


МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA



27

VOL. XIV
SKOPJE

DECEMBER 2014

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА	Год.	Број	Стр.	Скопје
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE	14	27	1-110	2014
	Vol.	No	pp	Skopje



МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

**СОВРЕМЕНА CONTEMPORARY
МАКЕДОНСКА MACEDONIAN
ОДБРАНА DEFENCE**

ISSN 1409-8199
e-ISSN 1857-887X

Година 14, бр. 27, декември 2014 / Vol. 14, No. 27, December 2014

Skopje
December 2014



СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

Издавач:

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Министерство за одбрана

„СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА“

„Орце Николов“ 116 1000 Скопје

Телефони: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

Интернет адреса:

WEB на Министерството за одбрана:

<http://www.morm.gov.mk/sovremena-makedonska-odbrana/>

Списанието излегува два пати годишно.

ISSN 1409-8199

Скопје, декември 2014 година

Сите права се резервирани

Се забранува репродуцирање на публикацијата и нејзините делови, како и нивно трансформирање во разни медиуми: електронски, магнетни ленти, механичко фотокопирање, снимање и друго, без писмено одобрение на издавачот и авторите.

CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

Publisher:

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ministry of Defence

„CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE“

„Orce Nikolov“ 116 1000 Skopje

Tel.: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

Internet adress:

WEB of the Ministry of Defence:

www.morm.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defence/

The magazine published twice a year

ISSN 1409-8199

Skopje, December, 2014

All rights reserved

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the publisher and authors.

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ НА
МИНИСТЕРСТВОТО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Д-р Зоран ЈОЛЕВСКИ, *претседател на Издавачкиот совет*
Доц. д-р Александар ГЛАВИНОВ, полковник, *главен и одговорен уредник*
Доц. д-р Мухамет РАЦАЈ, бригаден генерал, *заменик-главен и одговорен уредник*

ИЗДАВАЧКИ СОВЕТ

Проф. д-р Орце ПОПОВСКИ, полковник, *Воена академија, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Росе СМИЛЕСКИ, полковник, *Воена академија, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Митко КОТОВЧЕВСКИ, *Институт за безбедност, одбрана и мир, Филозофски факултет, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Томе БАТКОВСКИ, *Факултет за безбедност, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Методи ХАЏИ-ЈАНЕВ, полковник, *Воена академија, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Билјана ВАНКОВСКА, *Институт за безбедност, одбрана и мир, Филозофски факултет, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Цане МОЈАНОСКИ, *Факултет за безбедност, Скопје*
Доц. д-р Фердинанд ОЦАКОВ, *Министерство за одбрана на РМ*
Доц. д-р Ненад ТАНЕСКИ, *потполковник, Воена академија, Скопје*
Доц. д-р Жанет РИСТОСКА, *Министерство за одбрана на РМ*
Д-р Урим БЕЈСЕЛИ, *Центар за управување со кризи*

МЕЃУНАРОДЕН УРЕДУВАЧКИ ОДБОР

Проф. д-р Лидија ГЕОРГИЕВА, Република Македонија, *претседател*
Проф. д-р Арта МУСАРАЈ, Република Албанија
Проф. д-р Николај ПАЛАШЕВ, Република Бугарија
Проф. д-р Митко КОТОВЧЕВСКИ, Република Македонија
Проф. д-р Зоран ДРАГИШИЌ, Република Србија
Доц. д-р Абас ЛЕШИ, бригаден генерал, Република Албанија
Доц. д-р Ерик КОПАЧ, Република Словенија
М-р Лоренцо ХИПОНИА, САД

УРЕДУВАЧКИ ОДБОР

Проф. д-р Зоран НАЦЕВ, *Институт за безбедност, одбрана и мир, Филозофски факултет, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Билјана КАРОВСКА АНДОНОВСКА, *ФОН Универзитет*
Проф. д-р Ризван СУЛЕЈМАНИ, *Државен универзитет – Тетово*
Проф. д-р Тони МИЛЕСКИ, *Институт за безбедност, одбрана и мир, Филозофски факултет, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Оливер БАКРЕСКИ, *Институт за безбедност, одбрана и мир, Филозофски факултет, Скопје*
Проф. д-р Драге ПЕТРЕСКИ, полковник, *Воена академија, Скопје*
Доц. д-р Ненад ТАНЕСКИ, *потполковник, Воена академија, Скопје*
Доц. д-р Александар ГЛАВИНОВ, полковник, *Воена академија, Скопје*
Доц. д-р Димче ПЕТРОВСКИ, генерал-мајор, *ГШ на АРМ*
Доц. д-р Атанас КОЗАРЕВ, *ЕУРМ, Скопје*
Доц. д-р Жанет РИСТОСКА, *Министерство за одбрана на РМ*

В.Д. секретар и лектура: доц. д-р Жанет РИСТОСКА
Технички уредник: Билјана ИВАНОВА
Компјутерска подготовка: Александар АТАНАСОВ

CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL OF
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Dr. Zoran JOLEVSKI, *President of the Publishing Board*
Doc. Dr. Aleksandar GLAVINOV, Colonel, *Editor-in-Chief*
Doc. Dr. Muhamet RACAJ, Brigadier General, *Deputy Editor-in-Chief*

PUBLISHING BOARD

Prof. Dr. Orce POPOVSKI, Colonel, *Military Academy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Rose SMILESKE, Colonel, *Military Academy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Mitko KOTOVCEVSKI, *Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Tome BATKOVSKI, *Faculty for Security, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Metodi HADZI-JANEV, Colonel, *Military Academy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Biljana VANKOVSKA, *Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Cane MOJANOSKI, *Faculty for Security, Skopje*
Doc. Dr. Ferdinand ODZAKOV, *Ministry Of Defence of RM*
Doc. Dr. Nenad TANESKI, *Lieutenant Colonel, Military Academy, Skopje*
Doc. Dr. Zhanet RISTOSKA, *Ministry Of Defence of RM*
Dr. Urim VEJSELI, *Crisis Management Center, Skopje*

INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD

Prof. Dr. Lidija GEORGIEVA, Republic of Macedonia, *President*
Prof. Dr. Arta MUSARAJ, Republic of Albania
Prof. Dr. Nikolaj PALASHEV, Republic of Bulgaria
Prof. Dr. Mitko KOTOVCEVSKI, Republic of Macedonia
Prof. Dr. Zoran DRAGISHIC, Republic of Serbia
Prof. Dr. Abaz LLESHI, Brigadier General, Republic of Albania
Doc. Dr. Erik KOPAC, Republic of Slovenia
MA Lorenzo HIPONIA, USA

EDITORIAL BOARD

Prof. Dr. Zoran NACEV, *Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Biljana KAROVSKA-ANDONOVSKA, *FON University*
Prof. Dr. Rizvan SULEJMANIU, *State University of Tetovo*
Prof. Dr. Toni MILESKE, *Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Oliver BAKRESKI, *Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje*
Prof. Dr. Drage PETRESKI, Colonel, *Military Academy, Skopje*
Doc. Dr. Nenad TANESKI, Lieutenant Colonel, *Military Academy, Skopje*
Doc. Dr. Aleksandar GLAVINOV, Colonel, *Military Academy, Skopje*
Doc. Dr. Dimche PETROVSKI, Major-General, *GS of the ARM*
Doc. Dr. Atanas KOZAROV, *EURM, Skopje*
Doc. Dr. Zhanet RISTOSKA, *Ministry Of Defence of RM*

Acting Secretary: Doc. Dr. Zhanet RISTOSKA
Graphic Designer & Editor: Biljana IVANOVA
Technical Editor: Aleksandar ATANASOV
Proofreading and Editing: MA Elena TRAJANOVSKA

CONTENTS:

Aleksandar GLAVINOV FOREWORD	9
Lidija GEORGIEVA FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOWARDS PEACE MANAGEMENT	11
Rose SMILESКИ, Zoran NESHKOSKI ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF THE NUMBER OF FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CITY OF SKOPJE FOR 2009 AND 2010	19
Muhamet RACAJ, Ivica DANEVSKI STABILITY PACT - REFLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	33
Nenad TANESKI, Borche CHAMINSKI GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FROM ASYMMETRIC THREATS	45
Tanja MILOSEVSKA, Nenad TANESKI TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA	55
Oliver BAKRESKI PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY AS A VARIABLE WHICH SHAPES THE POLITICAL- SECURITY RELATIONS	67
Toni NAUMOVSKI, Vancho KENKOV CONCEPT AND PRIORITIES OF CYBER DEFENCE	77
Zoran JEFTIC, Elizabeta RISTANOVIC MEDICAL CARE OF MASS SPORT EVENT AS A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION	87
Metodija DOJCINOVSKI, Ferdinand ODZAKOV SPECIFICS OF TERRORISM IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR ITS EXECUTION	99

Dear readers,

In front of you is the new issue of the international scientific journal “Contemporary Macedonian Defence”, a journal in the field of security, defence, military and military-technical sciences. The journal has been issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia in continuity for 15 years.

From back in 1999 to date, scientific papers from renowned authors, who deal with issues of defence and security from various aspects, have been published in this journal. The contribution of such a journal for the scientific thought and theory in the field of defence is undisputed; however, it is also significant that by giving the opportunity to the experts by the means of this journal to address the public, implementation of particular and practical solutions are reached in order to promote the defence system of the Republic of Macedonia.

I would like to point out that the journal, as a scientific-theoretical journal, today has the attributes of a modern scientific journal, which means it is classified in several international classification systems and library facilities, thus, acquiring a new dimension and providing an opportunity to the authors to present their work internationally, sharing scientific and practical experience at a higher level.

The Military Academy “General Mihailo Apostolski”-Skopje, as a part of the Ministry of Defence and the only military high education and scientific institution in the Republic of Macedonia, successfully performs its primary task: to provide education, development and training of staff for the needs of: MOD, ARM (Armed Forces of the Republic of Macedonia), the Crisis Management System, the Protection and Rescue System and to perform scientific research for the needs of defence in accordance with the law. The professors and the personnel are creators of the most significant scientific contribution in the field of military projects, the results of which are used for promotion of the teaching and applicative activity of the Academy, as well as throughout the country and abroad.

As editor in chief of the international scientific journal “Contemporary Macedonian Defence” and as a professor and an officer, who has developed his entire professional career in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Macedonia and the Military Academy, I believe that in the following period, in cooperation with the teaching and scientific staff of the Academy and the other high education institutions in the country, I will succeed in further developing the quality and reputation of the journal in a dignified manner.

**Colonel Dr. Aleksandar Glavinov, Assistant Professor
Chief Editor of
„Contemporary Macedonian Defence“**

FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOWARDS PEACE MANAGEMENT

Lidija GEORGIEVA¹

Abstract: *It is almost two decades that political and academic communities are striving to bring to common ground the ongoing and usually no easy debate about possible or most successful approaches to bring post-cold war violent conflicts to successful and applicable solutions. Although such debates are still open especially in the light of new or recently emerged instabilities and conflicts (Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Ukraine) there is no clarity or even mutually acceptable understanding towards effective solutions. From the beginning of the 90s, intensive and influential debate about preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention has dominated as a consequence of joint understanding that more could be done, and should be done in preventing violence in the Balkans and elsewhere in countries and regions affected by violence. Yet after so many years of international efforts and debates in peacebuilding and state building it seems obvious that there is more space for criticism than for satisfaction. This paper will analyze theoretical debates and conceptual dilemmas that followed international conflict resolution and resulted in self-criticism of liberal peacebuilding approach and policy. In addition, the paper will address the contribution of recent debates about peace management approaches that are attempting to bring into the discussion and conceptualization of the so-called “bottom up” approach or local perspective on peace management. The aim of the paper is to contribute to a discussion on how to understand conceptual and practical complexity of conflicts and to find out how lack of consensus affects recent critical debate.*

Key words: *conflict resolution, peace management, peace formation*

Introduction

During the last two decades, ones we have witnessed escalation of violence and armed conflicts all over the world (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014). Numerous research and policy centers have shifted their priorities on projects and data gathering which are used for more appropriate understanding of conflicts and violence. Although the period of the last decade of the XX century was expected to be less violent and turbulent, analysis and data supported the general opinion that this is the most violent period after the Second World War (SIPRI).

Conflict resolution and conflict management become important topics on the agenda of different international organizations and institutions, governmental as well as nongovernmental ones. It appeared as necessity because the traditional Cold War conflict management between global or regional powers should be adjusted to a new security environment filled by

¹ The author, Ph.D, is Professor at the Institute for Security, Defense and Peace Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, UKIM, Skopje, RM

nontraditional threats and challenges for security (Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus, 2006). One possible answer to such challenges was recognized in crisis management policy of international organizations that were forced to reconsider their approaches for dealing with violent conflicts.

As a parallel to the concept of conflict management, the crisis management concept was introduced as an immediate solution for conflict de-escalation. From the theoretical perspective conflict management is defined from different positions (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2006;). Although obvious divisions were, and are still present regarding the scope of management activities used within the cycle of the conflict, two general positions are describing conflict management as policy and instrument dealing with immediate acts of organized violence and escalation events (narrow definition) and second arguing for more broader definition of conflict management including not only policy and instruments that should decrease violence and bring conflict actors to cease fire but also to deal with different aspects of complex conflict situation and attitudes and perceptions.

This approach was recognized within intensive academic interest for conflict prevention and early warning conceptions. Gurr developed a more sensitive approach to the political mobilization and conflict (Gurr, 1993) and Carment (Carment, 2009) developed not only conceptual clarification of conflict prevention but also established projects in order to support theory with relevant data about failed and fragile states based on qualitative and quantitative methodology. The interventions in the conflicts in former Yugoslav republics were used as case studies for measuring different factors as the role and impact of ethnicity, religion, identity in conflict escalation. Quantitative and qualitative research, especially one conducted in SIPRI and Upsala University are showing the frequency and intensity of conflicts through different indicators (Wallensteen and Johansson, 2014).

Although conflict prevention, according to peace and conflict researchers and practitioners should be predominantly utilized and analyzed concept, the same enthusiasm has not been shared on the side of policy makers coming both from international institutions or national representatives. At this period of time, NY Times after search of conflict prevention will show over 4000 articles. Instead, conflict management as a broader and more comprehensive concept was squeezed into a narrow definition of crisis management that was very often recognized as crisis intervention and short term engagement. Military crisis management became the most usual instrument for conflict de-escalation and sometimes a necessary instrument before some peacebuilding strategy became possible. From the perspective of almost twenty years of international conflict management it became obvious that late intervention or even non-intervention prevailed as a response to more complex security environment. SIPRI analyses show that 2011 is final period of intensifying conflict management, peacebuilding operations, whereas after 2011 there is a decrease as a result of several factors: low interest of governments for participation in missions, financial crisis and low budgets, as well as increase of the instruments for non-military/civilian aspects of operations.

What is more optimistic than previous explanation of the in/efficiency of international conflict management is that the growing number of researchers and academics are becoming critical about concepts defined and policies used for their implementation during the aforementioned period. Richmond is one of the leading academics that challenges international relations theory and its understanding and definition of peace.

In his understanding the previous concepts' reliance on internal violent or externalised institutions and agency reform and conditionality should be replaced by concept of 'peace formation' which counterbalances the previous one. Without incorporating a better understanding of the multiple and often critical agencies involved in peace formation, the states which emerge

from statebuilding will remain as they are-failed by design, because they are founded on externalized systems, legitimacy and norms rather than a contextual, critical, and emancipatory epistemology of peace. This paper examines the theoretical and practical dilemmas related to the use of different strategies for peace governance in post conflict settings.

Conflict and management dilemmas

There is extensive experience, knowledge and lessons learned about international conflict resolution in the last two decades. The core presumption is that increased number of conflicts that escalated in the last 20 years has been resolved through negotiated settlement supported by peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies. Literature addressing conflict and its management is extensive but there is no common understanding about its definition and scope. Sandole's understanding is that "conflict management should be about ways in which parties try to deal with conflict"(Sandole 1993:6). He also agrees that simplistic view of conflict management obscures its processual and power dynamisms. Yet, conflict management is not only about dealing with the conflict; it also denotes if the management of conflict is in violent or competitive and nonviolent or cooperative ways. From the other perspective "Conflict management represents an attempt to do something about reducing, limiting or eliminating the level, scope and intensity of violence in conflict and building a structure where the need to resort to violence in future conflicts is controlled (Melin, 2014).

The most important issue should be how to address different forms and intensity of violence in conflict situation. This means after the obvious failure of conflict prevention, conflict management (narrow definition) will be explicit instrument for dealing with different forms of violence, implemented through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral strategies. What triggered interest and debates as well as critical analysis and evaluation are unilateral and multilateral strategies mostly interventions and peacebuilding or peace negotiations and mediation as it was in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and conflicts in other regions.

However, there are other concepts that challenge conflict management as a useful policy and tool and argue that instead of inclining towards power dynamics resolution, the actors should incline towards conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Ramsbotham's understanding is that conflict management is part of conflict resolution and he attempts to overcome the obvious top down understanding and approach towards conflict situation without sufficient knowledge and understanding of the root causes of the conflict.

The understanding of different approaches would be incomplete if tension between conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and conflict management is not addressed. The general conclusion could be that there is a constant tension between academics and practitioners that would argue about shortfalls or advantages of one in relation to the other concept. Debates among conflict resolution scholars (Ramsbotham,

Woodhouse and Miall, 2006) and others would argue conflict management is more interventionist oriented and control focused approach that neglects root causes of conflict. Recent debate introduced conflict transformation, as a more sensitive approach i.e. it should be more sensitive along conflict life cycle. Lederach offers a complex definition of transformation that understands social conflict as an evolving from, and producing changes in, the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions of human experience. It seeks to promote constructive processes within each of these dimensions while according to Lederach dealing with relationship within the broader perspective of conflict should be a more effective strategy (Lederach, 2003).

Based on conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation conceptions we have witnessed implementation of range of instruments and tools predominantly as a third party intervention in conflict zones. This includes varieties of peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, diplomacy and mediation, negotiation, interventions, sanctions, etc. From the point of view of operational level, those approaches are referred as multidimensional conflict resolution that consist of early-warning systems, peacemaking, preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement operations. Different missions were launched with the aim of dealing with the complex aspects of the post conflict challenges and were referred to as multidimensional. It became obvious that “long-term commitment to post-settlement environments, including disarmament, the repatriation of refugees, the restoration of order, election monitoring, the protection of human rights, reforming and strengthening government institutions, formal and informal processes of political participation” are more complex and demanding (Richmond 2001: 10-11).

Although it is possible to come to a common position that multidimensional missions and operations are extremely costly and demanding there is no consensus or agreement about the success of this kind of interventions. If we keep distance from the statements of international organizations officials about effectiveness and successfulness of the deployed or completed missions the information that could be useful and contribute for how to analyze and measure the impact of this strategies on conflict dynamics are present in quantitative data or case study analysis. Yet, as in the case of conceptual ambiguity, there is an open debate and criticism regarding attempts and positive attitude that different quantitative data and case studies can be used in support of effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies in its broader or narrow definition. This criticism is supported by the broadly supported opinion and perception that conflict resolution and settlement solutions are insufficient and failed in coping with conflict issues and usually resulted in brake up of peace settlements. Therefore more appropriate conceptualization of conflict will be necessary and more complex understanding of the causes of conflict to conceptualize conflict its dynamics and escalation or forms of violence (Richmond 2013: 271-287). One way of understanding is to reconsider not only conflict and violence but also conceptualization of peace and its maintenance.

Peace management perspective

Since academic and expert communities have become critical towards understanding of structural or immediate factors that fuels conflicts and violence and started to challenge the opinion about successfulness of the strategies for conflict resolution it was reasonable to expect innovative and more thoughtful alternatives and conceptualizations. Such alternatives on the small scale are presented through the critical approach that strategies of conflict resolution delivered as third party intervention are less successful in containing violence, that intervention could in addition fuel violence or to reduce local capacity for peacebuilding or prevent local ownership. Paris argues that... "without exception, peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period have attempted to 'transplant' the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states" (Richmond 2013: 271-287). His argumentation regarding peacebuilding practice after the Cold War is that international agencies become more open proponents of liberal political and economic principles in pacification of conflicting societies through practice of "transmission mechanisms" that could be divided in four categories: instrumental role in shaping peace agreement; impact on implementation of settlement solutions, guidance and assistance; conditionality for financial arrangements and support; and practicing quasi-governmental functions by serving on behalf of local authority (Paris, 2002:645). In other words, peacebuilding as a conflict resolution strategy aims to generate liberal market democracy model that will fit domestic governance. By doing this peacebuilding should not be considered as a pure controller of violence but as a distinctive form of globalization process (according to Paris) or as an instrument for reconstruction and domestic governance.

The literature suggests that there is increased attention to the evaluation of post-conflict arrangements and its un/success. Peace governance is recognized as a dynamic but challenging process often based on institutional and policy arrangements aimed to at least settle conflict dynamics or in other cases even to provide more sustainable peace.

On the other side there are arguments that liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding, including localized practices of peacemaking offers a form of peace that could be legitimate across local and international scale (Richmond, 2013:272-287). From this perspective local attempts to create peaceful institutions are of great significance, as it was recognized as bottom up approach for peace formation. Although the importance of local peace potentials is recognized as crucial for successful peacebuilding and maintenance of peace, it is difficult to recognize if and in which case legitimate peace formation has been established. Richmond offers conceptualization that peace formation represents autonomous, but often well-informed, peace oriented, and legitimate discourse...positioned vis-à-vis the conflict, state coming into being and international standards.

Based on the criticism of conflict resolution strategies that are predominantly instrumental in practicing peacebuilding or statebuilding and liberal market democracy norms transfer, the conclusion should be that hybrid forms of peace were neglected or marginalized. One of the obstacles that could prevent such formation is decision that

conflict settlement and peace processes should rely on political elite as stakeholders and key actors in institution building after the conflict. The other obstacle is that non-state or civil society actors are considered important in the process of social peacebuilding and reconciliation but restricted from substantial influence in the process of negotiations or peace settlement. As a consequence, partial or substantial resistance forms towards liberal peacebuilding solutions were recognized. The aforementioned are not the sole factors for such kind of resistance but only the most obvious ones.

In this way a new possible shortfall of conflict resolution is acknowledged i.e. lack of shared vision about causes of conflict and prescription of one side solution for settlement. Some analysts that critically approached peacebuilding practice and achievements now are advocating for the necessity to replace strategies and models that are proven as ineffective. There are suggestions for implementations of the model designed from the ground up in each case in locally resonant ways respecting autonomous agency, capacity, custom, identity, religion, and alternative models of politics, society, and economics and their relations with, resistance to, exposure to, and acceptance of the liberal peace paradigm (Richmond, 2013). This could be understood as an attempt for more “societal” than political approach to conflict resolution but still not sufficiently clear if such solution will be supported with immediate coercive or non-coercive instruments.

Conclusion

The aim of this article is to contribute into a discussion on how to understand conceptual complexity of conflicts and conflict resolution practice keeping in mind recent critical voices about failures of international actors in peacebuilding. The aim of the article is not to cover the full spectrum of debates and criticism but to show that lack of consensus in conceptual understanding and practicing is still present and even more powerful.

As a conclusion it could be stated that after two decades, political and academic communities are still striving to come to a common ground about possible or most successful approaches to bring post-cold war violent conflicts to successful and applicable solutions. Such debates are still open especially in the light of recently emerged instabilities and conflicts like Syria or Ukraine, not excluding frozen conflicts. Still, there is no clarity or even mutually acceptable understanding about effective solutions having in mind that negotiation; sanctions and coercion are used in both cases.

From the beginning of the 90s intensive debate about preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention was influential as a consequence of shared understanding that it could be done and should be done more in preventing violence in the Balkans and elsewhere in countries and regions affected by violence. In short time the debate about preventive action was replaced with the debate about the usefulness and inevitability of intervention and more robust international acting.

Yet, after so many years of international efforts in peacebuilding and state building it seems obvious that there is more space for criticism than for satisfaction.

Theoretical debates and conceptual dilemmas that followed international conflict resolution resulted in criticism of liberal peacebuilding approach and policy. In addition, the recent

debate is focused on the peace management approaches and discussion about conceptualization of so called “bottom up” approach that will include and rely on peace formation. Peace formation is looking for merging international with local conceptualization of peace and recognition of importance of bottom up approach.

REFERENCES

- Brown, M. E. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, The MIT Press, Cambridge. 1996
- Carment D.: Security, Development and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy (Routledge Press) (with Teddy Samy and Stewart Prest). pp. 1-272 (2009)
- Dennis J. D. Sandole, Hugo Van der Merwe, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, 1993, Manchester University Press
- Carment D.; Harvey F.: Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence, PRAEGER, 2001
- Cockell J.: Peacebuilding and Human Security: Frameworks for International Responses to Internal Conflict,” in Peter Wallensteen, ed., *Preventing Violent Conflict: Past Record and Future Challenges*; Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1998
- Chester, Hampson and Aall: Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict, USIP, 1998
- Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, Patterns of organized violence, 2003–12 SIPRI, <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2014/02>
- Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman, Eric C. Marcus, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed, Jossey-Bass, Wiley Imprint, 2006
- Oliver P Richmond, Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation, Cooperation and Conflict September 2013 vol. 48 no. 3, 378- 400
- http://www.lir.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350602_conf-2011-richmond.pdf
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2005) *The Transformation of Peace*. London: Palgrave.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2008) *Peace in IR*, London: Routledge
- Oliver Ramsbotham , Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 3rd Edition, Polity Press, 2011
- Lederach, John Paul. “Conflict Transformation.” *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 <<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation>>.
- Molly M. Melin, Conflict escalation in international conflict management: A foreign policy perspective, Management and Peace Science, September 22, 2014
- M. Brecher and J. Winklenfield: A Study of Crisis; Michigan Press, 2000
- Peter Wallensteen, ed., *Preventing Violent Conflict: Past Record and Future Challenges*; Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1998
- Ted Robert Gurr: Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, USIP, 1993

- EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report No 2, June 2001, Brussels
- Wallensteen, Peter and Patrik Johansson 2014. The United Nations Security Council in state-based armed conflicts, 2003-12. SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, pp 56-69.
- Wallensteen, Peter, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, Third Edition, Sage Pub, 2011

ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF THE NUMBER OF FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CITY OF SKOPJE FOR 2009 AND 2010

Rose SMILESKI¹

Zoran NESHKOSKI²

Abstract: *This paper shows the research about the occurrence of fires and explosions on the territory of the city of Skopje for a period of two years (2009-2010). The obtained results are analyzed and compared from several aspects. A comparison of the total number of fires is made, and these results are further analyzed according to the place of occurrence, other facilities etc. Calculated damage that was done by the occurrence of fires is given. Reasons for the occurrence of fires is determined, the way they are caused and eventually summary curves obtained by time (by hour) of the occurrence of fires during the period of two years are given as well.*

Keywords: *fire, property damage, analysis.*

Introduction

The simplest one-component gas combustion is a complex set of chemical reactions that take place simultaneously and include transfer of heat, mass and other chemical and physical processes [1,2]. Burning - burning is a process of oxidation – the reaction of the substance that burns with oxygen from the air. If matter that burns is in a solid or liquid state, it is a heterogeneous chemical process, and it is homogeneous when the fuel is gas [2]. For uninterrupted process of burning - firing it is necessary to meet the following conditions simultaneously: to have a substance that burns, material that supports combustion, external impulse and free flow of oxydo-reduction reactions in the flame [3]. If the specified conditions are met, the burning process will begin. Whether burning will further develop into fire of a smaller or larger extent depends on the ability of heat transfer. If there are conditions for its smooth transmission, and the general conditions for the occurrence of a fire are not violated, it will continue or otherwise it will go out.

There are many causes of fire. Some of them are caused by humans, others are caused by failure of individual machines, apparatus, devices, installations (these cases are usually associated with electricity), followed by spontaneous combustion of substances and as a result of natural phenomena etc. [4].

¹ The author, Ph.D, is Professor at the Military Academy „General Mihailo Apostoloski“ – Skopje – Associate Member of the University of „Goce Delcev“ – Stip, RM

² The author is from the MOI of RM, Skopje

Speaking of explosions, the situation is somewhat different, starting from the general division of physical, chemical and nuclear explosions. The name itself speaks for their genesis. If we consider the most common explosions, chemical, it is inevitable to state that they are caused by certain chemical compounds or mixtures whose common name is explosive materials [5]. These materials differ from the substances that can cause fire; there is no need of the presence of oxygen from the atmosphere for their activation since they have it in their composition. Characteristic of some explosives, primarily the propellant that can cause fire by self-combustion, due to exothermal decay over time. Fire can be also caused by the assets that have already been used, but were not activated at the time. Such assets are called unexploded homicidal means [6].

In case of fires, they can sometimes be caused by previous explosions, or fire can be the cause of an explosion. All kinds of explosions have their own meaning.

Property damage from fires and explosions in most cases is great, and the process for their establishment is very complex. Fires cause direct and indirect damage. Direct damages are assessed or determined by scientific methodology. Indirect or actual damages have a negative impact on the economy, the environment and the services that intervened in extinguishing the fire [7,8].

1. Analytical Review of the Occurrence of Fires and Explosions

There are several definitions of the term fire, and the most frequently mentioned is that fire is an uncontrolled burning process that endangers the lives of people, material goods, and living and working environments [3,9].

The growing trend of scientific and technological development in many areas, and in the prevention of fires and explosions in the field of security, requires continuous monitoring and updating of existing achievements. Risks of fires and explosions develop in parallel with the development of new technologies. For this purpose, processing it is necessary to use all data for caused fires and explosions from one specific area (region) for further expert and scientific analysis. The applicable processing model can give results that will be scientifically interpreted as in this particular case.

Considering the fact that Skopje is the capital and largest city of the Republic of Macedonia, it also represents the administrative, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, historic, university center etc., data on fires and explosions that have occurred in the period of two years (2009-2010) will be processed.

The city covers an area of 1818 km² [10] and is populated (according to the last census in 2002) with 509,926 inhabitants, and according to the data it has 146,566 households and 163,745 apartments in ten municipalities: Aerodrom, Butel, Gazi Baba, Gjorce Petrov, Karposh, Kisela Voda, Saraj, Centar, Chair and Shuto Orizari [11]. Due to the complexity of the city and large area of coverage, the Fire brigade for fire protection of Skopje intervenes, which is staffed, systematic, and technically equipped in one main center in Avtokomanda and four other sub centers in the settlements of Bit Pazar, Taftalidze, Gjorce Petrov and Dracevo [12]. The results of the survey for fires and explosions that occurred in 2009 and 2010 through analytical review are presented further on in the paper.

1.1. Overview of Fires and Explosions in the Territory of the City of Skopje in 2009 and 2010 and Their Analysis

Subject of the research was occurring fires and explosions in the territory of the city of Skopje for the period from 2009 to 2010. Within these studies relevant and original sources from institutions that treat this problem were used.

The obtained data will be presented in detailed tables and graphs, annotated, and will include conclusions, and the final results will be displayed in the summary diagram. The large number of fires and their diversity, places of occurrence and if we add their distribution throughout the day, month and year, complicates their processing, but the process of research related with the number of fires is even more complex when grouped in separate groups, a process that is long and arduous.

For the period that the research is conveyed for, it was concluded a total number of 2,053 fires and three explosions of gas cylinders were caused because of various reasons. Further research shows that outdoor fires are dominant (1,047), while the number of burned vehicles is 168. A detailed review of the number of fires and explosions in the research period, as well as the amount of property damage is shown in Table 1.


Table 1. Number of fires, explosions and property damage for 2009 and 2010

No.	Fires that occurred in:	Number of fires		Number of explosions		Property damage caused by fires and explosions expressed in denars	
		2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
1.	Buildings	408	418	3	0	58.384.000,00	122.323.000,00
2.	Open space	408	639	0	0	14.147.000,00	59.882.000,00
3.	Vehicles	95	73	0	0	13.415.000,00	15.457.200,00
4.	Other	12	0	0	0	140.000,00	0,00
	Total	923	1130	3		86.086.000,00	197.662.200,00
	Total (Overall)	2053		3		283.748.200,00	

From the table it can be concluded that the number of fires in buildings and in open space is higher in 2010, while the number of vehicular fires is somewhat smaller. On the other hand, if we analyze the total number of fires and property damage, the ratio is not in a dependent correlation. The increased number of fires to 18.4% in 2010 caused 57% higher property damage than the previous year.

As to the occurrence of explosions, a total number of three explosions of gas cylinders have been registered. The reason for their explosion is a failure of the safety system. According to their character, these explosions are in the group of chemical explosions, but the additional research determined that one explosion was combined. First, a physical explosion occurred, while a gas explosion followed.

For a more appropriate summary of the results from Table 1, they are displayed graphically (Graph 1).



Graph 1. Comparative data about caused fires in 2009 and 2010

From Graph 1 we can see the difference in the number of fires caused by year. In terms of the total number of fires per year, in 2010 there were 203 fires or 18.40% more than in 2009. The number of fires in buildings in 2010 increased by 10 fires, or 2.40% compared to 2009, while the number of fires in open space in 2010 increased by 231 or 36.13% compared to 2009. The number of fires in vehicles in 2009 is 22 fires or 23.16% more than in 2010.

With further analysis of Table 1 and Graph 1, the following data can be derived. In 2009, total property damage of 86.086.000,00 denars is recorded. The damage caused by the fire of buildings is 58.384.000,00 denars or 68.2% of the fires in the open space is 14.147.000,00 or 16.43% of the fires in vehicles is 13.415.000,00 MKD or 15. 58%, and the damage recorded from other fires is 140.000,00 denars or 0.16% of the total property damage caused by fires in 2009.

In 2010, recorded total property damage caused by fires is 197.662.200,00 denars. Damage from fire in buildings is 122.323.000,00 or 61.88% of the fires in the open space is 59.882.000,00 or 30.29% of the fires in vehicles is 15.457.200,00 denars or 7.82% of the total property damage by fire in 2010.

Property damage caused by fires is greater in 2010, which was due to the higher number of fires.

During the survey it was noted that in a number of fires, property damage was not determined, which will certainly affect the totals. By researching these fires, it was noted that the fires in the buildings where no assessment of property damage was made, there was a larger concentration of material value. Localization and extinguishing of the fire lasted longer and caused greater damage. If we add the property damage that was not evaluated and

was caused by fires in open space and vehicles, the total value of property damage would be much greater. The following table shows the number of fires for which no evaluation of property damage has been done in the period of investigation.

Table 2. Fires with unevaluated property damage in 2009 and 2010

No.	Fires with unevaluated property damage		
	Fires that occurred in:	2009	2010
1.	Buildings	7	14
2.	Open space	2	14
3.	Vehicles	3	4
	Total	12	32
	Total (Overall)	44	

It is obvious that an evaluation of the property damage has not been done for a total of forty-four fires by the time of the survey, which does not necessarily mean that it will remain unevaluated. One reason for that could be the short period of time from the occurrence of the fire to the survey. The determination of the property damage is a complex multidisciplinary process that requires involvement of many experts from different profiles that will work as a team. For such an evaluation a lot of time is certainly needed. When it comes to assessment of damages, others, such as cultural and historical monuments, various artifacts, etc., should not be forgotten. Their value is priceless.

1.2. Fires in Buildings

In the next phase, research on fires that occurred in buildings is done. In Table 3, a systematic review by types of facilities is given. From the table it is clearly evident that in the investigated period, 25 types of buildings were burned and one group of fires was distributed in other facilities.

From the table we can see that in the period of study the difference in the number of fires caused by types of facilities is negligible. Therefore, in these two years in the city of Skopje roughly an equal number of fires by types of facilities were caused with few exceptions in the difference in the fires caused in catering facilities with parking lots and garages.

In both years, the most common fires are in residential buildings, apartments and houses, which coincides with literature data, and coincides with the causes of fires. Here, the most common cause is failure of the electrical installation.

Table 3. Fires in buildings in 2009 and 2010

No.	Facilities (buildings)	Number of fires	
		2009	2010
1.	Residential facilities, apartments, houses	218	224
2.	Cabins	28	20
3.	Shopping stores	18	12
4.	Substations, electrical distribution devices	18	20
5.	Utility rooms	13	15
6.	Agricultural buildings (barns, stables)	11	10
7.	Catering facilities	11	19
8.	Working facilities	9	12
9.	Craft stores	7	7
10.	Schools	5	5
11.	Parking lots, garages	4	0
12.	Residential and agricultural buildings	3	1
13.	Administrative buildings	3	1
14.	Warehouses for finished goods	3	4
15.	Manufacturing plants	3	7
16.	Malls	2	0
17.	Other stores	1	1
18.	Religious sites	1	0
19.	Gas stations	1	0
20.	Utility production facilities	1	0
21.	Residential and business facilities	0	2
22.	Power plants	0	1
23.	Warehouses for construction materials	0	1
24.	Children's homes	0	1
25.	Hotels – motels – camps	0	1
26.	Other buildings	48	54
	Total	408	418
	Total (overall)	826	

1.3. Fires in Open Space

Fires that occur primarily in open space (on the ground surface) can be fires on farmland with crops, meadows, pastures, bushes, low-growing vegetation etc. These fires will be significantly influenced by: external weather conditions, schedules, density and type of vegetation i.e. the type of the fuel material.

The survey results show that outdoor fires are most common, as is expected, and other studies have come to the same conclusion. In addition, grouping according to the locations and objects that were burned was done. Dominant are the fires of the group “dry grass” and garbage dumps. In the first case we have almost twice as many fires in 2010. A detailed overview is given in Table 4.

The occurrence of fires in open space has been influenced by several factors such as natural external climate influences and changes (season), topography, human factor, type of vegetation (forests, crops and agricultural areas), roads and communications in open areas, and more. Influential factors are the outside temperature, relative humidity (determined by rainfall, rainy days and parts of the day), the human factor etc. [7,8,9].

Table 4. Fires in open space in 2009 and 2010

No.	Fires in open space	Number of fires	
		2009	2010
1.	Dry grass	235	440
2.	Garbage dumps	99	125
3.	Other open areas	50	19
4.	Stubbles	8	6
5.	Mixed forests	5	9
6.	Crops	5	0
7.	Meadows – pastures	4	0
8.	Coniferous forests	2	1
9.	Maquis	0	36
10.	Deciduous trees	0	2
11.	Vineyard	0	1
	Total	408	639
	Total (Overall)	1047	

1.4. Burned Vehicles

To make the picture and the number of fires complete, a survey on the occurrence of fires in vehicles has been done. They are grouped into five categories. A detailed overview is given in Table 5.

From the table, it is evident that for these two years the most numerous fires are those of passenger motor vehicles. In 2009, the number of fires of vehicles is higher by 22, or 23.16% compared to 2010. In 2010 there were fewer fires of vehicles compared to 2009. The remaining number of fires (by types) of vehicles is approximately equal.


Table 5. Fires of vehicles in 2009 and 2010

No.	Fires of vehicles	Number of fires	
		2009	2010
1.	Passenger motor vehicles	80	61
2.	Freight motor vehicles	6	5
3.	Busses	3	2
4.	Combined motor vehicles	1	3
5.	Other vehicles (road vehicles)	5	2
	Total	95	73
	Total (Overall)	168	

2. Ways of Causing Fires

Further research, in order to close the circle, was designed to analyze the ways of causing fires. In the literature, many authors have defined modes of occurrence of fire. Ways of causing fires in 2009 and 2010 in Skopje do not deviate from the theoretical knowledge when it comes to urban areas [4,7].

For simpler processing in this case the results are displayed graphically (Graph 2).

**Graph 2.** Ways of causing fire in 2009 and 2010


From the displayed, unfortunately, it is clearly shown that the highest number of fires is caused by carelessness of different human activities. The second place includes fires for which the cause has not been determined. The number of fires that are intentionally caused follows, then natural causes and the lowest number of fires are caused by child's play, or numerically expressed, the following data have been obtained: in 2009, 75 % of fires were

caused by carelessness, 18.74 % were unspecified, 4.87 % were caused intentionally, 1.73 % were caused by natural causes, and 0.10 % by child's play. In 2010, 68.76 % of fires were caused by carelessness, 29.02 % were unspecified, and 1.41 % intentionally caused, 0.44 % were caused by natural causes and 0.35 % were caused by child's play.

3. Ways of Causing Fire

Reasons that cause fire are found in the literature among which the most common are: electricity (from the place of production, transmission, and its use), static electricity, natural phenomena, deliberate causing, unsafe fireplaces, ducts for conveying gases, structural defects, etc. [13, 14, 15, 16].

During the investigative actions, it often happens that the cause of the outbreak of the fire is undeterminable. In such cases, the term "unknown reasons" is used. Unfortunately, this figure is often dominant. Certainly science has an explanation for this term, and the explanation is reflected in the complexity of determining the cause because it is about great ashes where great part of the evidence is destroyed, and it is common to work with modern laboratory equipment that would give a contribution [4]. Regardless of all factors, people who treat this issue should make the extra effort to identify the real reason. The following graph shows processing of fires according to the above mentioned fire division.



Graph 3. Ways of causing fire in 2009 and 2010


From the graph we can see that the highest number of fires is the ones with no established reason for their occurrence. Then follow the fires caused by faulty electrical installation, and electrical appliances and devices. And lastly, fires caused by open flames, malfunction of fireplaces and other causes.

It is evident that in 2009 and 2010 there is a large percentage of fires with unspecified reasons for their occurrence, and also the number of fires where the cause was a faulty electrical installation is not negligible, faulty electrical appliances and devices.

4. Time of Occurrence of Fires

Data for the occurrence of fires in 24 hours for each hour per year for 2009 and 2010 have been processed. Fires by hour of occurrence are shown in the graph where one can see exactly the intensity of the “curve” line and frequency of the occurrence of fires.

From Graph 4, the fact that the two “curves” are moving along the same dynamics and intensity is interesting. It can be concluded that the difference arises only in the total number of fires that is previously described, and it is obvious that the two curves come to a point of intersection only at one point and that is in the first eight hours of the day in 2009 there were more fires unlike in 2010.




Graph 4. Reasons for fire in 2009 and 2010

From this view more conclusions may be derived: in both investigated years in terms of the occurrence of fires it is obvious that in the first nine hours of the day there is an almost constant value of the occurrence of fires. Analyzing the reasons for such movement of the curve, it also can be taken into consideration that some of these fires are from the previous day and night, and the activity of the people and the burden of many systems is on a lower level. From 9 am until 1 pm, there is an expressed increase in the number of fires, and from 1 pm to 9 pm there is a plateau with few extremes. After 9 pm, there is a rapid reduction in the number of fires. These data are of particular importance in planning resources for fighting fires in the following years, as well as taking preventive measures throughout the city.

In the next graph (Graph 5), in order to have a better review, analysis and deduction of conclusions, and the occurrence of fires by their location, a summary view of the curve is given. From this, several common statements can be derived.

1. It can be noted that the number of fires in open space and in facilities in both years is growing after 10 am (with one extreme at 8 am in 2009), followed by small extremes, the

number of fires remains quite high until 8 pm when it starts to decline sharply. This reduction is explained by high intensity of their extinguishing in the visible part of the day and night.



Graph 5. Common review of the fires by the location and time of their occurrence

2. From the look of curves it is clear that they follow the dynamics of the total number of fires, though with smaller values. These results may be of particular benefit to the institutions that deal with this issue, primarily for budget planning, forces and assets in the future, because this trend that occurred in 2009 and 2010 must not be repeated by the number of fires, but probably allocation of time will not vary in a great deal. These curves are probably similar for other cities, and even in the whole country, because Skopje according to the available data is the leader in the number of fires compared to other cities. This conclusion is realistic because the greatest part of the population, industry, transport etc. is concentrated in Skopje.

3. The next feature is that in both investigated years, there are several sections of the curves, which suggests that in these points there had been the same number of fires.

4. As for the fires of transport vehicles, the appearance of curves at first glance seems it does not have enough elements for their analysis, but with careful consideration and review in another ratio on the vertical axis, characteristic extremes in repetition are noticeable. Thus, most of the fires in 2009 occurred in the first hours of the day, about 9 am and 8 pm. While in 2010, regarding the first hours of the day the case is similar to 2009 with a slight shift to the morning, followed by the appearance of fire in the afternoons, followed by a decrease and again an increase in the evenings.

In-depth analysis comes to a conclusion that the occurrence of fires on transport vehicles has occurred at all times of the day. It is noticeable that in the first hours of the

day and night the number of fires is somewhat smaller. Usually, this is the time when the intensity of the movement of traffic and people is poor. When analyzing fires that occur during the day, especially in the visible part of the day, in 2009, the number of fires is higher around 9 am, and in 2010 around 2 pm and 3 pm.

Conclusion

Indicators for causes of fires and explosions are a useful tool in the process of preventing, detecting, insurance, protection, upgrading of existing legislation and more. Based on numerical data, representing the conditions, special feature or the movement of a particular phenomenon, they can warn of occurring problems. Essentially, the indicators are data that are collected and presented in a pre-defined manner, in order to establish a link between the existing data to the purpose of prevention and operation in protection against fires and explosions. Properly selected indicators based on a properly selected time series may reflect the key trends and provide quick and appropriate action by all participants in the process of security and protection against fires and explosions. The structure of the data gives a general picture of fires and explosions, property damage, the consequences for people's lives and more.

Results can find wide application in sizing and shaping of many directions in the field of protection against fires and explosions as well as safety in general. It also creates opportunities for applications in the area of staffing, personal and shared equipment, education, specialized training of firefighters and more.

This paper through common curves gives its scientific contribution to the occurrence of fires, but also a social application that would reflect by analysis of the time of occurrence of fires, especially transport vehicles where there is an inversely proportional behavior of the curve, especially during night-time hours.

As for appearance of the explosions, it can be concluded that the population of the city recognizes the dangers and consequences of their occurrence, and hence the small number of explosions is negligible (three explosions in a period of two years or one and a half average annually). However, the fact that explosions occurred because of a malfunction of the safety system is concerning.

REFERENCES

- [1]. Pleše M., Physics of explosives, CVTŠ, Zagreb, 1987.
- [2]. Smileski R.Lj., Popovski O.B., Internal ballistics, Military academy, Skopje, 2001
- [3]. Pavelić D. S., Burning and extinguishing agents, Mi Star, Zagreb, 2000.
- [4]. Smileski R., Research methodology of fires and explosions, Faculty of Security - Skopje, 2010.
- [5]. Smileski R., Popovski O. and Trajkovska A., (2000). Adherence to safety distances during transport of explosive substances as a condition for maximum road safety. Symposium of the Association of traffic engineers from Macedonia and the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Macedonia, Ohrid 28-30.09.2000. Transport and Communications 2000, Strategic directions for development, Anthology of papers, Skopje, 160-165.
- [6]. Smileski R., Popovski O., Shosholovski Lj. (2013). Unexploded ordnance (ammunition) as a cause of explosion-fire, Anthology of scientific papers, Safe engineering during work and fire, International Slavic University "Gavrilo Romanovich Derzavin" Sveti Nikole-Bitola, 213-221.

- [7]. Neshkoski Z., Protection against fire in urban areas, PSM, Skopje, 2012.
- [8]. N. Nikolov, Protection of forests and other open spaces, Fire union of Macedonia, Skopje, 2012.
- [9]. Karabasil D., Basics of firefighting tactics, Buducnost, Novi Sad, 1998.
- [10]. <http://www.skopje.gov.mk/DesktopDefault.aspx>, accessed on 23.03.2014.
- [11]. State institute of statistics, Census of population, households and dwellings 2002, Book XIII, May 2005.
- [12]. <http://www.skopje.gov.mk/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=16&tabid=325>, accessed on 22.03.2014
- [13]. D. Stojanović, Protection against fire and explosions, Birotehnika, Niš, 1978.
- [14]. <http://bhstring.net>.
- [15]. Karabasil D., Lovreković Z., Fire risks of facilities and technology through history, Anthology of consulting papers Fire protection, environmental protection and facilities safety, Subotica 1998.
- [16]. Neshkoski Z., Health and safety in terms of fire and evacuation, Proceedings of scientific papers, First International Scientific Vocational Conference, Bitola, 2013.

STABILITY PACT - REFLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Muhamet RACAJ¹
Ivica DANEVSKI²

Abstract: *The Stability Pact is an expression for the attempts European problems to be solved primarily by European powers. The Pact reflects the political will of almost the entire international community to fade hotspots of conflict in the Balkans, to promote dialogue and cooperation among the states in the region and to remove the danger of recurring crisis. The priorities of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, as well as its successor - Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) alongside cooperation between countries in the region are democratization and development of civil society, economic recovery and internal reforms. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe relies on the principles of United Nations, OSCE and Council of Europe. Nowadays, changed conditions contribute a lot to the evaluation of the efforts of the regional countries for mutual cooperation. Proportionality requirements of the EU candidate countries for their membership and the evaluation of their efforts and achievements, can take the counter function of the expressed interest to join the European Union.*

Keywords: *cooperation, initiative, stability, development, process.*

Introduction

There is no doubt that in the last ten years, regional cooperation in the Balkans evolved to a greater level, and the effects are positive, as a result of reflection of the interests of the region. The development of regional cooperation was caused by the consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan conflicts of the 90s of the last century. Way of cooperation based on political and financial aspects, driven by external entities to "post-conflict" stabilization character, led to cooperation while it is increasingly accepted as the internal needs of each country in the region that has an active role. A special place in the development of regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe is the policy of the European Union in order to promote cooperation in the Balkans by the so-called "regional approach" in the framework of the Stabilization and Association process and joining the countries of the region to the EU. Therefore, regional cooperation is an essential element for

¹ The author, Ph.D, is Brigadier General of ARM and Professor at the Military Academy „General Mihailo Apostolski, Skopje

² The author, MA, is from ARM

meeting the precondition for integration in the European Union, a necessity for each candidate for membership in the organization.

However, regional cooperation should be taken only as a replacement for the European Union and Euro-Atlantic integrations. Regional cooperation in the European Union builds mutual relations of countries, but it is also a condition for further integration of Southeast Europe into the European Union. Regional cooperation should be observed by the need of developing societies and thus be an important preparation of regional countries for future membership in the EU and NATO.

Regional cooperation under international leadership

Today, the region of Southeast Europe is involved in a number of multilateral initiatives; those kind of general political topics lead to specialized forms of cooperation. The reasons that prompted multilateral cooperation in the Balkans, or in Southeast Europe, in recent times resulting from the interests of the region: the need of approaching the European Union and other integration and rational direction of neighbouring countries to each other due to limited national markets, the development of economies and infrastructure, regulation of social and economic issues, the use of common resources and more. European Union along with other international actors took part in the process and influenced the Balkan countries in establishing better international cooperation. The co-existence and influence of examples in other sub-regions of Europe and beyond, such as, for example, the Benelux countries, Scandinavia, the Mediterranean or the Baltic³. The disappearance of Yugoslavia and the emergence of six new sovereign states, and later seven, despite the long-term centrifugal effects, left a significant gap in the relationship among its former subjects and objectively caused a need for new forms of cooperation.

One important feature of regional cooperation, a strong bonding factor in the region is the European Union, to which all the countries are related in some way. Some of the countries are member countries, others are covered by the policy to expand or have special agreements with the Union. Due to the fact that the process of European integration, for those countries that want to become part of the family, and it is practically almost all countries of the region, is extremely important as the content, and the form and intensity of regional cooperation.

One of the forms of regional cooperation is the Stability Pact which was preceded by a multitude of initiatives for cooperation among the countries of the region of Southeast Europe. Political will, expressed through the general political indicative contained in the geographic dimension can be divided into two groups of co-operation⁴:

a) Organizations and initiatives that are focused primarily on cooperation in the Balkans and

³ Kronja J., Lopandić D. (2012), Regional expert discussion "Regional Cooperation and European Integration," European Movement in Serbia and the Friedrich Ebert, Beograd, p.2.

⁴ Kronja J., Lopandić D. (2012), Regional expert discussion "Regional Cooperation and European Integration," European Movement in Serbia and the Friedrich Ebert, Beograd, p.2.

b) Organizations and initiatives that relate or cover the Balkans geographically in the wider context.

The expressed political will of the countries involved in the establishment and maintenance of peace, security, regional cooperation and the well-being of its citizens is translated into initiatives managed by the international community, such as the Central European Initiative (CEI, 1989), the Central European Region Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 1991), Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC, 1992), Royaumont Process (RP 1995) South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP, 1996), this was primarily called process neighbourliness, stability, security and cooperation in Southeast Europe, Southeast cooperation Initiative (SECI, 1996), EU Regional Approach (RA-EU, 1996), Stability, security and Cooperation in SEE (CSEE, 1996)⁵. In 1997, the Multinational Peace Force South-eastern Europe was initiated, and in 2003 followed the initiative of regional cooperation, known as the Adriatic Charter⁶.

Evolution and new structure of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

In spring 1993, after the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, the former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur proposed a "Stability Pact for Europe", whose main objective was Europe to continue to be a place of stability, democracy and the rule of law, with given emphasis on consolidating future partners for the expansion of the European Union⁷. The "Pact for Stability and Development" was accepted in 1997, and its idea was to meet the convergence criteria in the course of economic and monetary union (EMU). Next, the Stability Pact was initiated at the time of the bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 and was called "Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" (SPEEC)⁸.

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe includes initiatives such as "Southeast Cooperation Initiative" (SECI) and "Royaumont process" with its "successor", "Regional Cooperation Council" (RCC)⁹. "South Eastern Cooperation Initiative" was conceived as a "transitional", which by reducing the barriers that separated the region one from another, leading closer to EU membership¹⁰.

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe promoted and put into operation in Sarajevo Summit, held on July 30, 1999. As the first comprehensive strategy to prevent

⁵ Riedeland M., Eichelberg M., (2009), „Regional cooperation in South East Europe - the period stability pact, "Program for foreign and security policy, Analytica, Skopje, p.1.

⁶ Penev S., Project for Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, p. 172.

⁷ Varwick J., (2003), The Kosovo Crisis and the European Union: The Stability Pact and its Consequences for EU Enlargement, International politik, Vol.4.

⁸ Penev S., Project for Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, p. 171.

⁹ Kronja J., Lopandić D. (2012), Regional expert discussion "Regional Cooperation and European Integration," European Movement in Serbia and the Friedrich Ebert, Beograd, p.1.

¹⁰ Schifter R., (2002), Southeastern Europe in the Post-Milosevic Era: The Need to Lower the Barriers, .Mediterranean Quarterly.

conflicts of the international community, it aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of Southeast Europe in development of peace, democracy, respect for human rights and the creation of economic prosperity. "Stability Pact aims to support the countries of Southeast Europe in their endeavour to promote peace, democracy and respect for human rights, contribute to economic prosperity for achieving stability in the region. Those countries in the region tend towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, together with the other participants in the Covenant; firmly believe that the implementation of this process will facilitate the achievement of their goal"¹¹.

The Stability Pact provides a framework for stimulating regional cooperation and expedite integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Pact Secretariat in Brussels was organized into three units¹²:

- Working table I - focusing on democratization and human rights,
- Working table II - focusing on economic reconstruction, cooperation and development matters and
- Table III - focusing on security issues (defence and security, Justice and Home Affairs).

The operation was initially conceived as a major platform for directing funds for reconstruction activities and coordinating donors, strongly focusing on regional cooperation. It later developed into a forum in which regional countries and international actors could sit side by side on an equal basis, to identify common problems and to plan strategies to cope with them. In its broad mandate and strong international support, the Stability Pact convinced SEE countries to engage in active regional cooperation through programs that would bring "practical benefits" and deeper political mutual understanding. This was the transformation of the Stability Pact into the Regional Cooperation Council.

This new structure was officially launched in Sofia on February 27, 2008 and it was designed to define the increased mutuality of the region with the full support and commitment of the SEE countries, donor countries and other international actors. RCC has inherited the mandate of the Stability Pact to oversee the process of cooperation in South East Europe and to support European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region.

From today's perspective, in the 21st century, regional cooperation can be observed in three stages¹³:

1. Period of recovery and stabilization of regional cooperation through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe from 2000-2005.
2. Transitional period of the repeal of the Covenant and building new organizations of the Regional Cooperation Council (2006-2008).
3. Period of strengthening regional ownership (responsibility) and the consolidation of a new regional architecture - The Process of Cooperation in Southeast Europe (SEECp) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) from 2008 to today.

¹¹ Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on Chapter III: Goals, Cologne, 10 June 1999, p.2.

¹² <http://www.stabilitypact.org/>, on 10.01.2014.

¹³ Kronja J., Lopandić D. (2012), Regional expert discussion "Regional Cooperation and European Integration," European Movement in Serbia and the Friedrich Ebert, Beograd, p.2.

It should be emphasized that the gradual evolution of the Stability Pact in the framework of regional responsibility should not be interpreted as a withdrawal of the international community in its support, or leaving the region. On the contrary, many of the international partners of the Stability Pact declare that they stay engaged, but want to see the countries of the region gradually take on more responsibility in the process - political, financial and personal.

The Regional Cooperation Council as the successor of the Stability Pact has defined 6 general areas: economic and social development, energy and infrastructure, justice and home affairs, security cooperation, building human capital as well as cross-cutting issues such as parliamentary cooperation, media development, civil society activities and gender mainstreaming¹⁴.

The most important objective of the Council is to support regional cooperation in Southeast Europe on the principle of regional ownership, guided by the implementation of regional projects for the benefit of every country in the region. RCC is the first component of the initiative with regional ownership in the modern history of Southeast Europe. The Stability Pact was generally led by the international community; despite RCC is characterized by far greater autonomy. The countries of the region take leading roles in the organization, whereas international organizations like the UN, World Bank and European Union act as equal members of the program. RCC is designed to continue the strengthening of European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes in the region. The Stability Pact, the Regional Cooperation Council act in accordance with the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The accession of the countries in NATO is also considered an important issue.

There are two pre-conditions for this to be successful: enhanced regional ownership (responsibility) and continued international support in the transition phase. By increasingly working together to tackle and resolve common problems, the countries of South East Europe are paving their way to a credible and closer Euro-Atlantic future. The South Eastern European countries, the SEECP (as the only regionally-owned organisation so far) and the international community – must now ensure full implementation of the decisions taken so far to ensure a successful RCC. This idea contributed all the above-mentioned initiatives to be recognized in the new form of cooperation through uniting of the function of the countries in the region. The process of cooperation in South East Europe and former initiatives integrated into the work of RCC promise future perspective of the region. Almost all officials of the Balkan countries had optimistic visions for the future of the region¹⁵.

Stabilization of the Region

Kosovo War and NATO intervention in Ex Yugoslavia was the initial spark on the international community to take preventive actions and take coordination under its leadership. At that time Germany chaired the Council of the European Union, and immediately after

¹⁴ <http://www.rcc.int>, on 10.01.2014.

¹⁵ Riedeland M., Eichelberg M., (2009), „Regional cooperation in South East Europe - the period stability pact, “Program for foreign and security policy, Analytica, Skopje, p 4.

the bombing of Kosovo, in less than a week, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer restored the idea of a Stability Pact¹⁶ for South Eastern Europe, which unlike the earlier, offered the prospect of membership in the Euro-Atlantic integration for the countries of this region. Several months later, on 10 June 1999, by the initiative of the European Union, the founding document obligated more than 40 countries and organizations, including EU Member States, European Commission, USA, UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, World Bank, European investment Bank, the South East Cooperation Initiative and certainly the region to step up efforts to strengthen peace and democracy¹⁷. The Pact needed to show solidarity with the countries of the region that supported NATO's actions in Yugoslavia and to demonstrate to the citizens of Serbia, what the cost of continued international isolation is, encouraging them to move toward political change. Thus a consensus among the wider international community and regional states was expressed that something must be done to address the problem of instability in Southeast Europe¹⁸. The Pact was intended to be a "turning point" after a decade of reactive crisis management after "too many failures, too many devastated hopes and lives, too many unresolved tensions"¹⁹. The objective of the Stability Pact was to streamline the efforts of the international community in the region, while the other was designed to provide a platform for cooperation among countries of the region. Through its work the Stability Pact had a priority commitment regarding the countries of Southeast Europe to "strengthen its activities in terms of the values of the Euro-Atlantic structures"²⁰.

Considering the fact that the region has gone through five military conflicts, which caused many losses, suffering and sacrifices, the cooperation initiatives in Southeast Europe did not have enough power and capacity for action despite the efforts of the international community. Initiatives such as the South Cooperation Initiative and the regional approach of the EU, faced difficulties in their implementation in the former Yugoslav Republics who

¹⁶ France had similar initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe in 1994 (Baladurov pact), and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998 (Vedrinov Pact). Friis L. & A. Murphy (2000), "Turbocharged negotiations: the EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy*, Edition 7, No.5, the special edition. 767-786: 769.

¹⁷ The following countries and organizations were part of the Stability Pact: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Member States of the EU, Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, the USA, Japan, the Black Marine Group for Cooperation, Central - European Initiative, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European investment Bank, the International Monetary fund, NATO, the Organization for economic Cooperation and Development, the OSCE, representatives of Royaumont process, South - east initiative for cooperation, South - east process for cooperation, the UN, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Western European Union, World Bank.

¹⁸ Penev S., *Project for Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia*, Skopje, p. 175.

¹⁹ *Democracy, Security and The Future of The Stability Pact For South Eastern Europe, A Framework for Debate* by the East West Institute in partnership with the European Stability Initiative, Berlin, April 4, 2001.

²⁰ Agency Europe, cited in Friis L. & Murphy A. (2002), "Turbocharged negotiations: the EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe". *Journal of European Public Policy*, Edition 7, No.5, the special edition. 767-786: 769.

rejected any initiative which they saw as a revival of the old Yugoslav connections²¹. The evolution of social relationships undoubtedly leads to the need for creating new shapes and forms of regional cooperation initiatives, which translate into acceptable solutions for the region.

Experiences and lessons learned from the crisis management in different crisis areas around the world were on the basis of the establishment of the Stability Pact which contains three main segments: the creation of a secure environment, promotion of sustainable democratic systems, and the promotion of economic and social good. The working meetings and consultations about the future of the region were maintained at a balance with the international organizations and financial institutions and participants from the countries of Southeast Europe, considered to be a specific feature of the initiative.

The founding document promised Euro-Atlantic integration of all countries in the region, including possible full membership in the European Union, because of which the mechanism called Stabilization and Association Agreement was established. Comprehensive commitments of the Stability Pact with those of the Stabilization and Association Agreement was the key motivator for the region to engage in regional cooperation and continue the reforms for European perspective, and it also represented a crucial tool for success of the Stability Pact²². Offering the opportunity for membership of the SEE countries in the Euro-Atlantic family was just a survival mechanism of the Stability Pact.

The enthusiasm of the international community in the euphoria of stabilization of Southeast Europe and putting them on track to achieve European values, contributed for the Stability Pact to be adopted with enthusiasm by the intended countries. On May 17, 1999 in Sofia, British Prime Minister Tony Blair described it as a "Marshall Plan for the Balkans and urged the European Commission to draw a program for reconstruction and development such as South Eastern Europe has never seen"²³.

Inspired hopes

The Southeast Europe region has not remained immune to globalization processes. The collapse of the bipolar world had strong implications on the mutual relations of the Balkan countries. The economic crisis did not avoid the European Union, and further complicated the integration processes in the region. Seeing the actual differences in the motivation of European Union enlargement, and how this process took place in the last twenty years of the last century, and how it does now, could point out the reasons why the inspired hopes of the countries in the region remain only hopes, at least for now.

Understanding that this is a period of the European Union, when it is increasingly occupied by their problems, and less attention is paid to the concept of expansion,

²¹ Uvalic M. (2002), „Regional Cooperation and the Enlargement of the European Union; Lessons learned“. *International Political Science Review*, Edition 23, No. 3. 319-333: 325.

²² Riedeland M., Eichelberg M., (2009), „Regional cooperation in South East Europe - the period stability pact, "Program for foreign and security policy, Analytica, Skopje, p 3.

²³ Penev S., Project for Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, p. 175.

it is illusory the potential member states to expect proper application of fair representation rules equally to all countries. Obviously, understanding the interests of the Union formulates the response on submitted applications for membership therein, and thus warms up the hopes of aspirations and effort to establish a lasting and irreplaceable peace in the region.

The consensus that constantly calls on the European Union is one of the mechanisms for expanding the European family. But how well will it work in the current conditions? If standards do not comply with the Union as their creator, and the values that have established the relative ratio, the question arises whether the consensus principle still represents the Union. This situation in turn produces phenomena, processes and events which can lead into question current efforts of countries to maintain stability in the region.

Additionally, the trend of discharging the principle of consensus, or decreasing the “lowest common denominator” and pushing the European values to a standstill, the transitional period of the new millennium comes to changing the priorities of the European Union, and thus, the issues of human rights, democratization of societies and freedom end up being replaced by trade of energy, preserving the environment and fight against terrorism. On behalf of these priorities, over the last years, many compromises have been made at the expense of human rights, compromises which are increasingly addressing these issues, rather than keeping the promises that warmed up hopes of these countries.

The region of Southeast Europe is not just a geographical designation, but a political coin which represents part of the Balkan countries that have not yet been included in the European Union, and for many that have similar characteristics, whether it is the level of development, history in political and economic terms, or mutual challenges on the road to EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania are the Balkan countries of this “company” of which some have better predispositions, some do not have such advantages for the purpose of meeting different agendas, but the fact is they together share a need for cooperation to quickly and efficiently achieve the common goal - the European Union.

The initiative of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, was an attempt by the European Union to eliminate national egoisms of the countries in the region, and to unify and motivate them for regional cooperation. The idea of unification, by the European Union was clear, but at that time it seemed that the region did not understand the importance of regional cooperation. Does this initiative, although now widely perceived political maturity remained only an attempt, at least for now is just on hold?

Unambiguously, EU regional cooperation is positioned as a key principle for political stability, security and economic development in Southeast Europe. Many of the challenges that the countries face are not only national, but also common and have their cross-border dimension which includes the neighbouring countries in the region and requires continuous communication and openness. Understanding the essence of regional cooperation would make it easier for the region to move on its own track on the road to the European Union according to the values achieved because, as stated above “lowest common denominator” values are already porous.

Rationalization of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) is focused on activities in a number of areas in which the countries of the region identify and acknowledge regional cooperation to benefit all: economic and social development, improved infrastructure and energy, application of law and regulation Interior security cooperation and building human capital parliamentary cooperation. Regional cooperation, as a comprehensive topic, is related to every other area of possible cooperation or need to create recognizable values in the region. All the above processes make up the backbone of regional cooperation. Moreover, most of these activities and initiatives already benefit from a regional property and are designed to meet the priorities of cross border cooperation (CBC) identified by the region. But who is there to evaluate, and if there is such entity, do they perform the calibration European weighing machine.

Lasting peace and stability in Southeast Europe is possible only when the democratic principles and values, which many countries in the region have actively practiced and promoted, are deeply rooted in the region. International efforts must concentrate on consolidation and bonding of stable areas in the region, to lay solid foundations for a full transition to the region as a whole towards a peaceful and democratic future²⁴, indicating a return to the values of respect as a promoter for the advancement of the region.

Summary of reheating hopes, particularly the countries of the Balkans, indicates the following facts:

- Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe established the cooperation of the countries of this part of Europe and laid the foundations of what today is continued by the Regional Cooperation Council. It was done at a time when most countries in the region had institutional ties with the European Union in the present shape and size. However, the persistence of the international community, the change of circumstances and the end of war and post-war period, created conditions that reached political adulthood of Southeast Europe at a high enough level. For the first time in modern history, the countries of the region have taken the question of cooperation in this part of Europe into their own hands, which led to the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Council.

- Southeast Europe is still loaded with heritage complex relationships, and political landscape of the region is marked with numerous open issues. However, the fact is that the region is progressing. It performs a new kind of maturity and responsibility, so that outstanding issues, such as the issue of Kosovo and different views of its status and decisions made, considering the political environment, it is important that the measure did not impair stability or security of the region and any other outstanding issues were not initiated, particularly the bilateral nature. The political maturity as a benefit of regional cooperation evidently reduces the potential that would endanger the stability and security of nations and their citizens insofar as they did in the 90s of last century.

The global economic crisis affects this region, changing values, standards and interests of the European Union to reduce the acquired benefit. By looking for a new challenge models and verification of the results and the imposing of some “new” standards

²⁴ Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on Chapter III: Goals, Cologne, 10 June 1999.

and principles, when the existing are annulled, the countries of the region are given the knowledge that their interests are insignificant compared to Europe.

Conclusion

It is clear that regional cooperation brings a long-term profit and in terms of overcoming some ungrounded deviations to neighbours, establishing trust and promoting bilateral relations. It is, in recent years, improved significantly. Although sub-regional cooperation often involves a process of European integration, this cooperation should not be perceived only as EU request, but also as a need of the region of giving significant support mechanisms to EU. The responsibility lies in the region. It must not be just the precondition for countries to join the European family, but a real indicator of their ability to successfully complete the transition period.

Regional cooperation could not be led from outside, it should be done so by the region itself. It was and remains the goal of many initiatives in various areas. Some of the new instruments will be established as a real test of the commitment of the region for cooperation (in particular the Regional Cooperation Council) and an indication of the success of previous forms of cooperation. It certainly is a quality new phase, which carries a much greater degree of responsibility in the region. And in that region there will be support from the international community. It is clear that the region's future is in the European Union, and regional cooperation accelerates the process, but also leads to spatial and its long-term capability, just as political and economic cooperation make the region attractive to investors, facilitate trade, accelerated modernization. Through regional cooperation, practical countries express unity through compromise, as the region moves towards EU standards and practice of European cooperation.

Knowledge of the regional cooperation is not endless. Forms of regional cooperation are limited, especially having in mind different levels of social development of the region reached through these forms. Individual recognition and respect for social and reached political maturity, as well as proper understanding of the real needs of the region is the only way the benefits of the Stability Pact and regional cooperation should not be turned into a dangerous peace under the appearance of democracy and human rights.

REFERENCES

1. Varwick J., (2003), The Kosovo Crisis and the European Union: The Stability Pact and its Consequences for EU Enlargement, International politics, Vol.4.
2. Democracy, Security and The Future Of The Stability Pact For South Eastern Europe, A Framework for Debate by the EastWest Institute in partnership with the European Stability Initiative, Berlin, April 4,2001.
3. Journal of European Public Policy, Edition 7, No.5, the special edition (2000).
4. Kronja J., Lopandić D. (2012), Regional expert discussion "Regional Cooperation and European Integration," European Movement in Serbia and the Friedrich Ebert, Beograd.
5. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on Chapter III: Goals, Cologne, 10 June 1999.
6. „The Stability Pact - European problems solved European forces“, DEUTSCHE WELLE, 10.06.2009.

7. Penev S., Project for Euro-Atlantic integration efforts of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje.
8. Puhalo S., Mujagić N., Memišević T., Miholjčić D., (2011), On the way to European Union, PRO EDUCA, Banja Luka.
9. Regional Cooperation Council, Strategy and Work Programme 2014 – 2016, Sarajevo, 25 April 2013.
10. Regional Cooperation Council, South East Europe 2020 Strategy – Jobs and prosperity in a European perspective, EU
11. Riedeland M., Eichelberg M., (2009), „Regional cooperation in South East Europe - the period stability pact, “Program for foreign and security policy, Analytics, Skopje.
12. Schifter R., (2002), Southeastern Europe in the Post-Milosevic Era: The Need to Lower the Barriers, .Mediterranean Quarterly.
13. Uvalic, M. “Regional Cooperation and the Enlargement of the European Union; Lessons learned“? *International Political Science Review*, Edition. 23, No. 3. 319-333. (2002): 325.
14. Friis, L. & Murphy, A. „Turbocharged negotiations: the EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”.
15. Used links:
http://www.mfa.ba/vanjska_politika_bih/multilateralni_odnosi/regionalne_inicijative/pakt_o_stabilnosti_za_jugoistocnu_evropu/.
<http://www.stabilitypact.org/>
<http://www.rcc.int>.

GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FROM ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Nenad TANESKI¹

Borche CHAMINSKI²

Abstract: *The main intention of the presented paper is to identify the risks and challenges of the impact of geopolitical factors and modern threats to the security of the European Union (EU) energy infrastructure. The maintenance and promotion of economic and political stability of EU in the current environment of a complex geopolitical conditions and the increased risk of asymmetric threats, have underlined the urgent need of implementing energy security in the European security policy. To be more specific, the paper gives an overview of geopolitical determinants and asymmetric threats that announced the need to define an effective strategy for protection of the EU energy infrastructure. Economic, political and security risks primarily as a result of energy instability are the key arguments that justify the need for defining an effective strategy for energy infrastructure protection. Current regulations are based exclusively on the principles of „soft security” and their focus is internal political security, as well as the Union’s security. Extension and carrying out engagement outside its own borders, as well as the application of the available methods and tools, represent an alternative that EU would have to use in order to gain its energy stability. An effective strategy for protection of the energy infrastructure of EU is the basis for cooperation with other regional organizations and individual countries to maintain energy security and promote international relations.*

Keywords: *EU, geopolitics, energy security, energy infrastructure, asymmetric threats*

Introduction

After the Cold War and the creation of new conditions on the world stage, EU faced new security threats and challenges that significantly differed from those common in the era of polarization. Enormous human population growth and rapid economic development led to a significant increase of energy consumption in the 21st century. The trend of frozen conflicts recovery in countries of the former socialist bloc, the spread of global terrorism and organized crime, turned into real security threats, whereas the critical infrastructure became their potential target. This constellation of events and sudden changes of stability

¹ The Author, Ph.D., is assistant professor at the Military Academy „General Mihailo Apostolski”–Skopje

² The Author, MA, is commissioned officer in The Army of Republic of Macedonia

in the security environment, has promoted the energy infrastructure protection as a basic prerequisite for maintaining EU energy stability.

After the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) subway bombings, energy infrastructure protection against terrorist attacks has sparked an increased interest among members of the Union. The uncertainty of the outcome of the Middle East crisis and a the long term Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the natural gas delivery, which culminated in 2009, were indicators that the EU continuous and safe supply with the required amounts of energy resources is not guaranteed. It was a sign that EU energy policy has a serious disadvantage, which due to the complex geopolitical situation and the real risk of asymmetric threats requires a comprehensive and constructive approach.

Geopolitical importance of energy infrastructure

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, the geopolitics of energy resources has been the main factor for the development of global industry and international security. Of particular concern was the issue of the location of energy resources, their price, accessibility and the method of distribution to consumers.

As one of the most developed regions, EU is the largest importer and the third largest energy consumer globally. In 2011, the Union has provided about 53.8% of the required amounts of fossil fuels from import (Eurostat, April 2013). Out of the total amount of energy consumed in 2011, 35% is oil and oil derivatives, followed by natural gas with 24%, coal 17%, nuclear power 14% and energy derived from renewable resources with 10%.³ In 2008, EU countries had spent 22.3% of the total production of oil worldwide. The need for oil derived from the transport sector, where oil and oil products simply cannot be replaced. Besides its own production, which covers 14% of the total oil demand, the rest in 2011 was imported from Russia (35%), Norway (12%) Saudi Arabia (8%), Nigeria (6%), Iran (6%), Kazakhstan (6%), Azerbaijan (5%) and other countries (22%).⁴

In 2011, 30% of natural gas EU had been imported from Russia.⁵ According to projections, by 2030 this percentage would increase up to 60% (EU Energy trends, 2009). This growth can be explained by the obligations that the international community is taking to reduce carbon dioxide emission as a measure of environmental protection, but also because of the possibility of natural gas to be used as a substitute for other fossil fuels for electricity production.⁶ In support of this explanation there is an increasing doubt on nuclear power, especially after the nuclear plant accident in Fukushima as a result of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

From the analysis of the energy situation, it can be concluded that the energy

³ European Commission. Statistical Pocketbook 2013, Brussels, 2013: 19-24. 01.03.2014 <<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2013pocketbook.pdf>>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010: 50. 01.03.2014. <<http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf>>

resources, with an emphasis on fossil fuels, on which the development of the Union depends, are located within regions that are characterized by a prominent political and security instability, or countries which EU has designated as international terrorism supporters (Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria). Even the minor political instability in a country, which does not apply to major producer and exporter of oil, can cause significant deviations of the oil price. In October 2007, when Turkey launched an intense military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers Party in northern Iraq, oil prices, from \$ 87.40 raised up to \$ 94.53 per barrel.⁷ Turkey is not an oil exporting country, while Iraq then produced about 3 million barrels from the total amount of 85 million barrels of world's market in 2007. As a result of the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis, in March 03 2014 the price of crude oil on the London Stock Exchange increased by 2.2%, thus reaching a price of \$ 111.41 per barrel.⁸

Furthermore, the nationalization of energy resources and the refusal of foreign investments in the energy sector by the governments of energy independent countries is an additional problem that complicates the energy stability of the Union. This trend is particularly noticeable for Russia, a country that owns 5.2% of world reserves of crude oil and 17.6% of the world's natural gas reserves (British Petrol, 2013), managed by state-owned energy companies Gazprom and Transneft. By nationalization of energy resources, Russia has gained a strategic advantage, which was successfully used for self-promotion as a serious world power. Regardless of the Union, Russia has established bilateral energy cooperation with the countries of the European Union and Central Asia, and signed agreements which fully guarantee the sovereignty of the involved parties.⁹ Unlike the member states, EU still doesn't have a common energy policy.

The main gas and oil pipelines that are transporting the Russian gas and oil to EU (Friendship, Brotherhood, Union), are passing through transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus, where Russia's influence is significant. Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, the 2009 gas supply disruption to Ukraine, which directly affected the Union, and the recent intervention in Ukraine, is a remarkable indicator that Russia is not giving up its determination for continuous influence in energy transit countries and strengthening its positions in international relations.

Risk of asymmetric threats

In the analysis of the impact of geopolitical factors from the previous chapter, it was stressed that the delivery of energy resources to EU could be threatened by political instability in export or transit countries and regions where the potential civil wars, ethnic/religious conflicts and terrorism pose a serious threat to security of energy infrastructure. Particularly

⁷ Energy Information Administration (EIA). 27.02.2014. <<http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D>>

⁸ Anthony DiPaola. et all. „Ukraine Tension Seen Stoking Oil, Gas Prices on Supply Risk“, Bloomberg News, 3 Mar. 2014. <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-02/ukraine-tension-seen-stoking-gas-crude-prices-when-markets-open.html>>

⁹ Raphael Metais. „Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and Geopolitical Approach.“ EU Diplomacy Papers (03/2013): 13.

nowadays, when there is not an economy that could be developed and maintained without a stable supply with required energy resources, overall infrastructure for production and transportation of energy resources has become a strategic terrorist target.

Global Jihad and the permanent growth of the price of energy resources have increased the possibility of terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure in Muslim countries rich with energy resources.¹⁰ Besides political and ideological goals, terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure aimed to provide the funds, essential for logistical support to terrorist organizations. The enduring preoccupation of the security forces of any state in energy infrastructure protection from terrorism creates a situation conducive for acts by organized crime structures that work closely with terrorist organizations.

Unlike terrorism with the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism against energy infrastructure is not characterized by great publicity. Nevertheless, the potential economic implications of such terrorist acts are enormous, and they pose a serious threat to the global economy. In this regard, on February 14 2007, in order to disrupt the economy of the United States, the wing of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, called on militant Islamists around the world to attack the sources of oil and natural gas worldwide.¹¹ We can conclude from the given example that not only the United States, but other countries as well are directly exposed to the risk imposed by the focus of terrorism towards energy infrastructure, as the weakest point of modern economies.

Aware of the political and economic importance of energy resources for modern democratic societies, by attacking energy infrastructure terrorist organizations intention is to accomplish the following objectives:

- By attacking energy infrastructure, terrorists can cause serious economic consequences and undermine the stability of the governments they fight against, thus facilitating their quest for power;
- In many cases, the attacks on energy infrastructure, are viewed as a significant step in the fight against foreign powers that have strategic interests in the given region and support the official government, or against international companies involved in the development of energy infrastructure and exploitation of energy resources; and
- To use the opportunity to provide funds or threatened to stop delivery, in order to purchase weapons or increase the economic and social impact among the population that want to control.¹²

Electric Energy infrastructure, infrastructure for production and transportation of oil and natural gas, and nuclear power plants are the most vulnerable sectors of energy infrastructure and represent the most likely terrorist and subversive targets. Hundreds of

¹⁰ Ali M. Koknar. „The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism.“ ed. Gal Luft, and Anne Korin. Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century. A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009, 18.

¹¹ “al Qaeda Calls For Attacks on U.S. Oil Sources.” Xinhuanet, 15 February, 2007. 26.02.2014. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-02/15/content_5742399.htm>

¹² Ely Karmon. “The Risk of Terrorism against Oil and Gas Pipelines in Central Asia.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 6 January, 2002. 26.02.2014. <<http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=426>>

thousands of kilometres of gas and oil pipelines, electric power lines and other energy facilities, which are literally strapping the Earth, are easily visible and partially protected targets. The key power knots that manage the flow of electric power, represent critical points and potential terrorist targets whose destruction or sabotaging could withdraw additional funds for their restoration, or may cause complete disruption of electric energy supply, so-called „blackout“.

In terms of vulnerability, infrastructure for production and transportation of oil and natural gas does not differ from electricity infrastructure. Oil and gas pipelines carrying refined petroleum products and natural gas through territories of Chechnya, Dagestan and North Ossetia, have become a legitimate target for terrorist and criminal organizations.¹³ In 2007, Russian authorities have allowed the state companies Gazprom and Transneft to form „internal-private armies“ to protect their energy infrastructure. In addition to the establishment of private armed forces, Gazprom also has used various types of drones for monitoring of pipelines and other infrastructure.¹⁴

After 9/11, as a potential threat to nuclear energy infrastructure security within the European Union, terrorism has posed significant attention and pressing need for urgent measures for its protection. Nuclear terrorism has the potential to cause huge loss of life, environmental disaster as well as economical and security destabilization. The risk of successful terrorist attack on nuclear energy infrastructure increases in parallel with the growth of nuclear power plants and nuclear waste.¹⁵ If we consider that there are 132 nuclear power plants at the territory of the 14 Member States of the Union (IEA, 2013), than the inevitable conclusion would be that the risk of a terrorist attack is negligible.

Proliferation of WMD is an additional problem. From that point, by breaking the highly enriched uranium and separating plutonium from civilian purposes usage, all states have taken serious measures to prevent proliferation as the greatest global threat, even though, the danger of proliferation of nuclear materials is not completely eliminated, and the major risk comes from uncontrolled development of nuclear technology in certain politically and security unstable countries, and the threat of use of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations.

Founded on analysis of the goals of terrorist organizations and weaknesses of energy production and transport facilities, it can be concluded that the use of force does not provide full energy infrastructure protection. Consequently, the regulation of energy infrastructure protection has to be based on the concepts of so-called „hard security (hard security)“ and „soft security (soft security)“. Having in mind Buzan's claim that „the unification of the five components represents the accomplishment of the modern concept of security,”¹⁶

¹³ Ali M. Koknar. „The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism“, ed. Gal Luft, and Anne Korin. Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century. A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009: 24.

¹⁴ Cindy Hurst. „The Militarization of Gazprom.“ Military Review, The Professional Journal of the US Army, September-October (2010): 59-67.

¹⁵ „Nuclear Power and Security Threats“, No2NuclearPower, January 2007. 04.03.2014. <<http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/reports/Security.pdf>>

¹⁶ Лидија Георгиева. Европска безбедност: концепти процеси и институции. Скопје: Филозофски Факултет, 2010: 15.

in the context of energy infrastructure security, it can be concluded that „soft security” proportionally must be supported by the basic and unique component of „hard security” – military power. That should be the starting point in the process of planning and development of an appropriate strategy for EU energy infrastructure protection.

EU Energy infrastructure protection

The challenge of the necessity of the Union’s energy infrastructure protection was announced in 2006, when the European Commission published the „European Strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy”. According to the strategy, the security of energy infrastructure, which connects EU countries with regions rich in energy resources, has been identified as an essential condition for maintaining energy security.¹⁷ In this context, the biggest challenge of the Strategy is development of consistent foreign policy that would give Europe more effective international role in overcoming mutual difficulties with energy partners worldwide. Consistent foreign policy is necessary for reliable, competitive and secure energy supply.¹⁸ According to the current circumstances, regardless of the EU, each member state has implemented bilaterally independent foreign energy policy based on the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty. Union members, partly or rarely coordinate their external energy policy, a fact which in 2013 was particularly remarkable with the decisions of certain members of the Union to join the project to build the pipeline „South Stream”. Considering that the Union has an active security role, it becomes clear why EU has an exceptional need for an institutional solution of this serious issue. Despite the diplomatic approach, common foreign energy policy also offers the opportunity of integrating other methods and assets (including the use of force, pressure and sanctions) for accomplishment of the interests of the Union. This conclusion is supported by Robert Cooper’s opinion according to which „... Europeans should return to the harsh methods - use of force, pre-emptive attack, deception, and to do whatever is necessary against those who are still living in the 19th century in every sense of the word.”¹⁹

The development of the strategy for EU energy infrastructure protection, continued in 2006, when the principles and instruments for implementation of the „European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)” were prepared by the European Commission. The essential objective of the program was to determine the methodology according to which the EU critical infrastructure will be identified, standards for its security and the role of energy infrastructure operators in the preparation of security plans for its protection.²⁰

In 2008, the program for critical infrastructure protection efforts has resulted

¹⁷ European Commission. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, Green Paper. COM (2006) 105, Brussels, 2006: 15.

24.02.2014. <http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf>

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Robert Cooper. The Breaking Nations. London: Atlantic Books, 2003: 62.

²⁰ Commission of the European Communities. European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM(2006) 786 final, Brussels, 2006. 28.02.2014 <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786:EN:NOT>>.

in adoption of „Directive on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.”²¹ By adopting the „Lisbon Treaty” in 2009 and implementation of the provision for „secure energy supply in the Union,”²² finally were set the legal basis for development of an effective strategy for EU energy infrastructure protection.

Giving high priority to the protection of critical energy infrastructure, identified in accordance with the EPCIP, in 2012 European Commission has established a communication network which connects the operators who manage the critical energy infrastructure within electricity, oil and natural gas sector. One of the reasons for this initiative is the experience exchange between the operators in terms of energy infrastructure security. Giving utmost importance to energy infrastructure protection from external threats, this initiative gives the highest attention to threat assessment, risk management and security of cyberspace (Cyber security).²³

Following the contemporary security risks and threats to the critical energy infrastructure security, in August 2013, the European Commission approached to revision and practical implementation of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection. The prevalent subject of the working paper²⁴ is the issue of providing a high level of protection to EU critical energy infrastructure and its persistence to the risks and threats, in order to reduce the consequences, primarily economic ones, which could occur in case of possible suspension of energy resources supply. Additionally, considerable attention is given to the interdependence of energy infrastructure, industry and EU institutions. From the analysis of the contents of the abovementioned working document, it can be concluded that its main goal is to present a new approach of EU towards the critical energy infrastructure, which will basically be the practical implementation of specific preventive security measures, and rapid response in case of crisis and the establishment of applicable crisis management.

The above regulations for energy infrastructure protection, as well as the European energy policy apply only to EU member countries and are in context of the internal security strategy of the Union. If we reconsider the fact that the EU’s energy security depends on the energy infrastructure security of the energy independent countries, it can be concluded that EU must increase its efforts beyond its own borders, and relying on their own capacities has

²¹ The Council of the European Union. Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Official Journal of the European Union, 2008: 75-82. 26.02.2014 <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF>>.

²² European Union. Treaty of Lisbon. Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 50, (2007): 88. 01.03.2014. <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF>>

²³ For more information: Position Paper of the TNCEIP on EU Policy on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection, 2012. 26.02.2014. <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/doc/20121114_tnceip_eupolicy_position_paper.pdf>

²⁴ For more information see: Commision Staff Working Document on a new approach to the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection Making European Critical Infrastructures more secure, 08/2013. 27.02.2014. <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/doc/critical/20130828_epcip_commission_staff_working_document.pdf>

to develop appropriate foreign energy security policy, following the example of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Although the importance of energy security and energy infrastructure protection are covered by the instruments of ESDP²⁵ and the Security Strategy of the European Union,²⁶ EU has not yet determined the method how these instruments could be used in context of their purpose.

All of these regulations for energy infrastructure protection and foundation of internal and external EU energy policy are solely based on „soft security”. Unlike EU, at the NATO summit in Riga in 2006, NATO launched the mode of use of „hard security” for energy infrastructure protection. In paragraph 45 of the Declaration adopted at the Riga summit, it is stated that „...Alliance security interests could be threatened as a result of vital resources supply disruption. We support a coordinated, international effort to assess the risk to energy infrastructure and to promote energy infrastructure security”.²⁷ Subsequently, military operations „Active Endeavour” and „Ocean Shield” that NATO conducts in the waters of the Mediterranean and Horn of Africa, in certain parts completely coincides with NATO commitments listed in the Declaration of the Riga summit. Although, there is no energy infrastructure in the Mediterranean, the maritime transport of energy resources which final destinations are NATO and EU member states, is highly developed. This means that NATO equally focuses on cooperation and consultation with allies and partners, through the established forms of partnership and cooperation at the global level, including the cooperation with EU. Accordingly, one of the options of the Union to complement deficiency caused by the lack of proper external strategy for energy security is to strengthen its cooperation with NATO.

Conclusion

The widening gap between the rising demand and the continuing decline in domestic production of energy resources has resulted in increased energy dependence of EU on Russia and the Middle East. Political and security instability in the transit countries, in addition to the energy resources price growth, are the major security and economic risks against which the Union has not developed an effective solution. The commitment of EU member states for national approach to external energy policy has led to strengthening of Russia’s position as a significant factor in international relations. Using energy power in order to accomplish geopolitical goals, Russia has repeatedly tested the energy dependence of Europe, resulting in significant economic consequences.

Energy infrastructure’s essential importance for normal development and functioning of the European economy makes it a potential terrorist target with strategic significance. Although the probability of jeopardizing the EU’s energy infrastructure is at a low level, there are serious indicators that advocate that the risk is not only there, but it keeps increasing. Therefore, any threat

²⁵ EU instruments for short and long term prevention should also be used in a more effective way to refer to the basic reasons for...fighting for the scarce and natural resources (Лидија Георгиева. Европска безбедност: концепти процеси и институции. Скопје: Филозофски Факултет, 2010, 208).

²⁶ Лидија Георгиева, *Op. cit.*, 213.

²⁷ Riga Summit Declaration, NATO Press Release (2006/150), 29 Nov. 2009. 05.03.2014. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/pr06-150e.htm>>

of a terrorist attack on energy infrastructure in the Union, in any case should not be ignored, nor be the subject to exaggerated and uncontrolled reaction.

Determining geopolitical turbulence and asymmetric threats that affect the security of the energy infrastructure in transit countries, as one of the most important conditions for maintaining energy stability, EU undertook several ineffective measures to integrate foreign energy policy of its member states. Having failed in its intention to develop effective external energy security policy, following the example of the CFSP and ESDP, EU could consider the option of protecting its energy infrastructure through solid collaboration with NATO or the United States as a strategic partner of the majority of its member states. It is a fact that there are more options that offer solutions for maintaining energy stability of the EU. On the other hand, as a serious security actor on the international scene, the Union must work to define and execute a common strategy to protect energy infrastructure, as the most effective option.

REFERENCES

- Cooper, Robert. *The Breaking Nations*. London: Atlantic Books, 2003.
- Commission of the European Communities. *European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection*, Brussels, 2006. 28.02.2014. <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786:EN:NOT>>
- Commission of the European Communities. *European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection*, COM (2006) 786 final, Brussels, 2006. 28.02.2014 <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786:EN:NOT>>
- DiPaola, Anthony., et all. *Ukraine Tension Seen Stoking Oil, Gas Prices on Supply Risk*. Bloomberg News. Mar 3, 2014. 04.03.2014 <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-02/ukraine-tension-seen-stoking-gas-crude-prices-when-markets-open.html>>
- European Commission. *Statistical Pocketbook 2013*, Brussels, 2013. 01.03.2014. <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2013_pocketbook.pdf>
- European Commission. *A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, Green Paper*, COM (2006) 105 final, Brussels, 2006. 24.02.2014. <http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf>
- European Union. *Treaty of Lisbon*. Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 50, 2007. 01.03.2014
<<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF>>
- European Commission. *An Energy Policy for Europe*, COM (2007) 1 final, Brussels, 2007. 02.03.2014
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0001en01.pdf>
- European Commission. Position Paper of the TNCEIP on EU Policy on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection, November 2012. Position Paper of the TNCEIP on EU Policy on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (2012). 26.02.2014. <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/doc/20121114_tnceip_eupolicy_position_paper.pdf>
- Георгиева, Лидија. *Европска безбедност: концепти процеси и институции*. Скопје: Универзитет “Свети Кирил и Методиј”-Скопје, Филозофски Факултет, 2010.
- Hurst, Cindy. „The Militarization of Gazprom. “ *Military Review*, The Professional Journal of the US Army, September-October, 2010.
- International Energy Agency. *World Energy Outlook 2010*, Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010. 01.03.2014.
<<http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf>>

- Karmon, Ely. "The Risk of Terrorism against Oil and Gas Pipelines in Central Asia", *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, 6 January, 2002. 26.02.2014. <<http://212.150.54.123/articles/articleid=426>>
- Koknar, Ali M. „The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism.“ ed. Gal Luft, and Anne Korin. *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century*. A Reference Handbook, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009.
- Luft, Gal and Korin, Anne. *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century*. A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009.
- Metais, Raphael. *Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and Geopolitical Approach*. Brussels, College of Europe, 2013.
- Nuclear Power and Security Threats, No2NuclearPower, January 2007. 04.03.2014. <<http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/reports/Security.pdf>>
- NATO. *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010.
- Riga Summit Declaration, NATO Press Release (2006/150), 29 Nov. 2009. 05.03.2014. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>>
- The Council of the European Union. *COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection*, 2008, Official Journal of the European Union, 2008.

TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Tanja MILOSEVSKA¹
Nenad TANESKI²

Abstract: *This paper explores the role of media in a terrorist environment, the frequent interplay between media reporting and the use of violence by extremist movements. Access to the media brings terrorists closer to a democratic society's decision-making process, which significantly increases chances that this complex network of interactions will end with a result in a political decision that favours the interests of their group. The objective of this article is to more closely examine the type of relationships that can be established between a terrorist group and the media.*

Key words: *terrorist violence, media, communication, report, coverage.*

Introduction

Terrorists understand that instantaneous media exposure for their grievances requires simply a dramatic incident to attract the world's press. Terrorists seeking publicity are likely to garner a larger audience if they dramatically carry out targeted hijackings, bombings, hostage takings, assassinations, or other acts of violence. The press also has its own incentives to report major terrorist incidents. From the media points of view and aside from its fundamental responsibility to objectively report, the news-drama guarantees increased attention from viewers.

"Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press". (Hoffman 1998). The truism that the information is power is clearly understood by all parties, the media and governments as well as terrorists, their audience, and their adversaries.

The research hypothesis in this article could be summarized in this way: The terrorists operate within a prominent approach concerning the use of the media. The media, playing a vital role in this strategy, permits the terrorists directly to outline their message,

¹ The Author, Ph.D, is assistant professor at the Institute for Security, Defense and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, UKIM, Skopje, RM.

² The Author, Ph.D, is assistant professor at the Military Academy „General Mihailo Apostolski“ - Skopje

spread of the movement and its cause, legitimization of the movement and its activities, and intimidation of opponents.

Reporting terrorism and market competition

Media selects events that are newsworthy (based on its own set of values that give priority to violence and conflict in any form). Broadcasting news programs involves uncountable preparatory actions that involve the selection and discrimination of content that daily is placed on the desk of any entity that works and writes stories that will come out in the mass media. There is a competition among the different stories that will finally be emitted; those that are victorious are more dramatic, are more spectacular in a visual sense, are more emotional, and contain other elements that can be assimilated by an image-oriented culture.

The result is not only the shadowing of those events that, despite their interest, lack a conflicting nature, but the establishing of a dangerous pattern for those that want to be “made public” at any price (Ignatieff 1998).

In fact, televised coverage of the effects of a terrorist attack (especially if it is live) creates a paradoxical situation in which the spectators imagine more horrendous scenes than the very witnesses situated in the area (Ganor 2005).

Therefore, what the media do in their narratives of reporting on terrorism, apart from their emphasis on the dramatic part of terrorist acts, is that they represent them by constructing a reality about terrorism or terrorists for us, and this representation or construction involves selection, exclusion and inclusion. Meaning therefore does not depend upon how things are but how they are signified, and terrorists, in the way they are reported, are made to signify what official perspective wants them to signify, which, in the end, frame and prime public perceptions of terrorists and their acts without recourse to their historical background and the motivational causes. In other words, the narrative in which terrorism is reported does not give it any legitimacy, and terrorists are denied a framing which takes into account the historical background and justness of their cause. “The terrorists are identified with criminal violence and seen simply as bent on terror” (Schlesinger, et al, 1983).

The news media are owned and controlled by large corporations largely motivated by market share and profit. This affects their style, content, and reporting practices. Objective reporting is often outweighed by other factors, such as trying to acquire a larger share of the viewing market. The scoop and the news exclusive are prized objectives. Coverage can thus be selective, often allowing public opinion and government pronouncements to set the agenda for how the news will be spun. In such a political and market environment, the media will, often miss criticism of counterterrorist policies.

Deciding which incidents to report and how to report

The propensity of those in print and broadcast media has been to give priority to terrorist incidents in their news reports. This is understandable, given the influence, terrorism can have on policy making and either domestic or international political environments. However, the media have not been consistent about which incidents they report or how they

report them. They frequently cover some acts of political violence extensively but provide little if any information about others (Rainey 2005).

The relationship between the credibility that one gives to what he or she perceives visually and this use of the trust factor by the media has been an object of reflection. This signifies that the product that TV stations offer is “reality in and of itself,” without taking into account the context and a group of other circumstances that “surround” these images. Given this visual advantage, television does not hesitate to claim its capacity to reach the news story wherever it may take place. This proclamation, however, holds a dangerous misconception. Financial limitations cause the media to concentrate its resources where “it is believed” that there is higher news interest. This leads to a situation in which their interests in every corner of the planet have more to do with determining beforehand where a certain news event “can” take place than with where news is really happening (Laquer 2003).

The result of the aforementioned situation is the existence of several corners of the planet that are never discussed in the news, despite the emergence of problematic situations that could affect the world as a whole. This asymmetric quality of the news causes terrorists to concentrate their efforts in those places where they can receive the media’s attention, setting aside other places where their actions receive no interest aside from the violence itself (Soriano 2008).

The process for deciding which events to report is often driven by evaluating what kind of news is likely to attract an audience. If it is decided that dramatic incidents will bring in sizable shares of viewers, the media will not hesitate to prioritize such incidents for the day’s editions or broadcast. The media can be highly selective about which terrorist incidents to report. The ultimate decision tends to weigh in favor of what most affects readers or the viewing public.

Deciding how to report terrorist incidents is, from the reader or viewer’s perspective, seemingly a subjective exercise. Media reports have never been consistent in their description of the perpetrators of terrorist incidents, nor have they been consistent in characterizing examples of extremist violence as terrorism per se (Gus 2011). Media reports are inconsistent in labeling perpetrators of political violence, and media interests in the sheer violent nature of terrorism can be disproportionate to exploration of the underlying causes of this violence. Labels as ‘guerillas’, extremists’ or ‘commandos’, reflect a tendency to use indirect or vague language to describe what might otherwise be appalling behavior. Euphemisms that apply word outside of their normal meaning to mask or soften the language of violence are also common among governments, policy makers, and others. This practice is deliberately media oriented so that the press and public will more easily accept an incident or policy.

The Media as a weapon

For terrorists, information can be wielded as a weapon of war, making media as a weapon an important concept. Because symbolism is at the center of most terrorist incidents, terrorists as potential supplements to their arsenal explicitly identify the media. When terrorists successfully and violently manipulate important symbols, relatively weak movements can influence governments and societies. Even when a terrorist unit

fails to complete its mission, intensive media exposure can lead to a propaganda victory (Gus 2011).

This chapter summarizes the current understanding of factors influencing the decisions of media outlets to devote attention to terrorist attacks and discusses how such coverage influences potential sympathizers and supporters.

First, the fact that most terrorist attacks receive no or little media attention suggests that terrorist groups vary substantially in their ability to design attacks to garner media attention. It is not easy for terrorists to manipulate the media coverage they receive. Knowledge of why some terrorist attacks succeed and others fail to attract media attention could provide important insights into the political goals, media perceptive, and organizational capacity of the perpetrators. However, terrorist attacks vary widely for attention they receive. Most terrorist attacks receive no attention from major media outlets. Others, such as those in New York and Washington, DC, in 2001, London in 2005, and Mumbai in 2008, received heavy coverage (Kern, Just, & Norris 2003).

Second, a better understanding of the motivations of and constraints facing media outlets could inform the design of media relations and public diplomacy strategies of agencies responsible for counterterrorism. This coverage can provide terrorists with a vehicle for conveying their political messages to mass audiences, and it can distract from public understanding of the difficulty of preventing terrorist attacks and the steps that the authorities take to achieve this objective. Research in this area has begun to explore, in a systematic manner, the conditions under which the media are more or less likely to devote considerable coverage to terrorist attacks rather than other topics or other aspects of counterterrorism.

Third, the structure and competitiveness of the news industry appear to influence media attention to terrorism. As the media environment becomes more decentralized and competitive, news outlets may try to maintain market share by devoting more attention to terrorist attacks that employ novel tactics or that are particularly violent. Such a development could pose new challenges for the media relations of homeland security agencies by giving the public a distorted picture of the threat from terrorism and reducing the ability of the authorities to explain their policies and to put the problem of terrorism in an appropriate context.

Fourth, existing research is beginning to explore how the tone with which the media covers terrorism influences the attitudes and behaviours of mass publics, including voters, as well as potential sympathizers with terrorist movements. There is considerable evidence that coverage of terrorism increases fear and anxiety and that these emotional changes influence the preference of some members of the public for counterterrorism policies that rely on force. This may make it more difficult for authorities to respond to terrorist attacks with other types of policies, even if these policies might produce superior results. It is sometimes claimed that terrorists are effective in manipulating media coverage to convey their message to a mass audience and to gain sympathizers and supporters (Walsh 2010).

In other words, the narrative in the news stories about terrorist acts concentrates on the human-interest angle, without emphasising or discussing on the historical background

of the perpetrators of the violence acts or the victims of the violence acts. Although the media look for drama in all the events they consider worthy of being reported, the emphasis on the tragedy, violence, reactive and theatrical aspects of terrorist acts at the expense of detailed analysis of the events is so one-sided that one American political philosopher refers to broadcast coverage of terrorism, in particular, as a “phonograph of grief” (Weimann & Winn 1994).

Categorizing the relationship between terrorists and the media

The majority of a considerable amount of academic literature where this topic has been discussed has pointed out the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the mass media. Abraham Miller talks about the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and media, from which neither of the two can step out. He noted: “terrorism is capable of writing any drama – no matter how horrible – to compel the media’s attention ... Terrorism, like an ill-mannered enfant terrible, is the media’s stepchild, a stepchild whom the media, unfortunately, can neither completely ignore nor deny” (Tuman, 2003:115).

Barnhurst proposes two models that try to describe the relationship between terrorism and the media.

The first model is the *culpable-media model*. According to this model, the media complete a vicious circle. By reporting on terrorist attacks, the media play a part in conveying terrorist messages to a large audience. This is a key aim for terrorist organizations, and therefore encourages them to carry out more attacks, which will in turn be reported by the media. This creates a vicious circle, in which terrorist carry out attacks, which are reported by the media, and which subsequently lead to more attacks. In a sense, the model identifies the media as a cause for terrorist attacks.

The second model is called the *vulnerable media model*, and views the media as a victim of terrorism rather than a cause. In this notion, it is proposed that, even though the media could theoretically stop covering terrorism, this would not be enough to end terrorist activities. Terrorists do not have to rely on any one media outlet for their communication. This is because of the existing competition in the current media system (Barnhurst 1991). In addition, a “breaking news mentality” is deeply rooted in the media. This means that every newspaper, television network, or radio station constantly tries to be the first to cover a news item, which enables them to draw large audiences to their particular news feed (Glüpker 2008). This is caused by the increasing competition among media to cover news items as quickly as possible (Kushner 2000). In some cases, this pressure can cause journalists to underestimate the consequences of reporting on terrorism, or lead to incorrect interpretations of the activities of terrorist organizations.

In other words, it is the type of relationship between two groups involving mutual dependence where one party complements the other. There is, however, more than one type of relationship that can exist between terrorists and the mass media. The diversity of causes, ideologies, and social and cultural conditioning factors that inspire different terrorist groups are equally applicable to the type of relationships that these groups establish with the news media. Four different models of behaviour are:

1. **Complete indifference.** The terrorists' goal is to terrorize their victims, without seeking to attain media attention for their acts. There is no expectation that the press will become involved (this situation is highly unusual).
2. **Relative indifference.** The terrorists are not concerned with being on the news, even though they are conscious of the power that explaining their cause in currently existing media can provide them.
3. **A media-oriented strategy.** The terrorists are not only aware that the press can expand the scope of their words and actions, they also perform a series of operations based on the knowledge that they possess on the dynamics and functioning of news producers. After well thought manipulations, the news media becomes integrated in the terrorist group's actions. (The 7/7 bombings in London that resulted in an avalanche of reports on the sentiments and grievances of Muslims in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe and on the role of the Iraq war in the recruitment of home-grown British subjects. The U.S. news media did carry stories on the radicalization of young Muslims in the European Diaspora before 7/7, but this coverage paled in comparison to far more in-depth reporting on the predicament of Muslims in Western Europe. Once again, horrific acts of terrorism triggered news coverage that informed the public in the United Kingdom and all over the globe about situations and development that should have been part of news reports all along).
4. **Complete breakaway.** This is case of terrorists that see journalists and reporters as enemies that must be destroyed, putting them on the same level as other direct adversaries. The press ceases to be an entity that should be cynically manipulated (as democracy's Achilles' heel). It is instead viewed as the appendix of a system that must be destroyed (Wieviorka 2004). (American journalist James Foley was executed by terrorist organizations ISIS on August 20, 2014).

These four options do not only give us an idea of the variety of possible relationships that can be established between these two entities, it also allows us to see how terrorists can alternate between different models, or even adopt more than one at the same time. In fact, modern terrorist groups frequently employ strategies that work to satisfy the news media's demands, while at the same time considering them an integral part of an enemy that they seek to overcome and annihilate.

Terrorists and their Media-Centered Objectives

Terrorists who commit violent acts are looking for three universal objectives: to get attention, to gain recognition, and even in order to obtain a certain degree of respect and legitimacy. These objectives are attainable for those individuals that are capable of receiving the most media coverage. In addition, those that obtain it have more opportunities to influence others. Terrorists always calculate the effect that their actions will have in the media and the overall probability that this will provide them with the opportunity to be a member of the "triangle of political communication" (Nacos 2002).

Terrorists' ultimate objectives are political, even if promoted as religiously motivated. Some want national independence, others vie for regime change, still others demand the withdrawal of foreign powers from countries or regions. Whatever their ultimate goals may be, terrorists know that publicity and propaganda are necessary means to their larger ends. Thus, when terrorists strike or threaten to commit violence, they have the following media-dependent objectives in mind:

- First, terrorists want the awareness of various audiences inside and outside their target societies and thereby condition their targets for intimidation.
- Second, terrorists want the recognition of their causes, they want people to ask, Why do they hate us? Why do they attack innocent civilians?
- Third, terrorists want the respect and sympathy of those in whose interest they claim to act.
- Four, terrorists want a quasi-legitimate status and the same or similar media treatment that legitimate political actors receive.

In view of these objectives, one wonders whether and to what extent news coverage furthers one, several, or all of these terrorist imperatives.

As these organizations become more flexible as well as desperate for supporters, they expand their reach to non-traditional audiences in their own lands as well as the West. There is evidence to indicate that terrorist Web sites are now targeting women and children. The West is targeted for both public opinion as well as potential sympathizers. The reliance on the Internet is growing, and all trends indicate that it will continue to grow, especially because hacking and shutting down Web sites is neither a serious response nor a real threat to these parties. Terrorist organizations that are devoted to their cause continue to dedicate the extra resources necessary to maintain an online presence while relying on the latest technologies, from Facebook to GPS, to further their cause.

Terrorism as communication

"If terrorism is a strategy characterized by symbolic attacks on symbolic targets, it is also a strategy characterized by international manipulation of the news media" (Gus 2011).

This chapter addresses terrorism as a communicative act and explains how tightly woven are terrorists' violent acts and their communication strategies. The most visible (which perhaps means most successful) terrorist groups are those that operate with a communication model that has advanced beyond simple delivery of a message to a passive audience. Rather, the modern communication model used by terrorist organizations is audience-based, meaning centered, culture-dependent, and always tied into an ongoing narrative stream that is part of the socio-political context in which these organizations operate (Corman et al 2008).

Merely killing people or blowing up things does not accomplish terrorists' purpose. A simple model for terror effects uses concentric circles. At the cores, the damage-deaths and physical destruction-caused by the terrorist act itself. This is certainly significant; it would be improper to minimize the importance of loss of life and, to a lesser extent, loss of property.

Their success expands exponentially as reports and images of the act reach larger publics. The next circle comprises local media from the affected area that are seen by audiences familiar with the site, and perhaps with the victims, of the attack. Personal attachments are likely to lead to more visceral reactions.

Beyond that circle are more distant news consumers. Those without physical or political connection to the attack may be only moderately moved by the news, but no matter how distant, some are likely to shudder with a sense of terror. How many people get onto an airplane, even today, without some kind of 9/11-memory-based flinch? How many regular train riders, wherever they might reside, were unaffected by the 2004 bombings in Madrid that killed almost 200 persons and injured almost 2,000 more? On the other hand, people with no connections to train-riding or to Spain may have felt a less personal connection and have been less moved except for a general feeling of sadness about the loss of life, or anger about the savagery of the act.

All but the centremost of these rings are linked to the event by mass media, primarily widely accessible news media, but also self-generated media that terrorist organizations use with increasing skill. Most mainstream news organizations impose standards that rule out graphic images from terror attacks, but the perpetrators of such attacks might disseminate those images through the Internet and other new media sources to audiences that are smaller but are considered high-value, such as potential recruits. The terrorist groups also know that videos on You Tube or other online venues can reach substantial audiences regardless of how much attention is paid to these items by traditional media outlets. Videos showing the execution by terrorists of kidnap victims have sometimes been viewed online millions of times. Overall, getting words and images to various publics is far easier in this era of fewer determinative information gatekeepers (Seib & Janbek 2011).

Therefore, the news media play a central role in defining what “terrorism” is and what is merely “criminal.” Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda are fully aware of how this process works and plan their actions accordingly.

Brigitte Nacos has noted that “most terrorists calculate the consequences of their deeds, the likelihood of gaining media attention, and, most important, the likelihood of winning entrance—through the media—to the “triangle of political communication,” (Nacos 2007) which consists of the mass media, the public, and the government. In other words, the terrorists can use the media as a way to inject themselves into the conversation of civil society.

The media collectively constitute terrorism’s oxygen, and how media-spread fear and anger affect the public is something terrorists understand well.

New trends influencing terrorism and the media

A series of recent terrorist acts indicates the emergence of trends that influence the relationship between the media, the terrorist, and government. These include:

- A trend toward anonymity in terrorism,
- A trend towards more violent terrorist incidents; and
- A trend towards attacks on media personnel and institutions.

Anonymous terrorism

Today we see instances of anonymous terrorism where no one claims responsibility and no demands are made. This allows the media a larger role in speculation, and generally removes most bases for charges that they are amplifying a terrorist's demands or agenda. Reportage is inevitable; especially if it includes unbridled speculation, false threats or hoaxes; coverage can advance terrorists' agendas, such as spreading panic, hurting tourism, and provoking strong government reactions leading to unpopular measures, including restrictions on individual liberties.

More violent terrorism

In the context of advanced information and technology, a trend suggesting more violent terrorism cannot be ignored. The while worldwide instances of terrorist acts have dropped sharply in the last decade, the death toll from acts is rising and the trend continues "toward more ruthless attacks on mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs. The threat of terrorist use of materials of mass destruction is an issue of growing concern..." (U.S. Department of State 1996). If, and as, terrorism becomes more violent, perceptions that the press is to some degree responsible for facilitating terrorism or amplifying its effects could well grow. Increasingly threatened societies may be prone to take fewer risks in light of mass casualty consequences and may trust the media less and less to police itself.

Attacks on media personnel and institutions

According to the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrew's University, international terrorism kills around 350 people each year. While they are exceptional, events like 9/11, the Bali bombings, and the Beslan school massacre create a spectacle of horror, which inscribes itself into the cultural imaginary of the international community. In many respects, terrorism, as it is infused through the spectacle of media discourses, becomes the antithesis of our modern project, creating a new threat, a new disorder that challenges the trajectory of a global political and social harmony (Lewis 2005).

Some commentators suggest that the level of community fear is somewhat disproportionate to the actual risk posed by global terrorism (Wilkinson 1997). This view, however, tends to parenthesize the symbolic amplitude of terrorism and the ways in which the media and public discourse constitute a social imaginary that re-presents the world of phenomena as social knowledge.

Attacks on journalists who are outspoken on issues of concern to the terrorists seem to be on the rise. Recent attacks occurred in Algeria, Mexico, Russia, Chechnya, and London, but there have been cases as well in Washington, D.C. at the National Press Building and at the United Nations in New York.³ The apparent back-to-back murders of two American freelance journalists by the same group are

³ According to the New York based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) more than 1073 journalists have been murdered since 1992 as a consequence of their work-33 journalists were killed in 2014. See website address <http://www.CPJ.ORG/>.

unprecedented in Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ's) history. The beheadings on camera in a two-week period of first James Foley and then Steven Sotloff appear to be an acceleration of a pattern--dating at least to Daniel Pearl's killing in 2002--of criminal and insurgent groups displaying the murders of journalists to send a broad message of terror. With the rise of mobile Internet technology and social media in recent years, non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have tried to leverage platforms like Twitter and YouTube for themselves, bypassing traditional media to disseminate their messages directly. Islamic State is not the first group to use the beheading of journalists as a way to make a point.

Conclusion

This paper investigated the role of media in terrorist environments. Particular consideration was given to terrorists' efforts to publicize their cause, their manipulation of mass communication, and the prospective impact of the new Media. Issues related to reporting terrorism including question about which incidents to report and how to report them. The concepts of information as power and media-oriented terrorism were defined and explored as decisive reflections in understanding the role of media.

In all places in the world, the architects of terrorism take advantage of the mass-media—including the Internet for the benefit of their operational effectiveness, information gathering, recruitment, fund raising, and propaganda methods.

In the future, technological developments would allow terrorist attacks to be pulled out in ways that were previously unthinkable. Terrorists found an influential partner in the mass media that would help them obtain public attention for the group and its demands.

REFERENCES

1. Hoffman, B 1998, *Inside Terrorism*, New York, Columbia University Press.
2. Ignatieff, M 1998, *Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, New York, Henry Holt and Co.
3. Ganor, B 2005, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle. A Guide for Decision Makers*, New Brunswick USA, Transaction Publishers.
4. Rainey, J 2005, 'Unseen Pictures, Untold Stories', *Los Angeles Times*.
5. Schlesinger, P, et al. 1983, *Televising Terrorism: Political Violence in Popular Culture*, London, Comedia Publishing Company.
6. Laqueur, W 2003, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Continuum.
7. Manuel, R & Soriano, T 2008, Terrorism and the Mass Media after Al Qaeda: A Change of Course?, *Athena Intelligence Journal*, Vol. 3, No 1. Available from: www.athenaintelligence.org.
8. Gus, M 2011, *Essentials of terrorism: concepts and controversies*, Sage Publications, Inc, USA.
9. Kern, M, Just, M., & Norris, P 2003, The lessons of framing terrorism. In Norris, P, Kern, M & Just M (Eds.), *Framing terrorism*, London, Routledge.
10. Walsh, JI 2010, *Media Attention to Terrorist Attacks: Causes and Consequences*, Institute for Homeland Security Solutions.

11. Weimann, G & Winn, C 1994, *The Theatre of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*, London, Longman.
12. Nacos, BL, 2002, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism. The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
13. Wieviorka, M 2004, *the making of Terrorism*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
14. Corman, SR, Angela Trethewey, A & H. L. Goodall, (eds.), 2008, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Strategic Communication To Combat Violent Extremism*, New York, Peter Lang.
15. Seib, P & Janbek, DM 2011, *Global terrorism and new media: the post Al-Qaeda generation*, Routledge, New York.
16. Nacos, BL, 2007, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism*, 2nd Edition, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield.
17. U.S. Department of State 1997, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*.
18. Lewis, J, 2005, *Language Wars the Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence*, Pluto Press, London.
19. Wilkinson, P 1997, The media and terrorism: a reassessment, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 9, 2.
20. Barnhurst, KG 1991, The literature from terrorism. In A.O. Alali & K.K. Eke, *Media coverage of terrorism, methods of diffusion*, London, Sage.
21. Glüpker, G 2008, *Media and terrorism*. Norderstedt, Germany.
22. Kushner, HW 2000, *The Impact of terrorist events in the media on the traumatising of society*, Vienna.
23. Tuman, JS 2003, *Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*, London, SAGE Publications.

PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY AS A VARIABLE WHICH SHAPES THE POLITICAL- SECURITY RELATIONS

Oliver BAKRESKI¹

Abstract: *This paper focuses on the public/private partnership as a base for cooperation on a political- security level. The starting premise is that the private security and its structuring as a powerful industrial complex influential in all of the most important social sectors imposes the need for its coexistence with the state, especially the police. Hence, the analysis of the public/private dichotomy is a continual challenge in order to behold the difference, as well as the border of the public security, and where the private security starts. The elaboration made in this paper consists of a few elements: first, it is analyzed how the public and private securities are settled; second, an analysis is made about what kind of tasks are these two sectors engaged for; and third, where the point of divergence and the point of convergence of these two sectors are.*

Key words: *public/private partnership, private security sector, security relations, cooperation, partnership.*

1. Public – private dichotomy

The public – private dichotomy was a subject of interest for a long period backward. A number of analysts attempted to designate the border and the factors which separate the private security sector from the public security sector. In some academic debates, considerations ponder that the difference indicators are the degree of accessibility: the size with which some subject (a product or a service) has an impact on everybody in society. The second analysis points out to the fact that the difference indicators are in the ways of formulation (public or private), the nature of the connection between the giver of the services and the recipient of the service, the status of the employees and the way of financing. Third analyses are made on the basis of coverage. In this direction, main indicator of difference is the size of coverage, respectively, what does the public security cover, and what does private security cover. Fourth analyses point out that it is more appropriate to speak for the area in which they exist, rather than the size of coverage, having in mind the many gray aspects which exist.

¹ The Author, Ph.D, is Professor at the Institute of Security, Defense and Peace, Faculty of Philosophy, UKIM, RM

The dichotomy is exceptionally important for the relations between the public and private security and it refers to the elaboration in the context of the security development. It is evident that the most used formulation of the public-private dichotomy refers to everything which is more known as public and/or private sector.

This conceptualized categorization of the dichotomy opposes the public or government sector to the “private” or market sector. This is because of the fact that the government in the first case assures the services and they are financed by the laws in which the taxes are defined, while in the other case, users purchase services from firms driven by profit. The second part of the dichotomy or the logical separation of “public-private” refers to the difference between what is “transparent” versus “covert” or limited. Actually, it is in fact what designates the difference between the public and the private space. To be more precise, the basic meaning of the public space is its openness and availability to everybody, anywhere and at anytime, and opposite to this interpretation, the private areas are those to which the access is limited and in which the ones that “own” that space are actually the ones that manage it and have the right to define and to limit it with a certain level of publicity².

It means that the question we need to ask regarding the dichotomy is where the border between the private and public sector is. In general, there is no simple line of division of the police from the private security. There is a network of private and public organizations which deal with maintaining the order, which are not ambiguous both for the police and the private security. Basically those are functions which in different amounts can be done by the police, as well as private security³.

Some researchers had already come with a conclusion that the differences between the “private” and “public security sector” are more and more insignificant. Through their research, Bailey and Shearing discovered that the security services became combined in a new way, making it difficult to separate the public security and private security. Using the term “multilateral” for the function “security”, will in the future mean division of the security in four larger groups: commercial security companies; non-governmental which act as their own security service, or proprietor’s security; individual or self-protection and government forces which enable additional protection, with additional work and paid service activities. Because these events continue to happen, the border between the private and the public sector will become more and more indistinct, making it harder to separate the traditional public police forces from their private colleges⁴. Hence, the first basic question is “Is the sphere of action of the public security equated with the private security, respectively, is it possible to make such a comparison?” Second, “Who is this function useful for?” and third, “Where is the line of the private, and to where does the private security span?” If the answer to these questions does not supplement the private security or the public security, than these thin lines can be described as a “grey shade” area which contours the margins themselves between these two subjects. It means that

² Ahić J., *Sistemi privatne sigurnosti*, Sarajevo, 2009, str.17-37.

³ Bruce George & Button Mark, *Private Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 115.

⁴ Johnson Brian, *Principles of Security Management*, Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2005, pp.

it is the complexity of the private security, so similar, but so different from the public security which creates additional hardships in drawing the line.

The next problem in contouring the borders of the public and private security is the fact that there are many employees who perform security functions as part of their general tasks, but these functions are not their main role and purpose. For example, a receptionist whose main duty is to salute the guests and to answer to their questions, can also have an access control function, even video monitoring for surveillance. Would anyone consider this person as an employee of the private security sector? Also, a regular staff as hygienists can be used to search through suspicious items if there is an occurrence of a bomb set. Does that mean that the hygienist that has to do that quite often is part of the private security industry? Also, many citizens do voluntary work which can be interpreted as security functions, for example, neighborhood surveillance projects and voluntary street patrols. Are these activities interpreted as a part of the private security sector, respectively the private security industry⁵.

Another factor in shaping the private security industry border lines is cultural diversity among the countries. What is considered to be the private security product or service in one country may not be considered as such in another country. One of the most impressive examples is the one with the firearms in the USA. They are often labeled as personal security products and much of the security personnel are routinely armed. If a woman in Great Britain feels threatened, she can bear a personal counter-attack alarm, while in the USA, the other option could be to purchase a gun. In the USA, certain firearms can be a part of the private security, while in Great Britain, because of the restriction for their private use, this could not be a legitimate option. As a result of that, there is a cross cultural question in these situations while contouring the line where the public safety begins and ends⁶.

From the aspect of the political dichotomy, it turns out that the connection between the private security sector and the public security sector can be problematic, because of several reasons. The first reason is the conflict of interests which can be found in the accumulation of the public-private working places in the private security sector and the police. In the attempt to avoid this type of conflict, certain countries of EU had appropriated a legislature for limitation of the unnecessary accumulation of activities. In Belgium, Greece and Portugal for example, it is not allowed to private security companies to be involved in weapons production and distribution, nor in other activities which can threaten public security. The employees in these companies cannot be employed in the police or in the intelligence services (for example, Belgium, France and Portugal), and if they were, at least five years would have to pass before they could be employed in the private security sector. In some countries, it is not allowed for a private security employee to be an attorney or a notary, for example in Lithuania. In France, employees of the private security companies cannot be active in any other economic sphere. Unlike these examples, the experience in Russia shows that the law enables the military personnel from the organs of the Federal security service, while they are still employed, to be assigned to work in private firms and security companies with a

⁵ Bruce George & Button Mark, *Private Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, pp. 14-15.

⁶ Same., p. 15.

previous approval by their directors, regardless of the nature of the property⁷. According to Vadim Volkov, in the middle of the 90's from the 20th century, even 20% of the personnel from the Federal security service had a double function both in the public and the private security sector⁸. Another reason for a possible collision between the public police and the private security sector exists if they are competing for the same contract, or if they work in the same area, or treat the same case. Also, one third of the conflicts occur when too many former police or army personnel works in the private security sector. If the private security sector is well managed and functions based on an appropriate legal framework, this is not always a problem. Indeed, in the countries involved in post-conflict demobilization and security sector reforms, the private security sector is quite interesting, first of all, because of the high degree of unemployment – sometimes it is the only option to find work for the former military and police personnel. However, if the private security sector is not firmly regulated or if the laws are not completely enforced, there is a risk that a great number of former police and army members who work for the private security sector can bring to influencing, partiality and engagement between the current police officers and their former colleagues who now work for the private security sector⁹.

2. Public – private partnerships and security cooperation

In terms of structural changes which occurred as a result of the political processes and global security threats, the private security sector was imposed as a significant factor and a key player for assistance and support of the state apparatus and the citizens, as well as a necessary partner in the fight with crime. By that, this subject partially takes the responsibility which traditionally belonged to the police as a most visible manifestation of power in enforcing security, and it referred to the exclusive right to ensure security of citizens and their property.

The achieved development level and the cooperation between the public and the private security sector in a defined social – political system depends on numerous factors, among them is the position they take in society, the ways of deciding for the position, the place and the role of these sectors in the country, their contribution and real significance, the ways of financing these sectors, the nature of relations etc. Also, the connections between the users of security and those who deliver it, the working status of the employees who give services to a certain user etc.¹⁰. The comparison between the public and the private

⁷ Article 15 of the Federal law of the Russian Federation 'On organs of the Federal Security Service'. in Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, *Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Policy Paper – №20, 2007.

⁸ Voklov Vadim, 2000, p. 486 (see note 9) in Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, *Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Policy Paper – №20, 2007.

⁹ Born Hans, Caparini Marina, and Cole Eden, *Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Policy Paper – №20, 2007, p.20.

¹⁰ Ahić J., *Sistemi privatne sigurnosti*, Sarajevo, 2009, str.17-37.

security, as well as the explication of the nature of cooperation among these two sectors, expressed through the actual public – private partnerships shows that there is a chance for rapprochement of these two segments and that there is a clear need for their cohabitation in achieving the mutual goals.

From the conducted research, we can conclude that neither the police, nor the private security can perform their work without mutual cooperation and assistance. Although the private and public security sectors do not have identical interest in the fight against crime, their interests are complementary. While the private security owes its loyalty to clients and to employees, the police work comprehensively for the country. But, still both the police and the private security have a common goal – protection and security for the whole society.

On the one hand, the employees of the private security sector can be of great assistance to the police, providing clear and punctual reports on certain incidents, and on the other hand, the police can give proposals for conducting certain investigation. The services of the public and the private sector can be combined in order to decrease crime, and increase security¹¹.

In the liberal – democratic societies, market economy allows public – private partnerships. As opposed to that, the totalitarian organizations have the exclusive authority of achieving the security is in the hands of the country, where there are no evidenced forms of coexistence with the private security sector¹².

It is considered that the public – private partnerships (PPP) enable a clear specification of goals, rights and responsibilities in a legal obligation. Besides that, the long term and expensive efforts of the PPP can lead to achieving better allocation of the risks between the government and the performers of the private security. In the past, the government was the designer, the controller and the deliverer of these services. Through the “public – private partnerships for security”, the fields are equalized, and the government and the private security companies work together on every field¹³: from recruitment and training to military deployment, with which the partnerships for security enable military and security activities through the whole developed world. Because of the decreased defense budgets, the western allies of the USA maybe apply the principles for public - private partnerships very thoroughly, in order to decrease the expenditure through sharing the financial risks with the suppliers from the private sector. In exchange, the corporation gained a fairly stable basis in managing the monopoly of violence through partial possession of the defense and security infrastructure or their work or support¹⁴.

From a historical aspect, the relation between the public and the private security sector was not always the best. Back in the days, the police underestimated the private security, which felt that the police had no interest in their scope of action. However, nowadays, it is

¹¹ Dempsey S.John, *Introduction to Private Security*, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011, pp. 355-356.

¹² http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2011/87_2taylor.

¹³ Ortiz Carlos, *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, Praeger, An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, California – Denver, Colorado – Ohford, England, 2010, pp. 100-180.

¹⁴ Same., p. 100-180.

strived to achieve these partnerships, whose primary purpose is the development and the advancement of the public and the private security sector¹⁵.

Hence, the most frequent activities of the cooperation partnerships include:

- Establishing business contacts, including business lunches.
- Information sharing, such as local criminal tendencies, modus operandi (ways of work), incident information, e-mail addresses, web pages and info bulletins.
- Crime prevention programs, joint participation in the security field, methods for crime prevention through municipal security and joining the forces from a municipal interest such as video piracy, graffiti, false alarms and neighborhood watches programs.
- The sharing of resources, respectively, borrowing the technique and the terminological expertise, the lending of the computer equipment, “buying money”, loans and preparation of notebooks with contacts and other data.
- Training, such as hosting special experts and orators.
- Enabling a legal framework which includes the support and the draft legislation bill.
- Mutual actions, such as conducting investigations of complex financial frauds or cyber felonies; bringing a common security plan for protection of natural disasters, shootings and school violence, as well as violence on the working place and common operations for violations, such as street theft.
- Investigations and creation of guide books and review of: studies and protocols about false alarms, drug crimes on the working place, violence on the working place, intra info –television and others¹⁶.

It has to be emphasized that beside those kinds of cooperation, and especially after the 9/11 attacks in the USA, the public – private partnerships intensified the cooperation in the protection of the next sectors: protection of the critical infrastructure, cyber security, port security, terrorism protection etc.

At the end, we would emphasize that regarding the private – public partnerships there are situations when the economic expenses and benefits are an important factor in the determination whether the private sector is interested to engage in these partnerships¹⁷. Usually, there are short term expenses related with the engagement of the private companies and the adoption of the protection measures for the vulnerable categories, and that is why it is important to foresee how they can be motivated and encouraged to invest in the security sector and to focus their attention toward the long term benefits from the security

¹⁵ Dempsey S. John, *Introduction to Private Security*, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011, p.360.

¹⁶ Same., p. 360-362.

¹⁷ Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: Opportunities and Challenges.” *Homeland Security Affairs* 8, Article 18 (October 2012)

investments. That is why clear rules are needed about the types of benefits for the private sector, such as the example with the tax reliefs, which would result with investments for increasing the security. It is necessary to make efforts in order to emphasize and explain how the improved security in the direction of the possible terrorist attacks targets or other forms of violence is typically related with the further significant lowering of the expenditure for ensuring security. More substantive changes can also be achieved in the raising of the overall awareness within the private sector for the positive influence which its role has in the implementation of the security strategies. The concept that the security should not be perceived as expenditure, rather as an investment should be promoted further on¹⁸.

3. Instead of a conclusion: Advantages and shortfalls from the cooperation

The partnerships between the public and the private sector can enable many advantages both for the government and the business sector and can be applied in the countries with free market economies¹⁹ which means that their model can vary and can adapt of the actual political, social and economic conditions. Yet, there are situations in which the public – private partnerships cannot be applied because of the unique authorities given to the government. Also, there are cases in which these kinds of partnerships simply did not succeed to achieve the projected goals and did not satisfy the demands, or the business did not match with the governmental recommendations. The limitations of the public – private partnerships are consisted in the fact that certain functions remain social and are in the scope of the public sector. The decisions for employment and dismissal of governmental staff are of course, a jurisdiction of the public administration – and have to remain under the jurisdiction of the public sector. The agreements with the private sector can assist the governmental institutions in the human resource processes, for the enabling of the operative support, information, as well as expertise. Still, the concrete decisions have their roots from the political processes, and for their validity, a government signature is needed. If the opposite thing is done, the political process is undermined, and space is left for serious conflicts of interests, which is unacceptable and unethical for the government. The resource supply, crisis management and providing contracts is a task for the public sector and it should not be in the hands of the private complex, from the reasons that the private businesses cannot be obliged with budget resources. The firms can offer advises for the budget solutions, but cannot approve it. The public sector²⁰ also concludes contracts for goods and services supplies, and these contracts have to be signed by government representatives. If this activity is transferred and is under the incidence of control of the private sector, the public trust for the government authorities in charge for the tax revenues would completely collapse. Inappropriate management with the contracts of the public – private partnerships can lead to unsatisfied needs and surpassing the expenditure²¹.

¹⁸ http://news.wustl.edu/Documents/weidenbaum_biz_terror.pdf

¹⁹ <http://tenzorconsult.com/article/202>

²⁰ <http://o.canada.com/news/national/are-private-security-firms-the-answer-to-rising-police-costs/>

²¹ <https://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=LNLjjcfSktQ%3D&tabid=423>.

Fundamentally, the communication between the public and the private sector can decrease the skepticism and the mutual distrust. The continuous cooperation and interaction can build trust instead of separation and can be consisted of creation of future plans or an emergency response to a natural disaster. The public – private partnerships have a catalyst role for the new technological innovations. Although it seems that the cooperation goes smoothly in every cooperation initiative, still, the real cooperation can be far from mutual. Also, there are suggestions that if there is a consensus for the significance of the protection of the critical infrastructure, this consensus can be very shallow. The public – private partnerships enable a higher value for the government and the business sector, but there are still some fundamental gaps and examples when those kinds of partnerships simply can't realize their primary purpose. This kind of organization can lead to organization pathology, long term challenges, as well as much incertitude. In the public – private partnerships, the traditional hierarchy contributes for cooperation. As an addition of some traditional skills in the control and the management, the managers need to connect and coordinate in the common activities, the resources and the capabilities more and more. To that, as the platform for public – private partnerships mellows, the managerial and organizational responsibilities will alter, regarding the private and the ethical issues²².

The private security sector has to cooperate closely with the police because it will take over a bigger part from their responsibilities, and this cooperation in the field of security will play a key role in the protection of the state assets, as well as the need of the private security sector to acknowledge the technological development and the bigger networks of criminal organizations²³. Still, there is an opinion that this cooperation can be perceived as insufficient also because additional efforts are needed to be made for a more intensive cooperation which should create significant partnerships which will enable a solution for the broader interests in the country.

The advantages of the cooperation of the public/private security sector are these:

- Establishing business and personal contacts.
- Cooperation in certain projects, such as problems in urban habitats and high-tech, or cyber crime.
- Crime prevention and public protection.
- Crossing techniques and crime prevention through use of technology and control strategies.
- Information sharing.
- Expanding the resources. (the police could train or assist the private security to perform part of their work, including contracts for certain non criminal and harmless tasks for which police authority is needed, also the security can be helpful for the police in dealing with the corporate crime).

²² <http://law.jrank.org/pages/1691/Police-Private-Police-Industrial-Security.html>

²³ Lois Pilant, "Achieving State-of-the-Art Surveillance," *Police Chief* (June 1993), p. 25, in *Introduction to Private Security*, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011.

– The new problems and crime are in continuous upsurge and common efforts of the private/public sector are necessary to cope with this kind of crime (such as cyber crime)²⁴.

Today, it has to be underlined that the cooperation between the public and the private security sector is more troublesome. Numerous examples reveal that there is a lack of cooperation which has to be an essential link and a fundament for the public – private partnership.

It means that the lack of cooperation and communication between the police and the private security sector is considered to be insufficient. Beside the strong interests for crime prevention, the police and the private security rarely cooperate among themselves. One study showed that only 5% to 10% of the police officers cooperate with the private security sector, and that the training created for dealing with the threats from terrorist attacks, other natural disasters and social unrests includes only the police, fire brigade, the health care and the state organs, but omit the private security sector²⁵.

In the vehement discussion for the reasons of the lack of cooperation, it is explicitly and categorically noted that some of the reasons are also the discontent of the police from the private security and its shortfall of quality staff, appropriate training and education, certification, as well as the fact that the private security counterpoises „a threat” for their working area. On the other hand, they acknowledge that many of the private security personnel believe that the police have little knowledge about the numerous abilities, skills and services which they offer and as a result of that they cannot respect their role in the fight against crime and its prevention. Another, greater source of conflict is the information sharing, which according to the Act for freedom of information, is why some of the companies do not want a credible information to end in the hands of the public, and that is why many which illegally publish information are facing cyber crime charges, unlike the police officers, who use the gathered material and information to solve the case. However, in certain situations, the police can be legally disabled to share information with the private security sector. Beside the hardships in the cooperation of the police and the private security sector, the private and the state subject should still cooperate together because of these reasons:

– the police can assist in the preparation of the private security sector to contribute in emergencies (this is extremely important because the security is the one that first faces with the dangers). Also, the police can help in the coordination of the joint forces for securing the critical infrastructure, for which the private sector is responsible, as well as to assist the training of the private security in order to enable additional resources, competence and services.

– the police can benefit from the solid knowledge of the private security in the areas of technology and cyber crime, as well as to get to the source of information about certain incidents with which the number of emergency calls would be decreased²⁶.

²⁴ Dempsey S.John, *Introduction to Private Security*, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011, pp. 359-360.

²⁵ Same., p. 356.

²⁶ Same., p. 355-356.

REFERENCES

1. Akanji, Olajide O., (2009) *Politicised Intervention: Private Security Companies and Armed Conflicts in Africa*, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan,.
2. Ahić J., (2009) *Sistemi privatne sigurnosti*, Sarajevo,.
3. Article 15 of the Federal law of the Russian Federation 'On organs of the Federal Security Service.
4. Brian Johnson, (2005) *Principles of Security Management*, Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey,.
5. Bruce George & Button Mark, (2004) *Private Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,.
6. Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. (October 2012) "Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: Opportunities and Challenges." *Homeland Security Affairs* 8, Article 18.
7. Diamond A. Peter, (1999) *Issues In Privatizing Social Security*, MIT Press,.
8. Draper H., (1978) *Private Police*, Sussex: Harvester Press.
9. Dempsey S.J., (2011) *Introduction to Private Security*, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning,.
10. Hans B., Caparini, M. and Cole, E.(2007) *Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Policy Paper – №20,.
11. Hess, M.K. (2009) *Introduction to Private Security*, Wadsworth, Cengage Learning,.
12. Ortiz C., (2010) *Private Armed Forces and Global Security*, Praeger, An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, California – Denver, Colorado – Oxford, England,.
13. Pilant L., (June 1993) "Achieving State-of-the-Art Surveillance," *Police Chief*.
14. Sennewald A. C., (2003) *Effective Security Management*, Elsevier Science,.
15. Available on: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2011/87_2taylor. []
16. Available on: http://news.wustl.edu/Documents/weidenbaum_biz_terror.pdf []
17. Available on: <http://tenzorconsult.com/article/202> []
18. Available on: <http://o.canada.com/news/national/are-private-security-firms-the-answer-to-rising-police-costs/> []
19. Available on: <https://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=LNLjjcfSktQ%3D&tabid=423> []
20. Available on: <http://law.jrank.org/pages/1691/Police-Private-Police-Industrial-Security.html> []

CONCEPT AND PRIORITIES OF CYBER DEFENCE

Toni NAUMOVSKI¹
Vancho KENKOV²

Abstract: *Cyber defence is emerging as a high priority in an era of increasing use of information technology in the globalized world. Understanding cyber defence and security issues such as cyber space, cyber crime and cyber attacks ensure efficient functioning of information systems.*

Cyber attacks in cyber space are real, unexpected and increasing in number rapidly. This paper deals with cyber space as a new domain of security, as well as with the ability to protect cyber space from cyber attacks. It also explains the scope of cyber defence and the devastating effect and consequences of cyber attacks. The paper elaborates on the NATO approach in order to achieve effective cyber defence and secure Communication and Information Systems (CIS) services for the Alliance and its members.

Key words: *cyber space, cyber crimes, cyber attacks, cyber defence, cyber power.*

Introduction

In the era of information technology dominance, cyber space has become a significant security issue for governments and has led them to take measures for greater cyber security. The reliance of our societies on information technology resulted in evident security problems. Governments began to develop procedures and actions to protect cyber space from cyber attacks and this ability has become essential for cyber defence. The use of information technology by many participants defines cyber space as the new domain of security and a critical area of national security.

Cyber defence has become one of the top government priorities. There is a strong commitment to mitigate threats posed to cyber space. Many governments recognized that securing the society against cyber attacks can be addressed only through international cooperation and partnership, but there is still a lack of political will to implement cooperation in the field of cyber defence. The effect of cyber attacks also influences NATO communication and information systems and the Alliance has made many coordinated approaches to protect the key information and communication infrastructure. The Alliance also develops practical cooperation in the field of cyber defence with partner countries and other international organizations. Research, education and training are another dimension in the scope of cyber defence. This is an ongoing process due to the fact that cyber attacks are highly uncertain and unexpected. They are usually asymmetric with advantageous position of offence.

¹ The Author is working on his PhD thesis at the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Skopje.

² The Author, PhD, is a professor at the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace, Skopje.

Cyber space as a new security issue

Cyber space is a global domain within the information environment consisting of an interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, 2011).

Cyber space does not have a standard definition and this term is used to describe a non-physical space which is composed of many communication and information systems connected by the global network. It is used to describe a virtual world of information systems where an object in cyber space refers to a block of data floating around a computer system or network. With the advent of the Internet, cyber space now extends to the global network of computers.

Cyber space, the 5th space of warfare (after land, sea, air, and space) consists of all of the computer networks in the world and everything they are connect to and control via cable, fiber-optic or wireless. It is not just the Internet and includes many other networks that are not supposed to be accessible from the Internet (Schreier, Weekes, Winkler, 2011:8). In the era of information technologies and interconnections between individuals via communication and information systems, cyber space becomes one of the critical areas of national security, because the vulnerability of the states to cyber crimes is a significant security risk. Cyber space is a medium that consists of many participants with the ability to affect and influence each other and it is a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures (Baykal, 2013:7).

Another term, mentioned above, related to cyber space is cyber crime. According to Baykal (Baykal, 2013:9) cyber crime covers a broad scope of criminal activities but can be basically divided into three major categories: cyber crimes against person, cyber crimes against property and cyber crimes against government. Abusing any person by using a computer, such as religious, sexual or racial harassment, includes violation of privacy of individuals. The distribution of malicious software may harm the property of individuals and this is also called computer vandalism. The actions used to threaten governments are considered cyber terrorism and it refers to cracking governmental or military communication and information systems. Actually, the goal of cyber crime is to gain unauthorized access to a system in order to steal and gain access to confidential information or demolishing or causing harm to communication and information systems in order to damage or break the performance of the system. Individuals, sub national groups and governments are using cyber space to advance interest through malicious activities. Terrorist groups recruit, train, and target through the Internet, organized criminal enterprises, exploit financial data with profits that exceed drug trafficking, and intelligence services steal secrets (Reveron, 2012:3).

The security of cyber space is a significant challenge of national security. Cyber security refers to technologies, processes and practices designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. It includes the security of applications, information, and networks. Disaster recovery and end-user education are also a part of cyber security (Baykal, 2013:12). In the scope of cyber security governments

should implement some measures such as designing secure and flexible networks, communication and information systems and use security policies, standards and sustainable security mechanisms.

Cyber security or ability to protect and defend the use of cyber space from cyber attacks is essential for cyber defence. Securing the society against cyber attacks has become one of the highest priorities and to achieve this, governments must vigorously defend networks, and systems from varieties of threats both internal and external. It is important to list some cyber threats from the non-exhaustive list of the types of threat that we face. Here are some of them: spam (unsolicited email), malware (computer virus), web defacements (misinformation/discredit), user indiscretions (unintentional information leaking), targeted attacks (spoofing users to gain information/ access), classified information leakage, vulnerabilities exposed by poor maintenance, system privilege abuse (processing of private information/browsing unnecessary areas), social media, etc.

According to Baykal (Baykal, 2013:13-14) harmful actions or threats (potential or actual) are in the scope of cyber defence. Cyber defence targets the harmful actions that originally emerge in the cyber space. The objective of cyber defence is to guarantee the sustainability of cyber space services to users. He gives an example about which action should be treated in the scope of cyber defence. According to him, actions that have originated physically such as causing harm to server rooms or damaging cables are not in the scope of cyber defence. He says that this restricted scope of cyber defence only to malicious activities originally emerging in the cyber space is to limit cyber defence measures to the issues that can be best handled by specialized knowledge of cyber space, which is critical.

Cyber defence is a big challenge for governments and it can be addressed only through international cooperation and partnership. Governments have to lead a coherent response to secure the cyber space and on a national level it is a shared responsibility between all ministries and government agencies, the private sector and citizens. At the regional and international level, this entails cooperation and coordination with all relevant partners. It also requires selecting the best qualified personnel to lead these efforts (Schreier, Weekes, Winkler, 2011:14). Operating, managing and defending critical information infrastructure is easier when responsibility is shared and where there is international cooperation and partnership.

Influence of cyber attacks on information infrastructure

The information infrastructure becomes vulnerable and in the recent years there were many cyber attacks. In 2007 Estonia was subjected to a mass cyber attack. Governmental, business and media networks in Estonia were hacked by an attack that was thought to be initiated in Russia. The same year high technology and military organizations in US were hacked and a significant amount of critical data was compromised. In 2009, the hacker group "GhostNet" suspected to have originated in China gained unauthorized access to governmental and private confi-

dential data over a hundred countries. In 2010 Spain was under a cyber attack, when a world-wide network of computers was infected and among the infected computers were the computers of some major banks.

In 2011, during the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the governmental Internet Service Provider AMMAR compromised the confidential information of its users.³ Also, there are many claims that China has targeted US banks and newspapers, but determining where the attack originated is difficult. Even when it is determined where an attack has originated, there is a possibility that the hacker comes from another country, not from the country where the attack has originated. One of the most significant cyber attacks was the assault on the Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010 when United States and Israel were suspected. It was an act that had a scope to cause a physical damage to the Iranian nuclear facilities.⁴ In the NATO REWIEW online magazine there is a chronology of major cyber attacks. For instance, in January 2009, during the military offensive in the Gaza Strip, the Israel's internet infrastructure was attacked. The attack was focused on government websites. Israel suspected that the attack was executed by a criminal organization based in a former Soviet state, but sponsored by Hamas or Hezbollah. In 2010 a group named "Iranian Cyber Army" disrupted the service of the popular Chinese search engine Baidu. The same group had also hacked in to Twitter in December 2009. In January 2011, the Canadian government agencies were attacked. One of the objectives of the attack was to disconnect Canada's main economic agencies, Finance Department and Treasures Board, from the Internet. In October 2012, a worldwide cyber attack was discovered by the Russian firm Kaspersky. The virus dubbed "Red October", had been operating since 2007 collecting information from government embassies, research firms, military installations, energy providers, nuclear and other critical infrastructures. In March 2013, North Korea was suspected of launching a cyber attack over South Korean financial institutions, as well as over Korean broadcaster YTN.⁵

The core consequences of cyber attacks are: loss of Confidentiality (theft of information); Integrity (you cannot effectively control the system or process); and Availability (system becomes inoperative or infective). In the era of information technology, cyber attacks are the major threat to critical information systems which become more connected to the wider networks. In fact, cyber attacks target and compromise the critical infrastructure. These threats evolve constantly and become increasingly malicious. With the attacks increasing every year in number and scope, the governments and private sector have to force the measures that will protect the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of

³ See more in: Baykal, N. (2013). Introduction what is cyber defence security? Module 1. In Baykal, N. (ed.). Lectures Notes: Hands-on Cyber Defence Training Course for System/Network Administrators of The Republic of Macedonia. Ankara: Informatics Institute, p.22-23.

⁴ See more in: Michaels, J. (2013). „Pentagon seeking 'rules of engagement' for cyber-war“ USA TODAY, 4 April 2013.

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/04/pentagon-wants-cyber-war-rules-of-engagement/2054055/>

⁵ See more in: The history of cyber attacks-a timeline, Cyber-the good, the bad and the bug free, NATO REWIEW online magazine.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm>

the critical infrastructure. Especially the military has to think in this way and they have to expect that the cyber attacks will worsen.

At present, there is not any unique way to ensure information security. The varying the kinds of threats evolve into, the more difficult defence against these threats becomes. The threats are evolving so fast that users cannot handle them effectively (Baykal, 2013:15). Enhancing capabilities against cyber attacks is very important at a time when the critical infrastructure is more threatened by unexpected attacks. But who are the opponents of this 24/7 war. Hackers, organized crime groups, terrorist organizations, states or it is an insider threat. The last one maybe is arguably the most dangerous threat due to the fact of potentially unguarded access to the communication and information systems and infrastructure.

NATO approach to cyber defence

As NATO's operations become more network linked, the dependency between operations and communication and information systems has increased markedly. Protecting NATO communication and information systems through a cyber defence program is an integral part of achieving mission and objectives.

The core of debates and actions regarding to cyber defence is about a race between attackers and defenders as to who will find the next vulnerability first. The effects of cyber attacks can be highly uncertain or unexpected (Hunker, 2013). NATO as an Alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe recognized the risk of cyber attacks. Since the attacks of Estonia in 2007, cyber defence became a core priority of the Alliance.

In April 2008, NATO approved a Cyber Defence Policy as a common coordinated approach aimed to protect the key information and communication systems and any response to cyber attacks. Following the priority, a Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) was established with an authority to manage the cyber defence crises and to respond to cyber attacks on its member states. CDMA was tasked to conduct cyber defence of NATO information and communication infrastructure. The Cyber Defence Policy emphasizes the need to protect the key information system of the Alliance and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. The infrastructure within NATO is inexorably linked. It crosses national boundaries and what happens in one part of the network could very quickly affect another, causing potentially catastrophic results.⁶

Another respectable approach to cyber defence is NATO research and training in the scope of this issue. In 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD CoE) was established, in order to enhance NATO capability for cyber defence. This centre which is situated in Tallinn, Estonia, conducts research and training within the domain of cooperative cyber defence, through different activities such as consultation, analysis, exercise and courses.

⁶ See more in: Hartmann, U. (ed.). (2009). *Connecting NATO: NCSA Under the Leadership of Lieutenant General Ulrich H.M.Wolf*. Berlin: Hartmann Miles-Verlag, p.186-187.

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon cyber security was shown as a new security challenge that NATO has to deal with in the years ahead and NATO identified cyber defence as an important priority. In such circumstances, the Alliance has to help member states to develop capabilities that are rapidly usable, set according to the Alliance's missions. For "smaller" members of the Alliance it would be easier to develop common responses to cyber threats, than to do it alone. NATO as an organization can help and give advice on how to protect critical information infrastructure. Also of particular importance is building closer ties with the private sector, which has a wealth of expertise. It is necessary to find better ways through public-private partnership to investigate the military potential of new technologies, but carefully actively involving the public sector in these studies.

The NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept expressed the need to protect the NATO information and communication systems, as a result of rapid evolution and growing sophistication of cyber attacks. The Strategic Concept expresses concerns over cyber attacks becoming more frequent, more organized and causing major damage to public administrations, businesses, economies and potentially transportation and supply networks, as well as other critical infrastructure. The potential damage of these attacks can reach the threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.

In 2011 a revised NATO Cyber Defence Policy was adopted, with a clear vision for efforts in cyber defence and an Action plan for its implementation. The aim of this revised policy was to offer a coordinated approach to cyber defence across the Alliance with a focus on preventing cyber attacks and also to bring all NATO structures under centralized protection. It also emphasized the cooperation with partner countries, international organizations, the private sector and academia. The NATO Cyber Defence Policy and the accompanying Action plan make clear that NATO's focus is on protection of its own communication and information systems. The underlying policy principles are based on prevention, resilience, and non-duplication. The key of effective cyber defence is coordinated defence across Alliance members and NATO networks. Furthermore, there is a commitment that NATO will provide coordinated assistance if an ally or allies are victims of cyber attacks and request assistance (Hunker, 2013).

Cyber defence as one of the NATO's top priorities requires coordinated approach and capabilities to detect, prevent and defend against cyber attacks. The commitment to improve NATO cyber defence was reaffirmed at the Chicago Summit in May 2012. Bringing all NATO networks under centralized protection was assessed as a core task. The further reform, as a part of an ongoing reform process of the Alliance, was the establishing of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) in July 2012 in order to bring all NATO structure under centralized protection. The main purpose of the NCI Agency is to provide C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) technology and communication and information systems (CIS) services and capabilities for Alliance missions, including new threats and challenges like cyber defence and missile defence. The Agency also provides a co-operative sharing of information among Alliance, promoting the necessity of interoperability.

The Agency is the executive arm of the NATO Communication and Information Organization (NCIO), which aims to achieve secure CIS services. NATO recognizes the necessity for providing NATO with comprehensive cyber defence services because the entire NATO structure is connected to the same network and they face the same cyber threat. By adopting all NATO networks under centralized protection, virtual boundaries can be defined more easily and duplication of efforts and financial claims avoided.

Offensive cyber attacks capabilities developed by state or non state actors can easily affect NATO CIS services. In order to achieve an effective cyber defence and secure CIS services NATO has to focus on the new dimension of cyber space, cyber power. According to Hunker (Hunker, 2013), in building its security presence in cyber space, NATO must focus not only on preventing cyber attacks, but on how nations and non-state actors might use their presence in cyber space to influence events, in other word to exert power. He says that all discussions of cyber in an Alliance context has been about the defence, and less so about war. One focus of NATO doctrinal developments should be on consequences of cyber power, and not just fighting a cyber war or defending against cyber attacks. He suggests that the cyber power may serve as the framework for events that shape NATO's environment in 2030.

Conclusion

Cyber space as a new security issue referred to as the 5th space of warfare. In this interdependent world, danger of cyber attacks on communication and information systems and infrastructure in general is constantly present. The pace of technological change and reliance of our society on technology are even more impressive. With the increasing dependence on information technologies, the key information systems and infrastructure are more vulnerable to cyber attacks and that requires implementation of measures for their defence.

The problem of securing communication and information systems and their infrastructure cannot be solved utilizing uncoordinated and individual measures. Defence of key information systems and infrastructure has become the high priority of governments, developing common response to cyber attacks within international security organizations. In these circumstances international cooperation should be more than words. To address this challenge, it is necessary to develop a framework for further measures and activities with the primary goal of helping governments to defend against more and more damaging cyber attacks.

NATO as an international security organization recognized cyber defence as a core capability of the Alliance and its members. The commitment to improve NATO cyber defence is an ongoing process and the objective of the Alliance cyber defence is to guarantee sustainable and secure CIS services. While NATO strives to achieve this objective, there is still work to be done. The growing interoperability gap between Allies is a serious challenge for NATO, a condition that needs to be overcome. Furthermore, the increasing diffusion of technologies in cyber space requires development of cooperation in this field. Despite NATO commitment to enhance cyber defence, the truth is that effective cyber defence is possible by close cooperation with partner nations, other international organizations, academia, as well as with global information technologies companies such as Microsoft and IBM.

Cyber space becomes a very dynamic environment which crosses national boundaries, always produces new dimensions of uncertainty as a result of appearance of more centers of power in the cyber space, governmental or non-governmental. In these circumstances the above mentioned actors will shape the events in cyber space that can be multidirectional and affect communication and information systems with catastrophic results. In addition, technological changes can be put into practice by attackers more quickly and effectively than the governments. Ignoring cyber attacks can be very harmful for communication and information systems and their infrastructure. To avoid this, it is necessary to develop an effective response system with an international dimension. But the reality is quite different. In fact, until a country is not attacked, there is a lack of concern for cyber defence.

REFERENCES

- Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 Nov. 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
- Baykal, N. (2013). Introduction what is cyber defence security? Module 1. In Baykal, N. (ed.). *Lectures Notes: Hands-on Cyber Defence Training Course for System/Network Administrators of The Republic of Macedonia*. Ankara: Informatics Institute.
- Ehlers, J. V. (1999). *Information Warfare and International Security*. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Science and Technology Committee. <http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/nato/as285stc-e.html>
- Hartmann, U. (ed.). (2009). *Connecting NATO: NCSA Under the Leadership of Lieutenant General Ulrich H.M. Wolf*. Berlin: Hartmann Miles-Verlag.
- Hunker, J., (2013). NATO and cyber security. In Herd, P. G., Kriendler, J. (eds.). *Understanding NATO in the 21 st century: Alliance strategies, security and global governance*. New York: Routledge.
- Kissel, R. (ed.). (February 2011). Glossary of Key Information Security Terms. <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7298-rev1/nistir-7298-revision1.pdf>
- Materials from P4P CIS Officer Orientation Course, NATO Communications and Information Systems School -NCISS, Latina, Italy, 10-14 June 2013.
- Michaels, J. (2013). „Pentagon seeking ‘rules of engagement’ for cyber-war“ USA TODAY, 4 April 2013. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/04/pentagon-wants-cyber-war-rules-of-engagement/2054055/>
- NATO and cyber defence.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_78170.htm?
- Pindar, J., Rigelsford, J. (2011). *Cyber security and Information Assurance*. The University of Sheffield. http://www.eciia.eu/system/files/eciia_cybersecurity_pindarrigelsford_0.pdf
- Reveron, S. D. (ed.). (2012). *Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World*. Georgetown University Press.
- Schreier, F., Weekes, B., Winkler, H. T. (2011). „Cyber Security: The Road Ahead“ in: DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper Series (4).
<http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Cyber-Security-The-Road-Ahead>
- Schreier, F. (2012). „On Cyberwarfare“ in: DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper Series (7).
<http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/On-Cyberwarfare>

The history of cyber attacks-a timeline, Cyber-the good, the bad and the bug free, NATO REVIEW online magazine. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm>

Withman, E. M., Mattord, J. H. (2012). Principles of Information Security Fourth Edition. Boston: Course Technology, Cengage Learning.

<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9B5A9DE8-FAA3F39A/natolive/organisation.htm>

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69332.htm

MEDICAL CARE OF MASS SPORT EVENT AS A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL CIVIL -MILITARY COOPERATION

Zoran JEFTIC¹

Elizabeta RISTANOVIC²

Abstract: *Big sports events, especially those of a global character, necessarily demand engagement of the available resources of the host country armed forces. The great deal of the management of the big sport event is the organisation of the health care for the all participants. During the 25TH SUMMER UNIVERSIADE 169 medical doctors, 161 medical technicians, 23 physiotherapist, 6 biochemists, 6 pharmacist, 6 pharmacy technicians, 5 radiology technicians, 79 drivers took care about more than 20 000 participants, through Policlinic, ambulances at the venues and Medical military Academy. During the games we examine 2612 patients, and 55.21% were injured and rest of them have some kind of illness.*

Key words: *sport event, health care; mass gathering; sport injuries*

Introduction

Civil- military cooperation is a recently introduced concept and it means coordination of common efforts of civilian and military structures in order to contribute to accomplishment of a military mission in peace, crisis situations and disasters. The civilian structures are: local inhabitants, local authority agencies and institutions, international, governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies (4). *Civil- military* cooperation is a new quality by means of which civil- military connections are established and support is provided for the military forces in civilian surroundings.

Although the concept of civil -military cooperation appeared first in the military as its function directed towards giving support to missions and tasks to be performed by a military unit, reality and necessity of practice have defined the concept through the measures and activities taken by the military or civilian authorities in order to meet the needs of the host country and society.

The aims it faces most often deal with reaching and keeping the necessary level of cooperation between the system institutions and actors from the civilian society on one side and the army resources on the other side and, considered in broader meaning, cooperation with the MoD as well.

The significance of civil-military cooperation in the Armed Forces of Serbia is proportional to understanding of the position and role they should hold, both in the everyday activities and the missions of the Armed Forces of Serbia home and abroad. Undoubtedly, the appropriate use of

¹ University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies, Republic of Serbia

² Ministry of Defense, , Medical military Academy, Belgrade, Republic of Serbia

civil-military cooperation mechanisms brings multiple advantages to the Armed Forces of Serbia and the Republic of Serbia as a whole. In practice, this means that a higher degree of integration of the Armed Forces of Serbia into the social and political system should be facilitated, which could result in a cost-effective exploitation of the military and civilian capacities employed for performing the tasks of common interest and creation of a more flexible national defence system.

Unlike most other armed forces, in the Armed Forces of Serbia the function of civil-military cooperation is incorporated in all three missions. In other words, this function does not refer exclusively to the peace support missions, as it is the case in most countries of the developed world, where the "CIMIC" concept implies deployment of units only outside the territory of the state. In the Armed Forces of Serbia this function has to do also with the activities in the area of defence of the country as well as with providing assistance to the local authorities when necessary and when the armed forces services are needed³.

Big sports events, especially those of a global planet character, necessarily demand engagement of the available resources of the host country armed forces. Its role varies ranging from health, organizational, security or logistic aspect. All the measures and activities to be carried out by the armed forces in such extremely demanding situations for the country are part of their obligations within civil-military cooperation which is being built into given missions by all developed countries.

The jubilee 25th Summer Universiade was held in Belgrade and five other towns (Novi Sad, Zrenjanin, Vrsac, Indjija and Smederevo) from 1st to 12th July, 2009. All the parameters have shown that it was the world's biggest sport event held that year and the biggest sport event ever hosted by Serbia.

The Ministry of Defence of Serbia was involved in the preparation phase, in the course of games and after closing of the 25th Universiade, in execution of a large number of tasks within the following activities:

- Providing health care and medical support to the participants in the Universiade;
- Training and engagement of the civil national servicemen;
- Training and engagement of volunteers from the MoD;
- Engagement of the MoD members for protocol and administrative needs in the University Village and at the sports facilities (Cadets of the Military Academy and Guard Brigade members);
- Providing accommodation and logistic support to the employees of the Ministry of Interior;
- Reconstruction and building the sports facilities in the Military Academy (the athletic track, air-conditioning of the Sports Centre and construction of the Archery ground);
- General logistic support (washing of bedding, towels and sports equipment, assigning of the material means of the MoD and the Serbian Armed Forces to use etc.);
- Support and engagement of material and human resources in enabling and establishing the telecommunication system and exchanging information;
- Special defining of the roles in case of emergency;
- Implementation of measures, which the MoD was also in charge of.

In order to get a complete picture on the scope and depth of the activities launched and executed in the preparatory phase and during the competitions, it is necessary to point out that 5970 athletes took part in 15 sports events; there were 2737 officials, 1387 referees from 122 countries and all of them were provided with accommodation in the settlement especially built for that purpose. The competitions and the training were conducted at 53 separated sport venues; 203 medal award ceremo-

³ More in: Зоран јефтић Миленко Лаловић, Цивилно-војна сарадња – стварност и потреба, Медија центар „Одбрана“, Београд 2011.

nies were held; the athletes were given 1467 medals and 10,000 volunteers took part in the Games.

The aim of this paper is to show the principal contours of health care and medical support provided during such a big sports event, number of given health services as well as the basic steps in organization and including military capacities into the organization of the world event.

ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH CARE AND MEDICAL SUPPORT TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE SUMMER UNIVERSIADE – BELGRADE 2009

1. PHASE OF PREPARATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Although Serbia was officially selected to host the University Games in 2005, it remained uncertain whether the Games would be held at all until 2008. The economic crisis, size and importance of the event, lack of capacities of some partners as well as being late in implementation of the plans and preparations for the Universiade meant that it would be necessary to involve new partners into the organization and implementation of the project but it also meant that more members of the MoD than had originally been planned would have to take part in the event. Due to the fact that it was clear that the existing Organizational Committee was not capable of accomplishing organization of the Universiade, the Government of the Republic of Serbia formed a new Organizational Committee, thus taking responsibility for the organization of the event. The main role of the Organizational Committee was to find, within the state functions, the most acceptable and cheapest solutions so that the necessary quality of the services, which had to meet the world FISU standards, could be kept.

A particular challenge regarding the Universiade was health care and medical support to the participants and volunteers during the University Games. All the plans that had existed until 2008 proved to be totally unrealistic in terms of availability of financial, human and material resources. Having realized the importance of the event and the necessity of the more active participation of the Ministry of Defence and the Military Medical Academy, the Government of the Republic of Serbia made a decision in October 2008 to entrust the Military Medical Academy with the overall health care and medical support service at the 25th Summer University Games.

From then on, the active preparation with the respect of organization, providing human and material resources started with the aim for both the Military Medical Academy Management and the Ministry of Defence to reach the required world standards of health care and medical support, necessary at such a big sports event.

a. PLANNING

Defining of the tasks

- Level of health care and medical support – The level of health care and medical support to the Universiade participants was defined based on the FISU Medical Board and the official requirements, as well as on previous

experience and abilities of the Military Medical Academy and the MoD (15). The Military Medical Academy signed a contract in regard to its obligation to provide complete health care and medical support with certain limitations.

- Defining of the groups to be provided with health care and medical support – the groups of people, the groups of diseases and injuries to be provided with free health care and medical support were defined in accordance with the FISU requirements and the University Games standards (15).
- Defining of the ways of payment – a special price list was formed for the services not falling into category of standard ones, such as aesthetic surgery operations, chronic diseases, dental care and the national organizations were obliged to pay these services.

FORMING OF THE TEAMS (PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION)

Due to lack of time for organization, the Ministry of Defence and Military Medical Academy formed operational teams for planning and organization of all the tasks necessary for realization of the University Games. Efficiency was the basic criterion for the forming of teams, as well as certain personnel solutions which could handle the requirements and problems. There were three levels of management and organization.

The Minister of Defence represented the highest level of management being a member of the Universiade Organizational Committee, while the state secretary was a member of the Executive board. Both of them were personally present and involved in the activities on the highest possible level in order to solve the problems and get the information on current and potential organizational problems relating the Universiade. In accordance with the Minister of Defence decision, the Operational team of the MoD and the Operational team of the Military Medical Academy were formed, and they were responsible for the most complex tasks. The Operational teams represented the second level of decision making and management, and their role was to facilitate solving of the problems, functioning and involving of all the Serbian Army and MoD capacities engaged in the University Games organization as well as to control the dynamics and quality of conducted activities. Such organization enormously made the communication and coordination among all parts of the Defence system easier, looking for the best solutions within the system and defining the needs out of the system that could be directed towards the Government of the Republic of Serbia and other Ministries. The third level of organization and the tasks implementation was represented by the Coordination Team of the Military Medical Academy, which was led by the Director in charge of health care and medical support to the Universiade participants, the Polyclinic Coordinator, the Coordinator for the sports venues and the Coordinator for preventive medicine. A number of sports events took place out of Belgrade and health care and medical support for the Universiade participants competing there was organized in cooperation with the local health centres under control of the health care Coordinator in charge of the venues out of Belgrade.

2. GLOBAL ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL CARE

By definition, mass gatherings are the gathering of more than 1000 people at a particular location at a certain time interval (5). By other authors, mass gatherings include the events that have more than 25,000 participants. The incidence of injury and illness is higher for mass events than among the same size population (6). If the great world events and mass gatherings are defined as events with great potential for the occurrence of crisis situations, and the event, due to a large number of participants, a large number of events for a limited period of time in a number of locations, presents a crisis event in itself for each system that provides adequate service, then the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense should participate in these events in full and with all capacities, which is one of the most important forms of civil-military cooperation, both by definition and essentially.

2.1. ASSESSMENT

After establishing the organizational structure within the Ministry of Defense and the Military Medical Academy, each team started an analysis of the situation and risk assessment, responsiveness and risk management, financial and human resources.

Risk Assessment

Based on previous experience of the University World Games and other world events, published in the literature (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), such as large gatherings, rock concerts, the Olympics and World Championships, as well as regional and national competitions, estimates were made of the number of participants, the number of possibly injured and sick among the athletes themselves, as well as spectators, guests, VIPs, volunteers. Then, risk events that involved a large number of people in a small space were recorded, such as the final game in basketball, sports in which risk can result in injury threatening life and health of competitors, such as judo, taekwondo, high board diving. Then, the knowledge and skills of medical workers were analyzed and the skills that are needed at different levels of service and at different places of sporting events were underlined. Monitoring the global epidemiological situation and the recommendations of the World Health Organization, the risks of occurrence of epidemics and the spread of swine flu virus H1N1 were estimated. In cooperation with the Ministry of Interior and the Military Security Agency, the risk of terrorist actions and natural disasters was estimated; based on these estimates, the role of the MMA and the Serbian Armed Forces in cases of mass disasters was defined. As the Universiade took place in towns outside Belgrade, up to 100 km away, transport of the injured or sick from these towns to MMA posed a particular risk, because of the distance. Communication between staff and patients, different cultures, customs and religious beliefs of potential patients are also presented as particular risks. For the system to be integrated into one unit, it was particularly important to ensure adequate communication between teams and coordinators, provide all supplies and ensure the supply of medical teams in a timely manner, as well as food for all people involved. As for the sports venues themselves, it was necessary that medical teams are clearly visible to appeal to our teams.

Assessment of Resources (material – human)

Assessment of material resources – the Military Medical Academy put all its material resources into operation concerning medical care of the University Games. It has 1,200 beds, 24 operating rooms, 5,000 different diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Annually, over 30,000 patients are admitted, 20,000 surgical procedures and 500,000 examinations are done. Based on the available material resources and requirements for the level of service the participants of the Universiade should be provided with, the material requirements that had to be renewed or purchased were defined. It was found that there was an insufficient number of medical vehicles, and also concluded that it was possible to raise the level of service to the highest level possible by acquiring the latest generation of MRI, and other devices, medical bags and consumable material resources. Based on available information about the locations of the competition and training, their distance from the places of primary and tertiary medical care, as well as the risks of sports activities, the total number of ambulances needed was estimated, which in the busiest period was 35, at the level of the city of Belgrade.

Assessment of human resources – the Military Medical Academy consists of 470 physicians (120 professors; 237 PhDs; 68 Masters), 40 dentists, 36 pharmacists and 1,400 medical technicians. The concept of MMA is based on the principle that all services operate, even if 25% of the staff is inactive, as is the case during the holiday season. With redistribution of working hours and tasks, this approach has enabled formation of over 125 medical teams, each consisting of a doctor, a medical technician and a driver.

Level of Training of Personnel

The level of training of personnel within the medical teams and engaged during the Universiade 2009, stems from the education of medical personnel in the Armed Forces of Serbia. Every doctor working in the Armed Forces of Serbia has to complete undergraduate studies of medicine, to have a minimum of two years of work experience in primary health care, in most cases including providing of emergency medical services, and later to complete one of the specializations at the MMA. During the work at the MMA, they may all be on duty at the MMA Emergency Center, where they gain the necessary experience in providing health care in emergency medical situations. Before the start of the Universiade, training seminars were held twice at the MMA in providing emergency medical services. The MMA high school medical staff must complete secondary or high medical school and when in the course of being employed at the Military Medical Academy, all of them work within the MMA Emergency Center, Clinic of Emergency Medicine or intensive care unit. During the selection of medical teams, the level of English or other languages by the medical team leaders was particularly taken into account.

2.2. ESTABLISHMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS

On the basis of risk assessment, human and material resources and requirements and standards for providing health care to the participants of the Universiade 2009, we started to standardize solutions of providing services at different levels of organizational chart.

Primary health care, providing first aid, was carried out on all the facilities for competition and training as well as within the University Village Polyclinic. Every competition and training facility was covered with at least one medical team and an ambulance. A medical team consisted of a doctor, a medical technician and a driver. In case of assessment of high-risk events, additional team member in terms of a doctor, an anesthetist or a physiotherapist was added to each team. Each medical team was equipped with a minimum of portable EKG, defibrillator, and three sets of bags: internal medicine, surgery and anesthetics bags, with equipment that allowed providing first and emergency medical aid in the field. Each ambulance was equipped with a uniform medical material that allowed for providing emergency medical aid and life support during transport to secondary or tertiary levels of medical care. In support of the patient transport from the sports venues outside Belgrade, a medical helicopter was available, equipped for providing adequate first aid. The MMA Operations Centre was in charge of the medical teams at the venues, with the venue coordinator, who coordinated the work of medical teams working at the venues with the Polyclinic and the MMA.

In the University Village, where all athletes were accommodated, a Polyclinic was established, with the following services: Pharmacy, Epidemiology with the insulator, Surgery with Orthopedics, Gynecology, Ophthalmology, Internal Medicine, X-ray with ultrasound, Dental Unit, Day hospital, Physical Medicine with rehabilitation.

The Polyclinic Operations Centre was in charge of the Polyclinic, with the coordinator, who coordinated the work of the services within the Polyclinic, as well as the work with the medical teams at the venues and the MMA. At the University Village Polyclinic, primary and secondary level of health care was provided, with the duty crew to provide emergency medical assistance within the University Village.

All medical services that could not be provided at the venues or the University Village Polyclinic were offered at the Military Medical Academy. At the MMA, the so-called “fast lanes” were opened, which enabled providing medical services to participants of the Universiade in the shortest possible time. Each MMA department had separate rooms and beds for possible admission of participants, and the MMA Clinic for Infectious Diseases designated a special insulator for the patients suspected of having Mexican flu.

3. IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

Work on providing medical care to the participants of the Universiade began with the opening of the Polyclinic in the University Village on 24.06.2009, when the first delegations started arriving. From the following day on, with the beginning of training, medical care was in place in the sport facilities. The last day of medical care provided to the participants in the University Games was 15.07.2009, when the University Village Polyclinic was officially closed. An important segment of the organization of medical care at such an important world event with a big number of participants is the area of preventive medicine in assessment, control and management of risks. This included food and water control in all the Universiade facilities, as well as control of the current epidemiological situation.

The table below shows the number of people involved in medical activities during the Universiade.

	Team	Med Doctor	SRO attendee	Medical technician	Physiotherapist	Bio chemist	Pharmacist	Pharmacy technician	Radiology technician	Engineers and technologist	Driver	Assistant
Polyclinic		35		33	16	6	6	6		5	2	4
Facilities in Belgrade	45	72	23	80	10						57	
Facilities outside Belgrade	20	27		32							18	
Preventive medicine, food and water control		12		16						1		4
Total	65	146	23	161	23	6	6	6	5	3	79	6

HEALTH CARE

Polyclinic

During the University Games, 1793 medical examinations and 6007 medical treatments were performed at the University Village Polyclinic. 941 injuries were diagnosed (53.48%), and 852 cases of illness (47.52%).

Sports venues

During the competitions and training throughout the University Games, 585 Games participants were examined and treated. There were 391 injured (66.84%), and 194 sick (33.16%) patients.

Emergency Centre at the Military Medical Academy

During the University Games, 233 participants brought from the Polyclinic or sports venues were admitted to and treated at the Centre, 26 of whom stayed for inpatient treatment. 110 were injured (47.01%) and 124 were sick (52.99%).

The total number of medical examinations and their structure are shown in Table 1.

	Number of examinations	Number of injured	% of injured	Number of sick	% of sick
Polyclinic	1793	941	53.48	852	47.52
Sports venues	585	391	66.84	194	33.16
MMA Emergency Centre	234	110	47.01	124	52.99
Total	2612	1442	55.21	1170	44.79

Graphic presentation of the number of the examined, sick and injured patients

- Examined
- Injured
- Sick

MMA Preventive Medicine Centre

Throughout the Universiade, the *Institute of Hygiene* controlled water quality in swimming pools and performed food control.

Analyses of swimming pool water:

- Number of taken samples 112
- Number of performed analyses 2128
- Number of water chemical tests 1568
- Number of water microbiological analyses 560

Food analysis:

- Number of received food samples 2512
- Number of frozen food samples 1256
- Number of performed food analyses 13755
- Number of cast substrates 14300

The Institute of epidemiology

During the Universiade, 22 suspected cases of influenza (virus A) of H1N1 type were recorded. The patients were admitted to the MMA Clinic of Infectious Diseases for inpatient treatment. Out of all the suspected cases, only six were confirmed to be positive to virus of influenza H1N1. All the patients with influenza were successfully treated at the MMA Clinic of Infectious Diseases.

Conclusion

One of the most useful things, when the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Serbia are concerned, is the experience in organization and coverage of such a mass event, where a great number of people and material resources are deployed to several locations in real time. Practically, this event mobilized the Armed Forces of Serbia and the Ministry of Defence, while testing combat readiness of those parts that were involved in the Universiade activities. Prior to the beginning and during the Universiade, a special attention was devoted to specific education of medical staff in terms of their preparation to provide urgent medical treatment in cases of emergency, which resulted in an increased level of combat readiness of the activated staff and improved abilities to work under specific conditions in the field, without being directly supported by other parts of the hospital.

The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Serbia undertook numerous commitments and tasks in preparation and staging of the 25th Universiade. In spite the of complex material, financial, organizational and weather conditions, all activities related to the preparation and implementation of the tasks were carried out in a planned and organized manner, without any emergency or unwanted events.

In order to provide health care throughout the University World Games, we had to renew our material resources. Certain procurements were made to meet the needs of the Games, and consequently in the latter phase the needs of the Ministry of Defence. All procured medical equipment and ambulances (the value of about 243 million dinars), and 10 ambulances donated by EU (the value of about 40 million dinars) became the property of the Ministry of Defence. Substantial benefits to the defence system, which cannot be expressed only in terms of material values, were obtained through a rational engagement of human and material resources.

Non-material benefits represent an important advantage both for the Military Medical Academy and the entire defence system of Serbia. They can be defined in the following terms: Contribution of the defence system to accomplishment of a national task and advancement of national interests; Improvement of civilian-military cooperation with all the structures in the country and important international organizations; Promotion of the MoD and SAF at both national and international level; MMA doctors and medical staff acquired another important personal reference in their CVs, while MMA obtained another internationally recognized reference; Sharing experience with the members of foreign delegations, both professional and organizational, opened up new possibilities of networking and work on joint projects; Unique experience in organizing the biggest events for all the MoD and SAF members involved in preparing and running the 25th Summer Universiade.

The main deficiencies of health care during the University World Games were a lack of IT connections between the medical teams and a fully reliable monitoring of the current number of the injured and sick at the sports venues and the University Village Polyclinic. Due to the short period given to the Ministry of Defence to get involved in organization of the University Games, it was not possible to procure IT equipment timely, and consequently there was not enough time left for the equipment to be properly connected. The use of one information system would have made it possible for medical records to be kept in a more efficient way and for connection between the venues, Polyclinic and Military Medical Academy to be more reliable, which in turn would have added to a more efficient control, planning and response.

It was practically demonstrated that the military system in peacetime could be involved to provide support to civilian events, and that it could achieve great success, while getting closer to society and people as a whole. At the sessions of Organizing and Executive Committee of the 25th Summer Universiade, the extraordinary contribution by the MoD and Armed Forces of Serbia to preparing and staging, after the Olympic Games, the biggest world event was regularly emphasized. The official representatives of the organizations being present during the Universiade especially stressed high competence, professionalism and commitment of various categories of the MoD and SAF personnel who took part in the event.

REFERENCES

- (1) Arbon P. The development of conceptual models for mass gathering health. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 2004, 19:208–212.
- (2) Baker WM, Simone BM, Niemann JT. Special event medical care: the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics experience. *Annals of Emergency Medicine*, 1986, 15:185–190.
- (3) Brennan RJ et al. Medical and public health services at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games: an overview. *Medical Journal of Australia*, 1997, 167:595–598.
- (4) Доктрина цивилно – војне сарадње Војске Србије, Генералштаб Војске Србије, 2013.

- (5) DeLorenzo RA. Mass gathering medicine: a review. *Prehospital Disaster Medicine*, 1997, 12:68–72.
- (6) Franaszek J. Medical care at mass gatherings. *Annals of Emergency Medicine*, 1986, 15:600–601.
- (7) Jaslow D, Yancy A II, Milsten A. Mass gathering medical care. *Prehospital Emergency Care*, 2000, 4:359–360.
- (8) Зоран јефтић Миленко Лаловић, Цивилно-војна сарадња – стварност и потреба, Медија центар „Одбрана“, Београд 2011.
- (9) Keim ME, Williams D. Hospital use by Olympic athletes during the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. *Medical Journal of Australia*, 1997, 167:602–605.
- (9) Levett J. A new opportunity for public health development: Athens 2004. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 2004, 19:130–132.
- (10) G Loncarevic L Payne , P Kon, V Petrovic, D Dimitrijevic, T Knezevic, Mediћ, N Milic, J Nedeljković, K Seke, D Coulombier, PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS FOR TWO MASS GATHERING EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (H1N1) 2009 - SERBIA, JULY 2009, *Eurosurveillance*, Volume 14, Issue 31, 06 August 2009
- (11) Scott F. Wetterhall et al. Medical Care Delivery at the 1996 Olympic Games. *JAMA*. 1998;279:1463-1468.
- (12) Stiel D, Trethowan P, Vance N. Medical planning for the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. *Medical Journal of Australia*, 1997, 167:593–594.
- (13) Suner S, Gaffney JK. Medicine at mass gathering events. www.emedhome.com, 2000 (http://www.emedhome.com/features_archive.cfm, subscription required).
- (14) Universiade 2009. Medical booklet Head of delegation manual UB 2009
- (15) Завршни извештај Министарства одбране о раду током Универзијаде, Београд 2011

SPECIFICS OF TERRORISM IN THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR ITS EXECUTION

Metodija DOJCINOVSKI¹

Ferdinand ODZAKOV²

Abstract: *The occurrence and threats of terrorism continually create interest in the theory and practice regarding full identification of hazards prior to violence. Relying on their own forces and resources, terrorist organizations have adjusted their goals, political issues and security dilemmas. Different perspectives on the problem of broadening of crises left the firm stands on fighting terrorism and contributed to a selective support in preventive actions of international organizations and collective security systems.*

Terrorism is defined as an act of violence, but the intensity of the activities is different at different stages of action. The complexity of the problem of prevention requires knowledge of the indicators and the specifics of the process of planning and preparing for terrorism. Security challenges after increasing terrorist activities worldwide have eliminated the alternatives in terms of countering it. Mankind started adjusting to the new way of life, making everyday killings, abductions, harassment, injury and other forms of violence, a day to day concern of the international community.

This paper contributes to the indications of possible risks and threats of terrorist organizations and individuals, and their actions to breach the security situation in the period of planning and preparation for terrorist activities, indicating the various security aspects for monitoring, assessment and preventive action.

Keywords: *terrorism, prevention, planning, violence*

Introduction

The events after the Cold War and the beginning of a period of transition in the European countries and worldwide led to the domination of the concept of terrorism. Incomplete understanding of this phenomenon raised many security issues and dilemmas that stretch the period between the definition and the coordination of attitudes, slow down the process of prevention, and marginalize manifestations of terrorism, change scientific views, findings and claims, initiate further research. Understanding terrorism has divided nations and peoples, has affirmed ethnic, religious and national interests, and has divided regions and the world.

¹ The Author, Ph.D, is a Professor at the Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" - Skopje

² The Author, Ph.D. is Head of MSSl of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia and Professor at the Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" - Skopje

The meaning of terrorism is a result of the huge space of action, which allows daily impact on the human population, creates worry, fear, panic, insecurity, or even becomes more common in the real world. The lack of consistency leads to “use” the new forms - terms of terrorism, that today’s practice through the media sees as “narco-terrorism”, “terrorism in the West”, “Pornography: The New Terrorism,” “consumer terrorism”, “telephone terrorism”, “economic terrorism”, “terrorism on four legs “and the like³. Mixing these terms with the real meaning and true forms of terrorism, creates a feeling of absolute ignorance of specific terminology, etiological and phenomenological features of its creation, sometimes even disturb the existence and integrity of the opponent, even if he is unknown⁴.

The era of terrorism in which we live, enables fast and simple carrying out of acts of violence, shortening the period of preparation for action. Numerous forms of terrorism are a reminder of things that not only should not be forgotten, but should strengthen prevention, early warning and handling of terrorist threats, as an of state institutions and authorities, and ordinary citizens. Measures and activities in the “first operation” enable violence to be delayed or minimized to the extent of regular functioning of the system.

The authors of this paper wish to indicate the efficiency of interception of possible threats and dangers of terrorism, at the stages of their preparation. Thus, contribution to the research will be guaranteed if the curious reader manages to understand the phenomenon of becoming aware and creating dark ideas of terrorist campaigns, which will help in creating their own future and the future of their country and their descendants.

Real world today finds less differences between terrorism and other forms of violence, but a growing number of scientific books and papers, make differentiation regarding marked political element, use of violence, spreading fear and terror, threat, psychological effects and anticipated reactions, distinguishing the victim-target, organized activity, the method of achieving the goal and others regarding different forms of violence⁵. In his paper “A new era of terrorism,” the author, Gelke addresses the specific terms of the phenomenological and etiological aspects of acts of violence, that use elements included in the stages of planning terrorism. Thus, on the one hand two aspects are the key to implementation of terrorism: the action of a group, organization or movement as perpetrators, while the other the key to implementation of terrorism are the victims, who for the purpose of performance should be innocent people who are not involved in military operations, thus providing a clear indication that terrorism is a violation of the norms given by the humanitarian law of conflict⁶.

By identifying terrorism in the period of its preparation, the paper describes the events; identifies security-criminal aspects, the strategies of contemporary terrorist organizations, the capabilities of states and institutions characteristic phenomena and manifestations, the actions of the authorities, opposition and preventive measures and activities in the period of preparation for the implementation of unconventional acts of violence.

³ Echerenfield Rachel, *Narcoterrorism*, New York, Basic Book, 1990; Alexander George, *Western state terrorism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, Johnosn Phyllis and Martin David, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization report*, London: James Currey, 1989; Corcoran,

⁴ Jenkins Brajan, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975

⁵ A.Shmit and A.Jorgman „*Political terrorism*“, Guide for participants, authors, concepts, database, theories and literature, Amsterdam, Nort Holand, 1988

⁶ Adrian Gelke, „*New era of terrorism and international political system*“, Magor; Skopje 2009

Understanding the specificity of the problem

The most discussed issue at a global level in the last two decades is the type of aggression, which caused by various reasons, is being implemented in the field of political, economic, national, religious, military, security and other areas. Political elites have not forgotten the need to create and support the militants' wings for achieving radical goals. Many times the topic of discussion has been the difference between terrorism and other forms of violence, and why our own violence, perpetrators call terrorism? One explanation is that "Terrorism is a violent activity, fuelled by the outrage committed by a person, group, state actors and other offenders, to achieve certain goals."⁷ Individual statements confirm that messages sent by the use of terrorism, are not the basis for achieving main objectives, but represent manipulation for the request that can be intimidation, coercion, or propaganda. This approach opens a discussion that leads to the answer of the question of specificity, the ways and methods for the preparation of terrorism.

In the analysis of one scientific paper titled "Political terrorism"⁸, 22 items were identified that can be found or connected in 109 definitions of terrorism. The following represent the highest percentages: 83% for the element of "power-violence", 65% the element of politics-policy, 51% the element of fear-terror, 47% the element of threat, 41.5% psychological effects and expected reactions, 37.5% objective-target, with 32% intention planned, systematic, organized activity, with 30.5% method of combat, strategy, tactics, 30% insanity, abuse of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints, 28% coercion, blackmail, causing obedience, 21.5% publicity etc. All of the above aspects are taken into consideration in the planning of terrorist activities, but are implemented in all stages starting from the planning stage through the preparation phase, the execution phase and the withdrawal phase of activities.

Why perpetrators decide to commit acts of violence, defined as terrorism, is a dilemma, and that is why this form of violence is difficult to identify and even harder to diverge from other forms of danger⁹.

Armed aggression

Act of violence
Armed aggression
Political objectives
Twisting action
Mortality

Terrorism

Act of violence
Armed aggression
Political objectives
Twisting action
Mortality

Murder

Act of violence
Armed aggression
Political objectives
Twisting action
Mortality

Confirmation of this can be seen if we make a comparison between the given example, in which all three elements - armed aggression, terrorism and murder, are acts of violence,

⁷ The same

⁸ A.Shmit, A.Jongman, "political terrorism", Amsterdam,1988

⁹ Alfred de Mise , „*Lorenzacio*“, published in the magazine „Scene in a chair“, Firenza 1834. It describes the problem tyrannic and specificity in planning the murder of Alexander De Meduchi ruler in order to liberate the city of Florence

further, the three forms of jeopardizing can be armed, furthermore, the three forms have political goals that are planned, prepared and performed before committing the crime, the three forms represent twisting acts that may have to change the political landscape, opening crisis, eliminating political entity, etc., and in the three types of threats there can be victims. Despite these characteristics, the common denominator of the three forms of danger is taking measures and actions for successful implementation through proper planning before starting the activities. This confirms the complexity of the problem of the definition and identification of terrorism, especially seeing the preparations for indicators of terrorism, prior to its implementation¹⁰.

This attempt at explanation, favours violence and politics as inseparable blend of specific items that prior to performance bring close the power and after performance divide power. Division of power is the basis for achieving the goal, which should eventually absorb attention, reward, recognition, power, future, and many other aspects of the planned objectives that are achieved through the idea, the dream, benefits, fanaticism, and ideology. A survey of a number of phenomenological aspects associated with terrorism cases, can lead to the development of a number of security theories.

Theories of planning terrorism

Theories of planning terrorism represent specific explanations for the emergence and existence of the phenomenon. Most often, they are impossible without a comprehensive approach to determine the reasons for its occurrence. Scientific and professional practice intensively searches for understanding of the motives, tactics and strategies for achieving the goals. The three specifications provide the basis for the preparation and planning of violence. Terrorism is a tool to intimidate the civilian population by causing fear and uncertainty¹¹. Asserting that terrorism is a deliberate effect, confirms the need for time distance or period of creation of the idea of violence, to its execution. The idea of violence is created by limitations on the use of conventional means of warfare.

The dynamics of preparations for terrorism is dynamics on preparedness of the state authorities for prevention and early warning of crises caused by security risks and threats. The attacks on US in 2001, is a milestone in the development of future theories of security that learned from the case, launched a new application of preventive tactics and methods on the principle: "face the threat head on." Terrorism creates conditions for reaching the bottom, which the state does from the top. The symbolism reminds of times of history and points to open the scientific and professional literature alert the characteristics and specificities between the preparations of violence¹². The example of the George Washington University, where entry procedures were demonstrated at the conference on terrorism in 1998, pointing

¹⁰ Alber Cami, „*Traitors*“, Rusko Delo, 1905. The author explains the preparation of the revolutionary socialist group, which plans and organizes bombing against the Grand Prince Sergei. Identified reasons for preparations of violence relating to current revolt and heavy fraternity.

¹¹ Paul Wilkinson, „*Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response*“, 2006

¹² Zerar Shalian and Arno Blin, „*History of terrorism*“, Tabernakul, 2009

out that that one day terrorists were going to attack a building in Washington and cause hundreds of casualties, became reality three years later when 19 people contributed to the death of about 3000 persons. On the other hand, the planning and preparation for terrorism are linked with the ways of living which have been extremely dynamic in the past two centuries on the European continent.

The social order in Russia in the 19th century led to the humiliation of the people and creating banditism, which is accepted by many honest citizens who were trying to liberate people from the cruelty of government¹³. Bandits are social revolutionaries coming from the people who travel and call for the creation of associations and preparation of revolutions. The only activities available to achieve their own ambitions, ideas, and goals are violent means: poison, knife, gallows, and other tools. The ambience is always open for their use. Revolution, on the other hand, is the idea of the individuals-revolutionaries condemned in advance, having no personal interests, whose only need is a revolution. The nature of the revolutionary commitment does not allow delay and is cruelty to itself, but also cruelty towards others¹⁴. Passion of revolutionaries indicates the attainment of goals through constant thinking combined with the coldest calculation.

Planning terrorism is related to creating resistance, intelligence, organization, character and energy against the state machinery that as covert elements (invisible) cannot be defeated¹⁵. The real danger of the revolutionary group is recklessness of its members, while the real success is the secret murder that no one is protected of. Success is guaranteed with few people and little technical means, as a practical form of action. Among the various approaches for planning terror there are several sub-theories: first, attack is the best form of defence, second: freedom depends on the willingness, third: the spread of the news of the action is a means of propaganda, the fourth: choice of arms choice of righteousness¹⁶. Duration of the period of planning operations is different, depending on the conditions, training elements, commanding the action, safety measures, etc., and could take 18 months or more¹⁷. In the preparation period different objectives are run and evaluated, but the main activity is determined just before the action. One of the key features is the choice of unprotected targets, which may be simpler to implement. During the period of planning terrorist activities, information collection by their own intelligence agencies and individuals plays an important role. This period includes the implementation of exercise and test activities, in order to achieve the effects of the operation.

Profiling terrorism during the preparation

There is no restriction for the period of preparation (mobilization, recruitment and training) of persons to support terrorist activities. Anyone can be a terrorist; there is no re-

¹³ Mihail Bakunin, „*Terrorism and banditism*“, Geneve, 1869

¹⁴ Sergej Nejacev, „*Revolutionary Catechism*“, Geneve, 1869

¹⁵ Nikolai Morozov, „*Terrorism battle*“, Женева, 1880

¹⁶ Johan Most, „*Advice to terrorists*“, Frajhait, 1884

¹⁷ Mitko Kotochevski, „*Contemporary Terrorism*“, Makedonska Civilizacija, Skopje 2003

striction on age, gender, religion. They are very flexible and adaptable category of people who decide to dedicate their lives to achieving various goals (religious, ethnic, national). Managing them, directs their emotions in order to carry out lethal action where they see victims and enemies. They neither feel fear, if selected to carry out a suicide attack, knowing they will lose their own life, nor have they remorse for the innocent victims¹⁸.

Experience of monitoring the phenomenon showed and proved that after the arrest or killing of any terrorist, their number instead of decreasing, increases at least twice (usually from among the families and friends of those killed / arrested terrorists). Understanding the motives of terrorists lies in understanding their culture / ideology, therefore, their actions / activities should be understood from their point of view. Terrorist' scenes should be analyzed coldly and objectively, by assessing the possibilities for predicting their subsequent activities. Few specific steps can be identified in the period of preparation for violence: rationality, good motivation and mental justification for their actions. Aware of the difficulty in the creation of the group, the leadership in the organization of terrorism and organized approach. Terrorists in the period of preparation for violence, it is necessary to have decided to change their way of life, by being alienated from society.

In principle, the maturation of a person from the ordinary, normal citizen into a person ready for any order even to sacrifice their lives while causing significant damage and / or numerous casualties in his opponent can develop in one of the following ways¹⁹: the person first becomes a supporter of a terrorist group, and gradually gets closer and supports the group. Satisfaction by success, allows a person to become a passive supporter, and later a member of the organization with involvement in planning activities. There is an opportunity to volunteer in other organizations, which facilitates adjustment to the desired goal. Often encouraging events such as battles with police or other security forces, the loss of a close family member, a prison sentence and the like, can motivate a decision for direct connection to the terrorist group. This process of creating a terrorist takes place over a longer time period in multiple phases. Support from relatives or friends can be of particular importance, especially if accompanied by a recommendation²⁰.

Recruitment and etiological features

In the past, especially during the 70s, the structure of terrorist groups was stratified so that, if we compare the group with a pyramid, the base was unemployed and socially alienated people who in some way had been rejected by society. On top, there were mainly people with a university education. For a long time there was a deep belief that most suicide bombers are uneducated people who are deeply indoctrinated with the goals of a particular cause. But more recently, we have witnessed another phenomenon, which means more people with a university education, that seemingly lead quite a normal life and are

¹⁸ Malkolm W. Nance, Terrorist recognition handbook, second edition, A practitioner's Manual for predicting and identifying terrorist activities, CRS Press, Washington, October 2003

¹⁹ Rex A. Hudson "The Sociology and psychology of Terrorist who becomes a terrorist and why", Library of congress, Washington DC, September 1999

²⁰ Ferdinand Odzakov, „*Terrorism and organized crime*“, Solaris, Skopje Ckonje 2010

not different than their neighbourhood or workplace, literally overnight (at a given sign), cleared their past and became direct perpetrators of terrorist acts sacrificing their lives. A motivation to join a particular terrorist group may be different. In simple words, there are as many terrorists as there are many reasons. Renowned psychologist Eric Shaw²¹ provides an explicit example which he calls “the personal path Model”, regarding the accession of the people to their future “profession” as terrorist. Shaw says that “the components of this pathway include early socialization process; narcissistic injuries, escalator events, a separate confrontation with police and personal association with members of terrorist groups.”

Specific for developing countries (mostly from the Arab world, or more specifically the Middle East), the local terrorist groups prefer in their ranks to recruit new members from the younger population. Here are two interesting and somewhat opposing examples. On the one hand, Abu Nidal, in most cases recruited alienated, poor and uneducated young people strictly trained to be able to identify themselves with the group led by a figure which is also well-known and mysterious. On the other hand, Hamas is a contrast regarding recruitment. It is a well known fact that the group recruits its supporters from the Islamic University in Gaza, created upon the decision of the Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar El Sadat in order to prohibit the Palestinians to study at universities in Egypt.

The last two decades of the last century and the first few years of the 21st century, new trends in the system of recruitment by terrorist groups had been introduced. During this period, tens of thousands of volunteers from Muslim countries in Africa and Asia headed for training camps located in Afghanistan and / or region of Pakistani-Afghan border to learn the skills of war. Most of them were aged 17-35 years and the social structure varied from unemployed to highly educated.

In today's modern world, the characteristics of terrorism in the period of preparation to perpetrating violence identify division according to gender. Certainly men are much more numerous in the terrorist groups, but women's motivation comes from many sides: that her boyfriend is already a member of that group²², ability to execute certain activities that would make her more respected by her comrades, the motive for revenge for the death of someone in their family who had been killed as a member of that group, and more.

Terrorists generally are considered to be people who would make an extreme act such as hijacking planes, detonating car bombs in public places (street, near school, hospital, market or other public facility), and the most extreme are entering the cafe, bus, shop. Few pounds of explosives strapped around him, thereby causing the death of a smaller or larger number of people, mostly innocent women and children. But is it always that way? We cannot consider as terrorist an individual or even two or three people that for some reason took a weapon and opened fire on innocent people. It is considered that someone who is capable of hijacking an aircraft or commits suicide bombing is either mentally ill or just a fanatic. The famous American expert Maxwell Taylor with his collaborators study elaborates

²¹ Shaw Eric, D. “*Political Terrorists: Dangers of diagnosis and an Alternative to the Psychopathology Model*“, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 8, 1986,

²² Galvin, Debora M. “*The Female Terrorist: A Socio-Psychological Perspective*“, Behavioral Science and the Law, 1, 1983,

that people who apply any of the above mentioned methods usually are considered to be mentally ill or fanatics²³.

And renowned criminologist Franco Ferakuti simply notes that “there is no (in practice) isolated terrorist”, that is, when it comes to individuals that independently, without help from anyone, committed an act like those who carried out by terrorist groups; we have a typical example of “mental case”²⁴. An example is the study of David G. Hubbard referring to the hijackers of planes in which he concludes that the hijackers of planes are mentally ill patients whose disease is manifested by hijacking the plane. He said that all the aircraft hijackers have several common elements: abusive father, who is often an alcoholic; deeply religious mother; sexually shy, withdrawn and inactive people; younger sister to which the hijacker is protective, and, of course, poor / limited achievements, financially bankrupt, with limited earnings potential.

Conclusion

The twenty-first century is a period characterized by a complete divergence of the rules and norms of bullying. Terrorism is one of the methods for achieving goals, which proved to be the most effective threat. Twenty years ago, terrorism needed many people, painful preparations, finances, whereas today, it is a respectable tool of an organized group of people that due to various reasons and motives, achieves high goals. The effects of the preparation and execution of terrorist acts have become equally important both in the period of performance, as well as in the period of preparation.

Asymmetric threats are an advantage that the state actors responsible for prevention and early warning, are unable to timely identify and impede. Recruiting, mobilizing, funding, training, and psychological and propaganda and other activities are part of the great opportunities for smooth conduct of preparations for terrorist activities.

In the process of preparation of terrorism, engagement of volunteers is important, mercenaries, that shortens preparation for planning, targeting, developing and implementing violence. Red lines between the rebels and the government have been deleted in the proliferation of terrorist organizations, the number of followers, murders, massacres and other acts of violence that directly affect the human mind. Who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter, a legal and social sociological-philosophical dilemma, because beliefs of supporters of terrorism exercise are in expansion when pressuring unprotected, hungry, poor and dependent.

REFERENCES

1. Echerenfield Rachel, *Narcoterrorism*, New York, Basic Book, 1990; Alexander George, *Western state terrorism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, Johnsnn Phillys and Martin David, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization report*, London: James Currey, 1989; Corcoran, Clodagh, *Phornography: The New Terrorism*, Dublin: Attic Press, 1990

²³ Taylor, Maxwell, and Ethel Quayle, „Fanatism, Political Suicide and Terrorism“, No.2, 1988

²⁴ Ferracuti Franco. ‘A Sociopsychiatric interpretation of Terrorism’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and social science*, 463, September 1982

2. Jenkins Brajan, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, Los Angeles: Crescent Publications, 1975
3. A.Shmit and A.Jorgman „*Political terrorism*“, Guide for participants, authors, concepts, database, theories and literature, Amsterdam, Nort Holand, 1988
4. Adrian Gelke, „*New era of terrorism and international political system*“, Magor, Skopje 2009
5. The same
6. A.Shmit and A.Jorgman „*Political terrorism*“, Amstersam, 1988
7. Alfred de Mise „*Lorenzacio*“, published in the magazine „Scene in a chair“, Firenza 1834. It describes the problem tyrannicid and specificity in planning the murder of Alexander De Meduchi ruler in order to liberate the city of Florence.
8. Alber Cami, „*Traitors*“, Rusko Delo, 1905. The author explains the preparation of revolutionary socialist group, which plans and organizes bombing against Grand Prince Sergei. Identified reasons for preparations of violence relating to current revolt and heavy fraternity.
9. Paul Wilkinson, „*Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response*“, 2006
10. Zerar Shalian and Arno Blin, „*History of terrorism*“, Tabernakul, 2009
11. Mihail Bakunin, „*Terrorism and banditism*“, Geneve, 1869
12. Sergej Nejacev, „*Revolutionary Catehism*“, Geneve, 1869
13. Nikolai Morozov, „*Terrorism battle*“, Жењева, 1880
14. Johan Most, „*Advice to terrorists*“, Frajhait, 1884
15. Mitko Kotochevski, „*Contemporary Terrorism*“, Makedonska Civilizacija, Skopje 2003
16. Malkolm W. Nance, *Terrorist recognition handbook*, second edition, A practitioner's Manual for predicting and identifying terrorist activities, CRS Press, Washington, October 2003
17. Rex A.Hudson “The Sociology and psychology of Terrorist who becomes a terrorist and why”, Library of congress, Washington DC, September 1999
18. Ferdinand Odzakov, „*Terrorism and organized crime*“, Solaris, Skopje Ckonje 2010
19. Shaw Eric, D. “*Political Terrorists: Dangers of diagnosis and an Alternative to the Psychopathology Model*“, International Journal of Law ana Psychiatry, 8, 1986,
20. Galvin, Debora M. ‘*The Female Terrorist: A Socio-Psychological Perspective*’, Behavioral Science and the Law, 1, 1983,
21. Taylor, Maxwell, and Ethel Quayle, „*Fanatism, Political Suicide and Terrorism*“, No.2, 1988
22. Ferracuti Franco. ‘A Sociopsychiatric interpretation of Terrorism’, ‘The Annals of the American Academy of Political and social science, 463, September 1982,
23. Hubbard, David G. „*The Skyjacker: His Flights of Fantasy*“, New York: Macmillan, 1971

“SOVREMENA MAKEDONSKA ODBRANA”
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

International scientific journal „SOVREMENA MAKEDONSKA ODBRANA“ is a theoretical journal published by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia. The magazine regularly comes out twice a year and once a year there is a special issue on a particular topic. The magazine publishes original scientific papers, reviews of books in the field of defence, security and peace, on a national, regional and global level.

The magazine publishes only reviewed and specialized papers: original research papers, accompanying research papers and professional papers and book displays.

If Magazine accepts the paper the authors are not allowed to publish it in other journals.

Papers must not have more than one co-author.

The manuscript should be submitted in electronic form too as to facilitate the printing of the magazine. The pages and appendices should be numbered.

Papers should be written in English, where the paper should have a title, abstract and keywords.

The paper which are not to be printed are returned to the authors with an explanation.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PAPER

The paper should include: title, author, institution, abstract, keywords, introduction, main part, conclusion and reference. The full paper should not exceed 5000 words in English.

Title of the paper - 14 points, Times New Roman, centered. Title of the paper should be short, but give a true reflection of the content and preferably contain as many keywords from the subject matter covered as possible.

One blank line.

Authors name and surname, lower case (Bold), 11 points, Times New Roman, centered.

Two empty rows.

Institution – cursive (Italic), 11 points, Times New Roman, centered.

Two empty rows.

Abstract - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced. The content of the abstract should be an essential and independent entity.

One blank line.

Keywords - maximum 5 words, 11 points, Times New Roman, single spaced.

Introduction - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced. One blank line.

Main Part -11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced.

One blank line.

Conclusion - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced. The conclusion should be a brief summary of the paper, and to include research results that occurred.

One blank line.

Reference - 11 points, Times New Roman, cited according to the Harvard style of citation. The cited reference should be given in a separate chapter in the order in which they appear as footnotes in the text. Cite only the bibliographical data used in the text. Cite all types of sources of information - books, specialized magazines, websites, computer software, printed or e-mail correspondence, and even verbal conversation.

Papers that use tables, pictures, drawings, photographs, illustrations, graphs and schemes, should be numbered with Arabic numerals, and the title of the picture should be written underneath. Each image or group of images should be planned in a well structured manner. The images should be sent as separate JPG file with a minimum resolution of 300 dpi. Colour images are printed as black and white.

Format: A4-format, delivered in an electronic form.

Margins

TOP	5 cm	TOP	1.89"
BOTOM	5 cm или Page Setup	BOTOM	1.89"
LEFT	4 cm (inch)	LEFT	1.58"
RIGHT	4 cm	RIGHT	1.58"
		GUTTER	0"

The Editorial Board is obliged to submit the papers to the competent reviewers. The reviewers and authors remain anonymous. The reviewed papers, together with any observations

and opinions of the Editorial Board will be submitted to authors. They are obliged, within 15 days, to make the necessary corrections.

The time of publishing the paper, among other things, depends on following this guideline.

Deadlines for submission of papers - 30.04. and 31.10. in the current year

1. MILITARY ACADEMY

“GENERAL MIHAILO APOSTOLSKI”-SKOPJE

Doc. Dr. Aleksandar Glavinov, Colonel, Chief Editor

Vice Dean for finance, investments and
international cooperation

e-mail: aglavinov@yahoo.com;

aleksandar@glavinov@ugd.edu.mk

tel: 070 403 406

or

2. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE - DEPARTMENT OF PRODUCTION

Doc. Dr. Zhanet Ristoska

e-mail: zhanet.ristovska@morm.gov.mk

zhanetristoska@yahoo.co

or

sovremena@morm.gov.mk

tel: 070 403 046

EDITORIAL BOARD

"Sovremena makedonska odbrana"

The magazine published twice a year

www.morm.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defence/

СОВРЕМЕНА КОНТЕМПОРАРИ
МАКЕДОНСКА МАКЕДОНIAN
ОДБРАНА DEFENCE 27

ALEKSANDAR GLAVINOV

LIDIJA GEORGIEVA

ROSE SMILESKE, ZORAN NESHKOSKI

MUHAMET RACAJ, IVICA DANEVSKI

NENAD TANESKI, BORCHE CHAMINSKI

TANJA MILOSEVSKA, NENAD TANESKI

OLIVER BAKRESKI

TONI NAUMOVSKI, VANTCHO KENKOV

ZORAN JEFTIC, ELIZABETA RISTANOVIC

METODIJA DOJCINOVSKI, FERDINAND ODZAKOV

27

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА