to the EU Commission Reports, it was defined as a captured state³. In other words, the country was successfully climbing up the scale of the authoritarianism and all the relevant reports were consecutively recognizing a decline in democracy and freedom⁴. The misery index was rising high too⁵. All of that eventually led to a point of no return when Macedonia experienced its hardest political, institutional, and legal crisis since its

² The culture of impunity and untouchability of the high level officials was one of the rationales for establishing the new institution via the Pržino Agreement. That is the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Prosecuting Criminal Offences Related to and Arising from the Content of the Illegally Intercepted Communications (s.c. Special Prosecutor’s Office).

³ See the qualifications in the European Commission Progress Report https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf

⁴ See the Economist’s intelligence unit iconographic for Macedonia at <https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/>, where the one is declared as hybrid regime; see also Freedom House Report where it is clearly pointed out: ... “after more than two years of sharp decline in democratic development since the “Wiretapping Affair” in 2015, Macedonia managed to change course in 2017” ..., <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/macedonia>; In a manner corresponding to, also see the classification of Freedom House in which Macedonia, is classified as partially free <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/macedonia> and in <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/macedonia>.

⁵ For the detailed cumulative rankings on misery indexation for 108 countries, consult the Cato Institute whose public policy research data is available at <https://www.cato.org>.

independence⁶ and in two particular occasions it was been dithering on the edge of a security crisis. The degenerative Macedonian democratic discontinuity for which the country got the attribute as a captured state, namely, at one point, was revealed in a form of severe distortion and for the period between 2014-2017, Macedonia practiced *in situ* an acute democratic discontinuity. On the other hand, the same authoritarian turn will disfigure and dynamite the birth of a new political subjectivity that was gradually being built along the years of crisis and related social resistant movements.

On democratic discontinuity

What in this paper is seen as a democratic discontinuity certainly is related with the commonly accepted fact among political scientists that democracy does necessary have a linear progressive development in the sense of its continuous democratization. In this line, indicative, interesting and illustrative data one can find in Economist's special report dedicated to Democracy⁷ that serves to demonstrate the following: ... "Between 1980 and 2000 the cause of democracy experienced only a few setbacks, but since 2000 there have been many. And democracy's problems run deeper than mere numbers suggest. Many nominal democracies have slid towards autocracy, maintaining the outward appearance of democracy through elections, but without the rights and institutions that are equally important aspects of a functioning democratic system"....⁸ Having this in mind, one can certainly conclude that this is even more applicable for the younger democracies to which the Macedonian one is undoubtedly related. As Pendarovski reminds us via Carothers's intuitions: ... "Initiation of democracy in the former communist countries differed substantially from the same processes in the rest of the world. Years ago, arguing about the end of the transitional paradigm Carothers dismissed its core assumption that all countries emerging from dictatorships are in transition toward democracy, by default. Since, it became notorious that despite high expectations of the ordinary people and predictions of the pundits, liberal democracy has not gained ground in all of the post-communist countries after 1989 (Pendarovski, 2016 ; Carothers, 2002:6). One can assume and it is more than evident that Macedonian democracy is generally characterized by formal and declarative descriptions, while there is a lack of its substantive attributes. In place, namely, it is its reductive variant, often understood only as electoral (Chupeska, 2016), or, as Pendarovski notes: ... "it is about the electoral authoritarianism" (Pendarovski, 2016).

Although during the transition substantive democratic deficits were hardly surpassed, the state was trying to keep up on the track of its democratic continuity. That intention can be exemplified with the state response on the first serious crisis

⁶ Republic of Macedonia gained its independents in 1991.

⁷ Economist's Special Report, "What's gone wrong with the democracy", The Economist, March 2014, available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do>.

⁸ Ibid.

that happened in 2001. The exclusion of the Albanian minority community as constitutive element of the Republic, was actually the main reason for the interethnic armed conflict to arise at the time. Specifically, in constituting the independent Republic of Macedonia, the Albanian community was not entitled with the equal civic status, since the 1991 Constitution prescribed a strict civil model of nation-state, conceptualized on an integrativist and nationally exclusivist approach (Чупеска, 2011). Fortunately, with the help of the international community, this conflict was successfully resolved and with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Macedonian political system was improved in order to provide significant cultural and non-territorial autonomy for the communities via group-specific rights, power sharing, reductive veto for cultural issues, guaranteed representation and proportional inclusiveness (Чупеска-Станишковска, 2017). The conflict episode lasted for one and a half years, and of course, it was related to the spillover phenomenon caused by regional developments and especially, in the context of Kosovo and Serbia relations. Bearing in mind that this problem was effectively resolved, and that the country was systemically democratized in terms of multicultural accommodative and extensively liberal inclusion (Чупеска-Станишковска, 2017), I believe that, at this point, Macedonia was still rolling on the track of the democratic continuation, although it was obvious that this was not sufficient to defend itself from its inherent deformations that later led to factual and acute discontinuation. Consequently, in this paper, the period 2006-2017 is considered as the central passé of the Macedonian democratic discontinuity. The initiations of such discontinuation indeed started after 2008, when Macedonia was blocked from joining NATO, since at the time the governing coalition tendentiously began explicitly to move in direction of establishing an authoritarian rule. Later, this governmental coalition, as it was mentioned above, will succeed in encircling an authoritarian populist regiment with systematic interventions. Today, it is noticeable, that a direct consequence of such dynamic was the severe crisis that began in 2014/15 and lasted for the next 3 years.

In short, the ultimate contagious episodes of the Macedonian democratic discontinuity were related to the acute crisis (political, institutional, legal) that was activated and embodied in the populist and authoritarian circumstances, traumatically symptomized via fearsome security incidents : the Kumanovo incident in 2016⁹ and the violence in the Parliament on 27 April, 2017 [“The Bloody Thursday”]¹⁰. Indicating a huge virulent capacity to spread its insecurity infection in the whole Western Balkan Region, caused USA and the EU to become significantly *mobilized in resolving the Macedonian*

⁹ News: “Macedonia charges 30 with terrorism after Kumanovo clashes”, BBC News, 11 May 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32695909>

¹⁰ Sinisa Jakov Marusic, (BIRN), News: “Video Shows MPs Aiding Macedonia Parliament Assailants”, BALKANINSIGHT, 23 MAY 17, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/video-shows-macedonian-mps-assisting-parliament-assailants-05-23-2017>

outburst¹¹ and on the basis of a new approach. Instead of practicing “security before democracy” tactics, they made a paradigm shift towards the new idea: “security through democracy”. Finally, they took a robust role in helping Macedonia to get back on its democratic track, pushing forward for political negotiations between the Government and the Opposition (2015/16) as the only way towards crisis resolution. Negotiations, facilitated by the EU, lasted for two years. Results of the negotiations are related to the Przino Agreement and their respective institutional novelties¹².

Triggers of the crisis and the rise of a new political subjectivity

After the 2014 presidential elections, the opposition declared that there were findings for falsification of the election results¹³. In this respect, 2 years later, Freedom House describes the situation as follows: ... “The political and security situation in Macedonia declined markedly in 2015. In February, Zoran Zaev, head of the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), alleged that the government of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski had sponsored an enormous wiretapping program carried out by the country’s secret service. Under the program, more than 20,000 people may have had their private conversations illegally recorded. The leaked contents of some of the

¹¹ The phrase “security before democracy” was domesticated in the Macedonian public discourse due to the international community exhibitions approaching the politics in the country. Particularly, this phrase is related to the tolerance of state corruption and authoritarian tendencies, and related stipulations in the consecutive EC Progress Reports. It refers to the fact that the international community, and especially the USA, EU, NATO, were, for a long time, being simply satisfied with tackling only security questions as the priority, forgetting that security could never be achieved without democracy. In this respect, The Black Monday, 2011; the tragic Kumanovo incidents, 2016; but also the Bloody Thursday 2017, are indicative, as they were the direct consequence of the international community’s tolerance towards the Macedonian democratic incapacities. As soon as the International Community understood the potential devastation for the whole Region, the situation has changed.

¹² See the agreements stated by the Committee on the Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) for the Post-monitoring dialogue with “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as the declassified document by the Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly - Council of Europe, DECLASSIFIED 1 AS/Mon(2016)06 / rev 27 May 2016/ (p. 17,18,19) <http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/2221584/AS-MON-2016-06-EN.pdf/9915b980-a05b-41ef-b8e2-33a878aa8d2b>

¹³ In similar style, the Report in EURACTIV.COM writes: ... “Despite a peaceful election day, the OSCE/ODIHR monitoring report of the process indicates a number of serious shortcomings in the days and months leading to it, with remarks such as “the campaign of the governing party did not adequately separate party from state activities, at odds with paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. ...” and also ... “The European Commission endorsed the report and issued a press release along the same lines: “Commissioner Füle [in charge of Enlargement] pointed to the repeated OSCE/ODIHR recommendations regarding biased media coverage and the lack of separation between state and party activities, which are covered by the Copenhagen political criteria” ... ; See: News, “Macedonian opposition boycotts Parliament over claims of election fraud”, EURACTIV, May 19, 2014, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/macedonian-opposition-boycotts-parliament-over-claims-of-election-fraud/>

wiretaps, which Zaev released periodically, suggested among other things that members of the governing Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) had engaged in significant vote-rigging schemes during the 2013 local and 2014 parliamentary elections¹⁴ “.... In other words, there have been explicit indications that authoritarian rule was established and that soon a serious dissatisfaction among the population will begin. Although, it is worth mentioning that among the first resisting attempts were the protests organized in front of the Macedonian Parliament, when opposition MPs wanting to boycott the decision for the budgeting, were being beaten by security formations¹⁵. They attacked the oppositional MPs and all the journalists were thrown out of the Parliamentary hall. This happened on 24 December 2012, (commonly known as Black Monday)¹⁶. Since then, namely, citizens started protesting against that specific occasion, and later they continued doing so and in similar situations when there were governmental decisions which in their essence were undemocratic. Initially dissents went in smaller and diverse groups, and that is why, at the beginning, they were being efficiently neutralized. But, during this period several deaths occurred under rather suspicious circumstances: the car accident of the journalist Nikola Mladenov¹⁷; the murder case known as the “Monster”¹⁸; the death of Martin Neshkovski and related suspicion for attempted cover-up of that murder¹⁹. There were indications for political imprisonments too, related to: detentions of journalist Tomislav Kezharovski²⁰, of the ex-interior minister Ljube

¹⁴ FH Report for 2016: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/macedonia>;

¹⁵ Kole Casule, “Macedonia opposition ejected from parliament in row”, DEC.24, 2012 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-macedonia-protest/macedonia-opposition-ejected-from-parliament-in-row-idUSBRE8BN0EX20121224>

¹⁶ Civil Media Archive, “DECEMBER 24 – A DAY WHEN DEMOCRACY WAS SUSPENDED”, CIVILMEDIA, 24/12/2015, <https://www.civil.org.mk/december-24-a-day-when-democracy-was-suspended/>

¹⁷ Sinisa Jakov Marusic (BIRN), News: “Prominent Macedonian Journalist Dies in Crash”, BALKANINSIGHT, 27 MAR 13, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/prominent-macedonian-journalist-dies-in-car-crash>; Апостолов. В. “Недоследностите во истрагата за Младенов”, ПРИЗМА, 08 МАЈ 2015, <http://prizma.mk/nedоследnostite-vo-istragata-za-mladenov>; Also, it is worth to note that there are leaked tapes about the journalist’s death in the “Oppositional Bombs”.

¹⁸ Sinisa Jakov Marusic & Sase Dimovski (BIRN), “Macedonia Opposition: Ethnic Terror Convictions ‘Suspicious’”, BALKANINSIGHT, 27 May 15, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/zaev-macedonia-monster-case-convicts-are-innocent>;

¹⁹ News: “Zaev’s “bomb”: Nikola Gruevski tried to hide the truth about Martin Neshkovski”, META.MK, 5 May, 2015, <https://meta.mk/en/bomba-na-zaev-nikola-gruevski-se-obidel-da-ja-uvievistinata-za-martin-neshkovski/>

²⁰ Press Release, “EFJ Calls for All Charges Against Journalist Tomislav Kezharovski to be dropped”, International Federation of journalists (IFJ), IFJ.com, 09 October 2014, <https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/efj-calls-for-all-charges-against-journalist-tomislav-kezarovski-to-be-dropped.html> and at <http://www.ifj.org/nc/news-single-view/backpid/34/article/efj-calls-for-all-charges-against-journalist-tomislav-kezarovski-to-be-dropped>; Мери Јордновска, “Сите контроверзи во случајот Кежаровски” ПРИЗМА, 22 Јануари 2015, <http://prizma.mk/site-kontroverzii-vo-sluchajot-kezharovski/>; News: “RSF condemns sentence for Macedonian journalist Tomislav Kezharovski”, Report-

Boshkovski²¹, of a church representative Jovan Vraniskovski²², of the owner of the A1TV broadcasting house Velija Ramkovski²³. The Lustration Commission was also, activated against public intellectuals, with its peculiar role to expose them and to damage their integrity, honor and reputation, as well as to threaten their existence. Those individuals were being “publicly satanised” without leading any investigation on the supposedly wrongdoings²⁴. The Judiciary was under attack too. In only one day almost all the judges from one Court Unit in Skopje were arrested and allegedly suspected of abuse of official position²⁵. At this point, the resistance was still fragmented, but with potency. But, when the government decided to impose an external state exam on students aided with surveillance cameras and when it tried to eradicate the autonomy of the university with a new law for higher education²⁶, the resistance had intensified and the democratic social movement was massively mobilized. One can say that at that point, the crisis had officially begun and a few months later it experienced its peak. Throughout its most acute times, the crisis was related to the massive

ers Without Borders (RWB), January 16, 2015 - Updated on January 20, 2016 <https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-condemns-sentence-macedonian-journalist-tomislav-kezarovski>.

²¹ Sinisa Jakov Marusic (BIRN), “Macedonian Police Suspected of Ex-Minister’s Torture”, BALKANINSIGHT, 28 MAR 16, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-suspects-seven-over-boskoski-s-arrest-03-28-2016>.

²² For this particular case, the European Court of Human Rights later will rule that a violation of Article 11 was in place (freedom of assembly and association) in line with the Article 9 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion) of the ECHR, which arose from the refusal to register the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric as a separate religious community. See in Sinisa Jakov Marusic (BIRN) “Macedonia Police Arrest Renegade Priest Vraniskovski” BALKANINSIGHT, 12 DEC 11, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-arrests-renegade-priest-vraniskovski>

²³ Sinisa Jakov Marusic (BIRN), “Police Drama at Macedonian A1 TV” BALKANINSIGHT, 25 NOV 10, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/police-drama-at-macedonian-a1-tv>

²⁴ Because of its controversial aspects, among other recommendations, the EC Progress Report for Macedonia requires the authorities to “revise/abolish the lustration law and its implementation”, stressing that “ideological or party reasons were used as a basis for lustration”. See in the ECPR : https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/news_corner/news/news-files/20150619_urgent_reform_priorities.pdf. Also, the ECHR case of Karajanov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia serves to demonstrate that the lustration process was highly controversial. See at ECHR data : <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22%3A%22001-172563%22%7D>

²⁵ Е.П., “АКЦИЈА „ЈУСТИЦИЈА“: Уапсени 14 судии и 11 судски службеници – се сомничат дека го оштетиле буџетот за 1,3 милиони евра”, АКАДЕМИК.МК октомври 8, 2014 <https://www.akademik.mk/aktsija-justitsija-uapсени-14-sudii-i-11-sudski-sluzhbenitsi-se-somnichat-deka-go-oshtetile-budhetot-za-1-3-milioni-evra-4/>

²⁶ Sinisa Jakov Marusic (BIRN), News: “Macedonia Protesting Students Occupy Faculties”, BALKANINSIGHT, 11 FEB 15 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-students-liberate-central-university-complex>, See also the international open letter supporting Macedonian academic community : Tod May, “A letter to the Macedonian legislators; An open letter in support of the Macedonian student protests.”, Aljazeera.com, 27 Dec 2014 <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/letter-macedonian-legislators-2014122781547248467.html>;

student protests [Students Plenum]²⁷, dissenting under the slogan “No Justice No Peace”. Well ahead, and in other various occasions, the students’ movement will be conjoined with other resisting groups: Professors Plenum, High Schools Plenum, Stop for the Police Brutality, No Justice - No Peace, Citizens for Macedonia all together building their common political subjectivity, and finally, congregated in the so called Colorful Revolution. In short, in 2015, a series of events constituted the triggers that turned an unstable situation into the acute crisis, in which two antagonized sides – (political enemies in Schmitt’s sense of the term) (Mouffe, 2005), were clearly present in the Macedonian political arena.

After the Students’ Plenum protests and their occupation of the universities, Zoran Zaev, as a leader of the largest Macedonian opposition party (SDSM) presented the public, via YouTube channel leaked audio materials showing the corrupt behavior and criminal activities of government officials. He pointed out that the government had been massively subversively active against the Macedonian constitutional order in a highly criminal way, targeting basically four clusters of their anti-systemic and anti-constitutional criminal activities: activities against the electoral results; police brutality and exceeding official powers in the Ministry of the Interior; the interference of the authorities and eradication of a three-fold division of power; acts of massive corruption caused by lucrative motives. He also stressed that at least 20,000 people had been illegally wire-taped and placed under surveillance including the author of this article. He also claimed that the intelligence units were controlled by government authorities and instrumentalised against ordinary citizens with opposition sympathies or tendencies for dissent. The leaked audio materials were promoted in public by a campaign entitled “Truth about Macedonia - Oppositional Political Bombs”²⁸. The leaked materials were a real shock to the Macedonian public, but on the other hand, previously silenced citizens used their anger and started organizing public dissent. They initiated protests every day, asking for the resignation of the government.

The next trigger, an even harder one to handle, was an armed incident in the city of Kumanovo on the night of the 9 May 2015, when in a fire exchange, provoked by “unknown terrorists”, 8 policemen were killed and 37 wounded. The fire exchange in Kumanovo - the second largest city in Macedonia, close to the Kosovo border, with an ethnically mixed population – indeed, occurred right before the scheduled anti-government

²⁷ Erwan Fouere, “Macedonian Student’s Plenum - A Cry for Respect” BALKANINSIGHT, 15 DEC 14 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/macedonian-student-s-plenum-a-cry-for-respect>

²⁸ Public Archive of the leaked audio materials : “Комплетен материјал од сите бомби што ги објави опозицијата” ПРИЗМА, 6.10.215, <http://prizma.birn.eu.com/%D0%BC%D0%BA/%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B8/%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%D0%BB-%D0%BE%D0%B4-%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-33-%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B1%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0>

protest, planned for the 17th of May. For many analysts at the time, this time-frame was rather suspicious; most of them, namely, saw the Kumanovo incident as a ‘pre-arranged and fake incident, with a specific goal of preventing the planned mass protests of the 17th of May and to create the impression of brewing inter-ethnic tensions between Macedonians and Albanians in an attempt to distract the mounting political tensions (the “political bombings”)²⁹. After the Kumanovo incidents, although seriously traumatized, people showed even greater connectedness regardless of their ethnic background, and despite malicious provocations against their connectedness, the biggest protest, scheduled for 17th of May, (alongside many small, everyday marches and rallies) went ahead despite the dreadful incidents. A mere week after the Kumanovo incidents, the 17th of May³⁰ protest became massive, yet peaceful, gathering of massive number of citizens who came out to show their support³¹. Most importantly, the march was a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, cross-ideological and truly civic display of unity and strength. Inter-ethnic tension was not among its features. Following the event, an occupation sprung up in front of the Government building in Skopje. There was a peaceful atmosphere among the occupiers who had declared it a free ‘camping zone’. Protesters, some linked to the main oppositional party SDSM, as well as many NGOs, ordinary citizens, liberal and free minded citizens, public opinion makers, intellectuals, journalists, artists were intensively asking for the resignation of the Government. The “camping zone occupation” included debates, exhibitions, and film projections. In this way, the protesters were sending a non-violent and pro-diversity message. Yet, despite the non-violent nature of the movement, some of the protesters had already been detained and held (without charge) for weeks, as the Helsinki Committee report³² arrests. On the other hand, there were the counter-protests and protestors supporting the Government³³.

At this point particularly, on 17th of May, when there were two clearly divided and antagonized political enemies present, or, when the “Others” were embodied in

²⁹ Marija Tumanovska & Robert Coalson, “Government’s Claims About Macedonia Terrorist Group Met Skeptically”, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, May 12, 2015 <https://www.rferl.org/a/macedonia-government-claims-of-terrorist-group-met-with-skepticism/27010370.html>

³⁰ News: “Tens of thousands demand resignation of Macedonian government”, The Guardian, 17 May, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/17/20000-macedonians-demand-resignation-of-gruevski-government>

³¹ Sinisa Jakov Marusic (BIRN), News: “Macedonians Stage Mass Protest for PM’s Resignation” BALKANINSIGHT, 17 MAY 15 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-braces-for-big-anti-government-protest>

³² MHC Announcement, “Информација за уапсени, приведени и притворени лица по протестите на 5 мај 2015 година”, Macedonian Helsinki Committee, 14 Maj 2015, <http://www.mhc.org.mk/announcements/294#>

³³ News: “Thousands Stage Counter-Protest in Macedonia”, VoA, 17 May, 2015, <https://www.voanews.com/a/protesters-set-camp-macedonian-pm-office/2776087.html>

their full political potential, I believe, the new dissentious political subjectivity was born. In this regard, the notion of political subjectivity was deduced via the angle of the “Imaginary”, which is its necessary precondition. Political subjectivity, namely, can be born in concrete societal, historical and power relations when there is certain acting against the power authorities (symbolic and normative ones). Political activity is usually related to transgression of symbolic order for which the Imaginary is a necessary precondition, since the rupture within the symbolic order always gives an opportunity for re-subjectification. Having in mind that the imaginative but reflective alienation toward the “Other” is a basic precondition for subjectivity, political subjectivity arrives as a result of a transgression against power relations and power authorities. That is exactly the momentum of possibility for bringing out a certain political subjectivity; a Deleuzeian transformative momentum of “becoming”, or Žižekian momentum as “acting out” (Chupeska-Stanishkovska, 2017). In our particular case, the fact that the crisis was provoked by the hard-line authoritarian exhibitions displayed by the ex-Macedonian government, the new political subjectivity was born in a highly antagonized political scene as a contestatory practice and in a transgressed manner and later it was embodied in a social resetting movement.

Many political sociologists are pointing out the functional component of crises and conflicts in one society. In this line, Kutcher and Dalton emphasize that the unconventional political action of movements helps in the long term to stabilize the political order (Kutcher and Dalton, 1990). The Macedonian massive protests, although with a potential to provoke direct conflict between pro-governmental agencies and civil resisting movement, at the same time, opened the possibility to stabilize the society and to reduce the tension but also, in Kuechers and Dalton’s sense, to stabilize the political order. Even more, as Meyers insides put forward in the same direction saying that protests serve as a vehicle not only for expressing political claims, but also for building communities, forging connections among people and for constructing a sense of self as well that protest movements include both efforts to transform society and politics of transforming one’s more immediate community and one’s self (Meyers 2001:166). When reflecting on protests and their capacities to induce a self-construction, Mayer’s insides, to be sure, are referent for the factual societal transformative circumstances that were exhibited on the Macedonian political stage when the new political subjectivity arrived as a result of consistory transgression against power relations and power authorities. In the same direction, Nash’s remarks on social movements are intellectually simulative. According to her, they are addressing formal political institutions (Nash, 2010:88)” She also, interprets Touraine’s intuitions on social movements where he points out that” class struggle in post-industrial society is no longer in the name of political or workers’ rights; it is not related to economic class struggle, but for people’s right to choose and control their own lives(Touraine, 1981: 26)”...

Due to the fact that the Macedonian authoritarian turn was an initiation intensively present by the State and the Party for which the control over every pore of the

society was a priority; the protests, consequently were undoubtedly addressing what Nash's is naming as formal political institutions (Nash, 2010:88), they were asking for the people's right to choose and control their own lives. In other words, particularly relevant for our case is the fact that the although authoritarian expositions were the reason for triggering the crisis, they also, provoked a rise of a new political subjectivity with a capacity to contest and to transgress the authoritarian symbolic and normative order, and even more, to invoke Mayer's so-called "societal transformation" (Mayer, 2001:166). The resisting actions of the Colorful Revolution created an antagonized tension and hostility, and paved the way for future political negotiations and agreements; such as the Przino Agreement did, indeed. With the Agreement, on the other side, new formal institutions were established. The disorganization and the democratic discontinuity in the Macedonian political system, or to say, its authoritarian turn, conjoined with power abuse, have led to an agonizing and antagonized political situation. Confrontations during crises, also, became the engine for social and later institutional change. One can say that there has been a social shift towards "institutionalization of the collective action" (Porta and Diani, 2006). The crisis, as we understand so far, beside the fact that it was traumatic, it can be considered as a functional trigger for bringing out a new political subjectivity via supra-ethnic civil resistance mobilization against a common enemy – an authoritarian government, but also, via contestatory and transgressed engagements that have not only helped in overthrowing the government, but they provoked serious democratic interventions in the Macedonian political system and brought a new element in the political culture (from submissive and nonresponsive citizens, they became responsive and engaged ones). Concerning the transformations in the political system, the Przino Agreement³⁴ introduced systematic novelties as The Special's Prosecutor Office and the Pre-Electoral Technical Government.

Conclusion

Macedonian democratic discontinuity, for which the country got the attribute of a captured state, at one point, was revealed in a form of severe distortion occurring between 2014-2017. That was the hardest political, institutional, and legal crisis since the Macedonian independence. On the other hand, it had its functional component, since it provoked a rise of a new political subjectivity embodied in a genuine civil resistance movement with contestatory and transgressed capacities against the democratic discontinuity exhibited by the authoritarian governance. The resistance started with the students protest under the slogan "No Justice No Peace" and later in other various occasions they will be conjoined with other resisting groups: Professors Plenum, High Schools Plenum, Stop For The Police

³⁴ Przino Agreement or Agreement from 2 June – 15 July 2015 is a political agreement between the main political parties in the Republic of Macedonia with the mediation of the European Union. See in the EC Announcement at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/hahn/announcements/agreement-skopje-overcome-political-crisis_en

Brutality, No Justice - No Peace, Citizens for Macedonia etc.; all together building their common political subjectivity materialized in supra-religious, supra-partisan, supra-ethnic Colorful Revolution. The later had a full capacity to encounter the democratic discontinuity with meaningfully diverse and unprecedented by then civic virtuosity. It brought a new element in the Macedonian political culture, having in mind that the previous political divisions were marked strictly along ethnical and ideological lines. Contestatory engagements of the newest political subjectivity have not only helped in overthrowing the government, but have led to serious interventions in the Macedonian political system, having in mind the novelties stipulated in the Przino Agreement, and particularly: The Special Prosecutor's Office and the Pre-electoral Technical Government. Following the actual socio-political transformation, with the subsequent bilateral agreements with Bulgaria and Greece, in the context of the systemic change, with a great sense of intelligence, some will correctly notice, even the formation of the "4th Macedonian Republic". In other words, the key years of the Macedonian democratic statehood embodiment, although it was hard to handle having in mind the discontinuations episodes, one can say, it is related to its four democratic constitutive periods related to certain historical events:

I. ASNOM³⁵ in 1945 [with the establishing of the first republic as Socialist Republic of Macedonia]; II. Independence Referendum in 1991 and the adoption of the *Constitution of independent Republic of Macedonia* [The Second Republic]; III. Signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001 , [The Third Republic]; Hopefully, the 4th Macedonian Republic, is to be initiated at the date related to the implementation of the Prespa Agreement³⁶, with which the name issue dispute with Greece was finally resolved, in order to associate The Republic North Macedonia in the NATO membership.

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³⁵ abbr. ASNOM refers to the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (Macedonian: Антифашистичко Собрание за Народно Ослободување на Македонија);

³⁶ The full text of the Agreement: <https://vlada.mk/mkgrdogovor>

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GENDER INEQUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO ACADEMIA IN TURKEY AND THE EU

Ece KUZULU¹

Abstract: *Gender inequality is a worldwide issue in almost every sector, including in education. This paper aims to focus on the gender imbalance between female and male academic staff members. The data gathered from the European Commission statistics, academic literature and the Turkish Council of Higher Education statistics was used to analyse the proportions of female researchers, assistant professors, associate professors, professors and women decision makers in the academia. The ratios of female and male academics in European Union countries are compared with each other and with Turkey as a candidate country. This paper states that the difference between female and male academics' proportions is clearly evident in the majority of analysed countries. An interesting and unfortunate finding is that the higher the academic title, the higher the difference between male and female proportions in favour of male academics. As the statistics gathered from the European Commission and the Turkish Council of Higher Education indicates, female academics are under-represented in decision making or managerial positions in academic hierarchy.*

Key Words: *gender inequality, academia, equal opportunity, tertiary education*

Introduction

The education system of a country can be considered as one of the most significant elements of development. Moreover, the education system of a country reflects the structure of its political and social systems. When the figures of statistics on women and men academics are examined, it is apparent that although there are many high achieving academic women, they fall behind comparable to men over their careers (Roos & Gatta, 2009). Knights and Richards (2003) argue that male understanding of accomplishment structures the average academic career progress which is research-active and uninterrupted career history. In recruitment, promotion and wage management, inequality of work is visible (Peterson & Togstad, 2006). Unfortunately, this is also accurate within the profession of academia. There are many studies addressing the

¹ Asst. Prof. Dr. of Human Resources Management, Izmir Demokrasi University, Department of Human Resources Management

issue of gender inequality in different sectors (Bechtold et al. 2019; Kulich & Ryan, 2017; Weyer, 2007; Isaac et al. 2012; Lathabhavan & Balasubramanian, 2017).

It is necessary to note that gender inequality is not only an issue for women, it is a matter to all genders and the society on the whole. This paper considers the issue of gender inequality of academic staff in tertiary education. As the world transforms rapidly, the academy also needs to respond to these changes and try to overcome gender inequality in decision making positions.

The gender pay gap issue is excluded from this paper because in Turkey the wages of women and men as public sector academic staff are the same. Hence, it is not necessary to compare Turkey with other countries in this particular matter.

Gender Inequality Issue in General

As it was indicated by Lucifora and Meurs (2006), in many OECD countries public sector employment accounts for a vital share of total employment and it plays a significant role in the economic performance of a country. Although the majority of the scientific research on gender inequality is mostly focused on the private sector, comparable results have emerged from the public sector as well. Equal opportunity to women in the public sector is a widely accepted goal in public administration (Connell, 2006).

According to Connell (2002), the term “gender regime” may be used to define the overall pattern of gender relations within an organization. A gender regime includes all aspects of gender relations. In the same study, Connell also suggested that there are four dimensions of the gender regime model, namely, gender division of labour, gender relations of power, emotion and human relations, gender culture and symbolism. The way in which authority, control and force are operated along gender lines, including organisational hierarchy, violence and legal power fall under gender relations of power. The emotion and human relations dimension of the model represents the way in which attachment and antagonism among people are exercised along gender lines. Finally, gender culture and symbolism include the language and symbols of gender difference, gender identities in culture and beliefs and attitudes about gender. This fourfold model may be used to reveal an organisation’s gender regime.

It is suggested that gender inequality is constituted not only by people, but also organizations (Acker, 1990). Following this statement, it may be claimed that different forms of gender inequality may be encountered in different types of organisations. Gender inequality has been an aspect of employment in higher education all over the world (Knights & Richards, 2003).

Monroe and her colleagues’ (2008) findings claim that women academics who were interviewed about gender inequality did not define it as a legal or political problem so much as a personal issue for which they had to take on individual responsibility. In addition, the respondents from the same research claimed that they had tried the legal route and found it produced little.

“Academic staff is defined as a type of personnel whose fundamental assignment is instruction or research. Academic staff members hold academic ranks with titles as professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor or lecturer. In addition, academic staff may hold titles of director, dean, chair or head of department (OECD, 2018). Gender inequality exists and it can be seen as a political and economic problem in the world. One of the main goals of the EU since 1999 has been to achieve equal representation of women in tertiary education (European Commission, 2010). Although there is plethora of various scientific discussions of gender inequality, the number of academic papers on gender inequality in academic circles is considerably low.

The She Figures (2018) publication states that at the EU-28 level, tertiary educated women are more likely to be unemployed than tertiary educated men. In the same publication, the unemployment rate for women in 2017 was found to be 3.8%, while the respective rate for men was 2.9%. The unemployment rate for tertiary educated women exceeded that of tertiary educated men in 27 of the 36 countries, with differences ranging from 0.1 percentage points in Austria to 9.4 percentage points in Turkey (She Figures, 2018). The unemployment rate for tertiary educated women exceeded that of tertiary educated men in 27 of the 36 (EU-28) countries, with rates differing from 0.1 points in Austria to 9.4% points in Turkey. The highest unemployment rates for tertiary educated women were found in Greece (18.6 %), North Macedonia (18.5 %) and Turkey (16.6 %) while the lowest ones were observed in Germany (1 %), the Czech Republic (1.1 %) and Iceland (1.2 %). As indicated by statistics, the unemployment rate for women with higher education is higher than for men with the same level education.

For the purpose of comparing the European Union Countries and Turkey, academic staff will be evaluated in groups of doctoral graduates, researchers, professors, associate professors and assistant professors and lastly decision makers.

Turkey and the EU Comparison in Terms of Female and Male Doctoral Graduates

The She Figures Publication (2018) reveals that the presence of women among doctoral graduates increased from 2007 to 2016 at EU-28 level. The proportion of women doctoral graduates ranged between the desired range of 40% and 60% in only six countries: France (60 %), Spain (58 %), Hungary (55 %), Turkey (54 %), Croatia (52 %) and Luxembourg (40 %) (She Figures, 2018). As stated by the She Figures publication, Turkey stands within the desired 40-60% range. The statistics shows that the highest growth rate in the number of female doctoral graduates in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) was observed in Turkey (173.9%), contrasted to the lowest growth rate in mathematics and statistics in Latvia (-100%).

Turkey and the EU Comparison in Terms of Female and Male Researcher Positions

As indicated earlier in the EU statistics, the distribution of doctoral graduates in all fields of study is gender balanced. Nonetheless, women researcher population is still sparse compared to men's. Another statement regarding women researchers is that the proportion of women and men researchers was 8.6 out of every thousand active women and 14.5 out of every thousand active men respectively, resulting in an unfortunate difference of 5.9 points per thousand at the EU level. Men researchers are more likely to work in the field of natural sciences, engineering and technology while women researchers seem more likely to work in medical and social sciences. Out of 39 countries, including Turkey, women researchers had the highest concentration in medical sciences in 12 (She Figures, 2018).

Although the highest rates of women researchers within the total active female population was observed in Iceland (18.6 points per thousand), the corresponding rates of men researchers in Iceland were higher than women's (20.2 points per thousand). Only in nine countries the ratio of women researchers among active women was found to be higher than the corresponding proportion among active men. Within these nine countries, the largest differences were found in Turkey (1.9 points per thousand), followed by North Macedonia (1.6 points per thousand) and Serbia (1.2 points per thousand) (She Figures, 2018).

According to the She Figures (2018), women researchers are more likely to work in the higher education sector in comparison to the other main sectors of economy (government, private non-profit, business enterprise sector). Women account for 42.1 % of the researchers' population working in the higher education sector in the EU.

Turkey and the EU Comparison in Terms of Female and Male Academic Career Progress

Sağlamer (2013) defines Turkish Higher Education System as follows: the tertiary education system works under the oversight of the Council of Higher Education (CoHE) which was established in 1981 within the framework of highly centralized governance. Turkish Higher Education System statistics on academia shows the current situation of gender representation in Turkey.

Turkey has an uncommonly high ratio of female full professors at its universities and in scientific fields (STEM) that are traditionally dominated by men in other countries (Özcan & İnanç, 2015). As they stated in their same paper, Özcan and İnanç also state that Turkey is regarded as a paradoxical case with respect to sex-segregation in academia by the reports (She Figures) published by the European Commission. The

reason of the paradoxical case is that although its female labour force participation is one of the lowest in Europe and within OECD countries, Turkey has higher proportions of women in academic positions, such as full professorships, than many other countries. A form of imbalance occurs when academic leaders are chosen for leadership positions such as deans, department chairs, directors.

The statistics from the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YÖK Öğretim Elemanı İstatistikleri, 2020) reveals that in public universities the total number of academic staff is 148014 and 56% (83290) of them are male, whereas 44% (64724) are female. If we look at title division, the number of female (23210) and male (23144) research assistants indicates that their ratios are quite similar, hence it can be said that there is equality. In Turkish public universities, the proportion of female assistant professors is 42% (13881) and the proportion of male assistant professors is 58% (18811). These numbers show that although the difference is not that obvious, the ratio of men assistant professors is higher than the corresponding one of women. The statistics implies that the proportion of female associate professors in Turkish public universities is 39% (5745) and the proportion of male academics that share the same title is 61% (8916). The difference between female and male associate professor ratios is greater than in terms of assistant professor ratios. When the numbers of professors in Turkish public universities are examined, it is evident that 32% of the professors are female (7674) and 68% are male (16303). The difference between female and male professor proportions is quite remarkable. An interesting and unfortunate point is that as the academic title gets higher, the difference between male and female numbers gets higher in favour of male academics.

A similar picture of a wider gap between women and men academics is shown in the She Figures 2018 report by the European Council. In the EU in 2016, women accounted for 35% of the assistant professors, 28% of the associate professors and 15 % of STEM professors (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics). The largest proportions of female professors were observed in Romania (54.3 %), Bosnia and Herzegovina (45.1 %) and Latvia (41.4 %). The smallest proportions were in Cyprus (13 %), Israel (14.3 %) and the Czech Republic (14.6 %). As indicated earlier, the female professor ratio in Turkey is 32% and it is above the EU average. The proportions of professor, associate professors and assistant professors in Turkey is not available in She Figures 2018, hence these ratios were gathered from the Turkish Council of Higher Education statistics 2020 for this specific study.

The She Figures 2018 report also shows that 7.4 of women academic staff members were professors, while the corresponding ratio of men was 16.7%. The difference between female and male professor proportions is quite remarkable. Among professors, women made up 36.2 % of staff members less than 35 years old, 27.5 % of staff aged 35 to 44, 25.8 % of staff members aged 45 to 54 and just 22.6 % of them were 55 or older.

The notable situation that was described above is similar in different countries. Danell and Hjerm (2013) state that from 1995 to 2010 in Sweden, female academics

have 37% lower chance to become professors than male academics and the difference in promotion ratios has not changed much since then. Iceland also shows similarity in gender inequality proportions in favour of male academics (Heijstra et al., 2015). Since decision making positions are mostly held by male academics, this situation constitutes an obstacle for female academics to find their place in a male dominated network and be promoted. In Netherlands, the academic promotion process also makes it difficult for female academics to become professors (Van den Brink & Benschop, 2014). In addition to this, it is stated that in the UK the top decision-making academic positions are also held by male academics (Fletcher et al., 2007). Johnson (2007) calls this situation a “cloning phenomenon” in terms of promoting academics to higher positions.

Turkey and the EU Comparison in Terms of Female and Male Managerial Position Holders in the Academia

In the majority of EU countries, the significant imbalances between ratios of women and men at the highest academic levels can be defined as unfortunate. Various academic studies demonstrate that female academics do not have the opportunity to contribute to the decision making process as a result of gender biases and stereotyping (Etzkowitz et al. 2000; Gherardi and Poggio 2001; Rosser 2004; Valian 1999 in Marini & Meschitti, 2018). Although there are various promotion processes and academic systems among countries, the common issues and the consequences of gender inequality are very similar. The under-representation of women academics in decision-making and leadership positions has negative consequences for scientific development and gender equality in the academia. Despite the increasing numbers of women among higher education graduates in recent decades, the numbers of women and their ratios compared to those of men in senior academic and decision-making positions are much lower than assumed (OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook, 2018).

The She Figures 2018 publication by Publications Office of the European Commission examines the proportion of women among the heads of higher education institutions and it states that women are less represented as they are moving up the academic ladder. Despite the fact that the proportion of women among heads of higher education institutions between 2014 and 2017 increased from 20% to 22%, the representation figures remain significantly low (She Figures, 2018). The same publication reveals that the highest proportion of women among the heads of higher education institutions was found in Sweden (41.7 %) and Latvia (37 %). On the contrary, the lowest ratios of women heads were observed in Greece (11.1%), Cyprus (10.4%), Turkey (8.5%) and Spain (8%). Compared to other countries that were examined in 2018, Turkey significantly lags in the representation at the academic decision making levels. When compared to the proportions stated in the same publication from 2014, it is unfortunate to admit that the picture is very similar to what was reported four year before this analysis.

When the figures from the EU statistics and the Turkish Council of Higher Education reports (stated above) were examined, the whole picture implies that the decision making positions in the academia are in hands of male academics. Additionally, the statistics shows that major management, administration, budgeting and human resources decisions are made by male academics who manage the universities. The reason behind the under-representation of women at decision making positions in the academia is claimed to be the patriarchal culture of higher education institutions (Dlamini & Adams, 2014; Leonard & Nicholls, 2013).

Since there is no available data available on female and male rectors in Turkish universities, each Turkish public university web site was visited at the end of 2019 and examined for the purposes of this study. The collected data shows that 6 out of 128 public universities in Turkey have female rectors. The percentage of female rectors, which is only 5.47, is quite disappointing. As the ratio of female vice rectors is 8.98%, the situation of vice rectors in Turkish public universities is not that different than rectors. Hence, it can be easily stated that the proportions of women rectors and vice rectors are very low and this reality does not differ from the European Union countries.

Conclusion

Gender inequality is an undeniable situation in many sectors all over the world. Unfortunately, although it has universal meritocratic values, the academia also suffers from the same issue. In order to achieve scientific excellence all talents are needed in play and women academics are a huge part of the talent. Equality between women and men must be a core value of each country and government. Systematic, unique and focused policies and practices are required to end women and men imbalance.

The evaluation of the statistics points out that although distribution of doctoral graduates in all fields of study is gender balanced, women researcher population is still lower than men researcher population. Another conclusion of this paper is that as the academic title gets higher the difference between male and female numbers gets higher in favour of male academics in Turkey and the European Union countries. The reports, data and publications that were analysed within this paper show that in many European countries male academics have dominated academic positions in higher education. However, Turkey seems to accomplish to be more gender-balanced in academia than some European countries with the exception of the decision-making positions. Female academics face greater obstacles than male academics in advancing to the highest academic positions in the EU (She Figures, 2018).

Sağlamer and her colleagues (2017) examined the She Figures publication of 2012 and stated that the underrepresentation of women in the decision-making positions of the participating universities was in line with the long lasting trends in Turkey, particularly at the political level where women's representation remains below international benchmarks. It is very upsetting that when the She Figures 2018 publication is exam-

ined the statement about Turkey remains the same. To sum up, there is no significant improvement of underrepresentation of women in the academia, especially in terms of the decision making positions. As it is also shown by Meulders et al. (2012), having a male dominated and male run university significantly puts female representation and interests at a disadvantage. Although there are various studies on gender inequality in the academia, the question remains unanswered as to why the inequality issue still exists. Gender stereotypes, the glass ceiling, gender discrimination, culture and expectations of society can be seen as some of the factors that influence the promotion of female academics to professorship positions.

As it was claimed by the academics that were quoted above and shown by the statistics that was gathered from the EU, the OECD and the Turkish Council of Higher Education female academics have been under-represented in decision making or managerial positions in academic hierarchy. One of the suggestions that can be made according to the findings of this paper is that there can be quotas in the membership of each scientific commission and board to secure women's representation at the top positions. Also, gender rotation of academic decision-making positions can be considered. In order to overcome gender inequality, it may help to have higher numbers of women in positions of power by giving them promotion opportunities as much as to men. Although this approach will not be sufficient to solve the problem, it may help as a tool. Another suggestion may be to generate more specific policies for different sectors and different occupations to fight against gender inequality. Another proposition is that gender-balance in the university could be a quality management evaluation criterion. Although some universities try to form gender-balanced appointment committees (Marini & Meschitti, 2018), the difference between female and male decision-making positions in the academia still clearly exists.

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THE WEAKNESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN RESPONSE TO COVID 19 PANDEMIC: THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY

Dilara SÜLÜN¹

Abstract: *This paper aims to explore the responses of the European countries facing the Covid-19 pandemic. The Covid-19 epidemic started spreading quickly and intensely first in Italy and Spain followed by the United Kingdom, Germany and France and it is now present in many European countries and worldwide. The European Union was established on the grounds of economic cooperation with the aim of political collaboration and solidarity. This paper analyses first the stages of European integration and explores the European attitude and spirit against the Covid-19 cases.*

Key words: *European Union, European Union integration, Covid-19, European solidarity,*

Introduction

The European Union is known for its success in providing political and economic integration to its members. The initial integration started indeed with an economic co-operation with the signing of the Treaty of Paris Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which was followed by the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 between France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Treaty of Rome states in its preamble its main objective as to 'preserve peace and liberty and to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe'. Thus, a customs union was introduced with a common external tariff aiming at a balanced economic growth within the EEC. Today, the European Union also states its main goals as (European Union, 2020):

- promoting peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens,
- offering freedom, security and justice without internal borders,
- sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and price stability,
- a highly competitive market economy with full employment and social progress, and
- environmental protection.

¹ Assist. Prof. Dr. Dilara Sülün, International Relations at the İzmir Demokrasi University

Since then, many other agreements were concluded within member states that fostered not only economic but also political integration for an advanced economic and political union.

However, while the EU can be seen as a good and successful example of a regional integration model for having promoted peace and prosperity in the European continent, its role as a global and strong actor in promoting global peace and stability is rather questionable. In this paper, we will analyse how the European Union coped with the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic in Europe. Did European solidarity happen as one would have expected, or did it fail?

Our argument is that European solidarity did not function as it would have been normally expected from a strong and 'united' European Union, and that the EU's responses to the global Covid-19 pandemic have been too self-centred. In the first part, we will address the historical background of the integration processes in the European Union, based on treaties. Then, we will explore the emergence of the Covid-19 epidemic and its cases in Europe. The third part of the article will explore the actions taken by member states which were against European solidarity. Finally, we will provide concluding remarks.

Steps Toward Unity and Integration in Europe

The historical roots of the idea of 'unity and integration' go long way back, but the process was accelerated in the 1950's. European Economic Community was established in order to bring an end to the wars between countries. Within this context, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman's Declaration was based on the planning of Jean Monnet, a French political and economic adviser to the French government. Monnet foresaw an economic cooperation in west European heavy industry; thus, he was the inspiration behind the 'Schuman Plan' which planned a supra-national decision making in the production of coal and steel (European Commission, no date, p.1). As a result of the 'Schuman Plan', the Coal and Steel Community was established between the six founder countries of the European Union; France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, where the circulation of coal and steel was liberalised. The idea was to unite European countries both politically and economically with the aim of providing a lasting peace.

On 25 March 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed, creating the European Economic Community (EEC), or 'Common Market' and the Euratom Treaty was also signed on the same day, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). Euratom was created in 1957 to further European integration and cope with energy shortages through the peaceful use of nuclear power. It has the same members as the European Union and is governed by the Commission and Council, operating under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Euratom regulates the European civil nuclear industry, which produces almost 30 % of energy in the EU (European Parliament, 2017).

Both the EEC and the EAEC were inspired from the ECSC supra-national structure and the main European institutions were established to ensure the functioning of the European Community. The EEC and these institutions were founded on the traditional distinction between the three powers: a legislative power, an executive power and a judiciary power (University of Luxembourg CVCE, 2020). These were the Assembly

(European Parliament), the European Council and the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.

The EEC brought:

- a customs union for the six founder member states,
- free circulation,
- free competition,
- a common commercial policy.

The Single European Act (SEA) was signed on 28 February 1986 in Brussels and came into force on 1 July 1987. The SEA is an important treaty in terms of European integration as it established European political cooperation. Once the Single European Act (SEA) entered into force, the title ‘European Parliament’ (which the Assembly had used since 1962) was made official. The SEA also increased the EP’s legislative powers with the introduction of the cooperation and assent procedures (European Parliament, no date).

The Maastricht Treaty which is officially known as the Treaty on the European Union was signed on 7 February 1992. This treaty marked the beginning of “a new stage in the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”. First, it laid the grounds for a single currency, the euro, and considerably extended cooperation between European countries in new areas (European Central Bank, 2020):

- European citizenship was created, allowing citizens to reside in and move freely between Member States,
- a common foreign and security policy was established and
- closer cooperation between the police and the judiciary in criminal matters was agreed.

With the Maastricht Treaty, the Union was founded on the European Communities which constituted the first pillar and two other pillars were added for other areas of cooperation, namely, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 27 October 1997 and came into force in May 1999, whereby the co-decision procedure was simplified and broadened in its scope. The European Parliament was provided with the right to approve the Commission President. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, member states agreed to transfer certain powers from national governments to the European Parliament across diverse areas, including legislating on immigration, adopting civil and criminal laws, and enacting foreign and security policy (CFSP), as well as implementing institutional changes for expansion as new member nations join the EU (Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs, no date).

The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 2003. The aim of the Treaty of Nice was to reform the institutional structure of the European Union to withstand the challenges of the new enlargement. With the Treaty of Nice, Parliament’s legislative and supervisory powers were increased, and

qualified-majority voting was extended to more areas within the Council (European Parliament, no date).

The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community was signed on 13 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009. With a few exceptions, the Treaty put the European Parliament on an equal footing as law maker with the Council in areas where this was not previously the case, notably in setting the EU budget (Parliament enjoys full parity), agriculture policy and justice and home affairs.

The overall objective of the treaty was to make the union's structures and functioning more effective, more efficient, and democratic. It gave more power to the European Parliament by adding many new policy areas to the list of those on which decisions are made by the co-decision procedure. Now the European Parliament has equal decision-making power with the European Council, in addition to adding new policy areas, the EU Parliament now also has increased power in determining the EU's budget and international agreements (Carleton University Center for European Studies, no date). The Lisbon Treaty aimed to make the European Union better and more democratic and contribute to provide more power to the EU at the global level.

The Emergence of Covid-19 and The Situation in Europe

On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office was informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown cause detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province of China (World Health Organization, 2020). On 11 and 12 January 2020, WHO received further detailed information from the National Health Commission about the outbreak. According to information conveyed to WHO by Chinese authorities on 11 and 12 January, 41 cases with novel coronavirus infection have been preliminarily diagnosed in Wuhan City (WHO, 2020). The disease is now referred to as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and is a new strain of coronavirus that has not been previously identified in humans. The initial outbreak in Wuhan spread rapidly, affecting other parts of China. Cases were soon detected in several other countries. Outbreaks and clusters of the disease have since been observed in Asia, Europe, Australia, Africa and the Americas (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020).

The WHO declared the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak a pandemic on 11 March, 2020. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of WHO, said at a news conference on 11 March 2020 *'We are deeply concerned both by the alarming levels of spread and severity of COVID-19, and by the alarming levels of inaction'* (WHO, 2020).

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) is a Eu-

European agency which monitors the Covid-19 outbreak, provides risk assessments, public health guidance and advice on response activities to EU Member States and the EU Commission.

Since 31 December 2019 and as of 13 May 2020, 4 223 047 cases of COVID-19 have been reported, including 291 519 deaths (ECDC, 2020).

Cases have been reported from:

Africa: 69 504 cases; the five countries reporting most cases are South Africa (11 350), Egypt (10 093), Morocco (6 418), Algeria (6 067) and Ghana (5 127).

Asia: 695 846 cases; the five countries reporting most cases are Turkey (141 475), Iran (110 767), China (84 018), India (74 281) and Saudi Arabia (42 925).

America: 1 845 638 cases; the five countries reporting most cases are United States (1 369 964), Brazil (177 589), Peru (72 059), Canada (71 157) and Mexico (38 324).

Europe: 1 602 977 cases; the five countries reporting most cases are Russia (232 243), Spain (228 030), United Kingdom (226 463), Italy (221 216) and Germany (171 306).

Oceania: 8 370 cases; the five countries reporting most cases are Australia (6 964), New Zealand (1 147), Guam (152), French Polynesia (60) and Northern Mariana Islands (19).

Other: 696 cases have been reported from an international conveyance in Japan.

Deaths have been reported from:

Africa: 2 403 deaths; the five countries reporting most deaths are Egypt (544), Algeria (515), South Africa (206), Morocco (188) and Nigeria (158).

Asia: 22 774 deaths; the five countries reporting most deaths are Iran (6 733), China (4 637), Turkey (3 894), India (2 415) and Indonesia (1 007).

America: 110 714 deaths; the five countries reporting most deaths are United States (82 387), Brazil (12 400), Canada (5 169), Mexico (3 926) and Ecuador (2 327).

Europe: 155 496 deaths; the five countries reporting most deaths are United Kingdom (32 692), Italy (30 911), France (26 991), Spain (26 920) and Belgium (8 761).

Oceania: 125 deaths; the four countries reporting deaths are Australia (97), New Zealand (21), Guam (5) and Northern Mariana Islands (2).

Other: 7 deaths have been reported from an international conveyance in Japan.

COVID-19 Situation update for the EU/EEA and the UK

As of 13 May 2020, 1 268 603 cases and 150 327 deaths have been reported in the EU/EEA and the UK. The table below shows cases in European countries in detail.

EU/EEA and the UK	Cases	Deaths	Reported cases per 100 000 population	Reported deaths per 100 000 population
Spain	228030	26920	488	57.6
United Kingdom	226463	32692	340.6	49.2
Italy	221216	30911	366.1	51.2
Germany	171306	7634	206.6	9.2
France	140227	26991	209.3	40.3
Belgium	53779	8761	470.8	76.7
Netherlands	42984	5510	249.5	32
Portugal	27913	1163	271.5	11.3
Sweden	27272	3313	267.8	32.5
Ireland	23242	1488	478.9	30.7
Poland	16921	839	44.6	2.2
Austria	15910	623	179.8	7
Romania	15778	1002	81	5.1
Denmark	10591	527	182.7	9.1
Czechia	8221	283	77.4	2.7
Norway	8135	228	153.1	4.3
Finland	6003	275	108.8	5
Luxembourg	3894	102	640.7	16.8
Hungary	3341	430	34.2	4.4
Greece	2744	152	25.6	1.4
Croatia	2207	91	54	2.2
Bulgaria	2023	95	28.8	1.4
Iceland	1801	10	509.4	2.8
Estonia	1746	61	132.2	4.6
Lithuania	1491	50	53.4	1.8
Slovakia	1465	27	26.9	0.5
Slovenia	1461	102	70.7	4.9
Latvia	950	18	49.3	0.9
Cyprus	903	23	75.9	1.9
Malta	503	5	104	1
Liechtenstein	83	1	218.9	2.6
Total	1268603	150327		

Table 1. Covid-19 Situation in EU/EEA and the UK

Source: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/cases-2019-ncov-eueea>

As we can see from the table, the most affected countries in Europe are Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany and France.

The figure below shows us the geographic distribution of COVID-19 in the EU/EEA and the UK, as of 13 May 2020.




Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of COVID-19 in the EU/EEA and the UK, as of 13 May 2020

Source: <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/cases-2019-ncov-eueea>

How Did the European Union Cope with The Covid-19 Pandemic?

In the EU, Member States have their right to regulate and manage health systems and there are both public and private health systems across the EU. An important point is that the EU does not have a medical system valid across the EU as Member States have given the European Medicines Agency a limited role in health care within EU countries, and states are responsible for their own planning and stocking of medical equipment. It would be right to mention that there are several similarities in federalism between the EU and the US: 1) there are open markets between borders within the federal system; 2) states retain competency to run and manage their own health infrastructure; and 3) states retain the rights to limit internal movement within their borders through the implementation of public health interventions (Aubrecht et al, 2020, pp.4-5).

There have been many failures in some EU member states, such as:

- a failure in manufacturing and distribution of goods necessary to fight CV,
- a failure in providing adequate testing for CV, and
- a failure in implementing public health interventions in response to CV.

European treaties contain some provisions for acting together on public health issues, but they are rather limited, and while current arrangements allow action on “serious cross border health threats,” the EU must respect member states’ autonomy in operating their own health systems. The current spread of Covid-19 demonstrated significant obstacles in developing a comprehensive European response to infectious disease outbreaks as Member States prioritise their own interests even if this undermines solidarity with other countries (Anderson et al, 2020, p.2).

For example, EU health ministers expressed their concerns about the possibility of shortage in protective equipment and medicines in some member states due to the coronavirus outbreak, after Germany, France, and the Czech Republic blocked the export of anti-virus gear (Sanchez, EUobserver, 2020)

In this perspective, Stella Kyriakides, the Commissioner for Health, said that *“European solidarity is in the self-interest of us all”*. *“We must all be aware that a lack of solidarity towards European partners on any aspect of the crisis today may bring a lack of solidarity down the road,”* she added.

The Belgian Health Minister Maggie de Block also expressed that limiting exports of medical supplies was *“not in the spirit of the EU”*.

However, the German Health Minister, Jens Spahn, asked members to try to understand the measures taken by Berlin.

During the increase of corona virus worldwide, some concrete incidents have illustrated very well the problem of solidarity in Europe. Protective masks that were imported have been seized by other countries, starting a ‘mask battle’ between Germany, Italy, France and Spain.

At the American continent a similar situation happened with the President of the USA stating that within the context of the ‘Defense Production Act’, “The secretary of Homeland Security will work with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to prevent the export of N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves and other personal protecting equipment (Parker, Sink and Donnan, 2020)”. Donald Trump indicated that they needed these items immediately for domestic use, which created a problem for Canada and Germany who were expecting their orders for their medical needs. Trump’s decision has drawn particular outrage in Canada because Canada provides raw materials for masks made by American producers such as 3M and Honeywell. All exports of N95 masks, surgical gloves and other protective equipment were banned for few days indeed, but the crisis ended happily after the American producer 3M Co., criticized the ban and agreed to produce 55 million masks a month for U.S. health care workers and to import 167 million masks made by its facilities in China. The company said it will be allowed to continue exporting some masks to Canada and Latin America from

the U.S. However, the fate of exports to other parts of the world remained unclear (Bloomberg, 2020).

Let's have a look now at the situation in April 2020 in Europe. How did European countries act in this pandemic crisis? Did the spread and increase of Covid-19 cases forge the European solidarity? The response is not positive indeed, unfortunately major European countries acted self-centredly even before Trump's restrictive decision.

With the increasing shortages of countermeasures to COVID-19, some Member States have instituted bans on the exports of crucial medical supplies. The European Commission in response has ushered a communication that those goods need to be 'channelled to those who need them most' (Rujiter et al, 2020, p.2.)

The first battle occurred at the beginning of March 2020 between the Czech Republic and Italy; the Czech Republic blocked the 110.000 masks that were ordered by Italy. The problem could only be solved later by diplomatic initiatives.

Another problem happened with France too, when it seized on 3 March 2020 the Swedish orders that were imported from China to be delivered to Italy and Spain. The Swedish Government had to interfere, but after two weeks of diplomatic relations and efforts, France sent only half of the masks to Italy and Spain. The Swedish health company Mölnlycke declared that then onwards they would be making their deliveries to Italy and Spain through Belgium. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the problem of masks is an issue of 'independence and sovereignty' and asked for an increase of their production.

Germany also blocked the export of 240.000 masks that were due to go to the Switzerland and the issue became diplomatic (Anaolu Ajans, 2020).

The crisis has demonstrated how crucial are the four freedoms of the internal market. Many countries struggle to function without the free movement of labour and goods and travel restrictions. This especially affected the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania. The populations of Italy and Spain felt abandoned by other member states and EU institutions and believe that Russia and China were more supportive than the EU (Russack S and Blockmans S, 2020, pp.3-4).

There is no doubt that COVID-19 crisis puts to the test some of the core values the EU is founded on, such as the rule of law, respect for individual rights, and protection of democracy. Some of the current emergency measures even have the potential to damage core EU achievements like the single market and the freedom of movement. It is therefore necessary for Europe to build a European narrative based on the notions of reciprocity and solidarity (European University, 2020, p.7).

It is clear that the Covid-19 crisis will have lasting social and economic consequences in Europe, but it could be catastrophic for the most vulnerable countries and populations in developing countries. More than 500 million additional people could be pushed into poverty, in the least developed countries, where public health systems are weak and up to 75% of people lack access to soap and water. Overall, the need for additional health services is estimated at US\$10.6 billion in Africa alone. The EU is

mobilising more than €15.6 billion of existing external action resources to help partner countries worldwide, which should be complemented by resources from member states and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), amounting to a total of over €20 billion (EEAS 2020). However, the amounts announced by the EU are still very far from the needs of developing countries, estimated between US\$2.5 and US\$3 trillion (Jones et al, 2020, pp.2-3). If the EU seeks to increase its legitimacy and its position as a foreign policy actor, as stipulated in the Lisbon treaty, the EU should mobilise more financial and medical assistance to the developing countries.

Conclusion

The EU, which was initially a form of economic cooperation, turned into an economic union with time and has evolved into a large regional integrational organization. Today the EU is developing and acting in a variety of policy areas such as environment, ecology, climate, health, security, justice, foreign policy and migration. EU's objectives have become broader and higher with the ideological aspiration of becoming a global actor based on EU values and European solidarity.

The Covid-19 crisis demonstrated how difficult European solidarity and cooperation can be, as many member states were initially self-centred and closed their borders to solve the crisis in their countries. In that sense, the restrictions they imposed on the export of medical equipment may indeed reflect the instinctive self-preservation. After all, member states realized their inward-looking behaviour and criticisms raised over the EU, but what are the expectations now to solve the crisis?

The EU should lead the coordinate exit-crisis strategies across Europe and member states will need to allow the EU institutions to play their role.

Legal obstacles, especially concerning transfer of data, will have to be overcome, and a pan-European response to covid-19 will also require the UK government to abandon its ideological hostility to the EU.

The EU must also release more funds for research and development and for third countries in need of financial and medical assistance.

Covid-19 is not the first nor the last pandemic, therefore the EU has to learn from the current crisis and improve its tools and actions for the future.

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THE POLITICAL WILL AND ENERGY COOPERATION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH FOR THE EU AND ASEAN

A.Nazmi USTE¹
 Ulviyye AYDIN²

Abstract: *Increasing demand for energy compels countries to establish strategic energy cooperations. Due to the distance between energy suppliers and energy demanders and the financial dimension of such cooperation as well as its cross border characteristics, the establishment of such strategic cooperations requires a common initiative between states including regional and international institutions. This is a more complex process due to the different national interests of member states within regional integrations. The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of member states' political will in decision-making processes to establish the strategic energy cooperation in regional integration models. This research is limited to the European Union (EU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The literature review used for conducting this research aims to set a comparative approach for these regions. This paper argues that the political will is still a main determinant of both ASEAN and the EU member states' decision about the strategic partnerships for energy supply, reflecting economic and energy security priorities among states, political motivations and geopolitical objectives as well.*

Keywords: *ASEAN, energy, EU, political will, strategic infrastructures.*

Introduction

As the economies of the countries grow and societies develop, the importance of energy does the same. And so does the importance of the infrastructures that produce and supply this energy. Critical energy cooperations provide the secure energy supply that is indispensable to economic growth. Interdependence between the development and energy is a circle that keeps the global economy moving and the societies working. Therefore, providing a secure energy supply is an essential task of policy makers of the states, and the political will is one of the main determinants of governments' energy policies. On the other hand, coordination of national energy security issues between member states is a more difficult and complex process in the regional integration blocks.

Performing as the best examples of regional economic integration models, the EU is the largest and ASEAN is the fifth-largest economy of the world. The energy cooperations are

¹ A.Nazmi Uste holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration. He is an Assist. Prof. at Dokuz Eylul University in Izmir/Turkey.

² Ulviyye Aydin holds a Ph.D. in European Studies. She is an Assoc. Prof. Manisa Celal Bayar University in Manisa/Turkey

essential for both blocks to secure their energy supply. The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of political will of member states in the regional integration communities, more precisely ASEAN and the EU. First part of study briefly explains the strategic importance of energy cooperation and the concept of “political will”, by revealing the correlation between these two in energy cooperation. This part includes also some basic facts and informations about ASEAN and the EU that draw the brief economic outlook of both blocks. The next section describes the research methodology used in the study and its limitations. The third section of study consists of two subsections, focusing on political will in energy cooperation between ASEAN and the EU member states. In this part the aim was to define the main factors that affect decision-making processes for their energy cooperations. The final section of this paper presents conclusion of the key findings, comparing the role of political will in decision-making processes for energy cooperations in ASEAN and the EU regions.

1. Political Will - Energy Cooperation Correlation in Regional Integrations

Energy cooperation has a strategic importance for the states as it is a vital link connecting both domestic and exported oil and natural gas resources to refineries, terminals, chemical plants, businesses and consumers as well as other end users. All this movement of energy needs a serious safety to both humans and environment; financial resources to ensure the reliability of energy infrastructures and well-operated management systems.

Energy cooperation can be defined as one of the critical national policies as it supports economic and social prosperity of the community, including electricity generation, transmission, and local distribution facilities; gas processing plants, internal and cross-border pipelines; strategic storage and refineries (Truscott, 2009). While the need for energy resources increases simultaneously to the growing population and technological developments mainly, this situation enforces the states to create alternative options in order to provide an energy security. On one hand, technological innovations facilitated the establishment of safe energy infrastructures, at the same time, these advances pose serious risks for them, like cyber attacks, climate change and etc. Energy cooperations have a wide range of economic benefits across the value-chain in a modern world. Considering the strategic importance of energy resources due to their unequal distribution in the world and highly networked energy systems along a transnational supply chain (OSCE, 2008), investments in such critical projects have a vital significance for both public and private sectors. Such multiple characteristics of energy require a public - private cooperation as well as domestic and international cooperation mostly. In this context, economic, social, financial, security, environmental and sustainability dimensions of energy cooperation highlight the role of political will in the decision-making processes.

When strategic development policies are discussed, the “political will” is an often used concept. Usually, according to public opinion, the success or failure of the strategic cooperation projects highly depends on political will. For most people, while

strong political will guarantees the success of such projects, lack of it is the main reason of failure. Political will can be defined as “the commitment of political leaders and bureaucrats to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives and to sustain the costs of those actions over time” (Brinkerhoff 2000: 242). Some scholars argue that it means a political process covering complexly aggregated choices of a large number of political actors rather than an individual preference. But considering its impossibility, political will is defined as a “collective effort” based on “aggregate approach” (Post et al., 2010). From this point of view, political will can be explained as a result of pledged support “among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem” (Mujkic, 2015). In other words, political will can be defined as the political actors’ or political elite’s choice regarding how to act on a particular subject that aims to gain the desired outcome simply. Gleason (2006) argued that “financial commitment, political level of involvement, official policy and strategy documents, organizational levels, organizational structures, organizational processes, organizational culture, analytical frameworks, and concrete results” are several indicators that measure the political will. However, each of these indicators cannot be sufficient alone to examine the effectiveness of the political will. Considering that the aim of manifested political will is the achievement of concrete results on particular subject, all of these indicators must exist together.

As energy cooperation has a strategic significance due to its vitality as one of the production inputs of economic development and energy systems involve a large number of stakeholders (Muench et al., 2014), the political will of governments is one of the important determinants in making strategic project decisions. In that respect, the political will is one of the non-technical issues for realization of energy collaborations in spite of that the technological components for the launching of them are well developed (Mosannenzadeh et al., 2017). Considering that political will is a regulatory authority of legal, economic, financial, market and social issues, therefore, political will is as a key factor in the multi-actor decision-making process in energy cooperations needed to ensure energy security.

The nature of decision-making processes in regional integrations and multi-actor characteristics of energy cooperation increases the significance of the political will of member states. While the neighboring states aim to promote cooperation through common institutions and rules in regional integration, they may have different choices on priorities. The optimal coordination of national and supranational interests or expectations from integration is critical for member states. The decision taken at supranational or at association level must be viable and politically sustainable at national level and benefit citizens (Nicolaidis & Hornik, 2017) and must serve to maintain integration as well.

As fossil fuels - oil, natural gas and coal are still the primary energy resources of economies and unequal allocation of fossil energy resources in the world is one of the main aspects of energy geopolitics, energy security is one of the priorities both the EU and ASEAN countries. Considering the projected energy demand for both blocks,

regional cooperation is needed to ensure their secure energy supply that means not only the harmonization of legal aspects but also the development of cross-border energy infrastructures (Fünfgeld 2018: 317) for both non-renewable and renewable sources.

In this context, decisions of political actors and elites on the energy cooperations become more crucial for nation-states as well as regional integration communities.

2. Methodology

Based on literature review, this research aims to compare research findings for two regions – ASEAN and the EU. The paper is based on primary sources, academic research articles, policy documents and reports of international organizations and official institutions what has allowed to address the research topic from several perspectives. It is aimed to analyze the current status of the political will in decision-making processes for strategic energy cooperation, to identify the challenges and to produce a comparative approach for two regions.

In this study, it is focused on the cooperation of three most commonly used fossil energy sources.

3. The Role of Member States' Political Will In Energy Cooperation Decisions

3.1. ASEAN

Southeast Asian economies have been one of the fastest growing regions in the world since the 1980s, performing a dramatic rise in energy consumption. While the level of economic development in each country is very different, in general, economic, demographic and urban expansion in these countries has boosted energy demand of the region. The region is home to 649 million people - to nearly one-in-ten of the world's total population (Table 1).

Table 1. Population of ASEAN Countries (2018)

Country	Total population	Annual population growth
	thousand	Percent
Brunei Darussalam	442,4	3,0
Cambodia	15.981,8	1,7
Indonesia	265.015,3	1,2
Lao PDR	6.887,1	2,0
Malaysia	32.385,0	1,1
Myanmar	53.625,0	0,4

Philippines	106.598,6	1,6
Singapore	5.638,7	0,5
Thailand	67.831,6	0,3
Viet Nam	94.666,0	1,1
ASEAN	649.071,5	1,1

Source: ASEAN, <https://data.aseanstats.org/indicator/AST.STC.TBL.1>, 2020.

Economic growth raised the standard of living in ASEAN with nominal GDP per capita averaging at US\$4,021 in 2016 for the ten current ASEAN Member States, while in 1967 the five founding member states had an average nominal GDP per capita of just US\$122.

Table 2. GDP per capita in ASEAN (US\$)

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Brunei Darussalam	44.560,5	41.521,3	31.385,0	27.435,5	28.432,7	30.644,6
Cambodia	1.052,2	1.122,6	1.190,9	1.257,1	1.402,4	1.541,4
Indonesia	3.636,0	3.527,0	3.347,0	3.598,1	3.871,1	3.930,2
Lao PDR	1.799,4	1.949,5	2.221,2	2.400,4	2.510,5	2.627,5
Malaysia	10.662,7	10.989,0	9.603,1	9.441,9	10.041,0	11.067,2
Myanmar	1.208,6	1.275,8	1.140,0	1.221,4	1.248,8	1.440,8
Philippines	2.737,4	2.852,5	2.880,1	2.950,5	2.991,7	3.214,8
Singapore	56.967,3	57.562,5	55.646,2	56.724,3	60.306,0	64.567,3
Thailand	6.301,0	6.078,9	5.973,9	6.113,3	6.736,9	7.445,8
Viet Nam	1.907,5	2.052,5	2.111,3	2.216,3	2.389,6	2.546,2
ASEAN	4.088,6	4.085,8	3.914,9	4.066,8	4.337,9	4.601,0

Source: ASEAN, <https://data.aseanstats.org/indicator/AST.STC.TBL.7>, 2020.

The forecasts on growing energy demand due to the increasing population and trade, investments to upgrade the power generation capacity and to develop an infrastructure will be needed to fulfill ASEAN's energy demand, which has grown by 60% over the past 15 years (Liu et al., 2019) and made ASEAN net importer (IEA, 2019).

As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, ASEAN's main goal is "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region ... for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations" (ASEAN, 1967). Considering that the secure energy supply is closely related to achievement of the afore-mentioned target, political will exists for energy cooperation between member states in parallel with the establishment of ASEAN itself. A continuous political desire paves the way forward for energy infrastructure integration as a necessity of energy cooperation. ASEAN's energy policies are founded upon a number of various engagements, policy declarations and summit deals, trying to balance three challenging factors rightly - energy security, environmental sustainability and economic competitiveness (Velautham, 2015).

The first common initiative was the establishment of the ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE) in 1975 after the oil crisis of 1973 to keep secure petroleum supply of ASEAN region by collaboration amongst members and with external stakeholders. The Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities/Authorities (HAPUA) of 1981 has been launched to provide electricity interconnection. The ASEAN Energy Cooperation Agreement of 1986 covered a wide range of cooperation goals among member countries, drawing a legal framework of action programme of 1990 for enhanced cooperation on all types of energy sources and institutional areas.

The ASEAN Vision 2020 called member states to interconnect an electricity and natural gas within region realizing the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) projects in 1997. The Hanoi Plan of Action (1998) aimed to push the ASEAN states for early realization of the interconnection infrastructures. While the AEC Blueprint has a programme for the APG and TAGP only, member states manifested a political will on comprehensive and detailed regional energy cooperation with ASEAN Plan of Action on Energy Cooperation (APAEC) of 1999, 2004, 2010 and 2015, reiterating the implementation of an integrated ASEAN energy network, consisting of the APG and TAGP. To improve energy infrastructure networks in the region is also one of the initiatives of the AEC created in 2015. Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2010 and Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 decisively determine the energy cooperation as a key element of the region's enhanced integration and improved infrastructure based on a win-win principle.

Two key project areas - the APG and TAGP and the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) can be considered as the concrete outcomes of a continuous political will towards energy cooperation among ASEAN members.

ACE forms the institutional pillar of energy cooperation among the ASEAN countries that coordinate the implementation of intergovernmental energy policies,

integration of regional infrastructure, challenges on legal and regulatory frameworks. It is also responsible for international dialogues of the ASEAN on energy issues.

On the other hand, the APG and the TAGP projects envisaged the creation of a transnational energy network linking ASEAN's major energy demanders. This includes action to facilitate investment in fuel and power supply and infrastructure, focusing on efficiency as well.

The plan is to implement the APG with three Southeast Asian grids – Eastern, Northern, and Southern connections. As a result of completion of many electricity projects within these three regions and providing bilateral interconnectivity in several member states, the level of electricity security in ASEAN geography increases significantly (Wisuttisak 2019: 38-39). Aiming to develop an integrated cross-regional gas and LNG grid by 2020, 13 bilateral pipeline connections have been established within TAGP project, governed by the bilateral agreements between the member states.

IEA forecasts that Southeast Asia's overall energy demand will grow by 60% to 2040 (IEA, 2019). It is obvious that the ASEAN members should manifest stronger political will focusing on concrete outcomes in energy cooperation to meet the envisaged energy needs in parallel with the block's ambitious growth goals. However, energy cooperation between ASEAN countries still faces some socio-political, legal and regulatory, economic, technical and environmental barriers (Shi et al., 2019) in spite of their endeavors for a long time. For the CIMB ASEAN Research Institute, all these challenges that limit the robust energy cooperation are a result of "mismatch between political ambitions and the capacities, capabilities and...the political will of several member states to walk the talk" (CARI 2013: 8). However, Jones (2016) argued that the lack of national capitalist elites, dominance of state - controlled economic systems and protection of politically important enterprises by the historically emerged socio-political powers weaken the legal enforcement of integration and institutionalisation of the ASEAN economic cooperation and hence the energy cooperation.

On the other hand, the ASEAN region is geographically diverse which creates difficulties in physical connectivity. Secondly, while Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, and Cambodia are the energy importers, Indonesia, Laos, and Myanmar are the major energy exporters. A level of development diverge the domestic interests of the member states. Considering that energy infrastructures need a huge amount of private investment, close public-private sector cooperation is unavoidable for the ambitious targets of the ASEAN countries and it requires a functional and attractive coordination of political will. Some ASEAN member countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - developed domestic financial funds, programs and schemes that make energy efficiency projects more attractive and profitable for private investors. Some member states have succeeded to gain the support from international financial sources also. Continuance and sustainability of an investing system by the private sector is the main determinant that should be taken into account. The lack of harmonization of legal regulations, technical standards and weak institutional con-

nectivity can be explained with the principle of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference among ASEAN states.

While the above mentioned facts shape the energy policies and priorities of the ASEAN member states and draw the dimensions of energy cooperation between them, it is essential to demonstrate such a political will than can produce concrete results to meet the envisaged huge energy demand in the near future.

3.2. The European Union


The EU is one of the world's major trading economies, operating as a single market with its 27 member states and hosting 445 million people. The Union's GDP was estimated to be 18.768 trillion US\$ in 2018 (The World Bank, 2020), representing approximately 22 percent of the global economy. Representing the most of the world's developed countries; the EU is highly dependent on imports of fossil energy resources. The lack of fossil energy resources on one hand and the high demand for them on the other hand creates serious challenges for the EU's energy security. As it is shown in Table 3, a high proportion of the EU imports are concentrated among relatively few external partners and that poses an energy security risk.

Table 3. EU Energy Imports by Partners 2017 (%)

Partner Country	Crude oil	Partner Country	Solid fuel
Russia	30.3	Russia	38.8
Norway	11.4	Colombia	16.7
Iraq	8.2	USA	16.5
Kazakhstan	7.4	Australia	11.6
Saudi Arabia	6.6	South Africa	4.8
Nigeria	6.4	Others	11.6
Libya	5.2	Partner Country	Natural gas
Azerbaijan	4.5	Russia	39.8
Algeria	2.7	Norway	26.2
Mexico	2.1	Algeria	10.7
Angola	1.0	Qatar	5.2
Others	14.2	Others	18.1

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>, 2020.

The dependency rates (Graphic 1) show the degree to which a member state relies upon imports in order to meet its energy demands. The 55 percent of energy needs of the EU economies in 2017 were met by net imports. This dependency rate was more than half of the Union's total energy demands.

Graphic 1. EU Energy Dependency by Member States (%)

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>, 2020.

Due to its higher dependence on foreign suppliers, energy is one of the prioritized issues for the EU. The Union has been founded on energy issues years ago and fundamentals of the integration have been constructed on the principle of common sharing of production of key energy resources, strongly supported by the political will of state parties. Completing the post-war reconstruction period, the member states entered a rapid development stage and energy demands increased in parallel with their economic growth. The energy cooperation at EU level has failed to succeed into a coherent com-

mon policy (Poiana, 2017). During these years energy cooperation was missing from the top agenda of the member states who met their needs without any problems from suppliers until the oil embargoes in 1973-1974. Thus, a political coordination of energy issues within the EU appeared during the first oil crisis. However, it was a reaction to an external event rather than a common strategy (Aydin, 2015) based on official documents and green papers mostly. In the mentioned period a legal and economic framework of energy cooperation on the EU level mainly focused on liberalization of electricity and gas markets that resulted in a number of national markets with bilateral connections (Helm, 2004). The most remarkable initiative in the field of multilateral energy cooperation was the Energy Charter Treaty, which entered into force in 1998. The Charter is unique under international law and is designed to promote energy security through the operation of more open and competitive energy markets, while respecting the principles of sustainable development and sovereignty over energy resources. An inter-governmental organisation - the Energy Charter Conference was also established, which meets on a regular basis to discuss issues affecting energy cooperation.

The 2006 and 2009 crises with Russia - its biggest supplier - were the breaking point of the insufficiency of the EU's energy attempts made until that time. Additionally, the emergence of new competitors, such as China and India, and rising demand for energy in the global markets revealed the lack of energy cooperation among member states. In 2014 the Union started to make a new attempt towards the energy cooperation on the EU level, launching the European Energy Security Strategy. The European Commission explained this delay in energy cooperation by not facing any disruption in energy supply since the oil crises, describing the 2006 and 2009 natural gas crises as a "stark wake up call for a common energy strategy" (European Commission, 2014). Based on an achievement of secure, competitive, and sustainable energy, the strategy set out areas of energy cooperation in eight headings, such as diversification of suppliers, the establishment of common regulations, increasing production of renewable energy, development of new energy technologies and improvement of infrastructures. Establishment of the Energy Union has been defined as the final goal of the strategy, emphasizing the importance of a more united approach for energy cooperation and underlining the interdependence of member states.

As a result of shortfalls in supplies from Russia and increasing trend in consumption of natural gas, the EU was successfully able to promote the development of the Southern Gas Corridor coming from Azerbaijan and to attract LNG flows from several countries - mainly from U.S.A., Qatar, Russia, Nigeria and Algeria. It can be considered that the coincidence of geopolitical parameters and market interests played an important role in the background of the political will in the realization of these projects.

On the other hand, the EU faces difficult times because of the dealing with hard consequences of a financial crisis of 2008, the Brexit, refugee crisis and similar issues. The outbreak of COVID-19 is the EU's one of the biggest tests since its foundation.

Due to the successive crises the EU cannot focus adequately on energy coopera-

tion, enforcing member states to act more individually.

Thus, the energy cooperation is still a serious challenge for the EU economies to meet the growing energy demand as they strongly depend on energy imports. The different national energy priorities of 27 member states shaping on West-East axis mostly contradict with the Energy Union's aim of acting together. West-East axis's components - geographic location, the level of economic development, living standards, income levels, financial sources, natural resources, technical and infrastructure opportunities, political relations with main suppliers and involvement of private sector determine the positions of member states on common European initiatives for energy cooperation. For example, while some member states accept the European Energy Security Strategy's ambitious goals, motivated by environmental issues and economic interests, some of them are interested in security of supply. The dependency of the European internal energy market on cross-border commercial relations motivated by geopolitical factors can be considered the most complicated dimension of the EU's targets for energy solidarity. The EU is able to succeed in the goals of secure, competitive, and sustainable energy alone. The multifaceted characteristics of energy cooperation as well as energy itself require the involvement and solidarity of all shareholders and partners.

Conclusion

Energy cooperation is and will continue to be a key determinant of regional integrations, motivated by political, economic, geographical, environmental and technological factors. There is a vital need to harmonise a wide range of energy issues within blocks in order to achieve the targets that aim to benefit member states from integration.

Sharing the first ranks in world economic listing, the EU and ASEAN represent two different successful regional integration models. While some EU countries are ranked as developed economies, some ASEAN countries are among the fast developing economies of the world. Both are among the world's largest and most dynamic markets with their population of more than 1 billion in total. Needing to cooperate in energy issues closely among their members, due to the increasing demand, common element is the reason policy makers of the two blocks have been intensifying their efforts to ensure a secure, affordable and sustainable energy supply in different paths. An existence of a deeper economic integration mechanism in the EU enforces the states to consolidate their individual interests at a supranational level. Contrary to that, acting from the fundamental working principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty, ASEAN countries are more independent in their decision-making processes in accordance with their own political capacity to influence. However, it is difficult to consolidate the national interests in both cases and to make decisions with concrete outcomes. The EU countries are lacking of fossil energy resources, whereas some of the ASEAN members are net energy exporters. While this fact enforces the EU and its members to act considering geopolitical factors in energy cooperation, the ASEAN states approach has a more economic perspective.

The EU is a sui generis entity succeeded in too many areas of a supranational integration. Moreover, the Union is established on energy cooperation. In that respect, ASEAN member states can be considered more successful in energy cooperation.

Consequently, both the EU and ASEAN are projects motivated by particular political and social dynamics. While political will is essential for energy cooperation within these blocks, the achievement of desired outcomes depends on the ability and capability of forces behind the political will.

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THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE USA DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND MILITARY

Eylül KABAKÇI GÜNAY¹

Abstract: *The COVID-19 outbreak originated from a cluster of suspected pneumonia cases that flared up in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province. The outbreak, which was not taken seriously when it first appeared, has changed its center and the USA has become the country where the most cases, close to 1.5 million², are seen today.*

This study examines the effects of the virus on the American defense industry. According to authorities, American Defense Industry is negatively affected by the slowdown of supply chains. However, it should be noted that this negative impact will not be long-term because America is the country with the highest defense spending in the world and the largest arms export country. In 2019, the arms exports of the United States accounted for 36% of the world arms export, which is by 15 points higher than its closest rival, Russia.

The conclusions of study indicate that the American defense industry and military power are expected to lose temporary power; but it is possible that the corona virus will nurture nationalism and increase investments in the defense industry in the long run. However, there is another conclusion that sheds some light on the manner the federal budget is distributed in the United States. It is expected that the national defense, which has a significant amount from the Federal budget for possible terrorist attacks and transoceanic operations, will decrease its share from the budget and will be directed towards social security, medicaid and medicare areas.

Key Words: *Military Expenses, COVID-19, Defense Industry, Nationalism*

Introduction

American defense industry is the one of the most powerful defense industries of the world. According to a research made by *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (the SIPRI), 48 of the top 100 defense industry companies in the world were American companies in 2018. The weapon sales made by these companies, which constitute most of the American defense industry, made up 59.76% of the arms sales in the world in 2018.³

In addition, the five largest spenders in 2019 were the USA, China, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, Germany and France, together accounting for more than 60 percent of global military spending.

¹ Assistant Profesor at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at *İzmir Demokrasi University*, Turkey

² Worldometer, <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> Access Date:12.05.2020

³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/1912_fs_top_100_2018.pdf

Table 1: Share of World Military Expenditure of the 15 States with the Highest Military Expenditure, 2019

Countries	%
USA	38
Other countries	19
China*	14
India	3.7
Russia	3.4
Saudi Arabia*	3.2
Germany	2.6
France	2.6
United Kingdom	2.5
Japan	2.5
South Korea	2.3
Brazil	1.4
Italy	1.4
Australia	1.4
Canada	1.2

Source: SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, Access Date: 12.05.2020

Table 1 shows the share of world military expenditure of the 15 states with the highest military expenditures. Accordingly, the United States takes the first place, other countries take the second place and China takes the third place. India and Russia take the 4th and 5th place. The high level of American military spending is due to the policies and defense system implemented by the Department of Defense.

The US Department of Defense (DoD)

One of the important actors of the American defense industry is the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD provides the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States. Aligned with the new National Security and National Defense Strategies, the Budget expands the military's competitive space. The Budget is very important for protecting the homeland, promoting American prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence. The Budget requests \$686 billion for DoD, an \$80 billion or 13-percent increase from the 2017 enacted level. This includes \$597 billion for the base budget, and \$89 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations.⁴ In 2019, the USA increased its military spending for the first time in seven years to reach \$718,6 billion constant 2018 prices.

⁴ "An American Budget, Fiscal Year 2019", <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf>

As an employer, the U.S. Department of Defense is the nation's largest employer. It has over 1.4 million active duty personnel and 1.1 million reservists. It also employs 861,000 civilians. There are 450,000 employees stationed overseas in 163 countries. Additional 3 million Americans receive income from the DoD. There are also 1.1 million people serving in the National Guard and Reserve forces, and two million veterans and their families. One of the Department of Defense's duties is to provide military power when necessary. It is also in charge of a multi-billion-dollar global supply chain.⁵

Being a Global Player of Arms Production and Trade

The most important factor that determines the power of American defense industry is the weapons it produces and the market value of the products of these companies. According to Table 1, the top 5 firms in the world which are defense contractors and arms producers are American, and according to the calculations,⁶ the amount of arms produced by these companies accounts for 25% of the amount of arms produced by manufacturers all over the world. In this regard, the American Defense Industry holds a very strong place in the world.

Table 2: The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies In The World (Excluding China), 2017-2018.

Rank (2018)	Rank (2017)	Company	Country	Arms Sales (2018)	Arms Sales (2017)	Total Sales (2018)	Arms Sales as a % of total sales (2018)
1	1	Lockheed Martin Corp.	United States	47260	43880	53762	88
2	2	Boeing	United States	29150	26930	101126	29
3	3	Northrop Grumman Corp.	United States	26190	22370	30095	87
4	4	Raytheon	United States	23440	22040	27058	87
5	6	General Dynamics Corp.	United States	22000	19500	36193	61

Source: SIPRI, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> Access Date: 12.05.2020

Table 2 shows that Lockheed Martin Corp. holds the majority of arms production, followed by Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics Corp.

The business sectors of these corporations are as follows:

⁵ Department of Defense and Its Effect on the Economy <https://www.thebalance.com/departments-of-defense-what-it-does-and-its-impact-3305982>

⁶ The Calculation is made by the author through the rest of the same table.

Lockheed Martin Corp. is one of the largest companies in the aerospace, defense, security, and technologies industry. It topped the [list of US federal government contractors](#) and received nearly 10% of the funds paid out by the [Pentagon](#).⁷ It operates in four business segments: Aeronautics, Missiles and Fire Control (MFC), Rotary and Mission Systems (RMS), and Space⁸

Boeing is organized into three business units: Commercial Airplanes; Defense, Space & Security.⁹

Northrop Grumman Corp. operates in four business segments: Aerospace Systems, Mission Systems, Technology service and Innovation systems.¹⁰

Raytheon operates in aircraft engines, avionics, aerostructures, cybersecurity, missiles, air defense systems, and drones.¹¹

General Dynamics Corp. operates in two business segments: aerospace and defense. In addition, the well known F-16 belongs to the company with an initial order of 650 and a total order of 1,388. The F-16 has also won contracts worldwide.¹²

The United States is the world's largest defense industry exporter thanks to this production power. Although Chinese companies are not included in the ranking on the basis of arms producing companies (Table 2), China is also included in the ranking when looking at the main importer and exporter countries in major arms. However, the US is undeniably the leader with 36%. (Table 3)

Table 3: The Main Exporters and Importers of Major Arms, 2019

Exporter			Global Share	Importer			Global Share
1		USA	36	1		Saudi Arabia	12
2		Russia	21	2		India	9.5
3		France	6.8	3		Egypt	5.1
4		Germany	6.4	4		Australia	4.6
5		China	5.2	5		Algeria	4.4
6		UK	4.2	6		China	4.2
7		Spain	3.2	7		UAE	3.7
8		Israel	3.1	8		Iraq	3.7
9		Italy	2.3	9		South Korea	3.1
10		Netherlands	2.1	10		Vietnam	2.9

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2019, <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2019>

Looking at the Table 3, it is clear that the United States is the largest arms exporter in the world. The largest arms importer country in the world is Saudi Arabia. Russia comes after America in arms exports. Russia is followed by France in the third

⁷ https://www.fpd.gov/downloads/top_requests/Top_100_Contractors_Report_Fiscal_Year_2013.xls

⁸ <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/index.html>

⁹ <https://www.boeing.com/>


¹⁰ <https://www.northropgrumman.com/>

¹¹ <https://www.rtx.com/>

¹² <https://www.gd.com/>

place. In terms of size, there is more than 5 times difference between the main arms exported between France and the USA.

Graph 1: The USA's Military Expenditure, 1949-2019 (Million \$, 2018 Constant Prices)



Source: SIPRI, 2019 <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> Access Date: 08.05.2020


Graph 1 shows the fluctuations that occur in America's military expenditures. Especially after the Cold War, military expenditure decreased considerably. However, the increasing military expenditures after the 9 / 11 attacks were also reflected in America's budget. When Graph 1 and Table 3 are evaluated together, it is evident that the 9/11 attacks increased the rate of defense spending as part of US public spending.

The US Federal Budget and Defense Expenditures

There are 12 categories of expenditures in the federal budget, but two types of spending. The first is mandatory spending, the other is discretionary spending. Each expenditure category falls under the headline of mandatory or discretionary. These expenditures are (1) social security, (2) national defense, (3) income security, (4) Medicare, (5) health, (6) net interest on debt, (7) education/training/employment & social services, (8) transportation, (9) veterans' benefits, (10) administration of justice, (11) natural resources & the environment, (12) other.

Defense expenditure falls under discretionary spending. Discretionary spending means that lawmakers control it through annual appropriations acts. National defense is the top title of defense expenditure. Discretionary Spending is the portion of the budget that the President requests and Congress appropriates every year. It constitutes less than one-third of the total federal budget, while mandatory spending accounts for around two-thirds.

Figure:1 The Federal Budget Allocation, 2019



Source: <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/56324-CBO-2019-budget-infographic.pdf> Access Date: 09.05.2020

Figure 1 shows the allocation of the federal budget based on mandatory and discretionary spending for 2020 federal budget. In Figure 2, non-defense and defense spending are categorized as discretionary, whereas social security, medicare, mediaid and others are categorized as mandatory spending.


Table 4: The USA's Military expenditure (% of GDP)

Years	%	Years	%	Years	%	Years	%
1990	5,27832	1998	3,017625	2006	3,81958	2014	3,480897
1991	4,57218	1999	2,908401	2007	3,853906	2015	3,271831
1992	4,666264	2000	2,93344	2008	4,221692	2016	3,207892
1993	4,326937	2001	2,944343	2009	4,627103	2017	3,10901
1994	3,941279	2002	3,249549	2010	4,657001	2018	3,162865
1995	3,63847	2003	3,607286	2011	4,576704	2019	3,4
1996	3,350744	2004	3,785571	2012	4,227818		
1997	3,209909	2005	3,861065	2013	3,811199		

Source: World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/> Access Date: 12.05.2020

Table 4 shows the USA's military expenditure over years. According to the given data we can see there was a decline, especially after the Cold War era. But after 2008 financial crisis, there has been an increase of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This is due to the decrease of GDP and the retention of the same amount of military expenditure. The latest data shows 3.4% at 2019.

Graph 2: Defense Expenditure as a Share of GDP and Equipment Expenditure as a Share of Defense Expenditure, 2019.



Source: NATO, The USA Defense Expenditures, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191129_pr-2019-123-en.pdf Access Date: 11.05.2020

Graph 2 shows NATO members countries' defense expenditure as a share of GDP and equipment expenditure as a share of defense expenditure for 2019. NATO had agreed that each member country should invest at least 2 percent of its GDP into its military. The United States spends more than double the amount on defense than all other members combined. As we can see, the USA has the further position which is equal to nearly 3.4 % defense expenditure as % of GDP.

Fundamentally, what we attempt to explain with military expenditure is very essential. SIPRI military expenditure data are based on the NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civilian personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons.¹³

Global COVID-19 Pandemic and Effects on the USA's Defense Industry and Military

News agencies reported cases of many unknown pneumonia patients at a seafood market in Wuhan, China in Hubei province in late December 2019. The World Health Organization (WHO) first announced on January 12, 2020 that the cause of these complaints was a new coronavirus (2019-nCoV).

On 30 January 2020, WHO accepted Covid-19 as an international public health problem and declared it an epidemic. On February 11, 2020, the epidemic was called the "Covid-19" pandemic. Exactly a month later, on 11 March 2020, the COVID-19 epidemic was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization.¹⁴ As the outbreak COVID-19 became more global, it began to affect all areas.

Another reason for Covid-19 to have such a serious impact all over the world is that the world is unprepared for its occurrence. We can say that the world is unprepared for an infectious disease of this scale, because even the 2020 Global Risk Report published by World Economic Forum stated no possibility of an epidemic neither among the short-term nor long-term risks. The Report is prepared based on the Global Risk Perception Survey. The Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS) is the World Economic Forum's

¹³ World Bank Databank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS> Access Date: 11.05.2020

¹⁴ World Health Organization, <https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19> Access Date: 09.05.2020

source of original risks data, harnessing the expertise of the Forum's extensive network of business, government, civil society and thought leaders. The survey was conducted from 5 September to 22 October 2019 among the World Economic Forum's multistakeholder communities (including the Global Shapers Community), the professional networks of its Advisory Board, and members of the Institute of Risk Management. The results of the GRPS are used to create the Global Risks Landscape and Interconnections Map presented at the beginning of the report, and to offer insights used throughout (The WEF,2019:88).

The report states that the projected effect of infectious diseases has the lowest impact and risk for humanity. However, this was not true. The entire world faced an unpredictable hazard. Table 5 displays the Top 10 risks by likelihood and impact in the long-term and short-term over the next 10 years according to multistakeholders.

Table 5: Global Risks Perception and Expectations, 2020

Long Term	Likelihood	Impact	Short term	Risks	% of respondents who think a risk will increase in 2020 compared to 2019
1	Extreme Weather	Climate Action Failure	1	Economics Confrontation	78.5%
2	Climate Action Failure	Weapons of mass destruction	2	Domestic Political Polarization	78.4%
3	Natural Disaster	Biodiversity loss	3	Extreme Heat waves	77.1%
4	Biodiversity Loss	Extreme Weather	4	Destruction of natural ecosystems	76.2%
5	Human Made environmental Disasters	Water Crisis	5	Cyber attacks: Infrastructure	76.1%
6	Data Fraud, theft	Information Infrastructure breakdown	6	Protectionism on Trade	76%
7	Cyber attacks	Natural disasters	7	Populist and nativist agendas	75.7%
8	Water Crisis	Cyber attacks	8	Cyber attacks	75%
9	Global Governance Failure	Human Made environmental Disasters	9	Recession in major economy	72.8
10	Asset Bubble	Infectious diseases	10	Uncontrolled Fires	%70.7

Source: WEF The Global Risk Report,2020. <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020> Access Date: 15.05.2020

Table 5 shows that in the survey conducted by the World Economic Forum to determine the perception of risk, the respondents do not have predictions that such a pandemic would occur in the world. The respondents listed infectious diseases as the 10th condition that may have the most harmful effect on the world in the long term.

In this regard, the survey results of the survey conducted by the World Economic Forum reveal what the world had a risk expectation before the pandemic and according to this understanding, the greatest risks that await the world may occur in issues related to climate change, armed conflicts and cyber-attacks. Hence, given the indicated risk perceptions, it is not a surprise that policymakers give high priority to defense expenditure in an attempt to avoid the anticipated risks.

Precautions in the Struggle with COVID-19

As we know, New York is the national epicenter of the outbreak. The American authorities are worried about this novel coronavirus creating devastating results, especially deaths.

Table 6: Death Toll Comparison between Possible Coronavirus Deaths and the US History's Most Deadly Wars

World War II	291,557
COVID-19 Pandemic	100,000-240,000** (Estimated) ¹
Vietnam War	47,434
Korean War	33,739
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars	5,669
9/11 Attacks	2,977

Source: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2020/04/coronavirus-death-toll-vietnam-war-cvd/> Access Date: 12.05.2020

Table 6 shows the comparison between deaths caused by COVID-19 and the US history's most deadly wars. Estimates show that deaths from COVID-19 in America may approach the number of American deaths in World War II.

The number of deaths from coronavirus has exceeded the number of persons who died in the Vietnam War, in the Korean War, in the Afghanistan and Iraq War, and in the 9/11 attacks. Another important issue is the time. An estimated 47,434 American soldiers were killed in battle during the Vietnam War, which spanned from 1964 to 1975, within 11 years, but today's death tolls is about 90.000 according to "Worldometer"¹⁵ and the USA has reached this point in just a few months.

As a precaution due to the increasing number of cases, President Trump signed a

¹⁵ Worldometer, <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> Access date: 15.05.2020

historic 2 tn \$ stimulus package on 27th March 2020, designed by Legislation to shield the economy and relieve workers and businesses which are affected by COVID-19 virus and outbreak. This stimulus package will help to fulfill drained state funds and expand support to the healthcare system.

The package is the largest economic aid measure in US recent history. There are eight different areas to use these funds:

1. Check Rebates (301 billion \$)
2. Unemployment Insurance (250 billion \$)
3. Small Business Loans (349 billion \$)
4. Corporate Aid (500 billion \$)
5. Tax Benefit (221 billion \$)
6. Airline Wages (32 billion \$)
7. State Government (150 billion \$)
8. Supplemental Spending (340 billion \$)¹⁶

Indicators of Covid-19 Effects on Defense Industry and Military

Trade-Flow Restrictions

The supply shocks are the most visible effects of the epidemics on the defense sector. Companies are the victims of the virus. The US defense industry operates as critical infrastructure, but production has slowed with workers on leave. The Department of Defense keeps buying and is accelerating payments, but deferring delivery. According to DoD (Department of Defense), they still have a strong demand from their customers. In fact, DoD is trying to accelerate its demand in many ways. DoD continues to buy and issue contracts on a regular basis. Yet, DoD's efforts to accelerate payments while important, may not be enough by itself to support that aspect of the supply chain.

As the manufacturer companies produce not only for the Defense Department, but also for other institutions, the DoD is not the only customer of these suppliers. The failure of other customers to demand goods may cause the supplier companies to terminate their activities. Thus, Ellen Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, said "We believe there will be a three-month impact that we can see right now. So, we are looking at schedule delays and inefficiencies and so forth. That isn't a particular program, that's Major Defense Acquisition Program in general."¹⁷

As a consequence of this situation, the employment level reduction will lead to delays and increased costs. 106 contractors out of 10509 for defense industry have

¹⁶ Wall Street Journal, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-payments-from-the-government-11585229988> access date: 11.05.2020

¹⁷ Defence News, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/04/20/pentagon-bracing-for-three-month-slowdown-on-major-defense-equipment/> Access date: 11.05.2020

closed, but 68 companies were reopened. Defense industry is working during the COVID-19 pandemic, although there is a slowdown. However, the most essential part is the spillover impact from the commercial supply chain which is strictly interlinked with many defense supply chains.

The disruption in Trade Flow has several dimensions:

1. Containers Piling up at Marine Terminals
2. Distribution Warehouses Full or Closed
3. Flow of Containers Disrupted

Products may be produced even on a regular schedule, but the supply chain is not flowing the way that it normally would. Because of the sudden stop in the supply chain, the flow of trade can be completely affected.

In addition, ongoing travel restrictions are mostly being applied to medical equipment and travel restrictions to people, but they disrupt the flow, and countries are starting to adopt increased and additional number of trade restrictions that could have an impact on certain parts of the defense supply chain.¹⁸

Another indicator that COVID-19 will have some critical effects on defense industry and production capacity is the NDIA survey, released on April 23, 2020. Namely, the National Defense Industrial Association is America's leading defense industry association promoting national security. NDIA provides a legal and ethical forum for exchange of information between the industry and the government on national security issues.

The answers provided by workers from the sector reveal the possible effects and expectations regarding COVID-19. The key results of the survey are:

- Respondents expect the COVID-19 crisis to have the greatest impact on their revenue expectations, followed closely by their ability to perform on a contract and their access to capital.
- The technology and services sectors responded that they have been much more impacted by this crisis than the manufacturing sector.
- Smaller businesses were much more impacted than larger businesses.
- Cuts to billable hours, delayed payments from prime contractors and government customers are cited as reasons for the disruptions in cash flow.
- 51% of small businesses have experienced a disruption in their ability to perform on a contract as a result of a shelter-in-place order related to the COVID-19 outbreak.

¹⁸ Center for Strategies and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/podcasts/take-directed/coronavirus-crisis-update-shared-threats> Access Date: 11.05.2020

- 60% of the respondents expect to have long-term financial and cash-flow issues because of this crisis.¹⁹

Finally, the last we can say when the health system needs assistance, the Defense Department would be there (Figure 2). The USA has a lot of examples in support of this claim. COVID-19 Response of DoD is really supportive and relieves the overloading system.

Figure 2: Sites Where the US Defense Department Serves for COVID-19



Coronavirus/

Types of the afore-stated support:

61,900 DoD personnel in support COVID-19 operations; 4400 medical personnel; 45.000 air and army national guardsmen activated in all 50 states; 5100 navy, air force, and army reservists supporting COVID-19 response; 2 US navy hospital ships; 2000 ventilators approved for hospitals; Defense support of civil authorities by the Secretary of Defense; 20mn masks provided to Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA); 66 DoD labs performing certified clinical COVID-19 testing; 1.1m \$ in laboratory and diagnostic supplies.

¹⁹ National Defense Industrial Association, <https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/ndia/policy/documents/covid-19-small-business-impacts-survey-summary.ashx> Access Date : 13.05.2020

Conclusions

Countries that have designed their defense against global terrorism and internal security threats have spent hundreds of billions of dollars. The global military spending reached 1.8 trillion \$ in 2018. In February 2020, US President Donald Trump approved the 2020 defense budget of 738 billion \$, the highest amount allocated to the Department of Defense in the country's history. However, the enemy came not from where the world giants suspected, but from a virus that did not appear even in the The Global Risks Report 2020 and caused deep wounds that have not occurred since the WWII.

As stated in the text, the number of deaths expected to occur due to coronavirus in the United States will be more than the number of deaths in most wars. This is an indication of how seriously this virus should be considered in America. It can be said that the USA was caught off guard against such a pandemic, as the rest of the world. This grave situation faced in the United States is also partly a blame of the Government that does not cover the health expenditures of the citizens. While this is the case, it would be appropriate to expect a change in the primary spending areas of the United States. It can be expected that the United States will focus on areas such as health services, social assistance and solidarity funds, molecular biology and genetics instead of the defense industry in the budget. Hence, one of the possible developments expected after the pandemic is the increasing probability of transferring more resources to the prevention of contagious diseases, biomedical, molecular biology and genetics, especially in developed countries.

At the same time, this virus has changed the attitude of countries' obsession with each other in a global way and showed how problems seen locally can become global rapidly. For this reason, this virus, called the "Chinese virus" by Trump, was transported thousands of kilometers outside China, where it originated, in a few months, showing how global the core of locally identified problems can be. In this context, the attitude that attaches great importance to the defense industries in protecting the countries' own border security and interests in global conflicts is doomed to change henceforward. A transnational perspective should be created and the discourse of maximizing universal interests should be developed rather than maximizing individual interests.

In the United States, lowering defense budgets and delaying the supply of some major projects may be on the agenda for the next few years.

Another result of this study is the expectation that the impact of globalization will decrease, and nation states and nationalism will strengthen as a result of the epidemic. It is also a strong assumption that the indirect effect of this situation will strengthen defense and security policies, and that defense budgets, which are likely to decrease in the short term, will grow even more in the medium and long term compared to the past, along with political changes.

In conclusion, comparing the budget allocated to defense expenditures with the budget allocated to health expenditures is another issue. Accordingly, our study focused on how the need for the defense industry will be shaped in the world after the

pandemic and it is evident that a new world order will be created in which the classical defense concept will change, and the infrastructure owned by the defense industry can be used for health services.

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MIGRATION TRIGGERING THE YOUTH BRAIN DRAIN

Vlora A. ELSHANI¹

Abstract: *The migration² of highly skilled and educated people is becoming a key hindrance to the wider socio-economic development in the Balkans, mainly in the post-conflict/ex-communist countries like North Macedonia and Kosovo. Affected by both internal and external migration of residents, the migration of the youth, in specific, represents a concern in both countries, given its latest trends caused by employment or education purposes abroad. The management of the brain drain issue and also the movement from rural to urban areas within the country requires ongoing efforts with relevant mechanisms, in order to diminish the phenomenon and minimize inequalities. The article summarizes the facts aiming to contribute to the identification of the aspects concerning the migration and loss of human capital, as well as to provide conclusions by comparing approaches for facilitating the mismatch between the demand in the labour market and vocational education of youth in their way forward, reducing ultimately the brain drain and rural-urban migration in both countries.*

Key words: *migration, triggers, management, brain drain*

Introduction

The governmental policy makers and implementers have not aligned functional mechanisms with integration of evidence-based policies (strategy and action plans), to easily mitigate the impact of the brain drain³ with the emphasis on the youth and integrating the diaspora. North Macedonia and Kosovo have undertaken vast efforts over the last decade to adjust their migration legislation and practice to that of the EU, transposing and implementing numerous pieces of EU migration legislation – from the asylum and migration *acquis communautaire*. This represents a huge challenge, because the *acquis communautaire* requires not just legislative transposition, but also changes in terms of migration policies, administrative capacity, and provision of information, public participation and also investments in protection measures. Although legislative alignment has continued, the implementation is different from one state to another and it stands not just in this area, but in general with the implementation of legislation,

¹ The Author is a PhD student at the School for Doctoral Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, International Relations and Conflict Management, “Ss. Cyril and Methodius University” in Skopje

² Migration - the movement of people from one place to another that implicates a range of reasons, affected by socio-economic, social, demographic, political and security spheres of countries of origin and destination, for various purposes, such as: employment purposes, family reasons, education and similar, but also for political reasons and fleeing conflict areas.

³ Brain drain - the loss of many highly skilled and educated people from one country to another country. Retrieved from: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org>

due to either lack of budget or the specific mechanisms in place to address migration as a whole. At the level of integration processes, both countries continue displaying progress depending on their level of integration mechanisms – Kosovo remains far from joining the EU and North Macedonia has undertaken steps forward. Only recently, during the Covid 19 pandemic, the EU, with its lesson learnt, has invited the countries of North Macedonia and Albania to start negotiations. The freedom of movement for Kosovo is becoming a burden issue, since its citizens still need visas to move freely in the EU Schengen states. The high unemployment rate and low economic progress are creating further misbalance in the context of the demographic picture of the country, especially in the case of Kosovo, as well as unpredictable migration flow that may intensify further and become an alarming issue for both countries. In this context, North Macedonia, given the latest situation with opened discussions for negotiations, is being positioned in a more advantaged situation in terms of accessing the development programmes for the country. However, this does not mean that migration, as a trend, in particular for the youth, will no longer represent an issue. On the contrary, from this perspective, it requires systematic management with all relevant structures and creating employment opportunities for the youth.

North Macedonia –facts

The country of North Macedonia⁴ is in the Balkan Peninsula in Southeast Europe. It is one of the successor states of Yugoslavia, from which it declared independence in September 1991 under the name Republic of Macedonia. A landlocked country, North Macedonia has borders with Kosovo to the northwest, Serbia to the northeast, Bulgaria to the east, Greece to the south, and Albania to the west. The capital and largest city, Skopje, is home to roughly a quarter of the nation's 2.06 million inhabitants.⁵ According to the available data at Migration Policy Institute, the majority of the residents are ethnic Macedonians with 64.2%, Albanians 25.2%, Turks 3.9%, Romani 2.7%, Serbs 1.8%, other 2.2%.

The Republic of Macedonia is the first country that signed SAA and the first country in which SAA entered into force on 1 April 2004.⁶ North Macedonia has also put in place the National Programme for Adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire*⁷ (NPAA), defining the dynamic adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire*, strategic guide-

⁴ Regarding the country name dispute for Macedonia, agreement was reached between the Greek Prime Minister Alexi Tsipras and the Macedonian counterpart Zoran Zaev, on 12 June 2018, whereby the name “Republic of North Macedonia” was adopted. A referendum was held in Macedonia on 30 September 2018, with voters overwhelmingly affirming their support for EU and NATO membership by accepting the agreement, albeit with low voter turnout. After the agreement was ratified by both sides, it entered into force on 12 February 2019. Since then, the Republic of Macedonia is the Republic of North Macedonia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macedonia_naming_dispute

⁵ Facts about North Macedonia retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Macedonia.

⁶ The SAA (Stabilization Association Agreement) with North Macedonia, accessible at: <http://www.sep.gov.mk/en/content/?id=17#.XeZn2ZNKjIU>

⁷ *Acquis communautaire* - sometimes called the EU *acquis* and often shortened to *acquis*, is the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law. The term is French: *acquis* meaning “that which has been acquired or obtained”, and *communautaire* meaning “of the community”. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis_communautaire

lines, policies, reforms, structures, resources and deadlines to be realised by the state to fulfil the requirements for European Union membership.⁸ By October 2019, the EU failed to open the accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania and the resolution adopted by European Parliament clearly stresses it was a strategic mistake that both countries meet the requirements to start negotiations and yet they did not start. By the end of March 2020, a political decision was made to start the accession negotiations with North Macedonia and also Albania.⁹

Based on the Skills Mismatch Measurement Report in 2017, the labour market in North Macedonia is characterised by relatively low activity and employment rates and high unemployment. In 2017, 65.3% of the working-age population aged 15 to 64 were active in the labour market and the low activity rate was mainly a result of low female activity with a high gender gap of 26.7 % points. 22.5% of the labour force (aged 15–64) was unemployed, and although unemployment is continuously declining (from 34% a decade ago), it is still very high. Young workers have a high chance of being unemployed, but with no large gender difference in unemployment.¹⁰

Despite the poor economic situation, the labour market shows further improvement with declining unemployment and increasing employment rates. The unemployment rate (21.9% in Q1 2018) was high, especially among vulnerable citizens. The employment rate in this period increased slightly to 50.9%, up from 50.1% during the same period in the previous year.¹¹ Still, the numbers represent a concern considering the interest of young population seeking education and job opportunities abroad. Further, the rural-urban migration is also caused by employment factors which most often determine the migration flow. In 2018, the migration applications of North Macedonia population (first time asylum) to the EU was 3,325, which compared to 4, 255 applications in 2017 shows a decrease by 930 (Western Balkans Migration to the EU, 2019, p. 35). According to the studies, the key problems in North Macedonia relating to the youth position in the labour market analysis are: insufficient quality of educational outcomes; irrelevancy of educational outcomes in terms of labour market needs; a still-weak relationship between industry and working environment; career orientation is not yet integrated into secondary school curricula.¹²

As presented in the analysis (Babanoski K. p. 2), North Macedonia is a country where brain drain represents a significant issue and is becoming a serious problem for the future. It has a huge impact on the high- skilled labour migration out of the country.

⁸ The NPAA (National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire), accessible at: <http://www.sep.gov.mk/en/content/?id=13#.XeZonJNKjIU>

⁹ Decision of the EC on 25 March 2020, retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/press-corner/detail/en/IP_20_519

¹⁰ European Training Foundation, *Skills mismatch measurement in North Macedonia* https://www.etf.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2019-07/Skills%20mismatch%20measurement_North%20Macedonia.pdf p.12.

¹¹ Ibid.,8.

¹² Marija T. L., at al., *Youth Study North Macedonia 2018/2019*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 57.

The overall character of the high-skilled labour emigration (tertiary educated persons) follows the brain drain form. It is reaching significant levels and is not compensated by the 'feedback' effects of remittances, technology transfer, investments or trade.¹³ It is also concerning that as part of a youth study (Latkovic et al. 2013), 1.065 young persons between the ages of 15 to 29 were surveyed, and over half of the youth in North Macedonia (52.8%) reported their intent to leave the home country. The dominant motivations included a better living standard, better employment possibilities or better educational prospects.

In the conclusions of the study (Youth Study Macedonia 2013) related to the attitudes of the youth regarding their social status, it is obvious that nearly a third of the young people in North Macedonia prefers to move to another city in the country for better living standards, employment, better higher education, wider opportunities and diverse cultural events. The internal migration is mainly directed towards Skopje, the capital city as the place with the greatest employment opportunities, entertainment and cultural events. Young high school graduates express greatest aspirations for migration from the country. Young Macedonians have a greater desire to emigrate, in comparison to young Albanians. The rural youth prefers to migrate to other places within the country, whereas young people from urban areas - outside the country. Each young man from Macedonia who considers living abroad has no other reason than financial. The most preferred destination for living is Western Europe, whereas the second is the United States and/or Canada.¹⁴

Aligning with the Acquis in migration


Referring to the EC North Macedonia 2019 Report, the country continues to play an active and constructive role in the management of mixed migration flows, cooperates effectively with EU Member States and neighbouring countries and has made considerable efforts to ensure basic living conditions and services for all migrants staying in the country. Moreover, the report emphasizes that there are still uncertainties on the scope and structure of migration flows, inconsistent registration of migrants apprehended in irregular movements that prevents regular and adequate protection-sensitive profiling, as well as referral to national protection mechanisms. It applauds the effective control at the southern border, including with the deployment of guest officers from EU Member States at the border and the initiation of the European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement with the EU.

¹³ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Regional Dialogue SEE, Berlin, Maribor, Skopje, *Transition?, Political Challenges and Perspectives for Young People in South East Europe, Results of Representative Surveys in Eight Countries*, 2015, p. 42.

¹⁴ Marija T. L., at al., *Youth Study Macedonia*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Skopje, 2013, p. 66-67.

Migration trends and disparities

Referring to the State Statistical Office in North Macedonia, Macedonian emigration can be roughly classified into two groups: permanent family emigration, followed by brain-drain and temporary economic emigration. Besides these two groups, considerable numbers of citizens are also leaving the country illegally seeking asylum in EU countries. With the visa-liberalization in 2010, the number of Macedonian citizens seeking refuge and protection in EU countries has increased by more than 600%, where the majority are Albanians from North Macedonia. The Macedonian diaspora mainly consists of emigrants in the developed countries, such as: the United States, Australia, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and Canada (see Graph 1 below). Although Macedonians were predominant in emigration, the trend of migration for ethnic Albanians is on a constant rise. Moreover, the demand in the Western Europe labour markets has affected the increase in the number of migration of the youth and women with main purpose of employment.



Graph 1. (Source: State Statistical Office)

The demographic composition of the population in North Macedonia and the migration trends became a concern and were affected after the interventions in neighbouring Kosovo in 1999, when a large number of Albanians from Kosovo came as refugees to North Macedonia. Years later, with the independence of Kosovo, North Macedonia faced internal political tensions and inequalities that elevated the possibility for ethnic conflict. As a result, the number of emigrations increased since then and the trend is still active, albeit certain drops occurred the last year.

In North Macedonia in 2019, the urban areas participated with 31.6% of the natural increase, while rural areas participated with 68.4%. Vardar, East, Southwest, Southeast and Pelagonia regions show a negative natural increase. The data on internal migration within the same regions show that the dominant form of migration was from rural to urban areas with 37.0%. Rural-urban migration at the regional level was highest in the last year at 51.0%, while the Polog Region is characterised by inter-rural migration, making up 55.1% of the total migration in the region. The external net migration was highest in the Skopje Region, while lowest in the Vardar region (Theme: Population-MAKSTAT 27/06/2019).

The 2018 EC Progress Report on North Macedonia states that the quality of education continues to be a challenge at all levels. The 2015 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) assessment ranks the country fourth from the bottom of the list of over 70 tested countries, whereas on vocational training and adult education (VET), 113 new occupational profiles and 69 new standards for Qualifications are settled and adopted to bring them closer to the labour market needs with higher level of practical work and involvement of employers in education and training. Emphasis is placed on students with disabilities and from Roma communities.¹⁵

Considering the Europe 2020 Strategy that obliges states to reduce poverty and social exclusion by at least 20 million people by 2020, the state of North Macedonia has accelerated its efforts to reduce unemployment¹⁶ with specific programmatic approaches and tools undertaken with various active labour market measures that are initiated by the Ministry of Education as part of the National Strategy through Vocational Educational training centres in various occupations – becoming a roadmap towards labour market schemes related to on-job training for self-employment programmes and subsidised employment schemes. There is a significant mismatch between the supplied and demanded skills on the labour market, which entails the need for further assessment and analysis for creating a short-term labour market programme. Hence, the positioning into the labour market schemes for potential youth labour force remains a concern as it is not at the desirable level and is less attractive for the youth in rural areas. Moreover, it does not reduce their movement to urban areas mainly for employment purposes.

¹⁵ European Commission, North Macedonia 2019 Report. Accessible at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-north-macedonia-report.pdf> p.78.

¹⁶ According to State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia: Unemployment Rate dropped to 17.50 % in June 2019, from the previously reported number of 17.80 % in March 2019. North Macedonia's Unemployment Rate is updated quarterly, available from March 2004 to June 2019, with an average rate of 31.20 %. The data reached an all-time high of 38.70 % in March 2005 and a record low of 17.50 % in June 2019.

Kosovo – facts

Kosovo is also a landlocked state situated in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula in the southeast part of Europe, bordered by Serbia to the north and east, with North Macedonia to the southeast, Albania to the southwest and Montenegro to the west. It declared Independence in close coordination with the International Community on February 14, 2008. With the last census in 2011 (boycotted by local Serbs) in the Republic of Kosovo, it has a permanent population of over 1,800,000 residents. Within this number, Albanians account for around 95% of the total population, whereas the minorities include Serbs, Turks, Bosnians, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians.¹⁷

Kosovo population is known as immigrant population due to various politico-economic circumstances in the past. According to KAS Population Assessment of 2018, the causes of emigration in Kosovo are driven by various factors, but dominantly by family reunification (46%), socioeconomic factors (35%), without ignoring the political factor and better education. In its history of migration, the number of emigrants of Kosovo origin (1969-2011) is estimated to be about 703,978 people, whereas in 2017 it was estimated to be about 833,739 (net migration stock) people. Most of them live in Germany (39%), Switzerland (23%), Italy (7%), Austria (7%) and Sweden (7%) and 17% in other countries. Since 2017, a noteworthy number of residents changed their place of residence (municipality mainly) from rural settlements to urban and sub-urban areas for various reasons. The number of persons who have changed their place of residence from the previous municipality (from one municipality to another - within Kosovo) is estimated to be 9,376 inhabitants.¹⁸ The war in Kosovo led to mass emigration in Europe and other countries between March and June 1999. An estimated 850,000 refugees fled into neighbouring Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro, causing regional instability.¹⁹ After the declaration of Independence, Kosovo faced irregular emigration in 2014 and 2015 towards EU countries.

By February 2015, there were at least 1,400 Kosovars at the border between Serbia and Hungary, while in the first months of 2015, 42,000 Kosovars applied for asylum in the EU. In 2015, there were 122,657 Kosovar migrants in Europe – legally or otherwise. In 2018, this number reached 9,175, demonstrating that after a period perceived to introduce “open borders”, the people attempting to leave the country were more focused on legal means, such as temporary visas, work and study.²⁰ In 2016, more than 21,000 Kosovars acquired legal residence in EU countries. As for illegal immigration, 141,330 Kosovar citizens were reported to have entered the EU

¹⁷ Facts about Kosovo, accessible at: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo>

¹⁸ KAS -Estimation, Kosovo Population in 2017, accessible at: <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/4174/estimation-kosovo-population-2017.pdf>

¹⁹ Besim Gollopeni., *Kosovar Emigration: Causes, Losses and Benefits*, University of Mitrovica “Isa Boletini” Prishtina.

²⁰ Retrieved from: <https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/2019-escape-from-the-Balkans>

illegally. These figures do not include legal migrants, such as those whose residence is covered by work permits, states the reports. Furthermore, Kosovo became a country of asylum seekers and migrants in the last years.²¹ Recently, with the earthquake crisis of November 26, 2019 in Albania, Kosovo has become a country of destination for people affected by the crisis whose destination is the south region/Prizren area. The improvised collective centres provide food and shelter for these people (VOA news, Earthquake – 30.11. 2019).

The last EC Report on Kosovo in 2019 indicates that the education system yet does not respond sufficiently to the labour market needs, with high enrolment rates in primary (96%) and secondary (88.1%) education. The work on vocational education reform is still at an early stage, focusing mainly on analysing the current situation in vocational education training (VET) schools.²² The Vocational Education in Kosovo comprises 64 VET schools (out of which six are Centres of Competence) which are part of the formal education system, and 14 Vocational Training Centres (8 regional VTCs and 6 Mobile Centres), which provide short-term modular trainings for active job-seekers.²³

The challenge to strengthening the quality and relevance of education programmes and the link between education and the labour market as a precondition for employability and economic development has been present in Kosovo for many years. This challenge became stronger when the OECD-led PISA tests published in December 2016 highlighted that Kosovo has one of the worst education system of the world and they generated a public reflection, putting the improvement of the overall quality of education among the issues perceived of utmost priority by the population. Immediately, the Kosovo Education and Strategic Plan 2017-2021 (KESP 2017-2021) was approved that foresees the orientation and linking of education system with labour market needs.²⁴

Aiming to contribute to the general indicators of social exclusion and targets for addressing the root causes of the inequalities, under the Europe 2020 Strategy, which obliges states to reduce poverty and social exclusion by at least 20 million people by 2020, Kosovo has undertaken steps and is implementing the Active Labour Market Programme, tackling the unemployment of youth at Institutional level in coordination with implementing partners, donors and agencies. Considering that a high percentage of population in Kosovo is young, this issue requires advanced commitment and co-ordination of all actors to address it. In this context, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, through the Employment Agencies and Vocational Training Centres, are im-

²¹ Ibid

²² European Commission, Kosovo 2019 Report. p.50. Accessible at: <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-kosovo-report.pdf>

²³ European Commission, INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE (IPA II) 2014-2020, *KOSOVO* EU Support for Aligning Education and training with labour market*. p.5.

²⁴ European Commission, INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE (IPA II) 2014-2020, *KOSOVO* EU Support for Aligning Education and training with labour market*.

plementing labour market schemes for the youth and long-term unemployed people and are focusing their efforts to create labour potential for the youth for easy employment within and outside the country. In this regard, MoUs have been signed between the MLSW and the German Government, aiming to improve education and professional dual training services (i.e. construction).²⁵ Kosovo is part of various labour migration policies with Germany without any specification of professions or skill levels that correspond to Kosovo's labour market needs. As such, occupations such as forestry and fishing, finances and insurance and agriculture are among the professions that have excessive unemployment rates with a low chance of employment in Kosovo in the near future (GAP Institute, 2020). Likewise, the youth that moves from rural to urban areas in Kosovo is another concerning fact since agriculture activities for the youth and rural tourism attraction works are not being promoted nor considerably supported at the required level. The vocational education in specific tourism and agriculture sectors in rural areas is missing, consequently not being promoted and implemented. This further implicates the fact that these young people and adults residing abroad for education purposes are being prepared and are seeking jobs outside the country, whereas in the area of brain gain as part of non-vocational education, no significant efforts are implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Diaspora and other relevant Ministries, including the Ministry of Education, to influence the return young people and their contribution in their country of origin by inclusion of remittances and investments of the diaspora.

Mirrored efforts with the *acquis*

The Stability Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo – entered into force on 01 April 2016.²⁶ On 01 July 2018 the Commission confirmed that Kosovo has fulfilled all outstanding visa liberalisation benchmarks, however, the decision on Commission's proposal is nowadays pending in the EP and the Council. Therefore, the migration management in Kosovo is influenced by two processes – that of visa liberalization with the EU and the agenda for integration into the EU. According to the European Commission report 2019, the legal framework is largely in line with the *acquis*, however, a number of administrative instructions are still awaiting approval. The adoption of a new 2019-2023 Strategy and Action Plan on Migration is pending and there is a need to improve the exchange of information and inter-institutional coordination. Kosovo is facing various challenges arising from the increased number of asylum seekers, migrant smuggling and trafficking, increase of emigration, migration management, etc. It is affected by migration either as a country of origin, transit and, in certain cases, as a country of destination. It is emphasized that there are mechanisms in place for readmission, reintegration of readmitted persons, improved border


²⁵ Available at: <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/66634.html>

²⁶ SAA on migration issues for Kosovo is related to Article 85 on Visa, Border/boundary Management, Asylum and Migration, Article 86 on Legal Migration, Article 87 on Prevention and Control of Illegal Immigration and Article 88 on Readmission.

control mechanisms and prevention of irregular migration and fight against migrant smuggling.

Migration trends and disparities

Given the fact that Kosovo's almost 60% of population is young, the migration trends are an alarming issue since they involve the younger population (18 – 35).²⁷ The main reasons the young are seeking to leave the country are mainly due to the lack of employment opportunities in the country and the limited possibilities to integrate easily in the labour market schemes. It is concerning that the education in Kosovo has been suffering from creating series of graduated young professionals not fully matched with the needs-employment schemes and sectors. In 2015 (see Graph 2), Kosovo faced vast emigration towards EU countries and this is considered as the major brain drain in the last decades, together with medical personnel that is leaving the country for employment purposes, particularly to Germany.



Graph 2 (Source: EUROSTAT)

Although the National Development Strategy 2016-2021 refers to the Chapter on human capital development and the ability to acquire skills through migration, or brain

²⁷ According to tradingeconomics.com/Agency of Statistics in Kosovo, the unemployment Rate in Kosovo decreased to 25.30 percent in the second quarter of 2019 from 26.90 percent in the first quarter of 2019. The Unemployment Rate in Kosovo averaged 35.39 percent from 2001 until 2019, reaching an all-time high of 57 percent in the fourth quarter of 2001 and a record low of 25.30 percent in the second quarter of 2019.

gain from the diaspora, the measures and the Action Plan to achieve this is not sufficiently robust and remains a concern. In relation to internal migration, especially related to the movement of citizens and the youth, in particular from rural to urban areas, it is evident that there are not clearly implemented programmes that can engage the human capital into socio-economic activities and the vocational education is lacking specific occupations that would impact the decline of such movement. The youth from the rural areas faces difficulties in their access to the programmes they could apply for in their zones of living, compared to the ones in the urban areas. The youth from the rural areas are not offered equal opportunities to access vocational programmes, whereas from a gender perspective, the drop-outs by young girls coming from these areas are on a higher level, given their early marriages or their motivation to move to urban areas and even leave the country.

Conclusions

The poverty and unemployment rates continue to make migration an attractive option for many people, especially for the younger generations. In North Macedonia for almost half of the young population, the main reason to migrate is to improve their standard of living and get a decent job.

At this point, the Kosovo example is a more alarming case as it has a higher level of young residents that are seeking to complete higher education and get employment in the EU and overseas. Considering this situation and comparing it with other SEE states, Kosovo has the highest emigration rates; one of every four households in Kosovo has at least one member living outside the country.

While in the case of North Macedonia, the freedom of movement is not an issue anymore and the country has advanced to the level of opening the negotiation talks with the EU, the limited freedom of movement for Kosovars in the Schengen Zone implicates further illegal migration flow. As Kosovo citizens are still not free to travel, consequently, they are unequal with other southeast European citizens and are isolated. Comparing the population age in both countries, Kosovo's population has double the young generation compared to North Macedonia, and even less job opportunities. This means that the youth in Kosovo has higher tendencies for migration compared to North Macedonia related to education and employment purposes.

The current situation with education requires the authorities in North Macedonia and Kosovo to assess the education programmes and further enhance vocational education to address the mismatch of demands and needs in the labour market, in particular those fulfilling the gaps related to rural – urban migration. The comprehensively reviewed programmes would be considered essential if gender and minority component are not included as cross-cutting constituents, but a priority and a proportion for equal access to education and decent employability for the NEET²⁸ category.

²⁸ NEET- not in education, employment, or training: used by the government to describe a young person who is no longer in school and does not have a job or is not training to do a job. Retrieved from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/neet>

Both countries, drawing on their lessons learnt, are good potential for initiating a platform to support the decline of disparities for the youth by improving their access to vocational education and practicing skills through integration of gender and minority components, specifically within the employment and education programmes/schemes in the sectors of tourism, agriculture and rural development. The impact on loss/profit of the brain for both countries affects the brain drain and impacts development, causing a loss of long-term investment. Therefore, migration becomes the only option to overcome the difficulty for employment by impacting the state demographic changes, in terms of number of population, gender, age, ethnic structure, educational level, etc.

The rural-urban migration affects the depopulation of rural areas directly influencing the economic development. Furthermore, migration outside the country is the key factor for the decreased fertility rate and hence the decline of population in both Kosovo and North Macedonia. In both countries, and particularly in Kosovo, the strategic plan for remittances and diaspora investments needs to be promoted as a stimulator for the brain gain.

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WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL OF IMPLEMENTING THE ENERGY MANAGEMENT CONCEPT IN MILITARY ORGANISATIONS?

Maja MITEVSKA¹
Drago PETRESKI²

Abstract: *The military domain is not an exception in terms of energy demand as well as its dependency on energy and conventional energy sources despite all technological advancements. Nowadays, maintaining high energy resilience in parallel with achieving strategic objectives in the defense sector requires having access to, and exploiting, appropriate knowledge, tools, and techniques to translate the high-level requirements into action at an operational and tactical level. As per the transition towards a more sustainable energy future, a systematic approach for facilitation should be adopted. Through the application of recognized standards such as ISO 50001 Energy Management Systems, Ministries of Defense (MODs) can establish a set of required mechanisms in a structured format that will smooth the transition process. The MODs are the key decision-makers for these organizations and they are the first that need to demonstrate commitment to the process of implementation of the energy management system. To present its commitment and support, the MOD shall define, establish, implement and maintain an energy policy and emphasize the necessity for the reduction of energy consumption.*

Keywords: *energy management, energy conservation, military organizations*

Introduction

The world's population is constantly rising resulting in increased production and consumption of goods and services, greater demand for land, energy and materials and intensified usage of available resources. All of this leads to negative implications on the environment such as climate change, air, water, and land pollution and additionally to nonrenewable resource depletion, making the countries vulnerable to energy shortages and food scarcity. In parallel with the population growth, the demand for energy is going upward daily, becoming one of the most important concerns of modern civilization. The need for energy savings and the requirements for rational use of energy initiate the emerging of numerous international and national legislation and directives that aim to end the tendency of uncontrolled energy consumption and increase the level of energy efficiency. This necessity also imposes a continual search for more

¹ Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" – Skopje, Republic of North Macedonia

² Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" – Skopje, Republic of North Macedonia

efficient ways to reduce energy consumption and consequently decrease the energy costs and enable preserving the environment.

The military domain is not an exception in terms of the energy demand as well as its dependency on energy and conventional energy sources despite all technological advancements. In parallel to the changing characteristics of warfare, energy demands have been intensified with the developments in electronics with new capabilities and alongside the individual level, military bases and facilities have also become more energy-dependent. All security systems, lightings, communication devices, military vehicles and other equipment used on a daily bases are completely dependent on energy. Consequently, it can be assumed that the absence of continual energy flow makes military forces vulnerable. Beyond advancing technologies and equipment, the type and nature of warfare and energy demand have been transforming considerably due to social, economic and political change both on national and global levels. Therefore, the defense sector should recognize the need for reducing its demand for installation energy through capital investments in energy efficiency and conservation projects to increase savings and provide a sustainable and cost-efficient supply of energy.

Nowadays, maintaining high energy resilience in parallel with achieving strategic objectives in the defense sector requires having access to, and exploiting, appropriate knowledge, tools, and techniques to translate the high-level requirements into action at an operational and tactical level. As per the transition towards a more sustainable energy future, a systematic approach for facilitation should be adopted. Through the application of recognized standards such as ISO 50001 Energy Management Systems, Ministries of Defense (MODs) can establish a set of required mechanisms in a structured format that will smooth the transition process. This includes establishing policies for each consumption area, ensuring commitment from senior management, and ensuring appropriate monitoring, recording, and data analysis tools in place to understand where efforts should be focused and where the greatest return on investment can be achieved. This needs to be underpinned by a proper management system audit regime that will provide the basis for continual improvement in the implementation process and will offer systematic approach for improved decision-making.

In this paper, the emphasis is on the potential of implementing the Energy Management System (EnMS) in military organizations. The opportunities for implementing the EnMS are recognized in five consumption areas: administrative buildings and military facilities, street lighting within military areas, transport, waste collection and disposal, and water and wastewater treatment. Considering the complexity of each of these consumption areas this paper discusses only the administrative buildings and military facilities. The facilitation of the process of Energy Management implementation is accomplished in line with the international standard for Energy Management Systems - ISO 50001. The foundation of the standard is in the Deming's Plan – Do – Check – Act (PDCA) Cycle and according to this framework for continual improvement, the herein presented energy management concept can be modified to be appropriate for future application in different consumption areas.

Energy management in military originations

European Defense Agency

In order to improve the defense capabilities of the participating Member States, the European Defense Agency (EDA) pursues effective and output-oriented European

cooperation. Through the updated Capability Development Plan (CDP), approved by the Steering Board in March 2011, EDA provides the framework for addressing capability priorities and for guiding the definition of capability requirements that could be met through collaborative projects and programs among the Member States. The Energy program within the CDP aims to improve the safety and mobility of deployed troops thereby increasing their combat effectiveness while decreasing consumption and therefore energy dependency. Identified as a critical operational capability, the CDP Fuel & Energy priority goal is to provide a deeper understanding of the consequences of implementing renewable energy sources in the military domain. The objective is to provide operations with power, water and ensure recovery of waste via developing a standardized deployable, self-sufficient energy system architecture that incorporates advanced technologies.

The EDA, in March 2012, initiated the GO GREEN project that aims at supporting the increase of energy efficiency and use of alternative energy sources for faster, cleaner and more sustainable ways to meet the energy demand of European armed forces. With the intention of supporting the implementation of the GO GREEN project and the wider strategic approach to energy, the European Commission has identified an initial set of financial tools available for the Member States. Till 2015, EDA in continuity worked closely with the Commission on organizing the Consultation Forum on sustainable energy in the defense and security sector. The objectives of the forum are to facilitate the implementation of specific energy legislation (with a focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy) and identify potential challenges and solutions with Ministries of Defense. In the context of addressing challenges with regards to energy efficiency, the Agency in October 2015 successfully installed the Smart Energy Camp Demonstrator to analyze the benefits of integrating new technologies into traditional power grids for deployed camps.

NATO

The financial and logistical challenges to sustain NATO deployments from the aspect of energy dependency, and the risks to operations when the energy supply chain is disrupted, have demonstrated the necessity to significantly improve energy efficiency and operational resiliency for the military. In combination with personnel security risks and the opportunity to enhance positive relations with the local population, these challenges have led many nations to evaluate their energy use. Especially, optimal use of operational energy has become a major issue for a number of Allied and partner nations.

Beginning with the Lisbon Summit Declaration of 2010, the themes of Energy and Environmental Protection (EP) have been part of the subsequent declarations in Chicago (2012) and the Wales declaration (2014). NATO has recognized the benefits of reducing the energy, environmental and logistic footprint of its infrastructure, both

domestically and during the conduct of NATO operations.

Following the Chicago Summit Declaration, in October 2012 the Smart Energy Team (SENT) to nations was established, a project that was funded for two years under NATO's Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. SENT represented an interdisciplinary ad-hoc group of experts from various relevant fields assigned to generate cross-cutting knowledge and contribute to the integration of smart energy into the medium and long term NATO Defense Planning Process through integrating smart energy into Smart Defense. Based on the observations, discussions, and conclusions, Smart Energy Team (SENT) recommended for NATO to develop a strategy on smart energy, with supporting road maps, by establishing four lines of effort as presented in .



Figure 1 - Smart Energy Strategy³

The instability in oil prices, water scarcity, unstable weather conditions, and climate change effects are recognized as important factors that in near future will have a major impact on military operations and contribute to an increase in global tensions. To deal with climate migration, energy resource conflicts, and extreme weather disaster response, the US Army launched a Net Zero Installation initiative with the main goal to implement a holistic way of addressing their energy, water, and waste at all US Army installations. The Net Zero Energy concept () is in line with and supports the goals and objectives established within the NATO Strategic Concept. Therefore, if accepted and implemented by all member nations of the Alliance it will demonstrate results regarding cost benefits, energy security and reduced logistic and environmental footprint.

³ Source: (Smart Energy Team (SENT), 2015)




Figure 2 - Net Zero Energy concept⁴

The International Standard for Energy Management Systems – ISO 50001

The term energy management means different things for different entities. For instance, in a Guide for Energy Management, this term is defined as: “Energy management is the judicious and effective use of energy to maximize profits (minimize costs) and enhance competitive positions”⁵. Another definition stated by an energy management association is “Energy management is the strategy of adjusting and optimizing energy, using systems and procedures so as to reduce energy requirements per unit of output while holding constant or reducing total costs of producing the output from these systems”.

In 2009, the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) jointly published Europe’s first unified energy management system EN16001. Afterward, in 2011 the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) released an international standard for energy management titled “ISO 50001 Energy Management Systems Standard”, where the energy management

⁴ Source: (Goodsite & Juhola, 2016)

⁵ (Capehart, Turner, & Kennedy, 2006)

system is defined as: “a set of interrelated or interacting elements to establish an energy policy and energy objectives, and processes and procedures to achieve those objectives”.⁶

This international standard ISO 50001 was published in 2011 by the International Standard Organization (ISO). Firstly it was aimed at the industry, but shortly after its publishing, it was widely accepted in the commercial and public sectors. Generally, this standard is created to be applicable to all types and sizes of organizations, including industrial plants, commercial, institutional and governmental facilities, regardless of geographical, cultural and social conditions. It establishes a framework for the creation of systems and processes that are necessary to improve energy performance that will later lead to reduced greenhouse gas emissions, other related environmental impacts and energy costs.

The international standard ISO 50001 is based on a continual improvement framework called PCDA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) and incorporates energy management into daily organizational practices, as shown in .

According to the standard, the PDCA approach can be outlined as the following:

Plan: conduct the energy review and establish the baseline, energy performance indicators (EnPIs), objectives, targets and action plans necessary to deliver results that will improve energy performance in accordance with the organization’s energy policy;

Do: implement the energy management action plans;

Check: monitor and measure processes and the key characteristics of operations that determine energy performance against the energy policy and objectives, and report the results;

Act: take actions to continually improve energy performance and EnMS.

⁶ (International Organisation for Standardization, 2011)




Figure 3 - Energy management system model for ISO50001⁷

Implementing the energy management concept in military organizations

Energy Management as a concept was primarily created for the industry, intended for industrial plants and facilities, and the commercial sector. Since the public sector was recognized as a significant energy consumer this concept is accepted and implemented by the public administration, giving them the role of promoter of energy saving. The adoption of an energy management system by the Military organizations enables them to increase energy efficiency, reduce the total amount of energy consumption and therefore decrease the annual energy costs.

The inclusion of the energy management concept in the military organizations, as part of the public sector, derives from the fact that the military forces are significant energy consumers. Considering that for instance, in World War II, energy consumption was only 1 gal per day per soldier, whereas in 1991, this figure quadrupled by reaching 4 gals per day per soldier, pointing to the need for reduction of the energy consumption as immanent. The energy management concept should be in line with the national legislation and regulations as well as the determined national targets.

In practice the implementation of an effective energy management system, which will lead to sustainable energy consumption, can be done generally in five consumption

⁷ Source: (International Organisation for Standardization, 2011)

areas under the jurisdiction of the military organizations, as follows:

- Administrative buildings and military facilities;
- Street lighting within military areas;
- Transport;
- Waste collection and disposal;
- Water and wastewater treatment.

The facilitation of the process of Energy Management implementation can be accomplished in line with the international standard for Energy Management Systems - ISO 50001. The foundation of the standard is in the Deming's Plan – Do – Check – Act (PDCA) Cycle and according to this framework for continual improvement, the energy management concept can be tailored to be appropriate for a particular military organization.

The concept requires the creation of an enabling environment for its implementation and constant commitment from the key decision-makers towards increasing energy efficiency in the administrative buildings and decreasing the total energy requirements in those buildings.

The MODs are the key decision-makers for these organizations and they are the first that need to demonstrate commitment to the process of implementation of the energy management system. To present its commitment and support, the MOD shall define, establish, implement and maintain an energy policy and emphasize the necessity for the reduction of energy consumption. Further in the process of implementation, they can interpret their commitment through ensuring that energy objectives and targets are established, assessing if the energy performance indicators are appropriate for the administrative buildings and military facilities, considering the energy performance in the long – term planning and most importantly conducting a management review at a previously defined interval.

A management representative, selected by the MOD, plays a key role in the implementation process. The implementation of the energy system and the activities regarding it are planned and directed by the management representative. The MOD gives him the required authority and the needed resources for conducting the implementation tasks and therefore he or she is required to report to them on the performance of the energy management system and generally on the energy performance of the public buildings.

The management representative shall ensure that every person related to the improvement in the energy performance of the buildings is aware of their role, their responsibilities and the level of authority they have to support the energy management system.

The energy management team's responsibilities are to identify the technical and behavioral opportunities for improvement in all activities, ensure that the implementation of the energy management decisions takes action and to assess the financial viability of the system. The technical representatives should be responsible for collecting the energy consumption data from the buildings and delivering this data to the responsible person for data analysis.

Plan

The amount of consumption for each energy consumer can be assessed using two different approaches. Firstly there can be installed energy sub-meters on all significant energy users and then with the data provided from these meters the consumption of each user can be quantified. The other approach is estimating the energy user's consumption using different types of methodologies depending on the type of user considered.

Since the energy review is conducted to reveal the potential for energy performance improvement, the Energy Conservation Opportunities are identified in the final step of the review. Those opportunities are usually in the form of recommended measures that can be implemented in the future. For providing consistency of the Energy Conservation Opportunities list each measure needs to be specifically defined, starting with how it will contribute to energy performance improvement, how much it will cost, what are the expected savings, when is planned to be implemented, who is responsible for its implementation and etc.?

The energy baseline is established in order to serve as a starting point for monitoring and measuring energy performance improvements. Based on the EnMS's scope energy baseline should be ascertained. The energy baseline is necessary to be adjusted in cases when the energy performance indicators no longer reflect the organizational energy use, once there are changes in the processes, operations patterns or energy systems and if the energy baseline is predetermined to be maintained and recorded.

The aim of identifying relevant Energy Performance Indicators is to enable the management to periodically assess the energy performance of the system against the expected targets. The energy performance indicators usually measure energy use and its efficiency per unit of performance. The energy performance index represents a benchmarking indicator that can be used to assess the energy-saving potentials comparing the energy consumed by the considered building with the energy consumption of another similar building, applying the best technological solutions available on the national market. Using this indicator, in the future, the administrative buildings or military facilities can be compared with other buildings in the same organization, across the country or even in the wider region.

The establishment of objectives and targets requires ongoing communication directed either bottom-up or top-down in the management chain, including discussions and informal meetings for identifying issues and exchanging ideas and thoughts. The defined objectives need to be specific and consistent with the previously defined energy policy and they usually tend to be long term. On the other hand, the targets are necessary to be formulated according to the SMART criteria. Nevertheless, the action plans are created to serve as a description for achieving the established objectives and targets containing items about what measure is doing to be implemented, who will be

responsible for its implementation and when is planned to be implemented. A starting point for the formation of the action plan should be used as the energy conservation opportunities list which derives from the conducted energy review. After the establishment of the action plan, it needs to be formally approved by the MODs.

Do:

The identified energy conservation measures presented in the action plan are implemented in this phase. The implementation steps be performed in line with the requirements imposed by the ISO 50001 standard is necessary for the regular implementation of the EnMS. In previously defined intervals the management representative should check the progress of the action plan items and determine if they are performed as expected.

The MOD, the energy management team, the employees and the soldiers need to be aware of their roles and responsibilities regarding the energy performance improvements. Firstly, the members of the energy management team should have general training about the energy management concept, the international standard ISO 50001 and its requirements and secondly, they should be trained on the operating procedures that impact their activities and directly on the energy performance. For instance, the technical staff should follow the established procedures for collecting data and their appropriate documentation and update.

The established energy policy and the approved action plan should be available to all employees and soldiers. The MOD has to provide appropriate training, separately for the employees and the soldiers, where they will be presented the benefits of the energy savings and their responsibilities towards achieving those improvements. Those trainings are crucial in raising awareness among the building users since most of the no cost or the so-called “housekeeping” measures are related to their behavior. The technical personnel working on the building maintenance is necessary to have additional training in order to quickly respond to possible malfunctions of the energy management system in the building.

In order to achieve the targeted energy-saving rates, the energy users need to be operated and maintained properly. Firstly the critical operational parameters should be determined. In this case, the minimum (or maximum) temperature inside the building, the minimum or maximum air humidity level and the minimum amount of water needed can be considered as a critical parameter. The energy users have to be operated according to the critical parameters hence it will provide energy-efficient performance and also pleasant working environment. The heating system and the other equipment within the building should be maintained on a regular basis in previously determined intervals to avoid an increase in energy consumption.

Check:

The starting point in this phase is the definition of a measurement plan. This plan should cover what is going to be measured and monitored, the intervals when the monitoring and measurement are going to be done and who is responsible for conducting the afore-stated. Usually, the key attributes that indicate energy performance improvements and need to be monitored and measured are the following:

- Energy performance indicators;
- Effectiveness of the action plans in achieving objectives and targets;
- Effectiveness of the operation control.

An internal audit serves as a self – assessment tool to check, if the EnMS works appropriately.

Act:

In this phase, the top management actually confirms its commitment to the implemented EnMS conducting a management review. The general requirements for the appropriate inputs and outputs in this review, in compliance with ISO 50001, can serve as a guideline when collecting and reviewing the documentation. The review should reveal the barriers in the planning and implementation process and then they should be considered as opportunities for improvement in the next cycle.

Results and discussion

The implementation of the EnMS in the public sector, especially within the military organizations, can bring new challenges for the authorities. The military organizations, as public bodies, should have a role as a promoter of energy efficiency and energy conservation through implementing several technical and behavioral measures important for increasing energy savings. But energy management as a concept requires the establishment of a more systematic way of planning and implementing the measures. Accepting the PDCA cycle and creating an EnMS in line with ISO 50001 can be helpful in achieving energy performance improvements. Creating energy policies for every consumption area, raising awareness among the employees and soldiers and training them appropriately can have a significant impact on energy conservation. The training especially on the building users can be exceptionally useful when implementing behavioral or “housekeeping” measures.

On the other hand, the EnMS implementation imposes the conduction of energy review on the current situation, identification of an optimal energy consumption baseline

and appropriate energy performance indicators which are monitored and measured for a certain period after implementing the EnMS. From the energy review derives a variety of opportunities for improvement and they are used to appoint objectives and targets that need to be achieved with the EnMS. Hence, the MOD should establish general objectives and targets for all identified consumption areas and create action plans consisted of applicable technical and behavioral measures.

Finally, to evaluate the EnMS and its implementation process in compliance with ISO 50001 it is recommended to the energy management team to create its own internal audit and to conduct a management review from where will derive the potential improvements for the next cycle.

Conclusions

In this paper, the emphasis was on the potential of implementing the EnMS in military organizations. The opportunities for implementing the EnMS are recognized in five consumption areas: administrative buildings and military facilities, street lighting within military areas, transport, waste collection and disposal, and water and wastewater treatment. Considering the complexity of each of these consumption areas this paper discusses only the administrative buildings and military facilities. The facilitation of the process of Energy Management implementation is accomplished in line with the international standard for Energy Management Systems - ISO 50001. The foundation of the standard is in the Deming's Plan – Do – Check – Act (PDCA) Cycle and according to this framework for continual improvement, the herein presented energy management concept can be modified to be appropriate for future application in different consumption areas.

The need for energy savings and the requirements for rational use of energy initiate the emerging of numerous international and national legislation and directives that aim to end the tendency of uncontrolled energy consumption and increase the level of energy efficiency. The MODs should focus on development and support on an Energy Policy and an Energy Strategy, to initiate and sustain action plans for a more energy-efficient, and less fossil fuel-dependent and consuming, defense sector with a greater diversity of energy sources without any compromise to military operational objectives and capabilities. Furthermore, to develop and implement Energy Management Systems or Environmental Management Systems, which will include energy as one of the significant environmental aspects, to pursue the continual improvement of energy performance in a way that benefits military capabilities.

Finding innovative and sustainable solutions to improve the energy performance of military equipment can contribute to enhancing military capability. Often future energy demand is not properly considered into capability planning stages, and opportunities for efficient consumption are rarely examined, therefore, there is a need for the defense sector to become more efficient with the energy resources of which it consumes and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, through the implementation of energy efficiency and renewable energy production technologies, and policy and behavioral interventions.

This requires understanding energy demand by applying effective management systems both through procurement activities for new buildings, for refurbishment projects, and throughout the life of the building and other infrastructure assets.

Abbreviations and acronyms

CDP – Capability Development Plan
 CEN – European Committee for Standardization
 CENELEC - European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
 EDA – European Defence Agency
 EnMS – Energy Management System
 EP – Environmental Protection
 ISO – International Organization for Standardization
 MOD – Ministry of Defence
 PCDA - Plan – Do – Check – Act
 SENT – Smart Energy Team
 SPS - NATO's Science for Peace and Security

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