


МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA



35

VOL. XVIII
SKOPJE
DECEMBER 2018

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА	Год.	Број	Стр.	Скопје
	18	35	1-160	2018
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE	Vol.	No	pp	Skopje



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

СОВРЕМЕНА ОДБРАНА **CONTEMPORARY**
МАКЕДОНСКА **MACEDONIAN**
ОДБРАНА **DEFENCE**

ISSN 1409-8199
e-ISSN 1857-887X

Година 18, бр. 35, декември 2018 / Vol. 18, No. 35, December 2018

Skopje
December 2018



СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

Издавач:

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Министерство за одбрана

„СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА“

„Орце Николов“ 116 1000 Скопје

Телефони: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

Интернет адреса:

WEB на Министерството за одбрана:

<http://www.morm.gov.mk/sovremena-makedonska-odbrana/>

Списанието излегува два пати годишно.

ISSN 1409-8199

Скопје, декември 2018 година

Сите права се резервирани

Се забранува репродуцирање на публикацијата и нејзините делови, како и нивно трансформирање во разни медиуми: електронски, магнетни ленти, механичко фотокопирање, снимање и друго, без писмено одобрение на издавачот и авторите.

CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

Publisher:

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ministry of Defence

„CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE“

„Orce Nikolov“ 116 1000 Skopje

Tel.: 02 3128 276, 02 3113 527

Internet address:

WEB of the Ministry of Defence:

www.morm.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defence/

The magazine is published twice a year

ISSN 1409-8199

Skopje, December, 2018

All rights reserved

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the publisher and authors.

СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

МЕЃУНАРОДНО НАУЧНО СПИСАНИЕ НА
МИНИСТЕРСТВОТО ЗА ОДБРАНА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Радмила ШЕКЕРИНСКА, претседател на Издавачкиот совет

Марина МИТРЕВСКА, главен и одговорен уредник

Беќим МАКСУТИ, заменик главен и одговорен уредник

МЕЃУНАРОДЕН УРЕДУВАЧКИ ОДБОР

Мухамед РАЦАЈ

Нано РУЖИН

Тони МИЛЕСКИ

Николина КЕНИГ

Никола ДУЈОВСКИ

Наташа ПЕЛИВАНОВА

Ана ЧУПЕСКА

Александра ДЕАНОСКА ТРЕНДАФИЛОВА

Елениор НИКОЛОВ

Менде СОЛУНЧЕВСКИ

Џелал НЕЗИРИ

Жанет РИСТОСКА

Паскал МИЛО

Антон ГРИЗОЛД

Зоран КЕКОВИЌ

Синиша ТАТАЛОВИЌ

Јанцислав ЈАНАКИЕВ

Дезире ПАНГЕРЦ

Оливера ИЊАЦ

Мајкл ШУЛЦ

Патриција ФАРАЛДО КАБАНА

Емануела Ц. ДЕЛ РЕ

Еике АЛБРЕХТ

Секретар: *Жанет РИСТОСКА*

Техничка подготовка: „ФЕНИКС ПРИНТ“ ДООЕЛ Кочани

CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL OF
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Radmila SHEKERINSKA, Chairperson of the Editorial Board

Marina MITREVSKA, Editor-in-Chief

Bekim MAKSUTI, Co-Editor-in-Chief

INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD

Muhamed RACAJ

Nano RUZHIN

Toni MILESKI

Nikolina KENIG

Nikola DUJOVSKI

Natasha PELIVANOVA

Ana CHUPESKA

Aleksandra DEANOSKA TREDAFILOVA

Elenior NIKOLOV

Mende SOLUNCHEVSKI

Djelal NEZIRI

Zhanet RISTOSKA

Paskal MILO

Anton GRIZOLD

Zoran KEKOVIĆ

Siniša TATALOVIĆ

Yantislav YANAKIEV

Desirée PANGERC

Olivera INJAC

Michael SCHULZ

Patricia FARALDO KABANA

Emanuela C. DEL RE

Eike ALBRECHT

Secretary: *Zhanet RISTOSKA*

Processing: *"FENIKS PRINT" DOOEL Kocani*

Proofreading and Editing: *Rozi GROZDANOVSKA, Martina KIMOVSKA*

CONTENTS:

Ana CHUPESKA- STANISHKOVSKA
Yorgos CHRISTIDIS
**BREAKING THE “HOSTILITY DISCOURSE”: BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION
BETWEEN ATHENS AND SKOPJE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS
(2015 - June 2018)”9**

Dragan TRIVAN
**GEO-ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANSION OF
TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES27**

Andrej ILIEV
Jovan ILIEV
**THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS:
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES.....39**

Olivera INJAC
**NEW PARADIGM ON EUROPEAN SECURITY-
DID EUROPE BECOME A RISK SOCIETY?.....57**

Zlatko KUZMANOV
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY AND RECENT EVENTS69

Marija GJOSHEVA
CYBER TERRORISM AND CYBER SPACE79

Lazar GJUROV
Bojan MIKLOSH
THE LEADERSHIP STYLE OF GENERAL MIHAILO APOSTOLSKI89

Valmir HYLENAJ
Astrit HALITI
WHY DID THE SOUTH LOSE THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR99

Krunoslav ANTOLIŠ
**HOW TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES117**

Nikola MANEV
Elenior NIKOLOV
MECHATRONICS SYSTEMS IN ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES: REVIEW135

Vasko POPOVSKI

Stevko STEFANOSKI

**PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS ISSUES IN THE
NATIONAL RISK AND THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESSES W149**

BREAKING THE “HOSTILITY DISCOURSE”: BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN ATHENS AND SKOPJE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS (2015 - June 2018)”¹

Ana CHUPESKA- STANISHKOVSKA²

Yorgos CHRISTIDIS³

Abstract: *During the second half of 2015 and the first few months of 2016 Athens and Skopje, came face to face with a massive inflow of refugees. Their sheer number (app. 800,000), put to the test the administrative capabilities of both neighboring states and their bilateral relations on a variety of questions: from covering refugees' basic needs and human rights protection to the issues of border security. In other words, the crisis brought onto the surface the necessity of direct communication and collaboration between the authorities of the two countries – which was missing, having in mind the state of previously dominant “hostility discourse” due to the “name dispute”. Such necessity of collaboration between Athens and Skopje was agreed with the so called Confidence Building Measures (June 2015), and among those, one concerns the close cooperation in the area of “Justice and Home Affairs”. The latest, can be seen as the focal point of joint praxis between Athens and Skopje, since it covers intensive consultations between high level power representatives (Ministries on Internal Affairs, border police, customs administration), for the purpose of exchanging information regarding organized crime, corruption, terrorism, illegal migration and drug trafficking. Along these lines, the purpose of the paper is to examine the state of cooperation developed between Athens and Skopje on extremely sensitive issues, such as border security and internal affairs, since the second half of 2015, and to see to what extent it has affected the “hostility discourse” between the two countries. Also, having in mind that in the meantime a new round of bilateral negotiations on the “name issue” between the two countries began, under the aegis of the UN, the paper will also ponder upon its effects in that respect.*

Keywords: *CBMs, Athens, Skopje, refugee crisis, police cooperation, security, friendship in international relations, Prespa Agreement*

¹ A version of the following paper was presented by the two authors during the international conference entitled “The EU and the Balkans at the End of the Second Decade of the 21st Century”, organized by the Department of Political Science & International Relations of the University of Peloponnese, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and the University of Canterbury, at Korinth 4-5 June 2018.

² Ana Chupeska Stanishkovska, Dr.MSci.Phil, Assistant Professor, Head of Political Theory Cathedra, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, UKIM, Skopje

³ Yorgos Christidis, PhD, is an Associate Professor, at the Department of Balkan, Slavonic and Oriental Studies, at the University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki.

Introduction

It is a common knowledge that the bilateral relations between Athens and Skopje, as well as the political history of their relations, have been “hostile, or to say cold” for a long time, having especially deteriorated after VMRO-DPMNE had returned to power in 2006 and Athens had in practice blocked Macedonia’s/FYROM’s⁴ path to NATO in April 2008. For sure, the name dispute itself was the most explicit aspect in this regard, too. Nowadays, many of the misunderstandings between the two neighboring states are on the track to be overcome, due to the optimistic expectations related with the signing of the so-called Prespa’s Agreement, on 17 June 2018. But, even more importantly, and as a matter of fact, prior to the agreement, both governments were working on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) - agreed almost 3 years ago, in the summer of 2015, at a time of a worsening refugee crisis that posed regional, and even European, security challenges. In other words, the regional stability, as well as, the gravitational pool of the common European values brought Skopje and Athens closer to each other in the middle of the refugee crisis, beside their “no-so-good relations”. Consequently, this paper focuses upon the border security cooperation developed between Athens and Skopje since the beginning of the Refugee Crisis (in the summer of 2015) in which we saw a focal point for “breaking the Hostility Discourse”, changing also the dynamics of their bilateral relations, and one could say paved the way for the latest agreement. Furthermore, we believe cooperative and friendly relations, especially in uncertain times like the actual ones, are of great importance, particularly, taking into consideration the regional and even global securitization questions together with the probability of consequent risks related to it. Especially indicative in this regard are several security incidents in the region : the Russian intention to overthrow Montenegro's government by trying to assassinate Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic (2017);⁵ the Kumanovo incidents at the Kosovo-Macedonian/FYROM border (2016);⁶ the shootings against MPs exhibited in the Macedonian/FYROM Parliament (2017);⁷ current speculation on redrawing Kosovo-Serbia borders;⁸ as well as some examples of Russian involvement in Greece resulting in the expulsion of the diplomats there, too.⁹

⁴ In the text both the provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)” and Republic of Macedonia (M) are being used

⁵ See for example Ben Farmer, “Russia plotted to overthrow Montenegro's government by assassinating Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic last year, according to senior Whitehall sources”, The Telegraph, 19 February 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/russias-deadly-plot-overthrow-montenegros-government-assassinating/> (last access 10.08.2018)

⁶ Sinisa Jakov Marusic, Ervin Qafmoll, “Calm Returns to Devastated Macedonian Town”, BIRN, 11 May 2015, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/calm-in-macedonian-town-after-weekend-shootout> (last access 13.09.2018)

⁷ Valerie Hopkins, “What Happened in Macedonia, and Why”, The Atlantic, 28 April 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/macedonia-parliament-zaev-nationalist-violence-eu-europe/524733/> (last access 10.08.2018)

⁸ See for example “Kosovo's President, Belgrade Willing To Consider Border Changes”, RFE/RL's Balkan Service, 7 August 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-s-president-belgrade-willing-to-consider-border-changes/29417481.html> (last access 10.08.2018)

⁹ Vassilis Nedos, “Greece decides to expel Russian diplomats”, eKathimerini-com, 11 July 2017, <http://www.ekathimerini.com/230551/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-decides-to-expel-russian-diplomats> (last access 15.07.2018)

In the academic field of international relations and foreign policy, it is important to note here at the very beginning, there is a recognizable discursive line of thought commonly known as “friendship in foreign policy /or/ friendship in international relations.”¹⁰ Within the IR theory, namely, this idea is trying to replace the obsolete, but still, unfortunately dominant paradigm according to which international relations are inherently hostile. Instead, this discursive novelty gives emphasis on the practices of co-operation and solidarity between the states and on the building of their friendly relations. There is a spectrum of scholars that deal with international friendship¹¹. Hence, the fundus of building friendly foreign policies according to the “friendship in IR logics” is related to the necessity of co-operation at the three fundamental levels, as Van Hoef notes, let us paraphrase his thought. First, at the level of the political leaders; Second, at the level of the institutions (parliaments, administration and the local self-government); Third, at the level of the civic society (universities, cultural assets, trade unions, media, businesses, etc.). The idea behind this reasoning is joint work for stabilization of societal “anxieties” in order to ensure ontological sense of safety in relation to each Other¹². In the case of the relations between Athens and Skopje, we witnessed that the above mentioned ideas are applicable, if there is a political commitment for intensifying the contacts on all of the three levels. Also, we have recognized that such connections were being realized independently of the dispute resolution and related negotiations. In other words, in the context of Macedonia/FYROM-Greece relations the creation of the joint cognitive and normative frameworks was of crucial importance in dealing with the international political and security circumstances. The latter remark was explicitly agreed in the CBMs and in the Prespa Agreement too¹³. Even more, that this is not a naïve fantasy, there are historical evidences which serve to demonstrate the logic behind the “friendly IR relations”, as, for example, the case of the Franco-German friendship and the Czech-Armenian friendship, both were being normatively declared; and even more relevant in this occasion is the Greek-Bulgarian friendship for which the reconciliation was agreed on normative level¹⁴, too, as well as, the latest friendly agreements between Macedonia and Bulgaria and Macedonia/FYROM and Greece. These examples point out that neighborly, friendly, relations between even between Macedonia/FYROM and Greece are possible, due the fact that friendly foreign policy (or friendship in foreign policy) can be an explicit and legitimate

¹⁰ F. Berenskoetter and V. Y. Hoef, “Friendship and foreign policy”, Oxford University Press [subject: World politics; Online Publication Jul, 2017; DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.429] ACSESS: <http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-429>

¹¹ For More Please Consult: Bierman, 2005; Berenskoeter, 2007; Digeser, 2009; King, 2007; Koshut& Oelsner, 2014; Oelsner & Vion 2011; Smith 2011; Van Hoef, 2014.

¹² Berenskoetter and Hoef, “Friendship and foreign policy”

¹³ On the Prespa’s agreement: <http://s.kathimerini.gr/resources/article-files/symfwnia-aggliko-keimeno.pdf>

¹⁴ After 1974, Athens and Sofia would embark in what could be described as a “historical reconciliation”, reminiscent of the French-German reconciliation. It was a process of bilateral rapprochement that began by Konstantinos Karamanlis (Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής) and Todor Zhivkov (Тодор Живков) in the 1970s and continued by Andreas Papandreu (Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου) and the Bulgarian leaders in the 1980s..... led the two countries to put aside the legacy of confrontation and any ideological differences they had, and to build friendly bilateral relations. In fact, the bilateral agreement on issues of regional and international politics, in combination with the deterioration of Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish relations, during the second half of the 1980s, would generate the impression of a “Greek-Bulgarian axis” in the Balkans.

goal of a state foreign policy. Examples of reciprocal friendly gestures between Athens and Skopje, were being exhibited too, and prior to the agreement during the name issue negotiations: the renaming of the Macedonian airport from “Alexander the Great” to “International Airport Skopje”, as well renaming the Macedonian part of the Highway E7 from “Alexander the Great” to E7 “Friendship”. Reciprocally, Greece decided to unlock Macedonia’s/FYROM’s entrance in the Adriatic & Ionian Initiative and to open a border-crossing in the Prespa region.

In short, for our research, we have used the above-mentioned theoretical frame, but also we have been conducting interviews with high level officials and with persons involved in the process of Confidence Building Measures. We have been analyzing the news in the daily media in both countries, but also we used deductive methodology, as well as historical references. And what we found interesting and factually to be true is that during the evolution of the refugee crisis, the bilateral relations were not seen anymore as “hostile”, as the political context had been changed due to the initial normalizing gestures of both governments. Even more, this communication happened prior to the negotiations for the name dispute and the consequent agreement. Profoundly relevant in this respect is the fact that the so-called hostile countries have begun to cooperate on the most sensitive issues, those that are directly related to the sovereignty of the states: on the protection of their borders! Later on this would be stipulated normatively in the agreement itself.

I. The refugee crisis of 2015 - March 2016 as a catalyst for intensified contacts and cooperation between Greece and Macedonia/FYROM

The migrant crisis, from the summer of 2015 and onwards, functioned as a catalyst in bilateral relations, facilitating and encouraging cooperation between Greece and Macedonia/FYROM. That was mainly exemplified in August 2015 by the initiation of high-level bilateral contacts between the police forces of the two countries¹⁵; while, on 24 June 2015, during the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Kotzias (Νικόλαος Κοτζιάς) in Skopje, a list of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) was signed “aimed at strengthening mutual confidence and advancing overall bilateral relations”.¹⁶ Among the CBMs agreed, No. 10 was entitled “Justice and Home Affairs”, involving “consultations between representatives of the Ministries of Interior, border police, customs administration, with the aim of exchanging information and enhancing the fight against organized crime, corruption, terrorism, illegal migration and narcotics”.¹⁷

The number of migrant/refugee arrivals in Greece had increased considerably during 2015: whereas between 1st January and 30 September 2014, around 31,000 migrants had arrived in Greece, during the same period in 2015 their numbers rose to 393,000, an increase by 850%.¹⁸ In August 2015 the migration flows towards Greece increased even further, as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced an open-

¹⁵ See below

¹⁶ “Strengthening Mutual Confidence and Bilateral Relations. Athens-Skopje”, Skopje, 24 June 2015, also <https://a1on.mk/archives/504624>

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ Quoted in Nada Ghandour Demiri, «Η προσφυγική κρίση στην Ελλάδα», Heinrich Boll Stiftung 17 Νοεμβρίου 2015, <https://gr.boell.org/el/2015/11/17/i-prosfygiki-krisi-stin-ellada> (last access 3.3.2018)

door policy to refugees from Syria¹⁹ : only in August more than 100,000 reached the Greek islands.²⁰ In late August 2015 (20-21-22 August), Macedonia/FYROM shut down the border with Greece for three days, forcing thousands of people who were seeking to enter Macedonia/FYROM to get stranded on the other side of the border, in a place called Idomeni (Εἰδωμένη), generating dramatic scenes that were captured by the many international journalists who were present at Idomeni at that time.²¹ The crisis in Idomeni caused by the closure of the border actually activated channels of communication between the two police forces²² , as following a request by Skopje a meeting took place between high ranking Greek police officers from Northern Greece and colleagues from Macedonia/FYROM. It should be noticed here that following Kotzias' visit to Skopje, on 24 June, there had been a request by the Macedonian/FYROM police for initializing meetings with the Greek police, to which there was no positive response²³ . Until that point (end of August 2015), direct communication (let alone cooperation) and all contacts between the two sides was (very much) limited on the border regions. Any official contacts existing basically went through the Interpol.

At the same time, growing migrant flows and the establishment of the so-called Balkan corridor – i.e. the route that the migrants were following to reach Central Europe from Greece, passing through a series of Western Balkan states, in the area that once comprised the former S.F.R. of Yugoslavia - generated intensified concerns throughout the region and the European Union (EU) and brought about unilateral efforts to deal with the issue²⁴ , as well as attempts for a coordinated action. Thus, on

¹⁹ “Wir haben so vieles geschafft - Wir schaffen das” (we have managed so many things — we can do this) said the German Chancellor in an interview during the last day of August. Quoted in Janosh Delcker, “The phrase that haunts Merkel”, Politico, 19 August 2016, <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-phrase-that-haunts-angela-merkel/> (last access 20.3.2018). For the German response in August 2015 to the refugee crisis see also Mihret Yohannes “Angela Merkel welcomes refugees to Germany despite rising anti-immigrant movement”, The Washington Times, 5 September 2015, [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/10/angela-merkel-welcomes-refugees-to-germany-despite/...](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/10/angela-merkel-welcomes-refugees-to-germany-despite/) (last access 5.3.2018)

²⁰ Γεωργία Σπυρόπουλου, Δημήτρης Χριστόπουλος, Προσφυγικό: «Θα τα καταφέρουμε;» Ένας απολογισμός διαχείρισης και προτάσεις διεξόδου, Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκού Συνταγματικού Δικαίου, Ίδρυμα Θεμιστοκλή & Δημήτρη Τσάτσου, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήσης 2016, σ. 20

²¹ “... the dramatic scenes that ensued at the border when thousands of people were suddenly stranded in Idomeni were captured by the many international journalists who were present at Idomeni at that time, and widely covered by the international press”. M. Anastasiadou, A. Marvakis, P. Mezidou, M. Speer, From transit hub to dead end. A Chronicle of Idomeni, Bordermonitoring.eu, Vol 2, January 2018, p.7

²² Interview with a police source wishing to remain anonymous, 14 April 2018, Greece

²³ Interview with a police source wishing to remain anonymous, 14 April 2018, Greece

²⁴ On 17 October 2015, the Hungarian government, that treated the migrant flows as a “threat” to its security and identity, announced that it had completed the building of a fence in its borders with Croatia, thus making impossible the illegal passage of migrants from Croatia to Hungary. A similar move had taken place previously on Hungary's borders with Serbia (at the middle of September), where also a fence was built, diverting the migrant flows from Serbia to Croatia. See «Η Ουγγαρία κλείνει τα σύνορα με Κροατία», Η Καθημερινή, 17 October 2015, <http://h%20Oυγγαρία%20κλείνει%20τα%20σύνορα%20>

25 October 2015, a Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route took place in Brussels, with the participation of 11 countries - Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia - where a 17-point plan of action was agreed in order “to improve cooperation and step up consultation between the countries along the route”.²⁵ Among the operational measures agreed, was “No. 13” stipulating “Strengthening border cooperation between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with increased UNHCR engagement”.²⁶

On 30 October 2015 the first CBM meeting took place where the 10th CBM was part of the discussion, and where it was “decided to incorporate all contacts between the two police forces as part of the activities of the 10th CBM”.²⁷ The need to develop the cooperation further was gaining ground in both capitals. Thus, in an interview given by Macedonia’s/FYROM’s Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki to Greek journalists in New York, at the end of November 2015, Poposki was highly critical of how other European countries were dealing with the refugee crisis: “European countries, not only Greece, are buying time. They are playing the game of passing responsibility to the next country...” Poposki insisted that a Frontex force should be positioned at Greece’s northern borders, stopping refugees from continuing their journey towards the north. He also claimed that “There is no doubt that many of the “fighters” that are returning from Syria, are taking the Balkan route – maybe one in 100,000”. Poposki admitted that the system of registering refugees entering Macedonia/FYROM “is not foolproof”, asking for closer cooperation with the Greek security forces. Already the Greek press was reporting that “the Greek police in Kilkis (Polikastro), is closely collaborating with the police in Gevgelja, informing our neighbors about the arrival of new migrant arrivals. FYROM authorities are satisfied with that cooperation that did not exist earlier, they are asking however cooperation also on the issue of the “fighters” returning from Syria”.²⁸

On 17 December 2015 there was another meeting of the two countries foreign ministers, as Poposki paid an official visit to Athens.²⁹ Growing international criticism

με%20Κροατία%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html (last access 20.05.2018). Later on, similar fences would also be built by Austria in parts of its border with Slovenia, by Slovenia on part of its border with Croatia, by Croatia on part of its border with Serbia and by Macedonia/FYROM on part of its border with Greece.

²⁵ “Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route: Leaders Agree on 17-point plan of action”, European Commission - Press release, Brussels, 25 October 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5904_en.htm (last access 10.3.2018)

²⁶ *ibid*

²⁷ Interview with a police source wishing to remain anonymous, 14 April 2018, Greece

²⁸ Τάσος Τέλλογλου, «Επιστροφή «μαχητών» στα Βαλκάνια», Η Καθημερινή, 29 November 2015, <http://Επιστροφή%20«μαχητών»%20στα%20Βαλκάνια%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2018)

²⁹ See “Joint statements of Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias and the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, following their meeting (Athens, 17 December 2015)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint->

at the handling of the refugee crisis by the Greek government³⁰ - as the impression prevailing abroad was that Athens was primarily interested in facilitating the transfer of the migrants to the border, neglecting issues such as the proper recording of the entries or providing for the needs of the migrants - was affecting attitudes in Greece regarding cooperation with Macedonia/FYROM: not only among the leadership of the Greek Police that viewed cooperation with their counterparts from Macedonia/FYROM with growing pragmatism³¹ ; high profile Greek politicians, like Evangellos Venizelos (Ευάγγελος Βενιζέλος), were underlining the fact that the refugee crisis had added “another dimension” in the bilateral Greek-Macedonian/FYROM relations.³²

Kotzias and Poposki met again in Brussels in January 2016, on the margins of the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, where they discussed the “latest developments in the refugee crisis”.³³ By the end of January 2016 criticism against the

statements-of-foreign-minister-nikos-kotzias-and-the-foreign-minister-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-nikola... (last access 10.5.2018)

³⁰ On 1 December 2015 an internal European Commission document, entitled “On the integrity of the Schengen Treaty” called for “more efforts to avoid the illegal crossing of EU borders... the development of rapid development forces... (and) the development of a FRONTEX force at Greece’s northern borders”. According to Associated Press, by circulating the document the Commission was actually seeking to pressurize Greece in order to exercise better control over its borders. Quoted in «Μεγκένη» Σένγκεν για να αλλάξει... ρότα», efsyn.gr, 3 December 2015, <http://«Μεγκένη»%20Σένγκεν%20για%20να%20αλλάξει...%20ρότα%20%20%20H%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2018). There was also criticism against Greece by individual EU member states: thus the Prime Minister of Slovakia was quoted at the time, as calling for Greece “to be expelled from the Schengen Zone” (Κώστας Μοσχονάς, «Ευρω-εκβιασμός: «χωματερή ψυχών» ή εκτός Σένγκεν», efsyn.gr, 4 December 2015, <http://Ευρω-εκβιασμός%20%20«χωματερή%20ψυχών»%20ή%20εκτός%20Σένγκεν%20%20%20H%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html>, last access 20.05.2015), while on 20 October 2015 the Croatian Minister of the Interior, Ranko Ostojić, had accused Greece of “not being in a position to avert the entrance of tens of thousands of people from Turkey”. «Οι περιορισμοί δημιούργησαν χάος στη «βαλκανική οδό», Η Καθημερινή, 20 October 2015, <http://Οι%20περιορισμοί%20δημιούργησαν%20χάος%20στη%20«βαλκανική%20οδό»%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20H%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2015)

³¹ Interview with a source wishing to remain anonymous, 18 April 2018, Greece

³² Thus, in a newspaper article, Venizelos argued that the refugee crisis “is also connected with the EU-FYROM relations, and by extension with the bilateral Greece-FYROM relations, since that country is part of the land route of the refugees that enter and register in Greece and move to other EU member states... The refugee crisis does not alter the parameters of the so-called name-issue, the resolutions of the Security Council, and Nimitz’s mission. It is however, an element that we must add to our analysis regarding the parameters of regional stability and security in the Balkans (the problem is getting more acute, it is not decreasing) that together with the respect of the principles and values of NATO, determines the position of our country concerning FYROM’s prospect of accession in the context of the “open-doors” policy. Ευάγγελος Βενιζέλος, «Προσφυγικό και Εθνικά Θέματα», Η Καθημερινή, 3 January 2016, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/844380/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/prosfygiko-kai-e8nika-8emata> (last access 03.3.2018)

³³ “Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Foreign Minister of FYROM, Nikola Poposki, on the margins of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Brussels, 18 January 2016)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/news-announcements/foreign-minister-kotzias->

Greek government for its handling of the migrant flows had intensified: on 27 January, the European Commission issued a report, finding “serious deficiencies” in the control of the external borders and accusing Greece of “not fulfilling its obligations” – the Greek authorities were blamed for not checking the documents of migrants who were coming through and for not taking fingerprints.³⁴ In addition, Central European states, like Austria and Hungary were in particular critical towards Greece, seeking in effect to block the Balkan corridor, by stopping inflows into Macedonia/FYROM. At the end of January Hungary announced that it was sending 31 policemen to Macedonia/FYROM to assist in the guarding of the border with Greece.³⁵

On 19 February 2016, the CBM teams from Greece and Macedonia/FYROM met in Thessaloniki to review progress, while on 25 February the heads of the police forces of the two countries, Konstantinos Tsouvalas (Κωνσταντίνος Τσουβάλας) and Gorančo Savovski met in Thessaloniki. During the meeting, the two sides talked about issues concerning the refugee crisis, as well as issues concerning the fight against organized crime. In addition, the possibility of the Greek police providing knowhow and training to the Macedonian/FYROM police was also discussed. “The very good level of cooperation between the two sides was confirmed, as well as the mutual desire for the further development of bilateral relations at the level of police cooperation”.³⁶

At the same time, on 24 February 2016, 9 states - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia/FYROM, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro and Bulgaria - met in Vienna, following an Austrian initiative in order “to coordinate their positions over the migrant crisis”. During the meeting a 19-point communiqué was issued which, inter alia, called for stricter control of the borders and for the countries involved to decide by themselves on whom they allowed to enter or not. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Sebastian Kurz, did not miss the opportunity to once more accuse the Greek government of “lacking the will and the desire” to reduce the migrant flows, being interested “until now only on the fastest possible transfer of refugees to Central Europe”.³⁷

The Balkan corridor was eventually closed on 8 March 2016. At the time Macedonia’s/FYROM’s Defense Minister Zoran Jiolevski was quoted as saying that

meets-with-the-foreign-minister-of-fyrom-nikola-poposki-on-the-margins-of-the-eu... (last access 10.05.2018)

³⁴ Άννα Φαλτάιτς, “Stratfor: Η Ελλάδα αποδιοπομπαίος τράγος της προσφυγικής κρίσης”, 29 January 2016, <http://www.euro2day.gr/specials/topics/article/1394866/stratfor-h-ellada-apodiopompaios-tragos-ths-profy.html> (last access 3/3/2018)

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ “25-02-2016: Επίσημη συνάντηση του Αρχηγού της Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, Αντιστρατήγου Κωνσταντίνου Τσουβάλα με τον ομόλογό του Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Gorančo Savovski, στη Θεσσαλονίκη”, Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, 25 February 2016, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27 (last access 15/4/2018)

³⁷ Βίκυ Καπετανοπούλου, «Η Συμμορία των Δυτικών Βαλκανίων», *efsyn.gr*, 25 February 2016, <http://H%20συμμορία%20των%20Δυτικών%20Βαλκανίων%20%20%20H%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2018)

“The Republic of Macedonia hopes that the termination of the inflow of refugees through its territory, an act that effectively sealed the Balkan route towards Northern Europe, will facilitate its access to NATO... and that Macedonia will get its place at NATO’s table. We showed that we are a responsible member of the international community”.³⁸

The closure of the border was followed by protests on the part of the migrants that had been gathered at Idomeni. At the same time many who attempted to enter illegally Macedonia/FYROM, were arrested by the authorities and sent back to Greece.³⁹ President Ivanov criticized Greece for not “collaborating in the refugee crisis”, adding that Greece “should stop allowing the migrants to approach the borders with Macedonia”. However, within less than a month the mood had clearly changed: at the beginning of April Macedonia’s/FYROM’s Defense Minister, Zoran Jolevski, in an interview with an Austrian newspaper declared that “The good of the crisis is that we have strengthened our relations with Greece. Now we are cooperating better. We are neighbors and we are facing similar challenges.”⁴⁰

II. The continuation of the CBMs and other bilateral contacts (April 2016 – February 2018)

The refugee crisis of 2015-2016 had clearly opened up a “new chapter” of bilateral contacts and cooperation between Athens and Skopje that continued after the spring of 2016, despite the end of the refugee crisis, or the political changes that took place in Macedonia/FYROM following the parliamentary elections of December 2016. Thus Kotzias and Poposki held another bilateral meeting in Thessaloniki on 21-22 April 2016 on the margins of a quadrilateral meeting (Greece-Albania-Bulgaria-Macedonia/FYROM) - where there was also a meeting between the Ministers of the

³⁸ “Н ПГДМ елпиџеи оџи џа просфугиџиџи криџи џа џа џери пио конџа сто НАТО”, Аџина 9.84 FM, 10 March 2016, <http://www.athina984.gr/2016/03/10/i-pgdm-elpizi-oti-i-prosfygiki-krisi-tha-ti-feri-pio-konta-sto-nato/> (last access 3/3/2018); Also “Јолевски повиџа за приџм на Македониџа во НАТО за да се заџврсти стабилноста на Балканот”, Vesnik, 11 March 2016, <https://vesnik.com/makedonija/jolevski-povika-za-priem-na-makedonija-vo-nato-za-da-se-zacvrsti-stabilnosta-na-balkanot> (last access 20.05.2018), a position repeated by Jolevski on the 15th of April, “Јолевски:Македониџа џе продолџи да делуџа конструктивно во бегалската криџа”, SITEL, 15 April 2016, <https://sitel.com.mk/jolevskimakedonija-kje-prodolzhi-da-deluva-konstruktivno-vo-begalskata-kriza> (last access 20.05.2018)

³⁹ Thus, on 15 March it was reported by the Greek media that the police in FYROM had arrested and sent back to Greece around 1,500 migrants that had entered illegally, while it had stopped around 600 more from doing the same. «Θρίλερ με џους πρόσфугџες που πџрасан στην ПГДМ», ANTI News, 15 March 2016, <http://www.ant1news.gr/news/Society/article/438630/thriller-me-toys-prosfyges-poy-perasan-stin-pgdm> (last access 3.03.2018)

⁴⁰ Quoted in “Јолевски очеџуџа покана за џленство во НАТО на наредниот самит”, DW.com, 02 April 2016, <http://www.dw.com/mk/јолевски-очеџуџа-покана-за-џленство-во-наато-на-наредниот-самит/a-19160224> (last access 20.05.2018), also «Н просфугиџиџи криџи ениџхуџе џис џџџеџис џис ПГДМ ме џин Еллада», Naftemporiki.gr, 3 April 2016, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1088752/i-prosfygiki-krisi-enixxuse-tis-sxeseis-tis-pgdm-me-tin-ellada> (last access 3.03.2018).

Interior⁴¹ - and in Brussels on 20 May 2016.⁴² Joint training activities between the two police forces also began: between 6 and 11 June 2016 6 policemen from Macedonia/FYROM participated in a training seminar in Athens, organized by the Greek police, where they attended lectures on border management and migration.⁴³

Kotzias visited Skopje on 25 August 2016, where they examined the progress made on the CBMs. Following their meeting, the two foreign ministers underlined that the Confidence Building Measures “had boosted bilateral relations”, while they also “clarified that the CBMs are in no way connected to the name issue”, noting at the same time that they “contribute significantly in improving relations and creating a sense of mutual trust”.⁴⁴ Kotzias added that “when I first spoke about the CBMs many abroad thought that it is something exotic, something that would never materialize, it was even more exotic for my colleagues at the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU when I vetoed the imposition of sanctions at the expense of the country that provides me with hospitality today. I would like to say, that in more than a year that passed we have had many meetings with my colleague, the relations of Greece and the friendly northern neighbor have changed. Relations have been developed between our ministries, between other ministries, our societies. Our economic relations grow, and we have agreed in the context of CBMs contacts between universities. We have an effective cooperation, despite the initial problems, in coping with the refugee (issue) and everyone provides to the other the assistance it can”.⁴⁵

On 29 August 2017, the 6th meeting of CBMs took place in Athens, where among the topics discussed were, reportedly, police cooperation and political

⁴¹ “Quadrilateral Meeting between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM on cross-border cooperation (Thessaloniki, 21-22 April 2016)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/quadrilateral-conference-between-greece-albania-bulgaria-and-fyrom-on-cross-border-cooperation-thessaloniki... (last access 10.05.2018)

⁴² “The discussion focused on the confidence-building measures (CBMs) launched in 2015... and in particular on the results of the latest round of negotiations, which was held in Skopje last month, as well as on the operational follow-up necessary ahead of the upcoming round of negotiations, which is to be held next month in Athens. Mr. Kotzias expressed his satisfaction at the first positive results of the process”. “Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, with the framework of the proceedings of the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Brussels, 20 May 2016)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/fyrom-en/news/foreign-minister-kotzias-meets-with-the-foreign-minister-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-nikola-poposki-with-the...> (last access 10.05.2018)

⁴³ «13-06-2016: Με επιτυχία ολοκληρώθηκε εκπαίδευση στελεχών της Αστυνομίας της πΓΔΜ, σε θέματα προστασίας συνόρων», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27.%27&perform (last access 15.04.2018)

⁴⁴ «Ν. Κοτζιάς: Σημαντική πρόοδος στις διμερείς σχέσεις Ελλάδας – πΓΔΜ», [stokokkino.gr](http://www.stokokkino.gr), 25 August 2016, <http://www.stokokkino.gr/article/1000000000041135/N-Kotzias-Simantiki-proodos-stis-dimereis-sxeseis-Elladas---pGDM> (last access 3.03.2018), also «Στενότερη συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ συμφώνησαν Κοτζιάς και Πόποσκι», tvxs.gr, 25 August 2016, <http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/stenoteri-synergasia-elladas-pgdm-symfonisan-kotzias-kai-poposki> (last access 3.03.2018)

⁴⁵ Ibid

protection.⁴⁶ It was a continuation "of the friendly and constructive dialogue on mutually agreed topics, including connectivity projects in the field of transport and energy, police cooperation, European programs, culture, education, civil protection, public administration, health, diplomatic academies' cooperation and launching business initiatives," the Greek foreign ministry said in a press release.⁴⁷ Two days later, there was a meeting in Skopje between Kotzias and F Macedonia's/FYROM's new Foreign Minister Nikola Dimitrov, where the work of the CBMs was also on the agenda.⁴⁸

On 7 October 2017 the Head of the Greek Police, Konstantinos Tsouvalas met with his Macedonian/FYROM counterpart Lazo Velkovski, in Thessaloniki where a whole range of new cooperation measures was agreed.⁴⁹ On 1 December 2017, the heads of the Fire Brigade and Rescue Forces from Albania (Alfred Kristuli), Bulgaria (Georgi Parmakov), Greece (Vasileios Kapelios- Βασίλειος Καπέλιος) and Macedonia/FYROM (Adnan Dzaferoski) met in the Greek city of Ptolemaida (Πτολεμαΐδα), where "they exchanged views and proposals concerning the existing situation and the prospects of cross-border cooperation, seeking to increase the capacity of the services of the four countries for a timely and effective response, in emergencies relating to natural and

⁴⁶ «Εκτι συνάντησι για τα MOE Ελλάδας-πΓΑΜ στην Αθήνα», NOOZ, 29 August 2017, <http://www.nooz.gr/greece/ekti-sunantisi-gia-ta-moe-elladas-pgdm-stin-a8ina> (last access 5.03.2018)

⁴⁷ Quoted in "Sixth Greek-fYROM meeting on CBMs makes progress on several topics", ANA - MPA, 29 August 2017, <http://www.amna.gr/en/article/182273/Sixth-Greek-fYROM-meeting-on-CBMs-makes-progress-on-several-topics> (last access 5.03/2018)

⁴⁸ Kotzias stated that: "We are discussing the major issues we are facing, the common future of our two states. I am pleased at the very positive results we had on the Confidence-Building Measures at the meeting the day before yesterday, between the large delegations from both sides – 17 members in our delegation and 25 in yours – which shows that the relations between our two countries are developing more intensively than with almost any other neighbour. We will implement all the measures. New railway lines, new pipelines for natural gas. Cooperation between universities. Cooperation between Diplomatic Academies. We talked about the issues of energy, transport, research, police cooperation, and the security of the whole region". "Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Kotzias' statements following his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, N. Dimitrov (Skopje, 31 August 2017)", Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/minister-of-foreign-affairs-kotzias-statements-following-his-meeting-with-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-dimitrov>, (last access 10.05.2018)

⁴⁹ It was announced that "in order to lay new foundations for an enhanced police cooperation, both sides agreed on the need for deepening cooperation" and on the following measures: exchanging operational information "in real time", in order to cope with "serious cross-border crime"; arranging for operational meetings among experts on issues concerning drugs, migration, border management and terrorism; "defining" a Contact Point, in order to materialize the above mentioned decisions and establishing "direct communication"; having regular contacts, at a central level, as well as a regional and local level, between the relevant Authorities; making good use of the existing channels of communications; and capitalizing on all the possibilities provided by the multilateral, European and international, frameworks of cooperation (Europol, Frontex και Interpol). «09-10-2017: Επίσημη συνάντηση του Αρχηγού της Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, Αντιστρατήγου Κωνσταντίνου Τσουβάλα με τον ομόλογό του Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Lazo Velkovski, στη Θεσσαλονίκη», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27.%27&perform, (last access 15.4.2018)

man-made disasters”.⁵⁰ While a few days later, on 18 December 2017, there was a meeting in Thessaloniki among the heads of the police forces of Albania (Rebani Jaupi), Bulgaria (Mladen Marinov) Greece (Konstantinos Tsouvalas) and Macedonia/FYROM (Lazo Velkovski), where they discussed ways of strengthening police cooperation.⁵¹

On 9 February 2018, the 7th meeting of CBMs took place in Skopje, where it was agreed to push forward cooperation in various fields, including police cooperation, while a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperating in political protection was signed.⁵²

The Prespa Agreement, signed on 17 June 2018, incorporates the CBMs and in fact enhances bilateral cooperation in sensitive areas, such as police and defense cooperation. Thus, the agreement stipulates that “The existing CBMs shall be incorporated” (Art. 9, Par. 2)⁵³, while Art. 16 is dedicated to Police and Civil Protection Cooperation⁵⁴ and Art 17 to Defense Cooperation⁵⁵.

III. Expert survey

A sample involving 7 answered questionnaires and two interviews were conducted in a two-month period (April-May 2018). The sample involved police officers (who

⁵⁰ «Τετραμερής συνάντηση των Επικεφαλής των Πυροσβεστικών και Διασωστικών Υπηρεσιών Ελλάδας-Αλβανίας-Βουλγαρίας και ΠΓΔΜ στην Πτολεμαΐδα», Ελληνική Πυροσβεστική, 1 December 2017, https://www.fireservice.gr/el_GR/-/tetrameres-synantese-ton-epikephales-ton-pyrosbestikon-kai-diasostikon-yperesion-elladas-albanias-boulgarias-kai-pgd (last access 15.04.2018)

⁵¹ «18-12-2017: Ολοκληρώθηκαν οι εργασίες της τετραμερούς συνάντησης Αρχηγών των Αστυνομιών της Ελλάδας, της Αλβανίας, της Βουλγαρίας και της π.Γ.Δ.Μ., στη Θεσσαλονίκη», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang= (last access 15.4.2018)

⁵² «Εβδομη συνάντηση για τα MOE μεταξύ Ελλάδας και ΠΓΔΜ», Naftemporiki.gr, 9 February 2018, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1319621/ebdomi-sunantisi-gia-ta-moe-metaksu-elladas-kai-pgdm> (last access 3.03.2018)

⁵³ Full text of the agreement, p. 11 <http://www.pappaspost.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Athens-Skopje-English.pdf> (last access 3.08.2018)

⁵⁴ “1. The Parties shall cooperate closely in the fight against organized and trans-border crime, terrorism, economic crimes, having regard in particular to crime related to the illicit trafficking and/or exploitation of human beings; to crimes related to the production, trafficking and/or trade of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; to the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; to the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property; to offences against civil air transport; and to crime related to counterfeiting and/or smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol or fuels. 2. The Parties shall cooperate closely in the civil protection sector, placing particular emphasis on preventing and dealing with natural and man-made disasters and on disaster relief. Each Party may utilize the special education and expertise of the other Party, and whenever needed and possible each Party shall provide to the other its special infrastructure, particularly in fire-fighting...”, p. 16, *ibid*

⁵⁵ “The Parties shall reinforce and expand their cooperation in the area of defence, including through frequent visits and contacts between the political and military leadership of their armed forces, the appropriate transfer of know-how and capacity-building, the cooperation in the areas of production, information and joint military exercises. Special emphasis shall be placed on personnel training which the Parties could provide to each other”. P. 16, *ibid*

had participated in direct, official contacts and communication between the two sides from August 2015 onwards), advisors in the Ministry of the Interior, two Ministers (Defense and Interior) and one Prime Minister. It should be underlined that most of the answers were provided on the basis of anonymity given both the sensitive area of cooperation involved and the state of bilateral relations at the time of the interviews.

“QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SKOPJE AND ATHENS IN REFERENCE TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS AND ESPECIALLY FOR JHA, ARISING FROM THE CBM AGREED IN 2015 ”
1. What is your general opinion on the relevance of the CBMs?
2. What is your general opinion on the importance of this dialogue? Or why do you think this dialogue is important?
3. How do you assess the dialogue in reference to JHA under the framework of CBMs and what is your concrete experience?
4. Can you detect the main obstacles in the ongoing dialogue in the area of JHA?
5. Can you detect the main facilitating forces of the dialogue in the area of JHA?
6. What is your general opinion on the importance of this dialogue? Or why do you think this dialogue is important?
7. Does the “name-dispute” have any effect upon the ongoing dialogue? What kind of effect does the “name-dispute” have upon the dialogue?
8. Please give an assessment of the results of the dialogue until today?
9. Please provide a comment on the effects of a potential failure in the bilateral negotiations about the “name-dispute”?
10. If the Sides do NOT resolve the “name dispute”, do you think that the dialogue will be stopped or continued irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations?
11. What would be the effects of such negative outcome in reference to regional stability?

Their opinion/assessment was grouped on the following issues:

1. Concerning the CBMs there was universal agreement on their relevance-importance for bilateral relations. As it was underlined, the CBMs are dealing with and solving issues of mutual interest, providing possibilities to develop contacts, increased socialization and eventually building trust between the partners.
2. More specifically, concerning CBM No 10 (on Justice and Home Affairs), it was underlined that the dialogue was particularly important for strengthening cooperation in the area of border security and managing migration flows, essential for the stability of both countries – as it was characteristically put, “criminals and other organizations do not respect borders, nor do they have ethnic, religious or national differences”. The dialogue between the Police forces of the two countries solved many problems and established a climate of trust among them.
3. Concerning the main facilitating forces of the dialogue in CBM No 10, two were mentioned in

particular: the disposition of the governments and interpersonal relations at the level of Police leadership. Another factor that was mentioned was the pressure in favor of bilateral cooperation on the part of the EU.

4. Concerning potential obstacles affecting the dialogue it was argued that the obstacles are not that significant and have no impact on the course of the process”.
5. More specifically, on the effect of the “name-dispute” upon the dialogue most interviewees agreed that it does play a role, as it reduces the available potential. As it was specifically put: I have noticed that when there is significant progress on the “name dispute”, if there is improvement in the atmosphere or the general relations, then the CBM meetings and dialogue can be more substantive”; Concerning the use of the name “Macedonia”, the Greek respondents underlined that “During our meetings we didn’t have any problem with the name... They were very careful (on the use of the name Macedonia). They didn’t wish to undermine the process”.
6. On the results of the dialogue on CBM No 10, it was stated that there is a “drastically improved situation”, and that police co-operation is taking place at a significantly high level.
7. On the potential effects of a failure in the negotiations about the “name-dispute”, the majority agreed that the CBMs in general and the Police Dialogue in particular would continue, albeit with reduced intensity. As it was succinctly argued, “Having in mind that the CBM dialogue was proposed and established at a time when “name dispute” talks where at a stand-still, then it is reasonable to expect that the CBM dialogue will persist even if there is no solution to the name dispute”.
8. During the interviews, one recommendation was pointed out repeatedly, and that is that the level of co-ordination has to be further advanced. Especially, in relation to Home Affairs. It has been stressed that there is necessity to establish, at last, a Joint Center of Co-Operation In the Area of Justice and Home Affairs. This is commonly known as Contact Point, and such ones are already operating between Skopje and Sofia, Tirana, Pristina and Belgrade, or Athens and Sofia.

Conclusion

Since the summer of 2015, there have been concrete indicators that there is a certain paradigm shift in Greek-Macedonian/FYROM relations as governments in both countries have recognized the importance of building good relations. Through the CBMs a noticeable growth of cooperation took place, in areas like police cooperation and border management, while following the change of government in Skopje, in May 2017, bilateral negotiations led to an agreement on the so-called “name-dispute”. Even more noticeable is the fact that Athens and Skopje appeared to have agreed that in case of a failure in the negotiations about the “name-dispute then “discussions should begin on how to strengthen CBMs, in order not to interrupt bilateral relations and the debate about a solution to remain alive”.⁵⁶ Having in mind that both processes - the CBM consultations and the negotiations on the name issue had a positive outcome embodied in the Perspa Agreement, and this especially in reference to Articles 9, 16 and 17 - one can conclude that the friendly relations among “ex hostile” countries are possible, if there is political will to do so. In our specific context, as it was mentioned at the very beginning, the gravitational pool of the common European values and the need for regional stability and security, also have helped to bring Skopje and Athens closer to each other. Although this was initially triggered by the refugee crises itself, both governments have decided to shift their foreign policies in friendly directions and work together in the most sensitive areas.

⁵⁶ Βασίλης Νέδος, «Ο Ζάεφ και τα τέσσερα «αγκάθια», Η Καθημερινή, 7-8 Απριλίου 2018, σ.11

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Books & Academic Articles

- Σπυρόπουλου Γεωργία, Χριστόπουλος Δημήτρης, Προσφυγικό: «Θα τα καταφέρουμε;» Ένας απολογισμός διαχείρισης και προτάσεις διεξόδου, Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκού Συνταγματικού Δικαίου, Ίδρυμα Θεμιστοκλή & Δημήτρη Τσάτσου, Εκδόσεις Παπαζήσης 2016
- Anastasiadou M., Marvakis A., Mezidou P., Speer M., From transit hub to dead end. A Chronicle of Idomeni, Bordermonitoring.eu, Vol 2, January 2018
- Bierman, R., “Zur Bedeutung Freundshaftlicher Verbundenheit in der Politik”, in B.Aschmann(Ed) Gefühl und Kalkül :Der Einfluss von Emotionen auf die Politik des 19 Und 20 Jahrhundert(pp.197-230); Stuttgart: Franc Steiner Verlag, 2005;
- Berenskoetter, F., “Friends, there are no friends? An intimate reframing of the international”, Millennium-Journal of International studies, 35(3), [pp 647-676],2007;
- Digester, P.E. “Public Reason and international friendship”, Journal of International Political Theory, 5(1),[pp.22-40]2009;
- King, P. ” Friendship in politics”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,10(2), [pp.125-145], 2007;
- Koshut, S. & Oelsner, A. (Eds.).“Friendship and international relations”, Basingstoke, U.K.: Plagrove Macmillan, 2014;
- Oelsner, A. & Vion, A. “Special issue: Friendship in international relations “, International Politics, 48(1) [pp1-9], 2011;
- Smith, G.M. “ Friendship and the political: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schmitt”, Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic , 2011a); and in : “Friendship and the world of states “, International Politics, 48(1),[pp.10-27], 2011b.
- Van Hoef, Y. “Friendship in world politics: Assessing the personal relationships between Kohl and Mitterrand, and Bush and Gorbachev ”AMITY: the journal of Friendship Studies, 2(1), [pp.62-68]2014.
- Berenskoetter, F and Hoef V. Y. “ Friendship and foreign policy” ; Oxford University Press[subject : World politics; Online Publication Jul, 2017; DOI: 10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190228637.013.429] <http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-429>

Newspaper article

- Βενιζέλος Ευάγγελος, «Προσφυγικό και Εθνικά Θέματα», Η Καθημερινή, 3 January 2016, <http://www.kathimerini.gr/844380/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/prosfygiko-kai-e8nika-8emata> (last access 03.3.2018)
- Καπετανοπούλου Νίκη, «Η συμμαχία των Δυτικών Βαλκανίων», efsyn.gr, 25 February 2016, <http://H%20συμμαχία%20των%20Δυτικών%20Βαλκανίων%20%20%20H%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2018)
- Μοσχονάς Κώστας, «Ευρω-εκβιασμός: «χωματερή ψυχών» ή εκτός Σένγκεν», efsyn.gr, 4 December 2015, <http://Ευρω-εκβιασμός%20%20«χωματερή%20ψυχών»%20ή%20εκτός%20Σένγκεν%20%20%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html>, last access 20.05.2015)
- Νέδος Βασίλης, «Ο Ζάφ και τα τέσσερα «αγκάθια», Η Καθημερινή, 7-8 Απριλίου 2018, σ.11

- Τέλλογλου Τάσος, «Επιστροφή «μαχητών» στα Βαλκάνια», Η Καθημερινή, 29 November 2015, <http://Επιστροφή%20«μαχητών»%20στα%20Βαλκάνια%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2018)
- Φαλάτς Άννα, “Stratfor: Η Ελλάδα αποδιοπομπαίος τράγος της προσφυγικής κρίσης”, 29 January 2016, <http://www.euro2day.gr/specials/topics/article/1394866/stratfor-h-ellada-apodiopompaios-tragos-ths-profy.html> (last access 3/3/2018)
- «Εβδομη συνάντηση για τα ΜΟΕ μεταξύ Ελλάδας και ΠΓΔΜ», Naftemporiki.gr, 9 February 2018, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1319621/ebdomi-sunantisi-gia-ta-moe-metaksu-elladas-kai-pgdm> (last access 3.03.2018)
- «Εκτε συνάντηση για τα ΜΟΕ Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ στην Αθήνα», NOOZ, 29 August 2017, <http://www.nooz.gr/greece/ekti-sunantisi-gia-ta-moe-elladas-pgdm-stin-athina> (last access 5.03.2018)
- «Η Ουγγαρία κλείνει τα σύνορα με Κροατία», Η Καθημερινή, 17 October 2015, <http://Η%20Ουγγαρία%20κλείνει%20τα%20σύνορα%20με%20Κροατία%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2018).
- «Η ΠΓΔΜ ελπίζει ότι η προσφυγική κρίση θα τη φέρει πιο κοντά στο ΝΑΤΟ», Αθήνα 9.84 FM, 10 March 2016, <http://www.athina984.gr/2016/03/10/i-pgdm-elpizi-oti-i-prosfygiki-krisi-tha-ti-feri-pio-konta-sto-nato/> (last access 3/3/2018)
- «Η προσφυγική κρίση ενίσχυσε τις σχέσεις της ΠΓΔΜ με την Ελλάδα», Naftemporiki.gr, 3 April 2016, <http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1088752/i-prosfygiki-krisi-enisxuse-tis-sxeseis-tis-pgdm-me-tin-ellada> (last access 3.03.2018).
- «Θρίλερ με τους πρόσφυγες που πέρασαν στην ΠΓΔΜ», ANT1 News, 15 March 2016, <http://www.ant1news.gr/news/Society/article/438630/thriller-me-toys-prosfyges-poy-perasan-stin-pgdm> (last access 3.03.2018)
- «Οι περιορισμοί δημιούργησαν χάος στη «βαλκανική οδό», Η Καθημερινή, 20 October 2015, <http://Οι%20περιορισμοί%20δημιούργησαν%20χάος%20στη%20«βαλκανική%20οδό»%20%20%20Κόσμος%20%20%20Η%20ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ.html> (last access 20.05.2015)
- «Μεγκένη» Σένγκεν για να αλλάξει... ρότα», efsyn.gr, 3 December 2015, <http://«Μέγκενη»%20Σένγκεν%20για%20να%20αλλάξει...%20ρότα%20%20%20Η%20Εφημερίδα%20των%20Συντακτών.html> (last access 20.05.2018)
- «Ν. Κοτζιάς: Σημαντική πρόοδος στις διμερείς σχέσεις Ελλάδας – ΠΓΔΜ», stokokkino.gr, 25 August 2016, <http://www.stokokkino.gr/article/1000000000041135/N-Kotzias-Simantiki-proodos-stis-dimereis-sxeseis-Elladas---pGDM> (last access 3.03.2018)
- «Στενότερη συνεργασία Ελλάδας-ΠΓΔΜ συμφώνησαν Κοτζιάς και Πόποσκυ», tvxs.gr, 25 August 2016, <http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/stenoteri-synergasia-elladas-pgdm-symfonisan-kotzias-kai-poposki> (last access 3.03.2018)
- “Јолевски повика за прием на Македонија во НАТО за да се зацврсти стабилноста на Балканот”, Vesnik, 11 March 2016, <https://vesnik.com/makedonija/jolevski-povika-za-priem-na-makedonija-vo-nato-za-da-se-zacvrsti-stabilnosta-na-balkanot> (last access 20.05.2018)
- “Јолевски: Македонија ќе продолжи да делува конструктивно во бегалската криза”, SITEL, 15 April 2016, <https://sitel.com.mk/jolevskimakedonija-kje-prodolzhi-da-deluva-konstruktivno-vo-begalskata-kriza> (last access 20.05.2018)
- “Јолевски очекува покана за членство во НАТО на наредниот самит”, DW.com, 02 April 2016, <http://www.dw.com/mk/јолевски-очекува-покана-за-членство-во-нато-на-наредниот-самит/a-19160224> (last access 20.05.2018)
- Delcker Janosh, “The phrase that haunts Merkel”, Politico, 19 August 2016, <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-phrase-that-haunts-angela-merkel/> (last access 20.3.2018).

Demiri Nada Ghandour Demiri, «Η προσφυγική κρίση στην Ελλάδα», Heinrich Boll Stiftung 17 Νοεμβρίου 2015, <https://gr.boell.org/el/2015/11/17/i-prosfygiki-krisi-stin-ellada> (last access 3.3.2018)

Farmer Ben, “Russia plotted to overthrow Montenegro's government by assassinating Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic last year, according to senior Whitehall sources”, The Telegraph, 19 February 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/russias-deadly-plot-overthrow-montenegros-government-assassinating/> (last access 10.08.2018)

Nedos Vassilis, “Greece decides to expel Russian diplomats”, eKathimerini-com, 11 July 2017, <http://www.ekathimerini.com/230551/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-decides-to-expel-russian-diplomats> (last access 15.07.2018)

Yohannes Mihret, “Angela Merkel welcomes refugees to Germany despite rising anti-immigrant movement”, The Washington Times, 5 September 2015, [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/10/angela-merkel-welcomes-refugees-to-germany-despite/...](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/10/angela-merkel-welcomes-refugees-to-germany-despite/) (last access 5.3.2018)

Hopkins Valerie, “What Happened in Macedonia, and Why”, The Atlantic, 28 April 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/macedonia-parliament-zaev-nationalist-violence-eu-europe/524733/> (last access 10.08.2018)

“Kosovo's President, Belgrade Willing To Consider Border Changes”, RFE/RL's Balkan Service, 7 August 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-s-president-belgrade-willing-to-consider-border-changes/29417481.html> (last access 10.08.2018)

“Sixth Greek-fYROM meeting on CBMs makes progress on several topics”, ANA - MPA, 29 August 2017, <http://www.amna.gr/en/article/182273/Sixth-Greek-fYROM-meeting-on-CBMs-makes-progress-on-several-topics> (last access 5.03.2018)

Marusic,S.J & Qafmolla,E. BIRN “Calm Returns to Devastated Macedonian Town” <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/calm-in-macedonian-town-after-weekend-shootout>(last access 13.09.2018)

Press releases of the Greek Foreign Ministry (chronologically ordered)

“Joint statements of Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias and the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, following their meeting (Athens, 17 December 2015)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint-statements-of-foreign-minister-nikos-kotzias-and-the-foreign-minister-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-nikola...> (last access 10.5.2018)

“Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Foreign Minister of FYROM, Nikola Poposki, on the margins of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (Brussels, 18 January 2016)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/news-announcements/foreign-minister-kotzias-meets-with-the-foreign-minister-of-fyrom-nikola-poposki-on-the-margins-of-the-eu...> (last access 10.05.2018)

“Quadrilateral Meeting between Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and FYROM on cross-border cooperation (Thessaloniki, 21-22 April 2016)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/quadrilateral-conference-between-greece-albania-bulgaria-and-fyrom-on-cross-border-cooperation-thessaloniki... (last access 10.05.2018)

“Foreign Minister Kotzias meets with the Foreign Minister of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nikola Poposki, with the framework of the proceedings of the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Brussels, 20 May 2016)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/fyrom-en/news/foreign-minister-kotzias-meets->

with-the-foreign-minister-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-nikola-poposki-with-the... (last access 10.05.2018)

“Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Kotzias' statements following his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, N. Dimitrov (Skopje, 31 August 2017)”, Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/minister-of-foreign-affairs-kotzias-statements-following-his-meeting-with-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-dimitrov>, (last access 10.05.2018)

Press releases of the Greek Foreign Ministry (chronologically ordered)

- «25-02-2016: Επίσημη συνάντηση του Αρχηγού της Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, Αντιστρατήγου Κωνσταντίνου Τσουβάλα με τον ομόλογό του Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Goranco Savovski, στη Θεσσαλονίκη», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, 25 February 2016, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27 (last access 15/4/2018)
- «13-06-2016: Με επιτυχία ολοκληρώθηκε εκπαίδευση στελεχών της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ, σε θέματα προστασίας συνόρων», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform (last access 15.04.2018)
- «09-10-2017: Επίσημη συνάντηση του Αρχηγού της Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, Αντιστρατήγου Κωνσταντίνου Τσουβάλα με τον ομόλογό του Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της π.Γ.Δ.Μ. Lazo Velkovski, στη Θεσσαλονίκη», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform, (last access 15.4.2018)
- «Τετραμερής συνάντηση των Επικεφαλής των Πυροσβεστικών και Διασωστικών Υπηρεσιών Ελλάδας-Αλβανίας-Βουλγαρίας και Π.Γ.Δ.Μ στην Πτολεμαίδα», Ελληνική Πυροσβεστική, 1 December 2017, https://www.fireservice.gr/el_GR/-/tetrameres-synantese-ton-epikephales-ton-pyrosbestikon-kai-diasostikon-yperesion-elladas-albanias-boulgarias-kai-pgd (last access 15.04.2018)
- «18-12-2017: Ολοκληρώθηκαν οι εργασίες της τετραμερούς συνάντησης Αρχηγών των Αστυνομιών της Ελλάδας, της Αλβανίας, της Βουλγαρίας και της π.Γ.Δ.Μ., στη Θεσσαλονίκη», Αρχηγείο Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας, http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=(last access 15.4.2018)

Other

- “Strengthening Mutual Confidence and Bilateral Relations. Athens-Skopje”, Skopje, 24 June 2015, also <https://a1on.mk/archives/504624>
- The Prespas Agreement. Full text of the agreement, p. 11 <http://www.pappaspost.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Athens-Skopje-English.pdf> (last access 3.08.2018)
- “Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route: Leaders Agree on 17-point plan of action”, European Commission - Press release, Brussels, 25 October 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5904_en.htm (last access 10.3.2018)

GEO-ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANSION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES

Dragan TRIVAN¹

Abstract: *The expansion of transnational/multinational companies is one of the key features of economic development at the national, regional, and global level in the period after WWII. It is estimated that 25% of world production and about 40% of global exchange occurs within transnational corporations. In addition, they are currently the greatest direct investors. Cross-border business expansion creates numerous advantages in both fiscal planning, as well as in the areas of governance and management, corporate finance, strategic planning, management control and finance oversight, investment and business results of dependent companies. Access to financial markets, currency exchange control, dispersion of risk, economy of scale use, competition surpass, masking of the ownership structure and deliberate choice of jurisdiction of the court are only few of the advantages that multinational companies achieve. The importance of contemporary transnational corporation for world economy is enormous, and the decisions these company make, impact the lives of millions of people. The activities of the international conglomerate cause a number of economic, geopolitical, and security issues, including tax avoidance and other obligations, and wide spread corruption. In addition, there is evident suppression of local firms from the market, as well as pushing national economies in dependable status on imports and foreign investments. Cross-border activities of the transnational corporations often have a criminal character, causing vulnerability of human rights and environmental damage, and also lead to an exploitation of labor in their foreign subsidiaries. Finally, the business operations of these corporations in certain situations raise a question of the state sovereignty in those countries where corporations have its branches, including sometimes internal crisis incitement.*

Keywords: *transnational company, economy, security implications;*

Introduction

In the absence of generally accepted definitions, the term transnational corporations mostly implies business companies that have legal domicile in more than one country and which commercial activities have a significant impact on the economy of the residential/home country, as well as, in the countries where they operate/host countries (Pitelis & Sugden, 2000, 72 pg.). When defining multinational corporations, the following several elements are

¹ The author is a Professor at the Faculty of Business Studies and Law, Belgrade

taken into consideration: the existence of the parent company that achieves ownership, thus, controls and manages business operations and production abroad, through its branches located in several countries; the effort towards production, marketing, finance and other affairs policy, that surpass national boundaries and contribute to the realization of the corporation's geocentric orientation. However, in current practice, in a number of international documents, and even among the theorists, multinational and transnational companies, and in recent times, global entrepreneurship, are used almost as synonyms (Schaffer et al., 2017. 2-3 pg.).

Transnational companies may be in a certain way considered as a reaction to the state monopolistic capitalism with its protectionism and interventionism, i.e. a form of corporations' adaptability to the changed conditions of operations in national and international frameworks. The contradiction between the social character of production and private appropriation of work results once led in state-monopoly capitalism, as a way to mitigate these contradictions, the same principle, in the second half of the 20th century, affecting the formation of multinational companies, which through business globalization and internationalization of transfer are looking for ways for reproduction of the traditional capitalist modes of production in the changed circumstances. Accordingly, international concentration of capital (along with the 3rd technological revolution) has developed into an international centralization, which is characteristic of the post-industrial information society (Hart-Landsberg, 2013, 10-11 pg.).

Transactional corporation functioning is related to the competitive advantage owned by those who have global production and distribution networks. This advantage comes from the vertical and horizontal integration of a head company and its international subsidiaries. The majority of multinational companies through vertical integration ensures the supply of foreign raw materials and bypasses all of the imperfections frequently seen in foreign markets. This way provides a better distribution network. Through horizontal integration with its subsidiaries abroad, these corporations are in a position to use and protect its monopoly position, adapt their products to local settings and tastes and ensure a consistent product quality. Huge outputs allow multinational companies much better specialized production and labor division in comparison to smaller domestic companies. Also, these corporations have an easier access to the international capital market, which enables a position where larger projects can be funded. Finally, the branch offices secretly send to headquarters of transnational companies' relevant business information, facilitating better assessment of the market conditions (Distler, 2016, 65 pg.).

The IT revolution has strengthened the production potential, dynamics, flexibility, profitability, and competitiveness of transnational companies, allowing and encouraging their unstoppable global expansion. Corporations can seamlessly locate its drives and manage them anywhere in the world and relocate to the places with the lowest manufacturing costs - particularly in "the third world countries", with inexpensive labor force, lower or no taxes at all, and with lower environmental standards (Schutz, 2015. 30-31 pg.).

Global production networks in transnational frameworks have provided the opportunity to large corporations such as Volkswagen, Nike, Reebok, General Motors, and others, to organize production, distribution, and marketing of their products at the universal level. This approach helps multinational corporations avoid confrontation with the national union organizations that would work to protect the interests of local employees in regard to minimum guaranteed wage and working conditions (Woodley, 2015, 105-106 pg.).

In order to overcome possible conflicts and unfair competition between multinational corporations on one, and domestic companies or countries, on the other hand, there have been efforts in the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations in the last few decades to adopt certain rules of conduct of transnational companies. Hence, in 1975, the

UN and UNCTAD established the Commission and the Centre for transnational corporations, while the OECD in 1976 adopted Guidelines for Multinational Companies (innovated 2011).

I. The Global Impact of Transnational Companies and the Implication of its Cross-Border Activities

Some Indictors of Transnational Corporations Power

In regards to the global trend of transferring economic and political power from the national government and its institutions to multinational corporations and the business world in general, the annual report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – UNCTAD states that around 61,000 transnational companies are operating in the world today, with more than 500,000 subsidiaries abroad and about 89 million employees (UNCTAD, 2017, 31-32 pg.). One of the indicators of this trend is the amount of capital that is concentrated in and around corporations. For example, the multinational company BP (formerly British Petroleum Company) has a higher annual income from Finland GDP (BP, 2018), and Chevron Corporation of the GDP of Ireland (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2017). Also, the annual income of 200 major transnational corporations exceeds the total GDP of 182 countries of more than 80% of the world population (Chapman et al 2016, 119-122 pg.).

The list of the world's most powerful transnational companies, traditionally posted in Fortune magazine (Hense, 2018), shows that the top 10 according to annual revenue in 2017 were: Walmart (\$ 500-billion in revenues), State Grid (\$ 349 billion in revenues), Sinopec Group (\$ 327 billion in revenues), China National Petroleum (\$ 326 billion in revenues), Royal Dutch Shell (\$ 312 billion in revenues), Toyota Motor (\$ 265 billion revenue), Volkswagen (\$ 260 billion in revenues), BP (\$ 244.5 billion in revenues), Exxon Mobil (\$ 244 billion in revenues), Berkshire Hathaway (\$ 242 billion in revenues).

When it comes to transnational companies in Southeast Europe, according to the annual analysis of SEENews, the top 10 on the list of 100 largest by revenue in 2016 were: Automobile Dacia (Romania – € 4.6 billion in revenues), Petrol d.d. (Slovenia – € 3.2 billion in revenues), OMV Petrom Marketing SRL (Romania – € 3.2 billion revenues), OMV Petrom SA (Romania – € 3.1 billion in revenues), Lukoil Neftochim Burgas (Bulgaria – € 2.3 billion in revenues), Kaufland Romania SCS (Romania – € 2.1 billion in revenues), INA d.d. (Croatia – € 2 billion in revenues), Rompetrol Rafinare SA (Romania – € 2 billion in revenues), Rompetrol Downstream SRL (Romania – € 1.8 billion revenues) and British American Tobacco Trading SRL (Romania – € 1.8 billion revenues). It is interesting to note that the oil industry of Serbia AD, which was in previous years regularly among the top 10 transnational corporations in South Eastern Europe, dropped to 15th place (Krasteva, 2017, 4 pg.).

The Influence of Multinational Corporation in National Economies of the Host Countries

The expansion of transnational companies has created a variety of legal and ethical issues: the ownership issue, harmonization of legal regulations of the states where corporations conduct their businesses, equating the prices in different countries, the competition between large businesses and the creation of oligopolies, the formation of prices that may adversely affect the economic balance of the country where the branches of the corporation are located, the mismatch between legal norms and local customs, environmental issues, and others.

Regarding the impact of transnational corporations on the economic stability in the hosting countries, theory inclines towards the definition of the general national risk as a set of different risks in the context of transnational corporations' investments in a particular country (Simmons, 2007. 28-29 pg.). In this sense, the key components of the risk of an individual country for business and investments can be divided into two groups: components with possible quantification and evaluation (economic risks, financial risks and risks related to the exchange rate), and components of a qualitative nature and assessment of a complex nature (political risks, cultural risks, risks related to the legal framework of the country, regional risks and systemic risks related to global crises).

Neoliberal mechanisms allow transnational companies to simply and without limitations and protection of domestic production enter the market of national economies, and to undermine and colonize them. This is reflected through the economic submission of national states, human rights violations, endangering the democratic legitimacy of the political system, corruption, tax evasion, endangering the environment (Giddens, 2006. 55-56 pg.).

Transnational corporations are able to create serious issues in the home country, as well as in the countries where they have their branches. First of all, it is about the loss of jobs. This particularly affects the unskilled and half-skilled workers, and all the branches in the country of origin that have no comparative advantages, so that the industrial branches are starting to slowly shut down. For this reason, the union organizations in the countries that export capital are openly opposing the outflow of foreign direct investment. The problem for the home country is also the export of advanced technology that in a later production when combined with cheaper factors of production is used abroad in order to maximize corporate profit. In this respect, it is suggested that this may jeopardize technological superiority, and the national interests of the countries where the headquarters of transnational companies are located. For these reasons, corporations generally tend to concentrate research and development in the home country. Possible detrimental effects of transactional corporations in the home countries come from transfer prices and similar practices, as well as the relocation of business operations in countries with lower tax rates, which reduces the tax revenues of the home countries (Kolk, 2016. 30-31 pg.).

When it comes to the countries where multinational companies do business through its subsidiaries/branches, the problems are more pronounced and drastic in practice. The greatest negative consequence is that these corporations attain a dominant position in the local economies. Foreign domination in the host country is felt in many ways, including the refusal of local subsidiaries of transactional companies to export to countries that the home countries consider hostile, or pressuring the host country to accept the laws of the home country which prohibit the export to certain countries. Also, these corporations incline towards direct financing from abroad, if interest rates are too high over there (to avoid tight domestic monetary policy) as well as placing money abroad, if the interest rates in the host country are too low. For a country in which transnational companies do business, the harmful consequences are reflected in the outflow of funds for research and development in the home country; the country of corporation's origin causing greater technological dependence of the host country. Multinational companies are able to gain maximum benefit from their investment, either through tax and customs benefits, and/or through tax evasion. In developing countries, where the investment of transnational corporations mainly aim at the sectors for extracting ores, raw materials and minerals, the host countries are exploited – through low rent, using too much capital-intensive equipment which does not correspond to countries with larger labor force, insufficient training of the workers, and excessive exploitation of natural resources (Omoteso and Yusuf, 2017. 62-63 pg.).

Although in the late 20th century the different types of transnational corporation investments in developing countries reached almost 210 billion dollars annually, these investments did not significantly contribute to the improvement of the economic position of the poor countries which are insufficiently prepared and lack the necessary capacity to win a better position on the global market with their own national resources.

With respect to its role in the national economy of the host countries, transnational companies gained a special position by controlling the key branches of the economy of these countries. They are able not only to break the unity of the domestic economy – linking the most developed and most important part of the economy with foreign centers – but also to cause instability in the economy, and carry out economic, and if necessary, political subversions. This is a logical consequence of the domination of foreign capital in newly independent and poorly developed countries, in which that capital is not under the control of the national government but is mostly the other way around (Doddoli and Maradei, 2005. 13 pg.). Even when there are national laws that govern the activities of the corporations, these rules are often inadequate or do not apply to multinational companies.

Different Forms of Illegal and Criminal Activities of Transnational Companies

The strict corporate orientation to make profit, without looking at other factors in the surrounding, has often made corporations throughout history war profiteers and factual co-conspirators in war crimes. A typical example is the business cooperation between the largest American corporations and the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler, particularly in the period 1937 – 1941, when the building of the war machinery of the Third Reich was constructed. Hence, the German automaker Adam Opel AG, owned by General Motors Corporation, then turned into drive for the production of arms and military equipment.

The most important products were military trucks, including the triton "Opel blitz", which was a key advantage in the "lightning war" against Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. In addition, in Adam Opel AG factories, engines and other aircraft parts for Luftwaffe – Nazi war aviation were manufactured. The American corporation IBM played a similar role when responding to the Top Nazi by delivering the Third Reich so-called Helerite electric machines, precursors of today's computers. The aforementioned devices, that used punched card data processing, were primarily run in the concentration camps in Germany and in areas occupied by the Nazi. IBM was not only the seller of these machines, but they also provided their technical support, and IBM engineers trained German personnel to use the devices. Multiple sources confirm that the IBM owners and management were completely aware of what their machines were used for (Black, 2002, 48-49 pg.). Finally, for the purpose of sustaining the Hitler regime until December 1941, when the United States declared war on the Third Reich, Ford Werke company, a subsidiary of the US Corporation, Ford Motor, worked on the production of trucks and other vehicles for the German Army (Bakan, 2005. 89-90 pg.).

And in recent times, there are various examples of criminal actions of transnational companies, that used the war conflicts for gaining illicit profit. Thus, the British television network BBC, researching on the basis of data obtained from government sources in Iraq and USA, in June 2008, found that during the five-year military campaign by the Western allies in Iraq, more than 23 billion USD was embezzled or stolen from that country. Although a number of US corporations were called for responsibility on these grounds, and more than 70 investigative procedures were initiated, the top US government prevented further processing, so that neither of these companies has been brought to court for embezzlement or fraud during the intervention in Iraq (Cray, 2003).

The operations in Iraq created an opportunity for war profiteering to many transnational corporations, which did great lucrative jobs in the country devastated by the war conflicts. In this way, the private military corporation and equipment supplier for the United States Military, CACI International Inc. received the exclusive right to perform insurance services for people and property in Iraq. In 2003, Bechtel Corporation closed a contract worth 2.4 billion on rebuilding the devastated Iraqi infrastructure without

announcing a tender. By 2006, the costs of this project increased to 14.6 billion dollars. The Bechtel company was then pulled out of Iraq, while infrastructure rebuilding was not completed. The US Corporation Custer Battles was the first company in renewed Iraq prosecuted for fraud. In fact, in 2006 the Court in Baghdad ordered the company to pay \$10 million USD in compensation for 37 cases of fraud, including delivery of defective military equipment, and misrepresentation of bills and accounts. The verdict was quickly withdrawn, saying that the temporary coalition Government in Iraq is not part of the American legal system, and that an Iraqi court could not process the trial for acts committed in that territory. General Dynamics Corporation, which was a major supplier of all types of ammunition for the US Department of Defense since the start of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 tripled its profit. Finally, the oil corporation Chevron and Exxon Mobil from 2006 almost completely took over the production and export business of Iraqi oil (Cray, 2006).

Multinational corporations often do the so-called "predatory dumping", which involves selling products below the cost of production or below its market value abroad to drive out domestic competitors of the competition. After that, the price increases in order to gain the advantage of monopoly positions. Also, transnational companies use "sporadic dumping" - occasional sale of products below its market value, or below its value in the domestic market, in order to discharge the unnecessary and temporary surpluses of products without dropping any domestic prices (Plahutnik, 2002. 13 pg).

There is a widespread notion that many transnational corporations from the EU Member States, in an effort to expand their business into new markets, implement discriminatory practices towards consumers in the Western Balkans, by exporting to these countries products of recognizable brands, same names and packaging, but with inferior quality compared to those sold at the EU market. They are primarily food products, which declarations indicate that their structure is not identical to the products made for the customers in the European Union Member States.

It is considered that the activities of multinational corporations play a significant role in global warming and climate change. In addition, on a global level, there is noticeable expansion of environmental crime, i.e. actions committed with the intent of causing damage to the environmental and/or biological systems for the purpose of gaining the business lead. Areas of illegal activities, in which transnational companies are involved, inter alia, include woodcutting and trade of forest materials, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste, and trade of substances that damage the ozone layer.

A number of transnational corporations are involved in illegal importation and illegal production of food that is genetically modified. It should be noted that the methods of genetic engineering, often sponsored by powerful multinational companies, such as Monsanto, Sandoz, Aventis, Novartis and many others, in the last couple of decades have created a so-called chimeric constructs, or unnatural combinations of structural and regulatory genes, which often originate from completely unrelated organisms, thus achieving a complete bypass of all the biological limits of the species. According to

some surveys (Pellegrino et al, 2018), genetically modified plant species are grown today in 26 countries of the world, where there is a continuous increase of the total area covered in these cultures (1.75 million hectares during 1996 compared to 185 million hectares or 12% of the world surface in 2016). The rapidly expanding application of this technology has raised discussions to unprecedented scale at the international level, which has created a deep gap in the scientific community, influential corporations and other big commercial food producers, consumer unions, various interest groups, non-governmental organizations, and the political and government elites in many countries.

The list of 13 most hated transnational corporations in history, which in June 2010, in consultation with a group of prominent historians, was published by the notable online magazine Newsweek/The Daily Beast, headquartered in New York City created a resounding echo in the international community (Merrefield and Streib, 2010). The list consisted of: Standard Oil (monopoly abuse); Union Carbide (poisoning of tens of thousands of people in India); Exxon (responsibility for the ecological catastrophe near Alaska); United Fruit Company (political corruption); International Telephone & Telegraph (bribery affair with political officials and involvement in demolishing democratic government in Chile); British Petroleum (an environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico); Microsoft (abuse of monopolistic position); Goldman Sachs (investment fraud); Nestle (poisoning African babies with milk powder); Blackwater (rape and killings of civilians in Iraq); Monsanto (responsibility for ecological disaster); Halliburton (war profiteering) and Drexel Burnham (large-scale stock fraud).

Geopolitical and Security Implications of the Global Multinational Corporations Power

Up to the 70s of the 20th century, the growing power of transnational corporations was somewhat neutralized by developed national legislation, unions' activities, and various social programs. The globalization processes have since played their role, so that the national political interventions in economy became less viable. A specific cause of why such policy was compromised was the worldwide oil crisis in 1973 that caused a dramatic unemployment rate, inflation, and recession in many countries. Responding to this, the leading western countries have again adopted the concept of neoliberalism, removing thus all current administrative barriers to multinational corporations. In addition, the unexpected progress in the field of communications and transport made them more mobile and independent from national jurisdictions. In this context, Clive Allen, Vice-President of Nortel Network, a leading Canadian company in the field of high technology, once gave an illustrative statement that the company did not owe anything to Canada: and that "just because the Nortel Network was founded in Canada does not mean that it will stay there - the place has to be attractive to us to make us decide stay there" (Bakan, 2005. 22 pg.).

Multinational corporations were undoubtedly suited with the General Agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) from 1948, which caused a global drop in tariff rates. The

establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 was of even greater importance for the global dominance and growth of power of transnational companies. What is characteristic of this organization is the consistent representation of the concept of internal economic deregulation and the abolition of all restrictions in international trade, which is fully in compliance with the interests of global corporations (Hertz, 2002. 82-84 pg.).

The sudden rise of the contemporary transnational corporations coincides with the situation in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Since then, these companies have started to spread: “vertically”, – increasing their manufacturing capability and size, and “horizontally” – expanding to the new markets.

The globalization processes have, inter alia, contributed to deepening the gap between the rich and the poor, further increasing the power and influence of multinational corporations, and suppressing some of the basic elements of social heritage - the “welfare society”. In such an environment, the leading world economies established political and financial establishments that have corporate support and thus achieve their financial and political goals. Disregarding the needs of the majority, this not sufficiently transparent elite contributed to the current global financial crisis.

Despite their power and flexibility, it has been shown that even multinational corporations are not immune to global shocks, such as the global economic crisis in 2008. In the following few years, more than half of the world's largest companies declined in profit and close to 40% of them failed to achieve even a return of 10%, which is considered a basic example of creating any value. The reasons for the decrease in performance of many transnational corporations in the last decade are numerous, from the introduction of the new regulations and antimonopoly laws by national governments, to further development of technology and market changes (Steger, 2013. 108-109 pg.). However, the root of the problem may be another, more pronounced trend – the gradual step away from global, integrated economy towards independent, national economies. However, because of the national economy dependence on the operations of multinational corporations, it would be difficult to imagine a more radical change of these relations in the near future.

In a world dominated by transnational corporations and their political supporters, a number of neuralgic points, along with conflicts occasionally getting out of control have been created. Noteworthy examples are the great migrant crisis in Europe in 2015, the expansion of international terrorism with inadequate response, and the intensification of the relations between the West and the Russian Federation, which has acquired some of the characteristics of a renewed “Cold War” era.

As a reaction to the behavior of the current world's political and corporate elite, a kind of core of resistance groups, impersonated primarily in the extreme right or left political movements and organizations has emerged. Moreover, in recent years they have appeared in the political decision-making processes in a number of countries, including a number of EU Member States.

National economic turbulences, often linked to political crises, have brought in recent decades the citizens of poor countries to the brink of existential survival. This means that the entire society is pauperized by all criteria, whereby a number of states are at risk of bankruptcy. Poverty is increasingly a global issue not only in developing countries but also in the developed industrial countries, some of which significantly shrink on the global scale, as the continuing of these trends, associated with increased threats and risks brought about by environmental damage, demographic and migration problems, uncontrolled exploitation of economic resources and the like, may have a negative impact on global security in the future.

Conclusion

One of the key features of globalized world is the increasing role of transnational companies. In this regard, we should bear in mind that the free flow of capital and goods increases profits as the most important incentive and business objective of the corporations in the last half century and as such it has been further protected and encouraged by national legal frameworks and global applications of the measures adopted by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Accordingly, the accepted rules and regulations of the free market have enabled multinational corporations enough freedom and space to act without geographical and national restrictions, so that today, instead of the expression "International Economy" the term "Multinational Economy" is more often heard.

Transnational corporations had a very important role in the transformation of world economy in recent decades, in different properties and roles: as actors of international trade, investment promoters and promoters and carriers of new technology, new dynamics, linking and exchanges between the earlier weakly connected markets.

To achieve maximum profit, multinational corporations tend to affect the vital areas of individual and social life in the host countries and control all areas of resource consumption, production of goods, services, and capital more aggressively.

The privileged position of the transnational corporations distort market relations against national companies and the economy in the following ways: tax breaks, that lead to unfair competition at the expense of the local businesses and national economy; lobbying and corruption, bribery of the government and political elite; conditioning investments; fraud in the privatization process; acquisition of domestic companies under real market value; exploitation of cheap labor force.

Multinational corporations significantly impact the economic-political orientation and the pace of economic and overall-social development of the host countries where they operate, often preventing their adequate participation in the international division of labor and submitting these countries to their own business strategy. On that note, we should bear in mind that national governments control the territory; transnational corporations cannot, but their capital can control the political power in each individual country. The national states are in a position to legitimately have military force and enforce the law. Corporations have no such opportunities but are pushing for the development of an international legal system that would have mechanisms to control the institutions of the national states.

The current development of geopolitical relationships in the world refers to the possibility of partial redefining of the models of international free trade as we know it, so as the globalization in present form, including trade wars as well, and the strengthening of the aspirations towards

national economies. It will certainly not mean the end of multinational corporation and cross-border investment capital, but a possibility that these forms of entrepreneurship will be forced to adapt to new terms, which would lead to a certain decrease in global commodity exchange and a slowdown in leading economies, by following the trend of shortening the distribution chain.

REFERENCES:

- Pitelis, C. & Sugden, R. 2000. *The Nature of the Transnational Firm*. London: Psychology Press.
- Schaffer, R., Agusti, F. & Dhooze L. 2017. *International Business Law and Its Environment*, Fifth Edition. Boston MA: Cengage Learning.
- Hart-Landsberg, M. 2013. *Capitalist Globalization – Consequences, Resistance, and Alternatives*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Distler, J. 2016. *Acquisitions by Emerging Multinational Corporations*. Wiesbaden DE: Springer Gabler.
- Schutz, A.E. 2015. *Markets and Power – The 21st Century Command Economy*. New York: Routledge.
- Woodley, D. 2015. *Globalization and Capitalist Geopolitics – Sovereignty and State Power in a Multipolar World*. London: Routledge.
- UNCTAD 2017. *World Investment Report 2016*. New York & Geneva: UNCTAD.
- BP. Who we are. [Internet]. Available at: http://www.bp.com/en_gb/united-kingdom/who-we-are.html. Accessed: 16.07.2018.
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2018. *Chevron Corporation 2017 Annual Report (Form 10-K)*. Washington DC. [Internet]. Available at: <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000009341018000010/cvx12312017-10kdoc.htm>. Accessed: 27.07.2018.
- Chapman, S., Holborn, M., Moore S. & Aiken, D. 2016. *AQA A Level Sociology, Book 1*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Hance, D. 2018. A ranking of the biggest companies in the world by revenue. New York: Fortune. Available at: http://www.fortune.com/video/2018/07/19/2018-fortune-global-500-the-top-ten/?iid=recirc_g500landing-zone2. Accessed: 28.07.2018.
- Krasteva, N. (ed). 2017. *Top 100 Companies South East Europe*. Sofia: SeeNews.
- Simmons, C. 2007. *Risk Management*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Giddens, A. 2006. *Sociology (5th edition)*. Malden MA: Polity Press.
- Kolk, A. 2016. The social responsibility of international business: From ethics and the environment to CSR and sustainable development. *Journal of World Business*, 59 (3), pp. 23-34.
- Omotoso, K. & Yusuf H. 2017. Accountability of transnational corporations in the developing world: The case for an enforceable international mechanism. *Critical perspectives on international business*, 13 (1), pp. 54-71.
- Bakan, J. 2005. *The Corporation – The Patological Pursuit of Profit and Power*. New York: Free Press.
- Doddoli, L. & Maradei, M. 2005. *Svijet poslije drugog svjetskog rata (knjiga 3)*. Split: Marjan tisak.
- Black, E. 2002. *IBM and the Holocaust – The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America's Most Powerful Corporation*. New York: Crown Publishers.

- Cray, C. 2003. Time to Stop Iraq War Profiteers. Washington DC: Corp Watch. [Internet]. Available at: <http://www.corpwatch.org/artice/its-tme-stop-war-profiteers>. Accessed: 01.08.2018.
- Cray, C. 2006. The 10 Most Brazen War Profiteers. Washington DC: AlterNet. [Internet]. Available at: <http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/41083/>. Accessed: 04.08.2018.
- Plahutnik, A. 2002. Konkurenca, Monopol in povezane ter prijateljske družbe: Gradivo za Borzni fokus. Ljubljana: Ljubljanska borza.
- Pellegrino, E., Bedini, S. & Nuti M. 2018. Impact of genetically engineered maize on agronomic, environmental and toxicological traits: a meta-analysis of 21 years of field data. Scientific Report 8. Springer Nature. [Internet]. Available at: <http://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-21284-2>. Accessed: 10.08.2018.
- Merrefield, C. & Streib, L. 2010. History's 13 Most Hated Companies. New York: The Daily Beast. Available at: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/06/22/the-most-hated-companies-everhow-did-bp-score.html>.
- Hertz, N. 2002. The Silent Takeover – Global Capitalism an the Death of Democracy. New York: Free Press.
- Steger, B.M. 2013. Globalization – A Very Short Introduction. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.

THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS: HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES

Andrej ILIEV¹

Jovan ILIEV²

Abstract: *Europe and the world today are facing the worst migrant crisis since the Second World War. The reasons that led to this are diametrically different: fleeing from war sufferings, seeking a better life, leaving non-functional states to escape from various types of extremism and terrorism. The escalation of the migrant crisis began with subsequent changes and revolutions in the Arab world known as the "Arab Spring" and the Middle East wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. As a result of the escalation of the migrant crisis, European Union and Southeast Europe have faced a number of challenges that require immediate action for protection of their security.*

The migrant wave moves towards Western Europe as their ultimate destination for securing their lives and finding the basic economic conditions to survive, they pass through a great number of countries of South Eastern Europe. On this migrant journey, the Republic of Macedonia is one of the main transit countries on the Balkan Route. The migrant crisis with its characteristics has immediate negative effects on the economies of the countries, affecting the demographic structure and containing the capacity to jeopardize the security in the countries of the European Union and Southeast Europe.

The war in Syria began in 2011, and even then, a large number of Syrian people moved to nearby states in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt. As a consequence of the geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East and the intervention of the Islamic State the situation in Syria, in the spring of 2013, escalated in a civil war which became more brutal, and the wave of refugees became more intense.

As a consequence of the migrant crisis, the security problem has come to the fore, which reflects the real picture that the European Union is not sufficiently prepared to organize and oppose the emerging problems. On the contrary, disadvantaged states themselves and individuals were organized, each in their own way, which also created difficulties for mutual relations between certain neighbouring countries, as is in the case with the Republic of Macedonia.

From the summer of 2015 till today, the Republic of Macedonia, including all state institutions and organizations, intensively undertook, and still undertakes, a number of measures and activities for preventing the threats and consequences from the migrant crisis. All this actions are in the line with maintaining the security of the state and the security of all its citizens which live in the Republic of Macedonia.

¹ Associate professor in Social science department in Military academy "Gen. Mihailo Apostolski", Skopje

² Military academy "Gen. Mihailo Apostolski", Skopje

Keywords: *migrant crisis, crisis management, leadership, security crisis, integration strategy;*

Introduction

The migrant crisis is a consequence of many years of transition processes in the Middle East and North Africa within the so-called “Arab Spring”. These processes in Syria and Libya resulted in civil war, but also caused instability and humanitarian crises in neighbouring countries, especially in Turkey and Libya, where the largest migrants centre.

The Middle East is the region with the highest number and fiercest conflicts in the last few decades³. As a result of these conflicts, the great number of people which left the region for economic reasons is negligible in terms of the number of people who escaped from war, destruction, repression, persecution, terror and other violations of human rights and international humanitarian law⁴.

From the many crises and conflicts in the Middle East that have resulted in the emergence of large groups of migrants and internally displaced persons in the last few decades, the crises and wars on the territories of Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria can be separated as the most critical. Several successive and prolonged wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria brought the Middle East into a situation that could be defined as a humanitarian disaster.

During the war in Iraq there were no precise data on the number of migrants, but it was estimated that about 2 million Iraqis fled to neighbouring countries and about 2.5 million remained internally displaced persons in Iraq. Of those who fled to neighbouring countries, about 1 million people went to Syria and about 500,000 in Jordan. The rest went to Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Turkey and other Gulf countries. In this refugee crisis, around 137,000 people left for Europe from March 2008. The inflow of 2 million Iraqi migrants created socio-economic pressure in Syria and Jordan resulting in public discontent and demographic changes that could impair the security of these countries over a longer period of time⁵. Additionally, the poor conditions in which refugees live make them vulnerable to light influence and mobilization from various radical Islamic groups.

Prior to the war in Syria, the migrant crisis in the Middle East characterized the poor socio-economic conditions of parts of the population and the great instability of the region. This instability has been fuelled by a large number of conflicts that arise for various social, cultural and economic reasons all the time.

For example, different religious affiliation and nationalism were an inexhaustible source of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and inside Muslim conflicts - wars between the Shias and the Sunnis. The rivalry between these two Muslim groups has appeared as early as the seventh century after the emergence of Islam, and this rivalry is the cause of the vast majority

³ A Bonine, M. E., Amanat, A., & Gasper, M. E. (Eds.). (2012). *Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 342.

⁴ Kamrava, M. (2013). *The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 572-5900)

⁵ Wehrey, F., Kaye, D. D., Watkins, J., Martini, J., & Guffey, R. A. (2010). *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East after the Iraq War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Pg.95-97.

of casualties in a large number of conflicts in the Middle East, but also for the displacement of a large number of people⁶.

Such a complex security situation in the Middle East was further complicated during 2011 when a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and armed rebellions emerged and spread not only in the Middle East, but also in North Africa. Such events are known as the Arab Spring⁷. The violence in these events caused the occurrence of casualties and the displacement of a larger number of people and they were felt in a growing number of countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Sudan, Syria, Libya and Morocco⁸. The overthrow or weakening of the existing, mostly totalitarian regimes on the one hand, and the weak security systems of newly-formed governments, on the other hand, led to the conditions for the expansion of terrorist and radical militant Islamic groups in most of the region. These terrorist groups, most commonly linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, pose a threat to the security of the entire region and are responsible for the vast number of victims, suffering and displacement of people.

All of the previously mentioned organizations and events in their own way influenced the creation of a situation in which a huge number of people became concerned about their lives and sought a safe place of residence to ensure their survival and basic economic conditions for survival. However, until the war in Syria, the displacement of the population was largely regional and dominated by internally displaced persons⁹. The admission of the largest exporter of migration to Europe before the war in Syria was held by the African continent.

In the early spring of 2011, after the rise of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Syria, where there were similar socio-economic conditions such as high unemployment, dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation in the majority of the population, poverty, as well as dissatisfaction with the ruling elite's rule of very high level of corruption, encouraged the majority of the population to launch protests against the current state and government.

Syrian opposition in this period was divided and uncoordinated, without a general and effectively recognized leadership. On the other hand, the Syrian regime began to receive support from significant regional and world powers, such as Iran and Russia. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made only some formal changes in order to win the favour of the Kurdish population and the moderate Islamists in Syria, but did not accept any essential demands of the protesters and responded with massive operations, torture and murders of those who did not agree with him¹⁰. This situation made the protesters form groups and start arming themselves with the goal of overthrowing the regime with armed rebellion¹¹. In a short time, a full civil war broke out with the participation of thousands of rebel groups with different agendas.

The conflict began in March 2011, and the first exodus of the population from Syria began immediately after the start of the conflict. By the beginning of 2012, the conflict in Syria

⁶ Christofer M. Blanchard. (January 28,2009).Islam: Sunnis and Shiites.CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service. pp.1-6

⁷ Gelvin, J. L. (2012). The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know? New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 5-10.

⁸ Philippe Fargues. Christine Fandrich. (09.2012). Migration after the Arab Spring. European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 22.

⁹ The global refugee crisis. (June 2015). A conspiracy of neglect. Amnesty International. pp.1-34.

¹⁰ Haas, M. L., & Lesch, D. W. (Eds.). (2012). the Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Pg.81-95.

¹¹ Gelvin, J. L. (2012). The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know? New York: Oxford University Press. Pp.93-119.

intensified, and the displacement had also rapidly increased. Strong artillery rocketing increased both the number of refugees and the number of internally displaced persons¹². Since mid-2012, the Syrian refugee crisis had steadily increased, rising 10 times in the next 12 months. According to UN estimates by October 2012, around 30,000 people were killed; nearly 400,000 Syrians fled to neighbouring countries and about 1.2 million had been internally displaced people¹³. According to the UNHCR estimates given in early September 2013, about one million refugees left Syria during the first two years of the crisis, and another one million left the country in the last six months¹⁴.

People were massively displaced due to war crimes that took place on the ground, severe violations of international humanitarian law that included liquidation, arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful attacks on civilians, raids, attacks on protected objects, robberies, destruction of property and other monstrous affairs. Military actions destroyed the economy and ravaged the basic living conditions, so the demand for basic living and living conditions became one of the reasons for population displacement¹⁵.

Although a large dispersion of various rebel and terrorist groups in the country, Sunni groups linked to al-Qaeda, such as Al-Nusra and the radical Sunni Islamic State group, which occupied much of the territory of Syria were founded and expanded to great extent¹⁶. In the spectrum of diversity and intolerance, there are also Kurds who have suffered great traumas in the fighting of Kurdish rebels with ISIS, especially in the surroundings of the city and in the city of Cowbane in northern Syria. It was this sectarian nature of the conflict that gave it its specific cruelty and uncompromising nature with traits of monstrosity. Neighbouring countries and countries in the region have been supporting different parties in the conflict, depending on their religious affiliations, and large powers such as Russia, China and the United States have found favourable geopolitical interests on the territory of Syria.

The bulk of these migrants have been found in Turkey, the smaller part in other neighbouring countries, and a huge number are heading to EU countries daily to find a safe place to live and favourable conditions for economic survival. On the road to the EU, the most important route for their movement is the so-called "Balkan Route" on which the territory of the Republic of Macedonia is located. The large number of people who are moving, fleeing and migrating for any reason poses a threat to the security of the countries they transit and the countries that represent their final destination. This type of threat should be understood as a broader framework that can include humanitarian disasters, economic challenges, phenomena of resource and energy shortages, social and cultural misunderstandings and problems, inability to integrate migrants into new societies and their non-acceptance from the environment, to the inability to physically provide the space where there is so much that can lead to conflict and instability.

¹² Dr.Simon Adams. (March 2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council. Occasional Paper Series No.5.Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Pp.1-32.

¹³ Roland Popp.(November 2012). The Syrian Civil War: Between escalation and intervention. CSS Analysis in Security Policy.No124. Centre for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich. Pp.1-4.

¹⁴ Elizabeth Ferris. Kemal Kirisci. Salman Shaikh. (18.September 2013). Syrian Crisis: Massive Displacement, Dire Needs and Shortage of Solutions. pp.65-70.

¹⁵ Gucturk, Y. (2015). War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Syria. Insight Turkey, 17(1), p.27.

¹⁶ Refuge&Hope in Time of ISIS: The Urgent Need for Protection, Humanitarian Support, and Durable Solutions in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece. (January 2015). A Report of the Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. pp.1-40 (<http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-policy/upload/Refuge-and-Hope-in-the-Time-of-ISIS.pdf>)

1. Impact of the migrant crisis on the Republic of Macedonia

The current refugee crisis that began several years ago and has reached its peak in 2015 has a major impact, affecting countries that are the final destination, but also countries that are considered as transit countries, here we can include the countries from where migrants themselves come from. In this migrant crisis, two types of migrants were included, some were forced out of the Middle Eastern areas and the other group represented economic migrants, mostly coming from the African region.¹⁷ In addition to occupying more space, a characteristic of the migrant crisis is that it covers a wide range of exercising its influence that extends from the impact on personal safety of people, through an impact on social security and an impact on the national security of the states. At the same time, this has indisputable influence on the economy of the countries and the demographic image of the spaces.

In 2015 and in the first months of 2016, the Republic of Macedonia faced a large number of refugees and migrants who transited through its territory on the way to the northern and western European countries. The influx of migrants had at least two important dimensions that ordered taking emergency measures - the humanitarian dimension and the security dimension of the problem¹⁸. From a humanitarian point of view, there is an urgent need to ensure safe passage through the territory of Republic of Macedonia for migrants determined to reach selected countries in North and West Europe, as well as to provide clear and simple procedures for granting asylum for migrants wanting to seek asylum in the Republic of Macedonia.

From the viewpoint of national security, it was necessary to establish control over the entry and exit points of migrants (mainly entering and leaving the territory outside the legal international border crossing points) by applying appropriate registration procedures. Except for the purposes of border control (as one of the essential aspects of national security), application of such registration procedures was also necessary for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance, as well as for reducing the risk of exploitation of migrants by regional networks for human trafficking - consequently, due to the safety of migrants themselves.

The effects of the migrants crisis on the Republic of Macedonia have been statistically processed in the Survey Study of the Parliamentary Institute in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, published in July 2016¹⁹. This investigation

¹⁷ Elizabeth Collett, Camille Le Coz. After the storm - Learning from the EU response to the migrant crisis, June 2018, Migration policy institute, Brussels, pp.3-7.

¹⁸ Martina Smilevska, Emerging Challenges in Response to the Refugee Crisis The state of the Macedonian asylum system, MYLA, February 2015. Available at: <http://myla.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2015-Emerging-Challenges-in-Response-to-theRefugee-Crisis-2015-1.pdf>, pp. 3-5.

¹⁹ Алдијана Ахметовиќ. Ефектите на мигрантската криза во земјите од Југоисточна Европа - студија, Парламентарен институт, Скопје, 2016, 12-15. The document was prepared in the frames of the project "Establishment and Development of the Parliamentary Institute" of the Assembly of the

covers the period between 19 June 2015 (the starting date for the application of the amended asylum legislation) and 7 March 2016 (the date of closure of the so-called “Balkan Route” for refugees and migrants). Also, with the Operational UN portal, we gave the exact number of total transits of migrants through the territory of Macedonia from 2015 to 2018.

The total number of migrants which entered the Republic of Macedonia in the period between 2015 and 2018 and were registered according to the procedures determined in the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection²⁰ is 707,873 persons²¹. The vast majority of migrants originated from the Middle East and Central Asian countries that are engaged in wars or are facing serious security problems - Syria (275.312), Afghanistan (133.847) and Iraq (83.734 persons)²². Apart from them, there were also significant numbers of migrants and refugees from other Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries and territories. Detailed data on the number of migrants by countries and territories of origin are given in Table 123.

Table 1: Total number of migrants who entered the Republic of Macedonia between 2015 and 2018, by countries of origin:²⁴

State	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Syria	216,157	44,734	7578	6843	275 312
Afghanistan	95,691	26,546	6155	5455	133 847
Iraq	54,944	18,337	5853	4600	83 734
Iran	6,231	N/A	N/A	416	6647

Republic of Macedonia, co-financed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation with advisory support of the National Democratic Institute. <https://www.sobranie.mk/content/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%20%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%82/Efektite%20na%20migratskata%20kriza%20vo%20zemjite%20na%20JIE%20-%20MK.pdf>

²⁰ Published in the “Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia”, no. 49/2003, 66/2007, 142/2008, 19/2009, 146/2009, 166/2012, 54/2013, 101/2015, 152/2015, 55/2016 and 71/2016.

²¹ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), data closed with 30.10.2018 year, accessed on 02.11.2018 year

²² Source: daily briefings published on the official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. <http://www.mvr.gov.mk/granichni-premini> (Flow of passengers in the period 2010-2017 year - migration)

²³ Survey Study of the Parliamentary Institute of the Assembly on Republic of Macedonia, July 2016.

²⁴ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), data closed with 30.10.2018 year, accessed on 02.11.2018 year

The vast majority of migrants that entered the Republic of Macedonia continued their journey through the so-called “Balkan Route” to the selected countries in North and West Europe. Of the total number of 707,833 registered migrants found on its territory between 2015-2018, only 126 persons decided to apply for asylum in the Republic of Macedonia. More detailed data for these applicants, according to their countries and territories of origin are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Total number of migrants who applied for asylum in the Republic of Macedonia between 2015 and 2018, by countries of origin:²⁵

State	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Syria	56	22	3	2	83
Afghanistan	13	7	2	2	24
Palestine	4	0	1	0	5
Iraq	3	0	1	0	4
Pakistan	3	0	0	0	3
Algeria	2	0	0	0	2
Lebanon	2	0	0	0	2
Morocco	2	0	0	0	2
Egypt	1	0	0	0	1
Total	86	29	7	4	126

The migrant crisis is a threat for many aspects of social life and already has an impact on the economic and social security, as well as internal security in countries through which migrants transit or remain, including the Republic of Macedonia, via the Balkan route used to arrive in the Schengen zone, especially in Germany, Sweden and other Western and Nordic states.

Economic stability, which is a key for social stability and also for internal security would be affected by the use of additional resources and facilities (housing, health, communal services, transport and education) of the countries concerned, including the Republic of Macedonia²⁶. Our country has ratified many international conventions and instruments such as the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and its Protocol (1967) in January 1994. An important legal document is the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection that guarantees the right to social protection of migrants, as well as the conditions and procedures according to which a foreigner in the Republic

²⁵ UN Operational portal for Refugee situation (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>), data closed with 30.10.2018 year, accessed on 02.11.2018 year

²⁶ David E.Bloom, David Canning, and Günther Fink.(January 2011).Implications of Population Aging for Economic Growth. PGDA Working Paper No.64. pp.1-39

of Macedonia has the right to apply for asylum. The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection²⁷ was enacted in 2003 and since then several amendments have been made. The Sector for Asylum and Migration at the Ministry of Interior is the responsible body for the implementation of this law, while the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is responsible for the social protection and accommodation of asylum seekers.

This law stipulates that a successful application for asylum can be approved only if the person is recognized in the refugee category. Furthermore, before the final decision is made in the procedure for recognition of their legal status, asylum seekers have access to “free legal aid, accommodation, residence, basic health care in accordance with the health insurance regulation, the right to social protection under Law on Social Protection, the right to education according to national legislation for primary and secondary education”.

Also, at national level, the protection of migrants is guaranteed by the Family Law and the Law on Social Protection and other relevant regulations and legal documents. After the large number of refugees who have passed through the country since June 2015, the Macedonian government has brought new legislation in response to the refugee crisis. Among the first legally adopted documents during this situation were the Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with unaccompanied and separated children adopted in November 2015. The SOPs goal is to protect unaccompanied children in the receiving and transit centres by taking steps to identify, refer and protect their rights as a particularly vulnerable category.²⁸

Some of the refugees use only Macedonia as a transit route on their way to European countries. But the number of those who decide to stay and seek asylum in Macedonia is increasing. For starters, the refugee problem will be an additional burden for the economy of our country. Next, it will cause general discomfort in society, which will create a moment of growing xenophobia. Growing tensions would also include fear of crime. Thefts of food, clothing and other essentials for life products could not be avoided. In such times, organized crime cannot be excluded, such as trafficking in human beings. If we follow the example of Syrian migrants in Lebanon that produce hashish in order to survive, drug trafficking would not be excluded²⁹.

Looking further into the aftermath, we can add to the Syrian epidemic of polio. Infantile paralysis is transmitted by contaminated food or water, and in October the epidemic among children in Syria after 14 years of eradication has been confirmed³⁰.

²⁷ Published in the <http://www.pravdiko.mk/zakon-za-azil-i-privremena-zashtita/>

²⁸ Survey Study of the Parliamentary Institute of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, July 2016.

²⁹ Hala Kerbage, Ramzi Haddad. Lebanon drug situation and policy, Council of Europe, Brussels, 2014, pp.12-15. <https://rm.coe.int/drug-situation-and-policy-by-hala-kerbage-psychiatrist-at-hotel-dieu-d/168075f2a9>

³⁰ Silvana ONCHEVA, Margarita SPASENOVSKA, Scientific Labour, HEALTH ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS WITH MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, Skopje, 2016

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), disease is likely to spread from Pakistan, one of the three countries in the world where it is considered an endemic. They also warn that Syrian epidemics can become a threat to millions of children in the Middle East³¹. Infantile paralysis is easily transferred from person to person and spreads rapidly among children, especially in non-hygienic conditions where millions of people live in Syria, a war-torn country in the past 4 years, as well as in migrant camps in neighbouring countries.

2. Response of the Republic of Macedonia in accordance with the challenges of the migrant crisis

“The Republic of Macedonia has done a lot when it comes to dealing with the challenges posed by the refugee crisis, even more than some European Union member states”. This was pointed out by the President of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, in front of the media in Ohrid, after the meeting with his host, President of Macedonia Gjorgje Ivanov.

In order to provide adequate responses to all these dimensions of the refugee and migrant crisis, the Republic of Macedonia has taken a number of measures - by amending the legislation and by applying appropriate mechanisms of migration policy, relying on its own resources and cooperation with a large number of countries within and outside the region of Southeast Europe.

In 2015, the Republic of Macedonia faced a large number of migrants which transited through its territory on the way to the northern and western European countries. The limited capacities of the institutions involved, the state faced a situation where it could hardly adequately respond and on 18 September 2015, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted a Decision declaring a crisis situation on the territory of the southern and northern state border³², due to the increased volume of entry and transit of migrants across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia³³.

Upon adopting such a decision, a 25-kilometer cable rail was installed on the southern border, which was later reinforced with another additional line, and at the very border, after 10 years of reform and the introduction of the border police, members of the military were deployed as well as police officers from some European countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.

Presently, the situation in the Republic of Macedonia is secure. Border crossings with Greece and the Republic of Serbia are open and waiting to cross the border is

³¹ The public health dimension of the European migrant crisis. (January 2016). Briefing. European Parliament. pp.1-8. www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573908/EPRS_BRI%282016%29573908_EN.pdf

³² Government of the Republic of Macedonia: Decision on the existence of a crisis situation due to increased volume of entry and transit of migrants across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia (Published in the “Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia” No. 141/2015)

³³ Stenographic notes from the 70th meeting of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, held on 18 September 2015, p.2-7.

no longer than usual. The parts of the border line where migrant transited have been spotted and are under enhanced control of the security forces, allowing an optimum and uninterrupted passage in accordance with our national and international legislation and human rights protection declarations.

In coordination with the national bodies, the Macedonian Red Cross, UNHCR and other numerous organizations, the Republic of Macedonia, within its capacities, provides a humane treatment of refugees. The control of the border line with Greece and the Republic of Serbia has been stepped up, and as a result of the decision of the Government on Republic of Macedonia to declare a crisis situation among these border lines due to the increased influx of migrants and the need for maintaining peace and stability on a national basis.

So far, the Republic of Macedonia has taken a number of steps and measures in solving this global problem. It implemented amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, enabling migrants to decide whether to apply for asylum or leave the territory of the Republic of Macedonia within a period of 72 hours. This resulted in creating two temporary shelters in Gevgelija and Tabanovce for assistance on migrants.³⁴

The most important change in legislation whose sole aim was to mitigate the impact of the refugee and migrant crisis is the amendment of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection of 18 June 2015³⁵. This amendment allowed the “legalization” of the status of refugees and migrants that transit through Republic of Macedonia, providing a legal basis for their presence on its territory, as well as the use of public transport and humanitarian aid. Namely, before the entry into force of this change in the legal framework, the refugees and migrants entering the territory on Republic of Macedonia (especially those who did it outside the legal international border crossings) have only one legal opportunity to apply for asylum in Republic of Macedonia.

Given their clear intentions to reach the countries of North and West Europe as their preferred destination, it is obvious why only a small number of them have chosen this option.³⁶ Especially in circumstances when entering the Republic of Macedonia from the territory of Greece - a member state of the European Union and a signatory to the Schengen Agreement. Instead of applying for asylum, they choose to cross illegally through the territory of Republic of Macedonia. As a direct consequence of their illegal status in Republic of Macedonia, they were unable to use any kind of public transport, forcing them to transit through the Macedonian territory on foot, away from the main

³⁴ Prof. Dr. Jove Kekenovski, Scientific Paper entitled “The Republic of Macedonia - Collateral Damage to the Inconsistent Policy and EU Unpreparedness to Address a Refugee Migrant or Victim of Not Having a Strategy to Tackle Such Challenges”, March 21, 2016, Skopje

³⁵ Published in the “Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia” No. 101/2015.

³⁶ Olga Koshevaliska, Borka Tushevska Gavrilovikj, Ana Nikodinovska Krstevska. (March 2016). Migration Crisis: Macedonia on crossroads. Migration at sea, International Law perspectives and regional approaches. ed. Ana Nikodinovska Krstevska, Borka Tushevska Gavrilovikj. Giannini Editore. Napoli. pp 75

roads and using mainly the Thessaloniki-Skopje railway line as an orientation vehicle. In the harder parts of the route (narrow gorges, bridges and tunnels), migrants and refugees used the railway line not only as an orientation tool, but as the only possible path that led to a number of unfortunate on the railway line with fatal consequences. Moreover, illegal status of migrants has made them easier prey for thieves and trafficking groups.

The amendment to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection of June 18, 2015 provides an adequate response to these observed problems. Provide additional legal opportunities for migrants and refugees who transit through the territory of the Republic of Macedonia - except for the possibility to apply for asylum, migrants now have the opportunity to declare their intentions to seek the right to asylum. Such a statement may be submitted to the appropriate border authorities or elsewhere on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Following such a statement, refugees and migrants receive a certificate that allows them to stay legally on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia within 72 hours. Within that period, they can either submit a real asylum request on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia or continue the journey along the western Balkan route, using all available public transport types.

Apart from the described legal changes, the Republic of Macedonia has adopted a number of policy measures provided for by the existing legislation, mainly in the context of the crisis management mechanisms. In this sense, on August 19, 2015, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted a decision on the existence of a crisis situation³⁷ along the southern and northern border of the Republic of Macedonia. In accordance with this decision, the Crisis Management Centre activated its headquarters and adopted an Action Plan for Prevention and Management of the Entry and Transit of Migrants across the territory on Republic of Macedonia. Moreover, this decision enabled the army to provide adequate assistance to the police forces in their efforts to secure the borders and control the entry of refugees and migrants on the territory on Republic of Macedonia.

This decision of the Government was later approved by the Assembly, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the crisis management legislation. According to the decision of the Parliament, the duration of the crisis situation was extended until 15 June 2016³⁸. Later, it was further extended to 31 December 2017³⁹. In addition to providing the basis for granting military assistance to the police in the process of securing borders, declaring the crisis has made it possible to mobilize additional human and technical resources in the effort to manage the transit of refugees. Such mobilization enabled the establishment of transit migrant camps along the southern and northern border, where migrants were provided with the necessary humanitarian

³⁷ Government of the Republic of Macedonia: Decision on the existence of a crisis situation due to the increased volume of entry and transit of migrants across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 141/2015)

³⁸ Published in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 162/2015.

³⁹ Published in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 59/2016.

assistance. In addition, the construction of a temporary physical barrier (two-layered fence) along the southern border, which significantly reduced the possibilities for uncontrolled and unregistered crossing of the border between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece, was made possible.

During the efforts to ensure effective management of the refugee and migrant crisis from 2015/2016, the Republic of Macedonia has established close cooperation with a number of countries of Southeast Europe, especially those located along the so-called “Balkan Route” (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia), with the Visegrad Group countries (Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland) as well as with the EU External Border Management Agency (FRONTEX)⁴⁰.

The most important aspect of this cooperation was the close cooperation between the police forces of these countries, which included not only sharing information regarding the transit of refugees and migrants, but also providing assistance from the police force of most of these countries to the national police of the Republic of Macedonia in its efforts to secure its southern border. The police assistance included technical assistance (including various donations of necessary equipment) and staff assistance (providing personnel for the establishment of joint patrols along the southern border of the Republic of Macedonia).

The Government of the Republic of Macedonia is currently submitting a Proposal for a Strategy for the Integration of Refugees and Foreigners in the Republic of Macedonia from 2017 to 2027⁴¹. The new strategy also takes into account global migration trends and their impact on the possible needs and expectations regarding local integration capacity. The comprehensive policy for integration into the strategy is formulated in a way in order to act at the entry point, at the very beginning of the asylum procedure, without delay and without wasting valuable time, which can be better invested in the preparation for integration, such as attending classes in Macedonian language or Preparatory instruction for enrolment in a regular school. The initial phase for the development of individual integration plans is already in the reception centre for asylum, where early integration measures should be implemented.

Local integration is one of the three possible “durable solutions” for refugees envisaged in the new strategy. Other durable solutions include voluntary return to the country of origin and resettlement in a third country. Local integration is important for people who cannot return to the country of origin in the foreseeable future. It is based on the assumption that refugees will remain in the country of asylum and will find a lasting solution to their situation in that country. It is a way to enable refugees to restore their lives, enable them to become self-sustaining and create a new life as members contributing to the host society.

⁴⁰ Frontex at Glance. (2015). FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. pp.1-18

⁴¹ <http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/predlog-zakoni-2017.nspix>

Local integration is a complex and gradual process that consists of separate but related legal, economic, social and cultural aspects and imposes considerable demands on the individual and the host society (UNHCR)⁴². It is important to realize that integration requires a long-term commitment, both by refugees and by the host society. The strategy is aimed at the integration of persons who, in accordance with the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, have the status of belonging to any of the following groups:

- Persons with recognized refugee status;
- Persons under subsidiary protection⁴³;
- Asylum seekers, as beneficiaries of early integration measures, and
- Foreigners with regulated residence in the Republic of Macedonia.

The strategy takes into account that the time before the end of the asylum procedure can be used as a productive time when, at this early stage, the asylum seeker can participate in certain educational and professional training programs that will assist them in the later stages of the integration process. In accordance with the Law on Employment of Foreigners⁴⁴, asylum seekers also have access to the formal labour market and can apply for obtaining work permits. The new strategy builds on the results achieved by 2016, where important lessons have been learned about providing support to refugees in order for them to become independent members of the Macedonian society. In order to further improve the integration system and address the remaining strategic shortcomings, the new ten-year strategy focuses on the following objective:

1. Strengthening the integration system through capacity-building measures and partnerships that encourage local participation and interactive communication;
2. Development of sustainable early integration measures;
3. Realizing sustainable and long-term housing solutions that promote integration into society and avoid ghettoization;
4. Achieving educational goals in order to strengthen integration in the society and promote sustainable employment;
5. Providing employment opportunities for the purpose of strengthening the independence of

⁴² Marilyn Achiron. Nationality and Statelessness. A handbook for Parliamentarians, UNHCR, 2005, pp.17-24.

⁴³ http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/zakon_azil_izmeni.pdf: “A person under subsidiary protection is a foreigner who does not qualify as a recognized refugee, to which the Republic of Macedonia will recognize the right to asylum and will allow them to remain within its territory because there are strong reasons to believe that if they are returning to the country of which they are citizens or if they a stateless person in their country of previous usual residence they will face the real risk of suffering serious injuries “.

⁴⁴ Law on Employment and Work of Foreigners, OP on RM, No 217 from 11.12.2015, pp.3-4.
http://www.mtsp.gov.mk/content/pdf/zakoni/Zakon_vrabotuvanje_stranci_21715.pdf

the target group and avoiding its dependence on social protection;

6. Achieving optimum results by linking integration measures and acquiring citizenship;
7. Introducing innovative models for optimizing the results of local integration in all sectors.

In order to develop the measures and steps for the implementation of the new strategy for integration of refugees and foreigners in the Republic of Macedonia, the following key issues of integration have been set as an integral part of the strategy:

- Early integration,
- Housing and accommodation,
- Education,
- Employment and training on vocational skills,
- Prospects for naturalization and integration (obtaining citizenship, family reunification).

In the Republic of Macedonia, a general and public debate is underway on the draft strategy for integration of refugees and foreigners, and it is necessary to adopt it in the Assembly on the Republic of Macedonia.

Conclusion

From the many crises and conflicts in the Middle East that have resulted in the emergence of large groups of migrants and internally displaced persons in the last few decades, the crises and wars of the territories of Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria can be separated as the most critical. Several successive and prolonged wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria brought the Middle East into a situation that could be defined as a humanitarian disaster.

Due to the increasing number of migrants coming primarily from Syria and Afghanistan, the EU member states, as well as the candidate countries for EU membership from the Western Balkans, primarily the Republic of Macedonia, have faced the biggest crisis in the recent history of Europe. The intensification of the migrant wave towards the EU in 2015 initiated more serious challenges, especially in terms of its institutional and operational functionality. In addition, the crisis has triggered serious dilemmas and internal divisions between member states, both in terms of the integration approach towards already arrived migrants, as well as the necessary instruments for closing the active transit routes and for preventing new mass migrations and asylum claims on the territory of the EU, the SEE countries including our country.

This is why, at the beginning of the crisis, the EU and the Republic of Macedonia did not demonstrate a quick, clear and efficient response. On the contrary, they were mainly based on the national activities and measures of Member States that ran from the open door policy (German Chancellor Angela Merkel's approach), to the closing of borders and building wiretaps for their protection (the approach of Hungary, which was then applied by the Balkan countries). None of the listed approaches could totally eliminate the crisis. In March 2016, the EU presented a concrete and more dimensional response.

The effects of wire fences were seen after their installation. The number of migrants who transited through the Republic of Macedonia in 2015 was 477,876 persons, 173,450 in 2016, 29,718 in 2017 and 26,789 persons in 2018. The numerical indicators have given these results: the number of migrants in 2015 in relation with 2016 decreased by 2.76 times, 2016 compared

to 2017 by 5.84 times, 2016 compared to 2018 by 6.48 times. Comparing 2015 year with 2018 year the number of migrants which have transited through Macedonia decreased by 17.84 times.

With this we can absolutely confirm the hypothesis of this paper that the wire fences and international assistance and support in resolving conflicts and crises in the Middle and Middle East are the key dependent variables and indicators for overcoming the migrant crisis and creating a possibility for the returning of migrants in their native countries.

Turkey is the initial and main transit base for the largest number of migrants, whose implementation should ensure effective resolution of the crisis. The agreement is important from several aspects: the determination of the EU to provide adequate protection in accordance with the international legal norms for refugees; making a distinction between people with refugee status and migrant status; the determination of simultaneous action in the direction of closing migrant routes, the integration of the refugees arriving, the return of those who are not subject to protection in accordance with the refugee and migrant status principles or which pose a security risk; the dislocation of refugees and migrants from Greece to Turkey and the prevention of a new wave of migrants. Parallel to this, in order to eliminate causes of the crisis, the EU and Turkey have committed themselves to a common approach to security stabilization and post-conflict peace-building in Syria. In this way, the EU manifested its determination to seriously respond to the most serious crisis which they faced in the last 25 years.

Negative phenomena such as: increasing criminality “among migrants”, “by migrants” and “towards migrants” and the increasing number of incidents of migrants involving the police and the local population, should be prevented by increasing the number of physically present military-police forces in the area where migrants are moving and staying, especially larger groups and waves of migrants, in order to ensure the sense of security in both, migrants and the local population. The occurrence of infiltration of various terrorist and radical groups in migrant populations in order to abuse and jeopardize the overall security of countries that represent transit countries for migrants, can only be prevented by strengthened action by the intelligence and security services of the transit countries and countries where migrants are staying and by intensifying the cooperation between them for the purpose of timely exchange of information on possible threats.

In the Republic of Macedonia, the migrant crisis could cause a serious security crisis, although the humanitarian and religious political implications are felt on a daily basis. In this situation, the Republic of Macedonia must be responsible and control its own borders, precisely register migrants in accordance with the national and European regulations and maintain good foreign policy and diplomatic relations with its neighbours.

REFERENCES:

- Migration and refugee governance in the Mediterranean: Europe and International organizations at a Crossroads, by Sarah Wolf, London, 2015.
- Mediterranean flows into Europe. Refugees or Migrants, Manuela Roman, London, 2015.
- Migration after the Arab Spring, Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich, Oxford university Press, 2012.
- Economic crisis and austerity in Southern Europe: Threat or opportunity for a sustainable welfare state, Maria Petmesidou and Anna Guillen, 2015.
- Migration and Integration Common Challenges and responses from Europe and Asia Regional Economic Issues, November 2015

Migration crisis in the Mediterranean

Guy Halsall: *Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West*. Cambridge 2007.

Walter Pohl: *Die Völkerwanderung. Eroberung und Integration*. Stuttgart 2002.

Is this humanitarian migration crisis different, *Migration Policy debates*, 2015; Universidad Complutense and Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, 8 May 2009

Refugee/Migrant Crisis in Europe, 12 September 2015

The refugee crisis, in *Focus*, Wilfried Martens Centre, October 2015

Recent Migration of Roma in Europe, Mr. Claude Cahn and Professor Elspeth Guild

Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia", No. 49/2003, 66/2007, 142/2008, 19/2009, 146/2009, 166/2012, 54/2013, 101/2015, 152/2015, 55/2016 and 71/2016)

US State Department, "Trafficking Report for 2015", available at <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf>

Government of the Republic of Macedonia: Decision on the existence of a crisis situation due to increased volume of entry and transit of migrants across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 141/2015)

"Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" no. 162/2015, no. 59/2016

<http://www.sobranie.mk/content/MK.pdf>

UNHCR Annual Report, 2015 (available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html>).

European Commission Report of 13.5.2015 (available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm), European Commission Report of 4.4.2016 (available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1221_en.htm).

Report of the International Organization for Migration from 19-21.5.2015 (available at: Source: http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/Europe-Med-Migration-Response-Sitrep21-19May.pdf).

EUROSTAT Report on Refugees and Migrants in Europe in 2015 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics).

Convention on the Status of Refugees, UN, 1951 (available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html>)

Koser, K. (2007). *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, USA.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN, 1948 (available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf).

Daily briefings published on the official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia - <http://mvr.gov.mk/vesti>

Silvana ONCHEVA, Margarita SPASENOVSKA, Scientific Labour, HEALTH ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS WITH MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, Skopje, 2016

Bonine, M. E., Amanat, A., & Gasper, M. E. (Eds.). (2012). *Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kamrava, M. (2013). *The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.572-5900)

Wehrey, F., Kaye, D. D., Watkins, J., Martini, J., & Guffey, R. A. (2010). *The Iraq Effect: The Middle East after the Iraq War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

- Christopher M. Blanchard. (January 28,2009).Islam: Sunnis and Shiites.CRS Report for Congressional Research Service.
- Gelvin, J. L. (2012). The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know? New York: Oxford University
- Philippe Fargues. Christine Fandrich. (09.2012). Migration after the Arab Spring. European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
- The global refugee crisis. (June 2015). A conspiracy of neglect. Amnesty International.
- Haas, M. L., & Lesch, D. W. (Eds.). (2012). the Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gelvin, J. L. (2012). The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know? New York: Oxford University.
- Simon Adams. (March 2015). Failure to Protect: Syria and the UN Security Council. Occasional Paper Series No.5.Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
- Roland Popp.(November 2012). The Syrian Civil War: Between escalation and intervention. CSS Analysis in Security Policy.No124. Centre for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich.
- Elizabeth Ferris. Kemal Kirisci. Salman Shaikh. (18.September 2013). Syrian Crisis: Massive Displacement, Dire Needs and Shortage of Solutions.
- Gucturk, Y. (2015). War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Syria. Insight Turkey, 17(1),
- Refuge and Hope in Time of ISIS: The Urgent Need for Protection, Humanitarian Support, and Durable Solutions in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece. (January 2015). A Report of the Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
- Migration crisis in the Mediterranean
- Published in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia", no. 49/2003, 66/2007, 142/2008, 19/2009, 146/2009, 166/2012, 54/2013, 101/2015, 152/2015, 55/2016 and 71/2016.
- Survey Study of the Parliamentary Institute of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, July 2016.
- David E.Bloom, David Canning, and Günther Fink.(January 2011).Implications of Population Aging for Economic Growth.PGDA Working Paper No.64.
- Survey Study of the Parliamentary Institute of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, July 2016.
- Silvana ONCHEVA, Margarita SPASENOVSKA, Scientific Labour, HEALTH ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS WITH MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES, IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA, Skopje, 2016
- The public health dimension of the European migrant crisis. (January 2016). Briefing. European Parliament.
- Published on the <http://www.ohridsky.com/2016/>
- Government of the Republic of Macedonia: Decision on the existence of a crisis situation due to increased volume of entry and transit of migrants across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia (Published in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 141/2015, No. 101/2015.
- Olga Koshevaliska, Borka Tushevska Gavrilovikj, Ana Nikodinovska Krstevska. Migration Crisis: Macedonia on crossroads. Migration at sea, International Law perspectives and regional approaches. Giannini Editore. Napoli, 2016.
- Government of the Republic of Macedonia: Decision on the existence of a crisis situation due to the increased volume of entry and transit of migrants across the territory of the Republic of

Macedonia ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 141/2015)
Frontex at Glance. (2015). FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

NEW PARADIGM ON EUROPEAN SECURITY- DID EUROPE BECOME A RISK SOCIETY?

Olivera INJAC¹

Abstract: *Few issues are under discussion on contemporary European security - what stands behind the growing number of security challenges, does it depend on the geopolitics and interests of the great powers, how can Europe be more secure and how can the European society be less risky in the globalized world?*

Risk society refers to conditions where a lot security risks occur; among which the radicalization of certain countries and regions is emphasized, which has roots in cultural conflicts (e.g. religious fundamentalism). The European society currently faces uncertainty and insecurity, which are characterized by unpredictability and hybridity. It is challenged by security risks which have different forms and shapes, roots and causes. The fact is that Europe has reached a high level of development, but it is aggravated by the fear that, simultaneously with its development, the level of risks have increased. Europe is facing a period of huge uncertainty, especially from the rise of economic and political instability. In the aftermath of the Cold War, for the last three decades, the breakup of stable periods in Europe started with the appearance of the following security phenomena: first, ethnic conflicts started in post-communist states; second, terrorism the roots of which can be found in religious fundamentalism and third, radicalisation in certain regions caused by the disputes over territory or identity (e.g. Middle East).

Keywords: *security, Europe, risk society, terrorism, migrations;*

Introduction

The paradigm of an uncertain and risky world, gained momentum after the end of the Cold War, but it got intensified in the 21st century. The first decade and a half the focus was primarily on dealing with the risk and the extent of its effects, especially after the 2001 terrorist attacks in America.

The phenomenology of the “risky world” has been elaborated from the beginning of the 1990s through the Beck “risk society” theory (Beck, 2000). However, as advocated by the critical security theorist Williams, phenomenology may be analysed through the understanding of security in, at least, three dimensions: concepts, cooperation and strategy (Williams, 2008: 59).

¹ The author is an Associate Professor at University of Donja Gorica (Podgorica, Montenegro) - Humanistic Studies, Department for Security Studies

The trend of risk growth and transformation of the security is a new enigma. Therefore, directions of security research studies, particularly through the guidelines of the Copenhagen School and Critical Security Studies, expand the scope of observations in areas such as social identity, human health and livelihood, environment, and other.

Beck's arguments on risk society causes are that the main danger of risk society is its inability to maintain control of the situation and the effects of risk occur as consequences of certain actions and decisions. This is precisely the dilemma that will be examined and argued in this article, using the example of the risks that Europe has been facing in the 21st century.

In this paper we will try to emphasize the basis of uncertainty and danger of risk in Europe, starting with the basic thesis of Ulrich Beck on the appearance of "risk society".

Additionally, the question is whether the first decades of the 21st century are characterized by creating a security risk culture, especially in Western societies. The role of culture in creating the perception of risk is indisputable, particularly in relation with the construction of the phenomenon, which Williams referred to as "Western community of risk" (Williams, 2005: 22).

At the beginning of the 21st century the perception of risk, certainly was affected by the revitalization of terrorism. The phenomenon of terrorism, as a security risk as an inseparable means of political violence, has been present in human civilization for centuries, since the time religious sects and cults (Assassins, Zealots, etc.) used it as a means of extreme religious aspirations.

Until now, terrorism as a form of political violence is a tool and an inseparable part of politics in the most parts of the world. However, the approaches in understanding and the models of response to that format of terrorism have become more demanding with the appearance of terrorist organization known under several names ISIL, ISIS, IS or Da'esh (BBC News, December 2, 2015).

According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the trend of terrorism growth has dramatically increased in the last few years. That index indicates the global spreading of terrorism and the data show an increase in the number of deaths. For example, in 2014 the increase was 80 percent when compared with the last 15 years.

The aim of this scientific paper is to highlight several dimensions of the European security paradigm, due to security risks and the approach they entail. The paradigm of security and risk society in Europe has become more significant, due to the terrorism threat and the large waves of migration, which Europe has been facing with an increased intensity since 2015.

Perhaps the main perception of security risk is linked with the uncertain future of Europe, and at the same time with the specific preparations for its mitigation (Williams, 2005: 9). These risks require common responses that can moderate European security. The statement of Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General accurately describes the situation of the interdependent globalized world as follows: "we commonly share the responsibility for the security of each other" (Annan, 2004: 25).

The new European security strategy has global dimensions (The European Union. The European Union Global Strategy), due to security risks that it copes with. As it was stated in the policy papers which provide recommendations for building a new security strategy with global objectives: "The Global Strategy has the difficult task of setting the EU's interests and objectives in respect of global security as well as the means to achieve them in the medium and long term" (Kalm, 2015:1).

Europe and Risk Society – idea or fact?

In explaining the current European approach towards security risks in this paper the author used Beck's sociological theory of "risk society". Theory has evolved but the focus on Beck's explanation is the fact that risks has become a complex problem that depends on new insecurities and uncertainties and it is characteristic of this century "incalculable risks and manufactured uncertainties resulting from the triumphs of modernity mark the *conditio humana* at the beginning of the twenty-first century" (Beck, 2009: 6).

This chapter will focus on three main topics: 1. understanding risk, 2. explaining Beck's concept of "risk society" and 3. contemporary security in Europe and the tendency towards "risk society".

From the perspective of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, there are arguments for the category of risk (Beck, 2009:3), and by that, we will analyze, how this can be symptomatic for the security. Beck's theory of "risk society" became popular in security studies as a result of the attempt to discover reasons behind this theory in the age of modernization and globalization. In the opinion of critical theory analyst Williams, Beck sees risk society as an aspect of the "transition from modernity to late modernity and reflexive modernization" (Williams, 2005:2).

Risk theory, as a main characteristic of risk society, stresses the importance of losing control and focuses on the boomerang effects which come as consequences of previous committed actions (Williams, 2005:38).

First, it is important to understand how Beck defines the category of risk and what his recommendations are in order to avoid ambivalence (Beck, 2009):

1. Risk is a persistent phenomenon that requires our attention, but the danger is that it can use and transform everything, and it can draw the environment very easy and fast.
2. The degree of risk depends on the quantitative assessment of the risk and it causes a sense of risk all around.
3. If risk exists or potentially can exist, this can have impact on risk management and sometimes it can cause fear in society and induce prevention, where the approach is "spend a cent today, save a Euro tomorrow – assuming that the threat which does not (yet) exist really exists" (Beck, 2009: 3).
4. The issue of responsibility for taking risks exists on two levels: individual and social. In that sense, individual is about personal responsibility of decision makers and social refers to decisions made on behalf of others.
5. Global risks make a difference on the level of responsibility, and they have transformed the overall understanding of risks and the importance of some necessary elements for cooperation.
6. Communities engaged in global risks that must be functional in the age of globalization and cosmopolitanism are characterized by diversity and plurality.

It is obvious that some of the specific issues in understanding risk that Beck tried to indicate are: objective assessment of potential risk is a necessary precondition to avoid fear or inadequate response to risks, risks are not limited by time and place, quantity

and level of the responsibilities for risks are different on different levels, but global risks lead to the emergence of a risk community and that requires global responsibility.

Beck considers that Europe has a totally different approach in defining risk, than the United States (Beck, 2009:11), and managing and dealing with risks. That could be seen in the case of terrorism after the 2001 September attacks, since Europe has a different perception of the risk and in accordance with that, response on terrorism.

The significant assumption is that in the era of globalization, there are models of risk distribution and allocation (Bek, 2001: 55). Williams found reasons for that in the reflexive nature of contemporary security and he draw attention to idea that “different interpretations of international terrorism have caused different social entities within Europe to perceive different degrees of risk, thus serving as an issue to divide Europe” (Williams, 2005:2).

What is also relevant to the topic is the explanation of “risk society”, a sociological approach developed by Ulrich Beck in the mid 1990s, but still relevant for understanding security risks. It is very symptomatic how a “risk society” functions and what are the perceptions of that and by Beck’s vision of “world risk society” (Beck, 2009) on a global level.

In order to explore risk society in Europe, our first aim is to explore the sociological concept of risk society and to apply it on the actual risky situation in Europe. Starting from the basic Beck’s explanation, “risk society” is an aspect of the transition from modernity to late modernity and reflexive modernization. Beck’s description is that “risk society” is a phase in the development of modern society, that brings many different risks, resulting from processes of innovation and it can cause many troubles for different actors (society, politics, ecology, humans), and challenge institutions responsible for risk protection (Beck, 1994:27).

There is a very important distinction about the origin of risks (natural or manufactured). Manufactured risks are product of social circumstances and modernization. But, a huge test for the security institutions is sustaining both kinds of risks, and by conducting a risk assessment, preventing and creating secure societies.

The strong sense of insecurity, as one of the main features within the state and community, distinguishes “risk society”. The driving force of risk society is security, but also the creation of a culture of an unsafe society (Bek, 2001: 73).

Some of the contemporary security risks (terrorism, WMD, organized crime, climate change, etc.), are provoking a strong sense of insecurity. Terrorism is certainly such a risk, and as Williams stated, international terrorism is confirmation of what Beck means with ‘risk society’ (Williams, 2005:2).

Risk society theory can provide explanation for the functional dimension link with the security, but structural parameters of risk theory will not be used in this paper. The theoretical topic of Beck’s risk society is mainly focused on the risks such as socio-economic inequalities, ecological hazards, climate change, health problems, etc.

The need to apply risk analysis on European security became important after the 9/11 attacks, as Buzan and Hansen highlighted (2009: 251), due to circumstances with terrorism and migration growth that request constant “risk management”.

The Main purpose of using risk analysis is to establish a better assessment of security and terrorism and to identify problems and enable enactment of anti-terrorism and anti-migration policies (Buzan&Hansen, 2009:251).

Some of the most dangerous risks related to terrorism and the migration crisis in Europe, have challenged cooperation, solidarity and other important European values, within last years. The current security situation in Europe has the characteristics of risk society, due to the strong insecurity tendency caused by the risk from terrorism, as well as of the raise of migration flows into Europe.

Security risks rapidly change the global environment, which motivated the European Union to initiate adoption of the new security strategy, aimed at taking global actions, as stated by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini: "More than a decade after the 2003 European Security Strategy, the world has changed dramatically. And we have changed as well. For this reason I have launched a period of strategic reflection on the EU's way ahead in the world. It will lead to an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy" (European Union. European Union Global Strategy, 14 March 2016).

Strong influences on European security are caused by religiously motivated terrorist attacks, such as the case with Paris in 2015, which influenced the rise of fear and sense of insecurity within the European societies. For Paris attacks, ISIL took responsibility immediately after the attacks in which 129 people were killed (CNN, November 16, 2015).

The impact of the terrorism risk in Europe was explained in speech EU High Representative Federica Mogherini while presenting the new EU strategy: "The events in Paris have shocked not just a country, the people living in Paris, but the whole continent... We know the objectives of Dae'sh. They are trying to divide us. Division is what makes them strong. So they try to divide us inside our own societies, first of all. The diversity of our societies has made Europe's strength. It is integral part of our identity as Europeans. They want to turn it into a liability. They want our citizens to look at each other with fear and distrust." (EU. European Union Global Strategy. 14 March 2016, pp.1).

Threats to European societies, which come from the terrorism risk were stated in the EU's New Security Agenda, adopted in April 2015. Terrorism is one of three priorities, and important aspects of that security phenomenon, according to the Agenda (European Commission. The European Agenda on Security. April 2015, pp.12) are the roots and causes of terrorism. Mainly, the current threat in Europe has roots in the external dimension, which affect the local situation, such as:

- a) Impacts that come as spill over effects from neighbouring conflicts;
- b) European citizens that took part in Syria, Iraq and Libya conflicts and joined terrorist groups.

For the raise of terrorism risk, the "foreign fighters" or European citizens which participated in conflicts, after their return home have a significant impact. Also,

recent terrorist attacks in Europe, testify on the presence of the violent extremism and radicalization in the region.

In the terrorist attacks that happened on 14 November 2015 in Paris, in a few simultaneous attacks, at four different locations, 129 people died in suicide bombing attacks. Most of the Paris attackers were European citizens located in Belgium, but some of them were migrants and asylum seekers from Syria (The Telegraph, 2015, 15 November). One suicide bomber had a Syrian passport, and French authorities say fingerprints of the suicide bomber matched those of someone who passed through Greece and via the Balkan route reached the European Union (The Telegraph, 2015, 15 November).

It is not a new phenomenon in Europe for terrorist attacks to be committed by migrants who got European citizenship or were born in the attacked country, but originally came from Africa or the Middle East. It was also the case with other attacks, such as Madrid 2004, and London 2005, which reinforced the already present fear in Europe, regarding the implications of migrations and their link with terrorism (Adamson, 2006: 166).

From the early 2000s, experts expressed doubt on the connection of terrorism and migrations in Europe and the US: “Immigration and terrorism are linked—not because all immigrants are terrorists but because all, or nearly all, terrorists in the West have been immigrants... All major terrorist attacks conducted in the last decade in North America and Western Europe, with the exception of Oklahoma City, have utilized migrants” (Adamson, 2006: 195).

Terrorist attacks compromised attitudes towards migrations in Europe. But, it is important to stress two sorts of migrants who commit attacks:

a) people that participated and integrated into society, they grew up there, second generation, became radicalized while living in western societies, etc. (e.g. London terrorist attack 2005);

b) migrants that came from conflict areas, who have been already radicalized and participated in the conflicts (e.g. so called “foreign fighters” or former fighters, such as the Paris attacks in 2015).

The fact that some of the attacks have been committed by terrorists who migrated into Europe, had a very strong influence on the securitization of migrations. As Adamson stated, even from the mid 1990, concerns in Europe have raised regarding the relationship between migration and security, because of terrorist attacks performed by Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group in Paris and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Adamson, 2006: 166).

Migrations into Europe are mostly for finding a better life, but also for other reasons, and their roots are linked to the global security risks. After the cold war, the level of migrations into Europe has been constantly growing (Bali, 2012:585), and it has become part of global migration trends.

Europe is one of the most attractive regions for migrants, and new migration trends have grown rapidly from 2015, due to the conflicts in North Africa and the Middle

East. According to the reports of the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), almost a million migrants (990,671) arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean route in 2015 (IOM, 17 December 2015).

One of the challenging tasks for Europe is to explore causes of migration and due to the EU Agenda on Migration, it is related to poverty, human conditions and some deep-seated impacts, but also has links with globalisation and expectations for better life conditions, or it comes as a consequence of conflicts and crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, Asia and North Africa (European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration; 13.5.2015 COM(2015):2).

European migration risks are related to different aspects of security implications, such as:

- inability to control who has the right to enter into Europe;
- failure to control external territorial borders;
- smuggling of migrants to Europe via the Mediterranean routes;
- serious security risks, such as terrorism attacks, committed by migrants.

But, the most dangerous risks from migrations in Europe originate in the transnational trends in political violence, organized crime and terrorism. Adamson gives an explanation on how the migration flows are linked with other factors and how conditions for violent conflicts can deteriorate and complicate the international system (Adamson, 2006: 191). According to Adamson, three sorts of migration risks are: “providing resources that help to fuel internal conflicts; providing opportunities for networks of organized crime; and providing conduits for international terrorism” (Adamson, 2006: 191).

The trend of displaced persons from their country of origin, because of violence, terrorism and conflicts, all over the world is high, with almost 60 million people annually (Institute for Economic and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015 - Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. November 2015:59). According to data from that report, that is the highest number of violently displaced persons in the last decades, since the Second World War and one fifth of refugees (about 12 million) are from Syria, which were displaced in other neighbouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq) or have sought asylum in Europe.

The overall document, i.e. the Agenda on Migrations, provides different steps that the European Union should take in the coming years, to build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration (European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration, 2015). Measures that will be taken to maintain migration flows into Europe are based on solidarity and cooperation, and basically have soft approach, such as combating criminal activities on smuggling refugees, proportionality in receiving refugees within the states, protection of refugees, partnership with “third” countries, etc. (European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration, 2015:3-12).

Due to the actual trends, Europe perceives migrations as persistent risk and the Agenda stated that “the reality is that across Europe, there are serious doubts about

whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants, to the need to integrate migrants in our societies, or to the economic demands of a Europe in demographic decline” (European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration, 2015:2)

New Security Paradigm in Europe

Europe faces a new era of instability reflected in the global security risk. Parkes argues that “the EU’s external security environment is changing fast” (Parkes, 2015:2) and reflects on the internal security conditions.

The modern European security paradigm not only includes risks, but also refers to empowering individuals, societies, states and the international community and creating possibilities for further development.

Currently, the European security paradigm mainly includes cultural and political aspects, and tends to challenge institutional capacities for ensuring security in Europe.

The cultural aspect is an important part of the new European security paradigm in the 2000s, because of the strong religious impacts, radicalization as stimulus for terrorism and presence of terrorism which refers to Islam². Also, religious fundamentalism is vulnerable to risks linked with terrorism and various kinds of extremism. In Apaduraj’s opinion, nothing has surprised the world like the phenomenon of “militant sanctity”, that appeared in the last two decades in main religions, in the form of violent religious fundamentalism, which relies on the doctrine of spreading propaganda and negative attitudes about the opposite side, and causes uncertainty and fear (Apaduraj, 2008:13).

From 2001 to date, Europe has a significant terrorism impact. The era of uncertainty has appeared post the 9/11 attack and confirmed the idea of what it means to live in a “risk society” (Mythen, 2004:2). As it was stated in the document of the previous Strategy “Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism” (European Council. European Security Strategy, 2003:3) and it is evident by the European new terrorism trends.

The risks of potential dangerous terrorist attacks in Europe became pronounced since 9/11 when the security investigations in some European countries provided evidence on the purpose of the terrorist groups to use WMD.

Terrorist attacks in the past years have opened a dilemma of whether migration flows from Middle East and Africa are a conduit for international terrorism, and could Europe be protected from such risks. The terrorist attacks in the last three years, launched specific perception of the risk in Europe, which encouraged a sense of fear from migrants and foreigners, specifically about the problem consisting of two main

² The discourse of terrorism has changed over time, and the terms such as “Islamic Terrorism”, “Islamic Fundamentalism”, etc., that are in use for a specific form of terrorism, generally associated with a particular religion. For this reason, the phrase “terrorism that invokes Islam” will be used in the paper, because of disagreement with the tendencies to generalize this complex phenomenon.

components: radicalized views and actions of people that migrated into Europe and the migrants are not adapted and assimilated in the European societies.

Radicalization became widespread within Europe, as an underlying motive for the security paradigm in Europe, especially because of the link with terrorism and migrations. Roots and causes of radicalization depend on a multiplicity of factors. As analyzed in the report of the International Centre for Studying Radicalization, problems of radicalization can produce risk in a society, because of the main components: “righteous indignation, defiance, a sense of persecution and a refusal to conform” (International Centre for Studying Radicalization, 2015). The problem of radicalization is related with identity issues, that motivate the increase of radicalization within European societies. The fact is that large number of people from Europe (about 3000 from Western Europe), joined ISIL and participated in Syria conflicts (Brigs&Silverman, 2014: 6). Furthermore, radicalized persons after their return, undoubtedly have impact in their country of origin.

Security risks from terrorism and migrations, challenge the European institutional response and force construction of new models of response. National responses are mainly proactive, and include deployment of diplomatic, humanitarian and security measures to deal with the risks of terrorism and migrations. But, as Parkes noted, it is possible for the European Union to apply the “solidarity clause”, and arrange mutual support to ensure European security and repress terrorism and migrations (Parkes, 2015: 1).

Critical Security Theory and Terrorism Risk

Understanding contemporary security, as a traditional military concept, is overcome, because it includes more sectors and security concepts. As Buzan and Hansen stated, contemporary security analysis are much more shaped by alternative theorists, such as peace researchers, constructivists, critical security theorists, feminists and post-structuralists, because they went deeply “from purely material calculations towards more social and political understandings” (2009:272).

The alternative theoretical approach of critical security studies that define security as “condition of being and feeling safe” (Booth, 2007:110), provide models for understanding the risk society concept.

Due to critical security studies, human beings (individuals) and international politics are equally important for contemporary security. In the opinion of leading theorist Ken Booth, security has more values, than national security alone, and the main security risks are linked with survival, existence and emancipation.

This study expands their interest broadly, interpreting security as part of human society, and calls it “world security“, with the aim of preventing the whole world from potential risks and threats. It is a critical theoretical approach and it has a pessimistic vision on individual and global security (Buzan&Hansen, 2009:224), which includes a wide spectrum of risks (e.g. ecological, political and humanitarian catastrophes).

Emancipation is the main precondition for transcendence of security risks (Booth, 2007: 114) and security could be guaranteed only in societies which have progressive emancipatory policy.

Booth defines emancipation as a process that "...seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others"(Booth, 2007: 112), with the intention to make contribution to human freedom and enable political and other possibilities. Emancipation is significant for security, it contributes to security practice and creates secure conditions, as well as common interest for providing security.

That concept can improve the approach to security and risk. For instance, emancipation could have an important impact in building awareness for countering terrorism and radicalization, through the educational system and society resistance. Also, promotion of religious tolerance, respect and coherence within communities and eliminating stereotypes and prejudices could be the role of emancipation.

As Booth pointed out, between many threats in the era of globalization, terrorism and radicalization growth could cause other interacting insecurities (Booth, 2007:407). Traditional analysis of terrorism in many ways were filled with concerns and did not have a realistic view on the problem (Buzan&Hansen, 2009:234). Critical security studies have adopted this perspective so as to provide more persistent responses for terrorism, and especially in the field of roots and causes, as well as on consequences of anti-terrorist actions. That was the case with the concept "Global War on Terrorism", when critical studies expressed a broad range of consequences, such as securitization of terrorism and discourse of terrorism or problematic tools for terrorists profiling (Buzan&Hansen, 2009: 248-249).

Conclusion

Europe is threatened by risks that belong to the category of global or external, caused by violence that is manifested in some other regions, and their effects have reflection on European security. For instance, actual conflict in Syria enforced terrorism and migration flows, risks which challenge security in Europe. It created preconditions for risk society in Europe, not just because of their growth, but also because of the inadequate responses to them. Security implications that Europe experienced with this risks, suddenly showed vulnerabilities in institutional responses and incapability to control roots and causes and future trends.

Also, radicalization is such a phenomenon which provides support for terrorism and together with terrorism continues to exist as one of the main challenges for European security. Political instability and weak governance have provided ground for radicalization within the countries from which migrants come to Europe.

Measures which Europe undertakes to ensure and prevent security intend to solve the risks locally, but with the adoption of new security Strategy, the European security perspectives will have a global character (EU. European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

In this paper we have analyzed some aspects of contemporary security risks of terrorism and migrations in Europe, their tendency towards forming a "risk society".

In the opinion of security theorist, security risk consequences depend on dynamics and the type of risks: "Risk societies are capable of understanding themselves as constituted through 'risk dynamics', and hence of negotiating how best to meet the material and political consequences that arise from 'everyday risk management' as well as catastrophic risks" (Buzan&Hansen, 2009: 250).

European capabilities for security, protection and control, depend on some aspects, such as managing capacities to implement reforms, to adopt solidarity and to establish new positions of global power. The proper is an example that shows how weak solidarity for security is among the European states, which is obvious from the reactions and responses on the refugee crisis. There is also a severe fear that the European Union could be fragmented in its approach to security risks and that they will be reflected on the weak solidarity and institutional cooperation between the states.

The paradigm of Europe as a "risk society" has potential to be dynamic and depends not only on security risks, but also on possible responses and social resilience.

REFERENCES:

- Bek, U. (2001). Rizično društvo – u susret novoj moderni. Beograd: Filip Višnjić
- Williams, M.J. (2008). (In) Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society; Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 43(1): 57–79, SAGE Publications
- BBC News (December 2, 2015). Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names (online). Accessed at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277> on 24 March 2015
- Williams, M.J. (2005). The Politics of Risk: The US, Europe and Proactive Security for the 21st Century, Paper, 46th Annual International Studies Association Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii
- Annan, K. (2000 December). Courage to Fulfil Our Responsibilities. The Economist
- European Union (EU). European Union Global Strategy. (online), accessed at: <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en> on 28 October 2018
- Kalm, H. (2015). The European Union Global Strategy: How Best to Adapt to New Challenges?; Policy Paper. Estonia: International Centre for Defense and Security
- Beck, U. (2009). Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision. Constellations Volume 16, No 1
- Beck, U. (1994). The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization; in Beck, Giddens&Lash(ed.). Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1–55
- Buzan, B.&Hansen, L. (2009). The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge University Press
- European Union (EU). European Union Global Strategy. (online), speech of the HR/VP Federica Mogherini „The EU Internal-External Security Nexus: Terrorism as an example of the necessary link between different dimensions of action“. Accessed at: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151126barcelona_strategy_en.pdf on 16 March 2016
- CNN (November 16, 2015). Paris suicide bomber identified: ISIS claims responsibility for 129 dead (online). Accessed at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/14/world/paris-attacks/> on 24 March 2016

- European Commission. The European Agenda on Security. (online), Strasbourg, 28.4.2015 COM(2015). Accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf on 17 March 2016
- The Telegraph (2015, 15 November). How a Belgian parking ticket led to international manhunt for more 'plotters' in Paris attacks (online). accessed at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11997599/How-a-Belgian-parking-ticket-led-to-international-manhunt-for-more-plotters-in-Paris-attacks.html> on 19 March 2016
- Adamson, F. (2006). Crossing Borders – International Migration and National Security; International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 165–199
- Bali, S. (2012). Kretanje stanovništva; in Vilijams, P. Uvod u studije bezbednosti. Beograd: Službeni glasnik. 584-599
- International Organization for Migration (IOM). Europe/Mediterranean Migration Response (Situation report). 17 December 2015 (online). Accessed at: http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Europe-Mediterranean-Migration-Response-Situation-Report-17-December-2015_0.pdf on 20 March 2016
- European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration. (online), Brussels, 13.5.2015 COM(2015). Accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf on 20 March 2016
- Institute for Economic and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015-Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. November 2015 (online). Accessed at: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf> on 21 March 2016
- Parkes, R. (December 2015). Migration and Terrorism: the New Frontiers for European Solidarity. European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Apaduraj, A. (2008). Strah od malih brojeva. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek
- Mythen, G. (2004). Ulrich Beck – a critical introduction to the risk society. London: Pluto Press
- European Council (2003). A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy. Brussels
- International Centre for Studying Radicalization (2015). The roots of radicalisation? It's identity, stupid. ICSR Insight (online). Accessed at: <http://icsr.info/2015/06/icsr-insight-roots-radicalisation-identity-stupid/> on 25 March 2016
- Brigs, R& Silverman, T. (2014). Western Foreign Fighters – Innovations in Responding to Threat. Institute for Strategic Dialogue
- Booth, K. (2007). Theory of World Security. NY: Cambridge University Press

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY AND RECENT EVENTS

Zlatko KUZMANOV ¹

Abstract: *There has been too much talk and too many analyses and surveys on terrorism, and yet this phenomenon still remains undefined and misunderstood. What is the problem behind this?*

Is the problem that there is no more distinction between "state terrorism" and terrorism performed by various non-state criminal and terrorist groups and individuals;

Is it because the phrase "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is becoming the rule;

Is it the richness of cultural, ethnic and religious differences, which as a core value is a heavy burden and an obstacle to greater convergence of nations and countries;

Is it the desire for domination of some by others, the desire for exploitation;

Is it that humanity is drawn into the spiral of violence and is increasing become more violent towards others;

Is it that part of humanity thinks that "loyalty to religion and loyalty to democratic institutions and values is not consistent";

Anthropology has a constant desire to answer the question: What does it mean to be human? But, international terrorism creates an obligation to seek an answer to another question: What does it mean to be human and a terrorist?

Keywords: *democracy, state, violence, security;*

Introduction

The topic of terrorism is complex and emotional. It is complex because it combines many different aspects of human experience, including topics such as politics, psychology, philosophy, military strategy and history. Terrorism is also an emotional topic because the experiences of terrorist acts cause enormous feelings. Undoubtedly, terrorism causes strong feelings. A key challenge to understanding terrorism is the recognition of the moral condemnation of terrorist acts, and at the same time understanding the causes of terrorism.

When it comes to international terrorism, it needs to be underlined underline that international terrorism did not begin with the attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. However, from 9/11 onwards the international terrorists intensified their attacks worldwide. They

¹ The author is PhD, Ministry of Defence of Republic of Macedonia

murdered people of all nationalities, religions and backgrounds. Some of these attacks were done directly by terrorists under the control of the leadership of al-Qaeda. Others were done by networks that are loosely connected to al-Qaeda, but are inspired by its ideology and messages.

Terrorists aim to achieve the objectives through intimidation and fear. They argue that the end justifies the means, no matter the cost of human lives and sufferings. We have witnessed that terrorists carry out various acts. Some terrorists have been prevented by effective law enforcement; some have taken the political process; others faded over the generations. But al-Qaeda and its off-shoots and imitators are different. They differ from their predecessors with a unique combination of factors that put the current threat to a scale that we have not previously experienced.

At the global level these terrorists - loosely affiliated groups - operate without a conventional structure. Preparing its inspiration from global messages articulated by internationally recognized figures such as Osama bin Laden. Their messages are uncompromising. They argue that the West is a threat to Islam, that loyalty to religion and loyalty to democratic institutions and values are not consistent, that violence is the only appropriate response. This ideology is adaptable for many reasons, local and international. Terrorists take advantage of modern media to spread their propaganda and to attract followers worldwide. Together, al-Qaeda and like-minded groups constitute the first global threat of terrorism, which leaves only a few parts of the world untouched. They pose a threat to democracy in the world and to global economy.

We have faced skilled and well-trained terrorist groups before. But al-Qaeda and related groups have exceptional technique and ability. They are constantly ambitious and innovative. They can take advantage of modern international travel and communications inaccessible to their predecessors. They are sophisticated in their use of these techniques. They are willing to use any means to attack, no matter what the consequences for their victims or themselves.

Any discussion on the strategy of Governments to reduce the threat of international terrorism, must begin by analyzing the nature of the threat. For these reasons, we will elaborate in more detail on the role of anthropology in explaining the phenomenon of terrorism.

Anthropology in the context of terrorism

Anthropology is the scientific discipline that explores the cultural and biological diversity of the people. Anthropology studies humans, their culture, language, history, genetic and cultural similarities and differences between people. It explores how people live, what they do, how they think and how they behave towards the environment. Its area of interest is how human kind has developed, and how human societies were created. It is geared towards the present and future of mankind. We could say that the subject of anthropology comes down to one question: What does it mean to be human? This question is most directly related to the role of anthropology in understanding the causes of the emergence of terrorism, that is, why some people become terrorists.

Anthropology has not been a leading voice in the academic or public debate about terrorism, but surely the discipline's perspective of comparative, holistic, and relativistic thinking has something to contribute to the issue. A leading anthropologist on the subject of terrorism, Jeffrey Sluka², has suggested what the discipline brings

² Sluka, Jeffrey A. 2009. "The Contribution of Anthropology to Critical Terrorism Studies."

to the study of terrorism and “of human conflict in all its forms”, namely a cultural perspective; extreme topical and theoretical eclecticism³; a cross-culturally comparative and holistic perspective; an ethnographic approach based on long-term fieldwork and direct participant observation in the community studied; a scientific commitment to both objectivity and getting as close as possible to the subject, participants; an appreciation of the impact of ethno-centrism and cultural relativity; and a humanist concern for ethics, the potentially negative effects research may have on those studied.

There are widespread prejudices and perceptions on the background of terrorism. Terrorism (or any other form of violence) is not unique to religion, nor is terrorism inherent in religion. There are many reasons and causes for terrorism other than religion, and not all religions have conducted or condoned terrorism. However, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, there has been a distinct association between religion (especially Islam) and terrorism, at least in the minds of many. Worse, in popular discourse and in policy discussions, the impression is often given that terrorists are in principle uncivilized, if not insane. Terrorism is thus portrayed largely as a psychological or mental health issue: terrorists are “irrational”, or so consumed with anger and hate that they strike out blindly at innocents, using tactics that are condemned by the international community of rational civilized humans. If our first instinct is to dismiss terrorists as ill or evil, it is difficult to understand terrorism. Of course, it is difficult and dangerous to enter into a society gripped by terrorism, let alone into a terrorism organization, but that is the only way to discover what is happening “on the inside”.

Much of what anthropologists generally advocate is a form of “critical terrorism studies”, which, according to Richard Jackson⁴ of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Zealand, entails appreciating that terrorism is culturally constructed (both by and for the perpetrators and victims), that “terrorism” is a concept and a label that is inherently unstable (that is, its meaning varies between groups and changes over time), and that scholars should be involved not only in analysis but in “emancipatory political praxis”, that is, trying to solve the problems that spark terrorism and other social violence acts in the first place.

Another anthropologist who, if anything, has even more strongly condemned the standard “mishandling of suicide terrorism” is Scott Atran⁵, who wrote that a “common notion in the U.S. administration and media spin on the war on terrorism is that suicide attackers are evil, deluded, or homicidal misfits who thrive on poverty, ignorance, and anarchy”, or worse that they “hate freedom”. On the contrary, “survey data reliably

In Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds. *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*. Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, 138.

³ Eclecticism is a philosophical approach that does not stick to any rigid paradigm of set assumptions or conclusions but creates multilevel theories in order to gain insight into the phenomenon. The term comes from the Greek word “eclecticos” - to choose the best.

⁴ Jackson, Richard. 2007. “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies.” *European Political Science* 6 (3), 244.

⁵ Atran, Scott. 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism.” *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (3), 67-90.

show that most Muslims who support suicide terrorism and trust bin Laden favour elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity, and economic choice”. Contrary to popular impressions, terrorists “exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes” or major psychological pathologies”. Atran, actually concludes that terrorists are “more ideologically driven than grievance driven”, and ideologies are entirely cultural thought-systems. To learn more about these ideologies, Atran⁶ endorses doing something that politicians and victims seldom do, but that anthropologists do for a living—actually talking to them, even if we regard them as enemies.

Beyond the ideologies and “cultures” of terrorist groups, anthropology can also investigate their social structure and institutional organization. Atran directs attention, for example, to the system of radical religious schools that prepare the next generation of terrorists. He fully understands the positive social works that terrorist groups do in the absence of functioning governments and adequate social services. This suggests an approach for combating terrorism: democratic nations that fight terrorism therefore must discretely help others in these societies to compete with, rather than attempt to crush. In short, “if terrorism is a culture and a social structure, then anti-terrorism must also be a culture and social structure.”⁷

In this paper, we attempt to critically analyse the complex relationship between anthropology and the so-called ‘War on Terror’ by emphasising the consequences it has and it might have for the discipline. Furthermore, the recognition that anthropology’s methods and skills are especially in demand in wartime has once more posed the discipline in a central place within the social sciences, which has revived eternal debates at the heart of anthropology, around the ethics of spying and its social responsibility. Intelligence agencies and governments claim they need the anthropological analysis to improve counter-insurgency and national security, but anthropologists have to seriously consider what this link means for the future of the discipline. Although past wartime anthropological connections with the military could have been seen as appropriate for their times, today the link gives rise to much more complex and problematic issues.

In the not too distant past, the governments of certain countries, notably the US and the UK have established several programs through which they used the services of anthropologists to study the specified enemy by their military apparatus, in particular by intelligence organizations. Thus, in order to improve the collection of intelligence information in the “War on terror” the USA established the “Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars program”⁸ and the UK its “Combating Terrorism by Countering Radicalisation Programme”.

⁶ Atran, Scott. 2010. *Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists*. New York: HarperCollins.

⁷ Atran, Scott. 2004. “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism.” *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (3), 84.

⁸ The science program of Pat Robbers (PRISP) is the work of Professor Felix Moos and gets the name from Sen. Pat Roberts, a Republican from Kansas, who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Commission. Source: Addaia Marrades “Anthropology and the ‘War on Terror’: Analysis of a complex relationship”. MA ADST Programme 2006-7.

“Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars program – (PRISP)” was established in 2004 in the United States in order to help 15 different agencies of the USA IC, and not just the CIA as sometimes it is wrongly assumed, to recruit and train analysts with critical linguist or scientific skills that the labour market does not readily provide. The PRISP is funded by the USA Congress. In 2004, USA \$4.0 million were allocated, and in 2005 this was increased to USA \$6.0 million, which allowed for the increase in the number of scholars employed per year, initially set to 150.

“Combating Terrorism by Countering Radicalisation Programme” started in July 2006, when the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) launched a £1.3-million research initiative co-sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) entitled ‘Combating Terrorism by Countering Radicalisation’.⁹ The aim of the project was to analyse extremist Islamist groups present in six regions¹⁰ and five countries¹¹ to grasp a better understanding of their functioning in order to oppose them more efficiently. Academics were asked to “scope the growth in influence and membership of extremist Islamist groups in the past 20 years”, “name key figures and key groups”, and “understand the use of theological legitimization for violence”. Some of the core topics included “radicalisation drivers and counterstrategies in each of the countries studied” and “future trends likely to increase/decrease radicalisation”.

In both programmes anthropology was needed in a very specific way, namely as a means to improve the knowledge of the socio-cultural background of the enemy in order to design better and more efficient counter-insurgency strategies. Programmes have been framed in a particular rhetoric of patriotism and democracy that emphasises the duty of collaborating with national military intelligence agencies in order to join the global fight against terrorism.

But, this inclusion of anthropology in the fight against terrorism had its own vocal critics. Critics base their arguments on the grounds that collaboration with intelligence agencies violates the ethical codes of both the profession and the academy.

History and recent events

In order to define ‘terrorism’ for the purposes of this study, it is useful to begin with a brief historical insight. The use of violence with the aim of creating fear in a wider audience in order to prevent various parties from doing something, or, on the contrary, to coerce them into a certain behaviour, is as old as mankind. Such use of violence has served states and various regimes over a long period of time. The term ‘terrorism’ originates from Latin word ‘terrere’ that means ‘to frighten’. It obtained

⁹ Addaia Marrades “Anthropology and the ‘War on Terror’: Analysis of a complex relationship“. MA ADST Programme 2006.

¹⁰ Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Gulf.

¹¹ Jordan, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Turkey.

its modern form ‘terrorism’ during the Reign of Terror in France from 1793–1794. Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.

Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience/s), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.¹²

The United States (US) government has experienced similar problems in defining terrorism. Most government agencies in their doctrinal and strategic documents define terrorism differently. The US Department of Defence has defined terrorism as: The calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.¹³ The problem with the Department of Defence definition is that it covers all sorts of terrorist activities, it does not discern it clearly enough from other forms of violence.

- seriously intimidating a population;
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act;
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.¹⁴

These objectives can be achieved through various illegal activities. They range from attacks on a person’s life to cutting vital services to society, and respective threats; they include hijackings, kidnappings and other forms of criminal activity. According to the EU definition, terrorism is not a particular ideology or movement, but rather a method or tactic for achieving various goals.

Contemporary practice shows that terrorist organizations receive support for their activities in their immediate environment, but also in the wider environment and the Diaspora. For example, terrorist organizations such as “Provisional IRA”, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil homeland”, Hamas, Algerian GIA”, “al-Qaeda” and “The Kurdistan Workers’ Party”, receive support from the Diaspora. Despite organizational and functional similarities or matches, terrorist organizations differ in many elements.

¹² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Definitions of Terrorism. 2007.

¹³ Thomas R. Mockaitis. The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality. Westport, London: Praeger Security International, 2007.

¹⁴ Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. – Official Journal of the European Communities, 22.6.2002, L164/3–7.

They are different in ideology, political goals that they want to achieve, in relation to religion, their environment and society that gives them support, as well as ways of carrying out the violence. Unlike in relation to the past, when terrorist organizations were happening in a certain area, primarily acting in micro space, and only occasionally in the wider environment, in contemporary global conditions, local groups carried out terrorist actions globally.

The number of terrorist groups in the modern era of terrorism in the world is large. Thus, according to the American RAND Corporation presented in the Global Terrorism Database 648 terrorist organizations were active in the period from 1968 to 2006.

The research results presented in the study "How Terrorists Groups End" shows that of the 648 assessed and terrorist organizations:

- 268 or 41%, have ceased to operate;
- 144 or 21%, have ceased to exist because of internal conflicts, but violence and terror continued by members of their factions;
- 244 or 38% remain very active.

On the current world scene, as a continuation of the al-Qaeda mission, certainly the most active and most powerful terrorist organization is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Iraqi War as part of the US "war on terror" did not solve the threat to terrorism. Even worse, terrorism escalated. The occupation of Iraq and anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world enabled the creation of a second generation members of al-Qaeda. In this process, Iraq was more important for al-Qaeda than Afghanistan. This, together with the crisis in Syria is the basis for the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.¹⁵ Factions of al-Qaeda, reinforced by successes in Iraq and Syria, in April 2013, formally connected and create the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, made possible by linking ISIS with the al-Nusra Front. In June 2014, parts of Iraq and the Syria Caliphate were declared as a "state", entity under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

We can conclude that extreme and brutal Sunni Islamic state received its power on the basis of anti-American sentiment, Shia triumphalism that was created after the overthrowing of the regime of Saddam Husein by the United States and the dysfunctional nature of Iraq and Syria as countries. For ten years, the world ignored the process of creating the ISIS. Even, after the proclamation of the Caliphate, the brutal execution of citizens from Western countries and the massacre of the population that wasn't Sunni in Iraq and Syria the powerful Western countries and Russia began acting.

¹⁵ The foundation of the organization Al-Tawhid (Affirmation of the Oneness of God) from 1993, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004 created the Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (The Organization of the Monotheism and Jihad). End of 2004, the organization was renamed the Al Qaida in Mesopotamia (Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers Mesopotamia). End of December 2004, Osama Bin Laden appointed al-Zarqawi as his deputy, and emir of al-Qaeda in Iraq. In June 2006, it killed al-Zarqawi and his place has got Egyptian Abu Aiv al-Masri, who is replaced by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, because previous two were killed by US forces. In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed as a leader.

Concluding observations

It is impossible to say for sure what causes terrorism. A person's psychological make-up certainly will play a role, but to what extent is unclear. Some may come to terrorism, not out of any love for violence, but rather to further their ideological goals. Others may be motivated to use terror simply because it appears to be a useful strategic alternative, or may further the state's objectives. An individual may decide terrorism fits his or her own view of the world—that it makes sense. Indeed, terrorism may appeal to psychological, ideological, and strategic grounds all at once.

The challenges for countries and the international community in countering terrorism are increasing. Terrorism with this reach, this ambition and this sophistication presents unique challenges for law enforcement agencies in open societies. Terrorist networks can sustain themselves and attack anywhere, exploiting freedom of travel, identity theft and free flows of money. Therefore, the response has to be international as well as national. Because a central aim is often to cause mass and potentially catastrophic casualties, international terrorists have a wide range of targets. Thus, a key and most effective part of our defence is our intelligence capability which enables us to anticipate attacks before they happen. Because many terrorists are careless of their own lives, we cannot assume conventional protective measures will always work, although we must seek to deter and protect wherever it is realistic to do so. National states and the international community are taking steps to preserve the open society which the terrorists wish to destroy. In this struggle, often, the implementation of laws is limited by legitimate demands for respect for individual rights and freedoms of the citizens. So, the resistance must be complemented by policies that would discourage extremism and the recruitment of new terrorists.

REFERENCES:

- Addaia Marrades : Anthropology and the 'War on Terror': Analysis of a complex relationship, MA ADST Programme 2006.
- Atran, Scott. 2004. "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism." *The Washington Quarterly* 27 (3), 67-90.
- Atran, Scott. 2010. *Talking to the Enemy: Religion, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists*. New York: HarperCollins.
- American Anthropological Association. 1990. "General Principles of Professional Responsibility", in Eric Wakin. 1992. *Anthropology goes to War. Professional Ethics & Counterinsurgency in Thailand*. Madison: Centre for Southeast Asia Studies. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- American Anthropological Association. 1998. Code of Ethics. Available on <http://www.aaanet.org>.
- American Anthropological Association. 2006. "Resolutions on Iraq and torture advanced at AAA business meeting". Available on <http://www.aaanet.org>.
- Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth. 1987. *Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice*. Available on <http://www.asa.anthropology.ac.uk>.
- Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.) "The Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP)". Available on <https://www.cia.gov/careers/jobs/PRISP.html>.
- ERSC. 2006. Statement from ERSC regarding 'Combating Terrorism by Countering Radicalisation'.
- Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. – Official Journal of the European Communities, 22.6.2002, L164/3–7.
- Jackson, Richard. 2007. "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies." *European Political Science* 6 (3), 244-51.
- Jeffrey Record. *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2003, p. 6.
- Sluka, Jeffrey A. 2009. "The Contribution of Anthropology to Critical Terrorism Studies." In Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds. *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*. Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, 138.
- Thomas R. Mockaitis. *The "New" Terrorism: Myths and Reality*. Westport, London: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Definitions of Terrorism*. 2007.
- Teaching Guide on International Terrorism: Definitions, Causes, and Responses. Education Program (202) 429-3854. Available on www.usip.org.

CYBER TERRORISM AND CYBER SPACE

Marija GJOSHEVA ¹

Abstract: *Society and citizens in it keep pace with the events that technology affected. Network connections and advanced technology bring new and more sophisticated possibilities for breaking laws, carrying out attacks and achieving traditional terrorist methods in new, non-traditional ways. The Internet is more prevalent in our everyday life and at the same time it expands and increases its use, and as a result, more complex operations take place, a flow of confidential information related to the national security of the states is carried out.*

The massive commercialization of the Internet has enabled a rapid flow of information that spreads in a second in every part of the country and the so-called "cyber space", and their abuse can be part of a terrorist attack.

The term "computer or Internet terrorism" appears as a new form of organized high-tech crime.

This phenomenon, with a wider definition, could be described as "deliberate, politically motivated attacks against information, computer systems, computer programs and data that result in violence against targets that are not warranted by sub-national groups or secret agents."

Keywords: *cyber terrorism, cyber space, national security, high-tech crime;*

Introduction

The number of terrorist attacks began to escalate in the early 1990s, and since then, no day has passed without a terrorist attack. The word terrorism refers to a group of men with beards that throw bags of explosives, but in the context of information security, terrorists can come in many forms.

There is no unified, unique definition of how to define the term terrorism in the world. Although the word is complex in its meaning, certain definitions focus on the actors of terrorism, while others focus on terrorist tactics and goals, as well as the methods that apply.

One of the most commonly used definitions stems from the US legal acts. Terrorism is defined as follows: "Pre-planned, politically motivated violence committed against non-military targets by sub-national groups or secret agents."

The third major threat after chemical-biological and nuclear weapons is cyber terrorism. It is a special form of attack on computer networks and databases with the intention of applying

¹ The Author is PhD, Ministry of Interior of Republic of Macedonia

force or threatening the government of a state for its alignment of certain policy or making certain decisions, the use of the internet space as a field for earning illegally acquired money, as well as using the Internet to conceal the origin of illegally acquired money (money laundering), in order to use them in funding terrorist organizations or the modern term "cyber terrorism" (Gjosheva, 2017).

Cyber terrorism and national security

In the time that comes, terrorists will increasingly use high technology to achieve their goals, both for securing funding and for spying, sabotage, and terrorist attacks on buildings. The potential of terrorist organizations and extreme individuals in the future will gradually increase due to changes in technology, which will provide future generations with much more opportunities than those who have the current most-trained terrorists.

A new generation of terrorists armed with information will be able to engage in dramatic and destructive actions. The virtual space is the new place of events in which new dangerous players act by new rules and new weapons. Therefore, intelligent and criminal services become helpless against a new type of enemy that does not attack with a truck full of explosives, but only with numbers in the most sensitive areas of national infrastructure (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008).

The object of an attack may be important infrastructure (water supply, gas pipeline, electrical distribution facilities, etc.), such as an incursion into the computerized air traffic control system which will cause aircraft accidents, and activation of nuclear bombs, which would result in fear, panic among the population, large human sacrifices. Terrorists have a large arsenal of weapons including chemical and biological weapons, which can cause environmental catastrophes and chemical pollution, opportunities for dreaded poisoning of water systems.

Terrorists use the Internet to disseminate their goals, which consist mainly of spreading hatred, violence, and racism.

In this way, cyber terrorism directly affects the national security of the state.

Differences between cyber terrorism and other types of high - tech crime

The high-tech crime is special in a series of its own features and as a transnational organized crime, which is constantly developing, creates new challenges to the national security of the modern states.

Cyber terrorism cannot be identified with hacking activities involving unauthorized access to computer networks to disrupt their work without the intention of causing great harm. The terrorists can use hacking techniques to draw attention to their functioning, but this does not constitute cyber terrorism or a terrorist attack. It is just another indicator that shows that all advanced technology can be used for illegal purposes.

Illegal attacks and threats of attacks on computers, information networks and information stored in them as the main tools used by terrorists in order to intimidate the public, force the government, are usually hidden in cyber terrorism.

Cyber terrorism should also be distinguished from "Computer War" - manipulation of computers and computer networks in the context of interstate conflicts. The computer war is carrying out offensive and defensive activities of state structures in international conflicts. Cyber Terrorism and Cyber War can be matched to the use of certain methods, for example, destruction of computer networks, but this does not mean that it is the same activity. Cyber terrorism is not an illegal circumvention of the rules for using computer equipment and the Internet in general, by the terrorists.

In one sentence it can be defined as ideologically motivated attacks on computer systems, databases and networks, applications, carried out with the help of information technology and has the effect of causing fear, violence and substantial material damage to non-combat targets with aimed at influencing the public and political processes. Cyber terrorism is identified with the use of a high level of technological means against high technological goals (Krasavin, 2003).

Comparing the real threat of cyber terrorism with the threat of everyday terrorism that also uses advanced information technologies, should be considered into two separate aspects that deserve particular attention and analysis. The decision whether special counter terrorism measures are needed depends not only on the fact of the real threat of cyber terrorism, but also on whether there is potential support for information technology in the implementation of a terrorist act.

Cyber terrorists can work anywhere in the world and can hide their identities far more efficiently than terrorists who act in a traditional way.

This avoids the use and handling of explosives and the implementation of suicide missions. But it is not possible for terrorist targets to be delt with classical methods, and their destruction is not possible at a distance and without their own terrorist victims.

Some targets such as communication systems, power systems, traffic links, cannot inflict such a great damage on a classic terrorist attack and cause such great fear as it can with Computer Terrorism. The purpose of attacking computer terrorists can take place in thousands of kilometres of their physical activity, that is, from their operational base, which is protected from detection and detention.

Characteristics of cyber terrorists

Cyber terrorists often collaborate with weak states or states that have ineffective or corrupt security agencies in order to act more effectively.

Most hacker attacks are kept secret and are concealed from the public primarily to avoid panic and prevent an increase in distrust over the system, but a successful computer-made terrorist attack cannot be hidden from the public.

Developed information technology allows terrorists to access targets they cannot otherwise come across, for example, such as national security and defence systems.

Terrorism regarding the use of information infrastructure still has some limitations.

Although computer systems are vulnerable, they are complex structures. This alone means that monitoring the implementation of the attack itself can be complicated, as is the desire to achieve the desired damage. Except in case of casualties, deaths of people, etc., the attack on the information structure does not cause an emotional reaction and the success of the attack is not complete. As a result, terrorists are not motivated to use new methods and techniques, unless the traditional way of acting is considered appropriate.

As long as distant attacks cause convenience to terrorists, they also cause feelings of insecurity and difficulty in controlling the results achieved. If the terrorists are not sure they will achieve the desired result they are not inclined to experiment.

Terrorist groups are developing in environments where young people have limited opportunities for advancement in their societies. The phenomenon of transnational crime, terrorism and corruption is often seen as a distinct phenomenon. These phenomena have increased in tandem because the economic and political conditions that lead to these phenomena are quite similar. Terrorists are most often found in developing countries. In these countries, illegal businesses are the largest and most profitable.

They are so big that they have an impact on the political and business scene. The huge revenues from illegal businesses allow them to hire the best experts and specialists both in their countries and internationally thus, facilitating the use of information technology to promote their activities secretly, and to cross borders without disclosure.

Some of these experts do not know they are working for terrorist organizations, others would work voluntarily, because they are well paid.

But of course, one should not underestimate the human factor. Vital systems may depend on information technology, but there is still enough human supervision and control to prevent work hardship and cope with outstanding and unexpected situations.

Terrorists use information technology as a useful tool for support, as well as the benefits of modern technological advancement in order to advance their activities. They use the computer as a means of communication, for storing data, spreading propaganda, recruiting members, gathering data, etc. The terrorist groups themselves are aware that information technology hinders their secrecy, especially in the area of communication, the use of e-mail as one of the means of communication (Shelley, A, & P, 2003) .

Any individual who has hostile intentions and also has a computer knowledge can inflict cyber terrorism.

Four major categories of cyber terrorists are distinguished:

- **State-sponsored hacker groups** – state-sponsored cyber terrorists are in a growing boom and growth. The activities of these terrorists are from disabling state-

run computer networks and systems to breaking through vital government information that is later used to exchange information with another state;

- **Criminal gangs** - most of the criminal gangs are involved in cyber space. Their activities relate to the manipulation of bank accounts, stealing data from banks in order to make financial gains;

- **Unsatisfied insiders** - by reducing the number of employees in organizations, causing dissatisfaction with the fired. Employees from all sectors, even people who have sensitive and secret information, are dismissed. The desire for revenge and the great dissatisfaction of these laid-off workers poses a serious threat to the organization's cyber security;

- **The politically motivated hackers** - the purpose of this group of hackers are to disable computer systems and networks of large organizations in order to provide fair play in cyber space. This fair play refers to the realization of better human rights, better conditions and standards of work, etc. (www.vocabulary.com).

Most of the social activities are carried out with the help of computer systems and networks, such as electricity transmission, military operations, military sphere activities, business orders, payment of basic products, money transfers and many other operations, that is, activities that depend on the functioning of a state. All these infrastructures are well protected because they are vital for the functioning of a state. They have the highest level of security and state-of-the-art computer systems in favour of their protection.

But we are never sufficiently protected and safe. As states work on their cyber security, cyber terrorists are also working to increase their power.

If a cyber attack on electrical infrastructure would be performed, then the effects of cyber terrorism would be the strongest. This would result in the disruption of the supply of electricity, and in such circumstances where basic activities in a society cannot be carried out, the consequences would be disastrous. State, public and individual security would be endangered and thus the state would be exposed to attack.

In this case, banking and financial functions are difficult, leading to large financial losses, and in the case of citizens, there is fear and panic for their finances.

A large effect would also be caused if the control systems of both air traffic and ground traffic are taken over. In that case, it manipulates the navigation systems, regulates the speed of the trains. As a potential and one of the biggest goals of cyber terrorists would be an attack on the health system. Given that the entire healthcare system is computerized, and we all have electronic health cards, it is a tempting target for cyber terrorists. In our electronic records we have entered our personal data, health history, diseases etc. By introducing this system, terrorists can change people's health cards, treatment therapies, and so on, causing catastrophic human losses without wasted weapons (Collin, 1997).

Cyber Terrorism is 24/7, 365 days a year, a giant who never sleeps. One should invest in technology and experts who will monitor the systems 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.

Most citizens have never been in contact with any form of terrorist violence, but become aware of this form of an only ancestor mediated by the media.

Obviously, terrorists use the advantages of information technology, but there is no clear picture whether and when information structures become their target of attack. There is a risk of attack regardless of the protective measures, although the current fear of attack may be greater than the real danger.

The Internet provides a wide range of information that is freely available, for example, it has at its disposal the instructions and materials needed to create a chemical, biological weapon, or a bomb. This means that anyone who wants to make a bomb, assassinate, kidnap, renders all information, tactics and techniques available for the abovementioned activities.

With the development of information technology today we actually live in a cyber society. We constantly adjust the society in step with the latest technologies, and by doing so we consciously or unconsciously challenge ourselves to be exposed to new types of threats to our national security, both public and private security.

Information technology contributes greatly to the fight against terrorism, the rapid exchange of information, the cooperation of several security agencies, the implementation of better analyses, etc. Today, more than ever, the world must unite through technology.

The European Commission has asked all European Union member states to classify as a terrorist attack any "attack by accessing into the information system" if it leads to serious changes or destruction of political, economic or social structures. France has extended police authorization in the area of private property search without a court order when it comes to suspicion of a terrorist act. Spain limits the activities of any organization that is directly or indirectly linked to the ETA (the Military Basque Nationalist and Separatist Organization), the German government has reduced the restrictions on phone coverage, monitoring of e-mail communications, bank accounts, etc. Terrorists are always one step ahead of the anti-terrorist teams and their activities, they always look for the weakest point of defence and focus on attacking it. Of course, this does not mean that we should surrender in advance, and give up the fight against terrorism, especially in the information sphere. It must be balanced between the actual level of threat and the level at which the use of information technology is not limited, and should focus on preventive action and prompt assessment and repair of any damage. For example, the fact that terrorists use the information technology for encrypted communication does not mean that the legal possibility of encrypted communication should be abolished. In other words, the development of security measures should focus more on efficient and quality human control of vital information systems and effective

crypto-protection, and less to limit the use of information and technology achievements that are generally socially useful. The Internet offers many opportunities, of course without special regulation, it offers a huge audience, anonymity of communication and a rapid flow of information (Gjosheva, 2017).

Cyber terrorism is carried out in cyber space. "Cyber Space" or computer space is the term first used by William Gibson in 1984 in his science-fiction novel "Neuromancer" as a domain term that encompasses network communication on computers, the most prominent example being the Internet.

Cyber space

Cyber or Internet space implies a global information environment, consisting of mixed civil and military information networks and technology, with electronic paths that link groups, individuals, organizations and peoples around the world, exchanging a large amount of diverse data and information, and forming a virtual world - computer space.

It is a huge area in which classical terms, state border, border crossings and customs are losing any sense, and are increasingly becoming an arena for new types of diverse confrontations.

This is especially important because nowadays most countries already have substantial resources on the basis of information technology, including defence systems, administration systems, complex control systems, and other information-dependent areas. Those who still have nothing to do with this plan are doing their best to achieve certain results.

In this context, it must be understood that future enemies, whether states, groups or individuals, may try to compromise these infrastructures by using traditional tools as well as non-traditional computer methods.

Cyber space consists of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches and fibre optic cables, which allow their infrastructure to function and that proper functioning of computer space is the basis for economics and national security.

Securing cyber space is a particularly difficult strategic task that requires coordination and focus on the whole society, government, state and local systems of government and the private sector.

Strategic goals for securing the cyber space are:

- Preventing a computer attack on critical infrastructure;
 - Reducing the national vulnerability of the computer attack and
 - Minimizing the damage and time needed for recovery
- if an attack occurs.

In other words, cyber space is a virtual environment for information and interactions between people.

Attacks on vital information structures of society are very appealing to terrorists. How can the targets, such as military installations, the banking industry, air traffic

control, plumbing installations and other large centres that affect the normal course of people's lives be centralized. With the possession of a computer, it is possible to implement long-range attacks, with a high level of anonymity and with little financial costs.

The Internet and modern technology have brought many benefits to the modern man, but also to the terror of the terrorists (Jovanovic, 2014).

Conclusion

First of all, we need to have a strategy through which we will act.

One should keep up with recent developments in the field of cyber terrorism, learn all the latest threats and commit to improving their own electronic security, because security is a continuous process.

The governments themselves can bring new or complement existing laws related to cyber terrorism, by increasing the penalties for perpetrators (Beggs, 2004).

Cyber Terrorism is a threat to the future.

The unification of technological and socio-political trends suggests that cyber terrorism is a wave of the future.

If war is being conducted in cyber space, and if fighters of the future are irregular fighters, then cyber terrorism is a logical paradigm of future conflicts (Rathmell, 2003).

Cyber terrorism in the future will get more and more popular. It is an invisible threat. Having in mind the low cost and simplicity of initiating these attacks, by increasing the number of highly qualified professionals in the field of computers cyber attacks will be a normal occurrence in the future. If a state has an obligation to defend its cyber space, first of all it has to provide systems that will prevent unauthorized access. By rising the threshold of skills and the level of technology they can deter an attack on cyber terrorists in computer space.

The proposed SPECTRUM FCC plan aims to exchange problems in existing strategies to combat cyber terrorism. Although this plan is not definitive, it is intended to address basic problems in order to provide a framework for a full strategy to combat cyber terrorism. Cooperation of countries together will raise awareness of all issues including building a safe environment for all.

By understanding the existence of this threat, we are aware of its consequences, and by taking strategic plans, we contribute to having a secure information environment that will be productive.

Today, in the assessment of the threat of cyber terrorism, it is important to look beyond the traditional terrorist groups and look to well-trained cyber experts who already possess significant hacking skills. The next generation of terrorists will grow in the digital world, which will be more powerful and easily use hacking tools. They see greater potential for cyber terrorism than today's cyber terrorists, and their level of knowledge and skills in hacking will be greater.

REFERENCES:

- Gjosheva M. (2017) The New Challenges and Threats of the High-tech Crime on National Security. Skopje: Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Security, Defence and Peace.
- Rouse, M. (2010) Cyber terrorism [online] Available at: <https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/cyberterrorism>
- Janczewski Lech J., Colarik Andrew M. (2008) Warfare and Cyber Terrorism, [eBook] London: IGI Global, Available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.670.9033&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Krasavin S. (2003) What is Cyber-terrorism, [eBook] SANS (System Administration, Networking, and Security) Institute, Available at: <http://www.crime-research.org/library/Cyber-terrorism.htm>
- Bryden A., Fluri P., Shelley I. Louise (2003) Organized Crime, Terrorism and Cybercrime, [eBook] Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: Baden-Baden, Available at: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1d74/fd6fe31186f367d4b5d2d2af0c1f619b13fc.pdf>
Available at: <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/cyber-terrorist>
- Collin B. (1997) The Future of Cyber Terrorism. Crime and Justice International, 13(2), pp.15-18.
- Jovanovic, Milovan B. (2014) Internet and Terrorism, Novi Sad: Faculty of Economics and Law.
- Christopher B. (2004) Developing New Strategies to Combat Cyber-Terrorism. In: B. Christopher; M. Butler ed. „Innovations Through Information Technology“, IDEA GROUP PUBLISHING.
- Rathmell A. (2003), Cyber Terrorism: The threat of the future. RANG Reprint, RP-1051.
Available at: <https://www.ipredator.co/cyber-terrorism/>.

THE LEADERSHIP STYLE OF GENERAL MIHAILO APOSTOLSKI

Lazar GJUROV ¹

Bojan MIKLOSH²

Abstract: *Leadership has always been the crucial element in combat. The senior officer in the battlefield is always the one who the subordinates look up to, and the one that must estimate the situation, decide and take responsibility for the unit's actions. General Mihailo Apostolski as one of the key figures in the Macedonian History in World War II and is a distinctive example of an exceptional leader in the battlefield. The analysis of his leadership style led to some valuable conclusions explained and proved by the notions of many theories that have studied the characteristics of leadership.*

Keywords: *leadership, general, intelligence;*

Introduction

Wars are an inevitable part of the past and the history, and the way of winning wars is only by correctly and thoroughly practicing the skill of leading, directing and motivating people - leadership. Leadership is the fundamental element and necessity in conditions of war. Macedonia as a country with an exceptionally rich history is one of the few that abounds with characters who can be distinguished as examples of top military leaders. One of them is General Mihailo Apostolski. A brave soldier, distinguished officer, inspiring leader, smart tactician, great commandant and a true patriot- these are some of the characteristics that come to mind when talking about one of the most significant leaders who gave his merit in various ways to Macedonia and the Macedonian Nation- General Mihailo Apostolski. The actions that he is mostly recognized for is his contribution in the operations for liberating Macedonia and Yugoslavia from the occupational forces during the Second World War.

Apostolski has a very rich military background and an exceptionally interesting resume from a leadership point of view. As the commandant of the People's Liberation Partisan Detachments of Macedonia³ he was in charge of all operations of liberating Macedonia from the Fascist forces during WW2, and it was not unusual for him during the war to take initiative

¹ The Author is Associated Professor at the Military Academy "General- Mihailo Apostolski"-Skopje

² Army of the Republic of Macedonia

³ Stojchev, V. (2004). Military History of Macedonia, Skopje: "Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski"- Skopje, pg.569.

by doing things first, and to set an example to the people he led. Many times his determination, calculations of risk taking and the specific way he led the people through the battles are described in various sources. After the war he continued to serve the country in the newly established Yugoslav People's Army. He was a decorated general, member of the General Staff, army historian and president of the Macedonian Association of Arts and Sciences.

When regarding his leadership approach one can conclude without hesitation that General Mihailo Apostolski is the perfect representative for leadership and regarding his rich experience and military background he will serve as an ideal example for examining and analyzing the characteristics he possessed. In that respect, at the end of this work the authors will establish a strong basis in understanding the leadership style of Mihailo Apostolski and learning the crucial characteristics that all military leaders should have during wartime in order to succeed in their plans. For the research to be proper, all information will be drawn from primary sources - direct interviews with the general noted in Beldedovski, M. (2003). *Memories*. Skopje: Magor, where the general talks about his life before, during and after the war, and one of the most significant secondary sources - Solunski, K. (1974) "The Life And Work Of Academician Mihailo Apostolski", *Macedonian Review*, Skopje: Nasha Kniga, pg.162., where the author points out the core characteristics of General Mihailo Apostolski as a military leader and as a person of integrity and ethics. The information provided by the sources that depicted Apostolski's leadership characteristics will be referenced to a leadership theory from Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). *Practicing leadership: principles and applications*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. In order for us to find the scholarly description and explanation for the significance of possession of these characteristics, this research will not only provide information regarding his military experience, but it will also point out personal characteristics which will be connected with an event in his military career during the war.

Main body

When regarding the rich resume and biography of General Mihailo Apostolski one cannot connect his figure, his behaviour and his deeds to only one theory. Since he gave his contribution to many significant things in the People's Liberation War and as it is known war is unpredictable, the exceptional leadership approach of General Mihailo Apostolski cannot be explained with only one leadership or management theory, but by combination of several.

First of all, when talking about General Mihailo Apostolski, his personality and his figure, one must understand that he was a very orderly and disciplined military officer. Regarding his function as a commander of the People's Liberation Partisan Detachments of Macedonia that he performed during the People's Liberation War and the fact that he was responsible for forming military units throughout Macedonia⁴, one can conclude that he understood the military organization thoroughly and fundamentally and the way it was supposed to be functioning. Also, it is noted that although he was under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Headquarters of People's Liberation Army, he personally wanted to contact all foreign headquarters from the allied forces who were supervising

⁴ Beldedovski, M. (2003). *Memories*. Skopje: Magor, pg.170.

the battles and the outcomes in the territory of Macedonia in order to personally report about the situation on the ground⁵. It seems that the understanding of the core bonds, relationships and formation of the military organization is a basic knowledge required if one decides to lead troops. All this can be related to the Scientific Management⁶ and the fourteen principles that are common to all organizations including the Military Organization, or in this case the People's Liberation Army. There is another example which supports the fact that he was very aware of the function that he was executing and the chain of command he was part of.

When talking about great leaders there is one core characteristic that defines them as such - morality. General Apostolski definitely had that characteristic, first as a person, and then as a military leader. In Beldedovski's Memories it is noted that the General's biggest concerns when marching throughout Macedonia was the mountainous terrain, especially when the partisans needed to descend the mountain of Galichica. The General stated that he was concerned about the wounded that were mounted on horses, because there was no actual and usable path to go downhill⁷. Another example that depicts the General as a caring person is when he was marching with his brigade one of the intellectuals (who were coming with them) said that it would be good if he let them go, with the explanation that they were additional burden to the brigade. On that matter the general said:

"You can see that we don't even leave the wounded (behind us), and if you come to the point of being wounded, we will mount you on horses and carry you on with us"⁸.

By these examples it can be easily concluded that the General cared for the people he led, and being caring is the key characteristic to define one as an ethical leader⁹. Definitely there are a lot more examples that depicted the General's integrity, commitment and concern for the people he led, but these examples alone provide sufficient information to define him as an ethical leader.

Another theory that can be related to the figure and the behaviour of General Mihailo Apostolski is the "Operations management and the Quality movement" theory¹⁰. According to this theory and the core attributes of the "System of Profound Knowledge" model: Appreciation of a system, Knowledge of variation, Theory of knowledge and Knowledge of psychology, organizations are seen as comprehensive systems instead

⁵ Ibid, pg.133.

⁶ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). Practicing leadership: principles and applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.63.

⁷ Beldedovski, M. (2003). Memories. Skopje: Magor, pg.166.

⁸ Ibid, pg.209.

⁹ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). Practicing leadership: principles and applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.23.

¹⁰ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). Practicing leadership: principles and applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.65.

of as discrete parts¹¹. Regarding some of the actions of General Mihailo Apostolski elaborated in Beldedovski's Memories, one can definitely recognize the characteristics of the System of Profound Knowledge. Starting from the fact that he never learned how to fight the guerrilla way of war¹², but he examined it and understood the core values of it and later on became a higher commanding officer of a very big guerrilla unit which was evolving into a conventional force, speaks enough of his Appreciation of the system and understanding its very essence. The functionality of the SPK model and its reference to the actions of General Apostolski can be condensed and proven by a statement from the General:

"But when I had decided on an "impudent" action, I tried to make the estimate as close as possible to the conditions and time which would give the best advantage, taking into consideration the partisans who fought and the weak morale of the occupying forces. I went with the confidence that we must win, and we did win" ¹³

By this statement it can be concluded that every great leader, as General Mihailo Apostolski, must be aware of his intentions, the actions he is about to make and the conditions that are a very important variable to the system. Only if one shows understanding and awareness of the system, he will be successful in achieving his goals.

All the things stated so far lead to another key characteristic that is of great importance to the successful leaders, the people who are capable of understanding the situation of their peers and their followers- Emotional intelligence and Social intelligence. There is a myriad of examples which imply of the General's possession of a high level of emotional and social intelligence. Regarding Goleman's Theory of Emotional Intelligence and Social Intelligence¹⁴ and using the leadership competencies¹⁵ which shape the leaders behaviour and approach, one can easily analyze General Mihailo Apostolski's actions and behaviour and understand their importance. Exemplifying the before stated, it is noted that when one intellectual who was attending the ASNOM (Antifascist Council of the Peoples Liberation of Macedonia) was asked by the General how was he, he responded with:

"It is good, but considering your behaviour, we never know what the situation is. You always say that it is all good, and yet we are still going from one battle to another" ¹⁶

This statement speaks a lot about the General's character. It appears that he remained calm in hard times, during battles and no matter what he did not let the people see

¹¹ Ibid, pg.66.

¹² Beldedovski, M. (2003). Memories. Skopje: Magor, pg.132.

¹³ Solunski, K. (1974) "The Life And Work Of Academician Mihailo Apostolski", Macedonian Review, Skopje: Nasha Kniga, pg.162.

¹⁴ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). Practicing leadership: principles and applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.90.

¹⁵ Ibid pg.92

¹⁶ Beldedovski, M. (2003). Memories. Skopje: Magor, pg.209.

fear on his face, meaning that he managed his emotions very skilfully. Self-confidence, self-control, adaptability, optimism and influence¹⁷ are some of the epithets that help in describing the emotional intelligence based on Goleman's Theory, and can be easily recognized in the General's behaviour. This is also supported by an article by Kotse Solunski - an author and a poet who wrote: "It could be said that, according to external indications, Apostolski displays gifted versatility. When he is speaking on a subject which has an emotional character, he - essentially a temperamental man - does not "supplement" sentences with mechanical gesticulation. He remains still, like the quiet tone of his voice. Tranquillity, dignity and confidence radiate from his every thought. Everything that is insufficiently known has an appealing force for him"¹⁸.

Elaborating further about the level of social intelligence and social awareness of the general, one can recognize Mihailo Apostolski as a greatly conscientious man and leader. He knew the history of the Macedonian people and all the misery and tragedy that they have been through. The Second World War was another hard period that meant nothing but suffering for the regular people (as every war) and as Solunski noted:

*"acquainted with the militant past of the Macedonian people, Apostolski knew that the decision of the people would be to fight, and he himself did not have any kind of dilemmas and expectations. He was a fighter, and a brave one. He was at the front immediately, in the first line"*¹⁹.

While analyzing the next statement of Apostolski, one can note a symbiosis of many leadership competences from Goleman's theory which can be made:

*"I think that the basic reason was that I did not permit (for them) to take vengeance on the Bulgarian prisoners, to kill them. I thought that the imprisoned soldiers must be respected, in accordance with the international law. I did not permit those soldiers to be killed, but that bothered someone."*²⁰

By the writings of Solunski one can clearly understand the level of social awareness and social intelligence of the general, but also one must understand that he was actually an officer of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when the war started, and when he joined the partisan movement it was a point of no return, because that would be regarded as treason. In one point in his article Solunski praises the determination of the general and his decisiveness stating: "The character of Apostolski appeared here in the form of conscious determination - decisive and brave. He was familiar with the military regulations regarding illegal political activities of military persons and aware

¹⁷ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). Practicing leadership: principles and applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.92.

¹⁸ Solunski, K. (1974) "The Life And Work Of Academician Mihailo Apostolski", Macedonian Review, Skopje: Nasha Kniga, pg.161.

¹⁹ Ibid,160.

²⁰ Beldedovski, M. (2003). Memories. Skopje: Magor, pg.286.

that military courts were not tolerant and forgiving. Nevertheless, all that did not stop Apostolski from following the way of his people²¹. Here in this example we can see the understanding of the risky nature of the decision that lay before him when joining the partisan movement.

The afore-elaborated about the possession of emotional and social intelligence according to Goleman's theory and the information from the article of Solunski, can be put condensed in one paragraph that describes Apostolski's attitude, approach, emotional intelligence and persuasiveness in the best way possible: "The expression on his face and in his eyes at that time conveyed the message that the solution for a successful result had already been found and now must only be carried out. It is not in his nature to take risks. He does not leave anything to chance. Industrious and meticulously, he discovers and studies all possibilities that could eventually materialize in the realization of the desired aim"²².

Analyzing the facts from the material used for the research, from the aspect of leadership, one can conclude that before deciding to take the first step in leadership one must be aware of the emotional and social intelligence in possession. In my opinion that is the crucial characteristic when defying leadership that covers all the core attributes of a leader. As stated in the table of domains and competencies of Goleman's theory, and as supported by the examples from the general's resume, first of all, one must be conscious of the personal characteristics in possession - therefore one must be self-aware to develop awareness for his/hers surroundings. By knowing the personal strengths and weaknesses one should reinforce the personal strong points and develop a plan of improvement of the weaknesses and work on them with considerable amount of self-confidence.

The lack of control of the feelings can be a crucial influence factor in the leader's work, especially in times of war, and almost always that leads to an unpleasant outcome, from which can be concluded that one must master self-management. Many of the examples testify to the fact that these characteristics were proven to be crucial in times of war, and if one finds himself/herself in a situation like that he/she better be in possession of these attributes. As presented in the examples about the general, it can be noted that he remained calm in hard times which evidences his stress management skills. Regarding the fact that Apostolski was conducting a guerrilla fighting, he and his troops were forced to change their position constantly, it can be noted that he had exceptional ability to adapt to new circumstances and environment. He always knew what to do and never lost a focus of the goals that needed to be achieved, which proves his determination and the last example given more than sufficiently depicts how his followers were seeing him.

²¹ Solunski, K. (1974) "The Life And Work Of Academician Mihailo Apostolski", Macedonian Review, Skopje: Nasha Kniga, pg.158.

²² Ibid, pg.162.

All leaders need followers, therefore they must be socially aware and develop social skills. The leader is the one who senses the emotion of the group, he is the one who feels how the organization breathes, and being open to the followers means that they can always rely on him and be sincere and open in stating their opinion. Being socially aware and mastering that part of emotional intelligence establishes a strong foundation for building bonds and relationships with the followers. Starting from there, the leader will have the opportunity to influence the followers in a non-coercive way, inspire them and achieve the set goals.

From the statements above, it can be concluded that if one does not possess enough emotional intelligence it is more than probable that he will end up being just a manager. Although, being a manager is not a negative thing, it must be understood that the leader is the one who makes the changes and leads the people to progress. If this is to be achieved, the leader must work on focusing on the process of getting things done and the people involved, and not only on the task itself. By doing that he will improve his social awareness and his relationship management skills.

Another thing that is in close bond with the emotional and social intelligence is the morale and the ethics of the leader. After engaging the first steps of the leadership and after self-reflecting and acknowledging the personal strengths and weaknesses, one should acknowledge the followers, their condition, needs and competencies. This is another core characteristic of a leader, as stated in the Ethical Leadership theory caring for the people is of crucial importance if one seeks to gain the respect of the people who are following him/her²³. The general's situations throughout the war, depict a clear and vivid picture of how caring for the people should look like, and how it should be executed. This should be kept in mind because, many times organizations are regarded as a "dead" structures, where all the people know their responsibilities, possess the skills and are aware of the deadlines that ought to be met and should channel their effort to do so. Considering the material and the examples from General Mihailo Apostolski's past, it is clear that the picture of a "dead" structure of an organization is not truthful and right from leadership perspective. Ethics is based on trust, honesty, integrity and openness to the subordinates, and all that can be condensed in the care provided or the concern shown for the people that the leader is leading.

Regarding the organization as a full system that is constantly seeking the gaps to be improved, as well as keeping the progress and the content of the organization in the focus, basically describes the operations management and the quality movement²⁴. In this theory, the System of Profound Knowledge is described by the appreciation of a system, knowledge of variation, theory of knowledge and knowledge of psychology²⁵. This concept makes a very thorough clarification in understanding the importance of

²³ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). *Practicing leadership: principles and applications*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.25.

²⁴ Ibid, pg.65.

²⁵ Ibid, pg.66.

having the “big picture” in mind and having the ability to foresee or predict the possible outcomes and the possible solutions which could deal with the eventual issues in the process. The first three elements refer to the organization and to the process itself, as for the fourth one - the knowledge of psychology - emphasizes the human factor in all processes and organizations. Understanding the characteristics and the way that the human psyche works can bring a lot of benefits and can also simplify the process of recognizing and addressing challenges. These characteristics could be gained from conscious thinking and observing the issue from many perspectives, and in order to shorten that process the leader should strive to practice this problem solving process as much as possible.

Since all the reference that is made throughout the work is about military leadership, referring to General Mihailo Apostolski, and serves as a reflective study for all current and future military leaders, the knowledge and the awareness of the functions in the military organization should be considered as an essential attribute to the leadership approach and observation. In the Scientific Management theory the premise that all organizations need a clear command structure is emphasized, Fayol identified 14 principles that he said were common to all organizations: specialization (division of labour), authority and responsibility, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of individual interests, remuneration, centralization, chain of command (lines of authority), order, equity, lifetime jobs (for good workers), initiative and spirit de corps²⁶. By regarding this example, it is clear that knowing how the military organization functions is of crucial importance for the military leader, no matter on which level of leadership he is positioned. If this is understood completely, the military leader would achieve the goals.

Leadership is a complex thing and it requires a lot of devotion on things that do not appear to matter at first glance. Personal development and improvement are the first steps in the leadership path and one can say the most important. Through this study one can see that being a leader requires some characteristics that can be recognized by the people and make them acknowledge you as a leader and follow you. The way the characteristics are acquired and built in a person is a matter of personal development. As it could be noted from the material and the examples from the epitomized leader General Mihailo Apostolski and his leadership experience and approach, one could conclude that the relations with the followers determine if the leader is successful or not.

Conclusion

As a crucial element and a basic need in times of war, by the analyzed leadership style of General Mihailo Apostolski, myriad conclusions can be extracted. First and foremost, if a leader knows himself - his weaknesses, his strengths, his emotions and masters the self-management,

²⁶ Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). *Practicing leadership: principles and applications*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pg.63.

only then he could be able to choose the best approach on how to deal with different problems and achieve the goals of the organization without losing faith and trust in his followers. As we had the chance to analyze the examples of the general, many times there could be information about his consciousness, his focus and his acknowledgement of the characteristics in possession. There is even information that he acknowledged his mistakes, and in that, one can see the actual magnitude of the man, which is a very important characteristic for a leader.

Secondly, the leader must know the organization he is in - the rules, the regulations, the structure, the obligations and responsibilities, the goals, if this is clear to him, then he will never lose focus of the goals, the mission and the status of the organization, and only then he will be able to persuade the followers to believe that what they do with him is the right thing and the right way to achieve the goals in the best way possible. It is inevitable to note that General Mihailo Apostolski was a man who definitely knew the structure of an army, was aware of the mission of the People's Liberation Front, and knew the tactical, operational and strategic goals of the organization. That combined to the personal knowledge acquired in the military schools, the personal experience and his instincts, he always knew how to estimate the risks and always made firm and precise decisions on what should be done. He, as a leader, never lost focus of the long-time goals, nor should any leader in the future let a situation or a problem swirl away the focus on the goals.

Finally, the leader must be emotionally intelligent in order to be able to communicate with the followers, to acknowledge their needs and to effectively solve the possible issues. Emotional intelligence is the key to leadership success. The leader must be aware of the level of his emotional intelligence and always strive to improve this feature. Every leadership characteristic in one way or another is linked to emotional intelligence. Decisions are linked to that, if the leader is not able to estimate the followers' mood about a certain topic, if he is not able to empathize with his followers, then every task that he will delegate will be sentenced to failure. Good decisions can only be made if the emotional intelligence is present in a leader's head and mind. Good relationships can only be created if the leader's behaviour is a fruit of his emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is the main reason why the leader is followed, why the decisions are good, why the goals are achieved and why everyone on the team - in the organization - is contented with the work done.

REFERENCES:

- Apostolski, M. (1986). "Vtoroto zazemanje na Kichevo", Studii i statii II. izd, Skopje: Nasha Kniga.
- Beldedovski, M. (2003). Memories. Skopje: Magor
- Shriberg, D., Shriberg, A., & Shriberg, A. (2011). Practicing leadership: principles and applications. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Solunski, K. (1974) "The Life And Work Of Academician Mihailo Apostolski", Macedonian Review, Skopje: Nasha Kniga.
- Stojchev, V. (2004). Military History of Macedonia, Skopje: "Military Academy "General Mihailo Apostolski"- Skopje.

WHY DID THE SOUTH LOSE THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Valmir HYLENAJ ¹

Astrit HALITI ²

Abstract: *This paper has been prepared based on an academic point of view. The American Civil War has been studied for a long time and the essay describes the war from this aspect. First, the strategy on both sides, the South and the North is elaborated. Second, the military forces and combat effectiveness are depicted and third, the ensuing political and economic consequences. Finally, this essay draws conclusions on the outcome of the American Civil War.*

Keywords: *Strategy, Civil War, the South and North, Political and Economic Aspect;*

Introduction

This essay will focus on the American Civil War with the ultimate goal of considering the question whether the Confederates lost the war and what were the main factors that determined the outcome of the war. The Civil War (CW) was the darkest war in the American history and showed its destructive character.³ At the same time, it could be said that the CW is the most ominous aspect of American history since its creation July 4, 1776.⁴ The war between the North and the South was a vast military struggle, a fact worth restating from time to time.⁵ The outbreak of the CW caught both sides unprepared for war; paradoxically, the people and both governments anticipated a short war.⁶ In the CW both sides used large military forces, many being more massive than most American cities.⁷ This war was characterized by the use of massive military forces on both sides, and as a result of this war, America was able to preserve

¹ MA. Valmir Hylenaj, PhD Candidate at the State University of Tetovo, Macedonia, Lecturer at the European College "Juridica" –Prishtina. vali.80@hotmail.com

² MA. Astrit Haliti, M.Sc. political sciences, University of Prishtina

³ Lt Cdr A McLennan, DRP, To what extent can the American Civil War be considered the first modern war? (Defence Research Paper, JSCSC, 2014), 11.

⁴ Howard Zinn. A people's history of the United States (New York: Longman, 1980), 71.

⁵ John T. Hubbell. Conflict and Command (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2012), 9.

⁶ John D. Milligan. Combined Operations in the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), 3.

⁷ Archer Jones. Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 59.

its status. The character of this war either in political, military, social or economic terms started as a result of two aspects - slaves and slavery status. Slavery is the core reason why the CW started. Although, it could be said that slavery was not the only reason and reasons such as, competing for nationalism, economics and states' rights are also to be considered. Also, some argue that the American nation, based on real American nationalism, was raised and developed hugely as a consequence of four years of bloody war between the North and the South.⁸ This war is the most prominent war which started during the first phase of the industrial revolution and changed this nation forever.⁹ The original United States was composed of thirteen individual colonies that clung to the Atlantic Ocean seaboard of the North America continent. It could be argued that the American system was not only morally wrong, but also inadequate. Along with the growth and strengthening of the country, the issue of slavery grew from a political aspect. This issue was the start of the problem and the political disagreements of the American class at that time. The most worrying point was the presidential election in 1860 and the elected president being Abraham Lincoln. In military terms, the CW started when the Confederate Commander at Charleston, on the 12 April 1861 received permission to start an attack on the fort, which surrendered on 14 April; it was at this point that the CW began.¹⁰ On the other hand, "politically the civil war started in December 1860 when South Carolina reacted to the election of Abraham Lincoln by seceding from the United States".¹¹ The CW witnessed huge mobilization, which was only higher during the Second World War. However, this war is of utmost importance since it made it possible to preserve the United States of America as a unified nation and restore the federal authority and government.¹² The CW also gave America a new life or a new birth of freedom as Lincoln put it at Gettysburg.¹³ The CW created conditions of preserving the unity of the state as a political whole, even though the human losses were substantial at the time of the CW. Moreover, the CW became the only way that the South and the North could resolve their great fostering differences.¹⁴ The CW introduced another way of conducting warfare; vast armies fought based on the characteristics of European warfare and it took place at a time when the power of the defense was approaching its apogee.¹⁵ Taking into account all arguments about CW this essay will focus on the Confederates' military strategy and their performance, the Union's strategy, the role of the leadership and finally it will analyze why the South lost.

⁸ Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid. *Themes of the American Civil War, the War between the States* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁰ Philip Katcher. *The Civil War* (New York: First Published by Arms and Armour Press A Cassell Imprint, 1982), 14.

¹¹ Jones. *Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat*, 1.

¹² Amy Renee Haines. "Total War and the American Civil War: An Exploration of the Applicability of the Label "Total War" to the Conflict of 1861-1865". https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10976/31/URJ32_Haines.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 15, 2018).

¹³ Gary Gallagher, Stephen Engle, Robert Krick and Joseph Glatthaar. *Civil War, Fort Sumter to Appomattox* (New York: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2003), 7.

¹⁴ Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones. *A Military History of the Civil War, How the North Won* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 1

¹⁵ Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattway, Archer Jones and William N. Still, JR. *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 15.

The Confederates' Strategy and Performance during the Civil War

This section of the essay attempts to give the readers a broad picture of the Confederates' military strategy and their performance throughout the CW. With the aim of analyzing the CW, this section will focus on the Confederates' military strategy and their performance. With the main purpose of analyzing the flow of the war and its outcome from a military perspective, we will consider the strategy as a crucial factor and we will analyze the performance during the CW. At the end of this section, a conclusion about the Confederates' military strategy and its effectiveness in comparison to the Union's military strategy will be offered. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by war and how he intends to conduct it."¹⁶ The strategy is crucial in defining the fate of war; however, every strategy is challenged by physical, political, material and military factors.¹⁷ Military strategy is closely linked with war's political objectives, so the military strategy of the Confederates had to respond to the political, as well as military considerations.¹⁸ After the CW commenced, the political and military leadership on both sides had very different approaches to the strategy and how to bring a quick end to the conflict.¹⁹ The CW, which started as a limited war, quickly gained great strength and developed into a total war. In the early months of the conflicts, both President Lincoln and President Davis wanted and hoped to fight a limited war. However, some historians argued and concluded that the CW between the South and the North was a total and modern war.²⁰ In many aspects, the CW was a watershed in the history of warfare, acquiring the form of total war, even though the CW started as a limited war.²¹ First and foremost, the strategy does matter substantially. Moreover, the planning and organization to start the war turned out to be of great magnitude and both sides and officials were forced to create European-scale war machines, essentially from scratch.²² During the CW, both sides relied on Napoleonic ways with turning movements and concentration of forces.²³ Since the dawn of history, strategy has played a major

¹⁶ John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray. *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 69.

¹⁷ Christopher Tuck. Lecture, "Strategy in the American Civil War" Defence Studies Department, JSCSC.

¹⁸ Borit. *Why the Confederacy Lost* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 49.

¹⁹ Bias Against "Military School". https://www.scarsdaleschools.k12.ny.us/cms/lib/NY01001205/Centricity/Domain/281/military_strategies__Northern_.pdf (accessed February 03, 2018).

²⁰ Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid. *Themes of the American Civil War, the War Between the States*, 68.

²¹ Gary Gallagher, Stephen Engle, Robert Krick and Joseph Glatthaar. *Civil War, Fort Sumter to Appomattox*, 17.

²² Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattway, Archer Jones and William N. Still, JR. *Why South Lost the Civil War*, 39.

²³ Borit. *Why the Confederacy Lost*, 9.

role in compiling the courses of action, logistic aspect, distance, time and terrain.²⁴ In this aspect, the strategy of the Confederates was designed to consider elements such as strategic and operational movements, planned objectives, actions and campaigns of military troops that led to major battles during the CW. The South strategy started as defensive in nature to protect the land already under Confederate control. At the beginning of the early stages of the CW in 1862, the Confederate strategy changed from defensive into an offensive strategy. This switch of strategy occurred due to the military necessity aspects and numerous external forces and factors that interacted with the Confederate military strategy and politics. Throughout the CW, military awareness was very important due to the communication between units in the front lines, logistic support and the proximity of the military engagement with the communities in the South. The Southerners made their feelings about the war clear through papers, editorials and public demonstrations. During this war, people received information and reports about battles, and the voice of the Southern people about the war and the outcomes of the war, to a certain extent, affected the military strategy of the Confederation. A clear example is that after a military defeat in Tennessee and Virginia in early 1862, the Confederates started to reflect, see and think about the end of slavery on a bigger scale than ever before. Also due to the black exodus of the North, the Confederate leadership commenced pursuing a strategy which was more aggressive and offensive.²⁵ However, material conditions and better logistic support enable armies to fight better and gain victory. In this regard, the Confederation had less material and logistic capabilities. This raised the question among the leadership of the Confederation at that time how to tackle the Union superiority in material and human resources. The main goal of the Confederation was to maintain its declared integrity, defending the Confederation as an independent nation, whilst at the same time protecting their citizens and their property. This was the primary goal of the Confederate government and it dictated the Confederates' initial defensive strategy in the following months.²⁶

In order to understand better the Confederates' strategy used during the civil war, some strategies will be analyzed. Four strategies, Davis' strategy of cordon defence; the second, Davis' offensive-defensive strategy; the third, Lee's protective strategy; and finally, Johnston's offensive-defensive strategy will be elaborated. The first, Davis' cordon defence strategy was used by the Confederates for most of the first year of the war and included the placement of troops around the confederation borders in order to defend the entire territory. Although this strategy had much political praise, it was

²⁴ Christopher R. Gabel. "Railroad Generalship: Foundations of the Civil War". <https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Confederate%E2%80%99s+Military+Strategy+and+Performance+during+Civil+War+pdf> (accessed February 02, 2018).

²⁵ Nathan Varnold. "Confederate Military Strategy: The Outside Forces that Caused Change". https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/178861/Varnold_colostate_0053N_13898.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 03, 2018).

²⁶ Milligan. Combined Operations in the Civil War, 3.

militarily disastrous, because in 1862, the federal forces, as a result of lessons from the western area of operation, launched an attack and had little difficulty in breaking the Confederates' military line of defense along the border. Due to the federal incursions, the Confederates abandoned their strategy of keeping all of their territories.²⁷ The second, Davis' offensive-defensive strategy was in nature as the previous strategy and followed the same path. As a result of this strategy, the Confederate government abandoned some areas which were less important to concentrate their main effort and resources on the protection of the key strategic areas or points. The Confederates were able to utilise their internal lines of communications, especially the railways, to rapidly change and shift their military forces to protect and defend the points from the Union. In doing so, the military forces could attack or gather force to rapidly reinforce their attacks. In essence, this so-called offensive-defensive strategy involved the adoption of a defensive position and attacks on the North military forces when conditions were favourable.²⁸ Third, Robert E Lee's protective strategy; it was basically a version of the previous strategy with a greater emphasis on the defensive segment, and it was adapted by Robert E Lee in the winter of 1862-1863. He recommended and suggested that the Confederates take the initiative and try to repel the Union's balance and superiority by attacking, focusing on and winning a decisive victory in this area over the North military troops, thereby convincing the North that they had to abandon their efforts to preserve the Union status.²⁹ In this regard, and due to the strategic and operational circumstances, Lee realized that the Confederation had no human, financial, material and logistic resources to carry out a lasting war and that, because of its losses in the Western area of operations they were facing an impending loss of the war. The only possibility to reverse this was to have a huge military victory over North military forces that would demoralize the people of the North and allow the Confederate armies to dictate the conditions of peace and allow the South to gain its independence. This strategy represented a considerable risk for Lee and with retrospective wisdom, it was doomed to fail. First and foremost, two invasions of the Confederates toward the North were not successful and did not achieve the required decisive victories and after Gettysburg in 1863, Lee had no men, and at the same time not enough government support to move to the North to Potomac for a third time. The circumstances of this situation reveal the major flaw in Lee's initial strategy and the cumulative loss of the most abundant resources of the Confederation.³⁰ The fourth strategy, the offensive-defensive strategy or Joseph E Johnston's strategy, had the same elements and it was also a variant of the second strategy with a special emphasis on the protection only as defensive. Developed and created for the Atlanta campaigns in 1864 by Joseph E Johnston, this strategy foresaw the deployment of

²⁷ John Cook. "Could The South Have Won The War?" <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8fd/8ea48938b9e660eealdb3046dd6f78a68bcf.pdf> (accessed February 04, 2018).

²⁸ John Cook. "Could the South Have Won the War?"

²⁹ John Cook. "Could the South Have Won the War?"

³⁰ John Cook. "Could the South Have Won the War?"

Confederation forces in a strong natural position, reinforced by further protection and further fortification on the ground, and expected the North military forces to attack. If however, the military forces of the North did not attack, but moved and went around the wings, then, Johnston declared that with his military intact, he would hit the enemy if that opportunity were to come and win without losing.³¹ This offensive-defensive strategy, as Frank E. Vandiver has noted, was formulated to protect and defend all resources under Confederate control in order to create conditions to maintain its armies and to counterattack when chances and supplies permitted.³² During the CW, the Confederacy was forced to wage strategically defensive war to defend its territory from conquest and preserve its military forces from annihilation.³³ Likewise, most Confederates accepted or recognised the importance of defensive military strategy and the necessity of conserving manpower which would be a crucial factor during the CW.³⁴ In the early stage of the conventional offensives, the Confederacy would squander its manpower instead of using non-conventional warfare. Moreover, this conventional offensive warfare did not touch the North's communication and transportation infrastructure.³⁵ Finally, it could be argued that the strategy of Confederates throughout the war was not universal in nature. In fact, Confederate President Jefferson Davis and General Lee jointly shared an identical military mentality of swift movement which aimed to be aggressive in order to defeat the military forces of the Union as quickly as possible.³⁶ The strategy was to punish the invaders and the objective was to discourage future attacks from the North. Every strategy has its flaws particularly one against an enemy that has superiority and manpower and more resources. In order to deal with this enemy, it is necessary to develop a sound strategy and utilize the resources more effectively. Finally, it could be argued that the Confederates' strategy might have had chance, if they were willing to concede territory and they could secure foreign aid and alliances. Two main factors influenced the formulation of the Confederate strategies: the first, the informal organization of westerners opposing Lee and the second, the friction of the conflicting strategic ideas.³⁷ It means that the Confederacy, in order to achieve victory, had to hold what it already possessed; that is, it had only to maintain itself.³⁸

³¹ John Cook. "Could the South Have Won the War?".

³² Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattway, Archer Jones and William N. Still, JR. *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, 47.

³³ Borit. *Why the Confederacy Lost*, 21.

³⁴ Peter S. Carmichel. *Audacity Personified: The Generalship of Robert E. Lee* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 2.

³⁵ Eleanor Dow. "The American Civil War 1861-1865". <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ewdow/Politics%20116/index.shtml> (accessed February 06, 2018).

³⁶ Nathan Varnold. "Confederate Military Strategy: The Outside Forces that Caused Change". https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/178861/Varnold_colostate_0053N_13898.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 03, 2018).

³⁷ Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones. *The Politics of Command, Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 170.

³⁸ Ibid.

The Confederates made their decision on the primacy of territory without reference to the enemy's strategy.³⁹ Moreover, the failed campaign of General Lee of Gettysburg in 1863, which caused such devastating losses in the Confederate side, is considered by many historians, to mark the beginning of the end for the Confederation.⁴⁰ Some argue that the Confederacy was unlucky in its failure to work out a general strategy of the whole war. Throughout the CW, the Confederacy did not have a grand strategic plan of the same type as developed by the Union, and at the same time there was no large overall plan of defence and offence which was to be followed throughout the war. The responsibility for this strategy or lack of a grand strategic plan rests on President Jefferson Davis.⁴¹ Finally, on the basis of facts it could be argued that the Confederate strategy was less effective than the Union strategy.

The Union's Military Strategy and performance during the Civil War

Having considered the Confederates, this section will focus on the Union's military strategy with the aim of analyzing it, its impact on the war and on determining the fate of the war. From a political aspect, the North was on the offensive toward the South and its strategic plan gradually evolved during the CW.⁴² It could be argued that "during the CW the North strategy changed as the conflict expanded from a limited war to restore antebellum status quo to an unlimited one to destroy slavery and sustain the social order and give the United States the new birth of freedom as Lincoln invoked during his Gettysburg address."⁴³ First, the primary goal of the Union was to restore the Federal government's authority over the seceded states; due to this fact the North developed and adopted an offensive strategy.⁴⁴ As often happens in history, the North strategy emerged only gradually.⁴⁵ The terrain played a crucial role because there were many notable points on both sides, for example, a large area of operation, inhabited terrain, geographical barriers, which both sides forced to coordinate specific military operations and movements of the troops.⁴⁶

It could be argued that "the most puzzling military aspects of the CW are not why the North finally won but, rather, how the South held for so long."⁴⁷ The main

³⁹ Jones. *Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat*, 143.

⁴⁰ Rebeca Beatrise. "What Were the Major Strategies of the Civil War?" <http://civilwarsaga.com/civil-war-strategies/> (accessed February 06, 2018).

⁴¹ Archer Jones. *Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg* (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 16.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴³ Robert Cowley. *Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy* (United States of America: Pimlico, 2003), 76.

⁴⁴ Milligan. *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 1.

⁴⁵ Cowley. *Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy*, 60.

⁴⁶ Milligan. *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 34

⁴⁷ William L. Barney and James P. Shenton. *Flawed Victory, A new perspective on the Civil War* (New York: University Press Of America, 1980), 4.

strategic problem facing the Union in the war with the Confederate forces was how to employ its almost full naval advantages against the Confederate forces.⁴⁸ For example, given the North in 1860 had over 90 percent of the nation's industrial output, the ability of the Confederacy to survive a modern industrial war for four years is remarkable, particularly having in mind that the Confederacy, in general, had additional problems with logistics and command and control. However, after the war started and became a long war, the political and military leadership faced a skillful opponent who was able to exploit its strengths and the weaknesses of the North.⁴⁹ On balance, the Union was more effective strategically, because the Union had better strategic performance during the American CW and concentration remained a priority for the North and at the same time the main operational strategy. Even though Robert Lee and Stonewall Jackson were probably the most celebrated generals during the CW, it was Ulysses S Grant that better performed during the war. It was Grant who fought and won the extended campaigns that sealed the strategic victory, by focusing more on simultaneity and a logistics strategy, because without enough supply and transportation, the North military forces could not achieve or enter the Confederacy's territory.⁵⁰ Also, the North's Navy forces blockade and capture of ports was one part of the logistics strategy with the main goal of depriving the Confederate military forces of key imports. Even though the North relied on a logistics strategy, it was necessary to conquer the Southern territory⁵¹. In this aspect, the North had better organization of the logistic activities during the CW, with respect to organization, supply and maintenance.⁵² The superiority or predominance of resources, including manpower, was a gift for the Union.⁵³ Another argument is that the North was more successful because its political and military leadership learned from its mistakes, especially Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant who solidified the North strategy and grasped victory from the wreckage of the early days.⁵⁴ The North relied on its huge advantage of population, agriculture, industry, financial reserves and resources.⁵⁵ The political and military leadership of the North created a strategy to defeat the Confederates by focusing on three factors or features; first, by blocking the coast, second, by securing the Mississippi and third, as the main goal, by capturing the capital at Richmond.⁵⁶ However, this grand strategy took a considerable amount of time to develop and deliver the final objective of restoring the Federal government

⁴⁸ Milligan. *Combined Operations in the Civil War*, 34.

⁴⁹ Jones. *Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat*, 128.

⁵⁰ *ibid*), 128.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁵² Herman Hattway and Archer Jones. *A Military History of the Civil War, How the North Won* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 136-137.

⁵³ Borit. *Why the Confederacy Lost*, 10.

⁵⁴ Cowley. *Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy*, 60.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁵⁶ Cowley. *Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy*, 63.

authority in the whole territory.⁵⁷ For example, public opinion claimed that the war would be short and require an invasion to destroy the rebellion. Also, Anaconda's plan included a complete block of the South coast and control of the Mississippi River. The reason for this was that the Mississippi River was the main inland shipping route in the South and was a valid transport and transportation route. Furthermore, river control meant that the Union military forces could isolate and capture Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana from the other Confederate states, and create conditions to split the Confederacy into two. This strategy created by the Union was so successful that it pushed the Confederates to counterattack aggressively in response. The Union began to fight the Confederate military forces more aggressively and at the same time, in 1864, General William Tecumseh Sherman led his military troops in his famous March towards the sea and his troops captured and destroyed everything they encountered. By 1864, the Anaconda plan had mostly been realized; the Mississippi was functional and open, the blockade was very effective and just one objective remained untaken, Richmond.⁵⁸ This further deprived the Confederate military forces of logistics and other items, such as, food and supplies they desperately needed in order to continue the military activities. When the capital of the Confederation, Richmond, Va, was captured in April 1865, the Confederate command was completely destroyed. With it the Union forces started to close and isolate the various units of the Confederate military troops along the South, forcing them to surrender.⁵⁹ American territory hugely determined the strategic problems.⁶⁰ In summary, the Union was more effective strategically than the Confederates during the CW. The main obstacles for the North were more logistics and due to that fact the North focused more on its strategy on the logistics aspect and concerns.⁶¹ Another important reason why Grant's strategy started to play a role in the Confederate decline after the Presidential election in 1864 was because Sherman marched from Atlanta to Savannah, whilst breaking railways, destroying factories, and stripping the countryside of slaves.⁶² Finally, the Union strategy and its performance during the CW was heavily influenced by geography. In this sense, the strategy was guided, and in a sense made, by geography.⁶³

⁵⁷ Ibid.,65.

⁵⁸ Ibid.,65.

⁵⁹ Rebeca Beatrise. "What Were the Major Strategies of the Civil War?" <http://civilwarsaga.com/civil-war-strategies/> (accessed February 06, 2018).

⁶⁰ Milligan .Combined Operations in the Civil War, 1.

⁶¹ Archer Jones. Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 128.

⁶² Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattway, Archer Jones and William N.Still, JR.Why South Lost the Civil, 434.

⁶³ Archer Jones. Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 13.

The Role of the Leadership during the Civil War

The opening section of this essay addresses and analyzes the role of political and military leadership on both sides. This section will touch upon two key leaders from the Confederate side, President Jefferson Davis, and General Robert E. Lee and President Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant on the Union side. Hence, it could be said that leadership was a significant contributor from the aspect of giving strategic direction, developing military strategy, planning and logistic support.⁶⁴ The leadership during the US war played extraordinary roles both in political and military terms. The political leaders both from the South and the North directly determined the flow and end of the war. However, given the limit of the words, this section of the essay will focus on the Southern leadership, reflecting also on the aspirations of the Northern leadership. Considering the Southern leadership of the Confederation we will focus on President Jefferson Davis as a political leader, and Robert Lee from a military perspective. The political leadership and difference in the character of both sides was significant in the war and in the outcome of the war. Some argue that Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederation was not a good leader. Attributes such as being rigid and austere were attributed to him and he struggled to manage his subordinates and generals. However, the military ability and knowledge were Davis's power and strength, but at the same time his weaknesses, because he focused more on military management and did not give finance, politics, diplomacy, and supply during the war the attention they deserved.⁶⁵ On the other hand, Abraham Lincoln, the President of the Union, was an incredibly gifted politician. Attributes such as warmth, charisma, and humour were his strong points and he was good at winning people to his side in order to win the war. Furthermore, he possessed the ability, flexibility, adaptability and ability to change tactics and to accept losing arguments if it meant winning the war against the Confederate leadership and military forces. His presidency was one of the triggers that initiated the war in order to restore federal government and at the same time he was the main human factor and responsible for the Union victory over the Confederate.⁶⁶ It could be said that the North engaged military forces and fought the war with a hand behind its back.⁶⁷ However, Lincoln's ignorance served him well and deterred him from giving too much of his time to military operations, but this was so difficult and served him badly, because he was forced to learn about the art of war, and how an army as a large and complex organization should work.⁶⁸ Lincoln as the

⁶⁴ Susan-Mary Grant and Brian Holden Reid. *Themes of the American Civil War, the War between the State*, 92.

⁶⁵ Jones. *Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat*, 15.

⁶⁶ Andrew Knighton. "Nine Reasons Why the South Lost the American Civil War". <https://www.warhistoryonline.com/american-civil-war/9-explanations-south-lost-american-civil-war.html> (accessed February 04, 2018).

⁶⁷ Borit. *Why the Confederacy Lost*, 20.

⁶⁸ Jones. *Civil War Command & Strategy, the process of Victory and Defeat*, 15.

President of the United States, had different characteristics, and very different from any previous or subsequent president.⁶⁹ Yet, both leaders had something in common, because both had only regional political strength. For example, Lincoln had dealt successfully with complex political situations, and on the other hand, Davis had done likewise without seeking office.⁷⁰ Another argument is that Davis' relationship with his generals is another reason for the Confederates' defeat. The relations with Johnston, Beauregard, and favoritism toward Generals Bell Hood and Braxton Bragg, or the failure to sustain Bragg and his fatal refusal to jettison Lieutenant General Leonid as Polk are all described as the major reasons or causes of disasters in the Western theatre, where the Confederacy lost the war.⁷¹ Conversely, Davis's reaction to General Robert E. Lee is perhaps one argument to explain the Confederate's relative success in the Eastern theatre. This dysfunctional partnership, according to biographer Craig L. Symonds, "was an unalloyed disaster for the cause they served and responsible in large measure for the failure of the Confederate war effort."⁷² In this regard, the Southern historian David M. Potter argued that "if the Union and Confederacy had exchanged presidents with one another, the Confederacy might have won its independence."⁷³ The argument goes that President Davis' shortcomings as a leader played a role in the Confederates' defeat. Some argue that Lee was the most audacious commander who has lived since Napoleon⁷⁴ However, another famous author Alan Nolan argues that Lee was a brilliant field commander, and does not think that Lee understood the grand strategy. According to this author, Lee should have pursued a defensive strategy similar to George Washington in the Revolution. Also, Nolan argues that Lee participated in the Confederates' defeat through his offensive oriented strategy.⁷⁵

Of all the army leaders and commanders including both sides, General Lee had the highest casualty rate. The argument or reason for this is that General Lee's offensive and defensive concept was applied to strategy, as well as to tactics.⁷⁶ For example, most historians have blamed and accused almost every prominent and distinguishable Confederate general at Gettysburg for operational and tactical mistakes that lost the battle, and among them Robert E. Lee himself, first for his mismanagement, overconfidence and finally for poor judgment.⁷⁷ However, some authors argue that the planned offensive campaigns conducted by Lee offered the South its best chance for

⁶⁹ Peter Cozzens. *Battles & Leaders of the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 104.

⁷⁰ Ibidm AJ.

⁷¹ Cowley. *Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy*, 73.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., 88.

⁷⁴ Carmichael. *Audacity personified, The Generalship of Robert E. Lee*, 3

⁷⁵ Cowley. *Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy* 7.

⁷⁶ James M. McPherson. *Battle Cry of Freedom the Civil War era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 472.

⁷⁷ Borit. *Why the Confederacy Lost*, 19.

success, especially, beginning with the seven days and culminating with his tactical masterpiece at Chancellorsville.⁷⁸ Finally, as an important and famous general, Lee bears considerable responsibility for the outcome of the war.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Grant was able to reorganize his military troops, reaching the level when he could understand the nature of war, and some historians argue that he had a clear vision and picture of what they wanted to do.⁸⁰ His success as a commander is due to his solid qualities, such as balanced judgment, courage, fixity of purpose, and sturdy common sense. As Wellington once said “When one is strongly intent on an object, common sense will usually direct on to the right means.”⁸¹ Grant’s military achievements were a product of his innate human qualities, due to his experience and environmental conditions.⁸² Moreover, he understood the basics or relation between politics and the military, and he understood that strategy had a crucial impact on the outcome of the CW.⁸³

Why the South Lost?

After analyzing the southern military strategy and its performance, the military strategy of the North and the role of the leadership during the war, this section will focus on analyzing why the South lost the war. First of all, the North overwhelmed the South with its great numbers and resources. In this aspect, the North started the war with huge advantages related to resources, personnel, logistic and military capabilities.⁸⁴ This was a huge advantage for the North which had more consolidated military position and more resources. For example, Lee merely recognized the facts due to the strategic and operational conditions, when in the spring of 1865 he conceded that the Confederacy, at the political and military domain had become morally and physically unable to maintain the contest.⁸⁵ There are two interpretations by many authors about the outcome of the CW. Internal interpretations about the CW focus mainly or entirely on the Confederacy side, and usually phrase the question “Why the South Lost”. On the other hand, external interpretations look at both the Union and the Confederacy, and often phrase it as “Why the North Won.” No matter which approach is taken, most authors and studies assume, at least implicitly, that the Union victory was inevitable.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ Carmichael. Audacity personified, The Generalship of Robert E. Lee, 9.

⁷⁹ Edward, H. Bonkemper, III. How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War (Virginia: sergeant Kirkland’s Press, 1999), 193.

⁸⁰ Stokesbury, L. James. A short history of the Civil War (New York: William Morrow, 1995), 213.

⁸¹ James Marshall-Cornwall. Grant as Military Commander (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), 221.

⁸² Ibid, 221

⁸³ Michael B. Ballard. U.S. Grant, The making of a General, 1861-1863 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2005), 4.

⁸⁴ Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattway, Archer Jones and William N. Still, JR. Why the South Lost the Civil War, 421.

⁸⁵ Borit. Why the Confederacy Lost, 11.

⁸⁶ Ibidg., 18.

Likewise, the Confederacy lost its war because the North had more men and guns and a better logistic strategy.⁸⁷ Similarly, they suggest that the North had a better industrial economy, railroads to transport supplies and uniforms faster, a larger population and more immigration. Moreover, the North successfully blocked the South with the help of the merchant fleet and naval ships and established a government, which gave the North a huge advantage because it was straightforward to function and work together. Linked to this essential aspect was the Emancipation Proclamation given by President Lincoln and this encouraged international support to the North. After this act, the North included many black men into the Union Army. Also, the North got support from other world powers, and on the other hand, the South did not.⁸⁸ After the end of the CW, Generals Joseph E. Johnston and Pierre G.T. Beauregard agreed “that the Confederacy should have won the war. The Southern people, wrote Johnston, were not guilty of the high crime of undertaking a war without the means of waging it successfully.”⁸⁹ It could be argued that the strategy on both sides was eminently straightforward. For the Confederacy, it was simple to defend its claimed national territory and gain international recognition to win the war. On the other hand, the Union aimed to reconquer and reoccupy the national territory to restore federal authority on the whole territory.⁹⁰ The notable failure of the Confederacy was its inability to grow excellent senior commanders. The Confederacy ended the war with those commanders it had at the beginning.⁹¹ Some arguments explain why the South lost the war; first, the South had a less strategic foresight, while at the same time the North had better strategic foresight; also, the North had better leadership, great numbers, and better logistics strategy and resources. The Confederacy possessed less population than the North; moreover, the people lost the will to fight on the Confederate side. These factors are crucial for the outcome of the war, even so it could be said that the Confederacy had a good chance to win the war, but after the Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the chance or hope to win the war was lost.⁹² The loss of territory and battles cast doubt on whether God truly favored the Confederacy and the Confederacy collapsed more from internal, than from external factors. The strategic decision by President Lincoln during the war, the Emancipation Proclamation gave the North a huge advantage and created more difficulties for the Confederacy, at the political level and in the military domain as well.⁹³ Other arguments why the Confederacy lost the war include: first, that the battle of Gettysburg had a huge impact; and was about resources, manpower, logistic; second, the political and social division

⁸⁷ Ibid., 20.

⁸⁸ Eleanor Dow. “The American Civil War 1861-1865”. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ewdow/Politics%20116/index.shtml> (accessed February 06, 2018).

⁸⁹ Robert Cowley. Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy, 73.

⁹⁰ Stokesbury, L. James. A short history of the Civil War (New York: William Morrow, 1995), 100.

⁹¹ Ibid., 211.

⁹² Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattway, Archer Jones and William N. Still, JR. Why South Lost the Civil War, 421.

⁹³ Ibid., 421.

in the South, which was connected to the will of the people to fight; and finally poor administrative leadership and slavery are also among the main reasons.⁹⁴ Some argue that the Confederacy collapsed due to the social divisions and because the North was able to defeat the military forces of the South. When analyzing the resources of the North, manpower, better logistics, strategic performance, industrial capacity, it could be argued that the Union victory was inevitable.⁹⁵ To win the war it needed to achieve brilliant maneuver, full mechanisms of war, and have supply systems to engage forces for simultaneous actions. During the CW, the maintenance of the strategic goal was key, and this was crucial to have unity of command or purpose and clarity in command.⁹⁶ To win the battles and the war, the military forces have to be deeply motivated. However, the South lost this aspect throughout the war.⁹⁷ The military leadership of the South, especially Lee in the spring of 1865, accepted the fact that the military troops are morally and physically unable to maintain the contest.⁹⁸ Even this was a signal that the Southern leadership felt that they could not continue the war. All these factors, starting with the leadership, political and social divisions, are factors that had a huge impact on the outcome of the war. Also, military, economic and industrial factors influenced the course of the war because this determined the actions during the war and eventually the outcome of the war. Finally, it could be argued that the great advantage of personnel, logistic support, better strategic performance, better leadership, better armaments for war influenced the North to win the four-year war. On the other hand, less manpower, less logistic support, leadership, political and social division, slavery are the main factors that contributed to the outcome of the war for the South and at the same time the loss of the war for the South.

Conclusion

As this essay has demonstrated, the American CW was the first modern war and this war shifted from a limited war to total war between the North and the South. The American CW was a bloody war and a dark chapter in the American history. The war lasted for four years from 1861 to 1865, turning the country into a theatre of operations for both sides. It is widely acknowledged that the American CW was an industrialized war. The reasons why this war began are different, but one of the leading factors that triggered this war was the slavery. Slavery was one of the main reasons behind the start of the CW; slavery was the core argument. Both sides wanted to have a limited and short-lived war. However, as time went on, the war

⁹⁴ Andrew Knighton. "Nine Reasons Why the South Lost the American Civil War". <https://www.warhistoryonline.com/american-civil-war/9-explanations-south-lost-american-civil-war.html> (accessed February 04, 2018).

⁹⁵ Aaron Sheehan- Dean. "Causes of Confederate Defeat in the Civil War". https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Causes_of_Confederate_Defeat_in_the_Civil_War (accessed February 10, 2018).

⁹⁶ Stuart Griffin. "Joint Operations". https://www.dle.mod.uk/pluginfile.php/899926/mod_resource/content/5/Griffin (accessed February 04, 2018).

⁹⁷ Borit. Why the Confederacy Lost, 10.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 11.

got more complex and developed into a total war with the involvement of all combat elements. Both sides developed their strategies to win the war; the North had drafted a strategy with the sole aim of returning control over the whole territory and restoring government authority. The South developed its strategy, with the only objective of protecting its territory and obtaining international support. Many historians have analyzed the American CW regarding victory for the North and the loss of the South; why the North won and on the other hand, why the South lost. This must be seen through many factors that led to the victory of the North and the loss of the South. In the planning and development of a war, several elements are essential, such as human resources, logistic support, movement and maneuvering, political and economic approach, etc. If these factors are to be considered, since the beginning of the American CW, the North was more consolidated in this regard, as it possessed more human resources and logistic support. Also, a comprehensive approach is required to wage wars, with respect to leadership, political approach and administrative organization of the war. In these aspects, the North was better led, and had more logistic support, better strategic performance and better logistic strategy to continue the war. Political differences among the leadership, hostilities, and a lack of will to fight the war were additional factors leading to the loss of the South. The Northern political class and the military leadership have managed to have a better strategic performance toward implementing the strategy. Similarly, not obtaining support for the South had great significance in the outcome of the war. Since the international community at that time did not support it, the Southern leadership could not obtain outside support during the CW. The North also had superior leadership and better management during the war. We can also argue that the internal factors at that time in the South had a huge impact on the outcome of the war; these factors were significant due to the political and social divisions within the South. Moreover, it could be argued that the Confederates lost because they suffered unsustainable casualties in combat. It is a well known fact that the Union had a numerical advantage with personnel and logistic support from the very beginning. This was evident throughout the war, and always gave the Union the ability to be in a better position. This advantage in combat power was a crucial factor in defining the fate and the outcome of the war along with the strategy, leadership, material and logistic factors, all of which played an essential role in the outcome of the war.

REFERENCES:

- Adams C.C. Michael. Fighting for defeat, Union Military Failure in the East, 1861-1865. United States: University of Nebraska Press. 1992.
- Borit, S. Gabor. Why the Confederacy Lost. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Borit, S. Gabor. Jefferson Davis's Generals. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Beringer E. Richard, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr. Why the South Lost the Civil War. Georgia: Georgia University Press, 1983.
- Bonekemper, Edward H, III. How Robert E. Lee lost the Civil War. Virginia: Sergeant Kirkland's Press, 1999.
- Burkhardt George S., Confederate Range, Yankee Wrath, no quarter in the Civil War. Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 2007.
- Barney, William L., James P. Shenton. Flawed Victory, A new Perspectives on the Civil War. New York: University Press of America, 1980.

- Balland, B. Michael. U.S Grant, the making of a General, 1861-1863. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 2005.
- Connelly, Thomas Lawrence and Archer Jones. The Politics of Command, Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy. Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1973.
- Cowley, Robert. Perspectives on the American Civil War, with my face to the Enemy. United states of America: Pimlico, 2003.
- Carmichael, Peter S. Audacity personified the generalship of Robert E. Lee. Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 2004.
- Cozzens, Peter. Battles & Leaders of the Civil War. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002.
- Corenwall-Marshall, James. Grant as Military Commander. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970.
- Gallagher, Gary W. The Confederate War. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Gallagher, Gary W., Stephan D. Engle, Robert K.Krick and Joheph T. Glatthaar. The American Civil War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003.
- Grant, Susan-Mary and Brian Holden Reid. Themes of American Civil War, The War between the States. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Hattaway, Herman and Archer Jones. A Military History of the Civil War, How the North Won. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991.
- Hewitt, Lawrence L. and Roman J Heleniak. The Confederate high Command. Shippensburg: White Mane Publishing Company, INC., 1990.
- Hubbell, T. John. Conflict and Command. Kent: Kent University Press, 2012.
- Jones, Archer. Civil War, Command & Strategy, the Process of Victory and Defeat. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
- McPhersen, M. James. Battle Cry of Freedom the Civil War era. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Milligan, D. Johen. Combined Operations in the Civil War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978.
- Katcher, Philip. The Civil War. New York: First published by Arms and Armour Press a Cassell Imprint, 1982.
- Ritter, F. Charles and Jon L. Wakelyn. Leaders of American Civil War. London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1998.
- Stokesbury, L. James. A short Story of the Civil War. New York: William Morrow, 1995.
- Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design, Strategy and the U.S Civil War: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Woodworth, E. Steven. The art of Command in the Civil War. London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
- Wood, W.J. Civil War Generalship, The Art of Command. US: Da Capo Press Edition, 1997.
- Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and his Generals. New York: Gramercy Books, 1952.
- Zinn, Howard. A people's history of the United States. New York: Longman, 1980.
- Tanner, G. Robert. Retreat to Victory, Confederate Strategy Reconsidered. Wilmington: A Scholarly Resources Inc. Imprint, 2001.
- Lt Cdr A McLennan, DRP “ To what extent can the American Civil War be considered the first modern war? (Defence Research Paper, JSCSC, 2014), 11.

- Surgeon Commander (D) P F Culwick Royal Navy. "Are Joint Operations new ? To what extent did joint operations affect the outcome of the American Civil War (Defence Research Paper, JSCSC, 2002), 5-7.
- Andrew Knighton. "Nine Reasons Why the South Lost the American Civil War". <https://www.warhistoryonline.com/american-civil-war/9-explanations-south-lost-american-civil-war.html> (accessed February 04, 2018).
- Aaron Sheehan- Dean. " Causes of Confederate Defeat in the Civil War". https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Causes_of_Confederate_Defeat_in_the_Civil_War (accessed February 10, 2018).
- Amy Renee Haines. "Total War and the American Civil War: An Exploration of the Applicability of the Label "Total War" to the Conflict of 1861-1865". https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10976/31/URJ32_Haines.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 15, 2018).
- Bias Against. " Military School". https://www.scarsdaleschools.k12.ny.us/cms/lib/NY01001205/Centricity/Domain/281/military_strategies__Northern_.pdf (accessed February 03, 2018).
- Cristopher R. Gabel. "Railroad Generalship: Foundations of the Civil War". <https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Confederate%E2%80%99s+Military+Strategy+and+Performance+during+Civil+War+pdf> (accessed February 02, 2018).
- Eleanor Dow. "The American Civil War 1861-1865". <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~ewdow/Politics%20116/index.shtml> (accessed February 06, 2018).
- John Cook. " Could The South Have Won The War?" <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8fd/8ea48938b9e660eea1db3046dd6f78a68bcf.pdf> (accessed February 04, 2018).
- Nathan Varnold. "Confederate Military Strategy: The Outside Forces that Caused Change". https://dspace.library.colostate.edu/bitstream/handle/10217/178861/Varnold_colostate_0053N_13898.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed February 03, 2018).
- Rebeca Beatrise. "What Were the Major Strategies of the Civil War?". <http://civilwarsaga.com/civil-war-strategies/> (accessed February 06, 2018).
- Stuart Griffin. "Joint Opetations". https://www.dle.mod.uk/pluginfile.php/899926/mod_resource/content/5/Griffin (accessed February 04, 2018).

HOW TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES¹

Krunoslav ANTOLIŠ²

Abstract: *It is quite legitimate to ask for improvement of the civilian monitoring of security and intelligence agencies, reaching in this manner a higher level of information security in the national security system. Croatia's model of overseeing the security and intelligence agencies in many aspects is unique, being at the same time more democratic compared with many other similar solutions in the European Union. The Croatian step forward, which was based on solutions similar to those in Norway and Portugal, has enabled a significant improvement in transparency in the work of security and intelligence agencies contributing at the same time to its further professionalization and depoliticization. Yet, although the civilian oversight system in the Republic of Croatia has been changing in the past fifteen years, there is a lot more to be done with respect to improvements under the condition that the policy is willing to accept them and the Parliament is ready to vote for them. Also, it is one of the best indicators of how much our society is ready to accept sincere transparency in what might be the most delicate segment of national security.*

Keywords: *civil oversight, security, intelligence, information security;*

Introduction

Information security plays an important role in all spheres of a country's functioning; its importance is particularly emphasized in the system of information and security. The component of intelligence oversight should be underlined as particularly significant component of information security system. The provision which creates space for depoliticizing oversight of the security-intelligence system is certainly a key step forward in the development of civil society in the Republic of Croatia, and it also constitutes an outstanding example as to how this can be done in the wider region and beyond. The oversight mechanisms which Croatia has instituted contribute to the development of democracy and depoliticization of the Croatian society, and may serve as an example to others as to how to make use of our experience and make a similar qualitative step forward in our own societies. Apart from all that was mentioned, we can add that there is a number of possibilities for legislator to essentially improve the position of the Council and at the same time to concretize its monitoring role.

¹ All statements made in this article are solely those of the author and in no way reflects the official positions or policies of the Republic of Croatia, Croat's Parliament, Croat's Government or Ministry of Interior.

² The Author is Associate Professor, Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, Police Academy, Police College

1. Intelligence oversight - some common features

The countries with developed democracies and the countries in “transition” have developed their own model of intelligence oversight, but all these models have some common features. One of these features is that intelligence oversight committees are specialized, no matter if the committees are formed after some intelligence and security scandal or by implementing some of the constitutional reforms. The committees are focused on security and the intelligence sector and in some cases are dealing with the whole security sector, while in others they are dealing with intelligence agencies with an exclusively focused oversight. Furthermore, the committees represent and reflect the political composition of the Parliament where the opposition has an important role in the decision making.

Moreover, in some countries the opposition holds chairmanship of those committees (Slovenia, Italy, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hungary). The mandate and powers of oversight committees are defined by law and have defined operating procedures. In some countries committees have a wide spectrum of responsibilities and in others, mandates and powers are limited to legality /1/. In both cases it is important to focus on the respect of human rights and legality. The wide mandate of intelligence oversight committees means dealing with operations and having greater power that results in a restricted way of reporting and operating “within the ring of secrecy“. The greater power usually means access to secret information and operations as well as being informed about important matters, but only in case when these matters are needed to perform the committee’s or the Parliament’s duties defined by legislation – on the “need-to-know” basis. The most frequent exceptions from the intelligence oversight committee’s access are sensitive information, operations, sources, operating methods, information from foreign entities, criminal investigations and judicial proceedings. The Parliament, in general, has a limited role in the intelligence oversight and it is mostly post-facto, relying on annual reports and discussions and only in extreme situations the Parliament can have a pre-emptive or ante-facto role in the oversight. After all, the main role of intelligence oversight committees is to contribute to the legitimacy of the intelligence and security services.

1.1.Ownership of the oversight process – some differences

Efficient oversight depends on the ownership over the complete process and on accountability of the Parliament being independent from the executive. It is crucial for the Parliament to establish an effective and an independent oversight committee. Consequently, one of the most important roles of the Parliament is appointment of members. In accordance with the membership structure, the oversight committee can include members of the Parliament (democratic legitimacy) or a group of experts and

can have a functional or an institutional approach. The essential role of parliaments in relation with intelligence is to compose the laws that clearly define the tasks and the means of intelligence. Good tasking is crucial for intelligence oversight. In some countries the committee performs the whole security sector oversight, while in others it is exclusively the responsibility of the intelligence oversight agencies. Furthermore, the oversight committee can have a wide or a narrow mandate, with great powers or with powers limited to legality. The wide mandate of the committees includes more responsibilities for legislation, budget, legality, efficiency in operations and top appointments, while the narrow mandate of the committees usually focuses only on respecting human rights and legality. The greater powers of the oversight committees mostly refer to the authority in inquiry, subpoena, access to premises, access to classified information and operations. Since most committees have no power of enforcement, the main job of the members of the Parliament has become making the issue interesting to the public. Therefore, the members of the Parliament have two important and legal oversight weapons: ability to give the impression that an issue is of public interest, and budget approval. Intelligence is necessary, but it is not the end in itself. It needs to be in service to national and international institutions.

1.2 Information access and safeguards surrounding information

When information access is mentioned in the context of intelligence oversight all necessary official approval (such as clearance) are important. Even if someone has the official approval to access certain information they should not actually access that information unless they have the “need-to-know” right. Moreover, the access to that information has to be a prerequisite for conducting one’s official duties. In essence, this principle aims to discourage “browsing” of sensitive material, thereby limiting access to the smallest possible number of people /1/. The most frequent exceptions from access to intelligence information include operationally sensitive information and ongoing operations, information related to sources and methods, information from foreign entities, international intelligence cooperation and judicial proceedings or criminal investigations. Identities and roles of human sources are among the most sensitive aspects of intelligence work and leaks of sources’ identity can jeopardize their personal safety. Also, dissemination of information about methods could render methods ineffective. It is only necessary when the oversight mandate refers to investigation of suspected serious crime like corruption or human right violations. Judicial proceedings restrictions are applied in order to safeguard both the right to a fair trial and the state’s ability to investigate and prosecute crime /2/. Information from foreign entities and about international intelligence cooperation can have profound implications on oversight because the sharing of information between intelligence agencies has increased exponentially over the past decade. In some of these cases, intelligence agencies assess whether and when this information will be available to the committee and this

assessment makes them responsible for potential manipulation of margin of discretion. Access to classified information comes with the obligations regarding the security of information. Parliament has to take steps to ensure that classified information, to which they have a privileged access, is handled in a way that does not lead to leaks or other forms of unauthorized disclosure. A failure to handle the classified information correctly may lead to violations of the right to privacy, compromise the effectiveness of intelligence activity and put the persons working for these agencies at risk /3/. Equally, it may significantly undermine oversight. Parliament's ability to maintain secrecy is vital for gaining the trust of the intelligence agencies and the executive. Therefore, it is important to implement certain specific measures. Firstly, these measures include ensuring appropriate persons are appointed to oversight committees. Security clearances, based on vetting, are one of the main policies to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information. Second is political responsibility of Parliament to appoint members of the committee, the people viewed as being responsible and acceptable to other parties and to the executive /4/. Security clearances and nondisclosure agreements for staff is one of the most important steps in ensuring information security as well as physical measures (meetings in camera, access only in the Parliamentary or agency's offices). After all, there are penalties for unauthorized disclosure as another measure of information security.

By observing the operating mode of intelligence services which follows the steps of the intelligence cycle, the Parliament can define their own role in overseeing of some parts of the intelligence cycle. This theoretical construct provides a useful framework about the Parliament's responsibilities in the intelligence oversight. At the first step in the cycle, planning and direction, the Parliament's responsibilities include defining the intelligence mandate, Parliament's influence in the appointment of intelligence leadership and budget allocation to intelligence agencies. The second step, collection, is the most sensitive part of intelligence work and includes a few intelligence disciplines (ELINT, HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, etc.) The role of Parliament at this step is creation of legal mechanisms for the authorization of exceptions to access relevant information. Processing, analysis and dissemination result in final intelligence product and it is of great importance to ensure for this product to be timely, accurate and objective and to prevent the usage of intelligence products in politics. This is the responsibility of Parliament in the entire process as well as increasing the appreciation of politicians for intelligence reports. However, in order to establish a quality intelligence oversight, it is necessary to deal with many challenges. Nature of intelligence work, information sharing, technology development and methods of evaluation of intelligence efficiency, professionalism and accountability are some of these challenges. Parliaments have much work to do in bringing higher cohesion and coherence to the intelligence community. Legislation governing the use of special powers should be comprehensive and should cover all available techniques of information gathering. Also, one of the intelligence oversight committee's goals should be finding appropriate ways of measuring the

intelligence efficiency and professionalism. To achieve the ultimate goal, a quality intelligence oversight, the Parliament should have a tough attitude. There is no place for politicization of oversight and co-optation with members of Parliament, only for motivation and political will to make this system effective, professional and accountable. But, no isolated institution can do control, oversight and governance. It involves implication and responsibility at multiple levels. As strong and efficient as it could get, Parliamentary oversight will never replace the other distinct levels of security accountability.

All these levels should work complementary and reinforce each other in the following way:

- Internal control - at the level of the agencies
- Executive control - ensured by Head of State and his Cabinet, Ministers, advisory and coordinating bodies
- Parliament - the most holistic approach to oversight doing legislative framework, mandates, tasks and budgets
- Judiciary - doing the supervision of compliance with legislation, the action when violation of acts or a conflict of principles is submitted to them and the approval of usage of special powers
- Independent bodies - doing investigation and report on complaints against agencies
- Public control done by media and civil society

External actors - doing the pressure or power of attraction (European Court of Human rights).

2.Examples of oversight models

The Parliament has a very responsible role in designing a workable relationship between liberty and security regarding the intelligence oversight. Therefore, it has several challenging objectives to reach. The first objective is to establish mechanisms to prevent political abuse. Secondly, it has to ensure a stable, politically bi-partisan approach to security which is good for the state and the agencies themselves. Also, the Parliament's responsibility is to uphold the rule of law and to ensure proportionate use of exceptional powers in order to protect civil rights.

Models for oversight of security and intelligence agencies are numerous in the world and this review of their work will give insight into advantages and disadvantages of the Croatian model which was set up under their influence. Yet, Croatia's particularity and historical development have made the Croatian model closer to or further away from those which will be described in this paper. The Croatian solution is certainly more interesting to the states faced with similar problems to those which Croatia had in establishing the law-based state, but it should also to be enhanced. Improvements are firstly related to establishing a quality legal base which, founded on the fifteen year old system, could contribute to a better and more efficient work of the Council, but also a better functioning of the security system in the future.

The following examples will give us a closer look at the particularities of the systems of some states which are more or less similar to the system that Croatia has at the moment.

2.1. USA

The USA has 15 security and intelligence agencies based across multiple state departments and 2 Committees dedicated to oversee the whole Intelligence Community /5/. In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 1977 were established, both committees with the same mandate. Memberships of committees are appointed by the Senate and House leaders and have wide spectrum of oversight responsibilities from legislation, budget, legality and effectiveness, operations and top intelligence appointments. Both, the Senate and the House Select Committees have authority to subpoena, to authorize covert operations and have full access to information, which makes them the most powerful committees in the Intelligence Community of the USA /7/. In 1978, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act – FISA to review national security wiretap requests and is specialized for authorization of the use of special powers /6/.

2.2 The United Kingdom

UK's intelligence and security oversight model is based on executive responsibility, rather than Parliamentary ownership. Three agencies: Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee established in 1994. The Intelligence and Security Committee, unlike most western countries, has a statutory basis (not only the Standing Orders). The 2013 Justice and Security Act brought some formal changes regarding the Intelligence and Security Committee. Members of the Committee are appointed by the Parliament, but only between candidates nominated by the Prime Minister after consultation with the opposition leader. The Chairman is chosen by the members of the Committee. The Committee has quite a narrow mandate (administration, policy, budget review) which was broadened in 2013 by the Justice and Security Act. Since then the Committee is required to report to the Parliament and is allowed, in specific circumstances, to enquire into operational matters. The Committee reports to the Prime Minister, who can, unilaterally or in consultation, delete the text from the Report before publishing or delaying its release.

The comprehensive legislation on information gathering, in particular the Regulation on Investigatory Powers Act - RIPA 2000, and well developed independent institutions complements its work /8/.

2.3 Germany

The German Parliamentary oversight model was formed in 1956 when the chairs of the political groups in the Bundestag in agreement with the Federal Government created the Parliamentary Group Chairmen's Panel. In 1978, the Group Chairmen's Panel was renamed to Parliamentary Control Commission, and in 1999, it changed to the Parliamentary Control Panel. The Parliamentary Control Panel has responsibilities to oversee three agencies: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV or the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD or the Military Counterintelligence Service) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND or the Federal Intelligence Service). The Panel has had 11 members since 2009, and the members are appointed by Bundestag. The Chairman of the Panel alternates every year between the Parliamentary majority and the opposition. The G10 Commission of the Bundestag verifies the activities of intelligence services that affect the fundamental right to privacy of correspondence, telecommunications and posts regulated by the Article 10 GG. The legal basis for the oversight performed by the Commission is the G 10 /9/. The confidential Committee of the Bundestag is a body which approves the budget of intelligence agencies.

2.4. Romania

Romania started with constitutional and legislative reforms regarding the intelligence services. There are seven intelligence and security agencies and four oversight Committees. Two main services have one special oversight Committee each, while the other departments with intelligence activities are under jurisdiction of the defence Committee. The first challenge for Committees was to find out how many agencies perform intelligence activities, what are their powers, what is their budget and if there is any relationship between them and other parties such as the military and the police, according to Born, H., Geisler, G., (2012) .

The members of Committees are elected by the Parliament and one of the four Chairpersons is elected from the government party. The strong legislative base defines a wide mandate and powers of the oversight Committees. The mandate includes responsibilities for legislation, human rights, complaints and appointments and budget control. The Committees have powers to organize weekly meetings with intelligence services, to access premises, to choose their agenda for oversight, to request frequently written reports on specific issues. The meetings are closed, but sometimes they organize hearings or debates with independent experts. The oversight is post facto and reports for the Parliament are published at least once per year.

2.5. Norway

The Norwegian oversight Committee was established by the Parliament in 1996. It is composed of seven members appointed by the Parliament but independent

from political parties. The Committee is purely an oversight body. It has no legislative power, no budget control, no control over internal organization of the services, but has an extensive right of access to premises, documents and information by visiting customs, immigration authorities and military bases. It has the responsibility to inspect the headquarters of the Police Security Service, the National Security Authority and the Norwegian Intelligence Service. The oversight is usually post facto, but the Committee also receives regular briefings during ongoing investigations, especially on the use of intrusive methods by intelligence services. When the Committee detects an issue, it firstly communicates directly with the service and, when all issues are solved, each problem is published in the annual report. The annual report is read very carefully by the Parliament, government and services, according to Born, H., Fluri, P., Lunn, S.,(2010).

2.6. Portugal

Intelligence system of the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) consists of 2 intelligence agencies Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and Defence Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED). The SIRP framework sets a comprehensive mechanism of control and oversight of the activities of the intelligence services - Council for the oversight of the SIRP. The Supervisory Board of SIRP, as the inspection body is responsible for monitoring and supervising the activities of the Secretary-General and intelligence services, ensuring compliance with the Constitution and the law, in particular with the system of fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees of the citizens. It is composed of three citizens whose profile gives the guarantee that they will respect, during the mandate and after its term, the duties of independence, impartiality and discretion. Its members are appointed by the Parliament by secret ballot, by two thirds majority of members of the Parliament present in the plenary. Its regular oversight means report analysis every 2 months about the ongoing intelligence processes and these reports are not public, according to Born, H., Fluri, P., Lunn, S.,(2010).

2.7. Croatia and some neighbouring countries

Information security and intelligence oversight system in the Republic of Croatia have been transforming and adjusting over the past years in accordance with the organizational structure of the information and intelligence system, but also in accordance with the requirements of the democratic trends of modern society development.

Fifteen years ago, transparency in the work of security and intelligence system was strengthened by introducing the civil oversight of the security and intelligence system. This directly affected the state of human rights and freedom in the Republic of Croatia without disturbing information security, which could serve as a model to other countries in their development of security and intelligence systems. Over the past fifteen

years, since legally-instituted civilian oversight of the work of intelligence agencies in Croatia has existed, certain changes have emerged which significantly altered the structure of the intelligence services, as well as the authority, area of operation and functioning of civilian oversight.

Croatia's Security Agencies Act, which became effective on 28 March 2002, stipulated the establishment of a separate body, the Security Agency Oversight Council, which functioned *sui generis* as a Parliamentary body, but which operated independently in the formal-legal sense. Organizationally, under legislation enacted in 2002, the intelligence and security agencies were established in three components working separately: abroad, and domestically with civilian and military components. They were reorganized by legislation enacted in 2006 (as published in Croatia's official journal, NN, no. 79/06, 105/06 – correction), which is still effective today, so that currently there are two agencies, the Security-Intelligence Agency (Croatian acronym SOA) and the Military Security-Intelligence Agency (VSOA), i.e., civilian and military with operations at home and abroad, and the Telecommunications Surveillance Operative-Technical Centre (OTC), which is charged with "... activation and management of measures for the confidential surveillance of telecommunications services, activities and traffic..."

The Republic of Croatia Security and Intelligence System Act (NN, no. 79/06, 105/06 – correction), which became effective on 16 August 2006, additionally amended the specified authority (of civilian oversight), i.e., of the Security-Intelligence Agency Civilian Oversight Council.

According to Lembovska, M., (2013) "While Slovenia has one parliamentary committee dedicated exclusively to intelligence oversight, covering every aspect of the work of the intelligence services, Croatia has developed a more complex model encompassing parliamentary, expert and civilian bodies intertwining and complementing each other. They have one parliamentary committee for Domestic Policy and National Security that is specialized not only in oversight, but is also the parent committee for all security related and internal affairs issues. Macedonia has also designed its own mechanism that divides responsibilities among three different parliamentary committees, where one tackles the security and defence policies and the others are concerned with overseeing intelligence. When it comes to the legal framework, different models have also been developed – the existence of a special law for intelligence/security oversight (Slovenia and Montenegro); a single act that regulates the security and intelligence system as a whole, determining all stakeholders including the role of the Parliament (Croatia), or dispersed provisions in several different laws (Macedonia). However, what matters most is having well-defined and clear legal provisions which provide a clear mandate for parliamentary committees and defines mechanisms that could be used by MPs in conducting their oversight activities".

3. Civilian oversight of the work of security-intelligence agencies – Croatia

The core of the security and intelligence system of the Republic of Croatia consists of two security and intelligence agencies: Security and Intelligence Agency (Croatian: Sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija or SOA), and Military Security and Intelligence Agency (Croatian: Vojna sigurnosno-obavještajna agencija or VSOA). In the interest of achieving civilian oversight of the work of security-intelligence agencies, the Security-Intelligence Agency Civilian Oversight Council (hereinafter: Council) has been established. The Council consists of its chairperson and six members who are appointed by the Croatian Parliament.

University-educated Croatian citizens may be appointed to the Council, wherein a minimum of one of each Council member must hold a degree in law, political science and electrical engineering.

The chairperson and members of the Council are appointed for terms of four years, and after the expiry of this term they may be reappointed.

The chairperson and members of the Council are accountable to the Croatian Parliament for the legality of their work, while oversight of the legality of their work is under the preview of the committee of the Croatian Parliament responsible for national security issues.

Matters essential to the Council's functioning not regulated by this Act and the performance of administrative tasks on behalf of the Council are regulated by a directive issued by the Croatian Parliament at the proposal of the Parliamentary committee which deals with national security.

Article 111

The Council performs the following tasks:

- monitor the legality of the operations of security agencies,
- monitor and oversee the enforcement of measures instituting confidential intelligence-gathering which impinge upon human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- submit the information and data which ensue from the aforementioned tasks in the form of reports to the National Security Council, the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, the chairperson of the committee of the Croatian Parliament responsible for national security issues, and the directors of security-intelligence agencies,
- provide notification of the method for filing the requests specified in Article 112 hereof.

In the performance of the tasks specified in paragraph (1) of Article 112, the Council may examine the reports and documents of security-intelligence agencies and conduct interviews with the chief officials and other officers of security-intelligence agencies, when this proves necessary in order to ascertain facts crucial to assess the legality of the work of said agencies.

Article 112

The Council performs the tasks specified in Article 111 hereof pursuant to a programme adopted by the national security committee; in compliance with requests from citizens, state bodies and legal persons concerning the observed illegal actions or irregularities in the work of security-intelligence agencies, particularly in cases of violation of constitutionally-guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Article 113

The petitioner submitting a request is notified of the completed oversight.

In its response to a request, the Council adheres strictly to the remarks indicated in the request. Insofar as illegalities are ascertained in the course of oversight, the chairperson of the Council notifies the Croatian President, the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Chief Public Prosecutor of the results of said oversight.

At the request of the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, and within a period not to exceed six months, the chairperson of the Council submits a report on the Council's work.

Article 114

The chairperson and members of the Council are obliged to maintain the confidentiality of all data to which they become privy in the performance of the work of the Council.

The obligation specified in paragraph (1) of Article 114 remains even after the cessation of duties /7/.

3.1 Croatian parliamentary decision on the security-intelligence agency civilian oversight council

This Decision /12/ regulates the procedures for the nomination and appointment of the members of the Security-Intelligence Agency Civilian Oversight Council (hereinafter: Council), the operating methods of the Council and the performance of administrative tasks on behalf of the Council.

This Decision establishes as follows:

- method for nominating the candidates for chairperson and the six members of the Council and the procedure for confirming the nominations for their appointment,
- rights and duties of the chairperson and members of the Council,
- operating method of the Council,
- processing of the Council's data and materials,
- performance of administrative tasks on behalf of the Council,
- securing the funds, premises and equipment for the operation of the Council.

3.2. Nomination of candidates for chairperson and members of the council and procedures to confirm the nominations for their appointment

The committee of the Croatian Parliament responsible for national security issues (hereinafter: Committee) issues a public call for the nomination of candidates for chairperson and members of the Council from among the ranks of respected public personalities who meet the criteria specified in Article 110(3) of the Republic of Croatia Security-Intelligence System Act.

The nominations of candidates for appointment to the posts of chairperson and members of the Council are submitted to the Committee. The Committee holds a session to confirm whether the nominations meet the criteria specified by the aforementioned Act and this Decision and ratify and submit to the Croatian Parliament the proposal for appointment of the chairperson and six members of the Council.

3.3. Rights and duties of the chairperson and members of the council

The chairperson and members of the Council cannot be members of the core leadership of political parties, nor may they participate in political party activities, nor engage in political activity in the Council.

The chairperson and members of the Council are obliged to:

- participate in sessions of the Council,
- pose queries to the chief officials of security-intelligence agencies,
- seek materials pertaining to the performance of their duties.

They are entitled to remuneration for the performance of their duties at a level established by decision of the Croatian Government.

The chairperson of the Council ensures implementation of the Programme adopted by the Committee for the performance of the tasks specified in Articles 111, 112, and 113 of the Republic of Croatia Security-Intelligence System Act.

3.4. Operating method of the council

The Council operates under the auspices of the committee of the Croatian Parliament responsible for national security issues, but it is independent in its work /10/.

The Council works in sessions attended by a simple majority of its members.

The standpoints and opinions of the Council are adopted by a majority vote of all members of the Council.

The text of the reports submitted by the Council is approved by a simple majority of all members of the Council.

Minutes to sessions of the Council are maintained, and audio-recordings of sessions may also be made. The chairperson and each member of the Council are entitled to seek that their opinions be recorded in the minutes separately.

Sessions of the Council is, as a rule, held in the premises of the Council, unless the Council's work, due to its nature, cannot be performed in said premises.

Sessions of the Council are convened and presided over by the chairperson of the Council.

Should the Council establish reasonable suspicion of groundless violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights and fundamental freedoms or transgression of legal authority by any security-intelligence agency during the performance of oversight as specified in the Republic of Croatia Intelligence-Security System Act, the chairperson of the Council shall forthwith notify the chairperson of the Committee thereof. The chairperson of the Council also immediately notifies the chairperson of the Committee in case the Council is prevented from inspecting the materials of any security-intelligence agency.

Upon receiving such notification, the chairperson of the Committee convenes a joint session of the Committee and Council without delay as soon as the conditions are met. At the joint session, conclusions are adopted on proposals by a majority vote of the members of the Committee and a majority vote of the members of the Council. Insofar as said conclusions are not unanimous, separate conclusions are adopted. The Croatian President, the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Chief Public Prosecutor, as well as the petitioner is informed of these conclusions. The petitioner is notified of the results of the completed oversight even in cases when no violations are ascertained. The joint session of the Council and Committee is held at the request of the Committee even in other cases when the Committee deems reasonable grounds for doing so.

The chairperson and members, and officials and employees of the Council who have had access to the data and documents of security-intelligence agencies are obliged to maintain the confidentiality of the classified data and documents, regardless of the manner in which they gained knowledge thereof, until they are no longer subject to this requirement in a legally stipulated manner.

Without the express consent of the Committee, the persons specified in the paragraph (1) of Croatian parliamentary decision on the security-intelligence agency civilian oversight council /12/ may neither publicly divulge, nor comment on the work of the Council, agencies and other bodies and individuals on matters of national security, nor disclose the data and documents of security-intelligence agencies to unauthorized individuals.

The persons specified in paragraph (1) of Croatian parliamentary decision on the security-intelligence agency civilian oversight council /12/ may not retain in their possession the documents of security-intelligence agencies.

The obligation to maintain confidentiality endures even after the release of the chairperson and members of the Council from their duties.

The Council adopts Standing Orders on its work which will more thoroughly regulate the matters under its jurisdiction, its treatment of materials and information, their storage and safekeeping, the staff matters of the Council and other issues not specified by this Decision.

The Standing Orders of the Council may not be adopted without the prior consent of the Committee.

The administrative tasks on behalf of the Council are performed by the staff of the Council operating within the framework of the Office of the Committee.

The funds for the operation of the Council are allocated from the central state budget of the Republic of Croatia. The Secretariat of the Croatian Parliament secures the premises and equipment and necessary personnel for the Council's operations.

4. Final provisions

In comparison to the legal solution from 2002 /11/, this new legislation /10/ excludes:

- ▶ provisions on the performance of tasks based on the filing of requests by officials of security agencies
- ▶ the provision on keeping abreast of legal regulations concerning national security in other countries, and
- ▶ the provision on proposal of solutions for improving regulations pertaining to the legality of the operations of security agencies.

It is particularly noteworthy that the new, currently valid Act (NN, no. 79/06, 105/06 – correction) does not explicitly stipulate legally mandated civilian oversight (the Council's oversight) of the newly-organized components of the intelligence and security system, effectively meaning the Telecommunications Surveillance Operative-Technical Centre (OTC).

Therefore, the Security-Intelligence Agency Civilian Oversight Council is currently unable to fully meet the demands placed before it in compliance with the Republic of Croatia Security and Intelligence System Act (NN, no. 79/06, 105/06 – correction) /10/. The reason for this can be found, for example, in the OTC's explanation as to what prevents the Council from implementing oversight in this institution. According to the previous Security Agencies Act (NN, no. 32/02 and 38/02) /11/, the Council's tasks included oversight of operations which under the new law have been entrusted to the OTC, and which was organized in compliance with Article 9 of the then valid law as a component of the Counterintelligence Agency (POA). Citing Articles 111 and 112 of the Act, which specify that the Council oversees the legality of the operations of security agencies and monitors and oversees the application of measures for confidential intelligence-gathering which impinges upon constitutionally-guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms. According to the OTC's director these provisions do not apply to the OTC. However, in Article 18, the Act (NN, no. 79/06, 105/06 – correction) specifies that the OTC is a body established to implement the activation and administration of surveillance measures for telecommunications services, activities and traffic and the establishment of operative/technical coordination between legal and natural persons which administer the public telecommunications

network and provide public telecommunications services and access services in the Republic of Croatia, as well as bodies authorized to apply confidential surveillance of telecommunications in compliance with this Act and the Criminal Procedures Act, and that these operations will be done for the needs of security-intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, i.e., bodies authorized to implement confidential telecommunication surveillance measures.

The position of the Council is that the citation of the bodies for which the OTC performs the aforementioned tasks (security-intelligence agencies and law-enforcement agencies) and the fact that the OTC may only perform these tasks at their behest clearly indicates that the OTC is a body which executes but does not independently decide on the measures which it implements. The Council's unambiguous conclusion is that the OTC is a body which is subordinated to the aforementioned agencies, or rather literally the "executive arm" of these agencies and law enforcement. Thus, setting forth from the principle of argumentum a maiori ad minus, the Council deems that its legal authority to oversee the legality of the operations of security-intelligence agencies and monitor and oversee the application of confidential intelligence-gathering which impinges upon constitutionally-guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms also encompasses the right to oversee the OTC as the "executive arm" of security-intelligence agencies. Otherwise, the Council is impeded from carrying out its legal obligations as specified in Article 111 of the Act. Inasmuch as the OTC's stance that the Council is not entitled to oversee this body but rather only the explicitly-specified agencies is accepted, then not even the Croatian Parliament, nor its Domestic Policy and National Security Committee would be able to oversee the OTC, since Articles 103 and 104 of the Act do not explicitly stipulate this.

5. Recommendations to improve the position of the Council

The recommendations for improvement of the status and the role of the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies are as follows:

1. To increase the competence of the Council not only with regard to monitoring but also to controlling the legality of the work.
2. When a legal person submits reports on behalf of someone, then stated consent of the person who submits the report should be required with the remark that the Council is not obliged to respond to anonymous reports.
3. To send a clear message to decision-makers that the competence for monitoring of the measures of secret information collection without a possibility of monitoring the Operation-Technology Centre for Telecommunication Surveillance (hereinafter: the OTC) is not complete, since OTC has a significant part in the implementation of the decision.
4. To require obligatory judiciary exam for the aspiring candidates who hold BA/MA in law to be appointed professional members of the Council.
5. In the Security and Intelligence System Act (2006), the Article that defines the procedure of the dismissal of the chairman and the members of the Council should be added to the Article on appointments.

6. To bring a decision by the Croatian Parliament according to which all candidates should undergo a full security clearance before being appointed, i.e. prior to the interview with the Parliamentary Committee competent for the national security matters.
7. Change in the Article 113 of The Republic of Croatia Security and Intelligence System Act (2006)(3) If oversight inspection establishes some unlawful actions, the Chairperson of the Council will send the report on the oversight results to the President of the Republic of Croatia, the Prime Minister and the Chief Public Attorney (add to this the chairperson of the Committee for the domestic policy and national security matters of the Croatian Parliament). (4) At the request of the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, and at least once every six months (should be replaced with once a year), the chairperson of the Council submits reports on the work of the Council to be discussed in the Croatian Parliament.
8. To return the competence that the Council was denied by the 2006 Act which had already existed according to the Act of 2002 and refers to the competence of monitoring legality of work in the domain of national security in other states and the competence to propose solutions for promotion of regulations stipulating legality of the work of security agencies.
9. Also, it would be worth considering the option of introducing permanent jobs for the chairman and members of the Council as well as the option of monitoring over particular evidence collecting procedures.
10. To introduce the system of obligatory providing the information to the chairperson and the members of the Council for the National Security System of the Republic of Croatia with emphasis on oversight (6 hours x 5 days = 30 hours) at the beginning of the mandate period.
11. Proposal for a chairman and six members of the Council for Civilian Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies should be made by the Croatian Parliament by a two thirds majority vote.

Conclusions

Naturally, the existing variant of civilian oversight which we have in Croatia will be improved in the future, but always on the basis of proposals from professional circles and political willingness, observing good practice and democratic standards of the EU and the world.

So far, the practice of harmonizing Croatian regulations of security and intelligence system acts with European security standards have positively affected the state of human rights and freedom in the Republic of Croatia without disturbing information security, which could serve as a model to other countries in their development of security and intelligence systems. It is particularly important to point out that harmonizing did not endanger regular (standard) operating procedures of intelligence agencies, nor did it make any impact on decreasing the information security level of the Republic of Croatia.

Only through synergy between the profession and politics it will be possible to make genuine progress in the oversight of the security-intelligence system of any country, in a region such as the Western Balkans, especially in the FYR of Macedonia which, in addition to the expert assistance of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, is just in the phase of implementation of the Croatian model of supervision, as well as the Middle and Near East, and Northern Africa.

REFERENCES:

- Safevote: The Leader in Voting Technology, Need to know, Available at <http://www.safevote.com/internetvoting.htm> [Accessed 10 December 2016]
- /Wills, A., Vermeulen, M., Born, H., Scheinin, M., Wiebusch, M., Thornton, A., (2011) Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European union, European Parliament study - 2011, Protection of information handled by specialised oversight bodies, 165 – 172, Manuscript completed in June 2011. Brussels, © European Parliament., Available at <http://statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ep-study-dem-control-intel-agencies.pdf> [Accessed 10 December 2016]
- Ibid
- Ibid
- Loch, K., J., (2005) Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the Central Intelligence Agency, *Foreign Policy Anal* (2005) 1 (1): 99-120. Available at <https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/1/1/99/1815793/Accountability-and-America-s-Secret-Foreign-Policy?redirectedFrom=fulltext>, [Accessed 1 November 2016]
- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (1978) AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, 4.- 6., Available at <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf>, [Accessed 11 November 2016]
- Gibson T. Tobias: Guide to the Study of Intelligence Intelligence Oversight Design, Available at https://www.afio.com/publications/GIBSON_Intelligence_Oversight_Design_from_AFIO_INTEL_FALL2017_Vol23_no2.pdf [Accessed 25 September 2018]
- /Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) Part II- Authorisation of surveillance and human intelligence sources, 36.-40., Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/pdfs/ukpga_20000023_en.pdf [Accessed 10 December 2016]
- /Wills, A., Vermeulen, M., Born, H., Scheinin, M., Wiebusch, M., Thornton, A., (2011) Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European union, European Parliament study - 2011, ANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES III. PARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN GERMANY 245-255, Manuscript completed in June 2011. Brussels, © European Parliament., Available at <http://statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ep-study-dem-control-intel-agencies.pdf> [Accessed 10 December 2016]
- /The Republic of Croatia Security and Intelligence System Act (2006) VIII. SUPERVISION TO THE SECURITY-NOTICE AGENCY, 103.- 114. Available at http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2006_07_79_1912.html [Accessed 19 September 2016]
- /Croatia's Security Agencies Act (2002) IX. SUPERVISION TO SECURITY SERVICES, 78. – 84., Available at http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2002_03_32_693.html [Accessed 1 September 2016]
- Croatian parliamentary decision on the security-intelligence agency civilian oversight council, Available at https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2007_05_46_1558.html [Accessed 25 September 2018]

Literature

- Antoliš, K., Mišević, P., (2014) Information Security & Strengthening Intelligence Oversight, in book: Corporate Security – Open Dilemmas in the Modern Information Society, CIP: 005-922-1, ISBN 978-961-92860-9-8, pg. 45 – 55, March, Ljubljana, Slovenia. Available at https://books.google.hr/books/about/Corporate_Security.html?id=C6PSoAEACAAJ&redir_esc=y [Accessed 7 October 2016]
- Antolš, K., (2011) – panellist - Overseeing the collection and use of personal data at conference Strengthening Intelligence Oversight in the Western Balkans, The Hague, The Nederland, Available at <http://studylib.net/doc/14935915/strengthening-intelligence-oversight-in-western-balkans-i...> [Accessed 10 October 2016]
- Born, H., Fluri, P., Lunn, S., (2010) Oversight and Guidance, The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010 Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., Cover design: Hristo Bliznashki ISBN 978-92-9222-129-4, 1.-11., Available at file:///C:/Users/KA/Downloads/Vademecum_v2.pdf [Accessed 9 November 2016]
- Born, H., Leigh I., (2007) Democratic accountability of Intelligence services, GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF) - POLICY PAPER – №19, Non-Political Oversight: The Role of Courts and Independent Bodies, Copyright © 2007 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces ISBN 978-92-9222-063-1, 14.- 20., Available at https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/vigilant/pp19_born_leigh1.pdf [Accessed 6 October 2016]
- Born, H., Geisler, G., (2012) Introducing Intelligence Oversight, ISBN: 978-92-9222-222-2 © DCAF, 3-6. Available at file:///C:/Users/KA/Downloads/Tool1_Born_Geisler_EN%20(1).pdf [Accessed 21 November 2016]
- Robinson, N., Graux, H., Botterman, M., Valeri, L., (2009) Review of the European Data Protection Directive, The European Data Protection Directive, RAND Europe Westbrook Centre Milton Road Cambridge CB5 1YG, © Copyright 2009 Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), 6. -10., Available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR710.pdf [Accessed 16 October 2016]
- Fluri, P., Born, H., (2013) Parliamentary oversight of the security sector: Principles, mechanisms and practices, Handbook for parliamentarians No.5, Section I, Evolving security concepts and actors: A Challenge faced by parliaments, 14.-24., Available at https://books.google.hr/books?hl=hr&lr=&id=yCJr9jg_DoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA12&dq=Parliamentary+oversight+of+t+he+security+sector+principles+of+mechanism+and+practice+manual&ots=zF14v6vBp0&sig=hANMWDlwt8wPfWNt4bn3euCK9wY&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 10 November 2016]
- Lembovska, M., (2013) Comparative analysis of regional practices for parliamentary financial oversight of intelligence services, Analytical Thinking Laboratory, Policy Report, https://www.analyticamk.org/images/stories/files/report/Financial_oversight_english.pdf

MECHATRONICS SYSTEMS IN ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES: REVIEW

Nikola MANEV¹

Elenior NIKOLOV²

Abstract: *As a key component of modern armies, armored fighting vehicles have grown vital to entire battles. Being as important as they are, their crew relies heavily on the AFVs ability to provide the best protection and chances of survivability, as well as being able to traverse different kinds of terrain with as little difficulty as possible and be able to deliver a strong punch to its enemies in terms of firepower. Most of the technological advancements that allow for this sort of reliability come from the integration of the AFV with mechatronics systems. Sufficiently cheap, dependable and extremely versatile, mechatronics systems have revolutionized the way battles are fought. Having that in mind, this paper is a review of some of the mechatronics systems in use with the existing AFVs and aims to provide better outlines of the benefits or shortcomings of this technology.*

Keywords: *Mechatronic systems, AFVs, review, integration, reliability;*

Introduction

Armored vehicles have been a key part of modern armies and their use has revealed their decisive role in determining a battle's outcome. Until recently, armored fighting vehicle (AFV) design could have been described as evolutionary, but not revolutionary. We stand witness as this opinion is changing as new technologies change the face of modern warfare. (GOV.UK, 2018) 21st century wars are taking place in cities, with urban warfare becoming the norm for today's battlefields. Space is scarce in an urban environment and with tanks and AFVs being extremely vulnerable on their own, they rely on modern sensor and communication technology to win the battle. (Eshel, Nativi and Tusa, 2012)

The systems that enhance the AFVs survivability are often small, even micro-sized electromechanical systems (MEMS) that complement the vehicle's purpose. MEMS meet the requirements for sufficiently cheap and dependable technical solutions implemented in most of the mechatronics systems found within the land armored platforms fighting on today's battlefields. With that said, this paper is a review of some of the mechatronics systems in use with the existing AFVs, and through a couple of examples, it has a goal to provide better outlines of the benefits or shortcomings of this technology, its versatility and its future applications.

¹ Postgraduate studies in Mechatronics at the Mechanical Engineering Faculty – Skopje,

² Associate Professor at Military academy "General Mihailo Apostolski" - Skopje

First, the paper defines the leading types of AFVs, accenting their characteristics. Then, it transitions to the everyday use of mechatronics and how mechatronics systems are helpful to AFVs. Only after this discussion, the paper reviews the mechatronics systems in use with today's AFVs, categorizing them by their enhancement capabilities in the vehicle's mobility, firepower and protection. At the end, the focus is put on the future trends in the application of mechatronics systems within AFVs.

1. Defining Armored Fighting Vehicles

To provide initial insights about how armed forces are viewing the utility of AFVs, it is best to define their purpose and abilities. An Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) is a self-propelled vehicle with a certain level of armored protection, some firepower and more than descent cross-country capability. AFVs include, but are not limited to armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and heavy armament combat vehicles, with tanks (mainly Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)) being a standalone category. (Pike, 2011)

The term "armored personnel carrier" means an AFV which is designed and equipped to transport a smaller combat infantry unit. As a rule, it is armed with a weapon with a caliber of less than 20 millimeters. Military doctrine calls for the APC to be employed as a "battle taxi" giving troops protection en route to the objective, with the infantry supposed to dismount to attack. In practice, infantry declined to dismount in battle, preferring the modest protection of a truck. With that in mind, the "armored infantry fighting vehicle" (IFV) was built as an AFV designed to transport a combat infantry squad while allowing it to deliver fire from inside the vehicle. It is armed with a cannon of at least 20 millimeters in caliber and sometimes an antitank missile launcher.



Figure 1 An APC (left) (Military-today.com, 2017) and an IFV (right) (Power-projection.com, 2005)

A further upgrade in armor and firepower is the "heavy armament combat vehicle" - an AFV with a direct fire gun of at least 75 millimeters caliber, weighing at least 6.0 metric tons unladen weight, which does not fall within the definitions of an APC, an IFV or a main battle tank.

Combat experience demonstrated that the best fighting vehicle combines firepower, cross-country mobility, and the capability to carry out a range of missions from anti-armor to attacking infantry positions. Those types of vehicles had been further developed into the “Main Battle Tank” or MBT. (Bean, 2014) MBTs typically weigh around 60 tons. Their primary armament is a cannon (90 to 130 mm in caliber), guided by a targeting and fire-control system that yield effective ranges out to 4000 meters. MBTs also carry one or more heavy or medium machine guns as secondary armament. Some also carry guided missiles.

MBT defenses include composite armor made from ceramics, reactive materials and alloys, but also hardened steel and even titanium. Countermeasures against incoming projectiles can be passive (smoke-grenade launchers to block visibility) or active (firing radar-guided projectiles). MBTs are also typically protected from nuclear radiation and biological and chemical agents as well.

Tracked suspensions give MBTs excellent cross-country mobility. Powered by diesel engines in the 1,200 to 1,500 horsepower range, their maximum off-road speed averages 45 kilometers per hour while road speeds go up to about 65 kph.

An addition to an MBT’s ability would be allowing it to carry an infantry fire team. So far, the closest thing is a combined arms tank (CAT) which is recognized in the Israeli Merkava, an MBT with sufficient internal space to transport a few foot soldiers, and a rear hatch that makes ingress/egress practical under fire.



Figure 2 A Heavy armament combat vehicle M1128 Stryker (left) (Zwilling, 2013) and a CAT Merkava IV (right) (David, 2014)

2. Mechatronics Systems Benefits

More often, formerly mechanical functions are replaced by electronically controlled functions resulting in simpler mechanical structures and increased functionality. As a result, many technical processes and products show an increasing tendency to integrate mechanics with digital electronics and information processing. Exactly this integration has led to the birth of mechatronics systems.

The integration within a mechatronics system is performed through the combination of hardware (physical components) and software (information processing). Hardware integration results from designing the mechatronics system as an overall system and bringing together the sensors, actuators, and microcomputers into the mechanical system. Software integration is primarily based on control functions. (Kolk and Shetty, 1997) The end result of this combination of different-natured components into a mechatronics system is called synergy. Synergy stipulates that the final product can be better than just the sum of its parts. Synergies may be in terms of performance, cost, power efficiency, safety, time for development, etc.

Transcending these beneficial aspects in the new vehicles' design, we are sure to notice vehicles being embedded with more mechatronics systems designed to enhance passenger safety or improve vehicle performance and dependability. The same practice applies to military vehicles; however the major difference is that with military vehicles these systems are used in a wider range of applications. This stems from a necessity that military vehicles are required to have better capacity and successfully conduct various functions. They are expected to fulfill not only standard transport tasks but also many specific tasks like capability to detect and destroy targets, protect their crew against an enemy, keep communication with other vehicles and commanders, etc. (Valis et al., 2006)

To sum up, mechatronics systems substantially improve a vehicle's capability to fulfill complicated missions in demanding environments. Not only do they influence their technical functionality, but they also enhance their dependability and reliability.

3. Mechatronics systems in AFVs: Review

Since the main characteristics of an AFV are its mobility, firepower and protection, any enhancements in each of these areas will be mirrored in the functionality and dependability of the vehicle. For that purpose, we can talk about three categories of mechatronics systems found in these vehicles: mechatronics systems that enhance the AFVs mobility; the AFVs firepower; and the AFVs protection and crew survivability.

3.1 Mechatronics systems that enhance the AFVs mobility

3.1.1 Active and Semi-active suspension

Balancing out between armor protection which significantly adds to the overall weight of the vehicle and mobility, or otherwise the systems capable of supporting that weight while being able to provide a stable and highly mobile vehicle is a matter of compromise. More specifically, the suspension system allows for the vehicle to remain mobile in an obstacle ridden battlefield, open terrain, or in an urban environment. (Choi et al., 2010) The mechatronics systems that support the AFVs mobility are a big part of that compromise.

The greatest challenge for this system is to smooth out the bumpiness for the vehicle and crew in off-road conditions, and absorb the shock that develops while firing the main weapon (generally relates to high caliber guns). With that in mind, plus the idea to increase cross-country speed and improve battlefield survivability and combat effectiveness, considerable effort has been devoted in developing active and semi-active suspension systems for land combat vehicles.

Generally, suspension systems are categorized as passive, semi-active, or fully active (Figure 3). Passive systems consist entirely of springs and dampers connected between vehicle wheels (or track suspension components) and the vehicle body (sprung mass). Displacements imparted to the system from the terrain result in compression/elongation of the springs, causing a varying force on the sprung mass. This imparts motion to the sprung mass. Damper components are intended to dissipate energy gained by the sprung mass as a result of the varied spring force.

Semi-active systems on the other hand, have variable and controlled energy dissipation mechanisms, i.e., variable damping rates, in addition to passive springs. Damping components still connect the wheels (or track system) to the vehicle body, with most systems being hydraulic. Actuators required for a semi active suspension system are often valve systems that control fluid flow rates (to control vehicle damping rates) and require little actuator power. (Beno, Hoogterp and Weeks, 1995)




Figure 3 Different types of suspension

Furthermore, fully active suspension systems contain active force generating components that can add or subtract energy from the system. The force generating components connect the wheels (or track system) to the vehicle/body. The net force applied between the sprung and unsprung mass is varied to achieve any desired combination of damping based on relative or absolute motions of the sprung and unsprung masses. Generating forces of comparable magnitude to the springs in a passive system requires powerful actuators.

3.1.2 Central Tire Pressure Management System

Armored vehicles according to the traction mechanism are classified into tracked and wheeled. A tracked configuration is the optimal solution for missions requiring unrestricted terrain movement in all-weather operations, but with the operating environment shifting to urban battlefields, the use of wheeled AFVs has seen a rise. Wheeled AFVs are capable of operating at greater road speeds, have a smaller noise print, spend less fuel, and require less maintenance and logistic support. However, their mobility mostly relies on the state of their wheels, or rather, their tires. Therefore, a substantial number of AFVs make use of a central tire inflation system (CTIS) that regulates the tire pressure for each wheel separately. It can be operated independently or by the vehicle's driver.

Despite their positive sides, wheeled platforms are more vulnerable to small arms fire and grenade, mine, and artillery fragments, due to the inherent weakness of tires. In response, the CTIS is designed to improve all-wheel drive performance, maximize vehicle mobility and performance in demanding terrain and conditions by adjusting the tire pressure to improve traction, eliminate tire leakage and reduce soil compaction, and provides full diagnostics, giving the driver complete control over its vehicle from the safety of its cabin. Additionally, a "limp home" feature prevents AFVs from getting stuck on the battlefield because of punctured tires, allowing for a more reliable transport, deployment ability, and faster recovery. (Dana.com, 2017)




Figure 4 Components of a CTIS

This system is comprised of (Figure 4): Pressure sensors, Quick release valves, Pressure switches, Air lines, Air valves, Speed sensor, Pneumatic Control Unit,

Electronic Control Unit, and Operator controls. The speed sensor, electronic and pneumatic control units, and the operator controls come one per vehicle, while the number of all other components depends on the number of wheels.

Depending on the vehicle's operating environment, CTISs are available in two main configurations - internal and external. With the internal configuration, most of the components run along or inside existing vehicle components, like the vehicle chassis and wheel axles. Because of its greater resistance to damage it is typically used for military vehicles.

3.2 Mechatronics systems that enhance the AFVs firepower

3.2.1 Targeting and Target Tracking System

The tank is a psychologically imposing and physically dominant weapon. Its most prominent feature is its destructive power with its large caliber, high velocity cannon. Yet, the big punch alone is not enough to say that an armored vehicle has a sufficiently high firepower. For this to be the case, AFVs rely on a sophisticated fire-control system integrated with a gun stabilizer that allows it to successfully engage targets while maneuvering. Additionally, the AFV's gunner takes advantage of the vehicle's targeting and target tracking system that makes even the lightly armored vehicles, worthy opponents against other conventional armored forces.

Apart from the fire control system (a computer on board that considers factors such as the range of the target, ammunition type, wind information and vehicle cant/tilt angle) AFVs are equipped with advanced, day/night, stabilized, sighting systems, laser rangefinders and cant/tilt sensors to achieve a high probability of hit, even while moving.

The gunner can place the crosshair on the target, use the laser range finder to get a range and the fire control system will adjust the necessary aim-off of the weapon so that the round will hit the target. (Chuan-Yean, Hong and Yew, 2010) However, even with stabilization, some skill is still required as the gunner has to manage his controls to ensure that the crosshair is always on the target – a challenging task while moving in an undulating environment. That's why some AFVs have been equipped with an auto target-tracking capability, being able to 'lock-on' to a target and track it continuously. The automatic target tracking system maintains a stable sensor-to-target line of sight in the presence of relative target motion and base motion disturbance to the sensor platform (the vehicle).

To detect movement and measure the direction and the velocity of motion the system uses turret mounted imaging sensors, cameras and an inertial measurement unit. Then, the target tracking system using a special algorithm and a real time video feed monitors any deviations of the target with respect to the tank's sights and therefore the positioning of the main gun and computes and sends a signal to the Main Sight System which constantly corrects the position of the main gun. This signal replaces what would be the gunner's command signal, trying to keep the target in his sights. (Ilamathi and Abirami, 2015)




Figure 5 Video ingest system

The block diagram found in Figure 5 defines a potential video ingest system. The image processor segment is where data extraction from raw video occurs. Image registration, detection of moving objects, and target tracking occur in this processing area. Data that can be used for real-time operation of hardware assets such as the steering gimbal and weapons system. This area is where an automatic target tracker function would reside. The Visualization and Post processor will have a secondary role of enhancing the image and use it as reconnaissance data. (Grumbine, 2012)

3.2.2 Remote Controlled Weapon Systems

Lighter and medium AFVs, as well as other support vehicles are generally fitted with a simple manned turret that is primarily tasked to engage lighter infantry targets, having the required firepower to do so, but lacks the armor protection against small and medium-arms fire. A solution to this problem is to take out the need for a person to stand in the open to operate the turret and support weapon. The military industry's response is the remote controlled weapon systems (RCWS).

The RCWS gathers optic data from the environment using the same sensors (Aselsan.com.tr, 2018) the fire control and automatic target tracking system would use. The modular optical solution can comprise a variety of possibilities (Elbitsystems.com, 2016):

- day camera (regular and HD),
- night camera (thermal imaging and infrared cameras),
- range finders (regular or high repetition – measure distance to moving objects),
- laser designator,
- laser marker,
- beam spotlights.

As a result, these robust weapon systems can operate during day and night under adverse environmental and terrain conditions, have high first-hit accuracy and auto-

tracking capability for accurate firing on-the-move. Additionally, the RCWS family has automatic ballistic correction capability for the target distance, target speed and route, meteorological conditions and ammunition type. By providing a link to the crew inside the hull, as well as computer-aided remote control, the weapon system mimics the actions of the soldier controlling it from the safety of its vehicle.

3.3 Mechatronics systems that enhance the AFVs protection and crew survivability

3.3.1 Active Protection Systems

Vehicle and crew survivability is directly proportional to the vehicle's protection capabilities and protection is conventionally achieved by enhancing the vehicle's armor. Traditional armor is based on passive armor technology, made from either armored steel or high strength aluminum, with explosive reactive armor added on top of the base layers to provide extra protection. However, armor adds to the vehicle's weight, which affects its size, profile, and mobility. Therefore, adding layers over layers of armor is essentially making the AFV a larger, slower target.

Since today's AFVs need to deal with multidirectional threats, Active Protection Systems (APSs) are the most efficient alternative to conventional armor. An APS commonly utilizes various countermeasures, activated at very close range and designed to destroy, disrupt or degrade an incoming missile or projectile, thus eliminating or reducing its penetration capability. With this, APSs allow for a significant level of protection against incoming threats without a significant increase in the vehicle's weight.

APSs comprise soft kill and hard kill systems. Soft kill systems feature Laser and Infra-Red jammers to spoof an anti-tank guided missile and cause it to crash to the ground. Alternatively, smoke grenades can be launched so that the enemy cannot guide the missile accurately onto the target. (Chuan-Yean, Hong and Yew, 2010)

On the other hand, hard kill systems detect the incoming threat and launch a countermeasure to directly destroy it, thereby forming a protected zone around the vehicle. At its simplest, this system uses radar technology (sensors and flat-panel radars) to detect a missile, and subsequently launch a countermeasure into a ballistic trajectory to intercept the incoming threat, that explodes at a pre-determined time at a distance of 10 – 30 meters from the protected platform.

3.3.2 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Detection and Protection System

Protection has to do with crew survivability in terms of combating all the circumstances that arise from the battlefield and keeping soldiers alive and in fighting shape after their vehicle has been affected by the enemy's actions. The use of NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weaponry puts this type of all-round protection to the test.

Armored units doctrine identifies AFVs as the weapon of choice to engage the enemy in NBC conditions. Having said that, most AFVs have a principal NBC protection system and a backup system to allow the crew to continue fighting in NBC contamination conditions. The principal NBC system can be turned on automatically or manually after starting the engine, and is controlled from the commander's control panel. With the engine running at idle and the principal NBC system activated it provides enough filtered air to create a positive pressure in the crew compartment. The positive pressure keeps contaminated air out and forces the smoke produced from firing the main or coaxial guns out. The backup system does not produce as much air as the principal NBC system but it does produce enough air to protect the crew when they wear their protective masks.

An automatic NBC protection system (Figure 6) uses a Radiation sensor (RADMAC), Chemical Agent Detector (CWA), Automatic Control Unit (ACU), Blower Control Unit (BCU), blowers, valves and filtered air lines (Yadav, 2009). The Radiation and Chemical agent detector are used for external and internal detection and generate electric signals for an audio/visual alarm in case of positive detection, automatic activation of the system through the automatic control unit and indication regarding clogging of the NBC/CBRN filter. At the same time, the blower control unit regulates the flow of air to ensure a positive pressure atmosphere within the crew compartment of the vehicle.




Figure 6 A functional schematic of the Automatic NBC Protection System

3.3.3 Automatic Fire Extinguishing System

When a kinetic or a chemical energy (high-explosive anti-tank) ammunition round penetrates a vehicle, any incendiary materials and ammunition in the vehicle will

ignite by the high intensity of heat causing the creation of an inferno inside the crew or engine compartments. It is the uncontrolled growth of the explosion and the resulting fire that causes the most damage, injury, and death in combat vehicles, often resulting in catastrophic destruction. To minimize damages to the vehicle's systems and save its crew, each of those vehicles must be embedded with a Fire Extinguishing System.

The automatic fire extinguishing system incorporates explosion/fire detection and fast suppression technologies. (Fire-protection.com.au, 2006) Two slightly different systems are designed for the crew compartments and for the engine compartment, although they function under a joint fire extinguishing system.

Typically, an automatic fire extinguishing system would consist out of 3 subsystems:

- Detection Subsystem - it either sees or feels the fire event. Crew compartment systems rely on electro-optical sensors to detect fires. They act like eyes, being able to detect sparks at the speed of light, making the system able to detect and extinguish the fire in fewer than 5 milliseconds. (Vestfold-brannteknikk.no, 2010) The sensors in the engine compartment act like our skin in that a wire sensor (thermistors) senses the changes in temperature and gives an alarm or activates the extinguisher at pre-designated temperature points.

- Controls Subsystem - it receives input from the sensors, verifies it is a real fire and then sends a signal to the extinguishers to release agent. Additionally, it constantly monitors the health of the whole system to determine if all components are operational and can be easily adjusted to provide audible alarms, continuing to monitor for fire after the master switch is turned off, or shut down the exhaust fans or the engine.

- Fire Extinguishing Subsystem - consists of an agent, shatterproof pressurized cylinder or a gas generator, high speed valve, wiring harnesses, nozzles, and piping. This is the active component of the system responsible for extinguishing the fire.

3.4 Future trends

Military organizations worldwide are modernizing their existing ground combat fleets, rather than acquiring new vehicles. As capable each improvement has been in the separate areas of mobility, firepower and survivability, it is the integration of the elements between them that is making the greatest contribution to AFV combat effectiveness. (Miller, 2017)

Right now, a combat vehicle has multiple systems - a weapons system, defense system, targeting system, etc. Each of those systems, is reasonably, different than the others, especially since they all fill out different roles, however, merging all of those systems in an open architecture platform reduces software lag, enhances performance and dependability and provides a more user-friendly interface to its operators.

It should be noted that with a limited number of small to medium sized mechatronics based, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) on today's battlefields that

have proven their worth against minimizing human casualties, it is very likely that the human crew component will be taken out of the AFV picture altogether. The tendency goes as far as this number growing a lot larger, since armies are looking to fully automate their existing fleets of ground vehicles. (National Academies Press, 2005)

The aerospace and defense community is focused on vehicle upgrades, adding capability, capacity, and functionality to existing platforms. Existing fleets are gaining IED protection, RF jamming, general upgrades resulting from component obsolescence, and capability enhancements based on current and future perceived threats. Additionally, although challenging, the potential to extend vehicle integration to sensors and platforms that are not even located on the vehicle itself, such as tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, offers the potential for significant extension of battlefield awareness and combat effectiveness.

Vehicles are now C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms and an integral part of the networked battlefield. Moreover, mechatronics are spread so widely that, once all of the AFV functions are depleted in terms of being supported by mechatronics systems, the systems will become more far reaching to include whole units of armored vehicles working as one.

In conclusion, future trends include fully automated, mechatronics based UGVs that serve as local, mobile databases in a networked battlefield. The vehicles act as sensor nodes that communicate and exchange data between them, and act to defend themselves by targeting and striking the enemy.

Conclusion

Modern militaries look to technology firms to inject existing ground combat vehicles with robust, yet cost-effective electro-mechanical innovations. Asymmetrical, unconventional warfare causes for a growing need for innovative electro-mechanical solutions on the ground, particularly in combat vehicles. Aerospace and defense technology companies are partnering with global military organizations to deliver increased power, functionality, and capabilities in the hands of awaiting soldiers. (Howard, 2012).

The systems presented as part of this review, although few to number, have become crucial to the AFVs performance on the modern day battlefields and it is extremely unlikely that ground forces would be successful in fulfilling their missions without them. Starting from things as simple as having the right tire pressure adjusted for the terrain where the engagement takes place, to tracking targets on the move and engaging them from behind the safety of your vehicle's active protection system, these mechatronics systems are the main reason behind the effectiveness of conventional forces.

Furthermore, the future envisions AFVs as unmanned, mechatronics-based vehicles that need little to no human interaction and as a part of a unified battlefield network. As such the AFVs will be capable of creating a better picture of their surrounding by serving both as interdependent information providers and users.

Soldiers grow more and more accustomed to the use of technical gadgets because they add significantly to the overall capabilities of their vehicles. Therefore, the tendency to innovate

and engineer different mechatronics systems with the purpose of integrating them with military AFVs should be a continuous process that follows the battlefield trends and takes from the experiences brought back from the modern battlefields.

REFERENCES:

- GOV.UK. (2018). A century after the first use of the tank, what does the future hold?. [online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-century-after-the-first-use-of-the-tank-what-does-the-future-hold> [Accessed 16 Sep. 2018].
- Eshel, D., Nativi, A. and Tusa, F. (2012). New IFV Designs Proliferate For Modern Warfare. [online] Aviationweek.com. Available at: <http://aviationweek.com/awin/new-ifv-designs-proliferate-modern-warfare> [Accessed 9 Sep. 2018].
- Pike, J. (2011). Armored Combat Vehicle (ACV). [online] GlobalSecurity.org. Available at: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/acv.htm> [Accessed 11 Sep. 2018].
- Military-today.com. (2017). Eitan Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com. [online] Available at: <http://www.military-today.com/apc/eitan.htm> [Accessed 11 Sep. 2018].
- Power-projection.com. (2005). M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle - PowerProjection. [online] Available at: <http://power-projection.com/Vehicle/Details/120101> [Accessed 11 Sep. 2018].
- Bean, S. (2014). Tanks in Counterinsurgency Operations. [ebook] Modern War Magazine, p.24. Available at: <http://modernwarmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/MW9-samparticle.pdf> [Accessed 10 Sep. 2018].
- David, B. (2014). Merkava - Tank Encyclopedia. [online] Tank Encyclopedia. Available at: <http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/modern/israel/Merkava.php> [Accessed Sep. 2018].
- Kolk, R. and Shetty, D. (1997). Mechatronics system design. Boston [u.a.]: PWS Publishing Company.
- Valis, D., Vintr, Z., Soares, C. and Zio, E. (2006). Dependability of mechatronicss systems in military vehicle design. Research Gate.
- Choi, E., Ryoo, J., Cho, J. and Lim, O. (2010). Optimum suspension unit design for enhancing the mobility of wheeled armored vehicles. Journal of Mechanical Science and Technology, 24(1), pp.323-330.
- Beno, J., Hoogterp, F. and Weeks, D. (1995). Active Suspension System Energy and Power Requirements for Military Applications. Report AECV Brainstorming Meeting.
- Dana.com. (2017). Military Tire Pressure Management System | Dana Commercial Vehicle. [online] Available at: <http://www.dana.com/commercial-vehicles/products/tire-pressure-management/military> [Accessed 10 Nov. 2018].
- Chuan-Yean, T., Hong, M. and Yew, V. (2010). Defence Science and Technology Agency Horizons. [online] Dsta.gov.sg. Available at: https://www.dsta.gov.sg/docs/default-source/dsta-about/dh2010_final.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [Accessed 10 Nov. 2018].
- Ilamathi, M. and Abirami, K. (2015). Automatic Target Tracker for Main Battle Tank. IEEE Xplore. [online] Available at: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7322896> [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- Grumbine, M. (2012). Automated Target Tracking: Closing the Gap Between the Predictable and the Unpredictable. [online] Military Embedded Systems. Available at: <http://mil-embedded.com/author/michael-grumbine-ge-intelligent-platforms-inc/> [Accessed Nov. 2018].

- Aselsan.com.tr. (2018). Remote Controlled Weapon Systems. [online] Available at: http://www.aselsan.com.tr/en-us/press-room/Brochures/Weapon-Systems/REMOTE_CONTROLLED_WEAPON_SYSTEMS_ENG.pdf [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- Elbitsystems.com. (2016). Remote Controlled Weapon Stations. [online] Available at: http://elbitsystems.com/media/Remote_Controlled_Weapon_Stations.pdf [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- Yadav, A. (2009). Nuclear Defence Aspects and Automation of NBC Protection System of ICV BMP-2/2K. [online] Drdo.gov.in. Available at: <https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/dss/2009/main/33-DLJ.pdf> [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- Fire-protection.com.au. (2006). Spectrex Automatic Fire Detection & Suppression.. [online] Available at: <http://www.fire-protection.com.au/CMSTemplates/files/fireprotection.com.au/23/2360eeea-988a-41d8-9eb4-fde989ced702.pdf> [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- Vestfold-brannteknikk.no. (2010). Military Vehicle Automatic Fire Extinguishing System. [online] Available at: <http://vestfold-brannteknikk.no/pdf/ansul/F-2010182.pdf> [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- Miller, S. (2017). Future Directions for Armored Fighting Vehicles.. [online] Armateonline.com. Available at: <http://www.armateonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MT-2-2017-Future-Directions-for.pdf> [Accessed Nov. 2018].
- National Academies Press (2005). Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Howard, C. (2012). Upgrading combat vehicles with versatile vetronics. [online] Military & Aerospace Electronics. Available at: <http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-23/issue-09/special-report/upgrading-combat-vehicles-with-versatile-vetronics.html> [Accessed Sep. 2018].

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS ISSUES IN THE NATIONAL RISK AND THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESSES

Vasko POPOVSKI ¹

Stevko STEFANOSKI ²

Abstract: *Contemporary world is characterized with more and more people on the move, witnessing the highest level of displacement. One in every 113 persons is a refugee and every three seconds someone is displaced globally. The Republic of Macedonia as a country located on the so-called "Balkan Route", witnessed this situation in 2015 and 2016 when more than 888,000 migrants and refugees transited through the country on their way to Europe. Taking into consideration that their presence on the national territory is an additional element of risk given their exposure and vulnerability to natural and human-made disasters, the Crisis Management Centre has recognized and included migrant and refugees aspects in the integrated risk and threat assessment, on the national and local level. It has resulted with updating of the local level risk and threat assessments for the municipalities of Gevgelija and Kumanovo and the national one. This paper presents the practical aspects of the integration of the movement of refugees and migrants within the risk and threat assessment process through elaboration of practical experiences and case studies. The fundamental question is how their integration supports the better understanding of the elements of risk and results in an enhanced risk evaluation and increased preparedness of the crisis management system to prevent, mitigate, respond and recover. In this paper a review of integrated risk and threat assessments shall be made in order to answer this question. The research results are based on the application of content analysis of various sources and comparative analysis research methods. Accordingly, it can be concluded that inclusion of refugees and migrants in integrated risk and threat assessments significantly improves the national and local level risk and threat assessments resulting in better analysis, assessment and preparedness. As a result, more precise operational plans with inclusion of new elements of risks for the mentioned territories can be prepared and implemented. With this approach, the Republic of Macedonia is implementing an innovative multi-risk and multi-sector risk and threat assessment.*

Keywords: *refugees, migrants, crisis management, risk assessment, disaster risk management;*

¹ The Author is PhD candidate, Fulbright Scholar, University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center

² The Author is PhD, Head of Department of Analytics, Assessment and Strategic Planning, Crisis Management Center

Introduction

It is a turbulent world with crises and disasters on the rise affecting whole regions and societies. Increased numbers of crises ensuing from conflicts, security risks, as well as natural and human-made disasters, are significantly pressing the population and more and more people are on the move. Consequently, unprecedented 65.6 million people are on the go being forcibly displaced, out of which 22.5 million are refugees (UNHCR, 2017). One in every 113 persons is a refugee and around the World, someone is displaced every three seconds (Edmond, 2017). Furthermore, climate changes and climate related disasters additionally increase the movement of the population. Geisler and Currens (2017) claim that many millions of so-called “climate migrants” are predicted to be on the move because of climate changes and rising sea levels.

On the other side, the increased number of major armed conflicts in 2015, which totalled to 15 (Uppsala Universitet, 2018), led to a huge migration wave from the Middle East, predominantly from the war-torn Syria. So, more than one million Syrians, alongside with economic migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and other countries have left their households and headed to Europe. Republic of Macedonia as part of the so- called „Balkan Migrant Route“ witnessed this situation when in 2015 and 2016 more than 888,000 migrants and refugees transited through the country on their way to Europe (Crisis Management Centre, 2016). This situation significantly pressured the security and crisis management capacities of the country forcing the Macedonian Government to declare a crisis situation on its Southern and Northern borders in August 2015. Huge numbers of refugees and migrants present on Macedonian territory led to a deteriorated security situation in the border regions, increased number of illegal trafficking in human beings, resulting in 25 cases of deaths and many more injuries from natural threats and traffic accidents.

Even though, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers until now have not been taken properly into account in crisis prevention and planning (Pauvert, Twigg, Sagamola: 17). Prevention is a set of “activities and measures to avoid existing and new disaster risks”(UNISDR 2009 Terminology) and they are implemented in such an organized and systematized way as to avoid the adverse impacts of the existing and potentially new risks on a certain territory. The main efforts were only to provide immediate relief and disaster support without taking into consideration their specific exposure and vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015 – 2030)³ provides grounds for integration of migrants and refugees in disaster risk reduction through participation in design and implementation of policies, plans and standards; coordination on local level and their contribution to the resilience of communities and societies (UNISDR, 2015).

Acknowledging this, the Crisis Management Centre initiated the process of their inclusion in the national crisis management risk system activities. According to Mitrevska (2016: 154), the Crisis Management System of the Republic of Macedonia is organized with the aim of continuous consultation, coordination, timely reaction, efficient and effective use of resources, as well as preparation and adoption of the Threat Assessment of the Republic of Macedonia for all types of risks and threats. Thus, based on the understanding that their presence on the national territory is an additional element of risk that is founded on their exposure and vulnerability to

³ The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030) is the most recent international accord to date on disaster risk reduction adopted by the UN Members at the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai, Japan (March 2015) and endorsed by the UN General Assembly.

natural and human-made disasters, the Crisis Management Centre has included migrant and refugees' aspects in the integrated risk and threat assessment, on the national and local level. It has resulted in mainstreaming of the local level risk and threat assessments for the municipalities of Gevgelija and Kumanovo, and initiated the integration of the issues and aspects of refugees and migrants in the national assessment document. Furthermore, with the level of worsening climate change projections, as well as the tectonic movements in global and regional geo-politics and geo-strategies, it is expected that the number of refugees and migrants shall increase in the near future. Therefore, it is necessary to fully incorporate the aspects of refugee and migrant crisis in the national and local risk and threat assessments.

For that reason, this paper presents the practical aspects of integration of the movement of refugees and migrants in the risk and threat assessment process through an elaboration of practical experiences and case studies. The fundamental question is how their integration supports the better understanding of the elements of risk and results in an enhanced risk evaluation and increased preparedness of the crisis management system to prevent, mitigate, respond and recover. In this paper, a review of integrated risk and threat assessment is made in order to answer this question.

Integrated risk and threat assessment framework in the Republic of Macedonia

Based on the Law on Crisis Management, the Crisis Management Centre is the main entity of the Crisis Management System and coordinates the "identification of phenomena and processes which threaten state security and or may lead to crisis, disseminates information to the Crisis Management System entities and population, issues early warning alerts, monitors the situation, exchanges data and information and proposes crisis management and assessment measures" (Law on Crisis Management, 2005). It is an independent directorate that has competences in the cooperation and coordination, supporting the bodies of the Crisis Management System (Steering Committee, Assessment Group, and the Main Headquarters), preparation of risk and threat assessments, coordination of the system during declared crisis situations, operation of 24/7 communication center with the emergency telephone number 195 and alerting and informing the general public.

The Main Headquarters is the main operational and expert body for management and coordination of the prevention and response activities in crisis and emergency situations. It consists of representatives from the key institutions that are also part of the Steering Committee. This headquarters has replications on the local and regional level in order to support the cooperation and coordination in prevention and response to crisis and emergency situations. The Steering Committee is the highest governmental body in the Crisis Management System, it is consisted of representatives from the key ministries from the security, and defense related areas, the Army, the intelligence and counter-intelligence services. Its responsibilities are within areas of proposing a declaration of a crisis situation, activating and managing the mechanisms for response and resolution

of crisis situations, as well as decision-making and adopting key documents from the crisis management area. The Assessment Group is responsible for continuous assessment of the risks and threats to the security of the country. In addition, it proposes various measures and activities for their prevention, early warning, response and recovery. The composition is similar to the composition of the Steering Committee having in mind that in the former the representation is on technical and expert level, whether in the latter it is on a senior political level.

As stated above, the Crisis Management Center has a central role and responsibility for preparation and regular update of the assessments of endangerment from all risks and threats to the territories of 80 municipalities, the City of Skopje and the Republic of Macedonia. Accordingly, it has developed all necessary human resources and technical capacities for implementation of the integrated risk and threat assessment.

The process of risk and threat assessment in the country is governed by the “Regulation on the Methodology for Preparation of the Threat Assessment of the Republic of Macedonia, its content and structure, modality of storage and update, as well as the definition of entities that receive the complete Assessment or part of it” (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation) adopted in 2011. This Regulation is not only a breakthrough by-law that regulates the methodological framework for assessment of all risks and threats, but a comprehensive by-law that establishes a holistic approach in the process of preparation of the risk and threat assessment in which all relevant international standards and criteria including those of the EU are implemented.

The Regulation considers all aspects of the risk and threat assessment and its content and structure have a general and a specific part. The General Part consists of general aspects of the assessment with elaboration of the objectives and scopes, general definitions, analysis process, as well as the risk elements (e.g. territorial area and characteristics: socio-economic, natural resources, demography, communications, environment, critical infrastructure, etc.; economic profile, general development aspects, etc.). On the other side, the Specific Part includes risk and threats, risk assessment procedures and activities including threat profiling, assessment of the exposure and vulnerability of risk elements, as well as capacities and capabilities of the Crisis Management System for prevention, early warning and response to the assessed risks.

Accordingly, in the period 2011 – 2016, the Crisis Management Centre, through its 34 regional offices, conducted the necessary activities for preparation of risk and threat assessment documents for all municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia (80 municipalities + the City of Skopje), as well as the initial draft of the National Assessment. In addition, the draft version of the National Assessment from all risks and threats was prepared. The process of risk and threat assessment is completely supported by ICT innovative solutions through the functional web platform “E-Assessment” which connects all available data bases for existing threats or threat profiles of the municipalities, exposure and vulnerability of the infrastructure, facilities and population, as well as data on the available resources of the crisis management system.

Refugees and migrants as risk elements in the national risk and threat assessment

The process of integrated risk and threat assessment in the country was defined as a bottom – up approach meaning that during the first stage (2011 – 2015) all municipal assessments were prepared and adopted and consequently, the National Assessment of all risks and threats was developed based on the analysis of the municipal assessments and information synthesis. Accordingly, as mentioned above, after the preparation of the municipal assessments, the process of preparation of the National Assessment was initiated in 2015. In addition, this period correlates with the so-called “Refugee Crisis” in the country and the broader region and the issues and aspects of the refugees and migrants were taken into consideration within the analysis and the integration of the document. According to Popovski and Stefanoski (2017), this document is huge importance to the country in terms of risk and threat analysis since it presents the overall characteristics of the country, its built environment and population dynamics, profiles all threats, and assesses and evaluates all possible risks, including the system capacities and the capabilities of its resources. Consequently, responsive operational plans for each risk are developed.

Within the scope of the National Assessment, there is a separate section on “Migrants, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons” where in accordance with the Regulation framework, the risk of refugees and migrants is elaborated in line with the structure of the Assessment Specific Part. Accordingly, it is necessary to define the refugees and migrants as categories of persons. Refugees are people who have fled war, violence, conflict or persecution and have crossed an international border to find safety in another country (UNHCR, 2010). On the other hand, migrants are persons that are leaving their home countries not as a result of direct threat or prosecution, but with the aim of improving their life with better jobs or education in other countries or based on similar grounds (e.g. reunion with the family, etc.). Furthermore, it is necessary to list all international law, primarily conventions to which the country has accessed e.g. the Conventions on Refugees from 1951 or the Protocol from 1967 and others that constitute the contemporary international legal framework for protection of the rights of refugees and migrants, since there are certain obligations for the host or transit countries.

With respect to the threat assessment, it should be noted that since gaining its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has faced several situations with increased numbers of refugees or migrants in its past. For example, the war in ex-Yugoslavia resulted with more than 35,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, while the Kosovo war crisis in 1999 resulted in an unprecedented number of 344,500 refugees (Donchev et al., 2002) with most of them accommodated in private families and others in 8 collective refugee centers. In 2001, the Republic of Macedonia faced an armed conflict with more than 74,000 thousand internally displaced persons

from the territories mainly in Northern and Northwestern parts of the country. The so-called “Refugee Crisis” starting from 2015 is the last in this list. These events are depicted on maps with either corridors of movement or locations of the collective and transit centers.

Each event comes from a different source, which means that most of them are from external sources – armed conflicts in countries in the regions or beyond, while only one event is related to an armed conflict on the territory of the country. Based on this it is evident that there were several similar events with different intensity that were successfully resolved and contributed to the country’s developing necessary resources and capacities for prevention and response to these type of events. Analyzing the historical events, as well as the current situation in the countries of origin of refugees and migrants, it can be concluded that these types of events will continue most probably with increased frequency and intensity, and will be multiplied by the climate change projections and emergence of climate refugees in the nearest future. Therefore, this type of analysis is beneficial for the crisis management system to strengthen its internal capacities for integrated risk and threat assessment and operational responsive planning.

Based on the analysis of the historical events and the current refugee crisis, in general the entire territory of the country is exposed to this threat, but most vulnerable areas for transit of refugees and migrants are the border areas, especially alongside the South – North corridor and the areas within the valleys or mountain passages. Accordingly, the municipalities in these areas with their infrastructure and population have the highest level of exposure and vulnerability, and they can be also considered as first responders with their resources. Altogether, the whole population alongside the corridors, near the collective and transit centers is exposed to this threat with different level of vulnerability, but more precise analysis and mapping is needed. On the other side, the exposure and vulnerability of the refugees and migrants will also be taken into consideration since they are new in this environment without any significant knowledge on the national or local threat profile. Also, their characteristics can increase the risk (e.g. refugees with disabilities, women, and children). Furthermore, the population in these areas is exposed to additional health threats as a result of the increased pollution from illegal waste dumping, poor WASH (Water and Sanitation for Health) conditions and practices, as well as possibilities for transmission of different diseases that are not typical for this region.

Within the framework of the specific risk element assessment, it can be concluded that various types of the critical infrastructure can be sensitive to this threat. For example, the transportation and communication infrastructure, housing (collective and individual), key national and municipal communal infrastructures (incl. electric power supply), especially water supply, waste water collection and treatment and solid waste collection and treatment infrastructure. Based on the previous events, different types of damages to the critical infrastructure can be noted either as a result of intentional acts of the refugees and migrants or as non-intentional acts. For the former, evidence

can be found in various events of riots and disturbances, as well as damaging of the transportation means and facilities and housing, while for the latter, the reasons are mainly in traffic accidents. As per the official records during 2015, there were 20 human casualties as a result of irregular movement along the railway tracks or from other traffic incidents, and further three human casualties as a result of a flash flood on 14 March 2016 in Suva Reka. Also, other types of critical infrastructure are very vulnerable to this threat, especially the social infrastructure, cultural historic monuments and any other types of infrastructure facilities that can provide illegal accommodation of bigger number of refugees or migrants.

Refugees and migrant crisis or events pose a significant pressure on the socio-economic systems of the host or transiting countries and this is also the situation in the Republic of Macedonia. The impact is evident in prolonged pressure on the national and municipal budgets for provision of security resources and services, provision of communal, health and other types of social services, as well as indirect effect on the economic activities in the identified area. These aspects can be quantified based on the regular reporting by the respective entities from the Crisis Management System and can be fiscally presented.

Within the framework of the section on the capacities and capabilities of the Crisis Management System for prevention, early warning and response to the assessed risks, it can be elaborated that prevention and response to this risk require a multi-sectoral approach which was provided successfully from the very beginning of the "Refugee Crisis" through a declaration of the crisis situation and coordination by the Crisis Management Centre. Each entity in the system has its own responsibilities and obligations to be fulfilled and this is done in inclusive and coordinated ways. Accordingly, various strategic documents, programs, action plans, as sectoral documents and procedures have been developed in order to provide operation and functional response to the "Refugee Crisis". Main responsible entities alongside the Crisis Management Center are following: the Army of the Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Interior, Ministries and entities that are participating in the Main Headquarters within the Crisis Management System, the Macedonian Red Cross, local and international and humanitarian NGOs, international organizations, as well as the hosting municipalities and border police teams from EU countries. Through the implementation of these coordinated activities during the last three years it can be concluded that the participating institutions have significantly strengthened their capacities for prevention and response to the refugee and migrant crisis situation. Therefore, it is necessary to continue internal information and knowledge sharing gained in order to keep the "nucleus" of expertise within the entities of the system.

As per the content of the Regulation it is necessary to recommend follow up of the operational plans and activities in order to fully operationalize the assessment. Therefore, it is necessary to implement successive revitalization of the areas and activities through full elimination of the consequences of the stay and transiting of refugees and migrants and

a recovery from these situations through getting back to a normalcy in functioning of the institutions and the facilities, as well as the life of the population in the affected areas. Each entity is required to implement activities within the framework of their competences. In order to implement this process sector based operational plans will be developed.

Based on this, it is evident that the National Assessment is including the refugee and migrants aspects within its threat profile and elaborates the various aspects of the risks in line with the Regulation even though that the draft version of the assessment is in the final process of review and adoption. It is in line with the essential requirements and human rights based approach.

Conclusions

Contemporary World is facing unprecedented number of people being on the move from various reasons, either to escape from armed conflicts areas or prosecution or to leave the home for better life. Approximately 65.6 million people are refugees at the moment. Gloomy projections of the climate change scenarios for next couple of decades is additionally worsening these situations. In its history, the Republic of Macedonia has faced several refugees crisis with the latest from 2015 being the biggest, where more than 880,000 refugees and migrants transited through the country in 2015 and 2016 on their way to Europe.

For that reason, this paper presents the practical aspects of integration of the movement of refugees and migrants in the risk and threat assessment process through elaboration of practical experiences and case studies. The fundamental question is how their integration supports the better understanding of the risk elements and results in an enhanced risk evaluation and increased preparedness of the crisis management system to prevent, mitigate, respond and recover.

The exclusion of migrants and refugees is contrary to the objectives of achieving resilience of societies and communities and “Whole Society Approach” to disaster risk reduction. Accordingly and following the Regulation on the methodological framework, the Crisis Management Centre has integrated the refugees and migrant aspects within the profiles of threats in the country. It reviews it in line with the various elements of the risk analysis and evaluation of the exposure and vulnerability of the critical infrastructure and population, as well as the capacities and capabilities of the system for prevention, early warning and response to risks. In addition, also the exposure and vulnerability of refugees and migrants is taken into consideration in order to analyze and assess their characteristics as elements of risks.

As a result, it can be concluded that the inclusion of refugees and migrants in integrated risk and threat assessments significantly improves the national and local level risk and threat assessments resulting in better analysis, assessment and preparedness. Hence, more precise operational plans with inclusion of new risk elements for the mentioned territories can be prepared and implemented. With this approach, the Republic of Macedonia is implementing an innovative multi-risk and multi-sector risk and threat assessment.

REFERENCES:

- Crisis Management Centre. (2015). "Information on the activities of the Crisis Management System in relation with the declared crisis situation on the part of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia during period 01.01.2016-31.12.2016". Crisis Management Centre.
- Donchev D. Oncheva S. and Gligorov I. (2002) Refugee Crisis in Macedonia during the Kosovo Conflict in 1999. [Online] Croatian Medical Journal. Available at <http://neuron.mefst.hr/docs/CMJ/issues/2002/43/2/11885045.pdf> [Accessed 12 May 2018].
- Edmond C. (eds.) (2017). The number of displaced people in the world just hit a record high". World Economic Forum. [online] Available at <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/there-are-now-more-refugees-than-the-entire-population-of-the-uk/> [Accessed 10 May 2018].
- Geisler C. and Currens B. (2017). Impediments to inland resettlement under conditions of accelerated Sea level rise. *Land Use Policy*, 66.
- Guadagno L (2016). Human Mobility in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science*. 7: 30.
- Law on Crisis Management (2005, 2011). Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.29/05, 36/11.
- Mitrevska M. (2016). Crisis management. Skopje: Faculty of Philosophy, 154.
- Pauvert B., Twigg J. and Sagramola S.(2017). Major threats, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees: Their inclusion in Disaster Preparedness and Management. Council of Europe: 17.
- Popovski V. and Stefanoski S (2017). "The refugee and migrant crisis in Macedonia associated with disaster risk management". *Security Dialogues*. Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017. Skopje.
- Regulation on the Methodology for Preparation of the Assessment of the Endangerment of the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and threats, its content and structure, modality of storage and update, as well as definition of entities that are receiving whole Assessment or part of it (2011). Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No.13/11.
- 1 UNHCR. (2010). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. [online] Available at <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html> [Accessed 09 May 2018].
- UNHCR. (2017). Figures at Glance. Statistical Yearbooks. [online] Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> [Accessed 10 May 2018]
- UNISDR. (2015). Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction 2015 – 2030. [online] Available at. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf [Accessed 09 May 2018]
- UNISDR. (2009). Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. [online] Available at <https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology#letter-p> [Accessed 09 May 2018].
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.[online] Available at <http://ucdp.uu.se> [Accessed 11 May 2018].

***„SOVREMENA MAKEDONSKA ODBRANA“
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL***

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

International scientific journal ***„SOVREMENA MAKEDONSKA ODBRANA“*** is a theoretical journal published by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia. The magazine regularly comes out twice a year and once a year there is a special issue on a particular topic. The magazine publishes original scientific papers, reviews of books in the field of defence, security and peace, on a national, regional and global level.

The magazine publishes only reviewed and specialized papers: original research papers, accompanying research papers and professional papers and book displays.

If Magazine accepts the paper the authors are not allowed to publish it in other journals.

Papers must not have more than one co-author.

The manuscript should be submitted in electronic form. The pages and appendices should be numbered.

Papers should be written in English, where the paper should have a title, abstract and keywords.

The paper which are not to be printed are returned to the authors with an explanation.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PAPER

The paper should include: title, author, institution, abstract, keywords, introduction, main part, conclusion and reference. The full paper should not exceed 5000 words in English.

Title of the paper - 14 points, Times New Roman, centered. Title of the paper should be short, but give a true reflection of the content and preferably contain as many keywords from the subject matter covered as possible.

One blank line.

Authors name and surname, lower case (Bold), 11 points, Times New Roman, centered.

Two empty rows.

Institution – cursive (Italic), 11 points, Times New Roman, centered.

Two empty rows.

Abstract - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced. The content of the abstract should be an essential and independent entity.

One blank line.

Keywords - maximum 5 words, 11 points, Times New Roman, single spaced.

Introduction - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced. One blank line.

Main Part - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced.

One blank line.

Conclusion - 11 points, Times New Roman, single-spaced. The conclusion should be a brief summary of the paper, and to include research results that occurred.

One blank line.

Reference - 11 points, Times New Roman, cited according to the Harvard style of citation. The cited reference should be given in a separate chapter in the order in which they appear as footnotes in the text. Cite only the bibliographical data used in the text. Cite all types of sources of information - books, specialized magazines, websites, computer software, printed or e-mail correspondence, and even verbal conversation.

Papers that use tables, pictures, drawings, photographs, illustrations, graphs and schemes, should be numbered with Arabic numerals, and the title of the picture should be written underneath. Each image or group of images should be planned in a well structured manner. The images should be sent as separate JPG file with a minimum resolution of 300 dpi. Colour images are printed as black and white.

Format: A4-format, delivered in an electronic form.

Margins

TOP	5 cm	TOP	1.89"
BOTOM	5 cm или Page Setup	BOTOM	1.89"
LEFT	4 cm (inch)	LEFT	1.58"
RIGHT	4 cm	RIGHT	1.58"
		GUTTER	0"

The Editorial Board is obliged to submit the papers to the competent reviewers. The reviewers and authors remain anonymous. The reviewed papers, together with any observations and opinions of the Editorial Board will be submitted to authors. They are obliged, within 15 days, to make the necessary corrections.

The time of publishing the paper, among other things, depends on following this guideline.

Deadlines for submission of papers - 30.03. and 31.10. in the current year

ADDRESS:

1. Prof.Dr. Marina Mitrevska –Editor in Chieve

e-mail: marinamitrevska@yahoo.com

or

2. Ass.prof. Zhanet Ristoska

e-mail: zanet.ristovska @ morm.gov.mk

zanet.ristoska@yahoo.com

or

sovremena@morm.gov.mk

Skopje, 12.04.2018

MAGAZINE EDITORIAL BOARD
„Sovremena makedonska odbrana“

The magazine is published twice a year

www.morm.gov.mk/contemporary-macedonian-defence/

ANA CHUPESKA- STANISHKOVSKA, YORGOS CHRISTIDIS

DRAGAN TRIVAN

ANDREJ ILIEV, JOVAN ILIEV

OLIVERA INJAC

ZLATKO KUZMANOV

MARIJA GJOSHEVA

LAZAR GJUROV, BOJAN MIKLOSH

VALMIR HYLENAJ, ASTRIT HALITI

KRUNOSLAV ANTOLIŠ

NIKOLA MANEV, ELENIOR NIKOLOV

VASKO POPOVSKI, STEVKO STEFANOSKI