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
29

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СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

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CONTENTS:

THE TRINITY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: DEMOCRATIC CONTROL, EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SERBIAN ARMED FORCES

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Abstract: *Existing analyses of civil-military relations in the Republic of Serbia (RS) focus exclusively on democratic control over the military, while analyses of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) are practically nonexistent. Therefore, in addition to democratic control analysis, this paper also deals with effectiveness and efficiency of the SAF. Based on an analysis of the SAF's participation in fighting the catastrophic floods that befell Serbia in May 2014 and in repairing the damage, the authors conclude that despite the military having fulfilled its mission, inefficient parliamentary control and limited resources available to the military suggest that all three elements are not sufficiently developed and that the RS has a lot of work to do in the domain of civil-military relations and their democratization.*

Key words: *democratic control, military effectiveness, efficiency, military missions, floods, SAF*

Introduction

Since the October changes in 2000 and especially since 2006, when it officially became the Serbian Armed Forces, the Serbian military has gone through numerous changes in terms of its organizational structure, the establishment of a system of democratic and civilian control, and the definition of new missions.The emphasis has been on transforming the military, first and foremost on reducing its numbers, abolishing conscription, allowing women access to military education and voluntary military service, introducing religious service into the military, adopting the Code of Honor, etc (Rokvic et al., 2013).These changes were made in conformity with relevant regulations and by legitimately elected government bodies.

However, the transformation of the military has not been accompanied by its modernization. Since the 1990s wars and the 1999 NATO bombing the military's material resources

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have been significantly reduced, the Air Forces and Air Defense being identified as the weakest link. From 2008 to 2012 alone the military had lost 5 aircraft during drills and routine flights, while 3 pilots had been killed in air crashes. The military's participation in assisting the civilian population during the May 2014 floods, as part of its third most important mission, revealed that other resources were also outdated, that they were insufficient, and that many of them had been sold for purposes other than specified.

Research into civil-military relations in the RS has not yet addressed the issue of material resources and their importance for fulfilling the military's core missions, having only dealt with democratic control as the central element of civil-military relations(Hadžić et al., 2009; Klopfer et al., 2012; Rokvić et al., 2013). Although democratic civilian control over the SAF is believed to have been established, one has to bear in mind that, to quote Kohn, democratic civilian control is "necessary for democracy but not sufficient" (Kohn, 1997).This view is shared by Bruneau and Matei, and according to them democratic civilian control is the most important but not the only element of civil-military relations in democratic countries.Not only must the security forces be controlled, they must be capable of fulfilling their mission efficiently and effectively. In other words, in order for civil-military relations in a country to be considered democratic there needs to be a presence of all three elements: control, efficiency and effectiveness or, in the words of Bruneau and Matei, the trinity of civil-military relations (Bruneau&Matei, 2008).

Having analyzed the existing literature on civil-military relations in the RS, we have concluded that there are only few texts dealing with the SAF's efficiency and effectiveness. This is why this paper will analyze both democratic control and these other two elements. It will analyze the SAF's material and human resources and then show, on the example of one of the SAF's core missions – assisting the civilian population during the May 2014 floods, whether and to what extent the military has sufficient resources to fulfill its mission.The paper will also analyze whether the principles of the trinity of civil-military relations have been met in the first place, that is, whether the RS is on the road to the democratization of civil-military relations.

For the purposes of this study, we analyzed the literature on civil-military relations, democratic control and military effectiveness, legal documents, media reports and survey data.

Theoretical approach – from democratic control to military effectiveness and efficiency

The starting point for studying civil-military relations is undoubtedly Samuel Huntington's capital work "The Soldier and the State", which defines civil-military relations as "the principal institutional component of military security policy" (Huntington, 1959, p.1) and interprets the role of the military through the concept of civil control, primarily subjective and objective control. Huntington's work was continued in numerous contemporary theories searching for the ideal type of civil-military relations that focus on democratic civil control in developed democracies (Schiff, 1995; Bland, 1999; Desch, 1999; Feaver, 2003). Following the changes on the international scene in the 1990s, the focus of studies on civil-military relations shifted from developed democratic countries to post-communist countries, where the issue of democratic control over the armed forces was considered taboo or, in the words of James Gow, an "absurd topic" (Gow, 2002, p.195). Andrew Cottey, Anthony Forster and Timothy Edmunds are among authors who have done their share to help enhance the understanding of civil-military relations and

democratic control in post-communist countries (Cottey et al. 2002). These authors argue that the countries which have brought the process of democratic security building to completion have undergone two phases of reform, each phase incorporating an agenda of democratic civil-military reform. The first-generation agenda focuses on structural reform and setting up institutions and relations "which provide democratic framework for civil-military relations" (Cottey et al. 2002, p.41). For this to happen, the armed forces must gain constitutional independence from the communist party, the communist party must be dissociated from the armed forces and the chain of command in the armed forces reorganized. The second-generation agenda, however, entails democratic governance of the defense and security sector, where setting up democratic control over the armed forces stands out as the most important element. According to Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, democratic control over the military in the second generation "depends on the development of state capacity", key elements of which are: building of effective defense policy making and implementation structures, effective parliamentary control over the civil-military relations, and a defense that engages civil society capable of "oversight and accountability in security matters"(Cottey et al. 2002, p. 41). However, the question arises as to which parameters should be used in order to prove the success of reforms and establishing democratic control. While we should keep in mind that there is no single model of civil-military relations and democratic control just as "there is no single model of democracy" (UN World Summit Outcome, 2005), it is possible, according to Owen Greene, to determine a minimum set of parameters defining democratic control (Green, 2002). The existence of a legal, constitutional and institutional framework, military subordination to legitimate civilian leadership, political autonomy of the armed forces, and efficient parliamentary control and control exercised by non-governmental and non-official civic groups are among the parameters identified by Cottey et al. which help to accomplish a strong model of democratic civil-military relations and democratic control. Other authors such as Richard H. Kohn, Rudolf Joóand Heiner Hanggi have also studied parameters of democratic control, identifying the following as the basic ones: rule of law, political neutrality of the military, military subordination to legitimate civilian leadership as well as efficient parliamentary control over the armed forces (Kohn, 1997;Joó, 1996;Hanggi, 2003) Although all these parameters of democratic control are relevant and interconnected, almost all the authors highlight the importance of parliamentary control, seeing the parliament as the workshop of democracy and it is there that the necessary limitations of power as well as efficient and effective mechanisms of oversight are to be defined (Born, 2006).

However, the question arises as to whether establishing democratic control in a country is all it takes to build democratic civil-military relations. Namely, if the military is controlled by legitimate democratic authorities, it must perform the tasks set by these authorities. And in order for these tasks to be successfully realized, the military must possess adequate resources which again depend on decisions of political authorities, especially as regards budgetary funds. In other words, in order to fully understand the

nature of democratic civil-military relations, it is necessary to analyze not only democratic control, the resources available to the military and the resources allocated to it by the political elite, but also whether existing resources are enough for the military to successfully carry out its tasks and missions. This means that it is necessary to examine the military's efficiency and effectiveness.

The largest contribution to the study of efficiency and effectiveness as the basic elements of civil-military relations was made by Bruneau and Matei. According to these authors, effectiveness is generally best determined by whether the security institutions are prepared to fulfill any or all of the roles assigned to them. Firstly, there must be a plan in the form of a strategy or even a doctrine, for instance national security strategies, national military strategies, white papers on security and defense, strategies for disaster relief, counterterrorism, etc. Secondly, there must be structures and processes to define and implement these plans, such as ministries of defense, national security councils, joint or general staffs, or other institutions facilitating cooperation between civilians and the military and/or inter-agency coordination, as well as international cooperation. Thirdly, a country must provide resources (in other words, money) to make sure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces, and other assets to carry out the designated roles and missions. However, in addition to an established system of democratic control and the military's preparedness to realize its missions and assignments, in order for democratic civil-military relations to be established, the military must accomplish the defined missions and assignments to the best of its ability – efficiently (Bruneau&Matei, 2013).

Democratic and civil control and effectiveness are also an important precondition for countries in transition to access EU and NATO. There are a number of specific incentives to focus on civil-military relations, including both control and effectiveness (particularly in NATO and its Partnership for Peace program) in implementing a wide range of roles and missions. Besides these organizations, the countries that become members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also pledge themselves to a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and consider the democratic political control "to be an indispensable element of stability and security"(The OSCE Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 1994).

In this paper we will make use of the proposed concept of the trinity of civil-military relations and in the following segments we will analyze democratic control over the SAF, their effectiveness, and, using the example of the SAF's participation in assisting the civilian population, their efficiency.

Democratic civilian control over the Serbian Armed Forces: weak parliamentary control

Numerous research studies of civil-military relations and democratic control of the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) have shown that Serbia has successfully completed the first-generation reforms (Hadžić&Stojanović, 2012), but it is facing problems during the second generation (Rokvić&Ivaniš, 2013).Democratic control over the Serbian Armed

Forces is regulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and other relevant laws, which also define the competences of state institutions in terms of control over the military.The Law on Defense stipulates that the President of the Republic, in accordance with the law, commands the Serbian Armed Forces, while the greatest authority over the means of control in the RS lies with the Parliament, since it is the Parliament that makes decisions about war and peace and deploying the military abroad, passes laws on defense and strategic documents and plans (the National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy, Long-term Development Plan, etc.),sets the military's budget and controls its expenditure, and particularly exerts control through a committee in charge of defense and military issues (The Law on Defense, 2007).The Law on the Serbian Armed Forces gives clear regulations on the need for members of the armed forces to be politically neutral. According to the law, military personnel are prohibited from attending meetings of political parties whilst in uniform and from engaging in any political activity other than exercising their right to vote (The Law on the Serbian Armed Forces, 2007). As was stated by Rokvić et al. the Republic of Serbia has a clear constitutional, institutional and legal framework for democratic control, and political and military spheres are clearly defined and separate. On the other hand, there are also significant challenges concerning the implementation of control in practice, especially parliamentary control (Rokvić et al., 2013).Numerous studies have shown that the performance of the Committee on Defense and Security of the National Assembly, one of the key instruments of control over the security sector, was entirely unsatisfactory in the period between 2008 and 2012, and that parliamentary control is the "weakest link" in the process of controlling the military as well as the entire security sector in the RS (Rokvić et al., 2013, Hadžić, 2009).Following the elections of May 2012 and 2014, the Assembly's convocation changed completely, an innovation in Serbia's parliamentary law being two committees controlling the security sector, one in charge of the military and the police, the other of the security services.Despite the division of the committee and the distribution of competences, nothing was fundamentally changed. The committee in charge of controlling the military (Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs) still does not have an action plan, election criteria and the necessary political willingness to actually exercise control and demonstrate its competences in practice. An analysis of the committee's sessions from 2012 to 2014, as well as an analysis of the sessions of the new 2014 convocation has shown that almost all of the committee's activities still amount to accepting reports. Issues such as the defense budget and budget expenditure control continue to receive very little or no attention. According to a report by the NATO expert team "Serbia's Self-assessment of Building Integrity", the Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia has a number of authorities but lacks experience in dealing with all the problems it is facing.Transparency in the defense system of the Republic of Serbia is unsatisfactory, the main areas of concern being public procurement, arms and military equipment trade and the sale of surplus resources (real estate and equipment) (Izveštaj ekspertskog tima

NATO, 2012). As was stated by a former member of the committee "the work of the committees is not serious enough in its essence" (Đokić&Erceg, 2014, p. 26).

In addition to approving the budget, one of the constitutional competences of the National Assembly is approving the final balance sheet,which enables budget expenditure control. This competence was confirmed by the Law on the National Assembly (Law on the National Assembly, 2010). However, despite being constitutionally and legally bound, the National Assembly failed to approve the final balance sheet in the period from 2002 to 2012, making it impossible to control budget expenditure. Thanks to the State Audit Institution, budget and public procurement control is partially exercised in practice. The State Audit Institution was established by a law passed on November 14, 2005 and it is the first independent institution with the right to control confidential procurements made by the military and the police. The SAI's 2010 report states that financial reports of the Ministry of Defense and the security services (Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency) failed to specify non-financial property and capital and that most of the Ministry of Defense's public procurements are carried out in a low-value procurement procedure.The report also states that the Ministry of Defense was in charge of carrying out 13,770 low-value and 461 high-value public procurement procedures during 2010 and 2011and concludes that major budget beneficiaries – the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior and the Security Information Agency – carry out more low-value public procurement procedures than the high-value ones (BCSP, 2014).The procurement of mostly low-value assets via public procurement procedures leaves room for malversation and corruption. The first global corruption risk analysis in the defense system carried out by Transparency International UK in 2013 estimated that Serbia meets all the preconditions for efficient civilian control and monitoring of defense policies, but pointed to the inadequate activity of relevant parliamentary committees. Out of the 82 countries assessed, Serbia was placed in band D+ which in fact indicates a high corruption risk in the defense system. According to the report of Transparency International,annual accounts of the security sector, including defense and secret programs, are audited by the State Audit Institution (SAI); however, its reports are not subject to parliamentary debate. There is little clarity with regard to the legal status of off-budget expenditure and the extent to which they exist in practice (TI Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, 2013).

It is precisely inefficient parliamentary control of the budget and budget expenditure, insufficient transparency in public procurements and the sale of surplus resources belonging to the military that have led to decreased military effectiveness, as will be demonstrated below.

Effectiveness of the Serbian Armed Forces:" good" plans and limited resources

The foregoing theoretical framework points to the conclusion that authors from the field of civil-military relations agree that military effectiveness requires the

existence of clearly defined missions and assignments but also adequate resources for these missions and assignments to be accomplished.According to research conducted by RAND, "the ultimate yardstick of national power is military capability" or "its military effectiveness" and any consideration of military effectiveness must begin with an examination of the resources – financial, human, physical, and technological (Tellis et. al, 200, p. 133).

In order to analyze effectiveness, that is, whether the conditions for effectiveness are fulfilled, it is necessary first to analyze the SAF's core missions.As Paul Shemella states, "clearly defined military roles and missions are fundamental to the structuring of any state's defense establishment and to decision making about the use of armed force" (Shemella, 2006, p. 122). The SAF Doctrine defines three core missions: territorial defense, establishment and preservation of peace and stability in the region and worldwide, and support provided to civilian authorities in countering security threats (The Military Doctrine, 2010).

Territorial defense has remained the first and basic mission of the Serbian Armed Forces.The Military Doctrine emphasizes that an act of aggression against the Republic of Serbia is unlikely and that it could arise from a global or regional armed conflict provoked primarily by the conflicting interests of great powers or other countries in the region. The Doctrine underscores that an armed rebellion fueled by separatist tendencies for the purpose of changing internationally recognized borders by force represents a particularly serious threat to security in the Republic of Serbia, while the most significant threat to Serbia's defense interests is posed by Kosovo and Metohija's unilateral declaration of independence, which could turn the crisis and the potential escalation of violence in this area into a source of long-term regional instability (The Military Doctrine, 2010).However, as Ejdus states, "the security dilemma created by the secession of Kosovo is no longer a military dilemma and the Serbian political elites do not regard the Kosovo issue as a problem that should be dealt with in military terms" (Ejdus, 2012, p. 228).

Given that an armed attack against the Republic of Serbia as a security threat is unlikely, the Serbian Armed Forces mostly fulfill their role through the other two missions. 327 members of the Serbian Armed Forces are currently serving in eleven multinational operations (MONUSCO, UNIMIL, UNOCI, UNFICYP, UNFIL, UNTSO, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUMAM RCA and Operation ATALANTA). The Serbian Armed Forces actively participate in the realization of the third mission. Since 2007 members of the Serbian Armed Forces have been engaged in multiple efforts to mitigate the damage from natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, wildfires, etc.), providing aid to vulnerable populations, road and bridge repairs, humanitarian blood donation campaigns, and providing medical assistance to the residents of rural areas (the "Military Physicians in the Countryside" campaign). During the winter of 2012, members of the Serbian Armed Forces were deployed from January 8 until March 7

due to heavy snowfall and low temperatures which had led to the declaration of a state of emergency.

The SAF's missions are realized in accordance with regulations and basic planning documents. For a long time, the Republic of Serbia did not have any strategic documents in the field of security. The National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy were adopted in 2009 and the Doctrine of the Serbian Armed Forces in 2010. As envisaged by the strategic documents, the following necessary plans were adopted: Long-term Development Plan of the Defense System of the Republic of Serbia and the Defense Plan of the Republic of Serbia. In 2009 a system of planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) was introduced in the Ministry of Defense and the Serbian Armed Forces as the basic model of planning in defense.

We could conclude that the SAF's missions are clearly defined in documents adopted by legitimately elected government bodies. However, there is the question of whether Serbia has the resources to accomplish the defined missions.

The SAF's resources are defined as human and material resources. After the 1999 NATO bombing these resources, especially the material ones, have been seriously reduced. The military industry incurred considerable losses, as did the military itself, and since then, almost no investment has been made into the modernization of the military. After the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro there was the unresolved issue of the distribution of military property, primarily military real estate. The Fund for Defense System Reform was set up by a decree of the then Council of Ministers in 2004, while the Master Plan for the Commercialization of Surplus Military Property was adopted at a session of the Government of the Republic of Serbia in 2006. The Master Plan included 447 facilities which the military no longer needed. Funds collected from the sale of military real estate were allocated as follows: 60% for the solving of housing problems of members of the military, 30% for the modernization of equipment of the military, and 10% for military infrastructure. Although the master plan can be a good example for the conversion of military property and providing additional funding for the defense budget, only 22 facilities were sold between 2006 and 2010. The main problems in the implementation of the Master Plan were complicated procedures, high prices of the facilities for sale and problems concerning documentation and ownership. The failed implementation of the Master Plan further impedes the modernization of the SAF, while Defense Minister Gašić claims that a large amount of the SAF's resources and technical equipment was sold in violation of procedure during 2006 and 2007, which set off an investigation (Vesti online, 2014).

According to RAND research, the size of the defense budget is, in principle, the most general single measure of the resources provided to a military by its political masters (Tellis et al., 2000, p. 136), while the 60-billion-dinar budget planned for the Ministry of Defense in 2014 ranks Serbia among the poorest countries in Europe in terms of military budget (Dragovic, 2013). Most of the budget allocated to the military is spent on salaries and only a small portion on investments. Thus, in 2010, 65% of

the funds were spent on personnel costs, 22% on operational costs, and only 12.8% on investments. This trend remained unchanged until 2014. Such distribution of budget funds does not include allocation for military pensions, which pose an additional problem. Namely, the passing of the Law on Serbian Armed Forces (2007) led to a discrepancy between pensions and salaries of professional soldiers, which had been raised by 11.6%, and, as a result, military pensioners sued the state in 2008, with a total of 34,047 lawsuits filed (Večernjenovosti, 2014). After six years of legal proceedings, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia granted their appeals and found that their right to pension rise had been denied to them in 2008, and that the state must pay off almost 20 billion dinars worth of debt (RTV, 2014).

War veterans as well as the military disabled are another problem facing the Ministry of Defense.There is no definitive data on the exact number of veterans in Serbia. According to the Ministry of Defense, approximately 500,000 people can be categorized as veterans, although estimates of some veterans' groups put this number at over 700,000.In 2012 veterans sued the country at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which ruled that Serbia must pay off around 2 billion dinars(17 million euros)worth of debt to veterans of the conflicts of the 1990s (Ritic, 2012). However, following an appeal lodged in 2014, the Court ruled in favor of the State on the grounds that the veterans had not tried their case in domestic courts (Ristic, 2013).

Chief of General Staff General Diković says that the country's economic potential is a limiting factor in the modernization of the military and that, objectively speaking, Serbia is a poor country. According to him, the military set its priorities concerning the acquisition of new weapons in accordance with the estimated level of threat to and security of Serbia and with the realization of the military's three core missions. It was General Diković who said that the modernization of the Air Forces and Air Defense should be given priority in the modernization of the SAF, "since the weapons available are inadequate for the military's goals and there are ongoing talks about equipping the military with modern aircraft" (RTS, 2014). Between 2008 and 2012 the military lost 5 aircraft during drills and routine flights and 3 pilots were killed in air crashes, while service ability and platform availability were identified as the main problems in the Air Forces. It also has no long-range transport capacity. Very limited coastal and river patrol capabilityis cited as one of the problems concerning resources (The Military Balance, 2013).

As far as human resources are concerned, the number of SAF's personnel was significantly reduced as a result of the professionalization of the military. From 1995 onward, the number of personnel was reduced (51,233 members) and this trend continued until the Serbian Armed Forces were fully professionalized. According to the data from Military Balance 2013, the Serbian Armed Forces have the following number of personnel: 28,150 active and 50,150 reserves.Conscription was abolished in 2011. However, there is great interest in voluntary military service and the Reserve Officers'

Training Course; in March 2013, the number of candidates who applied (3042 candidates) exceeded the number of planned enrollments by six times. Such strong interest might be explained by the fact that the Serbian Armed Forces represent one of the most trusted institutions in Serbia (Balkan Monitor, 2010).

However, this begs the question of whether the SAF can truly accomplish their missions successfully with such resources, especially the material ones.We will attempt to answer this question in the following segment on the example of the military's participation in assisting the civilian population as part of its third mission.

Efficiency of the Serbian Armed Forces – Building Noah's Ark

According to Bruneau, efficiency refers to the ability to fulfill assigned roles and missions at the optimum cost (Bruneau, 2013). In spite of insufficient funding and investment in modernization, the SAF managed to fulfill all of their planned assignments in 2013, and in an interview for the national broadcasting company in January 2013 Chief of General Staff General Diković said that the question of how the military succeeded in accomplishing its tasks given its problem with resources is a legitimate one (RTS, 2014).

The true extent of the SAF's problems with resources and, by extension, the concept of democratic control, was evidenced by the deployment of members of the SAF and other MoD personnel as part of the third mission in May 2014, when a state of emergency was declared in the RS amid catastrophic floods.

The Law on Emergency Situations (2009) clearly defined what is meant by this kind of situation and what the roles of state and business entities as well as citizens are in such a situation.The Law clearly defined that the SAF are deployed when the available forces are insufficient. However,the participation of the SAF proved to be indispensable on the very first day of the floods.The Prime Minister appealed to a large number of volunteers to assist the population affected by the floods despite the fact that there was no clearly defined chain of command overthe volunteers.Although responses in this kind of situation are clearly defined by the Law on Emergency Situations, as is the possibility of a partial or complete mobilization of civil protection units, the provisions of this Law never came into force despite the Government having declared a state of emergency.As a result, most of the rescue operation and recovery of the affected areas (primarily decontamination) was carried out by the SAF.

The SAF mobilized a large number of human and material resources.Between May 14 and 24 a total of 10,949 members of the Ministry of Defense and the Serbian Armed Forces were deployed on a daily basis, 802 of which were cadets of the Military Academy. In other words, the daily average number of SAF members deployed was 912, making this the largest SAF deployment since 2006.Members of special units also took part in the fight against the floods, which sparked off a public debate on whether the current number of the SAF's active and reserve personnel is enough or whether conscription needs to be reintroduced (Lazanski, 2014a).

The daily deployment of mobile military equipment in the fight against the floods included, among other things, 10 helicopters, 43 boats, 3 amphibians, etc.However, it turned out that the outdated equipment significantly hampered the mission.Military analyst Lazanski triggered a big public debate by raising the question of why Serbia did not have recourse to enough inflatable boats, soldiers, machinery and helicopters, but instead had to seek help and equipment from citizens and other countries (Lazanski, 2014b). Lazanski claimed that in 2005 alone, 14 amphibians in working order were destroyed and sold for scrap (Pravda, 2014) while Commander Kosić said that the military owned only one helicopter hoist with a basket which did not meet technical standards (Blic, 2014). Minister Gašić himself confirmed that much of the equipment had been sold off, including the sale of 874 boats at 100 euros a piece between 2005 and 2012.

On the other hand, some believe that the SAF were not engaged at full capacity. Analyzing the situation, former Defense Minister Šutanovac, now member of the Assembly's committee for control over the military, stated that command was inadequate and the SAF had mobilized only a part of their capacity in providing assistance (Nedeljnik, 2014).

Despite the problems they were facing, the SAF evacuated 10,299 persons, 6,857 of whom by ground and 3,442 by air,provided 2,500 evacuees with shelter in military facilities, manned the embankments, built pontoons and decontaminated the affected areas. According to the report submitted to the Assembly, in carrying out the assignments from their third mission the SAF were said "to have successfully accomplished the tasks set before them, without casualties or unforeseen situations, bearing in mind the limited amount and inadequacy of the existing rescue equipment as well as the complex coordination and the execution of tasks in the field."(Izveštaj o elementarnojnepogodi, 2014).

This inevitably takes us back to the question posed by General Diković himself, i.e.how the military managed to complete its mission given its problem with resources. One of the answers to this question can be found in the core values of the SAF, which are defined by theirCode of Honor and their commitment to these values. According to research conducted by Ejdus, one of the basic motives for pursuing a military career is patriotism (together with the social factor and professionalism) (Ejdus, 2012, p. 239). Research on the attitudes of the Military Academy cadets carried out in 2012 showed that 90% of the cadets embraced the virtue prescribed by the Code of Honorwhich states that loyalty to the Serbian homeland represents the military ideal of the members of the Serbian Armed Forces (Rokvić et al. 2012).In addition to high morale and commitment to the values prescribed by the Code of Honor,the military's high level of training and the military educational system as a whole undoubtedly made a great contribution to the realization of the mission.

All this inevitably begs the following questions: how long will the military be able to carry out its tasks without the necessary modernization and investment, is the level of the SAF's combat readiness high enough for them to successfully defend the

country as part of their first mission, and could they do this on their own, that is, does the theory of Serbia's "military neutrality" still hold up?[3]

Conclusion

The Republic of Serbia has a clearly defined legal and institutional framework for democratic and civilian control of the military, well-defined planning documents and military missions. However, democratic control is not applied in practice and an analysis of efficiency and effectiveness shows that while planning documents are well defined and missions clearly outlined, limited resources and insufficient investment in equipping and modernizing the SAF pose a big obstacle in their realization.Government oversights and lack of expertise and political willingness in exercising control, primarily over the budget and its expenditure, led to certain funds being spent for purposes other than specified and resources all of which reduced the military's effectiveness.

The May 2014 floods in Serbia and the SAF's participation as part of their third mission – support to the civilian population, revealed society's unpreparedness to battle natural disasters and its complete dependency on the military.The military was shown to obey the command of the elected authorities and carry out mission tasks legally assigned to it. Moreover, it accomplished its mission despite the limited resources available, thereby justifying its reputation with the public who sees the military as "the people's army".

However, the situation with the floods provoked a debate among experts and members of the public, particularly concerning the numerical strength of the military and the resources it had at its disposal. There is no doubt that the modernization of the military should be a priority and that it should incorporate the segments which are in the function of accomplishing its first mission (territorial defense), but the above example and the depletion of the resources clearly indicate the necessity for investing in the entire system. But how is modernization to be implemented if the military budget keeps decreasing, if real estate is not sold according to the Master Plan, if the budget funds do not cover the pensions which the Constitutional Court obliged the Ministry of Defense to pay and with the outcome of the war veterans' lawsuit hanging in the balance?

Even though investigations have been launched into the sale of resources in the military, we believe the Parliament should also assume some of the responsibility, if only political responsibility for failing to fulfill in practice its constitutionally and legally defined duties. Without stricter parliamentary control, especially over the budget, neither efficiency nor effectiveness of the military can be promoted. All three elements are interrelated and only partially realized in the RS, which clearly indicates that the RS still has a lot of work to do in the domain of civil-military relations and their democratization.

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[3] In 2008, the National Parliament of Serbia proclaimed Serbia's military neutrality towards existing military alliances. The policy of Serbian military neutrality was officially adopted after unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo.

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COST BENEFIT VS COST EXPENDITURE IMPLIED FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS

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Abstract: *This article will try to put on the scale material damage, human lives and economic consequences of terrorists attacks vs. economic costs and benefits from counterterrorism measures. In every possible case where people's freedom, security and wellbeing are in question, it becomes a very sensitive issue. Consensus is very difficult to reach when decisions need to be made. We always negotiate and make compromises. Many studies and analyses are done in this area. Some of them are justifying huge expenditure in counterterrorism and security measures aimed at saving human lives. Some are calling to balance these expenditures with other areas of saving and improving human lives. However, it is very difficult to find proper methodology, indicators and measure of effectiveness to evaluate and justify expenditure for security of people. When we talk about human lives there is no price that can substitute or return the lost life.*

Key words: *terrorism, cost benefit, expenditures, saving lives, economic cost*

Introduction

There are varieties of definitions for terrorism. However, all of them embrace the use or threat to use violence by individuals or groups to obtain a political or social objective through the coercion of a large audience to include noncombatant victims.[3] The terrorists' modus operandi is use of excessive violence to put pressure on governments to comply with their demands. Their impulsive and dreadful attacks are intended to spread anxiety or revulsion.[4] The best example that includes all the above mentioned elements is 9/11. The perpetrators were members of a group, Al-Qaida, determined to pressure US to move their military troops from the Middle East (which was at that time the primary political goal). Their attack resulted with the death of almost

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[1] Works at MoD of R. Macedonia, Ph.D
[2] Works at MoD of R. Macedonia, MA
[3] The Political Economy of Terrorism, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 2012, Cambridge University Press, NY,
[4] Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview, Todd Sandler, Oxford Economic Papers, 2014, http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/1/1.full.pdf+html

3000 people[5], it had a huge impact on major stock exchange and created $80-$90000 billion in direct and indirect damages.[6] This had impact on a global level where many countries started to allocate more resources for counterterrorism.

In spite of the rapid investments by the governments in security and counterterrorism measures, the terrible terrorist incidents continued all over the world. Here are some of the latest biggest attacks: Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21 September 2013; Chechen separatists' suicide bombings of a train station and a trolley in Volgograd, Russia in December 2013; Boko Haram's kidnapping of more than 200 female students in Chibok, Nigeria, in April 2014; a female suicide bomber detonated her explosives in front of a police station injuring 2 officers, 1 mortally, and killing herself in the process, in Istanbul, Turkey in January 2015; one or two gunmen attacked the Bardo Museum in the center of Tunis, killing 21 people, including 18 foreign tourists from 6 European countries, as well as Japan, Russia and Australia; one Tunisian woman and a Tunisian army soldier were also killed, in Tunis, Tunisia, in March 2015. These and countless other incidents shows that the government must assign means in an effective and measured manner to counterterrorism activities so that terrorists cannot cause substantial economic losses and succeed in their political demands.[7] These losses have a direct impact on the economic prosperity of the country. Economic impact of terrorism is greatest in small terrorism-plagued countries and developing countries.[8] Many studies are showing that countries with liberal democracies are more prone to terrorist's activities.[9] However, these are usual modern industrial economies that are capable, and can insulate themselves through judicious fiscal and monetary policy, rapid counterterrorism responses, and the transference of economic activities.[10]

Loss of human lives is the other aspect of terrorism impact. This is something that cannot be returned. All the material, financial damage can be repaired to normal, except for human lives. This is the biggest damage terrorists can cause. Excluding Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria, as countries with the biggest number of casualties in 2013, there were almost 4,000 attacks in the rest of the world, killing 3,236 people. This represents an increase of 54 percent over the prior year.[11]

Even though, OECD[12] countries have the smallest number of casualties and represent the minority of the total estimate, they have suffered from several of the most deadly attacks

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[5] The 9/11 Commission Report , National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/911comm-execsumm.pdf

[6] Assessing, Managing and Financing extreme events: Dealing with Terrorism, Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Beverly Porter, 2003, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10179.pdf

[7] Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview, Todd Sandler, Oxford Economic Papers, 2014, http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/1/1.full.pdf+html

[8] Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and developing countries: an Overview, Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/website/Econ_Consequences_ms.pdf

[9] Terrorist Group and Government Interaction: Progress in Empirical Research, David B. Carter, Perspective on Terrorism, 2012, http://q-aps.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/empirical_0.pdf

[10] The Political Economy of Terrorism, Walter Enders. and Todd Sandler, 2012, Cambridge University Press, NY,

[11] Global Level of Terrorism: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, IE&P, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-report-2014,

[12] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm

during the last 14 years. This includes the September 11 attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people, the Madrid train bombings, which killed 191, the Norwegian massacre, which killed 77, and the London bombings, which killed 56.[13] Considering all the losses mentioned above, general assumption can be that nothing can be protected well enough.

This paper will try to put on the scale material damage, human lives and economic consequences of terrorists attacks vs. economic costs and benefits from counterterrorism measures. In every possible case where people's freedom, security and wellbeing are in question that area is automatically grey. Consensus is very difficult to reach on this issue. We always negotiate and make compromises.

1. Implication of terrorists attacks

1.1. Most expensive terrorist attacks

Many scientists have already calculated the damage from terrorist's attacks. However, these are just numbers. So the real question is: can we really calculate the damage from terrorist attacks? In this part we will numerically show some data as a starting point for our analysis.

Since the main goal of terrorists is to put pressure on the government, so that it grants political demands, they will use all necessary means. In order to reach their goals faster, terrorists will augment the consequences of its campaign. In most cases this resulted in material damage, losses of human lives, heightened anxiety level and huge economic costs.[14]

Clearly, the 9/11 attack had significant costs that have been estimated in the range of $80 to $90 billion.[15]

However, this is a very good example of multiplication of the damage caused by the terrorists attack. It can produce economic shock wave transmitted around the world through financial markets, trade, and levels of confidence. "In the 9/11 case, the costs begin with the approximately $34 billion in insured losses (covering part of the $21.6 billion in capital losses for buildings and infrastructure), $576 million for rebuilding the Pentagon, and $7 billion for official victim compensation (covering claims for 2,973 killed as well as some of the $7.8 billion in lifetime earnings lost by 2,780 New York workers"[16] This is not the final cost. Since the attack caused an increased level of anxiety, no one felt secure anymore. The public perception of the threat becomes very sensitive and vulnerable to further attacks. As a result, the need for greater security

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[13] Global Level of Terrorism: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, IE&P, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-report-2014

[14] Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and developing countries: an Overview, Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/website/Econ_Consequences_ms.pdf

[15] Assessing, Managing and Financing extreme events: Dealing with Terrorism, Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Beverly Porter, 2003, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10179.pdf

[16] 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs, Dick K. Nanto, 2004, CRS Report for Congress, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7725/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21937_2004Oct05.pdf

increased, which caused direct cash outlays, expenditures that may reduce productivity, as governments and businesses spend more on guarding lives and property rather than investing in research, technology, and new equipment.[17]

As a general assumption, the cost of terrorist attacks varies, they are dispersed and in many cases very difficult to enumerate. The costs of material damage for security and people's insurance from terrorism can be calculated, predicted and measured. However, human lives have no price. Intrusions on civil liberties, human anxiety to threat are intangible.

Even though, 9/11 was the deadliest attack, other smaller ones made their significant marks to the respective countries. In case of the London bombing, the overall UK economy decreased additionally 4.5% after the attacks. Nonetheless, it has been estimated that the resultant fall in tourism could cost in excess of £300 million.[18] On the other hand, many businesses reported that they have had very quick recovery after the immediate impact.

However, London bombings affected all European stock markets. "London stock market, which used to measure the largest British companies on the stock market, had fallen 3.85%. At the Paris stock market the Cac40 Index of France's forty largest companies took an even worse beating, and had fallen 4%. In Germany, the Dax had shed 3.15%.[19] Spain's experience with Madrid bombing evaluation results are indicating that the terrorist attacks caused a loss of nearly 212 million euros to the regional economy of Madrid, equivalent to 0.16% of the regional GDP (0.03 of the national GDP). This confirms that the immediate economic dimension of a terrorist attack such as the one of March 11, 2004 —apart from human catastrophic consequences— is relatively low.[20]

Pakistan's experience was very different than the other countries. Instead of recovering with the passing years, they have negative implications. Foreign aid, military aid, loan write-offs and cheap loans in return for its active role in the 'war on terror' did not help. The cost far outweighs the benefit. According to the government's rough estimates, Pakistan has suffered a total loss of $45 billion due to war on terror, from September 2001 until 2009. The negative implications for the Pakistani economy cover areas such as the devastation of military, security, social and developmental infrastructure, loss of inflow of direct foreign investment, flight of capital, closure of industries in conflict zone and its spillover impact into the broader economy, sustenance of the IDPs, loss to tourism industry, loss of employment, etc.[21]

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[17] Ibid
[18] The Economic Effects of Terrorism on London – Experiences of Firms in London's Business Community, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2005,
[19] Financial Impact of Terrorism on Global Economy, Financial Markets and Tourism, Indian Business Chamber of Luxemburg, 2014, http://www.ibcl.lu/userfiles/documents/Impact-of-Terrorism.pdf
[20] The Economic cost of March 11: Measuring the direct economic cost of the terrorist attack on March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Mikel Buesa, Aurelia Valino, Joost Heijs, Thomas Baumert and Javier Gozalez Gomez, 2006, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.319.8266&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[21] The Cost of Conflict in Pakistan, Center for Research and Security Studies, http://crss.pk/downloads/Reports/Research-Reports/Cost-of-Conflict-in-Pakistan.pdf

Every country that has experienced terrorist attacks no matter how big it is, all of them have their unique experience. Sometimes small damage can have huge consequences.

1.2. Consequences from terrorist attacks

Consequences from attacks are priceless. First of all, there is a blockage of the whole state system for a brief moment. Immediately after many processes, the state and defense system start to recover. All of this requires manning and financing. No matter how big the attack is, the consequences are huge.

Estimating the impact of terrorist attacks requires accounting for the physical destruction of buildings and infrastructure and losses of human lives or capabilities (through injury), but also for the economic impact resulting from actions to mitigate damages. Furthermore, in an interdependent economic system, terrorist strikes cause the disruption of economic activities which may feed through even to economic entities which have not been direct targets of the attack.[22]

Foreign direct investment, tourism, international trade and short-term capital flows are the areas where attack usually has the impact on."[23]

Many studies have been done by examining in details the economic costs of the terrorist attacks in the abovementioned area. All of them have different meaning, and can be viewed from a different perspective. This depends to a great extent on the psychological effect that the attack itself has on the public, as well as decision makers.

1.3. Price of terrorist attacks

On the other hand, terrorists usually spend much less than the damage from the attack itself. This follows their tactics to achieve big impact with less investment.

In the case of London bombings the report from the relevant Metropolitan Police unit was that the costs of the London Bombings of 7th July 2005 can be approximately broken down as follows:

- Construction and Deployment of devices: £4,600 (of which actual materiel = £2,500)
- International Travel: £1,810
- Training Weekends: £ 825

  TOTAL: approximately £7,235.

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[22] The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part I), Friedrich Schneider, Tilman Brück and Daniel Meierrieks, *EUSECON,* https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.372923.de/diw_econsec0044.pdf

[23] Measuring the Economic Costs of Terrorism, Walter Enders and Eric Olson, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~mrgarfin/OUP/papers/Enders.pdf

Extensive investigations revealed that the likely funding for this was entirely self-generated by the leader of the cell, in the form of a £10,000 bank loan, and £4,000 cash withdrawn from credit cards. After several repayments of each, he defaulted, and therefore had more than enough funds to finance the attack and to make potential financial provision for dependents following the death of the bombers. There was not even any need for false identities.[24]

In the case of Madrid, by comparison, the 2004 Madrid train bombing is believed to have cost between $10,000 and $15,000.[25]

In the case of the 9/11 attack the majority of the money transfer was made by official banking system. "Al-Qaeda deposited around US $300,000 in U.S. banks, and spent all but US $36,000 of that before the attacks. About US $130,000 of the funds, the hijackers used, came through bank-to-bank transfers (including through MSB correspondent accounts at banks) and the rest was deposited as cash. Once these funds arrived in the United States, they were deposited in accounts at Union Bank of California and Sun Trust Bank in Florida, among others. All the hijackers opened accounts at these U.S. banks with their real identities. They accessed their funds with ATM and debit cards. An additional US $47,600 was deposited in overseas banks: US $9,600 in Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia, US $8,000 in a Citibank branch office in the UAE, and US $30,000 in a Standard Chartered Bank branch in the UAE. Two of the hijackers accessed these overseas accounts with ATM and Visa cards.[45] What is remarkable is that most of these transactions, because of their relatively small size and the lack of suspicion about the would-be hijackers, would not have set off any red flags even today."[26]

In general conclusion, we can say that terrorists and terrorist organizations utilize all methods for funding and moving funds across the globe. They are very flexible and very adaptive in comparison to the security systems. As soon as one door is closed, they immediately find a new way how to move funds, through official or unofficial channels. They are one step ahead of us, because they use our differences between security and financial systems.[27]

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[24] 7/7 Attack – London Bombing, Simon Dilloway, http://www.lophamconsultancy.co.uk/London%20Bombings.pdf

[25] Tracking Down Terrorist Financing, Council on Foreign Relations, Eben Kaplan, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-financing/tracking-down-terrorist-financing/p10356#p4

[26] Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview, Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen, Perspective on terrorism, Vol 7, No 4 (2013), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/279/html

[27] The Money Trail, Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances, Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus89.pdf

2. Implication of counterterrorism

2.1. Economic costs of CT

Increasing the security and protection of citizens is the automatic response to terrorist attacks. Each country has its own approach to increasing security measures. Again, 9/11 was a turning point where almost all countries in the world started to re-evaluate their security measures and immediately increased their budgets for security and counterterrorism.

Since the US suffered the deadliest terrorist attack, they have reevaluated all homeland security measures starting from intelligence, security, military and international relationships regarding counterterrorism. Domestic counterterrorism expenditures per year were about $25 billion up to 9/11 before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.[28]. Federal expenditures on domestic homeland security have increased by some $360 billion over those in place in 2001, 10 years later.[29] Federal government was focused on defeating terrorists at all levels: local, state, federal and international. Increasing the budget for intelligence and private security sector was imminent and reached the number of over couple of hundreds billion dollars.[30] About $80 billion in 2010 were spent for intelligence operations in order to protect US against the threat of international terrorism.[31] This increased budget was a result of heightened fears of terrorism and on the other hand budget for all other risks, crime and security was increased by $15 billion, which is an inconsiderable amount.[32] Counterterrorism operation seems to be the most expensive for the US budget. "The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals $73.5 billion, including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS). The Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget

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[28] Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending, John Muller and Mark G.Steward, Journal of Economics Perspectives, 2014, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/mueller-stewart-journal-economic-perspectives-summer-2014.pdf

[29] Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the risks, benefits and costs of homeland security, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Prepared for presentation at the panel, "Terror and the Economy: Which Institutions Help Mitigate the Damage?" at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2011, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//MID11TSM.PDF

[30] Ibid

[31] Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending, John Muller and Mark G.Steward, Journal of Economics Perspectives, 2014, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/mueller-stewart-journal-economic-perspectives-summer-2014.pdf

[32] Ibid

amendment for this operation that Congress is considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0 billion."[33]

A counterterrorism operation all over the world led by US and its partners turned into protracted closed loop of threat and economic warfare. This "closed loop warfare" also may cause financial instability in other smaller countries, and hamper international trade and capital flows.[34]

Also the European Union (EU) spending on security matters including counter-terrorism has also increased up to €93.5 million in 2009 and about 163% overall up to 2011. The heading 'Security and Citizenship' as it was renamed under the 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) was slightly reduced from the 2014 to 2015 budget (from €2 172 million to €2 146.73 million), spending on CT has increased.[35]

EU funding to tackle terrorist threats is developed through different funds and programs. "The 2007-13 Multiannual Financial Framework - MFF included a €140 million program for the 'Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks' (CIPS), designed to protect citizens and infrastructure from terrorist attacks. Under the 2014-20 MFF, the Internal Security Fund (ISF) is the financial instrument designed to support security-enhancing initiatives in the EU. The ISF is divided between: borders and visas; and police issues. The ISF has a €3.8 billion budget, of which only a small part goes to CT. More precisely, the 'ISF-Police' component of the ISF is aimed at ensuring security in the EU, including CT. For 2014-20, this instrument has a budget of €1,004 million (€662 million through shared management, where actions are carried out by the Member States, and €342 million through direct management by the Commission). EU spending on CT is not only through the ISF. A number of other sources of funds are spread across the EU budget. For instance, the Commission made €1.4 billion available for security research under the Seventh Framework Program for Research (FP7) for 2007-13. The aims of the funded projects included the development of technologies and knowledge to enhance security against terrorist threats."[36]

It is certainly tough to assess the suitable counterterrorism spending, and even harder to justify the necessary increase in that spending. The end state of counterterrorism and appropriate spending for it on the other side will always be challenged.[37]

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[33] The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Amy Belasco, 2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf

[34] 9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs, Dick K. Nanto, 2004, http://digital.library.unt.edu /ark:/67531/metacrs7725/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21937_2004Oct05.pdf

[35] Counter-terrorism funding in the EU budget, Gianluca Sgueo, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/559490/EPRS_ BRI%282015%29559490_EN.pdf

[36] Ibid

[37] Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2014, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/FBIJEPfin.pdf

2.2. Economic benefits from counterterrorism

All the spending in counterterrorism and other security measures aim to increase saving lives. Governments understandably invested considerable funds to counter and to deal with the threat. For example, Federal United States homeland security expenditure since 2001 increased approximately $31.4 billion per year. This is directly connected with the assessment of expected 4000 lives per year to be saved in order to justify the increased expenditures. The cost ranges from $63 million to $630 million per life saved, greatly in excess of the regulatory safety goal of $7.5 million per life saved. As such, it clearly fails a cost-benefit analysis.[38] Risk mitigation, security and counterterrorism are not the only programs that can save lives. Safe environment has been treated like a system, not like separate functions.

Table 1 shows US estimates of the number of lives saved for each foiled plot.

Date	Description	Estimate of lives saved	Comments
Dec 2001	"Shoe bomber" Richard Reid foiled as a suicide bomber on an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami.	200	prompt action by flight attendants and passengers averted the plot, not the security services.
May 2003	Iyman Faris convicted of planning to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge.	100	average death toll for bridge collapse is not high as evidenced by the Minneapolis I35W bridge collapse in 2007 with 13 fatalities.
Aug 2004	Two men convicted of plotting to attack the New York Stock Exchange and other financial institutions in New York.	200	cf. VBIED attacks on Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 killed 187 people, 1993 bombing of WTC killed 6.
Aug 2004	Two men convicted of plotting to blow up a subway station in New York.	100	cf. 2005 London underground bombings killed 39 subway commuters.
Aug 2005	Four men indicted for allegedly conspiring to attack Los Angeles-area military targets.	100	high level of armed security at U.S. military bases.
June 2006	Seven men indicted for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears tower.	200	cf. VBIED attacks on Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 killed 187 people, 1993 bombing of WTC killed 6.
July 2006	One man arrested for allegedly plotting to bomb New York City train tunnels and flood the financial district.	100	cf. 2005 London underground bombings killed 39 commuters. Flooding unlikely to cause mass casualties.
May 2007	Six men were charged with plotting the shooting of U.S. soldiers in an armed assault on Fort Dix.	100	high level of armed security at U.S. military bases.
June 2007	Four men planned to destroy JFK international airport by blowing up jet fuel lines.	500	mass casualties very unlikely as jet fuel is flammable, not explosive in nature
TOTAL		**1500**	

Table 3. Terrorist Plots that United States Authorities Claim They Have Foiled and Expected Lives Saved.

Table 1: Source: Cost-Benefit Assessment of the United States Homeland Security Spending by Mark G. Stewart and John Mueller.

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[38] Cost-Benefit Assessment of United States Homeland Security Spending, Mark G. Stewart and John Mueller, Center for Infrastructure, Performance and Reliability, 2009, http://nova.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/services/Download/uon:3125/ATTACHMENT01?view=true

Saving lives is a good starting point to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism. However, there are other areas that are also directly and indirectly connected and need to be invested in order to secure normal prosperous life.

In table 2 below it is clearly shown that expenditures are over exceeded. In simple words, it would mean for the boxed entries that 150 Boston-type attacks per year, 15 London-type attacks each year, or one 9/11-type attack would have to happen about every three years to justify the expenditure.[39]

	Type of terrorist attack					
	Ft. Hood Shooting	Boston, Times Square bombing	London bombing	9/11	Nuclear bomb, port	Nuclear bomb, Grand Central Station
Losses per incident	$100 million	$500 million	$5 billion	$200 billion	$1 trillion	$5 trillion
Level of risk reduction assumed						
10 percent	7,500	1500	150	4	.75	.15
25 percent	3,000	600	60	2	.30	.06
50 percent	1,500	300	30	.75	.15	.03
75 percent	1,000	200	20	.50	.10	.02
90 percent	833	167	17	.42	.08	.02
100 percent	750	150	15	.38	.08	.02

Many scholars have done studies on finding the different measure of how to calculate the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. There are many starting points and indicators that need to be considered in order to provide relevant measurement of effectiveness.

3. Conclusion

Not to say that before 9/11 there were no terrorist attacks, but this was the most deadly one and completely changed the perspective on looking at terrorism. On top of this it happened in US. Knowing their proactive approach at all levels of security, they have put additional impact on security environment. Besides many studies and statistical reports of the level of damage of terrorist attacks, in which loss of human lives reaches a considerable number, leave permanent mark in the mindset of the citizens. Terrorist attacks result in material damage, losses of human lives, heightened anxiety level and huge economic costs. Usually, there is a spillover effect and affects a considerable number of countries. The world trading market was affected by 9/11, with estimated damage in range of $80 to $90 billion. In the case of London bombing, all European

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[39] Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending, John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2014, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/FBIJEPfin.pdf

stock market was affected, too. The damage just to UK tourism was estimated at about £300 million. The overall damage is of great proportions.

On the other hand, terrorists have spent inconsiderable amount of finances to plot the attack. Once again, the most expensive one is 9/11 with estimated spending of up to $500,000. In the case of London bombings, cost was up to £14,000-15,000. Madrid bombings were about $10,000-$15,000. These numbers are showing and proving that with little efforts a huge damage can be caused.

As a result of the caused damage, a considerable amount was invested to increase the security and counterterrorism measures. This field is still under the discussions of finding the right measures of effectiveness to justify the huge increase in expenditure for security and counterterrorism. Overall, US have increased their budget from $25 billion before 2001 to $360 billion after 9/11. The European Union follows the same trend up to 163% overall up to 2011, just for security and counterterrorism. Cost-benefit studies of increased expenditure for counterterrorism have shown that increased budget gives results in saving lives, but it did not fully justify the huge expenditure in counterterrorism only. Nobody wants to survive 15 London-type attacks each year to justify counterterrorism expenditure.

It is very difficult to find the proper methodology, indicators and measures of effectiveness to evaluate and justify the expenditure for the security of people. When we are speaking of human lives, there is no price that can substitute or return the lost lives.

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GLOBAL CHANGES IN GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY RESOURCES, RISKS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract: *The actual changes in the world's energy market, with an emphasis on the revolution of the gas slates in USA and the economic rise of Asia, are factors whose mutual interaction implicates unavoidable changes in the balance of energy resources and global geopolitics. Energy dependent countries such as China, India and the European Union, supported by the traditional strategic partners (Russia and USA) are in permanent attempt to provide the necessary energy resources. Besides the uncompromising race, this development of events in the near future would result in serious confrontation of geopolitical and geostrategic interests of USA and the European Union on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other. The crisis in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the fall of the prices of energy resources are recent examples that show the fact that energy is the basic element of national power, capable of changing the geopolitical landscape of Europe. The suspension of series of capital energy investments traced through the territory of the Balkan Peninsula, as the recent promotion of the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Greek relations are events, which, to the countries from the region, among which the Republic of Macedonia, offer a lot of geopolitical challenges, but at the same time risks, too. They could be a source of political power and vulnerability; they could also stimulate economic progress or regress. In this elaboration the basic factors and their influence on the security of the Republic of Macedonia, as a result of the tectonic movements of the global energy geopolitics, will be determined.*

Key words: *Energy resources, geopolitics, geostrategic interest, security*

Introduction

The beginning of the industrial revolution in the second half of the XVIII century had promoted the energy geopolitics as a fundamental factor that dictated the global economic prosperity and international political stability. The political and the economic aspect of energy, which equally affects the producers and the consumers, has always been in the focus of the global public, especially in conditions of discoordination of the politics between the West and the East. In the second half of the XX century, because of the home deficit and the dependence

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of import, the Western politicians strived to take over the energy resources, especially the oil, as a main resource of vulnerability, and their "opponents" were still not aware of the political and economic potential of their energy resources.

However, this paradigm is drastically changing. The rise of Russia at the beginning of the XX century, announced its energy politics as a foundation for strengthening the political influence in Europe. The increased self-esteem of the Russian political leaders, caused by the potential of the national energy sector and the renewed influence in the international relations, resulted in a line of strategic projects for supplying the European energy market with the deficit fossil fuels necessary for maintenance of the economy in the European Union. The new geopolitical position of Russia, proportional to the ambitions of the former Soviet Union, represented a cause of worry which faced USA with the danger of losing the political influence and dominance in Europe.

Besides the rise of Russia as a geopolitical event which marked the beginning of the XXI century, the economic development of China and India represents the other key argument that strongly influenced the global energy security. As a result, it caused shift of the geographic center of global demand of energy from the West to the East. Meanwhile, the discovery of new national reserves and increased production of oil and natural gas, drastically changed the position of USA in the international (especially the European) energy market, giving the country one of the leading roles in production, consumption and trade with energy resources.

The mentioned structural changes of the energy market are indicators which announced the necessity of new evaluation of the global energy geopolitics. Besides the development of the energy relations between Russia and its neighbors, which by the way, implicated major movements in the politics of the European Union, the changes of the energy market proved that the energy has again become the key strategic determination of the international relations of USA. The interest and the increased involvement in the Ukrainian crisis and the collapse of the "Southern flow" are a typical example which not only confirms the previous finding, but also implies to the fact that the bilateral energy politics, which Russia is forcing with part of the European countries, does not fit the geopolitical and geostrategic interest of USA and their allies. If the pressure towards particular countries to impose sanctions or give up certain energy projects by which Russia would avoid Ukraine in the function of its geostrategic interests for taking over the energy market in Western Europe is taken into account, the newly created situation could be determined as a "New Cold War"[3]

As a result of the epilogue of the "New Cold War", the Balkan Peninsula has become the main energy knot of Europe in which, the geostrategic interests of the Western allies led by USA on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, are confronted. As a central country where the corridors which link the Balkan Peninsula with the four sides of the world are intersecting, the Ukrainian crisis has made the Republic of Macedonia the main base for imposing and realization of the geopolitical influences and interests of USA and Russia in the region. The projects "Turkish Stream" and "AMBO" are typical examples for the rivalry of both sides, which have a wide range of tools and methods for obtaining the sympathy of the Republic of Macedonia.

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[3] Starting from 2007, the term "New Cold War" is being used by many scientists who research and analyze the relations between USA and Russia. One of them is Richard Sakwa, who uses the term in function of clarifying the approach, the strategy of the Russian foreign politics in context of approaching the West, without taking into consideration the national interests of both sides, For more information see Richard Sakwa. "New Cold War" or twenty years' crisis? Russia and international politics". International Affairs, Volume 84, Issue 2, pages 241-267, March 2008.

The new geopolitical role of the Republic of Macedonia

The crisis in Ukraine is an event which could be determined as an index for the role of the Russian energy on the European geopolitics. The energy is what produced the political and economic chaos which rules today in Ukraine and has reshaped the borders of Europe. However, the energy represents a threat, and a challenge for every country in the region that as a result of its geographical position, accidentally or intentionally will grow into a key geostrategic point where the interests of the affected sides involved in the process of production and consumption of energy resources could confront. As a result of the major geopolitical movements in 2014, the "unknown" Republic of Macedonia has suddenly become a central point, equally important to the key players involved in the "New Cold War". This especially means Russia, which after the crisis in Ukraine – through which almost half of the total amount of natural gas exported to Europe transits – has put the focus on the pipeline "South Stream", a project that was supposed to enable a breakthrough of the energy resources through the Balkans and amplify the influence in the leading countries in the Union. For that purpose, the path of the pipeline was made through the geographical area of the countries in which the nations are related – Slavic nations (Bulgaria and Serbia) in the southeast of Europe, in which besides the secure transit of the natural gas towards the European Union, Russia would have the opportunity to strengthen its own influence apart from the influence of the Western allies.

However, in the spirit of the long-term struggle for dominance over the European land, the Western allies led by USA, had diametrically opposite interests whose realization costs great effort to prevent the building of the "South Stream" pipeline. The "aggressive" role in Ukraine, which has been assigned to Russia by USA, and part of the former Soviet republics, was the key factor that influenced the cooling of the relations between EU and Russia, and which culminated in a decision of imposing sanctions, not only by the Union but also by potential candidates for full membership. Previously, in 2009 the Council of Europe adopted the so called "Third Energy Package" whose main purpose was establishing unique energy market in the EU aiming to keep the price of the energy resources at the lowest possible level, rising the standards for the services and safe delivery. The fundamental principle of the legislative which is not in favor of the Russian energy politics is separating the property in the process of production, transport and distribution of the energy resources[4]. That means that the company could not have a monopoly in the mentioned processes. For Russia, "The Third Energy Package" is a discriminatory measure directly pointed against Russian energy giant Gazprom[5] .

Undoubtedly, the suspension of the South Stream would have bigger economic consequences for Bulgaria and Serbia, than the economic development of EU or the

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[4]   For this question see: European Parliament and Council of the European Union. *Legislation*, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 52, 14 August 2009.

[5]   Česlovas Iškauskas. „Third Energy Package: dispute between Russia and the EU", Geopolitika, 2011/03/23. 25.04.2015. < http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4561>.

export of the Russian natural gas to Europe, due to at least two reasons. The first reason is that the majority of the European countries have existing bilateral agreements with Russia for supply of energy resources through a special energy infrastructure (pipelines or infrastructure for storage of gas in liquid condition)[6] .The second reason is the fact that Bulgaria and Serbia, and even Croatia and Hungary, do not have appropriate energy infrastructures that would enable supply of the necessary quantity of natural gas to the public and private sector, regardless of its aggregate condition. However, in function of the realization of the geopolitical interests of the Balkan Peninsula, in December 2014, the Russian state leadership promoted a new project – "Turkish Stream" – as an alternative to its ancestor, which additionally stirred up the international relations. From a country that did not get into the energy plans of Russia and EU, along with Greece, Serbia and Hungary, the Republic of Macedonia finally was put on the planned trace of one capital energy investment.

Analyzing the development of the events and the epilogue of the South Stream project, it could be concluded that from the aspect of the Turkish Stream, the Republic of Macedonia, similarly as Bulgaria is growing into a center of gravity of the rivalry between the East and the West for taking over the Balkan as a future energy knot of the Old continent. That is the reason why the Republic of Macedonia does not have to be monitored only as a transit but also as a key country on which the destiny of the project depends for which Russia de facto is ready to use its entire diplomatic power and international influence. In fact, that is the main point which turns the project Turkish Stream into a more complex geopolitical competition. It would be very naive to conclude that EU and USA would be in the role of passive observers and to believe that the glove thrown by Russia would not be returned at least with proportional measures.

From the aspect of labor, the key factor which unconditionally had to be taken into consideration during the analysis of the problem is the actual status of the Euro-Atlantic integrative process of the Republic of Macedonia. As a candidate for membership in the EU and a country that fulfills the conditions for membership in NATO, on the way to realization of its strategic determination, the Republic of Macedonia is prevented by Greece and recently by Bulgaria as well. In the context of Turkish Stream, the bilateral disputes with some of the neighbors, especially Greece, for USA and EU are "a knife with two blades". On the one hand, the dispute between Macedonia and Greece, for the Western allies is a powerful geopolitical weapon which could stop the breakthrough of the Russian influence in Europe through the Balkan Peninsula. The actual economic condition in Greece and the Euro- Atlantic dead-end of Macedonia, are the key problems for which both of the "confronted" sides are in quest of urgent and painless solution. Having in mind the situation, EU and NATO are key factors that could make the Euro integration of the Republic of Macedonia faster and put an end

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[6]   Typical example is the Russian-German pipeline Northern Stream, which among Germany, satisfies part of the needs for natural gas of Great Britain, The Netherlands, France and Denmark.

to the financial crisis in Greece. On the other hand, the further ignoring of the bilateral dispute could cause a condition of anti-EU and anti-NATO mood and distancing of the Republic of Macedonia from the Euro-Atlantic determination. However, this option is the blade which does not favor USA and EU because it opens the opportunity of strengthening the Russian influence in the Republic of Macedonia. In that context, the abstinence of compassion of the Republic of Macedonia towards EU in relation to imposing the economic sanctions on Russia could be determined as an indicator that the second option is still possible; however, for Macedonia it is risky because of the possibility of facing the Ukrainian scenario, which resulted in change of the political leadership according to the taste of the West.

Risks and challenges

The epilogue from the confrontation of the global geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the Balkan Peninsula could be manifested with positive as well as negative effects for the future of the Republic of Macedonia. The increased geostrategic meaning and the improved geopolitical condition, in context of the confronted energy projects supported by Russia and the Western allies, are a serious challenge, but at the same time a risk for the Republic of Macedonia, which in the period to follow would have to choose between the Turkish Stream on the one hand and the AMBO on the other.

As previously emphasized, the geopolitical goal of the Turkish Stream is strengthening of the influence of Russia on the Balkans through establishing energy bilateral cooperation with Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, who in the next period could be used as a basis for deepening the cooperation in the sphere of political, economic and military cooperation between the agreed sides. At the same time, the involvement of Greece and Hungary could have a positive impact on worsening relations between Moscow and Brussels, and the energetic stability of the Union, which is gradually becoming increasingly dependent on the Russian natural gas.

On the other hand, the pipeline AMBO has a totally contrary geopolitical goal. Supported by USA, AMBO has a purpose of growing into a first energy project by which the Caspian oil, through Bulgaria and Macedonia would be transferred to Albania, without direct control by Russia, i.e. Turkey which focuses its economic interest more towards the East. Thus, the oil pipeline AMBO, would not only strengthen the strong influence of USA on the Balkan Peninsula but it would also prevent the possible warming of the relations between Moscow and Brussels which would not be in favor of the international affairs of Washington.

Furthermore, the interest of Russia on the one hand and the Western allies on the other, on the Balkan Peninsula, are confronted by the aspect of planned projects from transport infrastructure for geographic connecting of the southern with the northern and the eastern with the western part of the Balkans. The Chinese project called "The Balkan silk road" for connecting Greece and Hungary with a system of modern railway infrastructure through Macedonia and Serbia could be elaborated from the aspect

of strategic partnership between Russia and China. Apart from the Chinese project, "Corridor 8" presents a transport infrastructure project for connecting Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania, which, especially from October 2014 has seriously been actualized. According to its importance, first from the aspect of support of AMBO, second as an obstacle for strengthening of the Russian influence on the Balkans, this project has a powerful support by the Western allies.

The connection of the either of these two energy projects is of strategic meaning for the Republic of Macedonia. According to the energy balance of the country in the period from 2000 to 2013, a constant increase of the consumption of natural gas has been evidenced as a key energy resource towards which the energy politics of EU is focused on. In the period from the independence till the present moment, oil and oil derivatives, hold a constant share in the total need of energy with 30-35%, actually, they participate with 41.5% in the final consumption of energy in the Republic Macedonia[7]. According to this, the energy stability of the Republic of Macedonia in the future will depend on these two energy resources, which the country provides only by import. Resulting from the increased use, the dependence of the country on import automatically increases, in order to satisfy the energy needs, which means increase of the trade deficit. However, the recovery of one of the two energy projects does not mean decrease of import dependence, certain delivery of natural gas or oil with a more acceptable price, which would stimulate the economic growth of the country.

Besides the recovery of the energy and transport infrastructure, projects of the magnitude of the Turkish Stream and AMBO are synonyms to stable societies relations of which rest on well-developed neighborly relations. Because of the fact that they are serious and expensive projects, the political stability and the security condition of the countries, which the region consists of, are the fundamental factor that influences the final decision of the investor. These are the reasons why the confronted energy projects, besides the challenge, at the same time present a risk for the Republic of Macedonia. As previously emphasized, Russia and the Western allies are ready to engage the entire international power and influence to be the winners of this geopolitical competition. Therefore, both sides have an opportunity to apply different methods that could implicate series of security risks for the Republic of Macedonia. In that case, besides the Turkish Stream, Russia does not have concrete methods that give the commodity to impose its influence on the Republic of Macedonia. The Turkish Stream in combination with the Balkan Silk Road is a powerful project with enormous economic benefits. The energy and transport connection of the Republic of Macedonia on a north-east relation means improvement of the trade exchange most of all with the main partners – Greece as a leading economic investor – and Serbia, through which the country manages the trade exchange with EU countries, especially Germany. The promotion of the economic relations could easily

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[7]　State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia. Energy balance 2013, No. 6.1.14.79, 2014: 20. 27.04.2015 < http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/2014/6.1.14.79.pdf>

lead to warming of the political relations between Athens and Skopje, which under the auspices of Russia, would mean great progress in overcoming the long–term bilateral dispute. Moreover, it could be concluded that the establishment and promotion of the trade relations of the country and their secondary effects, is the fundamental method which Russia would use to impose its influence on the Republic of Macedonia.

Contrary to Russia, the Western allies have a wider specter of methods for strengthening their current influence in Macedonia. Besides the Albanian nationalism that could be easily "ignite" the Balkan Peninsula, Bulgaria as a member of NATO and EU presents a new prolonged hand for strengthening the influence of the Western allies in the Republic of Macedonia. The activation of the idea for Great Albania could result in a Balkan conflict that would stop both energy projects and at the same time activate the long-term geostrategic interests of the rest of the neighbors, especially the Republic of Bulgaria. For the Western allies it does not present as great issue as for the Republic of Macedonia because AMBO is not the only project for transport of energy resources from the Caspian pool to EU. The possible destabilization of the country for the Western allies would mean stopping of the breakthrough of the Russian influence on the Balkan Peninsula and as to the Republic of Macedonia, it would have serious consequences to the prosperity and security of the country. However, it does not mean that violence is the basic method of the Western allies for strengthening the influence in the Republic of Macedonia. The fact that Greece is still part of EU and member of NATO, in combination with the strategic determination of the Republic of Macedonia and the geostrategic interests of the Western allies, are the basic determinants which point that the diplomacy is a "win-win" method which would confirm the domination of the Western allies and the security of the Balkans.

Conclusion

Based on the geostrategic analysis and the trace of the two projects, it could be concluded that the Republic of Macedonia is a geographic space where the possibly biggest consequences of the confrontation of the sides that support the projects, which have diametrically opposite meaning, could be expected. Its territory equally needed to Russia and the Western allies – to the first for penetration of the influence in Europe and to the second for preventing the breakthrough of the Russian influence and maintenance of the hegemony in Europe. Therefore, both sides have certain methods the implementation of which in function of geostrategic goals, implies a series of security risks and challenges.

The growing of the geostrategic meaning and keeping sovereignty, as a result of the global changes in the geopolitics of the energy resources are the key challenges which the Republic of Macedonia may face. The new geostrategic meaning is a fact that has to be used by the Republic of Macedonia in function of strengthening of the cooperation with NATO and EU, and especially USA as a strategic partner. Without the political union and focusing the whole diplomatic and political capacity towards enforcing the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the Republic of Macedonia might face serious security risks and consequences identical to the epilogue of the Ukrainian crisis.

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REDUCING THE RISK OF ENERGY CRISIS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract*: The energy strategy of each country represents the pillar of energy supply security, and it is a key precondition for further development, especially in the economy, but also for the society as a whole. Managing of potential challenges to energy crisis takes primacy in the creation of any energy strategy. Energy issues and the development of each country should be considered in the context of energy security. Energy security is actually a product of the successful management of energy and energy resources in each country.*

The scientific conception of exploration of the issues in the paper "Reducing the risk of an energy crisis in the country through the implementation of the Strategy for Energy Development", arose from two strategic interests of the Republic of Macedonia, first, the strategic interest in providing diverse energy for economically reasonable price, as well as the strategic interest in promoting energy efficiency and reducing the overall energy import, which directly reduces the possibility of an energy crisis.

By implementing the Strategy for Development of Energy, the Republic of Macedonia, besides reducing the risk of a possible energy crisis, also contributes to strengthening the European energy strategy, developed to contribute to reducing energy dependence, providing energy at an affordable price for citizens and industry, security and continuity of the availability of energy, competitiveness of the energy market and environmental protection.

Keywords*: energy, electricity, renewable energy sources, energy efficiency.*

Introduction

Since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, energy crisis has knocked on our door several times. It first occurred during the economic embargo imposed in 1994 by Greece, then breaking the delivery of natural gas from the Russian Federation in 2007, 2010 and 2014. Macedonia as a country is dependent on energy import, and as a candidate country for member-

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ship in the European Union it takes steps to mitigate the risk of subsequent energy crisis. It is a signatory and has ratified the following documents:

- The Energy Charter, together with the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Aspects of Environmental Protection (1998);
- Framework Convention of the United Nations Climate Change (1997);
- The Kyoto Protocol (2004);
- Energy Community Treaty (2006);
- Statute of the International Renewable Energy IRENA (2009), and
- Memorandum of Understanding to enter Macedonia amongst Subprogram Intelligent Energy Europe (2011).

The strategic goals of the Republic of Macedonia in the energy sector, including the commitment to comply with the "acquis communautaire" of the Second Energy Package of EU are incorporated in the Law on Energy, adopted in February 2011.[3]

Macedonia is a small landlocked country, without its own resources of natural gas or oil, a candidate for membership in EU and NATO, trying to strategically plan and improve its energy security and thus reduce the possibility of energy crisis. Although several relevant documents have been created aimed at improving energy security and reducing the possibility of energy crisis, the fact remains that it cannot cope with the high demand of electricity, as in February 2012[4], the annual increase in energy dependence and supply of natural gas from a source that provided the image of a problematic situation with energy security. Moreover, a study by the World Energy Council entitled sustainability ranks Macedonia at the 89th place in terms of energy security among 129 countries for 2013; whereas in the region worse ranked than Macedonia in 2013 were Serbia (101) and Montenegro (115), and better Albania (87), Croatia (66), Slovenia (60), Greece (54), Bulgaria (26), and Romania (9).[5]

Energy policy of the Republic of Macedonia is determined by the Strategy for Energy Development.[6] By 2030, the strategy for energy development in the country is the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Macedonia. The current strategy was developed in 2010 and covers the period until 2020 with a vision to 2030. This Strategy defines the best long-term development of the energy sector in the country in order to provide reliable and good quality supply to consumers. The Energy Strategy identifies the following as priority needs for providing energy security: increasing the diversification of energy resources, maximum utilization of renewable energy resources, improving energy efficiency, and competitive participation in the regional energy market and the European energy community. Based on the strategy, a program was adopted for implementation of the strategy for energy development in Macedonia for the period 2012-2016 year.

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[3] MASA, Strategy for Energy Development in the Republic of Macedonia until 2030 (Skopje, 2010), 1.

[4] In February 2012, Macedonia faced a lack of electricity to meet its demand. The preliminary measure that was taen was the reduction of street lighting. MIA / Idividi, "the government declared electricity crisis," February 13, 2012, Retrieved on October 23, 2014 http://www.idividi.com.mk/vesti/makedonija/748029/

[5] World Energy Council. Sustainability Index for Macedonia.
http://www.worldenergy.org/data/sustainability-index/country/Macedonia/2013/ (Retrieved 23 October 2014).

[6] Energy Law (Fig. Gazette, No. 16 of 10.02.2011).

Strategy for Energy Development in Macedonia

The Strategy for Energy Development of the Republic of Macedonia defines the long-term development of the energy sector in the country in order to provide reliable and good quality supply to consumers.

The implementation of the stated primary objective takes into account the following priorities:
- Maintenance, revitalization and modernization of the existing and construction of new, modern infrastructure for production and use of energy;
- Improving energy efficiency in production, distribution and use of energy;
- Utilization of domestic resources (reserves of lignite, hydropower potential, wind and solar energy) for electricity production;
- Increasing the use of natural gas;
- Increasing the use of renewable energy sources;
- Establishing economic energy prices, and
- Integration of the energy sector of the Republic of Macedonia in the regional and European market for electricity and natural gas, by building new connections and to align the legislation with the existing legislation of the European Union (acquis communautaire) for energy, environment, competition and renewable energy sources.[7]

In fact, the energy strategy aims to provide reliable and quality power supply. The energy strategy defines energy security as regular meeting energy demand, and under sustainable environmental conditions and at prices which do not impede economic development and threaten the standard of living of citizens.

Key documents for the creation and implementation of the strategic energy policy documents adopted by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia:
- Energy Development Strategy;
- Renewable Energy Strategy, and
- Energy Efficiency Strategy.

Energy Development Strategy is adopted every five years, and covers a period of 20 years. Renewable Energy Strategy sources and energy efficiency are made for a period of 10 years and should be aligned with the Energy Development Strategy.

Modern industry and its development are based on the constancy of the potential sources of primary energy resources such as oil and natural gas. Today, Macedonia does not have an access to oil sites and sources of natural gas, and it is clear that it can only import these fuels and adapt them to market, without affecting the trends in making decisions about production and trade of oil and natural gas.[8]

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[7] Ibid 1, 2.
[8] Toni Milevski, Energy security. "St. Kiril and Metodi "- Skopje, Faculty of Philosophy (Skopje, 2014), 122.

Chance of energy crisis in Macedonia

While the EU is concerned by the lack of natural gas, Macedonia is more vulnerable to electricity. This can be inferred from the energy balances of Macedonia, the share of electricity used by households, but also the industry, and the fact that import of electricity is increasing. This fact only, in consideration of the electricity crisis in 2012, should stimulate the overcoming of this state of vulnerability regarding electricity. This can be achieved by enabling sources of heating for households other than electricity (gas, developed central heating, efficient use of wood, energy efficiency measures, etc.), and focusing on the use of renewable sources and natural gas. It is enough to recall the crisis that engulfed part of the European Union due to problems in the supply of natural gas from Russia in 2010. The Republic of Macedonia along with Bulgaria, Slovakia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, was on the list of EU countries that had been most affected by the gas crisis. Taking into consideration solely the fact that we have one of the least developed and smallest gas networks in Europe, this situation does not turn into drama. Macedonia is one of the few countries on the European continent that has no gas reserves (even Bulgaria has three-day worth reserves), other alternative fuels only for the industry.[9]

To reduce the energy crisis in the country, greater diversification of energy sources is necessary by type, sources and suppliers, as well as active participation in the regional energy market and the European Energy Community. Therefore, what is important is maximum utilization of domestic resources (renewable and coal) and long-term strategic policy for connection to the mains in the region (gas pipelines, oil pipelines and power lines), and building the business and friendly relations with all the strategically important stakeholders such as EU, USA, Russia and the countries in the region.

Macedonia has no conditions to build a reservoir of natural gas that would ensure security of supply. Renting reservoir space in the neighboring countries is one of the options available to suppliers of natural gas and/or the larger consumers.[10]

The energy infrastructure of the Republic of Macedonia enables the exploitation of domestic primary energy, import and export of primary energy, processing primary energy and production of final energy, transport and distribution of energy. The energy infrastructure of the Republic of Macedonia includes the electricity sector, coal, oil and oil products, natural gas and heat.

The general characteristics of the energy infrastructure of the Republic of Macedonia are:
-   Obsolete technologies and lack of investment in maintenance, modernization and expansion of existing facilities and construction of new facilities;

[9] Slobodanka Jovanovska, „Macedonia among the countries most vulnerable energy ", Utrinski Vesnik 2009, www.utrinski.mk/?ItemID=bcf446c10face2479A187977FAA5BF7B (Retrieved 23 October 2015).
[10] Ibid 1, 134.

-   High electricity losses (technical and commercial);
-   Low energy efficiency;
-   Unfavorable structure of the energy types (production, import and consumption) from an environmental and economic point of view and in terms of security of supply;
-   Existence of monopolized structures in specific segments of the sector;
-   Incomplete separation of production, transmission and distribution.

Macedonia is dependent on energy import. It imports its total demand for oil and petroleum products and natural gas since 2000, as well as part of the electricity. The energy import has been increasing in the past, but recently electricity imports due to rapid economic growth and the construction of new production facilities have particularly increased. And this leads to an increased risk of a possible energy crisis in the country.

Managing Energy Crisis in Macedonia

In the wake of the 21st century there is no sector of the society that can function without power. Hence, there is a need to protect the most abundant and the most needed sector - energy. In the energy sector, we can mention the following most common sub-sectors: electricity, oil and gas. The protection of the energy sector is very complex and requires a lot of resources. Successful protection of the energy sector must encompass all infrastructure facilities for production, transport, distribution and supply. To this end, the European Union's main political and economic efforts are focused on providing functional sustainability which in future could be ensured only through energy stability and timely and cost effective delivery of energy and resources to our economy. The Republic of Macedonia follows this trend, because if we do not have well-developed system of protection of the energy sector we cannot speak for managing it. Therefore, the Republic of Macedonia is considering to promote energy security, improve production and delivery, and development of alternative energy sources.

According to Daniel Yergin, there are several types of energy security: physical security that includes protection of infrastructure, resources and distribution; critical approach to energy security that includes energy supply; definition of energy security as a system of national and international policies that can respond coordinated at supply disruption and protect the flow of crucial supplies and energy security taking innovative policies to ensure affordable supplies in the future.[11]

For successful implementation of the Energy Development Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia, investments will be required primarily directed towards measures for energy saving and development of the transmission and distribution network and policies that create conditions for greater utilization of locally available, environmentally friendly, renewable energy, especially solar energy.

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[11] Daniel Yergin, The Quest – Energy Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. (New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 268-269.

If the country really wants to become energy independent, or to terminate the import of energy, it should use solar energy as a huge potential and integrate it in the strategy documents and the real policy on the ground.

Investments made in network development are essential to long-term energy development in our country and a necessary step in energy independence of the country; because, modernization of the network is necessary to exploit renewable, fluctuating energy sources.

The development of technologies and inventions in energy should be stimulated through higher education, and specific funding programs (grants) to individuals and institutions that have the capacity in these areas. Macedonia has quality innovators who have proven internationally that the country should have a system to support these people and their innovation, and encourage young people (students) to commit to research and innovation in the energy field.

Considering the fact that the energy needs of the world are rapidly expanding, and conventional energy is undergoing a downward trend, energy efficiency of all available energy is an imperative in modern living. This applies to countries with limited economic opportunities and energy resources, such as the Republic of Macedonia. Energy efficiency is one of the factors for a country's successful economy and protection of the environment. Provision of energy security requires greater diversification of energy resources by type, sources and suppliers, active role of the regional energy market and the European Energy Community. This requires maximizing the possible use of domestic resources and strategically viable long-term connection policy to the main energy sources in the region and beyond. Improving energy efficiency requires maximizing the use of renewable energy sources, to provide conditions for greater utilization of natural gas and transition of the energy sector of the Republic of Macedonia to market conditions. The transition to market prices for electricity will improve the investment climate; strengthen the interest to introduce renewable energy sources and to improve energy efficiency.

The tendency of the Republic of Macedonia is to reduce the use of coal (39%), oil products with biofuels (31.6%), and the expense of increasing the use of natural gas to (16%) by 2020. Furthermore, the biomass for combustion and hydropower to participate with around 6%. Solar and wind energy will together contribute to the production of primary energy with 0.6% and geothermal with around 1%.[12]

The Energy Development Strategy has four scenarios for the development of production facilities in the electricity sector of the Republic of Macedonia, and the capability of existing production facilities, the real potential candidates, and of course by the development of consumption. All scenarios of development are guided by the following principles of development:
- Maximum engagement of the existing lignite opencast;
- Utilization of hydro potential in Macedonia;

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[12] Ibid 1, 128.

- Use of natural gas for electricity energy;
- Use of renewable energy sources.[13]

By the implementation of the envisaged pace of construction of new production facilities, the diversity will be improved and therefore the security of electricity supply. In the past, at average hydrology, 80% of the electricity was produced in coal thermal power plants and 20% from renewable energy sources (hydroelectric). In 2020, production of electricity from coal thermal power plants is planned to account for 42% - 51% depending on the scenario, natural gas and renewable energy sources 24% - 28% and fuel oil thermal power plant 2% - 3%.[14]

By liberalization of the energy market, electricity prices in the coming period will increase. Therefore, Macedonia should continue the intensive energy reforms to reduce the impact of rising energy prices, reforms to improve the heat market, improving energy efficiency, support for local gasification projects and continue the plans for gasification at a central level.

However, we must note that for successful management of a major energy crisis, the state and private companies involved in the production, transmission or distribution of energy should raise the quality of its products, services, activities and investments, because it is the only way to become a key part of the public-private partnership in the field of energy in the Republic of Macedonia.

Conclusion

It is favorable for the Republic of Macedonia that recently there has been more investment in transmission of electricity, because this will provide avoiding bottlenecks in transportation, smaller losses, a quality connection to the integrated European market and an opportunity to withdraw a larger amount of electricity. Nevertheless, because of the fact that in terms of generation, we are speaking of capital facilities, which take longer period to build, we should start considering operationalization of the use of gas in the Republic of Macedonia, which would lead to substitution of the consumption of electricity in the country and would result in constructing gas plants or cogeneration plants.

Macedonia needs to be fully committed to the use of renewable sources for electricity production. Solar and wind energy is a renewable resource, and should be used more in the future to reduce the energetic dependence of the Republic of Macedonia and to satisfy the principle of diversification of resources.

Strong contribution to the fulfillment of the concept of managing the energy crisis in the country can be achieved by removing the basic anomalies identified in the current power system of the country. Obsolete technology should be abandoned, and we should put efforts into attracting investment for maintaining the modernization of the existing energy system of the country. Modernization is necessary in all segments of the power system of the Republic of Macedonia in terms of monitoring, control and automatic analysis of all technical parameters.

It is necessary to reduce high electricity losses, technical and commercial losses.

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[13] Ibid 1, 117-119.
[14] Ibid 1, 121.

Obsolescence of systems leads to increased losses and poor transmission and distribution of electricity. In Macedonia there are larger settlements with insufficient payment of electricity bills, and incidents of illegal use of energy. Loss of energy and thefts additionally burden the system and endanger the technical aspect, and lead to the generally irrational exploitation of energy resources.

It is also important to increase energy efficiency, which will contribute to reducing electricity consumption in all segments, in order to extend the duration of energy resources exploitation. If the Republic of Macedonia intensifies the gasification projects, the citizens, as well as economic operators will have reliable access to cheap energy; they will save on the purchase of expensive energy and resources and allow greater market competitiveness.

The availability of fuel and energy is primarily an issue of managing the energy crisis of any country, and it is a key precondition for further development, especially in the economy, but also for the society as a whole.

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European societies might need to rethink the way energy is consumed, eg by changing urban planning and consumption patterns. See Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (COM, 2011).

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NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THEIR PROTECTION

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Abstract: *This paper counterpoises a critical review ofthe need for foreseeing the country's interests,which link the needs of the individual and the collective actors with their actions. The starting premise is that interests are the primary purpose of the country,which makes efforts to protect them by any means. In other words, the interests should unite all subjects in the society, and they represent the institutional tool through which the security goals of the country can be achieved.*

Key words: *security, interests, national interests, security interests, protection.*

On interests in general

The notion interest is found in the centre of the philosophical and scientific individualist theories, the social groups, but also the state, its genesis, its nature and functions. The Latin origin of this word (*interessum, interesse*) means participation, taking share in something. The contemporary notion *interest* comprises categories such as value, attitude, as well as expectation and aspiration. In that sense, interest is a motivational factor, regulator of the individual and of the collective behaviour, a synonym for need and it is closely linked with assets. While designating the interest, a starting point should be the necessity and the goal of the subject whose interest is discussed. From the most significant perception, the system of values and ideas depends on the defining of interests and priorities in their achievement. Simultaneously, the interests put in motion social behaviour, and vice versa redefine the system of values and ideas.[3]

Basically, interests connect needs of individual and collective social actors with their actions in order to satisfy the needs, as well as the social power which they own or for which they compete in the direction of a greater and better meeting the needs. Interests designate the direction of every action, they always intermediate between

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[3]   See more: Живковић Мирослав, Теорија државе и права – Теорија државе, Полицијска академија, Београд 1995., стр. 205-206.

needs and goals, express aspirations and efforts to achieve a certain social power and gain necessary possibilities in the given social context for meeting certain needs, respectively, achieving certain goals as a priority.[4]

Since Jean- Jacques Rousseau's "common interest" is the one that by its content is related to the wellbeing of the community (the notion "common good") and a "mutual interest" formally equals the interest of the many.[5] The possibility to establish a community with non-interest behavior of the individual leads modern theoreticians from the XVIII century, as well as in the following periods, to define the political subject as a citizen or a civilian. At the same time, it is a collision of particular interests and pluralism of political interests,and the public/common interest gets to decide through institutions and mechanisms of representative democracy. In a modified manner, with identical questions, contemporary philosophers conduct their research. Hence, Jürgen Habermasspeaks about "constitutional patriotism" and about the interests of the "eligible commons" which could embed the norms based on a "reasonable consensus" and which, rationally embedded could, with communication, be transferred to others.[6]

It is considered that the Ancient Greek historian Thucydides,[7] in his opus on the Peloponnesian war, was the first to formulate the school of realistic interest.[8] The essence of the realistic school for internal policy, the main interpreter of which is considered to be Niccolò Machiavelli, is that political actors, it is indicated, are driven solely by selfish interests.[9] This outlook, according to Vojin Dimitrijević, has a double meaning, *i.e.* only with selfish interests the political events could be interpreted, and second, the prescriptive meaning is that it should be comprehended as advice for correct behavior. From the noted it stems that the disbelief in international law and moral and their underestimation is a characteristic mutual for all realists. As Dimitrijević emphasizes, lately it is mostly discussed about the realist theory of international relations or the realistic interpretation of international relations, which is based on the assumption that the international community is an anarchic society in which there is no central legislator, and according to it, there are no rules which everybody is obliged to follow. In other words, the international community resembles the primordial community, which was described by the classical English philosopher Tomas Hobbs and his followers as a community in which all the members are driven by their own interests and motivated,

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[4] See more: Митровић Милован, *Увод у социологију и социологију права*, Правни факултет & Службени гласник, Београд 2006., стр. 80-81.

[5] According to:Rousseau Jean-Jacques, *O porijeklu i osnovama nejednakosti među ljudima*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1978., str. 30-31.

[6] See more: Prpić Ivan,Puhovski Žarko, Uzelac Maja(urs.),*Leksikon temeljnih pojmova politike*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1990., str. 268-270.

[7] (GreekΘουκυδίδης, *Thoukydídēs*),born in Halimunt around 454 BC, died in Athens aound 396 BC was a Greek historianand author of themonograph "History of Peloponnesian war" which elaborates the clash in the V century between Sparta and Athens.

[8] See more: Тукидид, *Повијест Пелопонеског рата*, Дерета, Београд 1991., стр. 29-30.

[9] According to: Макијавели Николо, *Владалац*, Рад, Београд 1964., стр. 64.).

among other things, by the justified fear that all the other members will act selfishly when it comes to interests, they will not obey any rules and will act even in the most cruel way.[10] As Hobbs's apprehension for the primitive community is "homo homini lupus est", so in international relations every country has to respect its own interest and do it on the account of other subjects, because otherwise these other subjects will exploit every opportunity to bring as much harm to the incautious government.[11]

The realistic comprehension of the interest according to V. Dimitrijević in newer history was dominant due to the lack of any limiting rules and due to the dominant political- philosophical aspects, according to which the sovereign countries are not required to withhold regarding their own citizens, or from the aspect of the values their neighbors and other countries represent.

Furthermore, he notes that as much as it seems strange at the moment, back then, the ruler had to find excuses for his foreign policy engagements for achieving some unselfish reasons (not interests) which were mostly religious. That is how war and other foreign policy interests had to be justified in certain allegedly greater reasons, such as spreading the righteous religion, or its defense from an external attack, protection from heresy and other hazards. The realist theory gains special significance and gains distinguished impression after WWI, as a reaction of a short-term effort to pander international relations upon certain rules and to subjugate on certain universal values.[12]

Mijaković S. and Keserović D. consider that interests are determined by the projected needs which are supposed to be achieved and collated, for the protection and promotion of certain values, and in general, interest is an aspiration toward reaching and achieving a concrete goal. Hence, the protection and promotion of vital values is one of the basic interests of every referred subject of security.

However, "the interest list" is often wider and it mostly refers to categories in future tense, respectively, aspirations toward the achievement of the outlined goals, plans and ideas. For example, a vital goal of a certain social group could be secession of a part of the country's territory in which they live, declaration of independence or annexation with a third country, and by achieving that interest,the goals are "born" for achievement, protection and promotion of the values which are characteristic for the country.[13]

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[10] Хобс Томас, *Левијатан* део I, Култура, Београд 1961., стр. 108.

[11] According to: Димитријевић Војин, „Појам националног интереса и међународни положај Србије", во Вујадиновић Драгица, Гоати Владимир (урс.), *Национални и државни интерес модерне Србије*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & CEDET, Београд 2007., стр. 29-30.

[12] Ibid., p. 30.

[13] Мијалковић Саша, Кесеровић Драгомир, op. cit. стр. 44.

Notional qualification of national interests

National interest counterpoises a union of elements on which the fundamental needs of the nation/country are based, such as self-preservation, integrity, security etc., while vital national interests can be deduced to what has special significance for the survival of the nation, what cannot be a subject of negotiations and what presupposes the country's readiness to defend such interests with all available resources. Although the national interests are fluctuating, they always counterpoise a primary preoccupation for the country as general definitions of the state organs and relevant political institutions when it comes to leading foreign and domestic policy.[14]Mitar Kovač reckons that national interests in function to the referred values and operation are the fundamental needs of the nation or the country. They are the most general program nominations of the state organs and relevant political subjects from the aspect of achievement and protection of the highest social values and needs. By articulation of the national interests, the country expresses the fundamental preferences for its survival and prosperous development.[15]

Some authors point out that the notion "national interest" emerged as a result of the insufficiency in practice in internal policy. Thus, its possible theoretical value is decreased when it comes to international relations, because the conclusion that every country follows its own interests could be disputed, but not absurd.Therefore, it is actually recounted that national interest of a certain subject cannot be defined in any other way, except by the subject itself, i.e., the persons who make political decisions on their behalf, and that the international community cannot impose a universal comprehension of such interest to each of its members. With this, the definition for interest is transferred from the international to the domestic political stage and here the discussion starts about what precisely national interest is, which also in the eyes of the adherents of the realist theory represents the essence of the political decision making.[16]

According to DragicaVujadinović, national interest is a construction of the national identity, which originates and overhauls as a result of the interpretation of the dominant opinions of the intellectual, political, cultural, media and educational elites in a certain political-historical context. If the nation is like "an organic compound", a subject of national interest is then presented to the members as a significant part of their individual identity, as something given, to which they cannot oppose. D. Vujadinović emphasizes that both rational and irrational version of the interpretation of the national interest, in its essence it signifies an analytical- normative finding, which the irrational version diverts the interpretation of the national identity on a retrograde way,

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[14] See more: Савић Андреја, Стајић Љубомир, *Основи цивилне безбедности*, Факултет за правне и пословне студије, Нови Сад 2006., стр. 39-40.

[15] Ковач Митар, *Стратегијска и доктринарна документа националне безбедности – Теоријске основе*, Свет књиге, Београд 2003., стр. 31-33.

[16] See more: Furniss S. Edgar, Snyder C. Richard, *An Introduction to American Foreign Policy*, Rinehart, New York 1955., p. 17.

with reference to the previous authoritarian imposition of the common interest, while the rational version is turned toward the future, and directs national interest from the development projects point of view, looking on the present and past from the perspective of development/modernization capacities and opening possibilities for individual review of common interest.[17]

H. T. Eriksen in scoping the notion "national interest" as a significant qualifier introduces the identity of the ethnic community, which as such defines its past, history, historic memory, social character, cultural identity, customs and values framework and normative culture in a way on which the development of a certain national group leads it in the direction of openness and cooperation, interaction, communication, tolerance, enrichment through cultural and social mutual influences, taking an authentic attitude toward the positive achievements of others, accepting the highest civilization standards as own, as well as refusing isolation and xenophobia.[18]

According to the opinion of D. Vujadinović, a rational national interest on a fundamental and general level is a normative task for building constitutional democracy. In a normative notion, a rational interest on majority and minority nations in heterogenic ethnic countries is related to the respect of constitutional principles of constitutional democracy and equal respect of the members for their own and other nationalities in the same political community, which is not in opposition to their cultural identity of their own ethnic group. In that context, there is no fundamental opposition between the rational state interest and national interests of the ethnic group, as well as majority and minority groups. According to this author, it is about a substantive non-compliance of the national and the state interest in heterogenic ethnic or plural communities in an ethno-nationalistic constellation, when the national interest of the majority of the nation is imposed as dominant and identical with the state interest.[19]Patriotism, derived from ethno-centrically interpreted national interest, is in the basis affined with chauvinism and inclines treating "the other" as enemy or betrayer. Regarding that, "the perverted rationale of the intellect" is, according to A. Loshonc the background and the basis of the ethno-nationalist, interpreted both as state, and national interest (and also in the case of ethnic minority groups, especially in the cases of majority nations).

As R. Radonić emphasizes, no glorification of national interest, respectively, calling upon national homogenization, could be explained by itself, i.e. without any "internal" or "external" reasons for it. Inasmuch the reasons are solely "internal" usually it is a matter of a conflict of different social groups (ethnic, political, social)

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[17] According to: Вујадиновић Драгица, „Шта је рационални национални и државни интерес модерне Србије?" у: Вујадиновић Драгица, Гоати Владимир (урс.), *Национални и државни интерес модерне Србије,* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & CEDET, Београд 2007., стр. 18.

[18] For the situational, relational, political- historical determined character of ethnic national identity see more: Ериксен Хилан Томас, *Етницитет и национализам*, Библиотека XX век, Београд 2004., стр. 22-29.

[19] Ibid., p.19.

whose solution is not found in a compromise, rather than in absolutization of the rights and interests of one group or only one of them. The odds of the one side in the name of the "mutual" or "common" good for the other side does not only mean failure of concrete goals and interests for which it stands for, but also a serious diminishing of the chances for achieving the same goals in a democratic manner. Inasmuch if for the sake of national homogenization, the "argumentation" uses some external reasons, meaning that it is necessary in order to prevent conspiracy, protectionism, blockades and similar manifestations of "hostile temper" in the surrounding, could have even heavier consequences. Then, naturally, first comes the internal realignment for facing the "new situation" which is always made by damaging democracy and democratic; following the turn of the attention on internal (economic, social, cultural, political and other) problems of "inflamed" external issues; and at the end, comes to tightening of the relations with the neighboring nations and countries, respectfully the international community and by that including its own isolation from them. According to this author, anyone from the nation or outside of it, who will oppose this logic "defending" and "protecting" the national interest, comes to a harsh resistance from the "savior" and becomes charged as an enemy or a traitor?[20]

In defining national interests, the states are bound by the international system. In that sense, the status of the country in the international system shows how the national interests are defined and how they determine its foreign policy. However, national interest largely depends on the type of internal organization of the country. For example, the internal order which highly values the economic welfare in priorities ranks trade development and points out that the wars against other democratic countries is illegal, defines their national interests differently than the countries with an authoritarian regime which have a similar position in international system.[21]

The discrepancy of various interests often leads to conflict between the subjects which represent them. The main reason for conflict is the form and the content of the social, state and national interests which are most often designated by the bearers of political and economic power. The interests of the economic and the political elite are not always harmonious with the general interests, and among those which possess power and the promoters of the interests, antagonism often occurs between these interest groups and fractions.[22]

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[20] Радоњић Радован, op. cit. стр. 208-209.

[21] See more: Nye, S.Joseph Jr.: *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History,* Longman, New York 1999., pp. 46-47.

[22] See more: Galtung Johan, „ A Structural Theory of Imperialism", во: Little Richard, Smith Michael (eds), *Perspectives on World Politics*, Routledge, London-New York 2006., pp.232-233.

National interests through the prism of defense and their protection

Undoubtedly interests[16]and development goals for the defense are both goals for planning and developing the defense. However, they, without the tool of "planning" could never be operationalized, respectfully, they would only remain "a dead letter on paper". Actually, planning is a science which objectifies, operationalizes and puts in relation the real possibilities, the interests and the goals for the development of a certain system.[23]

Interests, regardless of which sphere they belong to, are the basic motive for engagement, as well as their continuous promotion and development. Hence, every subsystem of a certain country (political, economic, health, security, defense etc.) has its own interests which it aspires to achieve by any means and on which it permanently engages.

These interests within the framework of a certain subsystem are accomplished through development processes and through continuous and comprehensive action of all the segments of the subsystem on various levels of management and concerns every employee who has the duty to contribute in harmonizing the interests.

Certainly, on the highest level are the most common and most fundamental interests of a certain country and its internal actions, which, through development make improvement of the quality and accomplishment of efficiency. The question is raised, does defense have its own interests, or are their interests part and in function of the country. The defense does have its own interests, but they are exclusively in the function of the country, respectfully, in the function of achieving the goals of the defense, because defense by itself is not a goal, but one of the methods and means for achieving the common interests of the country.[24]

A notorious truth is that almost in every country the most general interests of the country are being expressed, which are the basis for development interests, in the constitutional act (the Constitution), the laws and defense strategies. The determination for permanent peace, freedom, independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, as well as development of democratic society are those fundamental interests, which emanates from the development goals, both common and defense. From this accrues that development interest is permanent promotion, building and development of the defense system. This ensures achieving and protecting the fundamental interests of the country, normally by armed combat and other forms of defense in order to keep the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the country. By planning and achieving development, the defense interests are achieved, and in that manner they

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[23] Stejner G., *Strategic Planning*, New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Singapore, Free Press Paperbacks, Published by Simon Schuster, 1997.

[24] Ѓорески В., Планирање на одбраната во Р.Македонија – модел и методологија согласно системот за планирање, програмирање и буџетирање, (докторска дисертација), одбранета 2005 стр. 51-145.

are operationalized and concretized in practice, the constitutional, the legal and the strategic definitions for the defense.[25]

In order to achieve the designated prescriptions, the Republic of Macedonia brought several strategic documents (National Concept for Security and Defense, Strategic Defense Review, White Papers of Defense, Defense Strategy and Operative Concept of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia), by which basically the fundamental predispositions are created for profiling the essential elements in the realm of national defense.

The national concept for security and defense notes the basic interests of the country[26] and as it is pointed out in the document, they are based on the "long-term needs of the Macedonian society which are vital for the life and security of the citizens, stability as well, functioning and continuity of the country". Interests arise from the highest fundamental values ascertained in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia[27]in which basically belong:

- Fundamental freedoms and rights of the human and the citizen, free expression of national affiliation, democracy, rule of law and respect for the generally accepted international norms;
- Integration and equitable representation of the citizens who belong to all of the communities in the organs of the country's authority and other public institutions at all levels;
- Protection of property, free market and entrepreneurship, humanity, social justice and solidarity;
- Guarantying, promoting and development of local governance, and
- Protection and promotion of the natural habitat.

The White defense papers from 2012 and the Defense strategy from 2010[28]define the substitute permanent interest. Hence, a permanent interest (fundamental), essential for the survival of the country, as it is noted in the strategic documents for keeping and promoting the country's identity with free expression of the ethnic identity of all the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as protection of the independence and territorial integrity.

In that context, the following values are considered to be fundamental:

- Protection and promotion of peace, security, health and personal safety of the citizens;
- Promotion of multi-ethnic democracy and inter-ethnic relations;

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[25] Ibid., p. 51-145.

[26] National Concept for security and defense („Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no.40/2003)

[27] The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia is published in the Official Gazette no. 52/91, and the Amendments are published in no. 1/92; 31/98; 91/01 и 84/03.

[28] Defense Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Defense, Skopje, 2010. (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia no. 30 from 01.03.2010).

- – Protection and promotion of the democratic values of the country: human freedoms and rights, rule of law, political pluralism, open political dialogue between the political parties, the principle of division of authority, protection of the cultural identity and heritage of all the citizens;
- – Stimulation of a sustainable economic development of the country on the principles of market economy, ownership and entrepreneurship;
- – Political-military integration in NATO;
- – Political, economic and security integration in EU.[29]

In the White Papers of Defense, it is noted that the Republic of Macedonia achieves its interests by consistent respect of human rights and freedoms, democratic principles and respect for international law, which enables resolving disputes in a peaceful manner, promotion of peace and stability and strengthening the reputation of the Republic of Macedonia in the democratic world. Within the framework of the international initiatives and missions, the Republic of Macedonia offers a long-term contribution in crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic realm.

In order to fulfill its national interests, the Republic of Macedonia relies on the overall organs and bodies at disposal, as well as the sum of resources which are available, because achieving and protecting vital national interests counterpoises a function of special policies of the country, which are basically directed toward achieving the following capital goals: first, deterrence and neutralizing the sources of imperilment, and second, creating a favorable setting for achieving and promotion of national interests.

Deterrence or neutralizing the sources of threats to our country, de facto through the prism of strategic research is related to the policies which explicitly or implicitly presuppose use of force, and neutralizing the threats by using force.

Regarding the creation of a favorable setting for achievement and promotion of national interests, the efforts of the country are purporting within the framework of the so-called domestic policies on the one hand, and foreign policy of the country on the other. Even though this does not concern the measures and activities of the country immediately related to its highest interests and goals (having in mind independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty), they are nonetheless significant, because they are factors which take part in the construction of the material power of the nation, the level of welfare and political stability on the one hand, and the reputation, significance and possibilities which the country has on an international level on the other. All of this understandably is projected in what some call "national power" which will be discussed later.[30]

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[29] The White Papers of Defense, Ministry for Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2012. P.21-22.

[30] Sarkesian, S.C. *US National Security,* 2nd ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp. 27-28.

Conclusion

The research interest of this paper was set on the analysis of the interests through the focus of defense and of course, the country. In this framework, the attribute "strategic" referred to the vital (national) interests, respectfully, the physical survival of the nation, the independence, or the survival of the country, its safety, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Basically, the designation of the fundamental interests of the country has an exceptional significance, along with the definition of the strategic interests, which nominally are in a correlation with the fundamental values. In addition, not only the designation of the volume and quality of the mutual correspondence has great significance, but also what it means concretely, or what that universal string is which ties these two elements in function of achieving the goals of the country. Hence, there is no dilemma that only a consistent policy will contribute for achievement of the goals, respectfully the former could be seen through the consequences of the country's policy. On the other hand, the incompatibility of the fundamental interests in communities which are multi-ethnic could result with projection of such interests which can basically be the basis for divisions and opposed attitudes which could lead even to mutual exclusion of the strategic goals from the agendas of the political subjects. That, understandably, brings in question the inability to establish a consistent state policy.

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THE GENDER DIMENSION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract: *Gender–based violence is a form of discrimination which seriously impedes women from enjoying their rights and freedoms on an equal stand with men. This global phenomenon also encompasses domestic violence, victims of which are most often women, thus making it a synonym for violence against women. National laws on domestic violence must acknowledge this gender dimension and offer the aid, support and protection needed to all victims. Violence against women by their intimate partners must not be treated as a private (domestic) affair by states, but rather as a public issue, and legal measures ought to provide the victim with the same amount of aid as victims of violence by unknown offenders. In violent relationships, the offenders need to be closely monitored so as to decrease the potential of recurrent cases of violence – which is a risk since the victim and the offender share the same living space.*

In the Republic of Macedonia, women are also most the common victims of domestic violence, but definitions in the legislation do not determine it as gender-based violence, so it is not considered as a specific form of discrimination against women. Women who have reported domestic violence have received psycho-social aid, and many of them also received legal assistance. However, taking into account the number of victims, the number of measures and punishments against offenders is inconsiderable and insufficient, which leaves room for recurrent violence (very often for revenge). By no means does this encourage trust in institutions, so this may also be seen as a core cause for the lack of reporting of such cases of domestic violence, and the reason why there are so many hidden victims who do not receive any assistance or protection. The state should strengthen the approach towards the issue of domestic violence, not focusing merely on victims and their rights, but rather intervene in efficient prevention, and sanctioning of offenders. Violence against women in general, and domestic violence, is a clear problem with severe financial, social, and other repercussions, and should be approached as a security issue, the solution of which needs efficient political and practical measures and policies.

Keywords: *gender-based violence, domestic violence, violence against women, legislation, legal aid*

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Introduction

Almost every country in the world is faced with the inability to determine the number of victims of crime, especially when it comes to women-victims of domestic violence. According to UN surveys, women are most often victims of sexual violence (50%), personal attacks (10%), and various crimes against personal property (10%). In domestic violence cases, one of the issues is the lack of impartial witnesses of the crimes. Domestic violence entails many health-related, economic, and social repercussions which are the subject to many research projects and public debates.

The Republic of Macedonia is no exception to this situation, but rather the opposite – the number of affected persons within the family is increasing on a day-to-day basis, especially the number of women. One problem in this regard is that due to various reasons (material, or otherwise), a small number of these victims decide to make the next step and report the offenders who subject them to the everyday horror. A large number of citizens' associations have started working to find solutions that can control at least some portion of the problem. In the past couple of decades, government institutions in cooperation with citizens' associations have started to work in the field of prevention and protection against domestic violence, offering assistance and support to victims, as well as undertaking steps to amend the legal acts and harmonise them with EU standards.

Definition and types of gender-based violence

According to the General recommendation 19 of the UN Committee for Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously impedes women from enjoying their rights and freedoms on an equal stand with men. It is aimed against women because of their gender, and it includes deeds that cause physical, psychological, or sexual damage and suffering, as well as threats regarding such deeds, coercion, and other limitations of freedoms. Gender-based violence is a global phenomenon, mostly affecting girls and women in any country or culture, regardless of social structure, religion, values or attitudes. It entails various forms of abuse of women based on gender inequality and women's subjugated position in the society relative to the position of men. It includes all activities resulting or likely to result in physical, psychological or sexual injuries or suffering of women, including threats of performing such acts, voluntary or coerced deprivation of freedom, whether it is in the public or private life. Thus, gender-based violence also encompasses violence within the family, violence in the wider community, violence done or tolerated by the state or its clerks, and violence and violation of human rights of women in an armed conflict (Seftaui, 2009). Consequently, the basic forms of gender-based violence are domestic violence, sexual violence, and human trafficking. Domestic violence is the cause of suffering for countless women worldwide, and yet the issue of their safety and security persists in the margins, which is why domestic violence in the national security policies is most often considered a private, i.e. domestic problem, undeserving of public attention.

Gender dimension of domestic violence

Gender violence is an endemic phenomenon, and violence against women committed by their intimate partner is a criminal, criminological, and sociopathic global occurrence, especially present in transitional societies where interpersonal relations are significantly disrupted. Data coming from various research point to the conclusion that domestic violence is becoming synonymous to violence against women, and so in practice, these forms of violence are equated (Симовиќ, Радојичиќ, 2012:22).

The wide spread and frequency of violence against women (including domestic violence) resulted in the adoption of numerous international documents within UN, EU and the Council of Europe (conventions, declarations, recommendations, conclusions) which ask for the elimination of all kinds of discrimination against women and undertaking measures to end violence against women (including adoption of specific laws on domestic violence, criminal sanctions for offenders, civil legal remedies, prevention and protection of victims). Generally speaking, violence against women is discrimination and a serious infringement of women's human rights, which is in violation to the specific provisions of CEDAW. The Convention for prevention and fight against violence against women and domestic violence, which the Council of Europe adopted in April 2011 in Istanbul, is of the utmost importance in this regard. According to the Convention, domestic violence encompasses "all acts of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence which occur in the family between current or former spouses, regardless of whether the offender lives with the victim or not". The Istanbul convention obliges the parties to criminalise all forms of violence against women so they can acknowledge them, prosecute and punish offenders. Furthermore, EU member-states and states aspiring to be members of the EU need to review their laws and their synchronicity to the Istanbul convention and the victims' directive, which have set new standards for response to violence against women. The efficiency of the strategies, policies, and measures undertaken in this direction will be measured by the degree of reporting of violence cases, as well as the satisfaction of victims with the authorities and services in charge in the process of offering support to victims. Increasing victims' trust will enable them to feel safer in the intent to report the crime, since it will make them feel more confident that all measures to solve their cases are being undertaken, especially those measures that can ensure that the violence will never repeat, and so the secondary victimisation will be prevented.

Domestic violence is the result of abuse of power and controlling family members with less power (material, financial, physical, etc.) In traditional and patriarchal societies, men have significantly more power than women, so domestic violence most often comes down to violence against women. According to the Beijing declaration and the Action platform(A/CONf.177/20 chap. I, 1995), domestic violence is defined as "any act of gender-based violence that results or could result in physical, sexual, or psychological damage or suffering to women..." This, as well as many other definitions in international documents regarding violence against women, also confirms the

conclusion that domestic violence is increasingly becoming synonymous to violence against women. Domestic violence is the most frequent reason behind victimisation of women, who are not only subject to immediate consequences of that violence (primary victimisation), but they also suffer from the inadequate treatment by authorities in charge of their protection, as well as from the negative treatment by their social environment (secondary victimisation). Of the overall number of women murdered worldwide, 40 – 70% were murdered by their partner, and according to the UK's Home Office, domestic violence is the leading cause for female mortality for women aged 19 to 44. In the US, 1.500.000 women are being raped or physically assaulted by their partner annually. In 2002, the Council of Europe proclaimed violence against women a serious public health problem, pointing to the fact that it is a leading cause for female mortality for women aged 16 to 44. Moreover, violence against women is already being placed as a security issue, and is being included into security policies.

In the social environment of a woman-victim of domestic violence, the tendency to blame the woman for contributing to the violence is very often present. It creates negative consequences for both the victim and the society, since if she expects to be blamed for the suffering she underwent, she will abandon the intention of reporting the violence. Even if she reported it, she might face secondary victimisation in the contact with police officials, or during the judicial proceedings due to the lack of sensitivity in their approach. Many reports on domestic violence against women are being dismissed because they are deemed to be a private matter, and offenders are most often merely warned or given mild punishments (UNODC, 2010:2). Furthermore, women-victims are burdened by feelings of shame and fear, so they often retreat from social activities, they lose personal relationships with other people, and reporting the crime might be perceived as an even greater evil than the crime itself. The fear of being cast away and rejected by her close friends and relatives, ruining the reputation of the family, exposing the children to emotional damage and social peril, causing escalation of the violence and retaliation by the offender, etc, will often discourage women-victims to report violence. In order to preserve some kind of partnership with the offender, from whom she is most often economically dependent, a woman will often sacrifice herself in silence, hoping that the relationship will improve and the violence will cease. Eventually, not reporting the crime may also result in lack of trust in institutions (whose task is to provide emotional, psychological, medical, material, and legal assistance and protect the women from retaliation and intimidation by the offender) and their efficiency and professionalism.

Legal and institutional framework for domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia

Domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia is defined in the Law on prevention, cessation, and protection against domestic violence of 2014, where it is defined as maltreatment, use of offensive language, violation of safety, inflicting bodily injuries, sexual or other psychological, physical, or economic violence, which causes feelings

of insecurity, endangerment, or fear, including threats for such actions, aimed against a spouse, parents, children, or other persons living in a conjugal or non-conjugal community, or shared household, as well as against a current or former spouse, partner or persons with whom they have a child or are in close relations, regardless of whether the offender and the victim share or shared a common household.

The definition of domestic violence is also to be found in two laws – the Criminal code and the Law on family. The definition in the Criminal code determines forms of domestic violence, manners of execution, consequences it raises, role of offender and the object of protection. However, it does not determine domestic violence as a specific form of gender-based violence, and therefore a specific form of discrimination against women. Consequently, the definition is gender-neutral, and also lacking in forms of economic violence and protection thereof, controlling the behaviour of women, the economic and labour exploitation. The Law on family shows the identical tendency. It this Law, there is a clear and palpable lack of recognition of domestic violence as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and girls (Мирчева, Гогов, 2014:15).

National laws and bylaws are also devoid of a definition of gender. Gender is only mentioned as basis for discrimination and violence in the Law on prevention and protection against discrimination – without even defining what gender constitutes, in the Law for equal opportunities for men and women, and in the National Strategy for Gender Equality of 2013-2020. A definition on gender-based violence is only provided in the National Strategy for Gender Equality of 2013-2020, where it is fully extracted from the UN Declaration on the elimination of violence against women of 1993, still leaving gender-based violence against women undefined. Moreover, national laws and bylaws do not institute a sufficient legal framework that would enable an efficient protection of victims of violence (Мирчева, Гогов, 2014:17).

The National Strategy on Cessation of Domestic Violence of 2012-2015 aims at developing a comprehensive and effective system to impede domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia. The subject of the Strategy is to impede or prevent all forms of domestic violence committed against any victim, but the measures it provides offer a specific approach that addresses individual needs of any victim. Bearing in mind that most commonly, victims of domestic violence are women, the Strategy offers a framework for gender-specific measures aimed at cessation and protection of women's specific needs, while simultaneously offering a wide range of other measures and activities to encompass other victims. The Strategy contains measures for action in the several strategic areas: prevention, protection, assistance and support for victims, persecution of offenders, multi-sectoral cooperation and strengthening institutional capacities and specialised services, as well as establishing a mechanism for implementation, tracking and evaluation. A new national mechanism for tracking and evaluation of this document has been established, comprised of a national rapporteur, national coordinator, and a National coordinative body for prevention and protection against domestic violence.

The 2012-2015 National Strategy on Prevention and Protection against Domestic Violence also contains paragraphs on the needs of victims of such violence. The vision of the strategy, among other provisions, also accounts for a "greater safety of the victims" and a "higher quality of services for victims and their standardisation" by the end of 2015. Key innovative characteristics of the Strategy are 1. development of individual packages of measures for prevention and assistance to victims who address their individual needs; 2. promotion of victims' integration in all spheres of society; 3. promotion of investigation and criminal prosecution with a consistent acknowledgement of victims' rights and their treatment in the criminal-punitive system; 4. standardisation and expansion of availability of measures for assistance and support of victims; as well as 5. measures for treatment of offenders. Leading principles in the implementation of strategic goals are the principle of treatment of victims compliant to human rights and freedoms, and the principle of non-discrimination. The mutual connection between discrimination and domestic violence is acknowledged and the Strategy underscores that "activities are especially aimed at an increased protection of victims facing multiplied discrimination".

The Strategy envisions a separate strategic area – Protection, assistance and support for victims in 4 strategic goals:

1. Promotion of institutional response immediately after violence has occurred by implementing a holistic approach;
2. Promotion of recognition of all forms of domestic violence and victims' identification;
3. Accessibility to direct aid and protection of victims;
4. Victims' integration into social life.

The government of the Republic of Macedonia formed a National coordinative body against domestic violence, in charge of tracking and analysing domestic violence in general, coordinating activities of the institutions and associations in this regard, as well as offering proposals for promotion measures. Other parties involved in the work of this body are representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, representatives of the judicial system, judges of court of primary instance, one public prosecutor, representative of the ombudsman, representatives of associations registered and working with domestic violence, whereas other institutions, the business community, local municipalities, academia, cultural and scholarly organisations, associations, and the media would get involved by necessity.

The National Council for Gender Equality is a national, multiethnic, multigenerational network, creatively oriented towards the future. It was founded in October 1994 and grew into one of the largest female networks in the Republic of Macedonia. A free SOS line for support of victims of domestic violence operates within the Council.

In the field of social protection, procedures for implementation of activities of the Centre for social protection in the domain of domestic violence are defined in more detail in the 'Guidebook on manner of implementation and tracking of measures for protection of family and victims of domestic violence', copied and endorsed by the Centre for social work and the manner of tracking interim measures ruled by the Court. The Guidebook is mandatory for workers working with victims of domestic violence, and contains provisions which partially manage the issue of the procedures needed to respect the standard of due diligence. In practice, this act closely determines legal obligations for implementation of protection measures, which centres for social work undertake in cases of domestic violence. The Guidebook also focuses on the procedure for establishing cooperation with other authorities (Ministry of Internal Affairs, health services – aiming to rule a proper punishment, and prosecution).

In 2012, a Common protocol of action in domestic violence cases was adopted. Under the jurisdiction of centres for social work come certain actions, such as leading the case, acting in urgent cases, estimating the needs of victims, and intervening in certain cases, full disclosure of their rights to the victim in the given situation, and engaging services that need to protect them. Directions for securing information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, health institutions, non-governmental organisations, education institutions, units of local self-government, and other persons and institutions are provided, aiming to undertake the measures needed to protect victims. Procedures are being run on the basis of the principle of confidentiality and free consent given by the victims, whereby the conversation needs to be held in special quarters designed for that purpose.

In the part on police actions, directions are provided for acting upon reports of domestic violence, recording reports and intervening by immediate response at the scene of the crime. Special guidelines have been prepared for these situations, for proper treatment of the victims and the offenders during interventions, aiming to stop further violence. Police officials usually act in cases where there are children present in the home, activating social services at the same time.

According to this Protocol, the role of health services is to provide complete healthcare to victims in order to preserve and maintain their physical and psychological health, as well as healing any injuries or psychological traumas that may have been incurred by the violence. In cases where there is reasonable doubt if the injuries sustained result from domestic violence, it is the health worker's role to interview the victim, encourage victims to confide in them, and learn more about the circumstances under which those injuries were sustained. In case of knowledge of domestic violence, compliant to the Protocol, health workers are under obligation to:

1. report domestic violence to the police;
2. establish motives and manner of sustaining the injuries and do a complete check-up;

3. Interview the victim concerning possible solutions to the problem, offer counselling, advise them on their rights, and

4. At the request by the authorities to deliver complete documentation relevant to solving the case, leading to a punishment for the offender.

The Law on keeping records in health institutions obliges health workers to file a Report on injuries in three copies, and keep track of the victim in her/his further treatment, when reports are being filed by the adequate services (police and Centres for social work), aiming to impede secondary victimisation of violence victims. The health worker, with consent of the victims, furthers the documentation to relevant institutions involved in the integrated and coordinated intervention system for assistance to victims of domestic violence, in compliance with valid legal provisions. In turn, these institutions are then obliged to treat these documents as confidential, in compliance with the Law on protection of patients, and the Law on protection of personal data. At the request of judicial organs, health workers/experts provide an estimate of the violence/injuries, circumstances under which it was sustained, etc.

Civil organisations, as a significant factor in the prevention and dealing with domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia, are working on raising public awareness and sensitising the public about the problem of domestic violence. They are also working on uncovering and reporting the cases, they cooperate with authorities and institutions that work on domestic violence victims' protection.

Authorities and institutions in charge of prevention and protection against domestic violence are the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Justice, units of local self-government and institutions working in the area of social care, child protection, internal affairs, health, employment and education. They are all undertaking measures to protect victims and prevent violence, and cooperate and coordinate their activities regularly. Institutions are obliged to make sure that procedures are run by competent experts, trained in implementing actions according to the Law on prevention, cessation and protection against domestic violence and gender-based violence. Compliant to this law, the court in jurisdiction rules interim measures for protection of victims, whereas institutions and the court in jurisdiction are keeping records on domestic violence (in compliance with the provisions on protection of personal data).

Cooperation between the authorities and institutions is defined as one of the main goals of the Protocol, but there is a palpable lack of a definition on the cooperation, ways in which it is being led, and the obligations stemming from this cooperation. The mechanisms for treatment of victims of domestic violence are in regards to:

1. identification and direction;
2. first-hand care and middle-term assistance;
3. re-integration and re-socialisation, and
4. criminal proceedings.

However, although the need for mechanisms for direction between the authorities and bodies is being acknowledged, this document does not offer a detailed analysis of these mechanisms (Мирчева, Гогов, 2014).

Overview of victims of domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia and interventions by the authorities

The overview of victims of domestic violence has been created on the basis of a report by the Department of social work for the period of 2012 – 30 June 2015, where reported cases of domestic violence have been analysed, as well as the treatment, and assistance provided to the victims. Regarding the structure by sex, the number of victims for the period of 2012 – 2013 shows a slight and insignificant trend of decrease, but in 2014 that trend took an upward trajectory. In the first six months of 2015, there is a significant rise in the number of documented victims of domestic violence, in comparison to the previous 3 years, rising to 70% of the overall number of victims reported in 2012. Women are much more exposed to domestic violence than men. Measured in percentages, of the overall percent of victims, 84.2% were women, and 15.7% were men. This emphasises the gender dimension of the issue of domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia.

For the period analysed, 56% of the victims of domestic violence were unemployed, whereas 44% employed persons, showing that domestic violence is present in both categories. However, the number of unemployed persons who reported the violence is higher. This can be an indication of a greater spread of domestic violence against unemployed persons, but is also indicative of the premise that they have a greater need of reporting the crime, since they are economically powerless and need material assistance and protection.

Regarding ethnical structure, the largest proportion of victims come from the Macedonian community – 79%, which is not necessarily an indication that domestic violence is more present in this community relative to others, since it reflects the proportion of the various communities in the country. Moreover, it may indicate that there is a higher degree of awareness of the existence of the problem, or of economic independence of women (since they are victims in most cases), of a trend of overcoming stereotypes and a greater emancipation, as well as a greater trust in institutions and aid and protection services.

Regarding the place of residence, the analysis shows that domestic violence is present in urban areas with 75%, and 25% in rural areas. It clearly points to the greater degree of presence of domestic violence in urban areas, but also to the greater awareness, independence, trust and information, due to which women in urban areas are less reluctant to report the crime.

Another fact that needs to be emphasized is that these numbers bear no witness to the spread of domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia, but of the number of persons who reported it. The largest proportion of cases remain uncovered and the of-

fenders are not opposed. In environments where there is no culture of open discussion of such 'private matters', the rate of domestic violence is always lower due to the lack of reporting, the reluctance to speak openly about it, and admitting it. That is certainly an issue for the main political trends.

After reporting the case to the Centre for social work, all victims of domestic violence were provided with proper protection and psycho-social assistance, and to a large proportion of them legal assistance was afforded. For certain cases, it was deemed that victims need to be placed in a shelter for their own personal safety and health, so they were placed in one of the four shelters throughout Macedonia. Institutions from other areas were also involved in the assistance measures. The victims, aside from psycho-social aid and advice, fulfilled their social protection rights, most of all their social welfare payments. In compliance with the new Law on prevention, cessation and protection against domestic violence, effective as of 1 January 2015, victims can also benefit from the measure allowing them to get engaged in active employment measures on the labour market. This form of assistance was afforded to 186 victims of domestic violence.

According to the Department of social work, the assistance activities were largely initiated by the reporting of the crime to a Centre for social work, but it is a small difference from those who reported it to the Ministry of Internal affairs, and those who reported it to other institutions. This can be used as an indicator of the degree of trust victims have in the authorities, as well as encouragement to change the attitude towards the treatment of victims, and can be put to use in the efforts to build trust first and foremost through employing experts who will not simply routinely question victims, but will also have training in how to recognise violence by themselves, encourage victims to speak out and ask for help from professionals who will offer them the help needed in a professional way, with respect for their personality and dignity.

Regarding the type of violence, they experience, victims mostly faced physical and psychological violence, and the real number of cases of domestic violence is greater than the number of documented cases. This is owing to the fact that victims suffered multiple types of domestic violence, pointing to the complex nature of this issue, and the consequences it leaves in its victims.

Regarding victim protection, the Centre for social work undertakes the following measures:

1. placing victims in centres for victims of domestic violence;
2. adequate healthcare;
3. adequate psycho-social intervention and treatment;
4. psycho-social treatment in counselling centres;
5. assistance for the family for education of children;
6. legal aid and representation; and
7. economic independence of the victims through their active involvement in the labour market.

The structure of the proposed and enacted interim measures for protection regarding offenders in domestic violence cases points to the following conclusions:

- analysed by years, the number of cases accepted by the court is increasing, with exception to 2013 (a year in which even the scope of the violence had also decreased);
- the largest proportion of measures are restrictive measures;
- the 'mandatory removal from home' measure, regardless of ownership, is obviously not used enough. Unfortunately, it was victims who left the home more often than offenders;
- the 'mandatory counselling' measure is in decline. This measure is extremely significant, since it provides the opportunity to prevent violent behaviour in the future;
- the 'mandatory medical treatment' for offenders who use alcohol, drugs or other psychotropic substances is also in decline. Field experiences show that this is one measure that is the most difficult to realise, since there are many doubts as to who ought to take the offender from their home to the appropriate institution. This is backed by the fact that health institutions have not adopted a protocol on the manner of implementation of the interim protection measures, which fall under their domain, in situations when offenders refuse to be voluntarily admitted into the health institution. For this reason, the measure is insufficiently used;
- generally, the number of measures ruled by the court is insufficient. One of the reasons – as seen by the conclusions made by the Centre for social work - is that a large proportion of the victims do not give their consent to raise the measures in front of the courts, since they only consent to protection measures under the jurisdiction of the Centre. On the other hand, the number of victims who retract their consent – fearing for their own safety - is large.

Of the total number of shelters, i.e. Centres for victims of domestic violence – four – those that are organisational units of the centres of social work in Skopje and Bitola, were used most often. Analysed by years, 2013 saw the largest number of victims placed in centres (a total of 33).

Conclusion and directions for action in the forthcoming period

Despite the fact that domestic violence is widely spread worldwide, societies seem to tolerate it very well. In most cases, it encompasses various forms of violence against women stemming from their intimate partners. Scientific findings on the scope, context, and factors of gender-based violence within the family have expanded in the past several decades, mostly due to feminist research and activism. Domestic violence is most often associated with victimization of women, since the largest percentage of victims of domestic violence are female. By encouraging them to report the crime, re-

ceive adequate aid and protection, states would protect the interests not only of victims, but of the entire society in dealing with criminal behaviour.

According to the results analysed by the Department of social affairs, domestic violence persists as a gender-based issue, where women are 84.2% of victims. The majority of cases reports to the Centre of social affairs end up offering in psycho-social support and legal advice on protection measures, but not many of the victims agree to take their cases to a court of law consequently. The number of interim protection measures – both suggested as ruled by the court, is not satisfactory in comparison to the number of victims of domestic violence. The number of cases referred to the advice centre for treatment of victims of violence is very low, especially taking into consideration the fact that this measure is a great contribution into prevention against domestic violence in the future**.**

The analysis of the legal and institutional setup of domestic violence in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the analysis of the victims who are on record provides us with several directions for action in the following period, which will aim to emphasise the gender dimension of domestic violence, as well as meeting the needs and rights of women – victims of domestic violence:

- Relevant laws in the Republic of Macedonia need to be enriched with definitions of violence against women, gender, and gender-based violence, in compliance with the definitions provided by the Istanbul convention;
- Roles and responsibilities of each of the actors in charge, as well as their mutual cooperation, need to be clearly defined, enabling for an efficient protection of women against domestic violence.
- General and specific obligations of each institution for prevention and protection against violence against women need to be revised in a way that provides for actions oriented towards the prioritising the needs and rights of victims;
- Establish a legal basis for periodic gathering of statistical data on violence against women in the family, and keep records;
- Within the Law on criminal procedure, urgent measures for protection need to be included, authorising local authorities to act;
- Legally determining rights of women-victims of domestic violence, and recognising their specific needs and interests;
- Initiate research to gain data on the spread of violence against women in the family, degree of reporting of the violence cases, reasons for not reporting it, victims' trust in the institutions and the services for aid and protection of victims, and the satisfaction from their actions, as well as the measures for protection. The response of the society to violence against women is most efficient if it is founded on a critical mass of scholarly data on its nature, a complete understanding of the factors that generate it, and a comprehensive, multi-sector approach in its prevention.

Women-victims of domestic violence should be treated with respect for their personality and dignity, be acknowledged as victims, and have their victimisation be taken seriously, gain information about their rights and the way how to realise their rights, and gain access to justice. Having an adequate treatment by professionals in specialised services means that both the interests of the victim and those of the society are protected, in the efforts to end domestic violence.

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CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM AND PROPAGANDA – TRENDS, MODELS AND DIMENSIONS

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Abstract: *Terrorist propaganda is not a new phenomenon. Propaganda is as old as terrorism, and it is a method of political battle. In history, terrorist propaganda has changed its profile and the tools for action. All media, both old and new, have served terrorists for their propaganda. Old media do not have such efficient impact in spreading terrorist propaganda, as the new ones, which rely on the Internet and modern ICT technologies.*
The different goals of terrorist propaganda could be promoted through effective media distribution. Some of the most popular goals of terrorist propaganda, distributed via the Internet, are dissemination, justification, promotion of illicit materials, etc.
The effects of terrorist propaganda can be seen in the public sphere, if citizens feel the fear of terrorism or by terrorist acts, organized in a sophisticated manner. Propaganda is used by terrorists at internal level for improving terrorist goals and positions, recruiting new members and acquiring support, etc., and external level to exert influence on the audience and get publicity.
Trends of terrorist propaganda indicate that in the course of history, propaganda has had different forms and models. The newest one has larger dimensions, because of the advantages of new technologies and media for implementation of terrorist activities.
The future of terrorist propaganda is uncertain, especially if we bear in mind that revolution of information technologies has brought about new trends and dimensions of propaganda and provide terrorists with opportunities to improve their models.

Keywords: *propaganda, terrorism, Internet, media*

Introduction

This paper aims to explain the evolution of usage of propaganda by terrorists, as a tool that contributes to the effectiveness of actions and helps in gaining support. That was the initial purpose of terrorist propaganda. Today, it means much more and particularly propaganda has a significant impact, globally.

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Terrorists' aspirations and purposes to get publicity and to gain support for their goals and objectives, are the key reasons for the use of propaganda.

Terrorist activities on the creation of propaganda have a numerous different forms and shapes, and depend on the kind of terrorism. Historical perspective of development of terrorism indicates that means, methods and ways of terrorist propaganda, are not changed over time.

In all stages of the development of terrorism, media are used for promotion of terrorist goals, as well as for public promotions of terrorist acts. The aim of such propaganda is to spread fear, to gain support or increase public support, etc.

Therefore, the main fields of analysis in the paper are focused on: a) theoretical and conceptual framework of understanding terrorist propaganda, b) origins of the use of terrorist propaganda, c) models of modern terrorist propaganda, and d) new trends of terrorist propaganda based on the use of new media.

The activities of terrorist propaganda have evolved, and currently propaganda effects are widespread. It is through the advertisement materials that we are surrounded by, or through the expansion of modern media, that they tend to influence on public opinion, as the ultimate effect and goal of propaganda.

Terrorism has become one of the most dangerous security risks in the last two centuries. Some of the types of terrorism may have a specific approach to propaganda, but all of them have violence as a means for propaganda.

Sometimes, terrorist acts can have the role of propaganda, and their consequences can be the most influential propaganda activity. That was shown in the 9/11 attack, which is, by the number of victims and other losses, one of the biggest terrorist attacks.

The new era of terrorism relies on new technologies, as means for propaganda, such as the Internet and social media. For the purpose of terrorist propaganda, many elements are used, which can ensure support for terrorists.

Terrorism is characterized by organized activities, performed through various tactics and techniques. The main purpose is to make an impact on public opinion, aiming at achieving the planned goals.

Some experts try to explain that new terrorism is related to the information revolution which altered the nature of conflicts globally[3].

Other explanations, such as the one provided by M. Crenshaw, point out the strategic and rational ability of terrorism[4], and it can be considered as persuasion method to wheel extremist ideas in political reality.

Wilkinson emphasized that terrorism is a technique for inducing fear[5]. For understanding of this topic, it is important to stress two main characteristics of terrorism[6]:

1. political intention, aim and purpose, as basic elements for conducting terrorist act.
2. psychological effects that terrorism causes.

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[3] Arquilla, J., Ronfeldt, D.&Zanini, M. (2006), *Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism* (in: Howard, R., Sawyer, R. (ed.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Contemporary Learning   Series, USA, 2006),p.110

[4] Crenshaw, M. (2006), *The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic* Choice (in: Howard, R., Sawyer, R. (ed.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Contemporary Learning Series, USA, 2006), p.54-55

[5] Wilkinson, P.(2002), *Terorizam protiv demokracije,* Golden Marketing, Zagreb, p.93

[6] Gaćinović, R. (1994), *Terorizam i propaganda*, Mladost, Beograd,p.10

Furthermore, Wilkinson has defined, the so-called „political terrorism"[7], as a systematic use of violence and fear to achieve political objectives. Some of the characteristics of such form of terrorism are:

-systematic use of murder, injury, or threats, in addition to fulfilling political objectives, revolution or repression,

-creation of an atmosphere of fear, coercion, and intimidation, but it is important to stress that indiscriminate attacks are made on noncombatants (soft targets).

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of Terrorist Propaganda

Terrorism, as means of political struggle, has always relied on several dimensions: public presentation of ideas and objectives, causing fear, acting through violence, gaining publicity, using the newest technological developments, etc.[8].

The development and modernization of society has enabled terrorists to use modern means of propaganda, which have become an integral part of modern terrorism, especially those with religious goals.

Ganor has stressed that modern terrorism has become a psychological warfare[9]. Terrorists are able to attain aims without carrying out a single attack, causing panic in public, which might be produced by continuous threats spread through media (e.g. by radio, TV interviews, videos and other methods). According to Ganor, modern terrorism exploits the imagination of the targeted population[10], and for that purpose, uses all popular methods of psychological warfare, based on media and broadcast.

Having in mind the definition of propaganda, it is obvious that it serves for controlling and influencing human behavior. According to the simplest definition of propaganda, it is a form of permanent, organized communication, which includes the production, dissemination and reproduction of ideas, images and messages, with the aim to convince and influence attitudes and actions of individuals and groups.

The origin of modern propaganda is related to the period before the World War I, when public discussions took place in the United States, with the aim to persuade the nation to enter the war.

There are several types of propaganda, but the most frequent are the political, economic and war propaganda. Terrorist propaganda used to have different approach depending on the types, but it still uses similar means and tools.

Basically, in the center of the idea of terrorist propaganda is the intention to draw public attention and to achieve publicity. Therefore, terrorists use supportive media to

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[7]   Wilkinson, P. (1976), *Political Terrorism*, London: MacMillan, pp. 56

[8]   Injac, O. (2001), *Sociološki aspekti savremenog terorizma u Evropi*, Čigoja štampa&UPNS, Beograd, p.25

[9]   Ganor, B. (2002), *Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare*, Institute for Counter Terrorism, p.1

[10]   Ibid, p.2

enable them to quickly convey the news.

According to Wilkinson, terrorism and media are in a „symbiotic relation", both sides of which have benefits.

„In a democratic society, when one says „terrorism", one immediately says „media". This relies on the fact that terrorism by nature is a psychological weapon, which depends on the transmission of threats to the wider audience"[11].

Wilkinson gives an explanation that terrorists manipulate with media for their purposes, mainly because of four capital aims[12]:

1. promotion of terrorist ideas and causing fear among the audience;
2. gaining support from the population and international publicity for their goals, with ideas, such as justice and victory;
3. hindering the reaction of the authorities and security forces;
4. mobilization, support and increase of the number of real or potential followers, with the aim to collect and ensure financial and other resources, and to encourage future attacks.

Bruce Hoffman points out that terrorists' need for media promotion and use of propaganda has the purpose to attract public attention and self-promotion, and it is based on both, propaganda action, as well as on the communication process[13].

As a method used by terrorists, propaganda is known since the Russian organization "People's Will" started its propaganda actions. Their postulate was "propaganda by deed"[14], which means they intentionally committed violent acts in public, for the aim of promotion and making an impact.

Hoffman tried to explain the specificity of understanding contemporary terrorism propaganda, through the definition of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis: „Propaganda is the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations"[15].

Some of the most important reasons for and causes of terrorist propaganda are: to gain legitimacy among the general public and make a psychological pressure on targeted audience.

According to the Meyer study on propaganda, there are some of the main means and goals of terrorism propaganda[16]: to disseminate banned information and gain support, to attract and affect opinions of the targeted audience and make influence on

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[11] Wilkinson, P.(2002), *Terorizam protiv demokracije,* Golden Marketing, Zagreb, p.189

[12] Ibid, p.192

[13] Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism* (revised and expanded edition), Columbia University Press, NY, p.198

[14] Hofman, B. (2000), *Unutrašnji terorizam*, ALFA, Beograd, p.13

[15] Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism* (revised and expanded edition), Columbia University Press, NY, p.345

[16] Meyer, C. (1991), *Underground voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru*, RAND Corporation, p.2

their minds and behavior, and to try to ensure conditions for achieving terrorist aims and ideas.

There is no doubt that terrorists want to communicate through propaganda and to forward certain messages to the target audience[17].

However, in Hoffman's opinion, the purpose of terrorist propaganda can be strategically guided and tactically implemented, depending on a few aspects and characteristics of actions:

- propaganda can be directed to spreading information, education and raising awareness, and can be supportive in a material, financial or spiritual way;
- propaganda can serve as a tool for terrorist recruitment;
- propaganda tends to have functions of coercion and to make impact on political and security counterterrorism measures;
- propaganda has an internal influence or this is the so-called "auto propaganda", task of which is to make the terrorist group stronger.

When terrorism gained global dimensions and impact, terrorist propaganda became an aggressive method of the terrorist battle.

The origins of terrorist usage of propaganda

Past and current functions and impact of terrorist propaganda have certain differences, mainly in their means, tools and methods, and not so much regarding their role and aims. In both periods, terrorist propaganda has the intention of achieving certain impact. However, the difference is the form of communication action and the intention to establish control over the group of followers, or on a certain audience.

Hoffman pointed out that in the past, old-fashioned communication tools were used, such as the three types of means for spreading propaganda[18]:

1. Secret radio stations under the rebels control;
2. All types of illegal publications - newspapers, posters, flyers, etc.;
3. The means of mass media communication (e.g. television, radio and press).

Depending on the period of history, terrorist propaganda definitely had had various forms of manifestation. According to Hoffman's approach, one of the most extreme terrorist propaganda, known as „propaganda by deed", has been used in XIX century by anarchists[19]. It was promoted by the extreme Italian politician Carlo Piscano, who promoted ideas of propaganda by committing violence, not only because of public attention or gaining publicity, but also to inform, educate and gather rebels and masses who had to support the revolution[20].

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[17] Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism* (revised and expanded edition), Columbia University Press, NY, p.199

[18] Ibid, p.199

[19] Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism* (revised and expanded edition), Columbia University Press, NY, p.5

[20] Ibid, p.5

This principle "propaganda by deed", was also applied by the anarchist organization in Russia in XIX century, but in a different manner. The organization "People's Will"had an entirely different approach of propaganda by deed, and it was used selectively against certain individuals with political power, such as the czar, royal family members, government officials, etc.[21]. The biggest propaganda act of this organization was the assassination of the Russian Czar Alexander II in 1881, and this model has been imitated later on, by other organizations which practiced terrorism. White stated: "anarchists discovered that the violence which arose from their attacks brought them publicity"[22].

Hoffman stated the strategic importance of "propaganda by deed", which provided model that later was emulated by other terrorist organizations[23]. The later use of this form of propaganda in XX century had the explanation that there was no other choice as a main justification of killing innocent civilians. This type of violent actions attracted the greatest level of publicity.

During XIX century, assassinations and other violent acts were committed to enforce political revolution. It became the paradigm of the terrorist propaganda, and these revolutionary characteristics were kept until World War I. The period between the two wars, especially the 1930's, and during the World War II, was marked by war propaganda.

Terrorist propaganda in XX century had revolutionary and rebel characteristics, basically because of the dominant types of ideological and ethnic-nationalist terrorism.

In late XX century, and the beginning of XX century, terrorist propaganda produced other implications and consequences, not only in terms of methods, but also by wider dimensions of actions. The best example of the method "propaganda by deed"was the terrorist attack in 2001 in New York and Washington, when almost 3000 innocent people died.

Contemporary models of terrorist propaganda

The Internet became an efficient tool for terrorist propaganda; because it gives an opportunity for terrorists to distribute contents directly, as most experts agree[24]. Contemporary models of terrorist usage of the Internet and other mass media for propaganda have different purposes and forms of terrorist action[25]. Currently, it is directed to reach support, through the dissemination of terrorist material, promotion of the appropriate behavior from the terrorists' point of view (e.g. violent acts), etc.

Propaganda conducted by terrorists via the Internet, covers numerous objectives

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[21] Ibid, p.5

[22] White, Dž. (2004), *Terorizam*, Alexandria Press, Beograd, p.321

[23] Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism* (revised and expanded edition), Columbia University Press, NY, p.7

[24] Ibid, p.202

[25] UNDOC (2012), *The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes*, United Nations, NY

and targets. Terrorist propaganda has various types of audience, which is an interesting phenomenon. It may be directed toward potential or actual supporters, opponents of ideas, followers of extremist ideas and goals, to direct or indirect victims of acts of terrorism or the international community. Propaganda targeted to potential or actual supporters has its focus on recruitment, radicalization and encouragement for committing terrorism.

Furthermore, propaganda can be used to demonstrate the performance of committed terrorist attacks, and in that case it is directed to those who provided financial or any other support for terrorism.

Through the dissemination of disinformation, or threats of violence and images of violent acts, terrorists want to cause fear and panic in societies. Due to the numerous terrorist propaganda goals, from manipulation to political ends, there are many different types of methods and tactics that terrorists use[26].

One of the most typical goals of terrorist propaganda is psychological manipulation of a certain audience, in addition to affecting minds and belief changes. Moreover, clear goals of propaganda are the processes of recruitment and radicalization that are intended to the specific audience. In that sense, it is important to stress, that terrorist propaganda is often directed to the most vulnerable and marginalized social groups, which can be fertile soil for propaganda goals.

In conducting propaganda, terrorists apply certain models of action. Some of the important contemporary models of terrorist propaganda are:

Dissemination of ideas and resources as a model of terrorist propaganda – it serves as a model of gaining support.

Terrorist propaganda is intended for dissemination of radical ideas and persuasion, but also to give directions, guidelines and warrants to their followers and supporters. In a period of the Internet development, terrorist propaganda relies on multimedia communications means and it uses it for providing ideological or practical instructions, explanations, promotion and justification of terrorist activities. Terrorists are very creative in using the Internet for this form of propaganda, and develop it in such models as virtual messages, presentations, magazines, audio and video files and video games.

It is important to stress that the dissemination of such forms of resources, generally described, is not prohibited and can be understood as a fundamental human right- as means of the freedom of speech and freedom of expression, which are both allowed and guaranteed by international law.

This two freedom rights give guarantees for individuals to share their views and opinions, or distribute materials which can be considered acceptable or unacceptable by others.

Some of the exceptions when this type of dissemination of terrorist resources

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[26] Ibid, p.3

can be prohibited, include communications that can be threatening to national security or encourage acts of violence.

Violence promotion as a model of terrorist propaganda – one of the oldest models of propaganda.

There is a broad spectrum of activities undertaken by terrorists via the Internet[27], in addition to the promotion of propaganda of violence. Terrorists distribute via the Internet recorded propaganda videos with acts of violence; aiming at increasing fear, and reminding people of their brutal methods (e.g. ISIL videos of execution in the cage or scenes of cutting off heads of captured persons, etc.).

Propaganda via the Internet also may include promotion of the so-called "entertaining" contents, such as video games, developed by terrorist organizations with the purpose to simulate acts of terrorism and encourage the user to be engaged in terrorist activities virtually.

A recent example is the usage of social networks for intimidation and recruitment of "potential jihadists" to join ISIL[28].

Promotion of extremist discourse and radicalization- it helps terrorists to spread extremist and radical ideas.

The extremist discourse is promoted by terrorists to encourage people to join extremist organizations and be prepared to conduct violent terrorist acts. It contributes to a growing trend of radicalization between the supporters and limited audience, or across the society where extremist discourse has been disseminated. Experts claim that the socio-psychological environment can generate conditions for the creation of potential terrorists, topic of Stahelski's paper "Terrorists are made, not born"[29].

Popular tools for distribution of that type of content are compact discs (CDs) and digital video discs (DVDs), but mainly it is distributed via the broad range of Internet tools, such as dedicated websites, targeted virtual chat rooms and forums, online magazines, social networks (Twitter and Facebook)[30], or through popular video and file-sharing websites (YouTube), etc.

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[27] Council of Europe (2007), *Cyberterrorism – the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes*, Strasbourgh

[28] Liang, C.S. (2015), *Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda*, GCSP Policy Paper, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, p.5

[29] Stahelski,A.(2005), *Terrorists Are Made, Not Born*: *Creating Terrorists Using Social Psychological Conditioning, Cultic Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1,* Washigton DC,p.1

[30] Ibid, p.5

Trends of Terrorism Propaganda and the New Media

New trends of terrorist propaganda are based on the development of the ICT means and tools and new media. Some of them are very popular and in frequent use by different terrorist groups, which has made a framework for analysis of the new forms of propaganda. Mostly, terrorists use the Internet for spreading messages and making an impact[31], based on the aim of their propaganda. The Internet plays a positive social role, but it is also used for illegal activities, such as cyber-terrorism or other purposes of terrorist activities[32]. Internet is recognized in many ways as an ideal domain for propaganda activity by terrorist groups, because of the following reasons:

- Easy access;
- Little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control;
- Potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world;
- Anonymity of communication;
- Fast flow of information;
- Inexpensive development and maintenance of a web presence;
- A multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video and to allow users to download films, songs, books, posters, and so forth);
- The ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which use the Internet as a resource for stories.

The Internet offers terrorists and extremists the same opportunity and capability that it does to the rest of society: to communicate, collaborate and convince. Authorities of the United Kingdom - UK Home Office, in 2006 have recognized the Internet as a domain "where many types of radical views are strongly promoted"[33].

Terrorists use the Internet for many illegal purposes, which include public provocation, radicalization, incitement, propaganda or terrorism glorification, recruitment, training (learning), planning and organizing terrorist activities.

Hoffman stated that since the 1990's, the Internet has been proved as a very beneficial domain and tool for terrorist communication, used for two main purposes[34]:

1. External – used for propaganda and other terrorist purposes;
2. Internal – used for establishing command, control and informative purposes.

Moreover, social media, as the most popular domain of modern communication, have become a tool of terrorist communication. The main advantage is that terrorists communicate over open channels. Terrorists use social media to spread violent propaganda materials and to carry out the process of finding new recruits. Furthermore,

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[31] Council of Europe (2007), *Cyberterrorism – the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,* Strasbourgh, p.15

[32] Ibid, str.15

[33] The United Kingdom's Strategy (2006), *Countering International Terrorism*, UK Home Office, London, p.10

[34] Hoffman, B. (2006), *Inside Terrorism* (revised and expanded edition), Columbia University Press, NY, p.202

they use it to carry out radicalization, as a process by which an individual or a group accepts extreme ideas and aspirations, which can lead to violent and extreme acts.

Experts point out measures which terrorist use to organize synchronized attacks, such as in 1998 on USA embassies. The most popular example of terrorist usage of social media are for the 9/11 attack in USA, which was enabled by information technologies[35]. As was stated in Cronin's analysis of the terrorist means, in simultaneous attacks there were a lot of casualties, and location prevalence of terrorist attacks was bridged by internet communications, but also roots of the extremism are planted through the websites and videotapes that are available across the globe[36].

The most popular means used by terrorists for radicalization and dissemination of extremist ideas, which may be turned to the acts of terrorism, are the different types of social media (e.g. social networks, blogs, business networks, enterprise social networks, forums, photo sharing forums, etc.).

There are different forms as to how terrorists abuse social media for propaganda goals, according to the Council of Europe analysis[37]:
- dissemination of illegal content, including threatening with terrorist attacks;
- inciting, advertising, and glorifying terrorism;
- fundraising for and financing of terrorism;
- training for terrorism;
- recruiting for terrorism;
- dissemination of racist and xenophobic material;
- other logistical uses for internal communication, information acquisition, and target analysis.

The new trends of terrorist propaganda which are carried out through the new media have definitely changed the nature of terrorist activities and raised efficiency of terrorist attacks.

Conclusion

If we look at the development of terrorist propaganda over the last two centuries, there are not so many changes. The most important change is related to propaganda proportions, which nowadays has attained a global reach due to the Internet possibilities and the usage of modern electronic technologies for communication. Terrorists use the Internet opportunities for propaganda, and it has become almost unimaginable terrorist groups not to be present on social media and networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, etc. Terrorist groups have their own websites and social network accounts, by which they communicate with the audience and present different types of propaganda, depending on the model.

The meaning of terrorist propaganda has gained totally different connotations for the

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[35] Cronin,A.K. (2006), *Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism* (in: Howard, R., Sawyer, R. (ed.), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Contemporary Learning Series, USA, 2006), p.77

[36] Ibid, p.77

[37] Council of Europe (2007), *Cyberterrorism – the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,* Strasbourgh, p.33-38

society in the XXI century, because in this information age, people are exposed to many risks. This is advantage for terrorists to easily achieve their goals, because new technologies are supportive to the realization of terrorist purposes.

Definitely, the risks from terrorism are much bigger in the era of new media, and propaganda contributes to that. Having in mind how powerful terrorist propaganda can be due to the information technology and Internet possibilities, and how it reinforces the effects of terrorism, the huge problem is how to establish propaganda resilience strategy.

The contemporary models of terrorist propaganda have proved that propaganda does not only serve to disseminate basic ideas or to encourage revolutionary character, as it was in the past, but also to stipulate and promote wider dimensions of terrorist goals. This case is typical for the era of extreme terrorism, which has become paradigmatic since the terrorist attack in USA, 2001.

Terrorism has become extremely dangerous, and propaganda provides support and prepares the ground for actions[38]. There are two main characteristics of contemporary terrorism, and propaganda perfectly works for them: first, aggression and violence against civilians and second, influence on certain audience to change their behavior and to serve interests of terrorists[39].

It is obvious from these new trends that propaganda is going to stay as one of the most important tools of terrorism. It is a fact that terrorists are willing to use all relevant methods and tools in the future in order to improve propaganda, which allows them to reach their goals.

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[38] Richard Falk explained great terrorist war, can be relied on that type of action and named that form of terrorism „megaterrorism" (see: Folk, R. (2003), *Veliki teroristički rat*, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, p.88)

[39] Victoroff, J. (2005), *The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches*, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), p.4

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SECURITY CULTURE'S ROLE IN SCADA NETWORKS PROTECTION

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Abstract: *There is a constant need to improve the security of critical infrastructure. Since SCADA networks perform critical tasks within critical infrastructure, it is very important to have those networks secured. One of the ways to do so is to raise security and safety awareness of all people involved in operations which concern SCADA functioning. This assignment, however simple it may seem, is very complex, but it is possible for managers to accomplish it through managerial activities. Authors argue that information security culture is the best tool for the security management to influence SCADA network security. This paper deals with elements of information security culture and the possibilities of using them in improving security of SCADA networks.*

Keywords: *security culture, information security, SCADA networks*

Introduction

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and software that perform critical tasks and provide essential services within critical infrastructure. The SCADA network segment contains the SCADA system, comprised of servers and work-stations that are used by operators to interact with the field devices segment. Operators use a software-based graphical user interface that monitors and modifies values of some crucial parameters (Nicholson et al. 2012). The reliable operation of SCADA networks is vital for such sectors of critical national infrastructure as energy, water, and transportation where both data acquisition and control are critically important (Cherdantseva et al. 2015). Critical infrastructure, and in particular control systems, require protection from a variety of cyber threats that could compromise their regular operation. These systems monitor the key parameters of production processes. They operate the control of these processes to ensure the proper provision of critical services. Originally, these systems were designed in an environment with the sole intent to monitor processes without considering the security requirements and the needs to protect them from external threats. These systems have a life cycle of decades. Many of those critical components that operate today do so in a context that is completely different from the one they have been designed for. They are exposed on Internet with obvious security risks (Paganini 2013). Attacks aim at the SCADA networks' security properties such as integrity, confidentiality, authentica-

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tion, or availability. An attacker could learn all the data and control commands and could use these commands to send false messages. An attacker can also interfere with the data transmitted over the network, and thereby compromise its integrity (Igure, Laughter & Williams 2006).

The traditional SCADA systems employ many types of devices. These devices are now reachable online and exposed to vulnerabilities, and different kinds of attacks. Although organizations have been actively using security technologies, security cannot be achieved through technological tools alone (Herath & Rao 2009). Many security firms have started designing solutions to address security problems of SCADA systems. However, the major challenge for governments is the inclusion of protection for these critical components in their cyber strategies (Paganini 2013). In order to have better security precautions in organizations, both the technical and non-technical aspects of information security need to be addressed (Zakaria et al. 2007). SCADA networks are naturally part of information systems within organizations, so their security can be achieved through information security.

However, without considering the human factor, even the state of the art technologies cannot guarantee security of the information. People are the weakest link in a firm (Aliti & Akkaya 2011). As many experts say, the real key to keeping information secure is managing the behaviour of end users and changing the corporate culture. Information security culture is a subculture of the general organizational culture. It should support all activities in a way, that information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily activities of every employee (Schlienger & Teufel 2003). It is something that is not a major concern for the most IT departments. They focus their time and energy in keeping critical systems properly configured and patched. That is why security management has to take that role. It has to initiate and administer an information security program, which consistently fosters awareness of security risks, communicates the business implications of security, and reinforces security policies (National Security Institute [NSI] 2004). A study conducted by Herath and Rao (2009) showed that subjective and descriptive norms play a role in creating security culture. They also found that managers need to make security policy related resources easily available to employees, and that there are numerous implications of self-efficacy for training or organizational development, as well as that managerial actions for employee involvement are very important (Herath & Rao 2009).

Since many countries effectively use SCADA networks, their protection could also be included in security managements' everyday tasks. In addition, organizations must be proactive in their approach to information security (Johnston & Hale 2009). That is one more reason why SCADA network security must be taken under careful consideration by the organizations' strategic documents and constantly monitored by the security management.

Security management's role in SCADA networks' protection

When we talk about information security, two categories of security management are available. The first category deals with security and IT risk management in general in the context of the business cycle, and the second establishes a management documentation to guide security. Balance among these creates the optimal situation for security management, where all levels of personnel (from upper management to SCADA technicians) coordinate to incorporate and put into effect security administration across the entire breadth of the lifecycle (design, implementation, operation/maintenance, and retirement). SCADA security depends on security administration, secure technology, and assessment, of which administration is the key for sustainable security (Stamp et al. 2003).

Security management's primary task, in information security in general, is to provide a strong commitment for the implementation of an efficient cyber strategy. That includes the assignment of information security roles, responsibilities, and authority for personnel. Each employee needs to know their responsibilities to protect information and assets of SCADA. Key personnel need sufficient authority to carry out their assigned responsibilities. A detailed security policy must be in place that describes how management defines roles and responsibilities. Each employee must be informed of all procedures adopted to keep architecture secure (Paganini 2013).

The first goal of management is to define a structured security program with assigned requirements to reach expectations and provide personnel with formalized policies and procedures. Senior management must establish expectations for information security performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance. The security policy must identify all the security requirements, which are essential for management in order to minimize cyber threats, including ones that come from insiders.

The security policy must be comprehensive and clearly define the essential procedures to be implemented in order to achieve the security objectives. Due to specific company goals and requirements, it is not possible to develop a common security policy for all companies. However, a well-grounded information security policy has to include a wide range of administrative issues such as data security policy, communication security policy, audit policy, physical security policy, etc. The security policy is just the first step. The second step is to create a security plan that documents the implementation, operation, and maintenance details (Igure, Laughter & Williams 2006).

Considering this, personnel training is one of the most important responsibilities for management in general. Managers have to provide a strong commitment to organizing training courses. Training also helps to minimize the likelihood that organizational personnel will unintentionally reveal sensitive information regarding SCADA network design, operations, or security controls deployed. One of the main goals of the training programme is to train personnel to recognize social engineering attacks made by hackers to gather sensitive information about a computer or computer network. Typically, these attacks lead up to more invasive and dangerous offenses. The network is more vulnerable if more information about internal configuration is disclosed. Data related to a SCADA network, including manufacturers, key people, computer operating systems and physical distributions of SCADA should be confidential and guarded constantly (Paganini 2013).

Another responsibility of security management is the definition of proper protection strategies, highlighting the risks related to cyber attackers and the necessary defence systems, for each component. The rapid and continuous evolution of cyber threats needs frequent revision of protection strategy to ensure it remains effective. That is why security management must evaluate each risk; analyse the probability of occurrence for the incident and the related severity. In addition, top management must accept identification of residual risk (Paganini 2013). One common ground for all men-

tioned elements of security management is information security culture. This culture, if adequately designed and implemented, can influence effectiveness and efficiency of each individual in terms of information and SCADA networks security.

Information security culture

In order to define information security culture, it is inevitable to state that it is an inherent part of the organizational culture in general. Simply said, organizational culture defines how an employee sees the organization (Ulich 2001). It is characteristic of the organization that changes and grows over time. Certainly, management can design and influence organizational culture. In fact, organizational culture represents one of the main management tools. The two core substances of the organizational culture are basic assumptions and beliefs. The organizational culture consists of the collective values, norms and knowledge of organizations. Those collective norms and values affect the behaviour of the employees (Ljustina, Radojevic & Cvorovic 2015), but they are also formed by their behaviour. Artefacts and creations such as handbooks, rituals and anecdotes are the expression of such norms and values. Ultimately, the organizational culture has a crucial impact on the corporate success (Rühli 1991). Organizational culture emerges and grows with time. It is formed by the behaviours of dominant organization members like founders and top managers. An organizational culture can have different subcultures based on sub-organizations or functions.

Information security culture is nothing else but a subculture within organizational culture. Therefore, it is a key factor in establishing information security, and hence, SCADA network security as well.

Information security culture refers to knowledge, assumptions, and beliefs of the employees as regards information security. Organizations that comprise well-developed and implemented information security culture can make employees a security asset, instead of being a risk (Von Solms 2000). However, even with such a culture in place there are still some compromises that have to be made, and conflicts of interests that should be managed.

Since employees present one of the greatest threats to information security (Mitnick & Simon 2002, p. 3), information security culture has to inform and educate them as regards keeping information safe and secure. We should also mention that insider SCADA attacks differ from external attacks. Inside attackers already have authorized access to the network, which is something that an external attacker must acquire through a combination of time, skill, and resources (Nicholson et al. 2012). Given that, it is necessary to provide employees with the adequate level of knowledge and user cooperation in order to avoid misuse of security techniques (Siponen 2001). In addition, it is important to provide the satisfactory level of organizational and security culture in order to establish a sense of unity among employees and hence create positive attitudes towards the organization in which they work.

Components of information security culture

Effective information security in organizations depends on three components: people, processes and technology (Aliti & Akkaya 2011, p. 16). People represent human factors, which can have positive or negative influence on information security management, that is "driving force" or "restraining force" (Fahey 2013). In order to have a positive influence of these factors, it is necessary to establish positive information security culture. However, it is very important to understand the company's culture and practices that affect the employees' actions (Leach 2003) in order to build information security culture. Martins and Eloff (2002, p. 205) mention that information security culture refers to assumptions about acceptable behaviours in relation to information security. Zakaria and Gani (2003) state that information security culture can lead an employee to act as a "human firewall" in order to safeguard organizational information assets. Information security should be viewed holistically, and all employees need to be aware of the potential security threats to the organization, especially, internal security incidents. To overcome these threats, an organization should encourage collective responsibility amongst all employees, and not just the technical staff, to perform security activities. An information security culture will also shape employee behaviour towards security concerns (Zakaria et al. 2007).

Emphasizing the non-technical aspects can help nurture information security as an essential part of everyone's daily work routines in an organization. However, security culture will develop and succeed only if there is involvement from all levels of employees (Zakaria et al. 2007).

The elements of information security culture can be viewed through elements of any organizational culture: artefacts, espoused values and shared assumptions (Van Niekerk & Von Solms 2010).

Artefacts represent things that could be seen, heard or felt in the organization. The official viewpoints, strategy documents, mission, and vision of the organization represent espoused values. That is, espoused values are the values that the organization wants to live up to (Van Niekerk & Von Solms 2010). The shared assumptions refer to the way of gaining success. They are implicit, shared by the employees, and they form through the years of organizational experience.

All these elements are common for organization culture in general, as well as for subcultures. This is also the case with information security culture. However, in an information security culture, knowledge underpins and supports all three levels of organizational culture (Van Niekerk & Von Solms 2010). Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010) argue that without adequate knowledge, information security cannot be ensured, so they suggest knowledge to be the fourth element of the information security culture.

Mechanisms to improve SCADA network security through security culture

In order to achieve satisfactory level of information security, organizations need to develop and nurture positive information security culture through the elements mentioned above. The adopted level of culture in turn, affects people's behaviour. The factors which influence employee behaviour through creation of security culture, are the knowledge which employees possess, behaviour of the managers, employees' own understanding of standards, and effort needed for secure behaviour (Aliti & Akkaya 2011). Nevertheless, management needs to develop and constantly monitor all of these factors in order to maintain information security culture.

There are series of activities that management has to perform if they want appropriate culture in the organization. For example, with the aim of gaining appropriate level of knowledge, training, educational programmes, seminars, etc. should be organized. Communication among employees and management should be clear, concise, and available. In addition, each individual must understand the communication channels. Employees should be encouraged to learn about security and secure use of information. Managers need to hold regular group meetings in which they will discuss and explain different problems and issues to employees (Aliti & Akkaya 2011). Management has to establish awareness raising programmes, and all the employees working with classified information should be especially educated on information usage. The best way of informing people on security issues is through personal contact, and the communication channel is a crucial factor. Once these measures take place, information security culture will be alive and accepted by all the members of the organization. Through explanation of security and safety procedures to the employees, their behaviour is going to change in a positive manner. This means that information security will be a step closer to the ideal proposed in the information security policy.

In a truly secure company, awareness of security practices intertwines the organization's culture and consciousness. In addition, the critical element of security awareness is education. It is hard to be aware of security incidents if you do not even know what the issues are. Education serves as informative factor for explaining these issues to employees. Education cannot be effective and concise if the material for the employees' learning is too long. That is why it is important to design clear, concise and effective security awareness messages. In addition, there are some critical topics, which security awareness programs have to include. Some of them are: social engineering, proprietary information protection, wireless security risks, computer viruses, password protection, office/physical security, workplace violence, industrial espionage, identity theft, e-mail precautions, data back-up, internet concerns, computer crime, hacking incidents, security breaches, how to report/respond to threats, internet attacks, legal use of software, laptop theft, privacy, travel security concerns, cyber terrorism, personal security (NSI 2004).

Development of information security culture also includes managerial activities such as planning, organizing, controlling and leading (Zakaira et al. 2007). This involves use of these activities for designing and creating everyday security tasks, guidelines for their application, and inspiring employees to effective accomplishment of security tasks, in order to reengineer and adjust existing values, norms and beliefs (Zakaira et al. 2007), that is to manage information security culture.

Conclusions

Security is a continuous process. It does not end with a good implementation of all of the required security technologies. The SCADA network must be constantly monitored for security vulnerabilities, and the software and hardware on the network regularly updated and secured with the latest patches. This process of regular maintenance is commonly referred to as configuration management. Apart from regular maintenance activities, the security technologies and procedures of a SCADA network must also be regularly audited (Igure, Laughter & Williams 2006). However, keeping SCADA networks secure is not only the responsibility of information technology (IT) security professionals and security management, but also the responsibility of all the people within the organization. Therefore, all users should be aware not only of what their roles and responsibilities are in protecting information resources, but also of how they can protect information and respond to any potential security threat or issue. Security awareness programs address the need to educate all people in an organization so they can help to protect the organization's information assets (Rotvold 2008).

Awareness and behaviour among all kinds of users are important parts of the information security performance of an organisation. Adequate information security training is thus required in order to create and improve user awareness and behaviour (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010).

Several single or combined measures might be taken in order to improve users' information security performance, ranging from the distribution of messages via, e.g. pamphlets, e-mails, intranet pages, screen savers, posters, mouse pads, and pens to games, formal presentations, lunch meetings, and training courses. Common for most of these measures is one-way communication directed at a large population from authorities to single individuals by use of expert knowledge. On the other hand, several organisational researchers argue that bringing in local knowledge through processes that involve employees is both necessary and efficient in order to attain all kinds of organisational change (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2010). All of these measures represent managerial tools that could shape organizational and information security culture, and all of them can be used for improving SCADA network security.

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOSOVO WAR CRIME COURT: A NECESSARY PATH TOWARDS ACHIEVING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE?

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Abstract: *This paper analyses the guiding principles and approaches of transitional justice policy in general and considers that one of its mechanisms is dealing with prosecutions at national level, in a case where grave violations of human rights have occurred in the past. Impunity must not be allowed and accountability for all parties directly or indirectly involved in mass atrocities must be pursued. This paper introduces the establishment of the new war crime court (tribunal) in Kosovo under domestic law, for the founding of which, the Kosovo national parliament approved the legal basis by adopting the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecution's Office in August 2015. The paper considers the creation of the court as a mechanism for achieving transitional justice in concrete manner on a longer term. Prosecution initiatives at national level are necessary to put the past behind and to achieve long-lasting peace and stability. But this is not an isolated mechanism for achieving transitional justice in Kosovo and must be regarded as an integral part of the process along with the individual reparations, truth-seeking commissions and institutional reforms.*

Keywords: *transitional justice, human rights violations, prosecutions, war crime court*

Introduction

Theorists and practitioners of transitional justice are interested in the aftermath of conflict and of large-scale human rights abuses: how do nations and political groups address past wrongs in order to create or recreate, in some cases, a decent civil order? From the failure to account for the Armenian genocide, through the Nuremberg trials, denazification, lustration processes in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, to the creation of *ad hoc* criminal tribunals, and then permanent International Criminal Tribunal, and the South African Truth Commissions and many other Reconciliation Commissions are considered to be part of the post-war economic and political transformation of societies into sustainable democracy.[2]

The definition of the concept of *transitional justice* in periods of political transition has not yet been fully addressed. Debates about *"Transitional Justice"* are generally framed by the

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normative proposition that various legal responses should be evaluated on the basis of their prospects for democracy.[3]Nevertheless, the linguistic expression *transitional justice* has been adopted for the first time in its technical sense by R.Teitel during the late 1980s, who then formulated the basic principles of this emerging discipline in her path-breaking work on the subject.[4] According to Teitel, who is considered as one of the most influential authors in this field, the institutional and legal development of transitional justice revolved around three major historical phases: 1) the post-Second World War phase of the Nuremberg Trials; 2) the post-Cold War phase which has modified the bipolar equilibrium and opened the democratization process; and 3) the steady-state phase of transitional justice.[5]

Guiding principles of transitional justice

Transitional justice is often explained as a "full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure liability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation".[6] According to the UN Approach to transitional justice, these processes and mechanisms are a critical component of the UN framework for strengthening the rule of law.Transitional Justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth-finding commissions, reparation programs and various kinds of institutional reforms. Transitional justice is trying to achieve accountability and redressing victims, provides recognition to the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and strengthens the democratic rule of law. As one of the basic principles of transitional justice is that whatever measures are undertaken, they must be in compliance with the international norms and standards, that is to say, in compliance with the UN Charter and the four pillars of the modern international legal system: international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law. In order to achieve compliance, the state should undertake investigations and prosecutions of gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence. Moreover, the state should ensure the right of victims to reparations, the right of victims and societies to know the truth about the violations and guarantees of non-recurrence of violations, in accordance with international law. There should be no amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of human rights.[7]

Second, while designing and implementing processes and mechanisms of transitional justice, the political context and the potential implications should be taken

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[3] Teitel, Ruti G., *Transitional Justice*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 52.

[4] Teitel, Ruti*G., ibid, p. 25*.

[5] Teitel, Ruti G., *supra note*, p.58.

[6] United Nations, Guidance note of the Secretary –General: *UN Approach to Transitional Justice*, March, 2010.

[7] The latter includes torture and similar cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, slavery, enforced disappearances, rape and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity.

into account, bearing in mind the fragile post-conflict and transitional environment. Thirdly, it must be considered that transitional justice needs may include assessing factors such as root causes of the conflict, the identification of vulnerable groups, such as minorities, women and children, and the condition of the country's justice and security sectors. These should be carried out by local and national actors and the international assistance has to concentrate on development of national capacity to initiate and lead the process. Fourthly, special attention should be paid to abuses committed against groups most affected by conflict, particularly women. Gender inequality is one of the most pervasive forms of societal inequality and is always present in conflicts and situations of gross human rights violations. Also, a child-sensitive approach is needed since children are most affected by armed conflicts. Transitional justice processes and mechanisms should investigate and prosecute international crimes against children, offer effective remedies to children and strengthen government institutions to promote and protect the rights of children.

Transitional justice processes and mechanisms

1. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

There are various activities proposed by international organizations, mainly UN, in order to strengthen the transitional justice mechanisms. For instance, mandating truth commissions that will examine violations of human rights and will eventually make recommendations on how to redress these activities is quite appropriate.[8]Such body, Truth and Reconciliation Commission,was established for South Africa in 1995, mandated to investigate gross violations of human rights violations perpetrated during the period of the Apartheid regime from 1960 to 1994, including abductions, killings, torture.[9] It had a seven years extended deadline. As soon as the investigations ended, the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) published the report which also included recommendations for a reparation program, including financial, symbolic and community reparations.[10]The TRC further recommended that South-Africa's society and political system should be reformed and prosecutions should be considered in cases where amnesty was not sought or was denied.[11]

After the Rwanda Civil War (1990-1992) and signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, such mechanism was provided in article 16 with the establishment of a

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[8] United Nations, Guidance note of the Secretary –General: *UN Approach to Transitional Justice*, March, 2010, p.10.

[9]   See more at htpp://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/Africa/south-africa.

[10] The TRC proposed that each victim or their families should receive approximately $3,500USD each year for six years. At the end, the amount of reparations paid to 21,000 victims was far lower than the amount recommended. Amnesty International, Annual Report: South Africa, 2009. Available athttp://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/africa/south-africa.

[11] See more at Hayner, Priscilla B., *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenges of Truth Commissions*, New York, Rouledge, 2002.

Reconciliation Commission in 1999, which was empowered to promote reconciliation, foster tolerance and culture of peace and human rights.[12] The Commission proposed a law to the national parliament that would punish all forms of discrimination.[13]

Furthermore, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established for Serbia and Montenegro in 2002 mandated to research the social, intercommunal and political conflicts in the period of 1980-2000 and establish cooperation with related commissions in neighboring countries.[14] Unfortunately, the Commission's work was considered a failure since no report was issued, and the Commission was ultimately disbanded in early 2003 due to a lack of agreement on essential aspects of the mandate, a lack of political will, funding and civil society support.[15]

In this context, since the 1990s over 30 post-conflict truth commissions were established in order to research and report on abuses of human rights and humanitarian law over a particular period of time in a specific country, or in relation to a particular conflict. Truth commissions are diverse and their mandates are often adapted to the specific need of the society. In practice, they have been recognized as allowing victims, their relatives and perpetrators to give evidence of human rights abuses or other criminal transgressions. Since they are designed as non-judicial bodies, in limited cases they are granted to refer case information to Courts and Tribunals. Generally, their recommendations place strong pressure on governments and other social structures that perpetuated abuse. Recommendations may also advocate for reparation to victims, propose memorialization efforts and reconciliation plans, and implicate the bodies or groups most responsible for any committed abuses. In some cases, individual perpetrators may be named. In some instances, commissions have been forced to end their mandates prematurely due to political opposition or lack of funding.[16]

Truth-seeking processes assist post-conflict and transitional societies to investigate past human rights violations which are undertaken not only by truth commissions but also commissions of inquiry or other fact-finding missions.[17]Compared to truth commissions, inquiry commissions have limited scope of investigations that, *inter alia*, connect to specific events, or geographic areas of a country.These mechanisms seek to unravel the truth behind the allegations of past human rights abuses. Mapping

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[12] Justice in Perspective –Africa – Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, available at http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=59

[13] About the Commission's work see more at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Rwanda99-Reports/Rwanda99_Report_summit.pdf

[14] Pejic, Jelena, "*The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start*", Fordham International Law Journal, 25, 2001, pp.1-22.

[15] See more on this issue in Dimitrijevic, Nenad, "*Serbia after the Criminal Past: What went wrong and what should be done*", International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, No.1, March, 2008.

[16] Hayner, Priscilla B., "*Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A comparative Study*", Human Rights Quarterly 16, no. 4, 1994, pp. 597-655.

[17] See E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Principles 6-13.

and documenting serious violations of human rights abuses is an important step in realizing the rights to the truth.[18]

2. Prosecution initiatives

Prosecution initiatives aimed to ensure that those responsible for committing crimes, including serious violations of international humanitarian law and gross breaches of international human rights law, are to be tried with international standards of fair trial and, where appropriate, punished. The credibility and legitimacy of prosecution initiatives require that they are conducted in a non-discriminatory and objective manner, regardless of who the alleged perpetrators may be. In this context states have the primary responsibility to exercise jurisdiction over these crimes. In reality, these post-conflict societies are usually too weak to carry out prosecutions at national or local level.

The role of international organizations in the processes of transitional justice has evolved since the mid-1990s. They were actively engaged in the processes of prosecutions at international, but also at national level. Increasingly, as in the case of Rwanda *gacaca* courts,[19] populations demand that justice be delivered in forms that would be recognizable from the standpoint of local norms and practices.[20] The gacaca courts were considered to be a method of transitional justice and were designed to promote healing and rebuilding after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 at national level. The creation of these courts did not mean replacement of the international tribunals. To the contrary, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to "prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring States, during 1994"[21], just as it created before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).[22] The ICTY and ICTR established in the 1990s to respond to ethnic cleansing and genocide, underscored the continuing relevance of prosecuting criminal responsibility for gross human rights violations.[23] But at the same time, these tribunals demonstrated the limitations while focusing on the prosecutions instead of redressing the victims as a form of justice. Therefore, a multipronged approach that includes both international and also domestic

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[18] United Nations, *supra note*, p.8.

[19] After the conclusion of the Rwandan genocide, the new justice system had difficulty prosecuting 130,000 alleged perpetrators of the genocide. Therefore, the gacaca courts were installed at national level to deal with the vast amount of perpetrators.

[20] About gacaca courts, see S. Thomson and R. Nagy, "Law, Power, and Justice: What Legalism Fails to Address in the Functioning on Rwanda's Gacaca Courts", *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 5, no.1 (2011), p. 11-30.

[21] See the UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) on establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and adoption of the Statute of the Tribunal.http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement

[22] See the UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) on establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/establishment.

[23] M. Wiliams, R. Nagy, J. Elster, *Transitional Justice*, NY, NY Press, 2012, p.4.

criminal trials, as well as the other mechanisms such as truth-finding commissions and reparations, constitutes to be the transitional justice "toolkit".

From a transitional justice perspective, it is preferable that prosecutions are carried out at a national level, as the main potential benefits of criminal justice can be most likely achieved, such as to assist in the deterrence of future violations, to express public condemnation of criminal conduct, to provide a direct form of account-ability against the perpetrators of heinous crimes, and to contribute to the restoration of public confidence in the rule of law.[24]For that purpose, national legislation should be in conformity with international human rights law and international criminal law. The assistance of the international community is required for exhumations, forensic analysis, investigations of mass crimes, and preservation of evidence. Also, the judicial proceedings need to be undertaken impartially, objectively and in timely manner, according to international standards.

Therefore, investigating and prosecuting crimes under national and international law is essential in achieving transitional justice *per se*.Transitional institutions are expected to deliver to justice the perpetrators of atrocities, recognition and reparation to their victims, and the conditions for lawful order and societal peace. The question is whether they can be achieved simultaneously or one at a time? The experience from South Africa's truth and reconciliation commissions, for example, demonstrated concerns that in emphasizing the goals of truth, forgiveness and reconciliation, the criminal justice was sacrificed.[25]

Establishing the New War Crime Court in Kosovo

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244(1999)[26] provided for an international law-based functional constitution by establishing the ultimate standards of legality for public authority exercised in the territory. Thus, the resolution was the legal basis for the creation of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) which had unprecedented authority[27]. With respect to judiciary, UNMIK's powers were to 'immediate re-establishment of an independent, impartial and multi-ethnic judiciary".[28]At first, it sought to rely exclusively on the local legal community, UNMIK was, very soon, constrained to establish an initial "Emergency Judicial System".[29] This *ad hoc*

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[24] AgimiIlire and IlirDugoli, "*Transitional Justice in Kosovo*", Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, Policy Research, Prishtina, July, 2009. htpp://www.kipred.net/site/document/ToJ_eng.pdf.

[25] Essays by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in *Truth v. Justice: The Mortality of Truth Commissions*, Princeton, Princeton University, 2000, p. 45.

[26] UNSC, Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).

[27] About the Kosovo constitutional order see more in Spernbauer, M., "*EU Peacebuilding in Kosovo and Afganistan: Legality and Accountability*", MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2014.

[28] UNMIK Report July, 1999, note 188, p.40.

[29] UNMIK Regulation 1999/5 on the Establishment of an *ad hoc* Court of Final Appeal UNMIK REG/1999/5 and an *ad hoc* Office of Public Prosecutor available at www.unmik.org.

judicial system allowed for the temporary appointment of judges and prosecutors for a three-month renewable term. Since there was no separation of powers within the UNMIK, the mission's judges and prosecutors were subject to the hierarchical powers of the Mission; moreover, they worked on three-month terms, which could have been renewed or discontinued on the discretion of the Mission.These arrangements seriously weakened their independence and gave the leadership of the Mission tight control over its prosecutors and investigators, who conducted very few investigations on war crimes. The judiciary was not allowed to work independently and many cases were blocked.

Therefore, as a step toward reconciliation and finalizing the prosecutions, the Kosovo national parliament approved the launch of the new war crimes court by adopting the Law on *Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office* in August 2015 by the Kosovo Parliament. The adoption was previously negotiated by EU and Kosovo parliament after months of bitter arguments, street protests, media speculation and delays caused by the political opposition to the legislation. And prior to the adoption of the Law, the amending of the Kosovo Constitution took place in order to set the legal basis for the new Law. The establishment of the new "Specialist Chambers" was previously initiated and triggered by an EU three-year thorough investigation into the allegations, which resulted into claimant that grave human rights violations were perpetrated, and was publicly announced in the rigorous Report of Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in 2011.[30]

The new Law establishes and regulates the organization, functions and jurisdiction of the new court.[31] The independence from the Kosovo judiciary is guaranteed in order to perform all the necessary functions properly, but also is considered to be part of Kosovo's justice system. According to the Law, these chambers are necessary 1) to fulfil the international obligations undertaken before, 2) to guarantee the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution of Kosovo, and 3) to ensure secure, independent, impartial, fair and efficient criminal proceeding in relation to allegations of grave trans-boundary and international crimes committed during, and in the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo. The objective of the Law is closely related to the allegations envisaged in the 2011 Report of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly that were subject of criminal investigation by the Special Investigative Force (SITF) of the Special prosecution office of the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK).[32]

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[30] Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report Doc 12462 of 7 January 2011. The Report strongly condemns the "inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo" and criticizes the "international authorities in charge of the region who did not consider conducting examination of these circumstances". Moreover, "the international organizations in place in Kosovo favored a pragmatic political approach, taking the view that they need to promote short-term stability at any price, thereby sacrificing some important principles of justice". The full report is available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=12608&lang=en.

[31] Art. 1(1) of the *Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office*, Law No.05/L-053 available at http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/05-L-053%20a.pdf.

[32] Art. 2(2) of the Law, *ibid*.

The Report states that EULEX has the responsibility to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes within their jurisdiction.[33] Thus, EU along with US has strongly pressed national authorities in Kosovo to address the presented accusations by creating a new war crimes tribunal within the national judiciary system.

The location of the Court/Chambers will be in Kosovo but also in a "host state".[34] This is necessary as a guarantee of the Court's impartially and independence, in order to function properly as provided by law. It is considered that impartiality and bias is the reason why domestic courts failed to proceed with the prosecution.

As for *its ratione temporis* jurisdiction, the specialist chambers will have the authority to prosecute over crimes that occurred between January 1, 1998 until December 31, 2000, which include crimes against humanity under international law[35], war crimes under international law, including grave breaches of international humanitarian law[36], and other crimes under national law.[37]As for *ratione loci*, the Court will have jurisdiction on the territory of Kosovo, that is, for crimes that were either commenced or committed in Kosovo.[38] The Specialist Chambers will have primacy over all courts in Kosovo. As for the applicable law, the Specialist Chambers will apply all customary international law and the substantive criminal law of Kosovo if it complies with customary international law, both as applicable at the time the crimes were committed.

The specialist chambers will consist of two main organs: the chamber and the registry. The Chambers are consisted of basic court chamber, court of appeal chamber and constitutional court chamber matching all the levels of court in Kosovo judiciary system. The judges will be chosen from the roster of independent international judges, "persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the necessary qualifications in their respective states. They need to be independent in performing their functions and shall not see instructions from any government or other source".[39] The judges need to have well established competence in criminal law and procedure and relevant international law, and extensive judicial, prosecutorial or defense experience in international or domestic criminal proceedings.

The registry will include defense office, victim's participation office, witness protection and support office, detention management unit and ombudsman's office.

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[33] *Supra note* 30, para.19.3.

[34] The EU has already asked the Netherlands to be the host state and it is expected that Kosovo and Netherlands will soon sigh an agreement which will regulate the functioning of the court. But also, the Law provides that "the Court may sit everywhere on an exceptional basis if necessary", Art. 39(6) of the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office.

[35] Art. 13(1) of the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office numbers all the crimes separately such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment etc.

[36] Art. 14(1) *ibid*.

[37] Art. 15(1) *ibid*.

[38] Art. 8 *ibid.*

[39] Art. 27(1) *ibid*.

As for the Specialist Prosecution, it is provided that it will be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for crimes under their jurisdiction and will also be independent in performance of the functions.[40] The prosecution can, in exceptional cases, use evidence provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the domestic courts. This court will be fully funded by the EU since it is clearly stated that budget will not come from the Kosovo budget.[41]

The legal basis has been set, but its implementation will be a difficult path to achieve. Protecting witnesses and assembling strong evidence to convict suspects can be rather challenging. Nevertheless, if the implementation is realized, than Kosovo would be the last of the former Yugoslav republics to try war crimes committed during the 1990s, since the ICTY failed to do this. National prosecutions, even more than international, are essential for fulfilling the demands of achieving transitional justice. The creation of this court could be considered as one of the mechanisms of transitional justice.

Conclusion

After the Kosovo war, during 2000, until order was established and while KFOR organized the KLA disarmament, a large number of Kosovo Serbs as well as the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) community were victims of revenge acts such as brutal harassment and discrimination. A small number of Kosovo Serbs remained or returned and joined enclaves, mostly in northern Kosovo, where they form the majority.

For the last 25 years, the population of Kosovo has faced apartheid, displacement and trauma. Kosovo is not a unique case; the truth is that, many other countries had the misfortune of repression as well. Many other nations emerging from conflict to transition to peace and democracy had to make difficult and often exhausting political changes and adopt new values and principles. Truth and accountability are absolute necessities if there is to be genuine reconciliation and lasting stability in the region. Transition implies both creating the conditions that make it possible to adopt more inclusive and efficient institutions, ensuring that such institutions are adopted and function properly.

The success of initiating and implementing transitional justice processes and mechanisms depends on a number of factors, inter alia, the political will to deal with the past and the strength of society to go through the activities. In the region of former Yugoslavia, civil society has gained the experience and confidence, necessary to initiate and conduct debates around the legacy of the past.

Thus, it is very important to encourage the development of transitional justice processes and mechanisms, recognizing that they can reinforce each other and are not mutually exclusive (e.g. truth commissions, prosecution and reparations). Not underestimating the role of non-judicial mechanisms such as promoting human rights and transitional justice instruments and support for widespread consultation, the judicial mechanisms, such as the establishment of the Specialist Court in Kosovo seem to carry more weight, if conducted properly. Insofar, there has been a lack of strong political will to proceed with this judicial instrument, having in mind the fact that these events occurred 15 years ago. Yet, not all is hopeless. The Kosovo national

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[40] Art. 35 provides the necessary responsibilities of the Specialist Prosecutor.
[41] Art. 63 (1), *ibid.*

parliament adopted the Law of Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecution, besides the strong opposition by some political parties and the public. Nevertheless, the prosecution office needs to distinguish perpetrators of human rights violations from ex-combatants, thus diminishing public perception that ex-combatants are reintegrated, *per se*, without regard to crimes they have allegedly committed. As domestic war crimes trials failed to address the scale of atrocity and courts fail to deliver justice for war crimes suspects in their jurisdiction, disregarding ethnic and national belonging,[42] other mechanisms need to be established. The Council of Europe's Report issued in 2011demonstrated strong determination of the international community that they "will uncompromisingly fight against impunity for the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses; the fact that these were committed in the context of a violent conflict could never justify a decision to refrain from prosecutions".[43]

Since Kosovo is still developing, or in some cases establishing, its institutions need to strengthen democracy at all levels. But, first they must deal with the past as an important instrument in the promotion of new social norms in the areas of justice, good governance, and human rights and to address the abuses of the past. The creation of the court in Kosovo will set an example for the whole region and abroad, as we can agree that "when a society turns over a new leaf or gets a fresh start, mechanisms of transitional justice can help strengthen this process".[44]

Will the creation of this court as a mechanism towards achieving transitional justice be enough to put the past behind? Whether justice will be finally served in Kosovo after so many war crimes, human rights abuses, and prosecutions, it remains to be seen in the future.

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TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA - RESULTS FROM THE SURVEY CONDUCTED WITH A SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE -

Zlatko KUZMANOV[1]

Abstract: *Continuous development of the defence and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia implies necessary and comprehensive analyses and modifications in the military education and training system. The research conducts systematic and methodological analysis of the development and operation of this system. It employs qualitative approach that relates hypotheses, variables and indicators as a whole, and gives a more precise understanding of dependence and changes among them. In particular, the research uses the comparative method, analysis and synthesis, content analysis, interview and a survey questionnaire on a relevant sample of respondents from the MoD, the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM), and the Military Academy (MA). The application of these methodological procedures collected objective, complete, verifiable, systematic and accurate experiential data, data with great epistemological value for the occurrence, subject of this research. Time determination of the subject of the research in terms of analyzing the developmental process in education, training and development system in the MoD, ARM and MA covers the period from 1992 to 2014.*

Keywords*: education, training, research, survey questionnaire, general hypothesis, specific hypotheses, results*

Introduction

The need for a thorough study of the phenomenon of education and training in the defence and ARM resulted from continuous transformation and reorganization of the Ministry of Defence, the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia and the Military Academy, in order to achieve and monitor standards and procedures applied in EU and NATO, and from the fact that no PhD research has been conducted in this area.

Therefore, a PhD dissertation has been made - **"Training and Development of Military and Civilian Personnel in the Defence System of the Republic of Macedonia"**. The problem of the research was formulated as follows: "Do current system solutions represent a good basis for providing quality education, training and development of military and civilian personnel for the defence and ARM?"

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By formulating the research problem in this manner, the intention was to collect the necessary data and facts that will enable us to realistically see all the positive and negative aspects of functioning of the current training and development system in the defence and ARM, in order to formulate appropriate conclusions and suggestions to improve planning, implementation, coordination and management of the education and training system of military and civilian personnel.

In compliance with the scientific and practical purpose, we set the following general hypothesis as a theoretical approach to the problem of research in this paper: "Current education and training system in the defence, due to partial coordination, overlapping of responsibilities, and lack of continuity in the operation of all organizational units responsible for training and development, insufficiently corresponds to the needs of construction of concepts and solutions that improve training and development of military and civilian personnel."

For the purposes of this PhD dissertation, despite the application of the comparative method, analysis and synthesis, content analysis and interviews, we conducted a research using a survey questionnaire, and included a relevant sample of respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA. Hence, in addition to this original scientific article we will present the results of the research gained by survey questionnaire.

Interpretation and analysis of research results

Research Sample

For the purpose of this survey conducted by using a survey questionnaire, we polled 81 members of the MoD, ARM and MA. The answers to the questions made it possible to explore their views and opinions regarding the occurrence, subject of research, and to draw conclusions with a high degree of probability. The basic set of units for the survey is a relevant sample of entities directly involved in planning, implementation, realization, monitoring and management of education and training in the defence and ARM. The sample meets the requirements of representativeness and appropriateness, and allows obtaining systematic data on the occurrence, subject of research, and its generalization for the entire population observed.

The research was carried out in organizational units of the MoD, commands, staffs, ARM units, and the Military Academy in the period from August to the end of September 2014[2]. The survey questionnaire was conducted anonymously and individually, with technical filling-in guidance provided in advance. The questionnaire, enclosed in form, had previously determined formulation of questions, sequence and possible answers, with the possibility of writing additional commentary on each question. It contained 26 questions related to the content that should have been familiar to the respondents. It united issues for the education and training system in the defence and ARM as a whole, in order to see how much the respondents are familiar with the contents

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[2] Based on the Decision by the Minister of Defence no.02-3895 /1 as of 31.07.2014 to conduct scientific research, and Order by the Chief of Staff no.21 -42 / 151 as of 25.07.2014 to conduct a survey by means of questionnaire with members of the armed forces.

that are not in direct responsibility of their institution. The formulation of questions is easily understandable, and answers do not require great effort by the respondents.

Categories of respondents:
Table 1

	CS	MO	Total
From MoD	17	11	28(35%)
From ARM	0	34	34(42%)
From MA	0	19	19(23%)
Total	17 (21%)	64 (79%)	81

Графикон бр.1

Respondents are employees in the MoD, ARM and MA in order to obtain data that can be compared and used to confirm or reject the hypotheses. In order to analyze the education and training system in the defence and ARM, 21% of the total number of respondents are civil servants (CS) from the Ministry of Defence, and 79% are military officers (MO) from the MoD, ARM and MA, as shown in Table 1 and Chart 1.

Level of education:
Table 2

	PhD	MA	Specialist	Bachelor	Total
From MoD	1	12	4	11	28
From ARM	1	4	25	4	34
From MA	13	4	2	0	19
Tot.	15 (19%)	20 (25%)	31 (37%)	15 (19%)	81

Графикон бр.2

The level of education of respondents, as presented in Table 2, is very high, which allows firm attitudes and data. Thus, the share of respondents with PhD is 19%, MA is 25%, specialists 37%, while secondary education is 19%.

Length of work experience:
Table 3

	Up to 20	21-30	31-40	Total
From MoD	7	10	11	28
From ARM	1	18	15	34
From MA	3	7	9	19
Total	11(14%)	35(43%)	35(43%)	81

Графикон бр.3

до 20 14%
31-40 43%
21-30 43%

□ до 20
■ 21-30
□ 31-40

Respondents with 20-year service are 14%, from 21 to 30 years are 43%, and from 31 to 40 years of service are 43%. This indicates that the structure of respondents in terms of their experience is sufficient, enabling them to have good knowledge of the subject of this research.

Gender:
Table 4

	Male	Female	Total
From MoD	19	9	28
From ARM	32	2	34
From MA	19	0	19
Total	70(86%)	11(14%)	81

Графикон бр.4

Женски 14%
Машки 86%

■ Машки
■ Женски

In terms of gender, shown in Table 4, we can conclude that the total number of respondents in the survey covered 14% female and 86% male. The proportion of females is approximately equal to their representation in the entire armed forces.

Results of testing hypotheses

Upon receiving the completed questionnaires from the survey, we proceeded to content and logical control of filled-in questionnaires. After content control, we concluded that all respondents answered all questions, and through logical control we removed conflicting answers to similar or related issues. The analysis of the survey results was conducted on the basis of responses to the questionnaire. First, we analyzed data from MoD, ARM and MA participants separately, and then we compared the results and formulated conclusions for the whole system. Based on the processing and data

analysis we conducted testing of the hypotheses (fully confirmed, partially confirmed and unconfirmed / challenged), and we matched them to the variables.

Conclusions from testing general and specific hypotheses

Through research conducted by analyzing content of primary and secondary documents, and through analysis of the results from the survey conducted with a questionnaire on a relevant sample of respondents from MoD, ARM and MA, we formulated conclusions for verification of general and specific hypotheses.

In the paper, as indicated, we set the following general hypothesis: **"Current system for training and development in the defence, due to incomplete coordination, overlapping of responsibilities, and lack of continuity in operation of all organizational units responsible for education and training, insufficiently corresponds to the needs for building concepts and solutions to improve training and development of military and civilian personnel."**

The general hypothesis was formulated through an independent, intervening, and dependent variable. The independent variable was reflected in the wording: "current system for training and development in the defence and ARM"; the intervening variable was reflected in the wording "incomplete coordination, overlapping of responsibilities and lack of continuity", and the dependent variable was reflected in the wording "sufficiently corresponds to the need for building concepts and solutions that improve training and development of military and civilian personnel."

This is a complex hypothesis that is inspected, tested by analyzing the contents of all existing laws and regulations, and strategic documents, primarily through research conclusions from 81 respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA, whose main activity is related to education, training and improvement.

Answers to questions 8, 15, 16, 24, and 25 from the survey questionnaire were used to formulate conclusions for examining both general and specific hypotheses.

By analyzing the results of question 8 **("Does Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System in the defence (PPBES) from 2006 provide planned development in the defence, and improve resource management?"**), we concluded that the respondents from MoD and ARM partially confirmed the general hypothesis, while respondents from MA fully confirmed the general hypothesis. The total result of this question for the whole system led to a partial confirmation of the general hypothesis.

By analyzing the results of question 15 **("In your opinion, which parameters are the basis for forming, reorganizing or abolishing organizational units responsible for education and training in the defence and ARM?"**), we concluded that the respondents from the MoD and ARM confirmed the general hypothesis, while those from MA did not. The total result of this question for the whole system led to confirmation of the general hypothesis.

By analyzing the results of question 16 ("**Does the existing education and training system enable integration of activities in the MoD, ARM and MA?"**), we

concluded that the respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed the general hypothesis.

By analyzing the results of question 24 (**"Is there overlapping of responsibilities in the education and training system among MoD, ARM and MA?"**), we concluded that the respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed the general hypothesis.

By analyzing the results of question 25 (**"In your opinion, what is the coordination among MoD, ARM and MA in exercising their functions in the education and training system?"**), we concluded that the respondents from the MoD and ARM confirmed the general hypothesis, while respondents from MA partially confirmed it. The total result of this question for the whole system led to confirmation of the general hypothesis.

Final conclusion from the examination of the general hypothesis for all segments of the system is that the hypothesis was confirmed.

The general hypothesis formulated 12 specific hypotheses that are reviewed as follows:

Special hypotheses

1. Analysis of the implementation of training and development in the defence and ARM in the past twenty-year period shows large variations in approach and quality of transformation of elements of the defence system and ARM.

To collect empirical material for examining the specific hypothesis in this paper, we applied the methods of content analysis of documents and interviews. We analyzed the development of education and training in the defence and ARM, which is divided into four phases, especially for MoD, ARM and MA with total conclusions for all segments of the system. Conclusions obtained for each segment of the system, at every stage and in total for the entire twenty-two-year period, fully confirmed the specific hypothesis.

2. The current position of the elements for the training and development system in the Human Resources Management Strategy, and Education and Training Strategy in the Defence, is a solid foundation for building an integrated system in accordance with the requirements for Euro-Atlantic integration.

This special hypothesis was investigated through questions number 5 (**"Do the provisions in the Human Resources Management Strategy from 2004 provide overall professional development for employees in the defence and ARM?"**), and number 6 (**"Do the defined objectives and functions of the entities in the Education and Training Strategy in the Ministry of Defence from 2006 enable the realization of an effective and efficient education and training system in the defence and ARM?"**). The conclusion, based on the results, is that respondents from the MoD partially confirmed it; it cannot be verified with respondents from the ARM because of the high percentage of respondents who were not sufficiently familiar with the contents of the documents, while respondents from MA partially confirmed it.

Total conclusion for all segments of the system is that this special hypothesis was partially confirmed.

3. The Realization of functions and tasks of the training and development system elements is not sufficiently effective, indicating a need to improve coordination and management of the system.

This special hypothesis was investigated through questions number 14 ("**Give your opinion to which extent are given activities represented in the implementation of the education and training system in the defence and ARM?**")**,** number 17 (**"Has the MoD undertaken all the necessary regulations which establish a stable financial support and control of the process for selection and referral of personnel to training and development?"**), number 24 (**"Is there overlapping of responsibilities in the education and training system among the MoD, ARM and MA?"**), and number 25 (**"In your opinion, what kind of coordination is there among MoD, ARM and MA in exercising their functions in the education and training system?"**). Based on the results, it was concluded that respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed the hypothesis. Total conclusion on all segments of the system is that this special hypothesis was confirmed.

4. Dedication for education and training in the Long-term Development Plan in the Defence from 2014 to 2023 is a solid foundation that should allow improving the quality of training in the defence at all levels.

This special hypothesis is verified through results obtained from question 7 (**"Are the commitments to education and training in the Long-term Development Plan in the Defence (LDPD 2014-2023**) **a clear roadmap for the objectives to be achieved?"**), where respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed this specific hypothesis.

5. The current Law on Military Academy is a good basis for establishing permanent education and training of officers.

This special hypothesis is verified through results obtained from questions number 4 (**"Is the existing Law on the Military Academy a good basis for establishing permanent education, military training and development of officers?"**), number 12 ("**Which adopted laws and strategic documents mostly influenced the design, planning and implementation of education and training system in the defence and ARM?**"), and number 13 (**"The establishment of which organizational units in the MoD and ARM mostly affect the design, planning and implementation of the education and training system in the defence and ARM?**"), where the respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed this specific hypothesis.

6. The provisions in the Law on Defence and the Law on Civil Servants provide the basis for implementation of training and development of civil servants in the defence, but they are not sufficiently respected and implemented in the system.

Questions: number 2 (**"Do you think that the provisions in the Law on Defence are good basis for establishing continuous military education, training, and**

professional development of both civilian and military personnel in the defence?”), and number 18 (**“In your opinion, what is the level of planning, organizing and conducting training and development of civil servants in the MoD?**”), investigated this special hypothesis. Based on the results, the conclusion is that respondents from the MoD and ARM fully confirmed it, while respondents from MA partially confirmed it. The overall conclusion for all segments of the system is that this special hypothesis was confirmed.

7. Contradictions in defining the concepts - education, training, development and improvement lead to inconsistency and confusion in their practical application.

This special hypothesis is verified through results obtained from question 23 (**“Is there a difference in the definition and use of concepts - education, training, improvement and development?”**), where respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed this specific hypothesis.

8. Established regulations and procedures for the selection and referral of military and civilian personnel to professional training and development abroad are not sufficiently clear, which imposes the need for precise determination of responsibilities and tasks, as well as improvement of the coordination.

Questions: number 10 (**“Does the adoption of the Rulebook for Referral to Professional Training and Development of MoD and ARM Personnel from 2012 fully regulate the procedure for nomination, selection and referral of personnel to education and training abroad?”**), and number 17 (**“Has the MoD adopted all the necessary regulations to establish a stable financial support and control of the process of selection and referral of personnel to training and development?”**) investigated this special hypothesis, and based on the results we concluded that respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed this specific hypothesis.

9. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System in the Defence is complex due to the number of segments that are part of this process; thus it is necessary to rationalize the organizational forms involved in the education and training process.

This special hypothesis is verified through results obtained from the questions: number 8 (**“Does the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System in the Defence (PPBES) from 2006 provide planned development in the defence, and improved management of resources?”**), number 19 (**“Give your opinion on the level of success in running the Programme - 2 Personnel and Education in PPBES (which includes education, training and development of military and civilian personnel in the MoD, managed by the HR Department in the MoD.”**), and number 20 (“**Give your opinion on the level of success in the implementation of the Programme – 4 Training in the ARM in accordance with PPBES (which covers the overall training of officers, NCOs, soldiers and civilians in ARM, and is managed by GS of ARM**), where respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA partially confirmed the hypothesis.

10. The provisions in the Concept for Development of Officer Corps, and the Concept for Development of NCOs, are a good basis for establishing a permanent military training of officers, NCOs and soldiers in the ARM, but their implementation and application is not complete.

This special hypothesis is checked through the results of question number 9 (**"Are provisions in the Concept for Development of Officer Corps, and the Concept for Development of NCOs in ARM from 2005 good basis for education, training, development and improvement of officers and NCOs?"**), where respondents from the MoD, ARM, and MA fully confirmed it.

11. The Guidelines for Training Management in ARM, and the Guidelines for Exercises are a good basis for the organization and implementation of quality individual and collective training in ARM, but they often face problems of organizational and execution aspect.

The special hypothesis is checked through results from question number 13 (**"The establishment of which organizational units in the MoD and ARM mostly affect the design, planning and implementation of education and training system in the defence?"**), where respondents from the MoD and ARM fully confirmed it, while respondents from MA partially confirmed it. Total conclusion of all segments of the system is that this special hypothesis was confirmed.

12. Lack of capacity for successful management of the education and training system in the defence, unplanned formation and abolition of organizational units responsible for training and development, and the lack of a clear plan for career development of personnel, who perform tasks in the field of education and training, affect the effectiveness of the training and development system.

This particular hypothesis is verified through results obtained from questions: number 8 (**"Does the Programming, Budgeting and Execution System in the Defence (PPBES) from 2006 provide planned development in the defence and improved resources management?"**), number 15 (**"In your opinion, based on which parameters are organizational units responsible for education and training in the defence and ARM established, reorganized or abolished? "**), number 24 (**"Is there overlapping of responsibilities in education and training among MoD, ARM and MA? "**), and number 25 (**"In your opinion, what kind of coordination is there among MoD, ARM and MA in exercising their functions in education and training system?"**), where respondents from the MoD, ARM and MA confirmed this specific hypothesis.

Conclusion

All observations, analyses and conclusions from the survey allowed us to provide guidance for future development of military education and training, guidance on what profile of military officers we need, and a number of particular proposals and recommendations for the improvement and construction of integrated, complete, effective and efficient system of education and training in the defence and ARM.

The development and improvement of the education and training system in the defence and ARM is a continuous process that does not allow improvisation and ambiguities. What is necessary is the coherent implementation of the provisions of the adopted strategic documents, especially in the area of human resources, and integration of the education and training systems, as well as constant updating. Preparation and update of system documents, and investment in personnel should be accompanied by adequate organizational and formational changes and improvements in positioning organizational units responsible for education and training in MoD, ARM and MA. The defence and ARM cannot function effectively without well educated and skilled management personnel, as a result of efficient, effective and integrated education and training defence system, which is properly substantiated and interoperable with NATO. Among other things, continuous improvement of standards in military education and training will allow MoD and ARM personnel to successfully pursue national missions and objectives, and to actively participate in international peacekeeping operations in different areas.

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THE PURPOSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONSULAR REPRENSENTATIVES IN THE BATTLE AGAINST CYBER TERRORISM THROUGH THE PRISM OF COOPERATION WITH THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THAY ARE ACCREDITED

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Abstract: *Throughout this paper the basics of the diplomatic consular representatives and their activities targeted towards the host country and its aid, support and cooperation for protection of its interests on a larger scale of security are presented. It is especially important that cooperation is on a larger level and the prevention of cyber terrorism is targeted on a local and global level, especially in developed countries, although this form of cooperation does not exclude countries, which are not that well developed. All of this is represented through the cooperation between USA and Macedonia.*

Key Words: *diplomacy, cyber terrorism, cooperation*

Introduction

The Republic of Macedonia is a relatively young country, which features limited natural, human, financial and other types of resources, and in the global perspective it is presumed as an easy target and a possible victim of cyber terrorism. The constitutional institutions in charge of internal and foreign security, are obliged to care for the security of the country, its citizens and their property. This type of constitutional placement of the state in particular, obliges the security services, to seek every day for new methods and equipment which would enable them to successfully deal with the modern evil of the XXI century, terrorism and its alternative form, cyber terrorism. The Republic of Macedonia cannot be excluded in this fight, and it needs to act with all its means and resources to continue the fight against cyber terrorism. The methods of the "battle" will be discussed further in this paper.

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A general idea about the diplomatic consular work

Diplomacy as a branch of foreign affairs of a country, including the Republic of Macedonia, is a tool, or a mechanism for presentation of few diplomatic individuals who are chosen according to internationally recognized criteria. When we speak of diplomacy, it is important to conceptualize the commitment of diplomats, because of general understanding. Many researchers believe that diplomacy had begun in the antique period, and maybe even earlier[3]. It is considered that the term **diplomacy** began being used in situations when a special messenger of the sovereign carried a hidden (inaccessible to anyone) document within himself, authorized to give therein to another sovereign. The carrier of the diplomatic act began to be called a diplomat[4].

According to Berigde, diplomacy presents, running international relations with an accent to negotiations instead of strength, propaganda or other such measures[5].

According to Barson, diplomacy is intertwined with the management of relations between two countries, as well as between the country and other instances, according to counseling and implementation of outside politics[6].

According to Markovski, in modern literature, the term diplomacy, is considered to take root from the Greek word diploma, which means formal administration of messengers between two countries, according to the rules which are in effect at that period in time; official authorities which conduct these things, and the dexterity in the public or secret conduct of these negotiations between the two governments. This form of translation of knowledge is considered to be a wise, cautious and polite way of behaving[7].

With a goal to successfully conduct the planned activities, diplomacy has set goals which it desires to meet and certain tasks to fulfill in order to meet the goals.

Prof. Gocevski says "We have determined that the basic goal is to eliminate all obstacles and indifferences between the countries and the people, as it was in the past, as it is in modern time"[8]. According to R. P. Barson: the goals of diplomacy are

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[6] Barston R. P., Modern Diplomacy, London 1996, str. 1, taken from Vladimir Pivovarov, Дипломатско конзуларни претставништва – authorized lectures, Skopje, 2006, p.15

[7] Danco Markovski, Дипломатија организација и практика, Кинематика, Skopje, 2002, p.17

[8] Trajan Goceski, Основи на системот на национална одбрана, third amended edition, Македонска ризница – Kumanovo, ЕВРОПА - 92 – Kocani, 2002, p.456

presented and he says: "The goal of diplomacy can be broken down to six wide areas, and in which margins, there are subgroups:

- Representation
- Hearing out
- Preparation
- Elimination of resistance
- Order and right changes
- Preparations in fulfilling international regulations"[9].

In his work, diplomatic executives are obliged to respect basic international documents, which regulate their work

- **The Vienna convention on diplomatic relations (18.04.1961)**
- **The Vienna convention on consular relations (24.04.1963)**
- **The Vienna convention on the contractor right**[10]

Via these documents, the basics of how diplomacy works are laid down, which for initializing its work serves separate methods:1) **General methods** in diplomacy: examination, observation, study and analysis of the contents of the documents, 2) **Special methods** in diplomacy: persuasion, promises, intimidation, reward, punishment and reinforcement[11]. Because there are multiple types of diplomacy, we will present a few:

a) Secret and public diplomacy
b) Formal and informal diplomacy
c) Economic diplomacy
d) Preventive diplomacy
e) Defensive diplomacy
f) War diplomacy
g) Shuttle diplomacy

Of course, chapters can be written on diplomacy; however, due to limited space opportunities this is enough for presentation. The connection between diplomacy and the home country is essential to how cyber terrorism is handled. We will talk about that in the next chapter.

On cyber terrorism in general

As we already mentioned, cyber terrorism is the evil of the XXI century, and because of that, methods for defense against such evil are still in development. We will

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[9] R.P.Barston, Модерна дипломатија, ЗУМПРЕС, Skopje, 1996, p.10

[10] See the complete Conventions-Владимир Пивоваров, Дипломатско конзуларни претставништва – authorized lectures, Skopje, 2006, p.219

[11] Zoran Nacev, Toni Petreski, Стратегиски проекции на Република Македонија во надворешната и безбедносната политика, ЕВРОПА 92, Kocani, 2013, p.82

now discuss the ideas and definitions of cyber terrorism, but to talk about cyber terrorism we need to present the types and forms of terrorism. These are the forms created by Gakinovik, who presents the following forms of terrorism:

- Conventional terrorism;
- Unconventional terrorism;
- Ecological terrorism and
- Cyber terrorism[12].

Conventional terrorism: a) murderous terrorist act from a distance and b) suicide terrorism.

a) Murderous terrorism from a distance: this form of terrorism presents a terrorist act, in which the terrorist commits murder from a distance using equipment such as projectiles, remote activated explosives, timed explosives, etc. In this form of terrorism the terrorists are taking their own safety into consideration.

b) Suicide terrorism[13]: in this form of terrorism, the terrorist again commits a murderous act but he disregards his own safety. People who conduct this type of terrorism consider themselves as warriors or martyrs. They usually have explosives hidden under their clothes, wrapped around their body, which they intentionally detonate at places where people gather – bus stations, train stations, markets, schools and the like. This form of terrorism was conducted for the first time by the Hezbollah terrorists after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982[14].

Unconventional terrorism: this is a form of terrorism in which no weapons are used; instead, the weapon is political influence or unarmed violence. This type of terrorism is hard to recognize because it uses modern techniques and methods to achieve the goals. The goal usually is wider influence[15].

Ecological terrorism: a) nuclear b) chemical c) biological terrorism.

What is characteristic about this type of terrorism is the use of natural recourses to meet the goal by the people committing the act. Usually, dams are blown up to create an electrical or water deficit. An example of this type of terrorism is the attack in 2001 in the Republic of Macedonia when the vents of the Lipkovska dam were stopped, which created water deficit[16].

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[12] Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012

[13] Suicide terrorism can be defined as the determination of its own self-sacrifice during the destruction of a certain goal, which would have an impact on political processes, Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012

[14] Ibid 2012

[15] See more at: Ibid, 2012

[16] http://star.vest.com.mk/default.asp?id=94165&idg=5&idb=1423&rubrika=Revija

a) Nuclear terrorism[17]

This type of terrorism uses radioactive material to achieve usually political goals. The defense mechanisms against this type of terrorism are weak and the materials used in this type of terrorism became easily accessible after the collapse of the SSSR. Another interesting fact about the use of radioactive materials is the use of military ammunition coated in radioactive material, usually uranium. This type of ammunition was used by NATO against Serbia, and it is considered that over 30,000 missiles with depleted uranium or about 15 tons of uranium had been fired[18].

b) Chemical terrorism[19]

The chemical compounds used in this type of terrorism are created in laboratories, are easy to transport, they are efficient in small doses and are easy to use. The first recorded chemical terrorism was committed by Aum Shinrinko, who used nerve gas in a subway in Tokyo. In this accident 12 people were killed, and more than 5500 were wounded[20]. We also must not forget the use of chemical compounds as a form of terrorism in World War II.

c) Biological terrorism[21]

The term biological terrorism refers to the use of different types of biological material, which causes damage and lowers the morale, and also results in many victims[22].

Quoting Kotovchevski "The detection of this type of terrorism is really hard, because toxic materials are produced in civil research laboratories and we cannot presume which will be used with a malicious intent[23]".

This is the reason why we recently started investing more funds into the supervision and control of the production and transport of such materials, in order to stop disasters from happening.

d) Cyber terrorism[24]

Cyber terrorism is a modern form of terrorism, and it is presented with the definition "Cyber terrorism is a premeditated, politically motivated attack on computer systems with a goal to cause information damage and induce violence[25]".

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[17] See more at:Mitko Kotovcevski, Современ тероризам, Македонска Цивилизација, Skopje, 2003, p.213

[18] Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012

[19] Ibid, 2012

[20] Ibid, 2012

[21] See more at: Mitko Kotovcevski, Современ тероризам, Македонска Цивилизација, Skopje, 2003, p.207

[22] Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012

[23] Mitko Kotovcevski, Современ тероризам, Македонска Цивилизација, Skopje, 2003, p.229

[24] Mitko Kotovcevski, Современ тероризам, Македонска Цивилизација, Skopje, 2003, p..247

[25] Radoslav Gahinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012

Gakinovovik presents the key points on which cyber terrorism is based:

- the terrorist inducts violence or threatens with violence based on his political motivation and usually belongs to a certain organization;

- the actions of the terrorist induct psychological after effects). Cyber terrorists do not just care about the goal, but about the after effects as well.

- terrorism usually is not supported by the people, and when it is supported by the people, it becomes a guerrilla organization;

- the demands of terrorists are unrealistic, they are always in a separatist form

- terrorists think that a frightened man can easily be persuaded, so they build their strategy in a way to keep tension in the public opinion at all times;

- terrorism is always one step ahead compared to the security organizations of a country because the security organizations of a country function only 8 hours a day (standard working hours) while a terrorists work 24 hours a day;

- terrorists sometimes prepare for years to conduct an action which may last only a few minutes;

- terrorists are usually a step ahead compared to the security organizations of a country, because their strikes are unprecedented, and they always target the so-called "meek targets";

- one of the key elements which will determine the future of terrorism is public opinion; while the police and the military can only control terrorism, public opinion can stop it at its tracks[26];

With these basic key points of **terrorism**, Gakinovovik provides the following definition: "Terrorism is an organized application of violence (or threat of violence) by politically motivated enforcers"[27].

The use of modern computer systems in committing terrorist acts started at the end of the XX century or more precisely, at the beginning of 1988, when a guerilla terrorist organization, in a period of two weeks, overwhelmed the embassies of Sri Lanka with around 800 emails a day[28].

- **Cyber terrorism** – a criminal act in cyber space aiming at intimidation of a government or its citizens to fulfill a political goal[29].

- **Cyber terrorism** – a criminal act in cyber space in which information-communication technology is used to destroy information in order to intimidate a government or its citizens to fulfill a political goal[30].

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[26] Radoslav Gaħinovič, Fenomenologija savremenog terorizma, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, Vojno delo – opštevojni naučno-teoriskij časopis, No.3/2008, p.57

[27] Ibid, стр.58, taken from Gaħinovič R.; Savremeni terorizam, Beograd, Grafomark, Beograd, 1998, p.31

[28] Mitko Bogdanovski, Drage Petreski, Сајбер-терористичките напади како глобална безбедносна закана, Современа македонска одбрана No.24/2013, p.62

[29] Radoslav Gaħinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012, p.16

[30] Dejan Vuletič, Pretnje sajber terorizmom u Republici Srbiji I bezbednosni odgovori na njih, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Žurnal za bezbednosne studije, Дејан Вулетиќ, 001/2008, p.78

- **Cyber terrorism** – is a form of interaction between human motives and information technology for terrorist activities in cyber space or virtual space. This is a definition of cyber-terrorism used by Sara Gordon and Richard Ford from "Symantec" to define pure cyber terrorism[31].

- **Cyber terrorism** – a criminal act committed by use of computers resulting in violence, death or destruction, causing terror and forcing a government to change its policy[32].

- **Internet terrorism** – premeditated, usually politically motivated attack on computer systems and programs[33].

- **Cyber terrorism** – the use of computer networks and similar tools aimed at interruption or disruption of a national infrastructure or intimidation of a government and its citizens[34].

- **Cyber terrorism** – terrorism conducted, planned or coordinated by the aid of computer networks[35].

- **Cyber space** – a form of a community, compiled of computer networks, or the space formed by computer networks[36].

Of all the above definitions it becomes clear that there is no single definition of cyber terrorism, whereas a definition is used according to the uses, practices and knowledge of the one who formulates this form of terrorism.

After presenting a few of the many definitions of cyber terrorism, it is time to present its forms – ways of function.

Cyber terrorism is manifested through many forms of action, such as:

According to Putnik and Milkovik, the following are the indentified forms of threats:

- Force majeure: a) natural disasters, b) defects

- The human factor with an attribute inadvertently a) errors in projecting, b) errors in hardware, c) errors in software and the use of the computer systems;

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[31] Mitko Bogdanovski, Drage Petreski, Сајбер-терористичките напади како глобална безбедносна закана, Современа македонска одбрана No.24/2013, p.59

[32] Centar za zaštitu nacionalne infrastrukture (Nacional Infrastructure Protection Center – NIPC) SAD, taken from Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012, p.15

[33] Mina Zirojeviћ Fatiћ, Zloupotreba internet u svrhe terorizma, M.P.Z., 2011, p.419

[34] James Lewis and Marcus Hendershot, taken from Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012, p.16

[35] Debra Shinder, taken from Radoslav Gaћinovič, Oblici savremenog terorizma, Kriminalističko policiska akademija Beograd, Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo, Beograd, 2012, p.16

[36] Dejan Vuletiћ, Pretnje sajber terorizmom u Republici Srbije I bezbednosni odgovori na njih, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Žurnal za bezbednosne studije, 001/2008, p.76

- The human factor with an attribute advertently: a) physical attack – sabotage and vandalism, b) electrical attacks – DEW and EMP c) security threats in cyber space.[37]

It is clear that terrorists use cyber space for many activities, and terrorist organizations have the largest use of it: lowered financial expenses for communication, education, fast and precise information of their members, fast and precise information of the public with their threats, as well as economic frauds, thefts, transferring funds, donations, etc.–usually by abusing malicious[38] software[39].

Because nowadays this presents a form of information war, it will be defined here as:

- **information war** – offensive and deffensive use of information systems to use, bribe, disrupt and destroy information and information systems of the opposing side and protect their own systems[40].

- **information war** – a form of a conflict in which the target of the attack is the information system of the opposing side[41].

- **information war** – applied actions to form information superiority[42].

- **information war** - an approach to armed conflict that guides the management and uses information in all forms and at all levels in order to achieve a decisive military advantage, especially in combined environment[43].

- **information war** – activity targeted towards any part of the system of knowledge and belief of the enemy. The goal is to use information as a weapon to change the belief of the opposing side (through manipulation, attack, influence)[44].

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[37] Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p.159 – schematic No.1

[38] Malciozen software is hidden software that works covertly to one you installed to collect certain data, to delete, destroy or redirect specific database

[39] View more: http://www.smartportal.mk/internet/maliciozen-softver-koj-sto-gi-napagja-os-x-i-i-os-uredite/

http://daily.mk/tehnologija/detekt-otkrijte-dali-vashiot-kompjuter-zarazen-maliciozen

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[40] Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p.163, taken from Greenberg. L., Goodman, S., Soo Hoo, K., Information Warfare and international Law, National Defense University Washington DC, 1998

[41] Ibid p.164

[42] Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p.164

[43] This is a working definition of the National Defence University of USA (National Defense Iniversity), taken from Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p.164

[44] For this definition of Richard Shafranski, Putnik and Miljkovic deem fullest and complete the definition of, Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p.164

Following the presented definitions we can draw a few constants about cyber terrorism and the reason why terrorists use the Internet as a form of terrorism:

a) weapon (cyber terrorism),

b) a way to communicate with the other activists,

c) as a medium to inform the public[45].

Information war can be described as a modern form of a psychological war; information and disinformation have important roles. Terrorists use cyber space to fulfill the following goals as well:

- propaganda to get more followers,

- giving simple activities to supporters,

- offering instruments for beginners training,

- distribution of information to activists,

- distribution of video/photos,

- informing mothers on how to raise their kids and prepare them for the war-like future of the jihad,[46]

- looking for members with certain skills (biologists, physicists, etc)

- offering basic resources for training via the Internet for terrorist activities, by giving out manuals with instructions for kidnapping, executions, how to use bombs, chemicals, poisons, etc.

- using the Internet as a means of funding from legal and illegal sources,

- manuals for hacking government sites,

- ability for safe and fast communication via providers for chat, which are difficult to follow,

- using a tactics for migrating web pages, which are hard to locate and track[47]. (example text: Snowden "sense monster" who says NSA - can be misused)[48]

- government computer networks, financial networks, energetic stations, etc. are considered as possible targets for cyber terrorism, and these are the perfect targets to attack, because the after effect is chaos, which is the goal of terrorism. Manipulation of the systems via software by „secret entrances", theft of classified information, deletion of information, damaging web-sites, etc. are just examples of how terrorists can enter the security system[49].

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[45] Mina Zirojevih Fatih, Zloupotreba internet u svrhe terorizma, http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0025-8555/2011/0025-85551103417Z.pdf

[46] Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p.175-176

[47] Nenad Putnik, Milan Miljkovič, Zloupotreba kiber prostora kao sredstva masovne komunikacije, Vojno Delo, jesen, 2012, p 175-179

[48] More: http://fakti.org/globotpor/quo-vadis-orbi/snouden-razum-monstruma-koji-pravi-nsa-moze-biti-zloupotrebljavan

[49] Mitko Bogdanovski, Drage Petreski, Сајбер-терористичките напади како глобална безбедносна закана, Современа македонска одбрана No.24/2013, p.60

If we want to explain why we covered the diplomatic consular work and help the country, which representatives are diplomats, it is important to explain the process, of which we speak in the next chapter.

The influence of diplomatic consular buildings in countries where they are accredited

Although, according to the documents of diplomatic consultations, it is forbidden to influence the home politics of the country, which hosts the diplomats, nowadays this phenomenon is present. Usually it is done for protection of the interests of the country, sending the diplomats, and its security. That means that the country sending the diplomats takes legal and illegal actions to increase the security for its own interests. The Republic of Macedonia is not an isolated island and it is under the influence of the diplomatic activities of the EU and NATO. Although, it must not be forgotten that the security policy adopted and united with these superpowers has its advantages.

Cooperation of the diplomatic consular representatives of USA and the security services of the Republic of Macedonia in the fight against cyber terrorism

The achievement of protecting your own country, the people and their property is the basic reason why there is a need for a close cooperation with the security systems on a local, regional and international level. The fact that this is the case with the security services of the Republic of Macedonia can be confirmed with: the exchange of security information, exchange of human resources and visits to certain positions of security services, implementation of specialist training, management of suitable assistance in the technical and technological equipment of the security services, etc. In this context it is really important to mention the cooperation between the security services of the Republic of Macedonia and USA, by which, US ambassadors influence our internal policy. In this cooperation we exchange training, equipment and other resources required to battle cyber terrorism together – such activities can be seen organized in certain state institutions such as: The Center of Training of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, The Academy of Public prosecutors and studies and other security institutions.

Conclusion

Due to the fact that no country is capable of handling modern cyber terrorism by itself; close, constant collaboration between security systems and services on multiple levels is necessary. It is also required to follow modern techniques, technologies and methods of successful countering cyber terrorism.

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GLOBALIZATION AND PROCESSES AND THREATS IT IMPOSES

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Muhamet RACAJ[2]

Abstract*: This paper focuses on the term globalization and its positive and negative implications on current economic, political and security processes.*

The end of the Cold War initiated many positive processes in the world, but a method for surpassing the conflicts and use of power in resolving multinational and multiethnic differences had not been established.

The alterations of international relationships which date from the beginning of World War I and continued with the end of World War II and the bipolar world separation, and proceeded with the end of the bipolarity and the beginning of the so-called new regime, led to significant changes in the Eastern bloc countries. It contributed to strengthening the integration processes in Western Europe. The functions of the key world organizations such as UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe have been redefined.

Problems, such as the use of mass destruction weapons, terrorist and asymmetric threats, money laundry and organized crime got global dimensions, which require new methods and development of global security systems within the internal security systems of countries. International security relies on contracted terms for cooperation and guaranteed agreement among the countries' security structures aiming at eliminating all possible security threats the countries could face.

Unavoidably, the future of smaller countries relies on joining the process of globalization and international global systems, which will guarantee their survival.

Key words: *globalization, security, collective systems, organized crime, money laundry, terrorism.*

Introduction

In order to better understand the changes that have happened in the relationship between countries and in the world economy as a result of capital increases expansion and cultural exchange, we should rely on the meaning of the term globalization as a process of connecting the world. Globalization is closely connected to the effect of free trade and liberalization of economic relations. Globalization could be referred to as a trend which significantly advanced

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after the end of World War II. This trend includes international movement of goods, money, information, people, and development of technology, organizations, legal systems and infrastructures needed for this movement.

The development of globalization could be followed in three directions:

• Through unification of the political systems;
• Through unification of the economic systems; and,
• Through unification of the security systems.[3]

The trend of alterations of political systems on global level refers to:

- establishment of democratic processes;
- respect of freedom and human rights;
- the principal of dividing the authority in <u>legislature</u>, executive and judiciary;
- multi - party systems etc.

The unification of the economic system could be seen by overcoming the barriers of international commerce after World War II, through agreements known as global trade and tariff contracts as well as through free trade promotion:

- of goods: customs reduction and elimination, creation of free trade zones without or with insignificant tariffs and costs,
- of capital: capital control reduction or elimination,
- reduction, elimination or homogenization of grants and local businesses.

Globalization has its supporters among the representatives of free trade, who claim that globalization leads to more efficient deployment of resources, includes all countries in trade benefits, which on the other hand lowers the prices, increases the employment and expands the production.

Liberals consider globalization as a benefit of democracy and capital, or political and economic freedom of democracy in the developed world, which creates larger financial wealth.

Globalization is ineluctability to which mankind must comply, it is not destiny, and it could be shaped. The first thesis is connected to a wider interlock, connection with the identity of the social network which goes beyond borders, all communication media, life paths, people are able to understand more languages via watching TV, surfing the Internet, etc. Internal politics becomes cosmopolitan as a dense network of national dependence has been established.

Capital flow and discovering new markets are to meet the greedy capital appetite and are constantly seeking selling opportunities and discovering cheap resources, for a bigger competition, as profit race is ruthless. The loss of individuals is minor, they are sacrificed for higher interests, and in the interest of capital even countries are lost also for higher aims and interests. In other words, the victims for higher interests are considered a collateral damage. Within the globalization, the new moves are not defined; the game is based on the new targets and areas of imposed interests. The strategies are not defined in advance. There is no fair play; politics has the biggest role, when it is able to paint the events with bright colors, although reality is dark. Final epilog, if the politics cannot play the role and present a pink image, it uses power which imposes democracy, creates human rights fighters, who later on use politics, sit on a table and negotiate solving the crisis, which means the initially established interests are to be achieved. An inevitable fact which leads to a conclusion is that with globalization the wealthy become wealthier and fewer, and the poor become poorer and more numerous. The migration towards the wealthier is one of the most serious aspects of globalization. The uneven distribution of

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[3] Gocevski T. "Globalization, Peace and Security", Skopje 2008, pg. 12-25

wealth will initiate conflicts and threats to world security. On the other hand, terrorism threats will be a "tool" for balancing globalization benefits.

Globalization and peace and security sustainability

Countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal and some other similar to them are not a separate unit in the frame of power of the inner countries. Their aim is establishment of mutual interests on a global level towards building strong Europe which can oppose USA, China and Russia, both with power and strength. The occurrence of national interest is aimed towards the community – Europe.[4]

Opening, or closing their borders is part of the politics of the role of the nation as part of the process of building the world internal politics. The renaissance boundary of internal politics had disappeared and a new common European strategy has been being built in the segments such as economy, finance, security, while internal values and common interests are being established. Globalization is a factor which brings new divisions and conflicts, but at the same time it is a factor for peace and stability.[5]

Globalization as a peace and security factor imposes the thesis that all conflicts cannot be resolved by engagement of armed forces. It also imposes the need for finding a different but adequate answer to transnational and global dangers. The multilateral approach as the answer to security threats today and in the future is the key solution affirming the positive aspects of globalization. According to the UN charter, peace and security maintenance is an aspect of global management. All countries had to realize that peace and security maintenance is a common interest and everybody has to make an effort for a peaceful world and to give a contribution to the realization of world order principles.

The powers for peace maintenance have become part of the global management structure. The UN forces for peace maintenance are aimed towards establishment of international organization in which a sincere cooperation between countries is possible. Namely, the UN forces could be defined as representatives who are not interested in the result of the conflict or they are neutral and objective with the conflict opposing parties. The UN forces direct their activities towards preventive diplomacy, peace establishment and creating a situation similar to the one before the conflict, peace keeping and peace enforcement.

UN is not expected to be a center for strategic monitoring of all the threats in the world. It is a military force which is in the UN service whenever peacekeepers are needed without a period for preparation. Including politics in the decision making for the UN activities, even among the allies, unconsciously imperils world peace and security are.

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[4] Negier Woods, "Power, Authority and Global Management", Skopje, 2010 pg. 27-51
[5] Z. Nacev, Globalization, "Peace and Security", Skopje 2008, pg. 27-31

The globalization power which fights for maintaining world peace and security of wider dimension is NATO, as a very significant instrument of military – political operating of Western Europe. Its dimension is building systems for collective defense of member countries rejecting aggression and providing help to the attacked party. Since the 90s, NATO has been aiming, besides defense, to other security dimensions such as: economic, demographic, environmental etc. not only for its member countries but also for wider European and international systems. NATO activities are aimed towards securing freedom of movement, borders' invulnerability, conflict prevention, promotion of peaceful conflict solution and giving support to peacekeeping operations.[6]

OSCE is the biggest regional security world organization. OSCE is an important instrument for avoiding conflicts, for early warning and prevention, for conflicts control which can result in violence, as well as in reconstruction of countries torn by this violence, or in other words their post conflict rehabilitation. OSCE works on weapons control, cooperation in economy and environment protection and as a monitor when elections are organized.

EU forces are civilian powers with limited authority in the area of security and defense. EU aims towards economic issues and its security policy is: protection of outer values, basic interests, strengthening the security of the union and member countries, improvement of international cooperation, strengthening democracy and legal state, and human rights and freedom protection. The capacity of European security and defense policy had started developing since 1999, through the following three components: military management of crisis, civilian management of crises, and conflicts prevention. European security strategy identifies threats such as: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, regional conflicts and disintegration of countries, which could cause regional instability.

Globalization and some modern security threats

The end of the Cold War initiated many positive processes in the world, but a method for surpassing the conflicts and use of power in resolving multinational and multiethnic differences had not been established. The trend of alterations which was inevitably imposed in the 70s of the last century, considered the golden era of globalization, imposed the need for changes in security systems. Namely, global threats such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, corruption, money laundry, torn apart countries and local conflicts, at the same time imposed the need for creating a mutual strategy as an answer to the "global village" countries.

Some of the abovementioned globalization threats will be considered in this paper.

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[6] Michael Pu, "Managing Globalization", Skopje 2010, pg. 240-271

Globalization and transnational organized crime

The term transnational organized crime[7] should be separated from the terms international (multinational) organized crime and global organized crime. Transnational organized crime means criminal groups whose organizer is in one country, but because of the range of criminal activities they act in other countries. Multinational organized crime means joined criminal groups from different countries who act in a bigger number of countries. Global organized crime means all forms of groups of organized crime in the world. All these terms are actually different variations of the same concept which is: organized crime acts out of the borders of one country. Boshkovic says: "crime could be international, but it should not be organized, in order to be organized it must have elements of the organized crime which makes it part of the transnational organized crime".[8]

According to the Convention, the elements of transnational organized crime are the following:[9]

- acts of organized criminal groups in many countries,

- acting in one country, but the preparations, planning, management and control are conducted in another country,

- acting in one country, a group of organized crime is joined and acts in more countries,

- acting in one country but the consequences originate from another country.[10]

Today, in the era of globalization, organized crime is seen through transnational dimension and the main reason for that are groups trafficking people, drugs, weapons, human organs, environment criminal acts, who do the trafficking in many countries for illegal markets and the profit from these criminal acts is hidden in third countries for taxes evasion.[11]

These types of big criminal organizations are a threat for many countries especially for small and weak countries in transition. Also, the corrupted countries are targeted because organized crime in such countries uses the weaknesses of the institutions, conquering the country in a way; especially futile soil for this are countries with dictatorial regimes.

Globalization and money laundry

Globalization is a futile soil for a relatively new pumping up of the state capital and endangering the countries' economy through money laundry. Although, in respect to the term it is a new category, it occurs at the end of the last century, and makes a disaster in the transitional period of weak countries' economy.

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[7] This term was accepted at the UN Convention for transnational organized crime, Palermo, 2000.

[8] Petrovik B.and Boskovic M." Transnational Organized Crime", Police Academy, Belgrade, 2003, pg. 43

[9] Boskovic M." Transnational Organized Crime", Police Academy, Belgrade, 2003, pg.43

[10] UN Convention for "Transnational organized crime", Palermo, 2010

[11] Labovic M. / Nikolovski M." Organized Crime and Corruption", Skopje, 2010

Money laundry is a process of different tactics for placement, hiding and integration of illegally gained finances to be integrated into legal businesses while the track of the illegal businesses is covered with the help of world and national financial systems.[12]

The connection between organized crime, money laundry and corruption cannot be separated. Without corruption, which leads to organized crime and money laundry, it is impossible these two to function.[13] In the last decade realizing the threat of this evil, the global community reacted in finding mechanisms to stop this evil which goes deep into its foundations. As a result of this, many conventions, declarations, recommendations, references, protocols and directives have been drawn by relevant international organizations and bodies and are obligatory within the regulations of national legal systems.

As opposed to countries which introduce regulations, there are countries known as „black holes", such are the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Caribbean Islands, Panama, Cyprus, Malta, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Ireland and etc. Under the motto for protection of secrecy of savings in their banks, they create opportunities for money laundry to place investments and with the approval of the international community to cover the corrupted officials who are allowed to open bank accounts on other name and other accounts.

The question which emerges is Why does this happen? The answer is in the interest of big powers, to „hold in their hands"the biggest criminals and through it to explore natural resources from home countries or to reach the planned aims more easily when there is a need of such.

Globalization and terrorism

The world of globalization is not pink. Globalization has created a new global sector which harms the world peace and does not allow commodity to the strong ones compared to the weak ones. This new sector is actually the terrorist organizations.

With the power of horror, on September 11th 2001, the globalization and mass media from New York and Washington, with only one single strike distinguished the terrorists as ones challenging the countries. This is how terrorists became "non-governmental organization of terror" and act as organizations of civil society determined and decentralized on the one hand locally, and on the other hand nationally. This could mean one type of the above national antiterrorist fiction, fixed on the Islamic terrorism, which could be connected to all possible targets, ideology and fundament. The terror should be differentiated – territorial and supranational, liberation movement from the new supranational liberation movement from supranational networks, which act supra territorially, no matter the borders, in a way in which one strike determines

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[12] M. Kotovchevski, "Globalization, Peace and Security", Skopje, 2008, pg. 96-97
[13] Labovic M./ Nikolovski M. "Organized Crime and Corruption", Skopje, 2010, pg.138-153

the supranational military and war rules. If up to recent times the armies interests were directed towards other military organizations and other national organizations, now the interests of the armies are directed towards supranational threats which endanger other countries.

Viewed from a historical distance, a big difference in terrorist actions could be defined as:

- at the beginning, terrorists tried to conduct an action in order to protect their lives , but now they conduct suicidal actions not valuing their own life in order to more successfully reach the set target,

- one of the targets by no means is to cause fear and panic within the population, to create a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty, to marginalize the role of the national defense system. In order to achieve this they sacrifice a big number of lives, not protecting children, women and elderly people, and the innocence of the victims is not even taken into account. The bigger number of victims the more successful the operation,

- another characteristic of modern terrorism is its openness to communicate with the media or in other words, the conducted action should be confirmed and the responsibility for it shamelessly admitted, or before the causes of an accident are proved, the responsibility for it is publicly taken.

The relation of terrorists has a special relationship which is "terror – recognition – self destruction". It is a fact that terrorism becomes international. It is becoming a global challenge which has no borders and endangers international relations while terrorists always make bigger and bigger material and human damages in order to threaten international security. The world reacts to these threats on a global level with numerous measures and instruments such as conventions, resolutions, recommendations, agreements etc., in order to suppress this highly negative occurrence, and these measures to be accepted by all countries. After the attacks on September 11th 2001, Americans declared war to terrorists and got a lot of supporters and opponents. The previous balance separation among Europe, USA and Russia was no longer valid. The rivals become allies in the mutual war to protect world peace. In this war against terrorism it is enough USA to point to a certain country being a terrorist threat and it immediately gets a support for military intervention. The enigma is whether they are terrorists or human rights fighters. International public showed solidarity with the Americans and started cooperating and acting to suppress terrorism. UN reacted with 1337 resolution for terrorist suppression and establishment of antiterrorist committee. The center of the activities of UN, NATO, EU and USA is the fight against terrorism. The instability and the conflicts in certain regions are a futile soil for terrorist activities. Only with a strong and united action, a steady and global war against this global evil called terrorism could be organized.

Conclusion

The end of World War II and post war countries' rehabilitation and new regulatory forms of regional and global management, especially after the Cold War, creates a strong development of world order. The beginning of the XXI century is characterized with global changes which positively contributed to the development of the global society. The benefits of the New World Order so-called globalization, created a relief for mankind in direction to freer movement of population, communication development, open borders, people live locally and think globally. The countries' common problems are resolved in correlation within the involved parties.

Globalization is a space phenomenon which starts locally and widens globally. Globalization, through political, regional and continental borders widens political, economic and social possibilities. It is initiator of trade, foreign investments, culture and it speeds up the idea of information, capital and human expansion.

The idea of a nation – country is fading more and more. The nation speaks more languages, the Internet means falling behind the world flows, a new form of cosmopolitan reality appeared. The thesis for universal belonging and freedom of "kingdom of sense" appeared, to which the global communication systems contributed a great deal. Understanding and developing universal standards which are integrated into modern regional and global common law for human rights and respect of freedom, actually indicates that all human beings deserve equal respect and care.

International security relies on agreed cooperation and security agreement of countries' security structures aiming to eliminate all kinds of security threats countries might face. Building mutual standards for democratization of societies imposed a mutual functioning in the frames of collective systems for security and defense through establishing mutual standards for training and equipping. This especially applies to smaller countries, such as our country. In other words, our country joining the collective systems is not declarative but fundamental. The possibility to deal with global threats in time of globalization is to answer with power to power, so that global advance could function, and only if opponents join together, globalization may progress.

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